JPRS ID: 9120 WEST EUROPE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 85
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= CIA-R~P82-00850R000200090006-4

~ ~ ~ ' ~ E ~ ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
E'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY'
JPRS L/9120
2 June 1980 -
- ~l\/est E v ro e R e~ rt -
p p
c~ouo ~siso) -
~ FB~$ FOREIGN BROAD~AST i~VFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICjAI, i1SE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
NOTE
- .7PRS publications contain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, p~riodicals and books, but also from news agency
tr2nsmissions and broadcasts. riaterials from foreign-language
sources are translated; those fL�om English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enctosed in brackets
[J are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text)
or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
, processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
- mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an _
item originate with the sour~e. Times within items are as
given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
For further inFormation on report conteni:
call (7031 351-?_811 or 3~1-2501 f~re~ce,
Cvprus, Turkeyl. -
.
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OW~IERSHIP OF
MATER7ALS REPRODUCED HEREICI REQUIRE THAT DISSE~IINATION
CF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFIC IAL USE ONI,Y.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
i
FOR CF~'ICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/9120
_ ~ June 1980
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 2 6/ 80 )
CONTENTS
_ T'~EATER NUG'LEAR FORCES
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ~
NATO Negotiating Offer on TNF Weapons Analyzed
- (Lothar Ruehl; EiJR~P~AR(~iIV, 10 Apr 80) 1
FEDERAL I~JPI,iBLIG DP GER2lANY -
Prvblem of Jerification for MBFR Negotiations Analyzed
(Wolf Haef-ele; EUROPA-ARQiIV, 25 Mar 80),,,,,,,,,,,,, 13 -
FRAN CE
'Peace, Disarma~ent' Conference Seen Tool of Soviets
, (Andre Lesueur; VALEURS AC~UELLES, 5 May 80)......... 25
Fiiture of Nation's Deterrent Force Considered
(AIR & COS1~S, 16 Feb 80) 29 -
In-Flight Refuelirg Increases FAS Capabilities
(Jean de Galard; AIR ~ OOSMOS, 16 Feb 80).........,,.. 30
COUNT RY SE CTIOY -
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
- Swiss ~1,rrest ~Yench Customs Agents
- (LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION, 28 Apr 80) 32 ~
- a - [I~I - WE - 150 FOUO)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FRAN CE
~ Gaullist Parallela in Giscardian Doctrine, Reelection
~ Prospects
~ (Michele Cotta; PARADOXES, 31 Mar 80) ~3
Socialist's Pierre Joxe on Possible Presidential Candidacy
(Pierre Joxe Interview; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR,
- 17-23 Mar 80) ....................o.................... 37
Estier on Socialist Ob,jectives, Relations Wfth Other
, Parties
(Claude Estier Interview; PARADOXES, 31 Mar 80)....... 40
PCF Pro-Soviet Strategy in Relations With Socialist Party
(Etienne I~bugeotte; PA.RADOXES, 31 Mar 80) 42
- Debre Projects Inflationary Economic Perf~~rmance Into .
19 80' s -
(Michel Debre; PARADOXES, 31 Mar 8U)...~ 44
Sunmary of Critical TEireshol3s in Economj.c Performance
(PARADOXFS, 31 Mar 80) 50
Cryogenic IYiotor, Second Launch Pad for 'Ariane'
(Pierre Langereux; AIR & COSI~S, 26 Apr SO)..~......,. 53
_ Titanium Sponge Factory CAnseruction Debat~ed
(AIR & OOS2~S, 12 .4pr 80) ......................o....... 60
_ Briefs
Military Propaganda Broadcast 63
: SDECE Grumbling 63
_ PCF Report 63
- ITALY '
Ever Increasing Role of Coal as Energy Source
_ (Paolo Massacci; ENERGIA E MATERIE PRIME,
Jan-Feb 80) ..........................................0 64
SPAIN
griefs
' 'MUNDO OBRERO' May Close 69
Soviet Visit 69
- b -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR nFFICT~IL IJSE nNLY
SWE DEN -
Industry (~iefs Polled on Falldin Governr~ent After
Nuclear Vote
( VEC?~ANS AFFARER, 27 Mar 80) . . . . . . . . z . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . 70
- Inflationary Spiral Begins To Reduce Busin~ss Optimism
( VE (;IC.ANS AFFARE R, 2 7 Mar E~0 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . o . . . . . . 76
- c -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
~
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
THP~ATER I~UCLEAR FORCES INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
NATO NEGUTIATING ~FF'ER ON TNF KF,A.YONS ANALYZED
_ 9onn EUROPA-ARCHIV in Ger~an 10 Apr 80 pp 215-226 "
~Article by Dr Lothar Ruehl~ BrusseYs correspo~ndent for Second German
Te~evisionr "NATO Negotiating Offer to Soviet Union Searah for a
_ R.alsnce in 'E~rostrategic Weagons'] _
~
~ex~ In conjunction ~rith ita resolution on introducing intermedtat~-
range nuclear ueapons sy~te~s in Western Etitrope,l NATO (the Atla.ntic de-
fense alllance, excluding F~anc~) aleo decided in Dece,ber 1979 pn a
negotiating offer to the Soviet Union.2 The United States Mas c:om~seiun-
ed (or eapoHered) to conduct negot~atioiia concerning mutual limitations on _
_ U.S. anci Soviet nucle~r Keapons of a. longer~ "continental" rang~s (long-
range theater nuclear forcea ~ LRTNF). It ~aas the intention of the gov-
ernments involved thst theae "peripheral" xeapons systema be negotiated -
frithin the framexork of the SALT talks, xhtch~ it xas hoped at this time~ -
xouid be ~ontinued soon ~fter ratification of the second SALT t,re~tx by
- the UoS. Sena~e.
It Maa an open secret that this offer to negotiate xas connected xith the
- serious ob~ectior~ that h~d a4ri8en in som~ countriea of the alliance to
introduction cf the nex internediate-range systema. At the inaistenc~ ~f
sooe alliance partners, the yeara that it xould take~ for the neW ay$tems
to becoae operational xere to be uaed to try to srrive at an underst~nd- -
ing ~rith the Soviet Union on mutual restrlctiona in the area betxaen the
"tactical" snd the intercontinent~l xeapons systens. Thus, "'theater
nuclear forces" ~N] Mere to be dra~n into the SALT grocess for the first
_ tiae TNF meaning wespons systems covering targets in the ~ropean
theater of xar.
On the Scope of the Negotiating Offer
The NATO offer rras initially limited ~o Zand based inteaaediate-range
nuclear ballistic xeaFons for theater use by the United St.at~s and the
Soviat Union. Par~.ty Kas equated with the "p~inciple of eq,uallty betxeen .
both sidea," as it says in ~he coamunique (Section 9 d) d~ted, 12 December
1979. The text further describes this principle as "equal7ity of both the
~ 1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ~NLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
upper 2lmits ~s ~ell as the rights" of both sides. On the other hand~
there is no mention of the actual objects of negotiation the targetable
rreapons. Although the NATO partnere are seeY.ing appro~eimate pa.ritv in nu-
clear warheads on intermediate-range offensive xe~pons~ or,1y "miesiles"
and �'sys~ems" ar~ mentioned in the text. -
This omission deserves mention in vieW of the grevious hietory of the offer =
~ritY~in the alliance and in light of the fact that the modern Soviet SS-20 =
intermediate-range ~nissiles carry three independently targeted warheads. -
It is all the more notexorthy since the same commur.ique exprreasly comments ~
on th~ multiple Warheads of the SS-20 missiles a.nd~ moreover, atreases
that all 572 missile systems that are to be brought in to modernize NATO'~s
LR'I'NF !n Europ~ xill be "equipped xith only one xarhead." The communique
furthermore links "the 5?2 LRTNP' xarheads" directly ~ith tha announced -
withdraxa~l of 1,000 nuclear Karheada from U.S. depots in Europe~ so the
modernization would "not increaae the importance of nuclear Weapons for
NATO." Until shortly before publication of the 12 December communic~ue,
= NATO officials in Brussels And high-ranking allied officera had relate~d
arms control parity to the number of targetable xarheads on land -based -
missile systems.i they said that NATO cou13 diapense Kith adoption of the
572 planned intera?ediate-range uiseilas only if all Soviet intermediate-
- range miesiles (SS~'s~ SS-5's, SS-20's) 2;AT0 estimated the number to
' be about 700 at the end of 1979 xere catal.oged and at lea8t all SS-20
- ~yatems we:e dismantled. This xould be the precor,dition for a"zero de-
ploymen`c , "
The corununique gr~eents as an "immediate goa~" of the proffered negotia,- -
" tion an agreement on limiting the number of U.S. sulci Soviet land -based
misails systems in SALT III. It ~entions an "overall" nuclear "balance"
(Section 9}, a"spectrum of the nuclear reaa~ione available to the alli-
ance" (Section and the goal of a"mora st~.b~e milita~ry ratio of forc9s
betxeen East a~i West" (Section 8). The ambiguity and vaguenesa of these -
phrasea point to a negoti~ting ob~ective that xas not axpreesly stated in
- the communique or, 12 Decembert an overall str~tegic parity between the
nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and thoae of the North Atlantic Alli-
- ance. An "across-the-board" parity such as this, NY.~.ich Wnuld include all
_ intercontinental, continental and other long-rAnge and interm9diate-rarige
systems xith nuclear capa.bilities~ xould even out the digpariti~s tha.t
exiat on both sides in indivldual sectors ~r at various levels because of
the different tschnologies and u~aed forces' atructures.
Accordinglye the "equality of upper ~.i_~i.~s nnd of rights" called for in a
supplementaxy nuclear arma control agr�~em~r~t migh~ very xell refer not
only to tho land-baseci misaile systems c;~ the United States a.r~d. the Soviet -
Uni.on in the LRTNF spher.ei on the contrary, it r~ight refer to a?11 offans- ~
7.ve nuclear xeapons syst~s in this range category~ land- and sea-based
missiles as Hell as aircraft in other ~rords, to Keapons eystems th~.t
~ initially were not suppc~ed to be mad~ objecta of the proffered negotia-
tion. Should thia logical conciusion provs true~ the real ob~ective of -
2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFI'ICxAL USE ONLY
the NATO partners rroulcl be reve~led as a limiting of the Soviet offensive
potential of the SS-20 ~,rd the Backfire bomber at the price of an ovE~rall
limitatioa on Western nuclear Weapons. To put it snother Way~ the~ NATO
p~-tnera would be ueing the SS-2Q u~ci Lackfire ae a reaaQn for reviaing
_ their longetanding poaition on ke~ping peM phersl nuclear xeaporu fYee of
arme liQitations. As a result~ the Soviat Union ~ight achieve the SALT
- goal it ha.s been purauing since 1969~ Khich ie that of including in SALT
- limitations aIl Zelivery systema for nuclear H~apons capsble of attacking
_ Soviet territory froa~ any geographical launch sites xhstsoever. Leonid
Brezhnev's offer dating f~om 6 October 19'I9 c~n alao be ur~derstood in this
- context, It is theref~re interesting that an 12 Dacember the NATO partners
responded to the Brezhnev speech in East ~erlin3 xith tho rather pc>sitive
- -sounding ~udgment that the Soviet party and govern~ent chief had express-
ed a'~ril?ingneas" in this regard (cf Section 9 of the co~aun~lqus).4 This
- simgle term, one that requires explanation, refers in the text to the pre-
ceding ata~~em~nt that "th~ disquie+,ing exp4nsion of the Soviet LRTNF po -
tential" makes it necessary to li~it co~esponding U.S. an3 Soviet ar~as~
aith the aim of establishing " a n~ore st~ble overall balance at loxer
- ievels of nuclear x~pons" better tranalation xould ~e: "ov$rall nu-
_ clear balance...").
Differing C~ncegtion$ ~f Balanee
Aside from the element of a~rillingnesa to nogutiat~ on intermediate-range
nuclear xeapons, Bre~hnev'a theseis dating froa~ 6 October 1979 vi~xa
_ Which ha confirmed a n~onth late~ in an interviex xi Moecow's PRAVDA
_ receiv~d anything but a positive assessment xithin NATO, and esp~cially
in Kashington. On the contrary~ criticized as an evasion of the prc~blem
at hand c~nnd as polit3cal deception xas Brezhnev's remark tha,t his got~ern-
ment xas xilling "to re3uce i.n comFarison to present lev~ls the number of
intermediate-range nucle~r Weapons vehicles poaitioned in the xestern
regiona of the Soviet Union" if "no additional inteanediate-range nucle~rr
Keapona vehiclea" xere "positi~:ied in Western ~rope."~ The U,S, NATQ
- delegation had pacesented a detailed re3eetion of Brezhnev's intarp~etation
of the forces ratio and of Soviet deployaent policy in this sector. One
_ of the Qain points of the U.S. ~critici8~i concerned. Bre~hnea`s sasking of
the SS-20 and the faat that the Soviet head of state ha~d spoken only of
delivery system~e not targetable xeaponsa he had ~thus canc~led 'ihe in-
cro~se in the frumber of these kea~ans result~n~ froa? the tripl.e xarhead
systems of the SS-20. The U.S. ex~egesis of the Brezhnsv sg~ec~ had al~o
acaentuated the element of the threat to western F~irop+s.
_ The aimilar absence of any mention of nuclear rora~heada in the negotiating
ofFer of the NdTO peu-tners could only ~ean tha~ ~ey Nere going to ~~et
their negotiating opponemta on their oWn gr~und right in the p~epe,ratory
phase leading up to negoi~iati4n8. Indeed~ Bre~hne~v had ~ain#ained on
6 October that "in the laat 10 years. the number of inter~nsdi.ate-range
nuclear xeapons vehicles in the Eur~pe~n part a#' the Sovie#. Union has not
been increased by a single missile, by a single ai~pl,ana, " a.rid that, "on
3
FOR OFFICIAI.. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL (iSE 0~1LY
tna contrar~, the number of launch pads for interaediate-range missiles as
well as the :~ize of the nuclear payloads of thesa missilas has even de -
crea,sed somexhat." ~e also said that the number of inedium-range bombers
had been "red~~ced" and, iir~ally, that the 5oviet Union did not etation
= such ~eapon~ on the territory of other states. In the f~ce of thie line of
~ argument, iz was deemed necessary to establish as the basis of ttie Western
negotiating offer the actual criteria for the changes that had occurred in
= the ra';io of forces (which was already marked by va~t Sovlet superiority
even before ~he SS-20 and the Backfire bomber xere introduced). Thi: haci
also been plarined in 3russels.
_ ~~eve;-theless, the tactical lessons learned from the 3ALT and MBFR negotia-
tions made it appear advantageous not to make any Frecise offer on speci -
fic points, so as not to provide the So~viet Union xith opportuniti~s for
concentrated pressur.e on the Western negotiating position or for tactical
maneuvers even before th~ negotiations had begun. A premature selection
_ b~ the West of s cific n~gotiating points like GLCM's ~ground-launched
_ cruise misalle~n3 ~SRBM'~ ~edium-range ballistic m~~sile] ?ras to be
_ avoided, ospecially slnce the offer of the NATO partners xho thus
- appeared as the petitioner but xho still had no xeapons of this kind ready
for deployrnent in E~rope at the time of the offer had to bring up to
- date the entire FBS (FB~ = fo~ward based systems~ or forxard-bascd systems
cagable of reaching Soviet territory) concept for SALT IIi. The United
S~ta~es h~.d alrea.dy reserved the right to diplomatic fYeedom of action with
referenca to land based medium-range nuclear-capable bombers because the
So~riet Union had refused in SALT II to include as "strategic systems" ir.
the SALT arms limitations its oKn combat aircraft of tr~is category (with
a maritime arul a masginal ir.tercontinental ogerational range} the
_ 'Pu-2?_ M(Backfire) a,n~'i because 240 of these aircraft could be deployed
by the end of 1985. On the other hand~ the Vienna SALT II Treaty h~s
already defined cruise missiles as belonging to the category of keapons
dalivery systems, regardless of whether they are armed xith nuclear or
conventional xeapons. This asymmetry in the original poeit~on for SALT III
reaulting from SALT II dictates that the main Western negotiators be ea-
- pecially cautious a.s does the entire F'BS aoncept in general. 'Phe same
is true for aIl sea-based interaiediate-range systems, eBpecially since
neither Great ~rltain nor France 's placing its SLF3M ~ea-launched ballis-
_ 'cic missil] systerns or miasile submarines at the dis~osal of the negotia-
~ tions; these syatems and vessels are their strategic rreapons for purposes
� of n~.tional deterrence (the deterrent effect in both cases is ninimal
~ince ths number of targetable weapons is limited). All the same, the
- ~ros pective conversion of both the Britiah ar~i F~ench 3LBM's to MIRV
~ ~ultlple indepandently targeted reentry vehicl] xeap~ne xill chazzge tha
numbers in the East-idest ratio. A$ far as the Eastern $ide of the equation
is concerned~ groxth of "short-range ayatens" for Soviet air and missile
forces in ~.l.irope has to be expected in the foreseeable future in terms of
both numbers and range.
4
FOR Of~FICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4
FOIZ OFFICIAL LiSE ONLY
It remains to be seen xhat effects the calculatior, of the allies to put off
naming the actual poin~s of negotiation xill have. Queations of diplomatic ~
tactica find their ansxers in the results of diplomacy. Tr,e first concrete
- negotiating offer on intermediate-range nuclear weapons is closely tailored
to the priority need of the idest to halt the groxth of S3 -2G deployment.
In order to advance tox~rci thia goal NATO has left opsn the broader field, _
thus preserving some leexay loeway for a pdrlty agreement co~vering
_ launch syatems. for example. There ia sufficient rooa for compromise be-
txeen the txo extremea an ~qual numbar of xarheads for land based ball-
. istic Wea,pons or an equal numbar of lau.nch systems for all internediate-
. range offensive xeapons. All the sam~, xith th~ir open negotiating offer
for mutually o~'fsetting intermediate-range offe:~sive systems~ the NATO =
- gartners have een'tured upon da.ngeroua ground in this respect a,s kell~ as =
has already been signaled by the publ'_c controversy in the West on the
- roal ratio of forcea in the "gray zone" of the intermediate-range s~here.
- It may be all the more dtfficult to ~rxive at an underatnnding rrith the Y
Soviet Union on mutunlly acceptable and applic~ble definitions for desig- `
nating "intermediate-range systems" for an arma control s~reemen~, since
substantial porticane of $he nuclear forces af both Sides can be counted
ar,~ong the "central" strategic forcea a.a Kell as the "peripheral" or -
"regianxl,'� depending on Khere they are atationed and xhat their mission
~:s a~ a p?rticular time. An example of this i~ the ~mbivalent case of
the U.S. Poseidon SLBM in the NATO Eliropean Com~ar~d sector (~+0 missiles
xith 400 xarheads on 5 submarinea in ~~rhich~ moreover, an ~.itional 40
- Poseidona carrying 400 xarheads are mounted for operations in accordance _
xith the centrsl U.S. SIOP target plan). The NATO pe?rtners exclude from
their ea7.culation of the "continental" intermediate-rango f"orces ratio
arid from their ;~egoti~ting offer these 40 SLBM's and their 400 war-
= heads xhich ar~a designated fcr a~aropean thea,ter of xar. They exclude
them because their avaflability is only relative and becawse they axe al- -
ready co~ered by SALTi they ara counted in the acroas-the boazd parity of
- SALT ~I. But how shou~d thelr number be reckoned and valuated later in
_ an "averall gtrategic ratio of forces" uith refarencg t~ the European
intermr+iis~te-range sphere?
The tactical nuelear fighters on U.S. aircrAf~ carriers p~esent a differ- �
- ent ca,lculation problem for "~xlanced" agreements. Their s~vailability de-
pende upon the ~oBition of �rh~ir. carriera xith respect to the Sovl.et
i;nion, visibility, the xeather and the operational situation s~t sea. AlI -
= these f,sc:tors are sub~ect to change. Hatr could they be fixed for a long-
_ term arms control ~greement? The NATO p~-rtners excluc~ed these aircraft
frc~m their 1979 ~ffer for ihe first phase of negotiations, but from the
- beginning of the SALT groc$ss in l969 the Soviet Un3.on he~s been demanding
' their i nclusion in SI?.LT lin?itations as FBS's. And there is no r~ason to
- assume that t;~e So~riP~s xill give up this p~eviously rejected SALT demand
ar~d then agree to ne~otiate on their oMn land -based mediua-rangs combat =
_ aircraft like the Tu-22 M(&rckfire) bomber and naval pe~trol aircraft.
5 �
FOR OI~FICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4
- FOR OFFTCTAL (TSE ~Ni,Y
- ~~ATG's idea o' a~antin; initiaily to negotiate ~nly on land-based longer-
or "interiaedir.te"-range b~llistic xeapons is tailored to the needs of the
W~st. Since ~h~ East has clear superiority in this tightly drawn sector
in xhich tne forces ratio is ea~sy to detern~ine~ and 8:nc~~ r~oreover~
hATO's LRTNF inalernization program calls for only theee weapons systems~
' a quid pro qt~~ presanis itaelf~ Un the ba.sis of app~oximately 700 Soviet
launch systems ~'or intermediate-range missiles compared to only 18 for the
West in F~ance, approximate garity can be zchieved as a negotia,ting result
x~th the aid of ?JATO's armament option set at ~ maximum of 572 targetable
- ~reapons; ~his could be done, for example~ by restricting the number of `
SS-20 launch systema in the entire Soviet Union and by dismantling the ~
S3-4's ard SS-5's. A total of 150 SS-20 missiles carry 450 ro~a~rheuds.
Gv~n if all 590 of the SS-4's and SS-~'s xere to be xifhdraxn so far from
- the western region of the Soviet Union that they could no longer reach
~ Western ~urope, an arms control agreeraent rrith this pa.rity level for tar-
getable weapons 450 to 500 Would still have to ensure that each
SS-20 launch systam in the Soviet Union xould be equipped xith only a
single missile and that tre capability for reloading xith up to four
missil~s ~ould not be used in operztional deployment.
