JPRS ID: 9103 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9103 -
21 May 1980 ~
West Euro e Re ort
p p
(FOUO 25/80)
~ FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORM~TION SERVIC~
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NOTE `
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JPRS L/9103
~21 May 1980
WEST EUROPE REPO RT ~
(FOUO 25/80)
_ CONTENT~
COUNTRY SECTION
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Soviet-West European Relationa: Changing Attitudes,
Perapectives
(Pierre Hasaner; COI~4~NTATRE, Winter 79-80, Spring 80) 1
_ FEDERAL I~EPUBLIC OF GERMANY ~
Market Saturation, Imports Threaten Auto Industry
(Eberhard von Kuenheim Interview; STERN, 10 Apr 80) 30
FRANCE
United States Seen in Need of French, Allied Support
(Raymond Aron; L'EXPRESS, 29 Mar 80) 34
Paul Thorez Debriefed on Soviet Life, Attitudes Toward Weat
(Paul Thorez Interv~iew; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR,
~ 7-13 Apr 80) 37
Vote To Be Taken on Israel Boycott
(LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION, 14 Apr 80) 40
~ Crepesu on Possible Leftist Coalition To Defeat Giscard
(Michel Crepeau Interview; LE NOITVEL OBSERVATEUR, -
7-13 Mar 80) 41
Shielding Computera From Terroriat Attacks Discussed
(Francois Lebrette; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 21 Apr 80) 44
ALAT Units' Speed af Reaction Demonatrated in 1q79
(Jean de Galard; AIR & COSMOS, 16 Feb 80) 48
- a - (TII - WE - 150 FOUO)
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CONTENTS (Continued)
Personnel Transferred From CNES to Arianeapaee
~ (Pierre Langereux; AIR COSMOS, 12 Apr 80) 53
Update on Super-Etendard Deliveries to Navy
(Jean de Galard; AIR & COSMOS, 5 Apr 80) 57
New Maintenance Schedul~s for Super-Etendard Reviewed
(AIR ~ COSMOS, 5 Apr 80) 61
Single Replacement for Air Force, Navy Aircraft
(Jean de Galard; AIR & COSMOS, 12 Apr 80) 64
Commenta on National Military policy Colloquium
~ (AIR & COSMOS, 5 Apr 80) 67
Briefs
Exocet N4t-40 Misaile 70 ,
Port Equipment Aid 70
ITALY
Trade With China Lagging Behind Other European Partners
(Pioro Oetellino; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 3 Apr 80) 71
Coat, Availability, Coneumptzon of Electricity in Piedmont ,
(Francesco Corbellini; ENERGIA E MATERIE PRIME, -
Nov-Dec 79) 74
Prodi Report on Statua of Auto Industry
(Eugenio Palmieri; LA STAMPA, 4 Apr 80) 87
SPAIN
Briefa
Trouble for Enclaves 91
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COUNTRY SBCTION INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
SOVIET-WEST EUROPEAN RELATIONS: CHANGING ATTITUDES, PERSPECTIVES
Paris COMMENTAIRE in French Winter 79-80, Spring 80
[Article by Pierre Hassner, former student of the Advanced Teacher
Training School, holder of a degree in philosophy and chief researcher
at the Center for International Studies and Research at the National
Foundation for Political Science, and a~ithor of a number of articles~
published in France and abroad on problems in political philosophy and
international relations: "Pr~saic and Powerful--The USSR Viewed From
Western Europe"]
[Flintn.r 79-80, pp 520-528] �
[TextJ One evening in June of 1977, President Giscard d'Estaing welcomed
Secretary Gene~al $rezhnev with great pomp and ceremony. A number of
. leaders from the greater cultural and political Paris had bzen invited,
but no outstanding intellectual was present. For at that moment, they
were all--from Jean-Pa�1 Sartre to Eugene Ionesco, from Michel Foucault
to the "new philosophers"--at the Recamier Theater, where they were
giving a counter-reception for Soviet dis~idents.
~ Visibly, the "in" place to be that evening was with Leonid Ply~shch (whom
Jacques Chirac, when he was prime minister, had accused of abusing French
hospitality by attacking his native coun[ry) and Andre Arnalrik (with
whom President Giscard d'Estaing had refused to meet), not the t~wo French
politicians and the Soviet dictator.
The Path Covered in 25 Years
To measure the length of the path covered, one must go back to 1952. At
~ that time, the French government arrested Jacques Du~:os and his cohorts
for plotting, the French Communist Party was promoting the slogan "The
French people will never wage war on the Soviet Union," and Jean-Paul
Sartre, the suthor c,f "Nekrassov" (a satire on Soviet emigres and their
reception in the W~ast), was writing in "The Communists and Peace" that
"an anticommunist is a dog," and that the truth about the Soviet Union
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should not Y~e publicized too widely for fear of "causing dispair in
. Billancourt." A special issue of LA NEF on the USSR as seen from Fr~nce
was published at the beginning of that great year, 1956, which thanks to
the Khrushchev report and the invasion of Hungary, was to be the first
to mark the great change in *_he attitude of French intellectuals. In
that issue, Raymond Aron could still write an article entitled "Fascinated
By the Soviet Union," in which he stressed that, for French intellectuals,
'~when the teacher is Russian, words change meaning and slavery becomes
liberation."
Today the French seem fascinated by the Sovi~:r Union anew, but lzss it
appears by "the shining future" or "the Medusa head of communism" than- -
by what seems to point to a chink in its armor. For months dnd months,
the two best seller~ in politics in Paris were a very serious book which
explained to the French public that there was a nationality problem in _
the US~R, and with a title seeming to foretell the collapse of the empire,
and a very keen study in which two French communists traced their dis-
coveries about daily life in Moscow, both the title and the cover of
which stressed the contrast between the ideology and the reality in the
Soviet Union.
e -
Indeed one must not fall into the typically Parisian trap of viewing the ~
development of intellectual fashions in Paris as representing that of
universal history, or ever Europe. If the two phenomena--the improvement
of relations between the Western European governments and the Soviet
Union through detente, and the disillusionment of the revolutionary left
wing with the regime following a series of revelations, ranging from
~ those of Khrushchev to those of Solzhenitsyn, are real a~1d striking, it
is difficult to distinguish what is French from what is European, what
has to do with passing fashion and what is the manifestation of irrever-
sible desacrali2ation.