U.S. reconna;.asance findings and estimates for the further deployment of
lriterraediai.e-range systems in the Soviet Union in the next 3 yezra up to `
19?3 assums tiia.~ the number of xe~pons (targetable xarheads) r~ill double -
from the pxvsent lev~l of about 1,400 to more than 3,000. ;,iro~+-th of the
_ SS-20 ~s figurEd into the accounting as the principal factor in the in- -
crease, According to U.S. observationa at the end af 15~79, 23 poai�ions
fo~ 69 SS-20 launch systems xe:e either ready for uge or under cona~ruc-
tion; deduced from this xas ~he deployment of up to 207 SS-20 misailes for
1980 and 1982. Western estimate8 re~ve~l. Lhat about 50 SS-20 la~~nch sys- ~
~ems erill have been added per year up to 1983, thus amounting ta between -
_ 180 and 225 launch syatems by the beginning of 1983. This means the Weat
.rould ha~~e tfl reckon xith up to 675 missiles, each xith three ~arheada
y oi more than 1,800 SS-20 k8rheads.
~
~ This assumption offers an example of the axgument being presented inside
- :~ATO aFainst a~a,rity goal for arms limitation in the intermediate range
as an end in itself. Since, hoWever, the figure of 572 NATO intermediate-
range xeapons 3n r~urope ~ril.~ on the one h~nd not be incra~,sed~ but on the
other hand is also not to be aubs~tarat~ally reduced, NATO diplomacy offera
no broad range of poasibilities unle~~ the Soviet Union limit~ SS-20 de- -
- ployment to its preaent leval ~r evAn reducea it. ~
Def~nition and Verification Problems
- The NATO partners have indicated9 that a xithdraxal of SS-20's from the
c.,uropean region of' the Saviet Union would not suffice~ because thair range
of 4,600 km or more xith three xarheada xould atill make it possible to
hi't most af Western Et:rnge even from a geogra?phical line running betHeen
P~'c.ropavlovsk and Tashkent. The mobility on land and the preaumed mid-~air
6
~ ~OR OFFICIAL JSE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4
r
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY'
l~ading ca~bility of the launch systea?s r~r~d their missiles make it more
difficult to monitar observance of an agree~ent. The uncertainties evi- ~
dent in the evsluatlon of U.S. aatellite reconnaissanGe findings an the
respective deployment levels of the SS-20 potantial in the Soviet Union
_ sjnc~ 1977 point up tha riak of baaf ng evaluations on nonverifiable aussump-
- tions about the SS-20 and of agrCeing to nonverifia.ble limitations.
It is thia very risk that pr.ompts a further negotiating dimension for an
arms control agreemezt. Yet. a furt her dimension stould include the real
- gray zone oP ambivalent xeapons systenA of vari~ble range~ armament and -
deployments in other xords~ it xould complicate agreement on srms control
� and make the parity agreed upon in the loxer distance range vulnerable to
- changes, and additional idantification problema, together xith definition
~ prc~blems, xould make verification very difficult. On the other hand, ex-
clusion of this critical aector leading to longer-ru;ge tactical xeapons
_ systee~s xould mean that~ on the basis of the existing and unchangea.ble
geogra.phic asymmetry in ~l.irope, annamenta in this part of the spec~~rum
Hould remain free of arma control to the advantage of the Soviet Union. '
~n example~ All Soviet tactical attack aircraft placed in service since
1970 have a maximun, penetratidn range of 900 3an or nore. According to the _
- iatest NATO information, the Su-19's (Fencers) are capable of flyi~g -
apgroximately 1,000-~ attack nissiona carrying nuclear xeapons and of re-
turnin~ to base nonstop. Kox xould these aircraft be classified ? In the
xestern part of tt-,e ~oviet Union xould they be considez~ed LRTNF systems as
dsfined by NATO? And hox high wo~.tld one rate the e111tary threat to
= Western ~rog~ g~nerated b thea in the ~asse of an ~ction radius of up to
- 300 km r~est of the ~arsa~ Pact border? The significance of the depth of
_ penetration of the ~,i-22 M bomber (Backfire) to the more remote territory
of '~le~tern ~rope (up to 3,500 km) illustrates the si~nificance to the
. Federal Republic of the much shorter-range Fencer in the xeatern pe~rt of �
the Soviet Union (Fencers are also deployed in Poland ar~d Czechoslovakia).
Should there be a zone free of a.-: effective military nuclear ~hreat
etretching aa far as the Rhine? If not. xhat price is th~a West contea~plat-
ing as a concession for its inclusion ;rithin arms control boundaries?
This same question must be asked xith reference to the Soviet "short-range
missiles" in Eastern Eti.irope. ~'he 3S-21 and SS-24 systems are groxing into
the ra;,ges of the old Pershing nisaile (up to 750 km). Western ~rope
and garticularly the Federal Republic, as a deployment area for Allied -
forces in Central Europe along xith its 148 Pershing II systems and 96
cruise ~issiles called for in the NATO program beginning in 1983, rrill
_ come xithin the operational range of these xeapons by 1985 acbd be thr~saten- -
ec~ by targetable nuclear keapons that do not belong to the "intermediate
range." -
Th@ definition of this range ac~ording to the effective range of aissiles
, carrying targetable weapons~ and according to the operational depth of
penetration of nucl~ar-cagable fighter aircra?ft, pos~s considerable
- difficulty. Although under the terms of SALT II it can be limited to
7
FOR OFFICrAT. USE ~N1.Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4
ror: c~t~ Ftc ~ nr, i~sr: c~tvt,Y -
, b~tueen i,00G and 50500 km the loxer li*~it for land-b~ed intercontin- -
ontal missiles and intercontinental bombers the lower limit of 1,000 km .
- i~ questionable. Thc language of NATO communiques has come up with no
solution to the problem to date. Even the term "long-rang~" ~n Englis~
_ is a gray-zone symbol. A translation as "long-range" xeapons xould be
misleaciing in rslation to the "intermediate-range" systems. Theee~ in
- 'turno r~re so called in relation to intercontinental Keapons. The NATO
plan fo~ LRTNF inalerniza.tion calls for ranges of 1~800 km for Pershing TI
syetems and 2~500 km for GLC'rI systems. The range of the Soviet SS-20 !.s
betx~en 4~000 and 5,000 km. The first Polaris missiles. ~rhich were al.,o
pl~.nn~d for ground launching from silos in Europe as "inte~ediaie-range
~~eapons," xere capable of flying betrreen 2,000 and 2,500 km. The modern
_ Palaris -A-3 and Poseidon SLBM's, based in British missile submarines or in
= U.S. missile submarines assigned to E~rope for SACEUR duty, ha.ve ranges of
- bet,rreen 4,OD0 and 5~000 lan. The maximum comba.t penetration range of Back- ~
fire bombers without aerial refueling is proba.~ly 3,500 km, but they can -
, also be equipped for such reflaeling. The range of the 78 Soviet SLBM's _
- which a.re stationed on diese2 vessels~ and xhich are not covered by SALT
(SS-td-4'g and SS-N-S's), is betKeen 600 and 1,200 km; thf~ is Nith xar- ,
heads that each carry betrreen 1 and 2 megatons of explosive poKer, The
Soviet 59-12 ground-to~-ground teissiles, deployed since 1969, have a range
of about 800 km, and the Soviet SS-N-3 cruise missiles designed for launch-
ing from shi.ps a~nd land (about 400 have been deployed) have a 7S0-km range
(and. therEfore should actually fall under the SALT II ba~n by the ~nd. of _
1981 if the Vienna treaty goes into effect).10 The Fencer's depth of pen-
~tr~tion up to 1~000 }an ia at the generally accepted loxer level for
"intermediate-range Weapons." NATO, for example~ does not count as "inter- -
mediate-range xea.pons" either the SS-N-3, the SS-N-4, the PershingI or the
~ F-'c Phantom tactical fighter, xhich has a combat penetration range of leas =
than 1~000 km for nucleax missions. _
= Since NATO itaelf hea established no binding criteria for determining
"l~ng-range thea'cer nuclear force" ~eapnns systems, and official U.S. term -
= inolog~ drawe no clear di~stinctiong betxeen "long range~" 'Saedium range"
_ a.nd "intermediate Pange~" the classification of xeapona frith euch extreme
r~.nge diaparities as 1~000 km ancL more than 3,000 km remains arbitrary.
- This conceptual gap is the ob~ective reason xhy no agx~eea~ent has been
reached in the calculation of ferce ratios and operstional relations in
_ this arms sphere. It favors the Soviet viex of tha situation~ xhich resta
- on the theais that a military "balance of forcea" exists in Europe bet~eeen -
- ;Ip.TO and the Warsaw Pact~ and that consequently NATO's nuclear moderniza- -
- tion program xould disrupt this balance and "f~ndamenta.lly change the
strate ic aituation on the continent" (Brezhnev on 6 October in East
Barlin~.~Z
~ Real Numerical Ratio and Operational Options
~ :n reality~ at ranges above 900 km and up to 1,000 km there is no ascer-
' t~.inable "balance of forces" in Europe in terms of numb~rs or operational
8
; FOR OFFICIAL USG ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
r~~r~ r rc: i nt, usi~: ~~~r~.v
- optiona (quite aside from the f~ct that 70 pe=cent of the rreapons in
NATO's "~heater nucleAr Meapons" TNF systems a.rsenal have rangea of
less than 170 isa). In mid-19?9~ NATO axrived at an official (although in-
ternal) numerical ratio bet~?een the roughly comp~,rable "LRTNF" eystems~
- approximately 590 NATO LRTNF delivery systems xith about 1.260 Karheads
compared to 1,400 for the Sovi~t Union, xith about 2~440 xarheads. And
thiv balance sheet definitely preeanted an optimistic picture slanted
toxstd the dlestern si~e, eince it contained the 40 U.S. Poseidon SLBM's
Kith th~ir 400 xarheads, the 64 Polaris A-3 SLBM'a xith 192 i+arheads on
Brit~sh sub~arines and the 80 SLBM's irith an equal number of x~xhead~ on
- F`rench submarines in other xozds~ 184 missiles carrying 672 xarheads~
H~pona xhich NAZ'0 cl~ssifies aa "strategic" xeapons aystsma and xhose
- opposite nunbers in the E~ast xere not included in the accounting~ even
though they are also capable of striking targsts in Western Europe. Also -
omitted fros the count Kas that portion of the 638 variable-range Soviet
SS-11 ICBM's stfll deployed as of the middle of 1979t these missiles might
ba aimed at targeta in Hestern Eti.iroge. _
_ After subtraction of the SLBM's on submarines, about 400 delivery eystems
reraain on the l~estern s~de of the balance sheet (including the appro~cimate-
ly 35 ~~:irage IY bomber8 azid 18 grourui-to-~gro~u~d IRBM �s belonging to the
F~ench~ as xell as the 50 obsolete British Vulcan bo~ubers). On7.y about
150 U.S. F-ill A~E medium-range fighters in Great Britain c~x be consider-
: ed genuine LRTNF systems for "continental" distances on m~ropean scale.
- FScom ogera.tional stsuidpoints, there are serious reservations about the re-
~aining 250 delivery syst~ms (combat range~ ability to penetra,te air de-
fensea, load capacityo operational epeed and so forth). By 198$~ the
- SQ Yulcans and ~pproximately 3,5 remaining Mirage IV': ~ri71 ha.ve been r~-
lieved of their responsibil~.ty for nuclear atrikes ag~?inst Soviet terri-
= tory. The other 160 to 170 LRTNF delivery systems are composed of tacti-
cal nuclear fightera based on land ard on U.S. si.rcra.ft carriers in the -
- eastern Mediterranean. To be sure~ this figure only represents an order of
magnitude that is easily changed~ for at leaat tha ca.rrier aircraft of the
U.S. 6th Fleet are not on constsnt alert statue xith regard to the Soviet
Union~ an!t not ~1.1 of thea arA available at all tim~ for nuclear attaak
' ansignments. Moreover~ the penetiration range of F-4 Phant.o~n fighter-
bombers (on a xeapone-carrying miasion against air defensea ) vis-a-vi,s _
the Soviet Uriion is marginal in flights launched f~om ':~es~ European bases. _
_ Excluding the Western SLBM's~ ~.he Sovi~t Union's LRTNF superiority Qver
NATO in E~.iroge amounts ta 1,400 to about 400 or a ratio of 3.5 to 1.
, M esadntial factor, hoxever~ is the aifferenca i.n the attack capacities
_ involved. The Soviet potential has been u~graded substantially by the -
_ SS-20 and 7`u-22 M(Bacicfire), The increase i:n ranges~ strike capability~ -
_ bomb load and t.~.rget precision and the aobility of SS-20 launch systems `
_ and the e~ultiple attack technology are creating nex options. A general.ly
more mobile ard oger~ti~nally ~ore flexi.ble potential is being developed. -
= Thi~ op~ns up the prospect o~' a fundamental change in the strategic situa- -
tion on the continent in favor of the Soviet Union. EWen more than the =
9
FOR OI'FICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
rc~ii urrrcini, n~;i~; c~rvt,v ~
r.umerical di.sparity in the LRTNF ratio of forces a disparity that has
indeed exis~ed for about 15 years it 3s this dynamic change in the pro-
portion betHeen opera�tional optione to the advantage of the East and
- thus of the conriitions of military security and effective deterrencg in a
- crisis which has induced the NATO partners to act ~fter long hesitation.
Uncort~in Negotiation ~'rospects
Tho NATO negotiating offer did not represent a direct response to
Brezhnev�a East Berlin apeech. Ths invitation to negotiate on interm~~liate
-range caeapons contra~ined in this speech xa8 ad.~udged ta be ~aore of an
attempt to rrard off the ia~pending NATO resolution on adopting such systems.
Nevertheless~ those in the circle of Wester:i alliance members xho backed
the offer to negotiate Were encouraged by Brezhnev's remaxk that under
certain circumstances thg Soviet Union rrould be xilling to limit its inter-
mediate~range potential in Europe. The NATO partners had first expected
~nticing offers from the Warsarr Pact and then stronger preasure~ but ul�i-
ma~ely they had looked for a resigned attitude in Eastern Europe. The NATO
partners ciid not take seriously the ~minous warnings for inatance~ from _
Andrey Grom~~ko during his visit in Bonn and later at the~ conference of -
Warsax Pact foreign ministers in Ea,st Berlin12 to the effect that
NATO's planned resolution on moderniziz~g its defenses would "destroy the
liases for the proffereci negotiations." Though they xere not convinced of
th~ Sovi~et Union's f~iture xillingnesa to negotiate, they xere quite cer-
tain of Soviet interevt in continuing the ~a ocess of East-West detente ir.
~arope and in the expansion of CSCE agreements on security. A Soviet in-
ter.est ir~ SALT was also assumed~ and this xould make negotiations along
the linea of the NATO offer unavoidable.
The effec~ of the Brussels resolutions in December 1979 on th~ negotiating
situation concerning mutual troop reductions in Gentral ~.trope (MBFR) is
also pertinent in this regard. The announced kithdraWal of 1,000 nuclear
warheads frc~m U.S, depots (a.bout 4,000 of the appsoxia?ately ~0000 Kexheads
in Etirope as a whole are lc~cated in depots in Central Europe) and the re-
solved "modernization" of the Pershing-A-I on the basis of the replacement -
of all 148 systems with Pershing II's in effect ta.ke care of the special -
offer made by the NATO partners for MBFR in Vienna in December 19'J5i On
. the one hand, the Sov~.et Union has announced ~ ~rithdraxal fxom Gexmany
(and Central E~.irope) of 1,000 ba,ttle tanks ari3 20,000 men by October 1980
- tirithout making it an ob,ject o.f MBFR negotiations in Vienna. On the othex
hand, the Western participanta had been demanding eince the erui of 197,5
the xithdraxal of 1~700 Soviet battle ta.nks and 68~000 men~ in five divie-
ions, as p�~econdition for the xithdraxa]. of 1,000 U.S. nuelear weapons
_ and 90 delivery aystems.
Out of these 90 systems F-4 Phantom nuclear fi hters and 36 "Persh-
ing launch systema" (tirithout technical spec~fia~tion~ only the 54 F-4's
have been at the dieposal of the Vienna 1~FR negotiations since December
1979� 'I'hus, both sides he.ve carrieri out the greater part of the iq?5
10
FOR UFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
y FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
compromise proposal~ and they have done it outside the MBFR frametrork. The
fonaal separation of the NATO negotiating offer da.ting from December 1979 -
froe? the aupplementary nuclear offer e+ade in Ueceraber 19?5 changes nothing
in this regard. If the Soviet Union is interested in A reduction and re-
aidual limitation of the nup?ber of U.S. Li~'TNF in ~,tmpe~ it muat either
?aake substantial MBFR conceaeions in Vienn~ or negotiate on the Decenber
1979 offer of intez~ediate-range arms lioltations.
FLrthermore~ the depreca.tory xord f`rom Moscox which xae announc~d in -
Nashington during the first xeek in January ia baing interpreted in
Brussels more as a response to President Carter's ad3ourrvnent of the SALT
II ratification process in the U.S. 3enate than as Moscox's final wozd.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had to disrupt all Sast ~1est rele~tions
- at least for a time~ ~uet aus these relAtiona h~d been te~porarily disrupt-
ed by the occupat~on of C~echoelovakia in Augvat 1968. Ttie NATO partners
have logically been holding open their negotiating offer in line frith
tt~eir intentions. In the first quarter of 1980 it xas Btill an open ques-
tion as to xhether their defense modernization progz~m xould ultimately
be accelerated, delayed or not affected at all by the crises in the Middle
Eaat. In any event, Andrey Gro~yko's apeech on 18 February 1q80 at ~n -
election rally in iialiningrad F~yon~ Moscox Oblast, revealed an interest
on the part of the Soviet Union in continuing "all negotiationa that have
been initiated" in the a.rea of arma li~itationo13 Although this statement
did exclude once again the negotiationa on interaediate-range ay~tems p~o-
_ pased by NATO~ hope remalned that in the longer run the 3ov~let government
= might be r?illing to come to terns in this area as xell. According to :
~ NATO's declaxed expectations f~om December 1979~ 1980 xas to be a big year
f~.;x anea-control and security negotiatioaus.14
Eastern coma~entaries since the brusque Soviet re~ection of the U.S. nego-
_ tiating offer in Jinuary 1980 permit the conclusion that a nex diplonatic
- position for the futurs is being laid out in Moacox. The auggestion that
failure to implement NATO's defense modernization xould be sufficient in-
cer~tive for negotiatione on intez~ediate-rangs Keapona offers the Soviat
_ Union a way out of ite aelf-constructed dilenma. in this matter (up to that
point MoacoW h~d denanded car?cell~tion of the NATO resolution as a precon-
dition for any negotiation). Since the fall of 19?9, the NATO pa,rtnars
have referred publicly in numerous governaent 8tateQents and diplomatic
interpretations of their intentions to the technical tise limit of at
leaat 3 yeus before the atart of initial deployment in the third quarter
of 1983, as sts~ted in the plar~ dating from Deceaber 19')'9. The mora r.e-
cent co~entariea psrnit one to conclude tt~t this pariod night be used
just as the NATO offer for negotlations intended. The Soviet governnent
can estina,~e the appacoxiAate political "point of no return" p~ior to the
atart of deployments It lies betxeen December 1981 (expi~stion of ~he
~ 2 year tiae liait for the deciaion on stationing in the Netherlanda and
expiration of the LRCM ~ong-range cruise misail~ deploy~ent ban under
t he terns o f the Yienna SALT II agreement) and tia~ fa11 of
1982 (deadline
- for p~ep~aration of the U.S. military budget for fisr.al. year 1984, Hhich
11
FOR OI~FICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
I
FOR OFFICIl~I. LJSE ONI.Y
begins on 1 July 1983). The best time politically for the assumption of
negotiations ~ould be the spring of 1981 prsceding the NATO conference~
since the next admi:iistration in Washington and a neK FRG government in
Bonn Nou1~ then be in office. By that time~ the neK NATO consultation
group for SALT III xould have p~roduced a substantial position for an arms
control negotiation on LRTNF.
F(?OTNOTFS
1. Cf Ruehl, "The NATO Resolution on the Adoption of NeW Intermediate-
- Re.nge Weapons~" EUROPA-ARCHIV, Vol 4~ 1980, p 99 ff.
- 2. Cf the communique of foreign and defense n?inisters~ 22 December 1979~ -
EUROPA-ARCHIV, Vol 2, 1980~ p D 35 ff.
3. Texti EUROPA-ARCHIV~ Vol 21~ i979, p D S56 ff.
more recent expressiona by Soviet President Brezhnev of xilling- _
neas to do so." The ~ench text of the comniunique sounds even more
po~itive in its asseassent~ favorable indications given recently
in thie rogarci by Mr Brezhnev."
5. a more stable overall nuclear balance at loxer levels of nuclear
aeapone." The omission of the first "nuclear" in the official German
translation is open to criticisa.
6. PRAVDA~ ,5 November 1979t a~tong other Gera~an sources, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND~
6 November 1979.
7� Speech by Brezhnev in F~st Berlin~ loc cit~ p D 5,58. ,
See Art III of the Vienna Treaty, 18 July 1979= textt EUROPA-ARCHIV~
Vol 15, 1979, p D 638 ff.
9. For exampl.e~ President Carter on 9 October 1979s cf EUROPA ARCHIV, -
Vol 21~ 1979, p D 560.
lU. Arts II and IV of the SALT II Protocol, EUROPA ARCHIV~ Vol 15, 1979, _
p D 389 f f.
11. Loc cit, p D 557.
12a Text of cocununique~ EUROPA-ARCHIV~ Vol 2, 1980~ p D 49 ff.