On the one hand, because of de Gaulle and the diplomatic tradition of
~ "reverse alliance with Russia, France is the country which for reasons ~
of pure realpolitik, has sought the most systematically for 20 years to ~
maintain a privileged place in East-West relations. At the same time,
France is the country in which the intellectuals, having gone farthsst
in their faith in the revolution, have also felt the shock of Solzheni[syn
most keenly, and have shown the most enthusiasm toward the dissidents
from the East.
On the other hand, if these two phenornena, belief in detente and Che cult
of the dissidents, are doubtless already on the wane, they are but one
- aspect of the two broader and more complex realities which have lost
none of their validity--the perception by the Western governments and
the conservative forces of the need for a cn_rtain accomodation with
Moscow, because of the power of the Soviet Union, and its decline as an
ideological model.
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Suddenly a certain relatively enduring convergence has developed between '
the perspective of the governments and that of the left wing, in par-
ticular the leftist intellectuals. Thanks to detente, the former see the
Soviet Union as all black to an ever lesser extent. Thanks to the ~
Krushchev report, rhe invasion of Hungary, the Sino-Soviet schism and
the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the latter has an ever less rosy, or red,
view of the Soviet Union. In some cases and to a certain extent, we are
even seeing a kind of game of musical chairs of which the episode at the
Recamier Theater is a perfect illustration: certain conservative govern-
ments and certain business circles have more sympathy for the Soviet
Union (in the name of realpolitik, economic interdependence, or the
~ Holy Alliance of the Friends of Order) than some past or present revolu-
tionaries (in the name of their Maoism or, in the case of the French
"new philosophers," their late discovery of the misdeeds of totali~
tarianism). ~
The Seandardization of the Soviet Union
- What has happened is a kind of standardization ~~f the Soviet Union.
Except for a few extremists on one side or the other, it represents less
a terrifying menace or a radiant future than a massive, cumbersome
pr~sence, as embarrassing as i*_ is disconcerting.
No one knows very well how to handle it, but no one imagines any longer
that it might disappear or change in nature basically in the foreseeable
, futur~, either by conversion to democracy or through disintegration.
This convergence on more realistic bases has come about through a kind
of diiferentiaLion process, which has taken the image of the Soviet
Union from the theological stage (in which it represented the devii or
the good Lord), througn the metaphysical stage (dominated by such
~ abstract notions as detente, convergence, peaceful coexistence, or for
the other side, the anti-imperialist struggle) to the positive stage.
Henceforth, on the one hand, revolution, communism and the Soviet Union
are not necessari.ly linked together, not only thanks to the demystifica-
tion of the domestic re~ime, but also ~ecause, from Eritrea to Cambodia, ~
it has become more and more difficult to believe in a world revolutionary
process and to identify it with the Soviet policy. On the other hand,
. where the Soviet reality itself is concerned, there is a concensus, some-
times explicit and sometimes unexpressed, which says that it represents
a failure on various levels ranging from economic well-being to the ideo-
logical modal, but a success on the military level. But it is precisely
this minimal conc~nsus on the basis of differentiation which supplies
- the point of depar~.~~.re for the new debate characteristic of the present
phase.
Is the mixture of power and weakness in the Soviet Union reassuring or
c~orrisome? Will it lead it to caution or to adventurism? Should it
encourage the West to give priority to military balance or to economic
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interdependence? It is on this that the hawks and the doves, Americans
and Europeans, rightists and leftists, hegin to clash again.
The USSR Seen From the Right
The image of the USSR has remained relatively atable for the right winq.
For example in West Germany~ according to a survey, the opinions of the -
older generation and the m~re skeptical have changed much less than those
of the young, more readily enthusiastic and easily deceived. After all,
neither the invasions of Budapest or Prague, nor the books of Solzhenitsyn,
nor the Russian intervention in Ethiopia have altered the o~inion of the
Western conservatives. These events have more nearly comfortingly con-
firmed their views, which proved mora correct than they had thought.
They enabled them to pursue a struggle against the illusions of the left
wing and the dangers of detente--an exercise at which both Franz-Joseph
Strauss and Mrs Thatcher excel:
There are, however, three reservations wich regard to the persistence of
the conservative view. First of all ehere is the fact that, unlik.e the
- fascist extreme right wing, the parties of the center right are the
government parties, and their 1Qaders are form,~r, present or future ~
ministers. If these parties are more anti-Soviet, in most cases, in
particular when they are members of the opposition, than the governments
they produce, they cannot remain isolated rrom the develapment of these
governments, whose concern with nuclear peace and East-West trade leads
to a less Manichean v~ew of the USSR. Finally, perhaps the most
interesting aspect of Brezhnev's visit to Bonn in the spring of 1978 was
his long and cordial talk with Franz-Joseph Strauss.
Secondly, the conservatives, in Europe as well as the United States, ~
s:~are not only a convergence of interests but a continuing flirtation
w ith China. But the very fact of being the allies of one communist
. power against another probably gives their anti-Sovie~ism a less ideo-
logical and more pragmatic aspect.
Finally, the conservative parties may in certain cases be more hostile .
~ toward another power--for example the United States or Germany, than
. toward the Soviet Union, or to another personality--~is~ard d'Estaing--
*_han to Brezhnev.
In the tradition of de Gaulle, the postulated primacy of nations over
governments and the importance of Russia as a counterweight to Germany
or the United States, leads to avoiding the placement of too much
- emphasis on the military growth of the USSR or on the expansidnist policy
out of fear of having to justify Atlantic integration. The result is
the paradox of seeing a party such as the RPR [Rally for the Republic],
the main stated ambition of which is to save France from the danger of
communist totalitarianism, seeking the sympathy of the USSR in the name
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of reasons of state. In addition, it evidences a certain to~erance of
the fashion in which the Soviets use the state apparatus against leftist
anarchism or the crusades for the rights of m~n encouraged by American
liberalism and moralism.
The USSR Seen From the Left
But it is above all in the left wing that one sees a change and para-
doxical attitudes toward the USSR. There the transnational differences
among the leftists, the comnunists and the socialists, national differ-
ences within these parties, and ambiguity or a guilty conscience joined ~
together to make the Soviet problem a fascinating e~~mrle of the more .
general developroent of the Western European left ~,ring itself.