13, NEUES DEUTSCHI,ANll, 19 February 1980, p 5.
14~. Cf the communique of the North Atlantic Council~ 14 Dmcember 1979~
particulaxly Part II, EUROPA-ARCHI V, Vol 2~ 1980, p D 38 ff.
COPY~IGHT~ 1980 Verlag fuer Internationale Politik GmbH~ Bonn.
7458
CSU : 310 3 12
FOR OT'FICIAl. USE ~NT,Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~ THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
PR4BLEM OF VERIFICATION FOR MBFR NEGOTIATIONS ANALYZED
. Bonn EUROPA-ARCH N in German 25 Mar 80 pp 189-200
[Article by Prof Dr Wolf Haefele, first chairman, Aasociation for the
Promotion of System Analysis in Arms Control (SADAC), 53 Bonn 12,
Postfach 120532: "Verification Systems for a Balanced Reduction of Forces
in Central Europe (MBFR)"; members and friends of SADAC made substantial
_ contributions to this article.]
[Text] As part of the preparations for negotiati.ons on a balanced reduc-
tion of forces in Central Europe--Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR)--
it became clear that a sufficiently adequate control--verification--over _
- compliance with future agreements regarding Che reduction of troops and
armaments as well as related measures in Central Europe--according to the
official terms used in the communique issued at the end of the preparatory
consultations for the MBFR in Vienna on 28 June 1973--would raise special _
problems.
Tfie international armament treaties signed in tne past contain a renuncia-
tion of the development, manufacture, procurement, stockpiling, and employ-
ment of individual typea of weapons. Controls on the surueillance over
compliance with the treaties involved only comparatively few components.
Because most of these treaties are "nonarmament treaties," that is to say, -
because they do not yet involve renunciation o� existing weapons, compara-
~ively simple provisions were sufficient to make an adequate measure of
confidence in the treaty-loyalty of the parties to the treaty credible. ~
In the case of MBFR agreements however we were soon to be dealing with
very much more complicated processes, such as, for example, the reduction
of malitary personnel, the return or disbanding of units, the reduction of
specific weapons system, their stockpiling, return, or destruction. Ade- /
quately reliable verification of such agreements would have to review not
only the implementation of the contract grovisions but would also have to ~
_ examine the agreed-upon new maximum troop strength and armanent figures
covering the entire period of the validity of the treaties in such a
_ reliable manner that security-policy threatening violations of these
ceilings would not go undiscovered.
13
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
On the one hand, there was a concegt, to the effect that reliable sur- -
veillance or MBFR agreements would be possible only through con~tant
physical controls which would have to cover the entire MBFR reduction
area. That would necessitate a large number of mobile inspection teams
- which would have to be stationed permanently on the territories of the
countries involved. On the other hand, Ct?ere were ~ustified ~b~ection5
as to whether such an effort would be ~ustified and whether such methods,
deeply interfering in the sovereignty cf the countries involved, might -
not generate more distrust than confidence, more uncertainty than
certainty.
- Zn this situation it was recalled that similar questions had come up in _
_ eonnection with the problem of aurveillance of the Nuclear Nonprolifera-�
tion Treaty and the question came up ae to whether an attempt ahould be _
made to learn from the experience gained there. Such an attempt, as far
as we know, has not ~een made by any of the NATO partners. Duplication
of effort was thus avoided; on the other hand.~ discoveries or results
could not be used. A special study group in NATO in recent years took up -
the question as to what rep4rts would be raquired for adequately reliable
MBPR verification and.what possibilities thEre might be within the frame-
_ work of Creaty agreements on the procurement and �orwarding of such mili-
tarily sensitive information. It was poesible to obtain certain facts as
to the technical possibilities for obtaining information and possible "
forms of cooperation among the treaty partners regarding the exchange of
information from the bilateral. verification agreements of the Big ~io on
the SALT-I treaties. But these bilateral agreements by the big powers
could not be used as mode].s for a MBFR verification eystem. Separate
efforts had to be inade especially also because, in the Weat, the FRG would
be directly affected by controls on its entire territory az~d because it -
was therefore bound to be interested in a sufficiently reliable but poli- -
tically also acceptable MBFR verification system. fihe following considera-
tiona should be viewed from such, rather fundamental and, in this aenae,
also long-term prospects. On the other hand; we have the particular -
shorter-term political timelinesa of this topic. In view of the range of
problems under discuasion, we ehould however c.oC contemplate one without
considering the other.
Meaning of MBFR Verification System
Disarmament problems have a long history going as far back into the decadea
after World War II. It is not our intentiion here to go into that hietory.
Nor do we want to take up disarmament problems in the more precise aense
of the word; inetead we want to addresa ourselves to the more comprehen-
sive and politically also much more relevant area of arms controls for
which the English language has the term "arms control." It is known that
- the term "control" in English, if anything, should be translated in
German wiCh the words "to have in hand" ratiher than with the single word
"control"1�--at leaet in the context we are dealing with here. This is
why Count von Baudissin selected the translation "ccoperative arms
control"2.
14
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The question of arms control as an element in the relations between the
superpowers has its own dimensions which may we11 also be of significance
to the Central European area. Beyond that however we have, in this area,
the problems of arms control through the controlled withdrawal of garrison
troops and the reduction of indigenous unita which may v~ry well be inter-
twined with questiona of ~rme control by the euperpowers but which never-
theleas have to be taken up separately. Above a11 this $pplies to those
_ directly involved, primarily Germany, in its momentary diviaion into two
parts. Independent analysis and consideration therefore are in Germany's
elementary and direct interests.
Troops are maintained in peacetime to provide security. Considering the
presently existing complex situation, one can therefore very eaaily miss
the point in taking up this rather simple observation. But, in addition
to the intellectual approach, there are other ways of figuring these
_ things out a:.a aere, it seems, the observation we h~ve ,just made does
apply. A troop reduction, within the meaning of this observation, in-
voles a reduction of security which 3a balanced out ~nly if the other
side likewise reduces its troope. Of course, such a reduction must be
verified3. Pursuing this straight-line argument, a verification sys~em,
in connection with the withdrawal of garrison troops, would have the task:
Of proving that the troops of the other side are really departing beyond
the boundary of the reduction area;
Proving that the troops of the other side remain actually withdrawn from
the reduction area; and by way of supplement,
Proving that the troops of the other side do not again come back across
the border of the reducing area.
Although this kind of abatract listing may seem rather redundant, in
operational terms this nevertheless does certainly involve different as-
pects of the verification problem. At any rate however it must be noted
that successf.ul verification takes the plgce of security provided by our
own troops. Thet~eed for securi2y however has inherently total features
which are then transferred to the system for the erection of successful
verification. Such inherently total features contain an open end when it
comes to the security issue and accordingly also on the question of
_ successful verification which consists in the fact that more and more
troop reduction, or more and more verification, are being demanded so
that one can be more and more completely sure. In this connection it is
- useful. to keep in mind the question which was asked by Chauncey Starr in
an entirely different field of knowledge and which has become famous in
the meantime: "How safe is safe enough?"4
The point of departure in the considerations just entertained was the
concept pair of war and peace. Ever si.nce we have had atomic weapons,
there has been no alternate relationship between war and peace. If an
15 ~
- FOR OFFICTAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OrFICIAL USE ONLY
atomic war h:s been started, the meaning of the issue:as to ~�hy a war is being
rought is already over and done with, Much has been said about all this
- and inuch remains to be said but the purpose here is not to ~ursue all
that. It might thus perhaps be sufficient if we simply abserve th&t th~
meaning behind maintaining troops tod$y residea not in the vossibility of
fighting a war but in mutual deterrence away from fighting a war. Then
for the first time we run into the reciprocal question as to what verifica-
tion can do in terns ~f substitu*ing troops, Does this also apply directly
when verification becomes a part of the purpose of deterrence?
There is more to be said here. The elimination of the t:aditional alter-
native between war and peace goes ccnsiderably further. Today we have an
- increasingly developing kiiid of inental grey zone whose existence is being
accepted only very reluctantly by the Western camg. Then we have the
entire scale of smaller needlepoint ~~~rk roughly in the boundary regi~n.
- Those needle stabs remain small enough, in order not to set the enemy
camp's decision-making mechanism in moti~n--but they do scinR nevertheless.
_ More significant pernaps is the conduct of limited w~rs by surrogate
~ parties and in surrogate places, although the causes are often of a local
nature, Cambodia and, mare significantly for us, Africa are direct ex-
amples here. This kind of multidimensional surro~ate relationship pri-
marily leads to confusion in the Western camp. Do we nave detente or do
we not? Are these events part of the category of war ~r not? vid
- deterrence work or did it not?
In this kind of confusion and lack of clarity, there is a growing feeling
of uncertainty and even fear because it becomea quite clear as to what
kind of event pattern one must design security considerations and security
measures for. War and peace then always prove to be categories which
simply cannot be used any longer. With a view to this situat~.on and the
existence of this mental grey zone,one must then also urgently ask wherein
resides the sense behind verification measures for a troop reduction in
Central Europe because one hesitates to say aimply in that case that the
security function of troops is replaced by the security function deriving
from a verification system.
This is the situation in which the MBFR problem complex is being tackled.
One must clearly realize that we are dealing here with a problem compl.ex
that falls within the area of international law, in other words, a legal
prob lem complex. Considering the polyvalent kind of reality, auch ae it
perhaps becomes clear in referring to what we mean by mental grey zone,
one cannot at all expect a legal treaty combination to cover the many
valences of the kind of reality we are facing today; instead, such a
treaty volume can cover only certain modes of ttiis reality. It is thus
certainly not sufficient if one relies exclusively oa legal treaties:
_ They always require a context within which they must be understood. In
case of desirable MBFR treaty, that can be only the situation in Central
Europe--to be understood in political-dynamic terms--wfthin the context
of the way it fits into the global-strategic East-West situation.
16
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Furthermore ene should keep in mind that verification measures need not
nesessar~ly be a component of such an MBFR treaty; one should keep in mind
- that, in the past, negotiations often failed because of the verification
requ~.rement. Let us mention only one example here: The nuclear non-
= proliferation treaty, negotiated in the niddle of the Sixties, in its
form originally submitted by the Soviet Union, did not provide any measure
for surveillance concerning the ~eace~ul uses of nuclear energy. WFcether
that was correct or not is an entirely different question.
But there is even more to be kept in mind. By virtue of their nature,
r~easures provided for verification in a legal treaty will always have to
- be limited in natu:e. This becomes completely clear if we reflect upon
the reciprocal applicabilitq of such measures. It cannot be in Germany's
interest to grant the opposing side unlimited measures un its nwn terri-
tory. But if the measures are limited, then the effect achieved with tihem
can also only be limited. Although tl-,is situation may look simple, it is
very much in con~yast to the tendency indicated above, that is, the ten-
- dency to contemplate security issues in an open-ensi~d manner.
The considerations presented here so far are i~tended to lead to a thesis.
And that thesis reads as follows:
The verification measures, to be provided in a future MBFR treaty, are to
have the purpose of granting security only for a part of the way. The
measures to be provided in such a MBFR treaty should be so designed that,
in addition to their function aimed at security, they will help make the
~ontinuing dynamics of politic~l evolution in B~irope clearer and that means
reducing the mental grey zone as much as possible.
This thesis is supposed to answ~er the question broached earlier as to how
_ faY the meaning of verification regarding troop withdrawals;:,.ia Central
_ Europe is today still to be found in the idea that the security function
of troops is replaced by the se~urity function of a verification system.
ti Purpose and Generally Required Characteristics of MBFR Verification System
From the angle of the thesis al.one, we can now outline the conclusions. If
the verification measures to be provided in a future MBFR have the task--
only part .,f the way--to grant security, then other additional measures
must be taken in order t~ assure the highest possible measure of security.
Then of course these additional measures will be outside the MBFR treaty.
They may consist in using so-called unilateral means for this purpose.
_ Satellite reconnaissance is obvious and this takes us directly into the
- broader NATO framework. In the narrower Central European framework how-
ever it might very well also be conceivable to increase the performance
of the "side-looking radar" in a specifically target-oriented fashion.
Here we might mention higher altitudes for the aircraft carrying the
radar and higher transmission capacities. From the specifically Central
European perspective of a troop withdrawal, othera higher priorities might
~17 ~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4
FOR OFFICIAL LTSE ONLY
arise regarding the development of such a more efficient radar system, ~
that is to say, other ~han is the case today. But one must likewise
think in terms of the increased utilization of other m~.litary recon-
naissanc~ activities.
In this kind of overall apgroacn we then naturally come to the question
~ as to how the measures, to be provided yegall.y, with{n a MBFR treaty, are -
: to be worked out. What are the viewnoints that are to be valid if the
~ political evolution in Europe is to be made clear also wit~i their help?
It may then be a good idea to formulate the purpose of MBFR verification -
measures as follows:
_ The verification measures to be provided in an MBF'R treaty should, in a
remonstrable fashion, confirm quantitative compliance with a~ointly agreed-
y upon upper ceiling for troop reductions in the reduction area by making it
possible to detect any major compliance failure within a limited span of
time and with a predetermined degree of probability. -
The implications of this formulation can be best developed if we take a -
closer look at some of its elements.
_ "In a remonstrable fashion." Earlier we said that the continuing dynamics
- of political evolution in Europe must be made clearer. This goal c3n be
approached among other things by creating a continuing dialog within a
formalize~ framework. The results of MBFR verif ication measures must for
t~~is purpose be capable of being designated in a fortual fashion and the
rules of the treaty must be so set up that these results lead to formally
remonstrable measures. The emphasis here is on the continued dialog. Here
we might recall the many voices who already saw considerable gains in the -
m~re negotiating of the SALT Treaty. People get together and they learn to
~raw conclusions from the particular reactions of the partner.
~ "Quantit,stively." In order to get reaults of MBFR verificAtio~ measures
which can be designated in a formal fashion, one must first of all supply
- statistics and not qualitative impreasions. In other worda, it ie a good
idea to fa11 back to counting procedures. With a view to the previously
- discussed limited purpose of verification measures it is however not
- necessary to count everything that can be counted.
"Within a limited apan of time." In the verification measures which now
- emerge in this line of argument it is decisive tc have s clear understand-
ing aa to the time span for which the verification statementa are to be -
signi�icant. If ineasures within the framework of a MBFR treaty from the
~ very beginning ure assigned~ only a limited funcrion, then one is not
forced to use that in covering necessiti~e for short-term alarms. The
additional measures, which would have to be provided out'side of such a
treaty, are probably much more suitable for that. On the other hand,
= MBFR verification measurea lose their meaning if counting measures permit
- x8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FC:i OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
a conclusion only after a very long, politically no longer useful spaa of
- time.
iPWith a predetermined measure." If counting measures are carried out con- f
cretely, they also contain errors. The gr2ater the effort made during
counting, the emaller can we make the anticipated error. In determining
the effort, to be advocated in terms of negotiations~ the advanced deter-
mination of an acceptable ~rror thus plays a big role.
"Major." The quantitative designation o� that which is to be observed
: goes hand in hand with the prior measure. Obviously, it makes no sense
to negotiate as to whether an in~ividual company has or has not been with-
dra~n; on the other hand, changes opening up new strategic csptions are
essential.
The explicit formulation of the purpose of verification measur.es entails
something elae. The input information, on whnse basis conclusions are
- drawn, must be open information so that it can be shown to the opposing _
side in a binding manner. From that ~ag1e it is obvious to think in
t~rms of mixed teams for inspection. Thie means that every obsex~ration -
must then be ma~'e jointly. The introduction of ~bservation and count~.ng
_ instruments would ser~re the same purpose and expliciC agreement must have
~ been worked out between both sides regarding Che technical eharacterie-
: tics of'such instruments so that measurements using such instruments must
be recognized on both sides. These considerations boil down to the idea
that the measures to be prcvided in an MBFR treaty:
Should be extensively formalized, that is to say, any examination measure
should be spelled out in detail according to type and scope;
Extensively ratior~al, that is to say, every examination measure should be
capable of being ~ustified ob,jectively also on the basis of the task or
purpose;
Extensively ob~ectivizable, that is to say, every examination measure
should be carried out in every place and every time in the same manner
and it should be capable of being c.h_~~iced out at any time.
In an entirely di�ferent context--~that is to say, in the development of _
surveillance measures regarding the (partial} compliance with th,e Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty--it turned out~thaC every surveillance system,
in tArms of its particular f~rm, can be traced to three fundameatal~~ele-
ments, that is to say, accountability, $urveillance~ and containments.
_ Accountability--that is to say, the accounting.of required and actual
values which can be designated in a numerical fashion--most easily leads
to a formalization and ob3ectivization which~,is why it is clearly e~-
phasizad in the combrol syste~ the IAE06.
19 .
FQR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4
I
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Design of MTFR Verification System
- What could our past considerations mean concretely and operationally as far
as the design of MBFR verification system is concerned?
In other words, when it comes down to quantitative compliance with a
jointly agreed-upon upper ceiling, one must ask how a ceiling should be _
designed quantitatively and how it should be recorded through verifica-
tion. One will try to find indicators which may supply sufficient infor-
mation as to fighting strength. It has turned out that numbers of
soldiers and battle tanks as~such can be considered as indicators. This
means that, for example, artillery, transporta_ion equipment, or logistic
facilities must not be counted separately. Instead, the fact that we
count soldiers and t,attle tanks alone means that all other equipmenC per-
taining to these indicators is assumed to exiat in proportion. One must
_ keep in mind that, in thi;~ ki~.cd of procedure, qualitative magnitudes, such
as the training level or tht modern nature of equipment, are not considered.
This, as we know, is a quite general problem of arms control. If the mean-
- ing of verification measures were to reside only in the substitution of
military security, then quality characteristics should not be disregarded.
In the above-mentioned type of defin3.tion af a verification system, this
however carries less weight. In any case, quantitative magnitudes will be
of central significance and to that extent their verification ~ontinues
to make sense. It is furthermore to be noted that the magnitLides contem-
plated here for army units should be reasonable and should therefore re-
Zate to them; special considerations would have to be entered into for the
navy and the air force.
The basic idea behind the verification system to be introduced now, in the
sense of the above statements, conaists in the definition of limited areas
in which the numbers of soldiera and battle tanks are accounted for.
Specifically, this means, firat of all, individual~.y determining the
accounting areas and their precise boundaries. Here we must start with
the idea that such accounting areae by no meane will be identical with
- the broader reduction area. Their boundaries in any case would be one of
the subject~ for MBFR negotiations,
Inventories and transfer measurements must then be carried out in the
accounting areas or along their boundaries. The actual troop strength
figures and the numbers of battle tanks at military posts, depots, and
exe;.cise areas in the accounting areas are then determined with the help
i of inventories. Inventories are drawn up first at the start of the treaty _
_ and are then repeated periodically. They represent a considerable expen-
diture for the controlling party and Chey a~.so are a burden on the ~
controlled party. Therefore, Che desire for a limitation of the scope and
frequency of such inventories resides in the nature of the matter itself.
In order to get continuing infor:nation on Che aituation in the accounting
areas ~ust the same, we need a constant measurement of t~ansfer beyond the
~
20. _
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4
- FGR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
borders of the accounting areas. In the case of units whose home stations -
are in the accounting area, transfers accordingly .9ignify the induction
and discharge af soldiers or the production ar,d scrapping of battle tanks.
Here, only observers on the spot car. mea~ure and confirm such transfers. L
The scope of ineasurements thus required could be reduced with the help of -
inventory and transfer assurances. In that case it would also be possible ~
to determine in the treaty that the cou~n~ing connected with the inventory _
needs to take place only at certain locations determined in advance. In
all other parCs of the reducing area .tt will then be necessary to determine
only that there are no undeclared inventories present. In the same manner,
. the limits~tion of transfers to predetermined border crossing points re-
quires a transfer assurance along the remai.ning boundary, once again only -
in such a manner that undeclared arrivals and departures can be ruled out. -
It is probably quite obvious that a verification system, based en the
measurement of quantifiable magnitudes and the processing of data obCained,
can be rational, abjectivizable, and forma~ized by virtue of its naCure.
_ Beyond that, we have the concept of reporting systems which, in case of
suitable formalization, could meani:~gfully supplement Che verification ~
system, A reporting system again would deal with inventories and txans-
fers of soldiers and battle tanks. The reports would have to ba sent
from the controlled party to the controlling party who would have to -
- account for them along with the observa~ions and measurements of his own
- inspectors. A reporting system should be multilayered, complex, and re-
dundant so that an examination as to the internal consistency of the
_ reports issues can lead to meaningf.+al determinatiuns, The basic idea here
_ is that the internal consistency of reports and external consistencies
- with the obsprvatians can be achieved most easily when the reports are "
' truthful. This is not logically compelling. But one must on the other -
hand keep in mind that all statements, which come about witk? the help of
a verification sqstem involving a finite effort, will be reliable only
= for a certain stretch along tk~e way. Tndependent of this restriction is
the consideration that rep~rting systems also enable us to reduce the �
physical effort connected with control measures by the controlling party
and connected with the materialization of controllability by the controlled
party under certain circumstances.
In the logical boundary case, this would lead to unilateral assurances `
regarding measures taken, tha~ is to say, it is necessary to be cautious
if verification measures are then sti11 aupposed to be useful and
credible.
Capacity of MBFR Verification System
The camparison of inventories and transfer measure~ents serve for a com-
parison of actual and required figures for troop strength and numbers of =
; battle tanks and thus fot~ the time.ly discovery of any excess in the -
21
FOR OFFICT.AY. IISE ONLY =
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200094406-4
F'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
ceiling. The capacity of a surveillance system based on this principle--
which is restricted by the unavoidabl.e c~unting errors and the wrong ~
estimates caused by random sampling--can essentially be characterized by _
the control effort, the reference violation, the discovery probability,
the falge-alann rate~ and the discovery time~--which is why theae magni-
tudes and ttieir reciproc;al dependence are now to be explained 1n greater
detail. -
_ By the control effort we mean the effort made both by the controlling
party and the contr~lled party; first of a11 we start with the idea that
it will be proportional to the number of inspector-manhours. Basical~.y,
the necessary control effort could be determined from a coat-benefit -
analysis; this would be betCer than if it were to be politically deter-
mined because otherwise, this kind of advance requirement, might be
accompanied by expectations which cannot be fulfilled and which thus
might run counter to t:he purpose of the veri�ication measures. But because
the parameters necessary for such an analysis can be estimated quantita-
tively, the control effort in the final analysis will after all have to be
~ a sub~ecC of the MBFR negotiations.
The probability of the discovery of the ceiling being exceeded by a cer-
tain amount, which we call the reference violation, is a quantitative
measure of the capacity of the verific~tion system under discussion. One
must keep in rnind that compliance with a jointly agreed-upon upper ceiling
can never be determined with full reliability in case of a finite veri`i-
cation effort. Instead, it is necessary to agree as to what ahould be
considered a major noncompliance with an agreed-upon upper ceiling and
with what probability euch a noncompliance is to be discovered, whereby
it is necessary to aecide whether Chis can be done with a justifiable
' control effort.
In surveillance systems with statistical elements, one cannot basically
_ rule out thF: possibility of a false alarm. 1'he same applies to the false
alarm rate as applied earlier to the control e�forC: Although it would
be desirab'le to determine its numerical value by means of a cost--benefit
analysis, we will, for reaeons of practicability, give a certain figure in
advance and we will then decide whether we can achieve a satisfactory
syatem capacity in this fashion, in comparison to the disadvantagea re-
sulting from every false alarm. -
The previously mentioned comparison between the required and actual figures
_ of military personnel and battle ta*~ke in an accounting ares essentially -
serves the goal of achieving a(relaCivaly) shorC discovery time. Even
if--~something which cannot readily be seen--the diacovery time in the over-
a11 effort decided cn here doe~ not nessarily drop as the inventory fre- -
quency increases, one can never*.i�eless observ2 quite generally that the "
- effort to be made will increase, ,.he shorter the required discovery time is.
Because, moreover, requirements for a high discovery probability and for a
22
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
i~OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ahort discovery tj.me cannot readily be met simultaneously but might even
conf ~ict with each other~ one must at this point part~cularly think abouC
the sense of the verification system under discussion. Previously we
noted that other measures might be more su3table with a view to earlq
" warning time. The genuine politicay ob~ecCive of a verification syetem
instead points Co the idea thaC one should conaider longer rather than
- shorter discovery time.
A rigorous analysis--which reasonably accounts the magnitudes ~ust dis-
cussed among each other likewise in connection with a suitable reporting
system and which permits a~udgment on the capacity of the overall
_ system--can be accomplished only in the specific case and requires a
large volume of input data. Such input data can partly be obtained
through field experiments. The purposes of ~uch field experiments, wh3ch
in individual cases are already being conducted8, would be the following,
among others:
- Testing the practical implementability of inventory and transfer measure-
ments;
Determinatian of effort, time requfrement, and attainable accuracy of
these measurements;
resting of implementability of backup observations for the discovery of
violations;
Proc~rement of basic data �or assimil.ation calculations which can then
replace further field experimeuts and which would be used in designing
the presen~ly contemplated verification system;
- Development and teating of possfbilities for formalizing all measurement
and surveillance processes under discussion; and finally
Development and testing of suitable in~truments and equipment.
Conclusions
One will always have to keep in mind that a verification system of the
kind described in this essay will from the very beginning reveal gaps and
possibilities for circumvention. The resultant question however must not
be aimed at the existence of those gapa and circumvention possibiliCies;
~instead--within the previously discussed comprehensive sense of such a
verification system--it must provide clarification as to whether they are
quantitatively acceptable. One must furtihermore keep in mind thar a11 -
measures desi~ed by one side naturall.y also are measures which the other
- side wants to have implemented. Here we come to an inherent contradic-
tion: On the one hand, we have the urge for more effective controls over
- the opposing side which sprin~s from distrust; on the other hand, we have
- 23
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
reluctance regarding the controls acceptable for our own side. In this
- kind of contradiction it is helpful Co become specific and quantitative
when concrete measures are under discuss~.on. One would have to contem-
= plate the propogal made here also �rom thie angle.
~arlier we expressed a thesis. Zt related to the circumstance thaC veri-
fi~ation measures, in addition to security, are al$o supposed to provide =
clarity as to the continuing dynamics of political evolution in Europe.
'Ihat is something we have to discus~ with each other. The formalizat~on
oY verification measures produced a situation where one creates a for-
- mzlized framework for a continuing dial.og. This is why a~oint com-
missifln should be provided for within a verification system. That com-
mission would have to meet at fixed intervals; it would have to take
cognizance of the conclusions deriving from the verification measures
taken by both sides and it would then have to came up with a formal
clearance or, in case of real or seeming irregularities, it would have to
~ try to discover the causes. Then the actions and reactions of the parti-
cular other side would offer additional points of deparCure for the
analysis of the situation. _
FOOTNOTE5
1. See SIPRI, Strategic Disarmament Verification and National Security,
London 1977, p 11.
2. Count Wolf von Baudissin, "Limitations and Possibilities of Military
Alllance Systems," EUROPA-ARCHIV, 1, 1970, pp 1 ff., especially p 5
(note). -
3. See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Verification: the
Critical Element o~ Arms Control, Washington, D. C. 20451, 1976.
There, this concept is defined as follows in the context we are in- -
terested in here: "To verify is Co ascertain the truth or reality of
something. Verification is the attempt to check the truth of a
statement against the facts of the case--to look beyond words to
deeds~ As a technica.l term in the vocabulary of arms control, veri-
fication refers to the process of assessi.ng compliance with the pro-
visions contained in arms contro7. treatiea and agreements. It is the
attempt to ascertain whether states are living up to their interna-
tional obligations."
4. Chauncey Starr, Social Benefits versus Technological Risks in:
SCIENCE MAGAZINE, Vol. 165, 19.9.1969, p 123.
5, jd, Haefele, Systems Analysis in Saf~guards of Nuclear Material, in:
Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on the Peaceful
Uses of Atomic Energy, Geneva, September 6-16, 1979, Vol. 9, pp 303-
322, United Nations, New York 1971.
24
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
6. The functions of the nuclear materials surveillance system were clearly
outlined by the model agreement worked out in 1971: The idea is at the
proper time to discover the theft of significant quantitites of fissile
material from the nuclear-engineering plants of the peaceful nuclear
fuel cycle. The basic principle behind the survei~lance measures in-
volves material accounting: At the end of an inventory period, the
book inventory, that is to say, the real inventory at the start of the
inventory period, plus the sum of all receipts, minus the sum of all
departures, during the inventory period, are compared with the real
inventory. Although,~on account of unavoidable measurement errors, the
book inventory and the real inventory will never quite agree, one can,
if we know the measurement instruments, use mathematical-statistical
methods in order after all to arrive at a conclusion as to whether or
not material was stolen. The surveill.ance procedure is so organized
that the operator of a nuclear fac3.lity collects all data necessary
for the preparation of a material accounting report, that the inspectors -
_ of the IAEO examine these data through random samples with the help of
their own measurements, and that--if there are no significant dif-
ferences between their own data and those supplied by the operator--
they prepare the material accounting report with the help of the opera-
tor's data. See InternationaZ Atomic Energy Agency, The Structure and
Contents of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in
Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
INF/CIRC/153, Vienna, 1971.
7, Rudolf, Avenhaus, Material Accountabil.ity--Theory, Verification, Appli-
cations, Monograph of the IIASA Wiley International Series on Applied
Systems Analysis, J. Wiley Inc., Chichester 1978.
8. See, for example, Inspection and Observation of Retained Levels of
Ground Forces and General Purpose Air Forces in a Specific Area,
Summary report prepared by Field Operations Division, Weapons Evalua-
tion Control Bureau, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
_ Washington, D. C. 1970.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Verlag fuer Internationale Politik GmbH, Bonn
. 5058 .
CSO: 3103
25
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE
~ 'PEACE, DISARMAMENT' CONFERENCE SEEN TOOL OF SOVIETS ~
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 5 May 80 pp 35-36
[Article by Andre Lesueur: "Communists--The Paria Appeal"]
- (Text] Soviet diplomacy has found a platform in Paris--
to mobilize all its teams in order to pursue "detente."
Obvious proof. The conference "for peace and disarmament" that met in Paris
at the beginning of the week confirmed it: the policy of the French Cammun-
ist Party can now be evaluated on1.y in funtion of the interests of the in-
ternational co~unist movement--therefore, of Moscow's strategy.
Certain observers, referring solely to the French aspects of this meeting,
concluded that it had failed. Questioned on this point the other week,
Francois Mitterrand remarked: "It seems to me that meeting can only be a -
failure, in view of the fact that those who will take part in it are not ex-
actly the ones who would have made it a success."
The absence from the Paris sumcnit--called on the initiative of the PCF and
its Polish counterpart--of all the ~ommunist Parties that in on~ way or an-
other have regained their liberty vis-a-vis Moacow (the Italian, Spanish,
Britiah, Swedish, Romanian, Yugoslav CP's) constituted, by contrast, a con-
firmation of the PCF's unconditionality vis-a--vis Moscow and its isolation
in Western Europe.
In the face of the "Euro-left"--a vast dialog started several months ago by
most of the European coumiunist and socialist parties--Marchais was able to
find, to support his initiative, only one important West European party, the
Portuguese CP, whose neo-Stalinist orientutions are well known. -
From the point of view of the interests of the PCF in French and European
domestic politics, the ber.efit of this conference is therefore nil.
Why did Marchais take the risk of being one of its organizing powers? The
other week, Jean Ellinstein, diasident communist historian, �urnished an
element of an answer: "Because the Soviets asked him to. This is one of the
consequences of his trip to Moscow at the beginning of the year."
26
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The Paris meeting is therefore not to be analyzed in function of the inter-
_ ests of the PCF but rather in relation to the strategy of the USSR, its true -
initiator.
At the preceding conference of this type, in East Berlin in 1976, the Sovi-
ets had hoped to fill in the cracks that had appeared in the international
communist movement. The failure was obvious: Marchais refused to go to Ber-
lin, and from the conference platform Berlinguer, ir. the ~~~me of the Ita?ian
CP, refuted the thesis of a single leadership of the world communist move- -
ment.
_ In Paris, something quite different was involved. The recent conquests by
the communist camp (in Latin America, Africa, Afghanistan), along with the =
Western diearray, have evidenced an inversion of the rel.~tionship of forces
between che two blocs. T'he Soviets intend to preserve this gain by neutral-
izing the West's capacity of reply--mainly by stimulating a reflex of West
European public opinion against the only effective weapon that the West
could pit against the Afghan coup de main: challenging detente.
_ The same three words were used by all the speakers at the Paris conference:
disarmament, peace, detente. No one talked about Afghanistan. But the com-
ing installation of new Pershing missiles in Europe by NATO was denounced. -
Without any mention of the SS-20 missiles already installed by the Soviets
- in the people's democracies. Tn the Helsinki line, hope was expressed for
the success of the Madrid conference, of which it is increasingly clear that
it will have the mission of ratifying the Afghan situation. The necessity
of ratifying the SALT 2 agreements and the importance of the Vienna negotia-
tions on disarmament were stressed--both of these having the consequence of
freezing the relatic�nship of East-West forces to the advantage of the USSR.
In his speech during the conference, Boris Ponomarev, chief of the Soviet
delegation, did not hide the fact that the object was indeed to pose an ob-
stacle to any challenging of the policy of detente: "The communists," he de-
clared, "have the duty to call on the working class, the peasantry and the
intellectua~s, the trade unions, the religious circles, the women's and
youth organizations and others, to make every effort to thwart the attacks
against the Helsinki final act, the sabotage of the whole of the peaceful
cooperation among the socialist and capitalist states of Europe.
It is, he stated, a matter of "preventing destruction of the structure of
e~tchanges established during the 1970's in the fields of science, culture,
education and sport."
Ponomarev, an acting member of the politburo of the CPSU, has responsibili-
ty, in his capacity as secretary of the Central Committee, for contacts with
the "brother parties" in the countries "outside the socialist camp."
HE appears to be a sort of commanding general of the forces that the commun-
ist movement has at its disposal. in the Western count_ries.
27
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
As for his concept of detente, to which he declares such devotion, he set it
out in June 1974 in an issue of the Saviet review PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOC-
IALISM. Here is what he declared:
"More than any other prior fact, the official acceptance of peaceful coex-
istence by the principal imperialist forces cuts through to the very bases
of the aggressive political and military organizations alined against the
socislist countries.... Lenin taught the co~unista that to thwart the re-
action, we must first of all liberate the masses from the ideological influ-
ence of the reaction.... This means that international detente is not ex-
pressed by the peaceful coexis'tence of two opposed ideologies but rather by
the possibility of developing and deepening our ideological struggle."
Preserving detente (conceived as one of the means of communist expansion)
and opposing the rebalancing of East-West forces undertaken by NATO: these -
are the two axes of the big opinion campaign which Moscow launched a few
months ago and of which the Paris conference is only one of the aspects.
The fact that it was held here is doubtlessly not due to chance: the hesita-
tions of French diplomacy permit the Soviets to view France as the "soft
- flank" of the Western alliance.
The appeal adopted at the conclusion of this meeting underlines its object:
_ it is a matter of mobilizing all the faithful CP's, but also all the "soci-
alists, social democrats, Christians and believers of other confes-
sions," in support of Soviet diplomacy. Marchais himself gave the opening
address, announcing a forthcoming initiative with wh;ch the socialistb and
_ social democrats would be associated. Union of the left, obstinately re-
jected on the domestic level, is thus insietently urged when it is a matter
of aiding the Soviet strategy.
Besides this "initiative," to which the Socialist International will doubt-
lessly hasten.to respond, mobilization is going ahead on other fronts. The
Movement for Peace, controlled by the communists, will organize a"world
meeting for peace and disarmament in Sofia in September. And a summit -
meeting of the "progressive movements of the Islamic countries" will be held
in Tashkent.on the same date, in an attempt to stabilize relations--singu-
larly deteriorated--between the Moslem world and the communist mnvement.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "Valeurs actuelles" -
11267
CSO: 3100
28
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE
FUTURE OF NATION'S DETERRENT FORCE CONSIDERED
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 16 Feb 80 p 40 ~ !
[Text] Last week the president of the republic presided over an important
working meeting in which the ma~or options for modernizing the nuclear weapon
systems constituting the national deterrent force were examined in the pre-
sence of the minister of defense, the general representative for munitions
[delegue general a 1'armement] and the army chief of staff.
To replace the Mirage IV strategic bombers--the first carriers of the French
- atomic bomb in 1964 and today still continuing their amazing career by carry-
ing out very diversified missions, but most of which will be withdrawn from
active service beginning in 1985--and also to supplement the Albion land-
- based strategic surface-to-surface ballistic missiles in the more distant
future, two solutions are being considered: either cruise missiles advancing
in low-Ievel flight and having a range greater than that of American cruise-
type missi.les, whose reported range is 2,500 km, or mobile surface-to-surface
missiles m~unted on standardized vehicles and capable of being airlifted
by cargo planes adaptable to unprepared or hastily arranged landing strips.
These mobile missiles, compact and outfitted with M4 multiple warheads (the
same as those which will equip "L'Inflexible," the sixth SNLE [missile-
_ launching nuclear submarineJ of the Strategic Naval Force), are faster than ~
the cruise missile by the end of the distance covered.
French researchers are capable of developing either of the two,missiles
to be selected in June by Defense Council members, who have been asked to
make such a decision. ~
A debate on the ma~or options of national defense policy is to take place
in parliament during the regular session in the spring of 1980.
The decisions concerning the future of the French dterrent force should
be made before the end of 1980. They will be incorporated into the next
military long-range appropriations bill, on which parliament will be requested
to make a decision in 1982.
COPYRIGHT: A. C., Parxs, 1980
11915
CSO: 3100 29
FOR OFFICI.4;. USE ONL'Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE
- ~ IN-FLIGHT REFLTELING INCREASES FAS CAPABILITIES
Paris ~iIR ~ COSMOS in French 16 Feb 80 p 41
[Article by Jean de Galard)
[Text] In-flight refueling is intended to increase the maxi.mi~ autonomy of
_ planes thus refueled as well as the maximum distance which they can cover.
Thus thanks to in-flight refueling, a strategic bomber's radius of action
is increased substantially; tactical planes can be escorted to r~:mote theaters
without making any technical stopovers and following itineraries making it
possible to avoid flying over certain countries when forbidden by the latter;
air defense planes can be kept on alert during extended flight.
It was to iilustrate this view of in-flight refueling, which C.135Fs of
the Strategic Air Force [FAS] today practice often and routinely, that the
- Air Broadcasting of SIRPA [Armed Forces Publ.ic Relations and Information
Service] held a large rallq in Istres last week, during which ~ounnaliats
on board A Mystere-Falcan 20 of the Air Lisison and Training Group were
- able to witness, ov~er the Mediterranean, series of refueling sequences of a
, M~rage IV and several Jaguar and Mirage F1 patrols by a C.135F air taaker.
During this event, Strategic Air Force commander Gen Jean Saulnier mentioned
the needs of the Air Force for refueling planes. Until 1985, the year start-
- ing in which only about 15 Mirage IVs will be kept in operation, the number
of C.135Fs (11) which the FAS has today will most likely be quite adequate.
_ Th~ae C.135Fs, today equipped with Pratt and Whitney turbojets for which
the Air Force has a large supply of spare parts, will probably be reequipped
- with GE/SNECMA CFM-56 turbojets in view of the operating potential which
- the C.135F airframes still have, but replacement of their engines is by
_ no means urgent. In theory, in-flight refueling enables a fighter plar.
to stay in the air indefinitely. In practice, pi'lot fatigue and oil consump-
tion limit flying time to 6 or 7 hours, corresponding to a~overed distance
of 5,000 to 6,000 1~.
In all likelihood, COTAM's [Military Air Transport Command] refuelable
i Transalls will be refueled in flight by other Transall~ because of the ex-
cessive differences in performance between a C.160 and a C.135F.
30
FOR OFFICIEu. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Today, for obvious reasons of economy, a C.135F used for mi5sions t~o train
- fighter pilots in in-flight refueling often refuels, during the same mission,
the three types of planes mentioned in the beginning of this article.
COPYRIGHT: A. & C., Paris, 1984
11915
CSO: 3100
31
FOR OFFICItiI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4
GO~VERI~IENT USE ONLY
COi~1TRY SECTION IN'rERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
SWISS ARREST FRENG~i CUSTOMS.AGENTS
Paris LA I,ETTRE DE L~EXPANSION in French 28 Apr 80 p 4
~Unattributed Article: "The French ~Held Hostage~ by Switzer-
land Are Probably Victims of a Provocation"~
[Text] "The Swiss are behaving toward our two civil sesvants
' in much the same way that the Iranians are treating the Ameri-
- can hostagee." This is the kind of remark one hears in the en-
tourage of the minister of the ~udget since the imprisonment
of two customs agents. It seems~ in fact~ according to infar-
mation picked up at the Rue de Rivoli~ that these officials~
acting entirely within the framework of their assigned duties~
had brought off a masterstroke four years ago~ when they ex-
posed a major money racket that had been going on between
France and Switzerland. The Swiss authorities had not forgiv-
en them far this~ at least to the extent that~ according to _
them~ this discovery was on].y made possible through the coope-
- ration of Swiss citizens worki.ng for them in various banks.
To nab the two F`rench customs men~ the Swiss Police l~iad them
contacted by an"informer~" who was presented as an informa- ~
tion specialist exclusively on its payroll. The latter (the
informer~ met with the two customs officials on 15 April at
the station restaurant in Basel and allegedly turned ovea~ to
them documents describing financial transactions made by
~ench citizens. Almost simultaneously the Swiss Palice in-
tervened with an arrest warrant dated 14 Ap~il~ a difference
in dates whiah~ for the ~`rench Government~ was proof enough of
the plot woven by the Swiss authoritias. What tends to rein-
force the conviction of Paris is that~ up to now~ no Swiss -
citizen has 'aeen arrested or even challenged i.n this entire
matter.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Groupe Expansion S.Ae
8117
CSO: 3100
32
GOVERI~NT U5 E ONLY -
i
;
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
GAULLIST Pt1RALLELS IN GISCARDIAN DOCTRINE, REELECTION PROSPECTS
Paris PARADOXES in French 31 Ma r 80 pp 18-21
[Article by Michele Cotta: "Giscard Successor to General de Gaulle?"
[Text] Giscard successor to Ge neral de Gaulle. All the political obser-
vers have been asking themselves since the beginning of his seven-year
term just how V3lergy Giscard d'Estaing wuuld repay, some day or other,
his Gaullist debt. Would Giscard try to shatter the RPR and isolate ~
Chirac within the Gaullist movement? Or, on the other hand, would he ~
patch things up with the mayor of Paris before 1981 to win the favor of
the RPR? Once again, VGE has confounded the, as it turned out, rather
simplistic speculations of the professional politicians: by making the =
great f undamental options of Gaullism Mis own the chief of state, one
year before the presidential elections, is attacking the evil at the
root. .
- Regarding the first principle of Gaullism, the role of the preaident in
the constitution and in the cou rse of events, VGE was converted early
- in his political career, around 1958. It would be pointleas to add
that his arrival at the Elysee in 1974 made the office of chief of state
even more- important in his eyes. It has now been six ~ears since Valergy
Giscard d' Estaing turned the knock-down argument about the role of the
president in the continuity of the Fifth Republic b ack against the fol-
lowers of Jacques Chirac. If h e was neither the initiator not the
prime beneficiary, there is nevertheless no doubt that the present chief
- of state has consistently been most prompt to adapt the General's con-
stituticnal clothes to his own profit
~ao Key Points
More re cent, by contrast, are h is positions on two key points of Gaulliat
doctrine, foreign policy and participation.