The most striking fact is the decline in the influence of the old fellow
travelers and the emergence of the New Left. The changes are in part
d~ie to the developments and the behavior of the USSR, as well as, para-
doxically, to the improvement of the international atmosphere. The first
major break between the Western intellectuals and the USSR since the war
occurred in 1956 after the invasion c~i Hungary. As to the decline in
_ the peace movement or the campaigns of the Stockholm pro[est against the
bomb sort (except where the unilateral disarmament movements, Aenerally
English, are concerne~), it was linked with the relaxation of the cold
war and the fear of a preventive war launched by the United States. But
the main cause for the emergence of a new autonomous left wing lies per-
haps less in a change in the perception of the Soviet Union and its
relations with the United States than in the emergence of other cult
objects or symbols of revolu[ion.
_ If we take the case of Sartre, it is clear tnat for him what changed was
_ less the image of the Soviet Union than his own attitude toward the PCF
[French Communist Party] and, in the ~inal analysis, the French workers'
class. The chain of equations--"being against the bourgeoisie = being
for the ;~ppressed = being for the workers = being for the communists =
being far the Soviet Union"--broke down not so muc`e at the beginning or
the end as in thp middle. First the Chine~2 and Cuban revolutions, then
_ ehe "peasant masses on three continents," [he "damned of the earth," of
whom Fanon made himself the spokesman, and then the young people, after
1968, in particular those who had participated in the "events" in France
arid more.recently in the "movement" in Italy, represented reasons for
wanting a change making it possible to wage the struggle againsE the
~ existing order in the 4lest without identification with the cortmunist
partfes and the USSR. These new objects of devotion, with their romantic
and activist aspec~t, symbolized by Che Guevara, contrasted sharply with
the cautious, rigid, authoritarian and conservative behaviors of the
orthodox communist parties and states.
_ On the basis of this movement, three new trends developed. For one '
branch of the new left, which was just recently predominant ever.ywhere
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aad still is in Italy and the FRG, for example, the concepts of revolu-
tion, violent rebellion and more generally overall struggle against _
imperialism and the reactionaries are retained and even reasserted with
a new energy. For one faction of this group, the Maoists, the USSR and
the communist parties in the West have joined the ranks of the capitalist
enemy. Yet another faction believes that, although they are bureau-
cratic, authoritarian and "gone bourgeois," the Western parties and to
an even greater extent the L'SSR still play a positive role on the world
scene, as supporters of the national liberation movements and the revolu-
tionary causes against the main enem.ies--capitalism, colonialism, the
United States and the multinational companies.
One finds this point of view within the extreme leftist groups them-
selves, among such Third World supporters as Jean Genet--pro-Arab, pro-
Baader-Meinhof and once profascist, as well as Regis ~ebray, who joins
support of Che Castro movement with that of Mitterrand. This tendency
is also often found within the Italian and French communist parties and
above all, perhaps, in the C~RES [Center f~r [Socialist] Studies,
Researcl~ and Education] and the Panhelenic Socialist Movement (PASOK).
At the other extreme, a certain number of young intellectuals, in France
in particular, have pushed the criticism of past illusions to the point
of rejecting even the concepts of revolution, the conquest of power and
= socialism. For the majorit~ of them, the waning attraction of Maoism,
_ in particular since the end of the cultural revolution and the death of
Mao, coincided with the discovery of Solzhenitsyn and ~he Soviet dissi- ;
dents, and, in some cases, with the point of view of certain writers who
- share what one could call roughly the sntipsychiatric criticism of
sociery. This ha~ led on the one hand to the generalization of their
criticism, which is directed not only at any state, authority, institu- ~
tion or leftist movement whatsoever, and any belfef at all in pr_ogress
and rationa:ity as :~~ach, and on the other, to the adoption of the Gulag
Archipelago as the archetype of the state and the Soviet dissidents as
the models for the only attitude possible for intellectuals--joining in
the resistance rising from below. Instead of a model, they have found
in che USSR, in the lighc of the Gulag Archipelago, a countermodel repre-
senting the ultimate logic o� the West, and in the Soviet dissidents the =
combination of a new nppressed people and a new heroic and enlightened =
elite. I am speaking, of course, of the new philosophers. '1'hey do not
by far have a shared position (some, for example, but not all, are again
praising the'liberal state and citing the United States as the least evil
society because it is the most tolerant of dissidents), but they all have . i
_ in common this need, born of their past, to f�nd new incarnations of
absolute good and evil. This sometimes leads them, through anti- .
Sovietism or anticommunism, to become the unexpected allies of the
established order (as in France) or of violent pseudorevolutionary
minorities (as in Italy).
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- Finally, the perhaps largest and most interesting but also the least
organized faction of the new left is made up of those who, sharing the
majority of criticisms directed by the new philosophers at knowri revolu-
- tions, are skeptical about violent movements and conservative institu-
tions, but ~ave not as a result lost all hope of a basic transformation
of society.*
For the first time, they have neither a f oreign modei nor an ideal
formula, but their disillusionment with the various Utopias is mixed ~
With a desire for liberation as strong as it was before. Their gaze
turns toward less general objectives, linked with t~ie local level, such
movements as feminism and ecology, or the establishment of communities.
For them, the USSR is neither an ally nor the main enemy: very simply,
it no longer hold any interest.
Eurocommunism
If the Western communist parties, Eurocommunist or not, and their
socialist or social democratic rivals have anything in common, it is
their inability to afford this kind of luxur.y. They are doomed, if not
to judge everything as a function of ehe USSR, at least to assign it
importance--which in a way becomes more complicated and more difficult,
fnr their attituda can no longer be either one of pure acceptance or one
_ oE unconditional rejection. ihe importance they give to the USSR is
closely linked both to their ideologica.l and organizational past (since
the split in the workers' movement which developed precisely on the pro-
blem of the Russian leadership and model) and their political futures as
_ potential government parties on the continent on which the Soviet pre-
sence is weighing ever more heavily.
The problem i.s particularly sensitive for the Eurocommunist parties.