The idea that mere considerationa of internal politice explain Mr Giacard
ci'Estaing's embrace of Gaulliat foreign policy is as far from ua as it is,
no doubt, from reality. The policy, in a nutshell, of determination to
33 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
uphold French independence from the two blocs; of appearing as a beaccn
in the eyes of small countries desirous of remaining equidistant, inso-
far as possible, from the communist ogre and the American hydra; of
attempting a positive dialog with the Third World and, within Europe,
a hi.gh-priority dialog with West Germany.
VGE has been following this line, point by point, the machinery of co-
existence between the United States and the Soviet Union b roke dawn. Even
if, for a short t ime after the entry of Soviet troops into Kabul, the
French position may have seemed a b it fuzzy, it must be admitted that
it has subsequently been better and better understood and that, taday,
it is the ob~ect of a more or less implicit consensus among the ma~ority -
of Frenchmen. In any case, it has caught shorC those who are, txadi-
tionally, fundamentally allied with the United States and who belonged
moet often to the "presidential party," that is, to UDF. While it has
more or .less picked up the support of the "anti-Giscardians" in the `
ma,jority, namely Jacques Chirac and his followers. Michel Debre hi~-
' self said that, in words at least, Valery Giscard d'Estaing's positions
had a Gaullist ring... "In reality," henchmen of the chief of state
� willingly explain, "there has not been the slightest change, on this
subject, in VGE's policy. He has always thought that independence was
a vitally important objective."
A Third Way
The president of the republic has never really hidden the fact, in the
last few months, that he did not have im limited confidence in President
Carter's method of governing. That it seemed to him irXesponsible and
even impossible zo consider that regardless of circumstances the position
of the Uni ted States should dictate that of France: the visit to Indira
Ghandi's India symbolized the prasident's intent: between uncomplaining
infeudation to the USSR and alinement behind Washington, there ia definite-
ly a third way. 1~o ministers, closer to the chief of state, confirm _
this distrust of the United States, in their respective domains. Jean-
Francois Deniau, minister for foreign trade, describes himself as pro-
foundly shocked by the way in which, in economic and trade matters, the
ihiited States tries more often and more deliberately than anyone else to
break French markets and to advance the pawns of American coffiercial
imperialism. Jean Francois-Poncet, th~: ,:unister of foreign affairs, is
no more convinced than the French president that the decisions of the
American president are well founded. Both believe the Soviets will be -
better contained by internal pressure from Afghans, and the hostil
reaction of Muslim countries, than by any sort of economic reprisals.
"Sanctions" all the less effective since even the United States itself
is not implementing them...
There remains the other principle of Gaullism, that of participation.
This is the one most recently brought out from the presidential histories.
In the speech given by the preaident on 21 February in Paris, at the time ~
34
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ~JNLY .
of the deferment of prizes for the best workers, he described participa- _
tion as one of the priorities of the decade of the Eighties. Valergy
Giscard d'Estaing announced his immediate goal was for Parliament to
' pass a bill allowing companies to distribute, freely and directly, to
their wage-earners, 3 percent of their capital. There too, whatever be
the flavor of the polemics, truth obliges us to say ttiat the current
president as far back at 1968 announced that in his opinion what French-
men most lacked was "consider2tion" by those who supervise and pay them.
And that, all along--the Blois program of 1978 makes it clear--VGE has "
- favored wage-earners participating in the profits of enterprise. But
_ never until now had he supported it with such force and clarity. The
formula: "make Frenchmen the praprietors of France," may be already _
several months old, but the emphasis Giscard gave to it on 21 February
is completely new. ~
- A Pascalian Wager ~
Wttethrer one speaks of [political] "recovery" of of convictions matters
little, at bottom: it is true that this Gaullist orientation, at the end
of this seven-year term, has considerable political value.
a
- First of all, it goes without saying, because it comes in the months . '
just preceding the presidential elections. Convinced that his "friends"
in the tiDF, reg3rdless of their intimations, are little desirous of b eing
olagiarized by him in this pre-presidential period, Valery Giscard
d'�staing is making a Pascalian wager in the political arena: he has
nuthing to lose (and, in any case, neither those who supported him in
1974 nor those who have come over to him like Jean Lecanuet) and every-
thing to gain, on the side of Gaullist voters who do not find in Jacques
Chirac the social aspirations of General de Gaulle.
--Finally, because ~his inflection of Giscardian policy cuts the ground _
from beneath the feet of the socialists~ In foreign policy, the latter
are hard pressed to oppose moat of VGE's directions, and eapecially
the maintenance of the openj_ng to the East and of detente. Regarding
participation, even if they challenge the effectiveness of the Giecardian
pronouncements, the socialista cannot fail to realize that they aound
pleasing to the ears of a party of wage-earners--the same who voted for
de Gaulle, rather than Mitterrand in 1965.
--Finally, becauEe these new directions, these new pronouncementa are _
made public in a time of overall, long-range crisie in the Left.
The rupture between communista and aocialiets destroys, and for a long
time, the credibility of the possibility of any true government of th e
Left. The division of the socialists between Marxista and reformiats,
in a word, throw~ overall socialiat schemes, plans, programs and pro~ects _
a veil of conf usion. There is no agreement within the PSF on the econo-
mic poiicy to follow; there is not, really, therefore, any alternative
to VGE's economic policy.
35
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- 'It~o Unknowns -
All thia goes to strengthen the hand of the president of tihe republic at
this very point in the battle of 1981. We must not, however, rush tao _
quickly to proclaim VGE's reelection inevitable-~uncontested reelection
(which could moreover turn out to be a reelection without victory...)
Two unknawns could still turn the game arc?und.
--First Unknown: how will the situation wi;.hin the PSF, between Francois
Mitterrand and Michel Rocard, turn out? The former believes he is the ~
party's anointed one, the latter believes he h:s--andy for the moment,
it is true--a larger measure of public support. What would be the atti-
; tude of the Gaullists toward Michel Rocard in event of a second ballot?
The latter would benefit more than Francois Mitterrand from Gaullist
= cross-overs. If one can believe the polls, it seems that this is the
- case. Wh3t would communist voters do, and would they be more inclined
to throw their support to Rocard than to Mitterrand? Unless the first
secretary of the PSF, for whom co~unist voters have already voted, in
1965 or 197~, continues to benefit ~rom what might be called the habits -
- of voters accustomed to the union of the Left?... -
--The Second Unknown: touches on France's economic position. Seeing that
- international pres~ue is loosening, the interna'1 figures themselves -
are once again making their constraining influence felt: inflation highaJ~
than ~ver in January 80, 1.9 percent; foreign trade out of balance; un-
_ employment up...Is France "sinking," as JacquPS Chirac continues to
maintain? Or, on the contrary, has it succeeded since 1976, as Raymond -
Barre claims, in avoiding recession?
So not all bets are placed yet. The campaign is already gaining steadily
in interest.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Compagnie Europeene d'Editions et Publications
PeriodiGues, 38, Rue de Bass
ano, 75008 Paris
9516
CSO: 3100 -
36
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
~
FOR OFFICitaL USE ONLY
COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
SOCIALIST'S PIERRE JOXE ON POSSIBLE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY
Paris LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR in French 17-23 Mar 80 p 42
[Interview with Socialist Pierre Joxe on 17 March 1980 by correspondent
Kathleen Evin--place not given: "Waiting for Francois Mitterrand's defini- ~
_ tive decision, his friends want to launch the candidacy of Pierre Joxe,
against Michel Rocard; Joxe voices his comments"]
[Text] [Question] During d~bates on the presidential eZection candidacy
and whether or not to dissolve the Assembly immediately in case c~f history,
isn't the Sociaiist Party getting immersed, entirely, in "politic~zl science =
fictian" as it has been remarked during [the term of] its last committee c
director?
[Answer] I understand that certain debates may give ~hat impression.
Let'~ take a look at what we have before us:.the Socialiat Party is divided; _
as the PCF is divided; as is the entire Left, notably on choices to be
made concerning programe. The "Socialist Pro~ect" has been unanimously
adopted, but, that hasn't prevented aome--who voted for it--to dipcredit it _
as early as the next day and to question it again every time. But our =
party is equally divided, becauae in the face of an important election
_ year [ter~n], instead of including thia election in a global and long-term
political strategy, some~comrades have decided to make the nomination of -
the candidate the main issue of the moment. Accordingly, a political
- clarification is required. =
[Question] A clarification?
[AnswerJ Yes. The socialists shosldn't be obseased with the queation of
- "who will be the candidate?", because it ia necessary to fully undexetand
- [that] 1) What is at stake in the nomination is not only the candidate;
2) Wt:at is at stake in the campaign is not only the electorate; 3) Wnat _
is at stake in the election is not only the Elysee. I will explain: -
41hat is at stake in the nomination is first a political platform; i.e.,
the choice of a long-term action, the purauit of a program administered
in a collective framework. Let's speak plainly: Mitterrand's political ~ ~
= 37 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE OI~TLY
platform is known. It is our [platform]. The ma~ority of the party has
- approved it. But [how about] the minority's platform. What is it? Now,
wha~ is at stake in the nomination is, therefore, the party's future. In
choosirg its candidate, the Socialist Party will r.hoose itself, it will be -
inevi~ably marked by the topica, the sty~e and the person who will repre-
sent it in the course of the campaign.
Wh~~n I again say that what is at stake in the campaign is not only the
_ electorate, I think about the very image of socialigm in France. The
presidency of the Republic must be taken by the Socialist Party "in pass- -
ing"--as, in chess, a pawn is taken "en passant"--at the end of a~~campaign
_ sus~ained by a program, tne "socialist pro~ect," whose finality overlaps,
, greatly, the electoral calendar. On the nature of this program, outlined
since [the times of] Epinay, by some among us, confirmed and modernized in
~tetz and Alfortville, there muan't be any heaitation, any compromise. And,
above a11, not by the socialist candidate who will be ita standard bearer.
Because, finally, what is at stake in this el.ection is not only the Elysee.
- It is, equally, the reestablishment of the balance of pcwers, and, in the
]_ong run, the preparation of a legislative victory for the dissolution of
the Assembly and the proposition of an alliance for the entire left. A
_ socialist who believes it possible to govern with a ma~ority of the right,
by making use of the exorbitant powers presently affiliated with the func-
- tion of the presidency of the Republic and who will not advocate a new
alliance, supporting nothing more than a meager agreement with the MRG
[Left Rad~cal MovementJ, the ecologists and the PSU, will be, in my opinion,
hard pressed in trying to represent his party in this election.
- [Question] You just made a kind of a composite drawing of the "bad can-
didate" in which we recognize, withaut dif.f iculty, Michel Rocard. Do you
believe, then, that the best PS candida te at this time is Francois Mitter-
- rand?
[Answer] Francois Mitterrand is, and will be, the best candidate of our
party if he wants [to be]. For now--and I regret it--the question does
not arise. We can wish that the candidate will be Francois Mitterrand.
. We can hope for it, for the political reasons that I have already expounded
above. But, we cannot decide for him.
- [Question] Are you partisan to a"consensus" solution for the nomination
of the candidate, or, rather, of an election fo.llowing the "primar3es"? =
- [/lnswer] The party decided upon its procedure for candtdate nomination
during its last congress: it's the militants as a whole who will vote.
- If there must be a consensus it cannot be but Francois Mitterrand. If,
unfortunately, he decides not to run, and only then, there wouid be, in "
my opinion, a rather great number of candidates.
38
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(Question] In this case, could you be the candidate for Faction A?
[Answer] Some comrades talked to me about it. Some even seemed to have
posed t:ie question in front of journalists. The only thing that I can
say today is that if, in spite of ot~r will, Francois Mitterrand decides
not to run, there will be, evidently, a candidate of the ma~ority of the
party. He will be nominated collectively.
[Ques~ion] Francois Mitterrand has often said [that] "united the Left
wins; divided it loses." The electoral results of the past weeks seem
to bear him out. How can you not predict a bad outcome for 1981?
[Answer] In 1981, the French people will find themselves before a simple
choice: either another 7 years of the Giscard government; i.e., 7 years
of diminishing buyi:lg power, social setbacks, curtailing of freedom, iso-
lationism, or 7 years of progress toward sociali;~m, regaining of liberty
_ and social rights, democratization of the state and national redress. In
all sectors: wages, living and working conditions, social services, -
taxation, etc, Giscard's government signified, to the majority of the
French people, reverses and drawbacks. In the second round, voters must,
_ then, choose between the pursuit of the most reactfonary politics France
has known for decades, and, the one which opposes it, proposed by the
- socialists. This simple language can, I believe, be understood by all-- .
communist or not.
[Question] Do you think, then, that Michel Rocard is mistaken when he says
that "all is not possible all at once" and that an alliance with the
communists is not indispensable? _
[Answer] It's only during periods of strong progressive politics--Popular
Front, Liberation, May-68--that strong social and economic progress are
realized. And, conversely, if profound economic and social changes are
not immediately produced, we re~ect thorough political changea in advance.
In regards to the calling for a"change of strategy" for the PS in case
of. victory in the presidential e].ection, I wish to state precisely two
points: First, the hypothesis of this "third way" was repeatedly turned
aside by sociallst militants in all the votes of these past years. Next,
this would be, for a leftist candidate, a very strange way to campaign
against Giscard, letting him think that he has, after all, a possibility -
of agreement with him or his ma~ority. If it's a question of administer-
J.ng capitalism, who can better do it than the advocates of capitalism.
COPYRIGHT: 19F30 "le Nouvel Observateur"
9626
CSO: 3100
- 39
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFZCIAL USE ONLY
COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE -
ESTIER ON SOCIALIST OBJECTIVES, RELATIONS WITH OTHER PARTIES
Paris PARADOXES in French 31 Mar 80 pp 27-28
[Interview with Claude Estier, managing editor of PS weekly L'UNITE,
- by Olivier Jay--date and place unspecified]
[TextJ [QuestionJ Since 1974, and despite the offers by the president
of the republic, the Soeialist Party has refuaed any real dialog with the
ma~ ority. 41hy?
[Answer] We're not trying to show off any kind of sectarianism. We -
are simply defending a.program which is fundamentally different from ~hat
of the present majority. If we are in the opposition, it is well and
- truly because the ideas of the parties which are supporting the Barre =
~ government do not seem to us to be in the interests of the workers of ~
this country. What could a dialog in these circt~stances mear,? -
[Question] But the political situation has changed since 1974. The
Communist Party now~stands in the way of any Union of the Left coming
- to power...
[Answer] We are not going to renounce our goals just because the Commu-
nist Party has changed: we do not want to govern out of an appetite for
power but in order to bring seal change to this society.. If we renounced
our demands, we would be betraying our voters.
[Ques*_ionJ But is it not essential, in light of the worsening economic
situation, to establish a po?icy of national unity or a govemment for "
_ the public welfare, as Michel Debre says?
- [Answer] When Michel Debre speaks of this government of public welfare,
he does not specify its composition too clearly. I believe he is think-
ing of a government in which Michel Debre would play a preponderant role.
To respond more precisely to your question, I will tell you that the wor-
sening economic and social situation, on the contrary, reinforces us in
our convictions. We predicted this wr~rsening and proposed various
- k0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
'I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY f
measures to avoid it. We are coherent. Why run to the rescue of Mr Barre
because of a crisis which he himself has intensified...
[Question] At thE international level, could you not be brought to aup- -
port the government?
[Answ er] I should say th at in that area I am rather waiting on the reac- -
tions of certain leaders in the right. Mr Chinaud, president of the UDF
group in the National Assembly was, not so long ago, ferociously oppoaed
_ to self-determination for the Palestinian people. He is not alone.
N~w, for the moment, no one has reacted to the recenr_ French proposals...
[Question] Would you support some of the reforms offered by the govern-
ment? _
[Answerj I remind you, and Mr Giscard d'Estaing remembers,~ that when at
the beginning of his term he had passing fancies--quickly smothered--for
social reforms, we aupported him. ,It is in fact thanka to us and not
thanks to his forces, that lawa were passed on contraception, abortion, -
and the lowering of the age of majority to 18. '
When a refarm proposal, even a timid one, seems to us to be in the
interest of Frenchmen, we vote for it. _
[QuestionJ And the recently announced proposal to extend industrial co- ~
partnership?
[Answer] That is a joke. We will not vote for this bill which represents
everything we reject: the workers are mocked by being offered worthless
- trinkets where structural reform is needed. ~ -
[QuestionJ Is there not even within the majority, however, a fringe which
would look more favorably on a dialog with the opposition? �
[Answer] Like you, I read or heard the statements of Bernard Stasi of the
UDF or of Christian Poncelet of the RPR, calling for such a dialog.
It m~an~ one of two things. Either these men hope to bring the Socialist
Party to renounce its proposals to its voters. And in this case, they
have badly miscalculated. Or their purpose is insincere. Let us admit
it. But we are waiting for them to reap the consequences. In politics, _
it is easy to multiply gtate~aents endlessly, to give oneself the air of
being progressive. But the reality is still the action one takes in
votes in Parliament. Let Mr Stasi or Mr Poncelet help us put an end to
the policies of the Barre government. Then we shall see whether we can
take their "willingness to be open" seriously.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Compagnie $uropeene d'Editions et Publications Periodi-
ques, 38, Rue de Bassano, 75008 Paris
9516 41
CSO: 31Q0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COUI:
~ RY SECTION FRANCE
PCF PRO-SOVIET STRATEGY IN RELATIONS WITH SOCIALIST PARTY
Paris PARADUXES in French 31 Mar 80 pp 5-7 -
[Article by Eti.enne MougeotteJ
- [Text] Georges Marchais is right. There is a powe~ful anti-communist
campaign bursting over the country. In the press, on the radio, on te?e-
- vision, in all the political organizations, among all the labor leaders,
except those of the CHT, a veritable deluge of accusations is being hurled
at the PCF.
But wnat is the cause and what is the effect? With PCF leaders--and the
secretary general in the lead--inveighing against the press, vilifying the
PSF, reprimanding radio and television, making accusations against capi-
talism, denouncing the govemment, stigmatizing imperialism, and all that
in terms which unpleasantly recall the style of the Fifties and the tone
of the coid war--is it any wonder that with spontaneous unanimity the
rightist press and socialist leaders, radio, television, and nonco~unist _
labor leaders, government figures and big money moguls find themselves
shoulder to shoulder in the effort to crush the Communist Party?
Let us be calm and with a cool head try to discover the reasons whfch have ~
led the PCF to abancion the Union of the Left in France in order to assert
its international solidarity with the Soviet Union and to abandon the way
of reformism to exalt that of revolution.
Three reasons come together to explain a shift which was probably begun
long before the official break-up of the Union o~` ~.he Left in September
1977.
" The first reason is specific to France, and concerns the increasing reali- _
zation on the part of :rench communis~t leaders that the Union of the Left
and the Common Program were mainly going ~o benefit the Socialist Party,
becoming not only the biggest leftist party, but even threatening to steal
from the PCF what it held most dear: its leadership of the working class.
It is not unthinkable that the PCF leadership came to this conclusion in
th~ aftermath of the presidential elections of ~974 but waited until
42
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
September 19:~7 to break up the Union of the Left officially in order to `
pocket their winnings in the municipal elections.
The second reason for the communist change ot course is international. It
consists of a new analysis of the balance of world power following the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Persuaded that, on the one hand, the socialist camp, with the aupport of _
a certair. number of sc-called nonalined countries of the Third World, is
in the process of showing its spots irrevocably, and that, on the other
= hand, the crisis of international capitalism could well be the final cri-
sis predicted in the Marxist vulgate, the French communist leaders think
- there is nothing further to be gaiuied from the Union of the Left, and
consequently they must shift all their efforts toward internationalist
solidarity with the Soviet Union.
Finally, a third reason, of a tactical nature and within the Conmunist
Party itself, explains these excesses of tone and language of the PCF
leadership. By provoking its adversaries and uniting them against it,
the PCF can employ a means of closing up ranks within the party and pro-
ducinQ ~ reflex of sacred unity in face of the attacks from the outside.
Those who ascribe the excesses of recent weeks to the temperament, the
character, or the style of Mr Marchais are fooling themselves. What
we are seeing is a strategic and tactical move which owes nothing to chance.
The P~F is falling ack into its ghetto in an orderly and deliberate way.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Compagnie Europeene d'Editions et Publications Periodi-
ques, 38, Rue de Bassano, 75008 Paris
9516
CSO: 3100 ~
43
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFF USE ONLY -
COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
DEBRE PROJECTS INFLATIONARY ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE INTO 1980'S
- Paris PARADOXES ir, French 31 Mar 8U pp 83-89
[Article by the former prime minister, Michel Debre: "A New Economic Policy
for the 1980's"] [on inflation, unemployment, E costs, government economic
policy, cutbacks in social services and standard of living, 1980 budget,
- ec onomic stagnation, cf with FRG__passages in slantlines in boldfaceJ
[Text) The decade of the 1960's was one of near=general prosperity. It was
- even better for France because it~s finances were being managed rigorously
and an incc,mes policy was ~ust starting up. The decade of the 1370's was
, characterized by erosion of international economic and monetary nechanisms,
the consequences of which were even m~re serious because of the laxity of
French fiscal administration. The features of ,the 1980's are imposing a
change because--and it is the least one can say--problems are go3ng to con-
- tinue and douhtless be exacerbated.
Since the beginning of the 1970's, it is indisputable that the essential
f ea ture of the French economy has been "overinflation." The causes ~f this
erosion are well known: a policy of easy money from 19T0-1972, a refusal to
campensate for the increased cost of energy from 1973-1978 with the least
grawth in purchasing power, a return to free pricing in 1978 without a cor-
resp~nding wage policy starting in 1978, f inally a less and less firm manage-
men t of gublic f inances. The result of this policy is, unfortunately, explo-
sive: while the rate of inf lation in France was roughly equivalent to that
in Germany from 1961-1973 (4.5 percent compared to 3.4 percent), it became
mor e than twice as high between 1974-1979 (10.8 Fercent compared to 4.3 per-
cen t). Tf we concede that.a nation's influence is inveraely proportional
to its rate of inf lation, we can better understand the changes in Europe's
balance of power in recent years...
- A Diminished Capacity for Resi3tance _
Enf eebled by inflation, the French economy inevitably manifests less capacity
to rpsist the international crisis. This crisi$--which is more and more
taking the form of war in the domains of energy, currency, and industry--
44
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
results in the foundering of the most vulnerable economies. Why then is
the rate of u:lemployment so high in France, Italy, and Great Britain? Why
is France the country with the greateet growth in unemployment in 1979
t+15.7 percent), while Gennany is--after Benmark--the country where ita
decline has been greateat (-11.8 percent)? The answer ie obvious: today,
unemployment is the direct consequence of inf lation.
A very recent illustration of this policy of expedience was given us in the
1980 budget.
This budget has in fact been a"great affair" even if the public has been
more excited about political opposition [to it], constitutional problens,
and recourse to the "question of confidence" than about the essence of the
subject.
The essence of the sub~ect is its v ery gravity and this explains everything.
The def icit wh ich by the end of the year will be close to 50 billion Fr. in
effect follows ceaselessly growing deficits: 1976: 18 billion; 1977: 22
billion; 1978: 34 billion; 1979: 37.4 billion. Also, the national debt is
reaching such a height that we will be condenned tc deficit for several years.
Appropriations dedicated to repayment of the debt in the 198~ budget have
thus reached 24.5 billion Fr, triple the level 3 years ago.
As in the previous years, this large budgetary deficit will be~ financed, at
least halfway, by promissory notea, or creation of money, The economies
accumulated for the other half will be at the e:{pense of investment.
As in prev ious years, finally, no reexaminati~n of the regulting state of
affairs will be undertaken. Most of the appropriations will be rechanneled
from one year onto the next, with inflation into the bargain, and some
additional expenses, with no questioning, however necessary, of priorities.
This state of affairs is not only contrary to the promises made, it ia not
only contrary to the austere prcnouncements we have heard so often: it is
very disturbing in respect of the future of France.
To go into the 1980's while pursuing this policy of systematically encourag-
ing inf lation would condemn to failure at the outset any intended efforts at
growth of investment, exports, or social justice. In truth, to conduct a
= successful new economic policy demands first of all that one wage a vigorous
war against inflation.
Why, the French are asking themselves, have we not succeeded in reducing the
inf lation rate when for 3 years government has made this its priority ob~ec-
tive? What good is it to slow down grawth or increase unemployment if even
these do not cut down inflation? How can we add economic stagnation ~o
overinflation?
45
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The German Example
_ Gennan policy gives us the answer. In this country in fact where the rate
- of inflation is only half that in France, af ter having been throughout past
years hardly one-third of ours, it has not- been necessary to increase unem-
ployment to fight inflation. The present rate of unemployment is the lowest
in 5 years. It is because strong action has been taken on production costs.
_ There can be no policy to fight inflation without a wage policy. The key _
- to hhe German success lies in the agreement b etween management and wage-
earners, an agreement supported by the federal bank and the public author- -
ities. This income policy, which was applied in France twice successfully _
between 1960 and 197~, has been re~ected since the re-emergence of inflation
in 1973. This was a mistake, and it is still a mistake. It is true that the -
labor union situation in France makes it diff icult�to have a contractual
policy on a national scale, and that contractual policies for individual
= professional branches or regions can in no way be substituted for a national
accord, when we speak of fighting inflation. The state must have more
direct responsibility. And it is this responsibility whicii for too r_iany
years goveYnments have not wanted to assinne.
- An Effort at Truthfulness
To work toward a true wage policy would require an effort at truthfulness.
Instead of lulling ourselves with the thought that our crisis is but tempo-
rary, instead of having faith that the tim~ will soon come when we will
_ have a society where people can work less, take longer vacations on paid
- leave, and retire sooner, the French should b e told that the French economy -
cannot support the style of life to which we have become accustomed and at
the same t~me cape with the expenses of the state, notably those for social ~
order, unless productions costs are not burdened each year by excessive in-
creases in every category. The international situation condemns us to make _
an extra ~ffort which alone can ne~it us to maintain the French standard of
living, the unity of the nation, and the strength of the state.
Doubtless an incomes policy will be difficult to enact, for to be accepted
~ it must impose many measures for the sake of social solidarity, especially
from the point of view of fiscal equality. B ut the longer we delay con- -
sideration of an income policy that is reasonable, the more we will find
ourselves involved in a spiral of inf lation, stagnation, unemployment,
impotence.
We will be told, doubtless, that the German budget is also in deficit and
that Germany is also having its problesns with public finance both at the -
state and regional levels. But the situation is different, particularly if
one takes into account the incames policy which keeps brakes on increases ~
in operational expenses, and if one considers that the Gexman deficit is for
- the most part the result of its efforts at equipage or of support to invest-
m~ent and research. It is not the same for us. Whether we speak of public
46
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4
- FOR OFFICIAL USE QNLY
or social fii~.ance, the permanent increases in opPrating expenses for several
yea rs do not allow us to devote the necessary sums to other kinds ~f o,~tlays -
- and Chey accentuate the inflationary character of our deficit. -
Toward a Voluntarist Economic Policy -
Constant inflation and at an elevated level thus permanently alters a11
economic policy. Now what we need is a voluntarist economic policy.
Hardly have we pronounced these words than the specters of state planning or
state socialism leap to the eyes of the reader or listener! It is an argu-
ment in bad faith. Voluntarism in economic policy is compatible with the
- spirit of enterprise and respect of the rules of an economy founded on net -
cos*_, as well as with international competition.
In our time, the fight against unemployment, the struggle for prosperity and
standard of living and also for the political strength of the nation, require
will power.
It is an act of will which could /dimini~h our-energy dependence/. This -
policy was for too long nothing but empty worde.
Thu s, we are 2 years behind the reasonable goals established in 1974 for
- our nuclear program, and at least that far behind in our program of energy
- econom ies. Greater efforts are clearly in evidence at present, and research
into new sources of energy has b een more effectively combined with previous -
approaches. In. this area there has been substantial improvement in recent
months and we should congratulate ourselves. The general ~ituation does
require more still, and on the other hand the increases which result from
inflation give to the sums expended a smaller return each year. A realistic
struggle against the basic causes of overinflation would give no vigor to our �
nuclear program and to research on all new forms of energy.
It is an act of will which would permit /a resumption in the growth of =
productive investment/. ~
From 1974 to 1978, productive investment in the private sector decreased each
year while it grew in Germany. Doubtless one could see at the beginning of
1979 some improvement, which was the best result of the frPeing of prices. -
But this new trend is weak and remains fragile. The efforts of the state
' through loans or transfers canna t suffice, that is, cann~t profit more than
a few enterprises. Efforts by b usiness leaders remain limiLed by increased
rates of interest. In this conn ection, worldwide inflation certainly plays ~
a p art, but the disparity Uetween Germany's investment possib ilities and our
own can be clearly seen when one compares German and French interest rates -
on long-term loans. We are so f ar behind that it would be fitting to estab-
lish compacts between those sectors of economic activity whose flourishing
is essential, compacts which could implement legislative programs established
in a given case for 3 or 5 years. _
47 .
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200094406-4
I
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
It is an act of will which should allow us to /recover contrul o�er our �
commercial policy/. -
- Our economy has, in the last 2 years, maintained the exports of which the =
French can be proud. Make no m~stake about it, this is the result of 20
years of effor~s by enterprises to modernize, and of the new orientation
of business leaders. W e can also say that the Common Market experience =
has had strong and beneficial effects on their behavior. However, we must ~
_ not rest on our laurels, however justif ied: we are obliged to do more.
, Unless someth ing unforeseen produces a decl.ine in consumption, oil prices
will remain at such a high level that new efforts in exports will be required
and this in turn will require in many sectors encourag~ent or coordinated
action from the state. This voluntarist attitude is all the more necessary -
sin~e competition on all export markets will be very lively among the commer-
- cial powers. -
One very serious problen is that of protecting the internal market, which
it is ofte~n said is incompatible with the growth of exports. The American, -
Japanese, and German examples prove the contrary. In reality, in the United _
States, Japan, and Germany, ta take 3ust thesF~ three states, administra- _
- tive measures or the establishanent of standar~s result in practical indus-
- tries. It is not inevitable, to take our o~n example, that some of our ~
textile industries should disappear, or that we forf eit new agr.oindustries.
- In erder not to appear tainted by protectionism, we use a new term: recap-
= turing the internal market. It is a more clever formulation, but the idea
is the same: to develop ways, by certain procedures, to favor manufactures ~
in light of internal consumption. And to understand what some of our compe-
titors are doing, it is not Malthusianism which moves them to act, but the =
saf eguarding of their national technol.ogies and of employmene against unfair -
competition. -
A reexamination of public and sociaZ f inancing, iiicome policy, new effort 4
at lessening energy dependence, new effor.t at exports and our internal
market, these directions all form a whole. They have been called for, in -
thecourse of recenC years, and in certain cases as I mentioned one could -
see progress; but we are still so far from realizing them that th~: years =
- ahead wil.t require of us at thP same timt, greater concentrated effort and
, actions equal to our words.
It is not possible to continue on the road of increasing unemp:Loyment. It
is not gossib le to continue along the road which by consequence of treasury ~
indebtedness aeprives us af a great indigenous, family-ariented policy.
- Does the state of the world /require us to reexamine our def ense budget,/
that is, an acceleration of those programs especially concerned with
_ nuclear deterrence? Our world is characterized by bellir_ose competition
and by insecurity. France must at the same time be found among the ranks of ~
J the victors i.n economic competition and also protect its security.
- 48
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4
= FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
That is to say that a modern financial and economic policy presupposes a
- neti,~ vision of societal policy and a new governmental conception of the
_ public wPlfare.
- The /nek~ vision of societal po2lcy/ must be audaciously af firmed. In the
_ years to come ~ae will not, except in family policy, be able to enlarge
_ significanrly either the field or the size of payments. The solidarity _
= which is a cond~tion for tt~is effort should b e characterized by ~ther -
directions: thus our housing policy, for much of the housing built in the ~
last 50 years should be not only modernized but totally replaced. Th~.
= younger generation is right in this respect to b e more demanding than the
older. There is also the new social direction of service for youth and for
all those--including young woman--who are not called to military service.
= Many are the social and cultural tasks of our collective life which neither
= the state ;~or the municipalities will be able to fulfill without this crea- -
tion, indispensable for cementing the society of t~morrow.
Finally, promotion azd participation should be a constant concern net only
= of the public authorities but also of educat4rs and business leaders.
~ The Public Welfare
= The impcrtance ~~f these social directions adds to the demands of economic
policy to demonstrate the utility or rather the necessity of adapting our
democracy to tim~s which do no~ forgive weakness. Let us be far-seeing
and struggle against not only the degradation of the authority of the
state but also against the contradictions which impair the functioning of _
= institutions. Let us not go back to the experience of the inter~-war years
when some democracies died and some of the greatest of the others nearly -
perished because they refused adaptations which, at the time, would have -
aiven political leadership a firmness suff icient to thwart the attempts
against the atate and against liberty. There are times in fact when demo-
cracies must rise up to the level of the public welfare and, in the inter-
~ est of the nation as of the rights of the individual, at the same time
- mobilize and direct public opinion throu~h a type of government supported
by a natiot~al assemblage and disposing of powers equal to its mission--
- the future of France.
All things han~ together. By starting from an apparently mode~t point, the
= budgetary defic.t, and describing from that point the vigor needed in eco-
nomic direcrions and the social conditions for their success, we end up on
= tne authority of the state, that is to say, politics.
; COPYRIGHT: 1980-Compagnie Europeene d'Editions et Publications Periodiquea,
38, Rue de Bassar.o, 75008 Paris
- 9516 "
CSO: 3100
49
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- r
COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE -
SUrAtARY OF CRITICAL THRESHOLDS IN ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE -
Paris PARADOXES in French 31 Mar 80 p 33
_ [Unemployment, industrial production, consumer demand, fnreign trade]
[Text] -
- Situatio~ Seuils Situetion
= 1~ ~ Favo~able ..2~., c?itiques 3~ ~ I~favorabie
Key: 1. Situation fiavorable
2. Critica3. thresholds
3. Situation unfavorable
.TOb ap~lications(Dec) ~,5 Demarxfes d'em~loi IDkcl t.5
C.v.s. [expansion QII- C.V.S. en milliuns
lmownJ in millions
~.o ~.o
=.s:.
~r i .
0.5 . . . . . . y~ ~ * -
- ~ iiia i t~......... 0.5
~ -
i;". _
~ p ' p
70 72 74 76 78 00 82
UNII~PLOYMENT
- This chart highlights t~ze extraordinary growth of unemployment over the
last 10 years and especially since 1973. It demonstrates, if there were
any need, that successive governmenta were not prepared to prepare against
~ what now 3ppears to be a constant feature of the French economy.
50
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
I
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Growth over 12 months (Dec) -
o~o o~o
- t5 Acrnisst`~~~N~~I cu: 1? n~nis 1[)n~ 1 t5
10 1p ~
- 5.. ~i,� g
~ ~
~ ~ i
� i
p .t 1 1 1 1 1, 0
70 72 76 7B BO 82
_ CONSITMER PRICES -
The gap between the period 1970-1973 and the period after 1973 a~pears
clearly. Except for the peak in 1974, it can be seen that inflation in
- consumer prices has remained steady at about 9.5 percent. On this level
the failure of the Barre Plan is manifest.
Annual growth
o~, ganainn �~o
n~~o~sse~~~F~~~ a~~~,~~~~ not includ d
t0 B T.P f!xrlus t0 -
5 ~~~Y;� . . T` . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
11~ i.: � _
I ~ '
0 . 't~ '.~I~ . . - . ~
_ 5 -5
_t0 ~ ~ ~ _10 '
70 72 71 76 78 80 82 -
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
In indu~trial production, annual growth shows, if it were needed to do so,
the b:eak in the grawth rate since 1973. Except for 1 year, 1975, growth
rates remained nea~ 2 percent per year. There too, we have a structural
factor which must be taken into account. French industry is no longer the
_ driving motor of the economy. . '
51
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Balance of trade/billions of Francs
801;~nc.~~ ~ ummeit:~elt�
~ 10 Mill~;~i~lr rlr Fianr.s
- ~ ~ - . . . . . . 0
-t0 _10 -
-20 _20
- ~ _30
70 72 74 76 7B 80 B2
FOREIGN TRADE -
.
- The situation is different with respect to foreign trade. The recovery
made fram 1976 to 1978 is manifest, but 1979 brought a relapse into deficit.
France has not yet reached balance in its international trade, despite the
excellent progress made by French exports.
COPYRIGHT: 1980-Compagnie Europeene d'Editions et Publications Periodiques,
- 38, Rue de Bassano, 75008 Paris
- 9516
CSO: 3100
52
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
-i
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
- FOR OFFICIAL U~E ONLY
~
- CUUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
CRYOGENIC MOTOR, SECOND LAUN(~i PAD FOR 'ARIANE'
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 26 Apr 80 pp 65-67
(Article by Pierre Langereux: "Im~,ortant Decisions on Space by a Limited
Council Meeting at the Elysee--60-Ton Cryogeni:c Motor and Second Launch Pad -
for Ariane")
(Text] The limited Councii of Ministers meeting devoted to space matters
that was held at the Elysee on 17 April 19801 took decisions of the highest ~
importance for the future of the Ariane launcher and for Europe's future in
space.
The Elysee made no comment on .this limited Council meeting, apparently called
in some haste. But the minister of industry, Andre Giraud, who took the ia-
itiative in calling the press together on the same day, in the presence of -
the general director of the CNES [National Center for Space Studies], Yves =
- Sillard, announced in effect that the Council has approved the construction ~
of a second complex for launching Ar.iane rockets at Kourou and of a new cry-
ogenic engine of high thrust (60 tons), permitting subsequent development of
tlie ARiane 5 rocket, the most powerful version of the present launcher.
Second Ariane Launch on 23 May =
The minister of industry announced that the next launch of the Ariane r.ocket
--the second test-flight launching (L02)--"will take place on 23 May."
Andre Gira-~d also revealed that the last of the four test-flight launches
(L)4) "will take place in February 1981," wYiich represents a slight lag (2
months) behind the previous forecasts.
At Least Four Launche~ per Year until 1984
- The future outlooks for the Ariane launcher are good, the minister of indus-
try declared. In addition to the first four test-flight launches, there ~
l. The limited Council of 17 April 1980 was held in the presence of the
president of the republic, the prime ministe.r, and *he ministers of in-
dustry (Andre Giraud), of defense (Yvon Bourges), of postal & telecom-
munications service (Norbert Segard), of transport (Joe1 Le Theule), of
research (Pierre Algrain), and of the budget (Maurice Papon).
53
FOR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
wi11 be, '~etween now and the beginning of 1984, nine European launchings of
- ~ ` Ariane rockets (Ariane versions 1, 2 or 3) to launch the Exosat satellite,
the two ECS's [expansion unknown], MARECS [expansion unknown] B, Spot, the
two Telecom 1's, and the direct-TV satellites TDF 1 and TV-SAT 1. Eight -
other export launches are also planned. Theae include one firm order and
two free options for INTELSAT, as well as five paid reservations for launch-
es for INTELSAT, for the ATT company, for the countries of the Arab League
_ (Arabsat project), and for one other customer who wants to remain anonymous.
This, on the best presumption, makes a total of 17 operational missiona be-
tween now and 1984 and a total of 21 missions from the first launching of
the Ariane rocket last Christmas. ~
Under these circwnstances, "the rate of production and launching of the
Ariane rockets will reach four launches per year between now and 1984," the
minister of industry declared. But the CNES will be capable of doing five
or even six launches per year (including one reserve launcher) during this
period with the existing launch pad, Yves Sillard specified.
Creation of a Second Launch Pad
- The limited C~ouncil acknowledged the ne~essity of beginning construction of
_ a second launch pad (ELA [Ariane Launching Complex] 2) at Kourou, mainly for -
launching the new Ariane 2 and 3 rockets.
The formal project for building ELA 2, with its schedule and costs, will be
presented to the next CNES board of directors meeting in June, and then sub-
mitted for government approval. _
- This second launch pad, which will be built close to (600 meters) the pres-
ent Ariane launching complex, will cost between 400 and 500 million francs.
� It is to be ready by the end of 1983-beginning of 1984. With the two launch
pads available at that time (the first one liaving been modified to launch
the new Ariane 2 and 3 rockets), the CNES will be able to carry out as many
- as 10 launches per year.
S;;~sequently, the second launch pad (ELA 2) will be mod~fied to launch the -
new Ariane 4 rocket.
~ Development af Ariane 2 and Ariane 3
'fhe minister of industry also announced that "the development program in
progress has the financial means to go as far as building the Ariane 3 ver.- -
_ sion." -
These new Ariane Z~nd 3 versions will be the onl~ ones used after the first
batch of six Ariane 1 rockets already ordered and presently under construc-
tion, Yves Sillard specified.
The Ariane 3 rocket will be available at the end of 1982-beginning of 1983.
- It will be able to put a big direct-TV satellite into orbit, or two telecom-
municationF ~~tellites simultaneously, the CIV~S general~di~rectar declared.
54
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Subsequently, it is intended to develop--also by Euxopean cooperation--even
more powerful versions of the European launcher: the Ariane 4 version is to
- be available ror 1985--looking forward to the eventual launching on INTEL-
SAT 6 satellites, wY~ich will appear starting in 1986--and the Ariane S ver-
sion is planned for the end of 1990.
The formal Ariane 4 project has not been presented to the limited Council, ~
for a decision is not necessary before 1981 (with financing beginning in
1982), with the launcher available 4 years later. The development cost of
. the Ariane 4 version will be about 400 million francs, in the same ordPr of
magnitude as for the Ariane 2 and 3 versions (360 million francs). ~
The Ariane 5 final version will make it possible to do launchinbs at costs
60 percent less than those of Ariane l,the minister of industry declared.
This rocket will be able to launch 10 tons into low orbit or a mini-space
- shuttle with a crew of two to five.
SEP Assigned the 60-Ton Cryogenic Motor
= The minister of indLStry annuunced that the limited Council had "decided to
_ begin the predevelopment program for the new cryogenic motor of 60 tons
_ thrust (HM 60) needed for building the Ariane 5 rocket.
_ rlore than 100 milli~n francs will be devoted to the initial work: 4 million
, is already provided and 7 mzllion more is planned for 1980, as well as 26
million francs in 1981, 35 to 40 million in 1982, and a like amount in 1983.
The feasibility study just decided on is to result in definition of the
technical specifications for the HM 60 engine in 1984. The development
scheduie will be fixed after conaideration by the CNES board in the coming
months.
The CNES has presently named the SEP [European Propellant Co) as the prime -
contractor for designing the 60-ton engine. But Franco-German cooperation
is planned for the complete development of the new engine. In particular,
- negotiations will be started to associate the FRG firm MBB [t~easerachmitt-
Bolkow-Blohm) in the project. -
Startup of Arianespace
As a result of the creation of the Arianespace company for production, mar-
- keting and launching of the Ariane rockets, the minister of industry de-
_ clared that "the problem of the relations between Arianespace and the Euro-
pean Space Agency (ESA) is now settled" (cf AIR & COSMOS, No 806).
Of the 11 ESA member countries concerned, 8 countries, representing about 94
percenr of the shareholdings, have already given their agreement to the
Fr~nch declaration (Spain and Ireland in the form of a statement of intent).
Only three countries--The Netherlands, Italy and Switzerland--have not yet
officially joined.