First of all, because their base level often has a version of the USSR
inheritaa from past indoctrination, but also because their voters an~
gotential allies make their break with Moscow a condition of access to
oower for them, and because, finally, the probable conditions of their
government experience would make it desirable for them to be bor.h pro-
tected against and by the USSR. It is moreover difficul*_ to know what
position to adopt to evaluate their vision of the USSR. It is necessary
to differentiate at least four levels--the electorate, the militants,
the intell.ectuals and the leaders themselves--�as well as four dimensions
in the foreign relations of the communist parties (and in particular
their xelations with the USSR), which influence their perceptions, i.e.,
the relations among parties, the relations among nations and the
alliances both on the domestic and international, European and global,
levels.
See Guillebaud in "The Orphaned Years," Le Seuil, 1978. _
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The classic view of the USSR which it would like to see maintained
' involves, in order of importance, the view of Moscow as the leader of
the international communist movement, the ideological model for socialism,
the promoter of European security and protector of the forces of peace -
in the European system and the liberatim movements against imperialism .
on a world scale. Acceptance of [his traditional view has waned to
varying degrees depending.on the parr_y. We c+ill limit ourselves to
mention of the three parties which have given birth to the Eurocommunist
not'_on (the Italian, Spanish and French parties) and to stressing both
the differences in their attitudes and their development, which makes
the very concept of EuroCommunism extremely ambiguous and uncertain, and -
- the common points which, despite everything, distinguish them from the
' others.
None of these three parties accepts the Soviet claim to leadership of =
the world communist movement today: They all believe that there should
not be a single leader or central authority proclaiming dogma. However,
' none of them rejects the concept of a world communist movement as such,
although the majority speak of a new internationalism which, in the view
of the Italians, should not be limited to the communist party, and which
they all believe should no longer have pro-Sovietism as the touch-stone.
None of the three recognizes the USSR as its socialist model, either:
_ They all say they want to build another kind of socialism, based on the
pluralist traditions and social structures of the advanced Western
society. But none, as a party, has gone so fax as to claim that the
USSR is not socialist, although the PCE [Sgar.ish Communist Party] and
numeraus key intellectuals in the French and Iralian communist parties
have s~opped not far short of this. All have criticized the lack of
political democracy in the USSR and Eastern Europe (ranging from the
denounciation of individual acts of rerression to recognition of the -
_ structurally antidemocratic aspect of the regime itself). But none has
admitted publicly that economic exploitation has carried out "real
_ socialism" or that the workers' c13ss there has fewer social rights than
~ in the capitalist world.
Similarly, where the relations ~f the USSR with Ezstern Europe are con-
cerned, they all condemn the invasion of Czechoslovakia, but continue to
justify the invasion of Hungary. They all admit implicitly, and some
explicitly, that the USSR dominates Eastern Europe at the expense of its -
allies' independence, but none has called the bloc an imperial system.
A,11 more or less accept the Western structures (NATO, EEC) which the
_ USSR calls aggressive. But in the discussions or current negotiations
on East-West relations in Europe (from the neutron bomb to East-West
~ trade), they gene.rally p1acE the USSR on the side of the angels. In the
same way, they criticize the clash of the superpowers in the Third World
and encourage the independent development of the formerly colonized
peoples. They contlnue, however, to utilize a class method of analyzing
- [he world revolutionary process and they regard (in any case the PCI
[Italian Communist Party~ and the PCF do) American imperialism and the
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multina[ional companies as ths main ensmy in this struggle for world
liberation, and the USSR as a powerfuZ ally in this struggle. In the
_ same way, where China and Kampuchea are concerned, they do not (with the
- excer:.ion o� the PCF) necessarily participate in the campaigns to de-
nounce and excommunicate Moscow, but they remain sympathetic to the USSR
- nnd VieCnam.
Tt-,e important thing in connection with [hese three positions fs, if
indeed they reflect a common logic--th~t of differer.tiation both within
the communist movement and in their judgments on the real Soviet situa-
_ tion (that is to say rejection of a clear-cut choice between obedience
and a to[al break, or between imitation and rejection), no one of them
is truly consistent or tenable. Their various directions and the stress
they place on one element or another bear witness, on the contrary, to a
series of uns~able compromises in response to contradictory pressures.
The Spanish Co~nnunist Party
The party which has moved the farthest away from the USSR is the PCE.
. The real break occurred after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, although
_ there have been several pseudo-reconciliations since. Santiago Carrillo
_ doubtless regards bonds with the USSR as compromising and its invective
has done nothing biit given him greater crediblity in the eyes of the
Spaniards. He has gone so far along this path that without a doubt, of ,
all the Spanish political for.ces, it is the PCE which has the worst
= relations with the t?SSR, much worse than those of the PSOE [Spanish
~ Socialist Workers Party] or the government, for example.
It is diffic~lt to assess to what extent the image of "David against
- Goliath," to which Carrillo has made very clear reference, is accepted
by the Spanish geople and the members of the party. Some within the
leadership, such as Marcelino Camacho, have voiced more favorable judg-
ments of the USSR, and a large number, among the older veterans above
~ all, while sharing Carrillo's desire for total independence, obviously
believe that he goes too far.
- Publicly, in any case, there is no split on the leadership level between
= the bolder intellectuals an3 the more cautious leaders, for it is Carrillo
himself (in his book "Eurocommunism and the State" in particular, which
' brought down upon him thx wrath of Moscow) and his right hand man,
, ~ianuel Aacarate, who have most clearly and forcefully dared to criticize
both the natuie of the Soviet regime and its role in the world. And they
are clearly, on almost all subjects, at one extreme of the consensus of
_ which we spoke, to which they aze linked solely by the fear of being too
_ isolated from.the other Eurocomcnunist parties. It is they who refuse
most explicitly to regard the communist movement as a church and Moscow
as Rome. They have termed the Soviet regime a primitive form of
_ socialism based not on the power of tha proletariat but on tha[ of a
_ small elite. In connecticn with the invasions and Soviet oppression in
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Eastern Europe, it is they who have voiced the strongest criticism, the
clearest defense of armpd resistance and the greatest solidarity with
the victims.
. In the final analysis their posi[ion on the problem of the international
- role of the USSR (both from ehe poin[ of view of relations among states--
and in particular the European balance--and that of the international
class struggle) is to a certain extent closer to that of the Chinese or _
at least the Yugoslavs than to that of their Eurocommunist comrades.