~
55
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
As for France, it is to present to Parli_ament shortly, for ratification, the
text of the ESA convention, already ratified by all the other member states.
Choice of the First French Cosnonaut in June
The program to prepare the first French astronaut, who will go into space on "
_ ~-board a Soviet Salyut station (in mid-1982) is proceeding as planned, stated
the minister of industry, announcing that the limited Council had confirmed `
the financing of the program for 1981 (18 million francs).
The CNES is presently drawing up a complete medical balance sheet for the
' five men and women candidates under consideration (cf AIR ~ COSMaS, No 807).
Discussions with the USSR on definition of the mission of the future French
astronaut will begin in May. The choice of t~e mission and selection of the
_ two candidates--the astronaut and the "understudy"--will be made in June
- 1980, Yves Sillard declared.
Agreement on Direct TV at End of April-Beginning of May
With regard to the satellite projects in progress, Andre Giraud announced in
particular that a detailed agreement between France and the FRG on the bi-
lateral TDF 1 and TV-SAT direct-TV preoperational satellite project is now
~ "very close."
It seems that several points remain to be settled; but the FRG officials
have quite recently made commendable efforts to accomodate the French ideas.
- The ir.tergovernmental agreement should thus be signed "within a very few
_ weeks"--theoretically "at the end of April or the beginning of May," Andre
Giraud specified.
- These satellites will be launched at the end of 1983-beginning of 1984. `
They will be built by a Franco-German group recently formed by Aerospatiale,
Thomson-CSF [General Radio Company), AEG [General Electricity Co]-Telefunken
y and MBB.
Startup of Telecom 1 and Spot
_ The framework for building new French Telecom 1 tQleco~nunications satel-
lites and Spot earth-observation satellites is in place, the minister of in-
dustry declared. The startup of the Telecom 1 project "has been delayed"
because of the military payload, and also as a result of "modifications of
transmission specifications not originally planned," the minister acknow-
ledged. The DGT [General Telecotrununications Administration] has had to mod-
ify the French satellite's aiming system and covering to enable Qther Euro-
pean countries (FRG, Italy and Great Britain) to use the telematics service.
The final negotiation of the Telecom 1 contracts with the industrial firms
should be completed in July, Yves Sillard believes. The Telecom 1 satel-
lites will be built under the prime contractorship of Matra, with Thomson-
~ 56
. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CSF for the payload. After an invitation to bid, Aerospatiale was also
chosen recently to do the heat control and the solar generator for the sat-
ellites. Other important systems have also been subcontracted to European
industry: the structure to Aeritalia (Italy), the attitude-control engines
to ERNO [expansion unknown] ~FRG), the power supply and wiring to BADG
- [expansion unknown) (Great Britain), the telecommunications equipment to
- SAAB [Swedish Aircraft Company] (Sweden), the antennas to INTA (National In-
stitute for Aerospace Research) (Spain), and the nutation damper to Fokker
(The Netherlands). ~
The industrial-construction phase of the Spot project is also to begin
shortly, with the launching of the satellite now planned for March-April
1984. According to Yves Sillard, the negotiations with the industrial firms
should be completed within 1 or 2 months.
The minister of industry also announced the setting-up of a"data-marketing
structure" for the Spot satellite to the benefit of the various users (IFP _
[French Petroleum Institute], IGN [National Geographic Institute], BRGM [Bu- -
reau of Geological and Mining Exploration], BDPA [Agricultural Production
Development Bureau], etc). This "structure" will very probably take the
form of a stock company in which the CNES will have a large share. The pro-
ject will be submitted next October for government approval.
Fou: New Meteosats
France also intends to "take part" in the project to build and operate new
geostationary weather satellites designed to succeed the present Meteosats,
with a view to improving weather forecasting (from the present 3 days to 6
days), the minister of industry announced.
The project provides for construction of four additional satellites (in ad-
dition to the Meteosat 1's and 2's), which will be launched at tt~e rate of
or~e about every 3 years, to cover Europe, Africa and the Middle Eset. The
French government hae therefore chosen an option that falls between the in-
~iustrial firms' numbers (three to five satellites).
- Exploitation of the data from these future satellites will be done by a new
European meteorological organization, EUMETSAT, with the French National
~ Weather Bureau and its European partners associated in it. The proposal is
presently under preparation.
"Master Project" for the 1990's
The minister of industry emphasized the "French desire not to fall behind in
- proceeding with the operations," in view of the foreseeable evolution of the
_ technologies in the coming years.
Thus, Andre Giraud unexpectedly revealed the existence of a"master project "
fcr the 1990's," presently under study in the CNES, with European coopera-
tion in view.
57
, ~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFII:IAL USE ONLY
This master project, which has not yet been submitted to the boards of the
CNES or the ESA, is aimed, the general director of the CNES specified, "at
acqu;ring for the 1990's the various technologies" to make it possible in
particular to build "large telecommunications platforms" and "automatic fac-
tories for fabrication in space."
The necessary technologies involve mainly intersatellite liaison, rendez-
vous and mooring in orbit, robot technology, recovery of space vehicles,
etc.
They could "take the concrete form of a mission at the end of the next dec-
ade," Yves Sillard declared. This mission would have three components:
--a relay satellite in geostationary orbit for transmission of data between
a satellite in low orbit and earth;
--a power module for supplying power to an automatic space factory;
--and an automatic space shuttle to moor to the module and bring back the
_ products made in the factory.
A later phase is for man in space, with the proposed Hermes mini-space shut-
tle with crew (of two to five); in fact, the CNES is presently considering
the comparative advantages of the automatic and piloted systems.
2.25 Billion Francs for the CNES in 1981
The French government has made budgetary provisions in line with its ambi-
_ tions, the minister of industry decl.ared.
Thus, the budget of the CNES will total about 2.25 billion francs in 1981,
as against 1.8 billion francs in 1980, Andre Giraud announced.
The 1981 budget includes 80 million francs of a total of about 300 million
: francs for the TD~' 1 direct-TV sat~eliite project, which is to start this
- year with about 100 miliion francs. T^ne French share of the direct-TV sat-
ellite project, develaped .}nint~y with ~he FRG, will in effect be cofinanced
}~y the (:NES ~and the Secretariat for Pcstal and Telecommunications Service
!which now has cversight of T~F).
But this budget includes only a part of the credits now devoted by France to
space. To it must be added the credits (more than 100 million francs) for
constructior. of the second launch pad at Kourou (if the project starts in
1981).
Nor does the 1981 CNES budget include the credits for the Telec.nm 1 satel-
lite project, financed almost entirely by the Secretariat for Postal & Tele-
communications Service (which is aver the DGT); but it does include the Min-
istry of Defense credits for the Spot observation satellite (for which a
military derivative, SAMRO [expansion unknown), is planned). I3either does
58
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
it include the credits for construction of the future operational weather
satellites to succeed the Meteosats; these future satellites will be charged
to the Ministry of Transport (which the Natienal Weather Bureau comes un-
der).
It can thus ~e estimated that the French space effort will total about 3 -
billion francs in 1981, Yves Sillard states.
For the following years, the CNES budget will be "rather down a little," un-
less the CNES again has "some very good ideas," the minister of industr;~ de-
clared.
Loc,king ahead to 1983, the CNES budget would thus fall between the 1980 lev-
el (1.8 billion francs) and the 1981 level (2.25 billion francs), depending
on the hypotheses--that is, with fewer or more "open credits" to permit the -
start-up of eventual new programs, Andre Giraud stated.
Furthermore, the CNES is preparing a"multiyear research research and devel-
opment program" which will be submitted for approval by the Center's board
of directors before 15 October next, the minister of industry announced.
COPYRIGHT: A. & 1980 _
11267
~SO: 3100
59 -
' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
. TITAAIIUM SPONGE FACTORY CONSTRUCTION DEBATED
Paris AIR ~ COSMOS in FYench 12 Apr 80 pp 11, 48 =
[Text] A report by the "basic materials, supply and competitiveness" working
group, which was established within the framework of the preparatory
activities of the Eighth Plan, has ~ust been disseminated by the French -
Office of Docimmentation.* This report once again underacores the wlnerability -
of.French industry, particularly as regards materials such as titanium and
cobalt, which are so important to the aerospace industry. -
Total Dependence of France _
An annex to thia report on the prospects for supplies of titaaium is of
special importance. In the f irst place, thia simex indicates that alchough
traces of rutile have been discovered in Brittany, French production of the
ore is nil; and supplies are totally assured by imports (238,000 tons of
raw material in 1978), principally from Australia aud Canada. France's
dependence on the basic material of t~tanium metallurgy; i.e., titanium
_ aponge, is total. On the other hand, ~.-ith respect to the production of
titani~ metal, alloys of titaniwn and semifinished producta, the intervention "
of the PUIC [Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlman Company] through Ugine-A~ciers was noted.
The report statea that as for t~ne use of titanium alloya in airplane eng ines,
certification procedures require that the manufacturing processes of these
alloys must be precisely identif ied. That is why~efforts to purchase _
titanium alloys from the DSSR have not been successful, since it refuses to
permit any control over such procedures. What is more, for the most vital
= e~gine parts, such as moving parts, it is also necessary that the sponge -
processinA methods themselves be precisely i,dentified. That is why sponge
from the USSR cannot be used for the moving parts, since the USSR refuses to ~
allow control of any kind. A feasibilitq study is being conducted by the PUK -
to evaluate the use of specially selected Japanese sponge for French engines
in IMI 685. Finally, the report notes rhat with respect to psrts cast in
*"Basic Materjals, Supply amd Competitiveness." Fre~ach Of�ice of Documentation.
- 29-31, quao Voltaire, 75340 Paris Cedex 07. 6t~ francs.
60
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY . _
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
titanium, Fra;ice has partially detached itself fzom the monopoly position -
enioyed by the United States in this sector, thanks to the construction of -
- the Messier-Arudy titanium foimdry.
Imbalance Between Supply and Demand
The report next takes up the s3tuation on the titanium market and emphaeizes
the imbalance between titanium sponge supply and dem~nd because of the
appearance of new users, particularly the nuclear industry, and the ir.creased
_ consumption of the aeronautical industry. The manufacture of the A.irbus
- airframe requires S tons ef titanium alloys (including 1.25 tons as the French
share); i.e., 10 times that of the Caravella airframe. Over 3 tons of
_ titani~ ,or titaniwn alloys, are also needed to manufacture an M-53 engine
_ inatead of the approximately 150 kilogram~ ior the Atar 9K50. For a CFM 56
- (French share), about 1.2 tons of ti+tan~~mm or titanium alloy are needed; ~or "
- Fi CF 6 50, about U. 3 ton ;is needed (F~rench sha~ e) .
The rapid grawth of ordexa from the world aeronautical industry since 1977
has greaLl.y increaaed tihe demand for tit~nium. The g~rowth rate of conaumption _
duriag the period covered 'by the Ei~hth Plsn will be 14-26 percent. Since
productive capacity i~ limi.ted and certiain countriea have stopped their
- deliveries, prices have increased while delays in delivery have occurred.
~ This situati~n can only be aggravated. We are in danger of quickly reaching
~ a situation df acknowledged shortage; and there is no doubt that France,
- whic'~ is totaZly depenaent on imports, is coday facing a profound and lasting
- crisis in re~ard to its supplies of titanium aponge. ~
- The report goes on to underscore the fact that titas~ium is one of the very
= rare metals for which France has the capabflity of d~veloping a totally _
integrated industri,al process, from extraction of~ the are S:~ rhe final product.
The r~alization of this ob~ective supposea the creation on natfonal territory _
_ of a titanium sponge production capability. '~he const;ruction ~n France of a
titan~.uun aponge production plant is, therefore, simult~neous~y a neceas~ry
condition and a mandatory point of paesage of cm~e of the ei.~ ma~or optiona
- af the Eighth Plan: "ta reduce our dependence in energy and raw tnateLials."
This will also contribute to the realization of that ot~er option of the -
E~ghth Plan, namely "the development of a competitive industry."
~ Cobalt and Composite Materials ~
The report also sugg~sts that [based on the aetion of] Frencta investors in the -
future in the cobalt sector, and particularly becas~sP of the increased uae of
alloys by the aeronauti~~al industry demand could risa by 1-$ percer.t per year.
This report also discusses the use of composite material~ by tne aeronautical
industry and the perspe~tives for use of these materials in the space aector,
= such as high resistance ceramics for high temperature structural applications. ~
The report also emphaeizes that the a.eronaut~cal in.dus~ry hae entered a new ~
era of innovation in the uae of new methods o� proiluc~ion to not on~.y incresee
61 . r-
FOR OF~ICIAL USE ONLY
~ -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
the quality of finished products but.also to better master the costs involve3.
As a matter of fact, during the last 5 or 6.years, international economic
development taas brought about a l.arge tncrease aa the order of 60-1.00
percent in the nrices of alloys used ~n the aeronautical sector. This
escalation of prices has caused a con~lete reexamination ~f the use of alloys
with respect to tonnage at the industrp level. Oae of the basic ob~ective.s -
- set forth is the constructian of pilot process~ng plants [ebauches] near the
coa~~s compared to the traditioabl techniques of forge and fovndry. The
report underlines the fact ttvit these new techniques require large industrial
reaources which aze already being used extensively by the Jnited States. TEie
report concludes that "with a view to reducing our industrial dependence and
to maintaining a capability to produce competitive airplane engines in France,
both in the technical and cost sectors, it is necessary to master the advanced
processes which are ~necessarq to assure sueh production. This involves:
, Being permanently informed about new developments abroad;
Having available the persannel staffing and study laboratories adapted to
these needs;
Assuring the installation of the productian resources wi~hin the desired time
_ frames."
COPYRIGHT: A. ~ C., Paris, 1980.
8143
CSO: 3100
62 -
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
!
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY �
_ COUNTRY SECTIC~N FRANCE
BRIEFS
MIL"iTARY PROPAGANDA BROADCAST--On 20 June, aver TV channel TF-1, TV viewers
will see a live broadcast ~howing General [Guy] Mery [chief of the armed
forces general staff] putting the French armed forces on alert from his under-
ground command post at the Armed Forces Operations Center. Aircraft takeoffs,
~ naval maneuvers and ground forces exercises will enable Frenchmen to get a
close view of the military training being given to their children. The program
will be shown during the time period normally allotted to "At the Theater This
Evening." [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 5 May 80 p 27)
SDECE GRUriBLING--There is grumbling in the French secret.servi~e. "Georges,"
the new head of the action arm of SDECE [Foreign Intelligence and Counter-
Intelligence ~ervice], has undertaken the reestablishment oi Prussian disci-
~ pline. Everyone in spotted dungarees and "blackface," doubtless an ideal
way to camouflage a secret agent. But the men of the action service, com-
mandos, initiated into exotic languagea or parachute ~umps with delayed canopy
' opening, consider this return to the "GI" ritual offensive. And they are mak-
- ing it known with ill humor. [Tpxt] [Paris L'EXPRESS in French 19 Apr ~0
p 143] 9516
I'CF REPORT--Gecrges Mgrchais's abrupt switch in for~ign policy is clarified
in a confidential PCF report. In all the trouble spots around the world,
the balance of forces is changing in favor of the communist bloc, this text
explains. Its victory is ineluctable. This study was prepared by the Com-
munist Conference of Paris. Its principal author is a permanent staffer,
Gerard Streiff, a deputy to Mar.ime Gremetz, who is responsible for the PCF's .
international affairs. Convinced that world tension is going to continue -
growing, Georges Marchais has decided to beef up the Gremetz team. From now
on, it will be charged with supplying him with more ana?ysea and syntheses.
[Text] [Paris L'EXPRESS in French 19 Apr 80 p 14?] 9516
CSO: 3100
63
' FOx OFPICIAL US~ ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4
,
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
~ -
= EVER INCREASING RfJLE 0~ COAL AS ENERGY SOURCE
Rome ENERGIA E MATERIE PRIME in Italian Jan-Feb 80 pp 35-44
(Article by Paolo Massacci: "Role of Coal in the Economy of Energy Sources"]
[Excerpts] Coal will certainly have an ever increasing -
role aaiong the various energy sr,~1rces. '~fierefore,
- greater attention must be paid to conditions of pro-
3uction and utilization, in order to achieve custs more
competitive with liquid fuels.
Italian Coal Market
In Italy, the contribution of solid fuels to energy production has proved ~
to equal 6.5 percent, compared with 67.3 percent for the contribution of
_ liquid fuels, with regard to their gross domestic consumptio:. in 1977.
- It is realized that the consumption pattern is somewhat different from the
pattern in the other leading ~ountries of the [European] Community (Bel-
_ giim?, France, Germany, United Kingdom) and from the Co~nunity pattern as
a whole for which a contribution of 21.7 percent solid fuels and 53.9 per-
_ cent liquid fuels was recorded, in 1977, as p~imary s~urces of energy in
the total g~oss constunption.
Yn Italy, therefore, the use uf the two principal e..ergy sources comes out
to be equal to close to i: 1 ~ in tY~e ratio between solid fuEl .and- 1~~quid
fuel, coa;pared with a ratio nigher than 1:3 for Europe and a still higher
ratio, equal to about 1:1.5, if world energy cons~nption is taken into
account.
Therefore, Italy seems to be lagging seriously with regard to the world
trend to increase the use of coal in the productinn of energy. There was ~
. a modest domestic production of lignite (1.8 million metric tons in 1978)
compared w~th a supply of mineral coal estimated at 1.9 million me~ric
- tons, with a mud~r~te increase in absolute value in comparison with the
previous year. -
64 -
~ FOR OFFICIAi.. USE Oh'LY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The National Energy Plan, which anticipates coal consumption on the order ~
_ of 20 million metric tons in the short range, certainly i~tends to modify -
- the present pattern of supply o~ energy sources, but it must be pointed
out that the consumption pattern will probably remain, at any rate, far
from the pattern in the leading industrialized countries and worldwide
trends.
In any case, in order to achieve the objective established in the PEN [Na-
= tional Energy Plan], it is necessary to establish a coal supply policy op-
, portunely that must make use of sizable investnent~activity abroad in
mining companies to be guaranteed in prices and quantities.
- In the present state of available technologies, Italian rPSOUrces are, in
fact, capable of ensuring only a limited contribution to the fixed national
requirement. Moreover, it is necessary to accelerate the proceas of devel-
- opment and, therefore, of utilization of domestic r~sources, starting with
_ Sulcis coal capable df satisfying 15 to 20 percent of the above-mentioned -
consumption level.
_ Acquisition of solid fuel energy sources requires ENI [Dlational Hydrocar-
bons Agency], no differently from what has already been done by the other
oil companies, to penetrate definitely into the coal market, adjusting its
own structures and accelerating a process of acquisitinn of new operating
ureas, already unders~ay, moreover, by the state agency.
Utilization Prospects of Sulcis Coal
~ The largest coal field in Italy, meetinc~ the needs of large coal consv.mers, -
, is located in Sardinia, in the vicinity of Porto Vesme.
A coal horizon of the subbituminous coal type is located at an average .
clepth of 500 to 600 meters, with re~ources amounting to many hundreds of
million metric tons of crude coal.
~ Economic considerations stemming from a new point of view on mine working
~nd from an updating of the mining plant, also in the light of a~ecent _
series of dri.llangs, have made it possible to determine that the economi- _
cally workable reserves amount to around 100 to 150 million metric tons,
u~dating the previous ENEL (Na~iorial ~lectric Power Agency] estimates going ~
back to 7 years ago and corresponding to an obsole,te mining structure and
a different market situation. The level of reserves seems adequate to en- -
sure for a long period of time (30 to 40 years) the supply of electric and
steam powerplants existing in the vicinity of the mine with an annual con-
sumption on the order of 13.6 to 16.3 million calories, or 2.5 to 3 mil-
~ lion metric tons of washed coal and, therefore, 3.5 to 4 million metric =
tons of crude coal at 4,SQ0 calories a metric ton, dependzng on the degree
of utilization of the powerplants and on the yield of washing to make the
product r~eet the users' specifications.
65
FOR OFFICI~ L'SE O~v'LY -
1
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
_ In order to achieve these production objectives economically, a project
has to be developed that will provide for abandor.ment of extraction methods
and the introduction of a new mining stn~cture adjusted to the attainment
_ of high productivity with the introduction of more m~dern technolugical
- methods in a production structure for which high professionsl qualifica-
tions are required anci, therefore, a transformation of the traditional
_ role of the miner, "se.rws ad metalla" [sla~~e to mines] .
The investment needed for carrying out this undertaking has been estimated,
somewhat liberally, by SAMIM [expansion unknown] to be on the order of 170
billion lire wit:h direct employment of ,abou~ 1,~00 unit5,
, Achievement of the.project is entrusted to the CARBOSULCIS [Sulcis Coal]
Company, establishe3 as the result of a national law with state capital
{EGAM [Agency for the Management of Mineral and Metallurgial Concerns]
and then ENI-aAMIM) amounting to 61.5 percent and with capital from the
Sardinian Autononaus Region EMSA [Construation Company] for the remaining
� 38.5 percent.
In spite of tk~e di~'ficulties encountered by the company in the first
- phase for the transfer. of ENEL mining shares, for reconstitution of the
profession~l quality of ~che employees in place of the old miners who all
went over to ENEI,, for the uncertainties of its te~.;:nical and administra-
tive center, the desire expressed by SAMIM to give development and en- '
eouraqement to the program for reactivating the Sulcis coal field must
be put down as positive, although only recently. -
~ I;1 fact, while the prospecting phase is nearing conclusion, an effort to -
achieve th~ new infrastructures of the mine is being observed and steps -
are being taken to strengthen the technical structure and to increase the
employment of workers with the opening of a new worker personnel recruit-
_ ing phase. -
= Diffxculties and Problems in Coal Utilization
_ Concerning Sulcis coal, it should be pointed out that the main difficulties
- in its use stem from the high sulfur content (6 percent in the crude coal).