Above all they emphasize the dangers of the two hegemonies and great
power poliCics. On that basis, they place the great powers on the same
level. In Western Europe, according to Carrillo, the two superpowers
would be hostile toward a victory for the left wing and socialism.
- Europe must thus be independent, on the militury level alsa, in order to
resist their blackmail. On the world level, it should seek an alliance
with all the anti-imperialist forces, not to aline with the USSR against
American imperialism, but to allow the existence of a multipolar world.
The Italian Comnunist Party
One finds no trace of this boldness and clarity among the Italian
communists, although this dnes not render them less credible. Their
deviation from the model and the Soviet vision= precisely because it was
slower (it had begun at least by 1956 and was based on experiences as
distant in time as the reservations of Togliatti concarning the sectarian
bent of the Third International in 1929 or his direct experience of the
Stalinist purges), much more discreet and more vulnerable to reversals
and changes of direction, may seem more timid, or, in an equally justi-
fied way, more authentic and less tactical. While f.or the PCE (and above
all for the PCF), the development of the perception of the USSR might
have been superficial or the result of a conflict with Moscow or a
tactical need to assert independence, the Italians seem instead to have ~
wanted to avoid or minimize conflicts with the USSR, or anyone else.
Their development may have been caused by the same domestic policy considera=
tions, requiring a certain distance from the USSR as a condition of
' their participation in the political game. But the main key must be
sought instead in a third phenomenon found to a much lesser extent in _
the other countries, to wit the mutual contamination or interpenetration -
between the PCI (which escaped Stalinization because of~fascism) and
Italian society. The result for the latter was a certain Marxist cul-
,
- tural hegemony making the right wing culture weaker therein and that of
the extreme left wing more Stalinist than, for example, in France. But I
the effect on the PCI was one of "Westernization" or "Italianization" ~
which seems to have given a whole generation of local administrators,
economists, historians and politicians a concept of civic life, of -
European integration or the economic crisis, which, whatever their
' abstract attachment to the USSR, seems to belong to a cultural universe
other than that of "real socialism" or the "general laws of social -
development." ~
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It is obvious that there are on all levels, apart from the old leaders
who experienced Stalinism and want to hear n~ more cf it (such as
Amendola or Terracini), cther men such as Longo and Pajetta, who have
doubtless remained more attached to their early education. Among the
young leaders, some have a social democra~.ic air, while others seem to
evidence a taste for order and control which makes them more ~similar to
the traditional Leninist "apparatchiks." The USSR means practically
nothing to the majority of the new young cadres of bourgeois origin who
represented the basis for the development of the PCI in the 1960's and
~ 1970's. Bu[ this is not the case with a large number of the older mem- -
bers of worker origin who form the nucleus of the party. Among the
intellectuals in the PCI, if indeed ehe majority are profoundly in-
- fluenced by Western culture and in particular American culture, some are
trying to preserve the philosophical basis for a communist identity by
retaining a link with such concepts as the "world ravolutionary process"
- or "the hegemony of the woxkers' class." Finally, even among the ~
electors, the vast majority of whom vote communist for noncommunist
reasons and most certainly non-Soviet reasons, a strong minority (30 ,
perc~nt)'expressed a more positive view of the USSR, in a survey pub-
lished by ESPRESSO, than of any Western country. An excellent recent
survey made o.f the cominunist base in Bologna, shows that if a small
faction believes that the Leaders do not go far enough in separ~tion
from the Sovi~t Union, and a larger faction agrees with them, they are
hoth surpassed by the number (made up above all, but not solely, of
- veteran militants and workers) of those who accept Eurocommunism as a
tactic, but remain attached to the iJSSR and even to Stalin.*
What then is the true ~ttitude of the PCI toward the USSR? As the party
- still functions o~ the basis of the rules of democratic centralism, the
last word falls to Enrico Berlinguer and his faction. But the movement
they head_is so diverse and the real situation they must take into
atcount so complex, that one never knows whether their hesitation and
contradictions mean that they are profiting from this diversity and
complexity or whether they are the prisoners thereof, as the address -
~ given by Berlinguer at the UNITA festival in September 1979 seemed to
_ suggest. In that speech he ap~eared to c:ite the concern to avoid causing
despair for millions of workers.as the explicit reason for avoiding
total rejection of the USSR. Whether the voices of the PCI are well
orchestrated or not, the fact is that their shading varies with the ~
speaker, the context and the subject.
_ * Marzio Barbagli and Freigiorgio Corbetta, "One Tact~.c and Two
Strategies--A Survey of the PCI Base," IL rNLINO, 260, November-
December 1978.
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Where the relations among communist parties are concerned, the PCI,
along with the PCE and the communist parties of Yugoslavia and Romania,
have been on~ of the "autonomous" bodies rejecting the effort made by
the USSR and the GL~R to impose a common line on the conference of
F.uropean communist parties held in Berlin in 1976. But since then, with
the Hungarian party, it has played more of the role of a mediator,
showing Chat it truly supports the formula "unity in diversity." This
effort is also clearly revealed in its very moderate support of Carrillo
against the USSR. On the other hand, the PCI is truly trying to promote
a new concept of internationalism eliminating the distinc~i~n (basic for
the Soviets) between the communist parties and their allies.
On the ideological Level, the judgment as to the socialist or non-
socialist nature of the USSR has become one of the most important themes
in the dialogue between the PCI and the noncommunist left. Communist
statements have varied, ranging from the very measured comment by
Berlinguer in January 1977 on "some antiliberal characteristics" of the ~
societies of the Soviet type, to the regrets expressed by major party
theoreticians, sometimes in the editorials of the party newspaper, UNITA,
regarding the persistence of a form of Stalinism in the USSR, the struc-
tural defects in a system which make repression possible, or again the .
existence of a socialist economic infrastructure along with the absence
of the democratic superstructure which should be one of the foundations
of socialism. The PCI asserts that it refuses to answer yes or no to
t.he question of the socialist nature of the USSR, for this would mean a
return to the lo~ic of labels and excommunication, but more important
than all this, it seems that no one can make abstraction of the his- ,
torical role of the October revolution and the present international
- role of th2 USSR. The leaders of the PCI insist on the need for further
research--undertaken in a spirit free of any polemic or apo~ogetic
approach--in order to understand the development of the Soviet system
since 1917 and its interactions with the general development of the
world.
The specialized institutes and the intellectuals in the PCI have more-
over in fact done remarkable work along .these lines. They organized a �
seminar on the USSR in January 1978, and on the spring events in Prague
in July of 1978. They have written a number of books on Stalinism and -
the history of the U~SSR, and finally, not the least of their contribu-
[ions, they have undertaken a campaign of articles urging the rehabilita-
tion of Bukharin and, more recently, Tratsky.
It is interesting to note that if these undertakings are encoura~ed by ~
th~ party leaders, their own statements always lag behind those of the
experts. The Latter obviously serve the purpose, with pedagogical and
exploratory goals in mind, of stating what the leaders think but do not
want to state officially. Berlinguer feels that he should take the pre-
sent and future relations of the PCI with the USSR into account, just as
a chief of state would, or almost.
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The relations between the PCI and the USSR have in fact somewhat taken on
the aspect of relations between nations. The Italian communists, even
more than the Yugoslavs themselves, seem to be pu[ting into practice the
_ formula stated by a Yugoslav rninister of foreign affairs: "As Yugoslavs,
we need American protection against the Russians. As communists, we need
_ that of the Russians against the Americans." Here again their excessive
diplomacy is no help in a proper evaluation of the attitude of the PCI
toward the foreign policy of the USSR in the international arena. One
thing is clear: They support the Soviet policy to the extent that it is,
in their view, a factor in balance and detente, but they are worried,
- without stating it explir.itly, about certain of its militaristic or
- expansionist aspects. They remember the days of Krushchev fondly and
support the so-called doves against the so-called hawks in the Kremlin.
In Europe, they defend Soviet undertakings but at the same time, they
support Italian participation in the European community and in NATO, with
arguments which suggest that they regard the strengthening of the West as
a security measure against interfe:ence by this ~ame USSR. They also
show their concern with Yugoslavia's independence: A number of Italian
communist leaders have made it clear to Western interlocutors that if
Yugoslavia were to slip into the Soviet orbit, Italy, and in particular
the PCI, might for their part move toward nonalinement. This does not
cast a very favorable light on their moral intransigence or the depth of
their attachment to the West, but it can be regarded as a message to the
latter to alert it to the possible consequences of abandoning Yugoslavia,
and in any case, as a sign of mistrust concerning the attitude of the
USSR after the disappearance of Tito. Where the 'Phird World is con-
cerned, the PCI seems to speak less of stable ba~ances than of the world
revolutionary process promoted by the USSR. Here we see a contradiction _
with its attitude toward European problems, just as its ecumenical con- -
. cern in seeking alliances with all progressive or peaceful movements
leads it to support [he social democratic parties in Europe and the .
military dictatorships in the Third World. The contradiction is somewhat
modified by the fact that the Soviets are also paying court to the
Socialist International. Reliable communist saurces have criticized the
~ fact that the USSR pursues a logic of confrontation in Africa, but again,
- the critics, incensed in particular by the Soviet support of Ethiopia
against Eritrea, are mollified by the fact that the Soviets themselves
seem unwilling to support Colonel Mengistu totally and that the PCI
shades its criticisms by pointing to the importance of class criteria in _
judging Soviet actions.*
In 1978 and 1979, the PCI made an effort to minimize or rise above these
contradictions, but in some respects it only aggravated themv On the
* See A. Minucci, "The Reasoning of a Criticism," RINASCITA, No 29,
21 July 1978, pp 1-2.
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_ theoretical level, the statement by Berlinguer to the party congress to
the effect that "it can happen and it does happAn that a communist party,
a socialist state, fir.;s itself closer to a noncommunist party, popular
progressive movement or democratic groups than to another communist
party or another socialist state"* represented a decisive step forward in
replacing an independent judgment for affiliation with a movement as a -
criterion of the "new internationalism." On [he critical level, the
application of this principle has seen fluctuations and hesitations: an
open attitude toward China during the tour of Eastern Europe made by
- Hua Guofeng, to the great displeasure of the USSR; support, at first
partial and then more categorYcal, of the USSR and Vietnam against
Kampuchea and China during their armed clashes; a very clear position,
at the time of the congress and perhaps under the influence of the
Yugoslavs, of condemnation of all intervention by a socialist country in
another, placing China and Vietnam on the same level; and a new flirta-
tion with the Chinese later, but without visible protest by the USSR.
Since that time, if the independence of the PCI on this matter has been
confirmed (in its defense, against Soviet criticism, of the action of
the Italian navy in rescuing Vietnamese refugees, as weLl), its support
of the USSR in matters concerning the military balance in Europe (like
nuclear modernization) has been just as much confirmed, the assertion of
the socialist nature of the USSR has been clearer, and support of the
dissidents in the East, including the Czechoslovaks, has been less -
clearly expressed, which has moreover given rise to protests in the
communist press itself by such pro-Soviet.intellectuals as Boffa, Guerra
and Procacci.
Whatever the variations may be, one aspect remains constant--the specific -
style of the PCI, which leads it, even when in fact its position supports ~
that of the USSR, as on nuclear negotiations, to present it in an -
original and constructive fashion or, as with the Iranian crisis, to
maintain a discreet position, if not neutrality, in contact with the
_ violent campaign of the French Communist Party.
[Spring 1980, pp 81-90]
' [Text] The Communist and Socialist Parties
Its an ill wind that blows nobody good. Reviewing a text written in
July 1978 in September 1979 or February 1980 poses formidable problems, ~
but by the same token, it provides precious information on the very sub-
ject which is the meat of the two parts of this article: the attitudes ~
l
~
~ UNITA, 4 April 1979 '
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of the Italian and French communist parties toward the Soviet Union.*
' If the variations, hesitations and ~ontraditi~~,.; in the PCI are per-
sisting, the general direction of its development as w~ll as its concern
with combfning adaptation and continuity are not in doubt. If, like all
the "Eurocommunist" parties, it modified its criticisms of the USSR in
1978-79, the invasion of Afghanistan gave it an opportunity to take a
further step in its criticisms (which arP very clearly consistent now
with the nature of its foreign policy), and thereby in the effort to find
grounds for understanding with the European left wing as a whole and in
particular with the German social democrats. One can simply note that
at each stage the resistance of the pro-Soviet base seems to increase,
but that the desire of the leaders to override it, paying the prices of -
pauses and periodic tactical retreats, also seems to be increasingly
evident.