In derc~ation of what has been s ~
' pecified in every other circumstance, Law -
393, of 1975, explicitly provides for the utilization of Sulcis coal in
powerplants located at the mouth of mines; in other words, with regard _
to the favorablP atmospheric conditions of the site.
_ Nevertheless, the problems steIIani,Zg from the high sulfur content must not
be underestimated and steps must be taken opportunely to acquire plants
~ for desulfurizing the coal or the smoke or both, and technologies for im-
proving the fuei. Projects for coal gasxfication are moving in this c3i-
rection and are being encouraged not only insofar as they do not represen~t
_ an obstacle to the immediate resumption of production in the Sulcis fiald,
but also ensure its development and better exploitation in the medium term. -
- 66
FOR OFFICIAf. L'SE OhrLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~ Advantageous technologies tvith a rather broad application are involved for ~
whose development a vast effort is being made all over the world by research
and industry. -
It should also be pointed out, with regard to the use of solid fuels in
general that there are limitations on their combustion in I~alian thermal -
powerplants associated with their construction features and the utility of
the production sites, with regard both to coal storage capacity and the
ability to process the coal and to eliminate the ashes.
The PEN should propose to overcome these disadvantages as much as possible -
to ensure maximum versatility of thermzl powerplants and to make maximum -
diversification of supplies possible. _
Further difficulties may stem from the emergence of new ecological rules
with regard to the discovery that snzroe types of coal, and more especially
lignite, release considerab'_e amounts of radioactivity during their com-
bustion, somefi.imes exceeding appreciably the radioactivity coming froan
nuclear powerplants with the same power.
Moreover, matters that are still controversial are involved, as~is evi-
~ denced by the controversial discussions in progress in the United States.
AlthoLgh they cannot be generalized, the dangers exist and must not be
underestimated. Therefore, a great effort is needed in research to make -
better utilizati~n of coal possible with ma~cimum safety.
The foregoing precautionary observations cannot, h~wever, move the role
that must be reserved for coal to a subordinate position, as is emphasized
by the Commission of the European Communities in its report in May of this
year [sic): "The importance of coal as a future source of energy requires
that steps be taken urgently toward a community policy on coal." -
This importance was confirmed recently in the conclusions of the summit
- meeting of the industrialized countries in Tokyo: "We are committing our
~ coantries to increasing as much as possible the use, production and ex-
changes of coal without harming the environment. We shall seek to replace
oil with coal in the industrial and electrical sectors, to encourage im-
piovements in the transportation of coal, to maintain positive attitudes
with regard to investments for coal projects." _
A Pc~licy for Coal
In the light of the foregoing economic observations, nowever, coal will be
able to play a constantly more important role among energy sources, if
. greater attention is paid to production and utilization conditions by
achieving costs constantly more competitive with the equivalent cost of
l.iquid fuels.
The need arises from the preceding remarks, also for our country, to de-
termine a suitable role for the utilization of coal within the framework
of a r..ational energy policy.
67 -
FOR OFFICI~i. L'SE OIv'LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
As was alsa pointed out in the resolution of the AIE [International Econo-
mists Association], in May of the present year [sic], this involves the pre-
paration and implementation of a program of research, development and c:emon-
stration of technologies for mining, transporting and burning coal.
- In addition, the problem of constructing new electri: powerplanta or of re-
placing existing ones burning coal exclusively or primarily comes up.
It is also necessary for research on technologies for converting coal into
~ liquid or gaseous fuels to be developed in our country al~o, includinq
setting up pilot plants. For example, Sulcis may be a site for installing
this kind of plant in arYticipation of a subsequent development of the pro-
_ graie tor extracting coal to be used as a source for a wider distribution
of energy in Sardinia.
It is likewise necessary to introduce a plan of operations that will en-
sure adequate amounts of coal supply in the framework of planning for the _
utilization of differentiated sources of energy.
In the light of the foregoing remarks, coal cann~t be set up as an alterna-
tive energy source to our country's exclusive use of oil, but, rather, it
is proposed as an energy source to which greater attention and importance
should be devoted in a coordinated system in which every available source
of energy must find a place or, at any rate, must be�:taken into consider-
ation.
~
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "Energia e materie prime"
10,042
CSO: 3104
68
FOR OFFICIAi., L'SE Oh'LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY =
COUNTRY SECTJ.ON SPAIN
BRIEFS
'MUNDO OBRERO' MAY CLOSE--Spanish Communist Party [PCE] leaders are looking
into the possibility of closing down MUNDO OBRERO, the party's official _
daily newspaper, due to the enormous debts that have been incurred. A1-
though the PCE only publicly admits to a 33 million peseta deficit, sources
within the party affirm that it exceeds 100 miliion pesetas. [Text]
[Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 11 May 80 p 5]
SOVIET VISIT--A visir to Spain by an official Soviet labor union delegation
has remained an absolute secret. The Soviet delegation, invited by Workers
Commissions, the labor union close to the cor~unist party, did not partici-
_ pate in any public activity. Workers Commissions provided no information _
nor did it provide thP customary joint communique. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16
in Spanish 11 May 80 ~ 5]
- CSO: 3110 _
69
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COUNTRY SECTION SWEDEN
INDUSTRY CHIEFS POLLED ON FALLDIN GOVERNMENT AFTER NUCLEAR VOTE
Stockholm VECKANS AFFARER in Swedish 27 Mar 80 p 3, 4
[Text] If the confusion over the energy question is now finished, the price
of the referendum is that a portion of the confidence that the business
world had in the government has been eroded, This ia how the reaction can
be interpreted am~ng the 100 big business leaders who participated in a poll
- by VECKANS AFFARER after the event. ~
Nearly half of these would like to see another government combination than
the one now in office.
111~1~
pa~rtilaoalition vill ni
. . ~
se ~ .
Q~
~ ~ 2 ~
- ~ e~ Moek~n ( 3 )
~~~~4) ~+r~~~0
41 ~�a'~t -
~ ~
aeidi~ol~st~m ?
n~c .
(5 )
- KEY: (1) Which party coalition would you prefer to see in the government?
(2) Do not know - 12x
(3) Bourgeois t'hree-party government - 48X
(4) Other ccmbinations outside the blocs - 13X
(5) Coalition government with social democrats - 27X
70
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONZ.Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[Caption below] A majority of decision makers support the three-party
government. Many, however, believe that the economy requires broad political
solutions and would like to see different coalition alternatives. ~
On the question of which government combination they would prefer, one-fourth
answered that they wanted a broad coalition government. That ie an old wish
from sections of business worYd which, according to them, have acquired new
power in the boriowing economy that Sweden is going thm ugh.
Managing Director K-G Svedberg of Philipsona is one of thoae, saying "As
long as the political blocs have not been cracked by the referendum, I would
prefer to see the blocs entirely broken and the government strengthened with
social democrats."
- Managing Director Ake Nilsson, Navigator, said, "What we need is an aggressive
program which runs over a longer time than the existing mandate period. With
a coalition government of the Swiss type the politicians cou~d stop leering ,
at each other."
It was noteworthy that six business leaders really wanted to see a coalition
between the conservatives and the social democrats.
The relatively cool attitude *_oward a bourgeoi~. three-party government was
- reflected in the answers to the following question, "How is your confidence
in the government after the 'yes' victory?" Forty-one said they had little,
47 had rather much, and 5 had great confidence.
(1) ' ~
i i ~ `
~
_ , I' ~
~ ~
~ -
~ , _
Ban em ar 1 reta are std4t~~ helbjtr-
tat upp bakom reYerin~en.
KEY: (1) Confidence in the government
(2) Great confidence - 5%
71 ~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(3) Rather much - 46~
' (4) Litt~e - 41X
(5) Do not know - 8X
[Caption below] Only 5 of 100 business leaders wholeheartedly support the
governm~nt .
The 100 ~usiness leaders who participated in VECKANS AFFARER's poll regresent
companies with a total business of 381 billion kronor and which have altogether
898,000 employees.
In the government which still has 2 and 1/2 years to serve, its prime minister
should be Thorbjorn Falldin, according to a majority of the business leaders
_ (70 in all). Several explained that they "forgive" the Center Party leader
because of the clear declaration of loyalty to the government that he made
Sunday after the counting of votes.
Managing Director Thorbjorn Ek of Hexagon said, "The vote was no defeat for
Falldin, and neither was it for the 'no' side. Thorb,jorn Falldin ahould
remain in the government as xepresentative for the very large minority. He
can then pertaonally lead the work of bringing forth completed sources of
energy."
Of the 30 who would now prefer to see Falldin withdraw, m::~~t of them want
Gosta Bohman to be the new prime minister.
Nils G. Asling's popularity has not been much reduced in spite of his supp~rt
- of line 3. ~Jnly 16 believe that he should heed the advice of the Federation
of Industries and retire.
A myth can now probably be laid to rest--the one that the energy referendum
would stop investments. The question, 1�Have you postponed investment decisians
while waiting for the referendum?" was answered n2gatively by 92 decision
makers. The other. eight can point to increased in~estment decisione worth
altogether 1.3 billion. It should, however, be note~ Ithat thia includea
SCA's [Swedish Cellulose Company] planned 800 million kronor investment in
Ortviken and Granges Aluminum's planned expansion at Sundsvall of 300 million
kronor.
Another ma,jor company which has stayed awake is Skaadia lnsurance Company,
which has increased its investments. "We have been careful Ln the stock
market. Behind this lies the conviction that the stock m3rket would have
been very adversely affected by a negative vote," says Skandia's finance
' director, B~orn Wolrath. He thinks now that business has already d~:scounted
the election decision.
Nearly half of those questioned (45) are suspicious of intentions to stog
nuclear power development after 12 reactors. Of these, several expressed
the belief that increases in the price of oil are reaching the point that
a new nuclear program must be worked out for the period after 1990.
72
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
"What is surpzising in this debate is that nobody seriously shows any
concern over a sudden lacl: of oil," says Managing Director Sture Odner.
"Therefore I don't believe that the halt is going to last. Twelve reactors
is not a holy number."
~ Forty business leaders believe, however, that the final nuclear power program
is now set. Fifteen anawered "Don't know." "Unlike the politicians, we
in the business world know how impossible it is to predict the future," said
_ one who wanted to remain anonymous.
One clear hope from the business community is that Sweden will now allow its
uranium to be mined. Eighty-two of those questioz~ed hope that Ranstad wi11
now be exploited--only 16 were against,
, Falldin's Double Role Is An Obligation
The belief that the nuclear power question is now settled is naturally not
realistic.
The many comments of thia nature are intended more to pin down Thorb,jorn
~ Falldin and the Center Party with "the meaeage from the people" than to give
assurances that the problem is over,
The prime minister has conceded that the safety interpretation of the Nuclear
Power Plant Act which was the basis for the Liberal Party government's grant
of permission to activate reactors seven and eight will continue to apply.
That is naturally essential.
But there still remains the question of reprocessing, which Thorb~orn
- Falldin very correctly emphasized on election night. According to the
Nuclear Power Plant Act, a contract is required for reprocessing of used
fuel. Such reprocessing is contracted for operation of react.~,ra seven
and eight until 1990. For reactors nine and ten the contracted reprocessing
service will laet no longer than the middle of the 19$0's. And while
waiting for international agreement on how plutonium from the reprocessing
will be handled there will be no new contracts or guarantees for reproceeaing.
T!;e alternatives are storage of waste products until the reproceasing service
is resumed, or direct storage for which further research is necessary.
We gueas that Thorb~orn Falldin in his dual role as nuclear power administering
prime minister and leader of. the Center Party finds it both urgent and
necessary to do the most that he can about these matters.
- P. G. Gyllenhammar Says, "Forget The Campaign And Support Falldinl"
[Interview with P. G. Gyllenhammar, President of Volvo]
[Question] What have we learned from this referendum?
73
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4
FOR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY
[Answer) We have learned where the people stand. I have always believed in
a clear majority for activating the reactors and a large w te in favor of
line 2, and that is what hapgened.
But I h~ve also teen entirely against the idea of a referend~. forcing people
to look upon thia queation in isolation. It has eaken too much power and
resources.
For the same reason I do not favor a referendum on the employee investment
funds--referenda should be about things which have the highest priority -
, for the voters. We can take care of ourselves according to the Swiss model. -
[Question] What should the govemment do now? -
[AnswerJ Now they should keep their distance and ob~ectivity--the economic -
debate is not abaolute. The government can have an ineight on the problem
but can do very little. Lack of knowledge is very risky in wage negotiations. _
SAF's [Swedish Employers' Confederation] analysis of the situation is one
that very few dispute, and it agrees with the economists of LO [Swec;ish Trade
Union Confederation]. SAF truly believes that we are in a difficult
- situation and in this situation I have no difficulty in wholeheartedly -
_ aupporting SAF. I have been concerned about it since the mid-1970's--in ~
1975 I was alone in suggesting a wage freeze.
[Question] LO can handle a four-month conflict. How long can Volvo manage?
[Angwer] A totxl conflict would shortly have a severe effect on Volvo. 1'he
best would be not to have a conflict, but the society would be making a
mistake if SAF could not keep its credibility and stand fast with what they
said. '
But I do not think that LO is showing militancy, only firmness.
[Question] What do you say to LO's suggesti~n of a social democrat-libersl-
center government?
[AnswerJ That would perhaps be good from LO's standpoint, but the solution
- of a coalition government should not be taken unless the country is in a real
crisis. It is like referenda--it is more important that the country is led
by a political philosophy. I do not see any signs that the conservatives
. are dev~uring the others in the government. Saying that is an excessively
one-sided way to aver-em~hasize the importance of the conaervatives.
[Question] Should Thurb~orn Falldin remain as prime minister?
[Answer] Falldin should lead the country. He was not elected merely so ehat
line 3 would win. And the entire center stands behind Falldin, while the
social democrats and the liberals are divided throughout all the lines. _
- 74,
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OF~ICIAL USE ONLY
Falldin also made an unusually balanced contributi.on on voting ni$ht. It =
is ~ust as well to put aside what all the cabinet ministers said during the
- campaign. First they said that the people shall decide, and then they go
out and eay that they have decided for the people.
COPYRIGHT: Ahlen S Akerlunda tryckerier, Stockholm 1980
9287
CSO: 3'_09
75
FOR OFFICTAL USE ONLY . -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COUNTRY SECTION SWEDEN
INFLATIONARY SPIRAL BEGINS TO REDUCE BUSINESS OPTIMISM
_ Stockholm VECKANS AFFARER in Swedish 27 Mar 80 pp 54, 60
' [Text] Sweden has comp out of the past year's wave of =
inflation considerably worse than other industrial
countries. Between February 1979 and February 1980
the Swedish inflation rate--measured over the 12-month
period--has increased by almost 150 percent, from 5.5
percent to 13.6 percent.
That is more than any other industrial country. Japan comes next, with an
inflation rate slightly more than doubled. But th~re the continual devalua-
tion of the yen has contributed to driving up domestic prices.
Sweden's standing in the inflation league has therefore become much worse. =
One year ago Sweden was almost a low inflation country with price increases ,
far below the OECD average. But after several rapid strides in recent
months we are well above the average for industrial countries. Only the
United States, England, and Italy now register a larger 12-month increase.
Even if Sweden is the worst, inflation rates have increased in all countries.
Nor is there any sign of improvement. Only Switzerland can point to a
decline. The inflation rate there went down from a high of 5.2 percent in
November to 4.1 percent in February.
An especially spectacular worsening has taken place in Norway. There they
had, with Austria, the lowest inflation rate in OECD during 1.979--~ust
- 4.7 percent. But then Norwegian consumer prices increased by 2.7 percent
in January and February and the 12-month increase thereby went to 7.4
percent. Businesses were acting quickly to regain the losses which they
experienced during the 15-month price freeze which expired at the end of
- the year. But this does not bode well for the spring wage negotiations.
On the average consumer prices in the industrial countries rose 12.7 percent
during the 12 months up to and including February 14$0. Increases were -
greater after the previous oil crisis--in November 1974 prices in the OECD
countries were 14.6 percent above the level of one year before.
76
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4
I
- FOR OI'FICIAL USE ONLY
?.11 the preciictions that the inflation rate would begin to decline have up
to now been pushed into the future, It also se:~ms that the energy price
increasea have not yet been felt in the consumer prices in many countries.
There is still a certain risk of new oil price increases and even other raw -
material prices can drive up the general inflation level. At the same tima
demands for wage ircreases will lceep inflation alive for the time being.
On the other nand the economic policies of today are more aimed at fighting
inflation than they were in the mid-1970's. Then the policies in several
countries were relatively expansive--there was an attempt to hold demand
high and employment down even though this caused higher inflation. The OECD
especially recommended measures to stimulate the economies of the larger
countries to speed up the world~s economy.
~ Now the ideas are changed. Already early in 1979 the economic policies of ~
m~st countries were being tightened up with the expressed objective of fighting -
_ inflation. Most of all it is monetary policy that is being used. That is
- noted in the record high interest levels in many countries, something which
also natural?y contributes to high inflation rates.
- These pol.icies lead to low growth and prob~bly new unemployment records. But
it should also lead to stopping the increase ~f inflation rates in the
industrial countries during the spring.
Next Raw Materials :~oom Is Coming In 1982
(Interview with Christopher Stobart, Chief Analyst at the Co ~nodities _
Research Unit Ltd ~n London]
_ [Ques~ion] After a violent increase to a top level of about 1300 pounds
- per tor., copper is now down at the same price level of one year ago, 99G
pounda. Is the copper boom finished? ~
(Answer] The immense ~rice increase last month is mainly explained by a
spectacular fever which spilled over from gold and silver. Speculative
capi.tal began to find ~cld and silver expensive in January. People took
their gains in these metals home and went over to copper. After last
mc~nth~.s rapid increase in interest rates in the world it began to be
expensive to have capital in non-interest-bearing metals. One can get .
neariy 20 percent interest in banks in the United States. F
[Question] 41hat do you believe is a reasonable price level for copper for
the rest of thp year?
[Answer] We believe in a copper price level in 1980 of around 800-1000
pounds. Because of high interest rates around the world the governments
have more or less programmed the expected recession to arrive this year,
That will cause a continued fall in the price of copper. But in June this
= year the 3-year wage contract comes up for the large American copper producers.
_ 77
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200094406-4
:,1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
, Tt is almost customary with these wage negotiations that the industry will =
be hit by srrikes. One estimate says tnat 40,000 tons of production can
be lost, which will certainly ca~ise prices to rise. That will temporarily
bai~nce the economic decline in aemand and price. Toward the end of the =
_ year we also believe in an increase in production in the copper industry =
which will probably drive up production over consumption for the first
time in several years. The prices will therefore fall, but at a rather
slow rate, we believe. But since the rate of investment in the industry has -
been low for many ;~ears, a rather small incraase in demand will ~oon place -
p~essure on production capacity and price,
- (Question] Also the price of aluminum has fallen back from a ton level of ~
just over 900 pounds per ton in January 1980. Do you foresee ~ continued
decline from today's price of about 860-870 pounds per ton? _
_ [AnswerJ No, we believe that al uminum prices are going to remain at a hfgh
level and perhaps even climb for the short term. We are on the verge of a
w~rldwide shortage of aluminum. There has not been sufficient investment
in view of the rapid advance of the metal. It has been restrained mostly
_ ~y the continuously rising cost of cnergy, and the production processes are
extremely energy-demanding.
[Question] The free market pricQ for aluminum is about 1900 dollars, while
. the American producers sell for about 1350 dollars. Locked-up prices and
= speculation fervor here too?
[Answer] Only in the sense that the consumer wili protect himself and insure
- his access to the metal. Stocks of aluminum ar~ now at an absolute minimum -
= around the world. Several important aluminum users, snch as the aviation
= i_ndustry, have full order books for all of the 1980's. The demand guarantees
_ a nigh price for 1980. Then it will depend on how deep the recession becomes.
(Q�:estion] A metal which showed a much slower price development recently
is lead. The price seems to be in a falling trend from 583 pounds one
_ year ago to abo~t 480-490 today. Will this development continue?
[AnswerJ We helieve that the market now largely discounts the fall in demand
by the automobile industry. Just now the Soviet Union and the eastern
- countries are large buyers. But the forecast is that the prices :~rwstly -
wi21 stay where they are today.
- [Question] One of the largest price declines on the markets has been that
- ~f *.in. ~Dnly three weeks ago the price was up at its highest level ever
of 8350 pounds per ton. How does the f.~t~lre look?
- [An::.:~rJ Tin prices this year are going to be strongly influenced by sales
from the Arnerican government's stockpile of strategic metals. They have -
decided r.o sell 35,OG0 tons to tin. That is quite a lot, when the world's
annu~l consumption is 20Q,000 tons. Now we beli~eve th~t sales are going
78 -
FOR OFI'ICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094406-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI.�Y
to begin in June with small quantities every other week. That can make -
pric~3 fall racher fast. But on the other hand, as has happened with so
many ~ther metal industries, there have been too few investments during the
entir.e 1970's. Very little new production has been brought forth. If
= th~ United States should stop their plans for selling or curtail the
quantities for sale we can have a price increase, Tl-~e picture for tin
is therefore ;.ather uncertain.
[Question] In the slightly longer range--how are metal prices going to react
in the coming recession?
[Answer] There are clear conditions for a rather poweriul raw materials ~
price boom sfter a decline. A stipulation is that the recession will be
rather mild, which we believe, At the same time, with the continued low
- investnents in the metals industries there can therefo*-e be a rapid
pressure on production capacity when business conditions change again ir.
1982. 7'he pressure on prices can be undermined by new raw materials
_ speculation if inflation continues to be high in the world, whicn seems
probable. Therefore we look for a powerful increase in prices in 1982., n
COPYRIGHT: Ahlen & Akerlunds tryckerier, Stockholm 1980
92~7 END
CSO: 3109
79
_ FOR OFFICIAL tJSE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090006-4