lt is almost exactly the reverse which seems to be true for the French
Communist Party. One does not know which to admire more--its perse-
verence in its pro-Soviet nature "as Afghanistan in itself finally alters
it," or the sharpness of the swings which, at the end of a generation,
have led it to reestablish the positions and the stress of the era dis-
cussed at the beginning of this article. Condemnation of the invasion
of Czech~slovakia, followed by approval of its normal.ization; solidarity
with the USSR and Portugal in 1974 and 1975, followed by conversion to
Eurocommunism in the autumn of 1975, and the violent Brezhnev-Marchais
conflict in 1976 and 19i?; beginning of normalized relations with the
USSR coinciding with the breakdown of the Uriion of the Left, but accom-
panied in an initial stage by an all-out nationalist French cot*nnunist .
attitude and the establishment of a~ certain ideological distance marked
by the support of the work "The USSR and Us," and finally the speed-up
of reconciliation by the formula of the "overall positive assessment,"
and then by the campaigns on Vietnam and subsequently the NATO missiles,
culminating spectacularly with the approval of the invasion of Afghanistan,
the trip made by Marchais to Moscow, and the praise of the conquests of
real socialism and the change in the balance of forces in favor of
socialism. -
Where should the key for these variations, as well as this contancy, be
~ sought?
The French Communist Party ,
Where the French are concerned, unlike the Italians, the~true attitude
of the leadership seems much more difficult to establish than does that
* The two parts of this article are the French version of an article ~
published in DAEDALUS (winter 1979). We are publishing this.revised
version with the kind permission of that puhlication. -
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of the militants. A certain r.umber of surveys seem to reveal a relatively
consistent development in the membership, while the public positions
adopted by the leadership ha�re often reflected drastic changes.
According to the responses [o a questionnaire drafted by L'HUMANITE
DIMANCHE in 1973, less than cne percent of the individuals surveyed
based their definition of socizlism on the USSR or the other socialist
. countries. Only ~ix percent dei?ned it as the collective ownership of
the means of production and the replacement or defeat of capitalism.*
This does not mQan that the communist party voters do not have the
slightest feeling of attachment to the USSR: Their view of that country
is consistently more favorable than the national average. But the
results coincide well with the general trend toward disaffection and
tend to approach the average.
This deVelopment is not however found everywh,:re. In 1974, 63 percent
of the communists surveyed regarded the Soviet experience as a success
~ in economic development, while 5 percent called ir, a failure. The
- national average was 47 percent and 19 percent, respectively. If in 1977
the national percentages had decreased slightly (40 percent and 22 per-
cent), the communist responses, for their part, had not changed.
Similarly, concerning the improvement in the standard of living in the
USSR, the opinion was hardly more favorable among the communists in 1977
(52 percent for, 15 against) than in 1974 (53 and 15 percent,
respectively), while the national average had dropped from 45 (against
20 percent) to 31 percent. On the subject of the sincerity of the USSR
concerning detente, the national responses, which were positive in 1974
(49 percent as opposed to 26 percent) had become negative by 1977 (28
percent as opposed to 34 percent), while the communist responses remained
positive in 1977 (52 percent as opposed to 16 percent), if indeed they
had dropped in comparison to 1974 (70 percent as opposed to 10 percent).
Concerning public freedoms, however, the devel~pment of a number of
favorable responses by the communists into unfavorable ones was great
enough to bring figures close to the national average, which was already
negative in 1974 (55 percent thinking that the Soviet experience repre- ,
sented a failure on the level of public and individual freedom) and
- became still more so in 1977 (61 percent as opposed to 6 percent). Among. ;
the communists, 33 percent spoke of success and 23 percent of failure, -
in 1974, while in 1977, only 17 spoke of success and 39 percent of
failure.~*
L'HUMANITE DIMANCHE survey "Socialism is Not Identified with the
USSR," LE MONDE, 22 November 1973.
SOFRES [French Opinion Polling Company], "The Soviet Union as Seen by ~
the French," surveys with commentary by A. Dukamel, March 1974 and
June 1977.
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The subject of violations of the rights of man is that concerning which
the PCF came into canflict most directly with the USSR in 1976 and 1978
(to the point of protesting the tirals of Orlov and Shcharanskiy much
more speedily and �orcefully than the PCI). It would seem natural to
assuma th~t the reactione occurred in the follawing ordar: French
society became ever more aware of the repression in the USSR, and that
awareness was comnunic~ted to the cotmnunist electorate; the leaders were
then in turn affected by this change, or adapted to it for tactical .
reasons; and finally, rhis led them to clash with the USSR. There is
certainly some truth in this description. Whether it be to give the
Union of the Left a chance or to wrest first place in this same left wing
from the socialists, the PCF urgently needs to improve its classic image
where it is most wlnerable. But when it tries to demonstrate its
independence of Moscow, it seems much more convincing when speaking of
its nationalism than when asserting its love of liberty, although its
development in 1979-80 served in the end to cast almost as much doubt on
� the one as the other.
It is also trua tha[, in connection with the USSR and a suitable attitude
toward Stalinism, one finds sincerely voiced and violently contradictory
points of view within the PCF, ranging from unconditional support--
Jeanette Vermeersch--[o the historical explanations and moral condemna-
tions of Jean Elleinstein (whose theses are not very different from those
of Carrillo or such Italian experts ss G. Baffa) and the oversubtle con-
torsions of Louis Althusser, who sees in Stalinism the result of an.
economist and humanist deviation. But it is even more true that the
abrupt swings in direction characterizing the recent history of the PCF
seem to correspond more nearly to unclear and unforseeable episodes in
the personal battle for power between its leaders and those in the
Kremlin than (as in the case of the PCI) the logical progression,
although cautious, of a social and ideological development.
The reactions of the French communists to the Krusfichev report and the
other events in 1956 were in contrast to those of the Italians. Until
the death of Maurice Thorez in 1964, the PCF was the firmest opponent of
' destalir,ization and the Krushchev policy. Under Waldeck-Rochet, between
, 1965 and 1969, it began a gradual movement toward the Italian position.
But the rise and establishment of control by Georges Marchais led to a
return to closer bonds with Moscow.
This development was illustrated by the attitude of the French (still
opposed to that of the Italians) at the world conference of communist
parties in 1969, by their accgptance of the "normalization of Czechoslovakia
and by their hostile attitude toward such different victims of the USSR
as Dubcek, Solzhenitsyn and Carrillo. There were, it is true, at the
time of the signing of the joint program and the presidential campaign
of 1974, some criticisms of Soviet policy in the realm of freedoms, but
this period non~etheless remained that in which, for example, Georges
~ Marchais proclaimed the superiority of Soviet democracy over democracy
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in the West in 1973 (which he began to do again, more or less, in 1978
and 1979, and more strikingly in 1980), while in 1974, the official
communist press published books offering an apology for the communist
countries, such as for example, "Socialism is Doing Well."*
In 1975 in particular, during the clash on the subject of events in
Portugal, the PCF alined itself clearly on the side of Cunhal and Brezhnev
against Berlinguer and Carrillo. Even further, the PCF seemed in fact
to be tacitly reproaching Moscow for not supporting the Portuguese
communists sufficiently. During the~prepar.ations for the Berlin con-
ference of European communist parties, the PCF found itself on the side ~
of the Soviets and the East Germans and against the "autonomists" on the ~
- subject of a joint document es[ablishing a common strategy. If the
Italians wanted this document to insist on detente and avoid any attack
on the Americans, the PCF for its part went even farther than the Soviets
along the "an~i-imperialist" path. Once again the PCF experienced the
fear that the Soviets might sacrifice revolutionary progress in the name -
of detente and the status quo.
Then came the great turnabout of October and November 1975. Since their
maximalism did not rally majority support at the conference, the French ,
communists moved from a more centralist position than that of the
centralists themselves to one still more "autonomous" than that of the
autonomists. From apostles of "proletarian internationalism," they
became apostles of the absolute priority of national strategy.~* Begin-
_ ning at tha[ point, it becomes still more difficult to understand their
line of conduct with regard to Moscow. On the one hand, they supported
the Italians (whom they had criticized two months earliei~) and the ~
Spaniards. They adopted the concept of Eurocommunism and seemed [o be
_ moving toward acceptance of the European and Atlantic institutions. On
the other hand, they set themselves apart from the Italians by serious ;
and open clashes with the Soviets and a more nationalist line. Marchais
was not present at either the 25th Congress of the CPSU or the celebra-
tion of the anniversary of the revolution, while FSerlinguer was welcomed
there with deference, and in the same period, Brezhnev did not meet with '
Marchais during his visit to Paris. ~
The swing toward nationalism became spectacular at the time of the break- ,
up of the Union of the Left. Beginning in the summer of 1977, the PCF
* M. Jouet, Editions Sociales, 1975.
See in particular J. F. Revel and B. Lazitch, "The True Life of G.
Marchais," and "Quarrel With Brezhnev," in L'EXPRESS, 31 July- ;
6 August 1978, pp 84-93.
. j'
~
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launched a violent antisocialist campaign, which was evidenced on the
in[ernational level by an even more violent campaign against the
Socialist International, West Germany, thE European Community and its
expansion, the United States and the capitalist world, and which, on the
theoretical level, led ta a nationalist or autarkic version of the Soviet
- and East German theory of monopolistic state capitalism. All of this
revealed an attitude opposed to t.hat of the PCI and the PCE which, for
their part, were basically favorable to Europe and were trying to seduce
the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany]. These new directions, and
in particular the collapsc of the Union of the Left, were of a sort to
please the USSR, particutarly since they were paralleled by an ever
clearer normalization of relations With it, the resumption of contacts
between the parties and the defense of the "socialist" countries, whose
achievements were increasingly said to be "posi[ive over all." The
opposition to supranationality and the clear and definitive split between
the com?r,unists and the socialists or the social democrats were consistent
" with the Moscow orthodoxy which Eurocnmmunism threatened. The campaign
of the PCF on thes~ points was moreover much more vehement in gene*al
than that of Moscow. The frequent praise addressed by the Soviets to
Willy Brandt and their courting of the Socialist International brought -
them closer in fact to the attitude of the PCI. With regard to both
West Germany and the social democrats, and perhaps even European inte-
gration, the USSR seemed to want to retain space in which to maneuver by
avoiding confinement to options which were too rigid and too negative.. -
In this connection, one can wonder if the spectacular reconciliation in
the shadow of t'~e tanks in Kabul does not reflect a swing on the part of
the USSR as much as the PCF. It is true it was prior [o the invasion
that G. Marchais rediscovered the fact that Soviet socialism had
eliminated exploitation and oppression, and the communique of the
- polftical bureau dat~d 26 October 1979 represented a step in the direc-
tion of the campaign of the Soviets to seduce the social democrats, by
referring to the collaboration with them in the struggle for peace and~
disarmament. But the fact remains that the reconciliation came about
precisely.coinciding with a revolution under the boot--more boot than -
revolution, and the pressure from a socialist camp more interested in
intimidating than seducing, as if--the only consistent element following
the criticisms of Krushchev by Thorez and of Moscow by the PCF likely to
accept the st~tus quo out of concern for detente--the only sincere
reproach the PCF had ever had to address to the USSR had had to be per- .
haps too peaceful or too liberal.
In any case, if the PCF had taken a step in the direction of tactical
use of the left wing of the social democratic sector~by the Soviets, in
October, Che Moscow communication adopted the view of that faction, so
dear to the French, as a tool of imperialism. And this was precisely
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the formula to which the Italian communists pointed as a test,* showing
that the USSR had turi:ed its back on peace and detente.
It is indeed tre attitude toward Germany--on the international diplomatic
level, toward social democracy--on the level of "ideological warfare,"
ur, on the contrary, the search for a third path, and above all, towdrd
the SPA as the intersection of the two, which seems to be the decisive
breaking point both for the USSR and for the two great communist parties
in Western Europe.
The European Socialists
It is not certain that they are wrong. Perhaps too much attention has
been paid to the development of the Western communist parties, and not
enough to that of the socialist and social democratic parties, whose
future may well be still less predictable and yet have much more import
on that of Western Europe. After all, not only in northern Europe,
where the Scandinavian social democrats, the British laborites and the
- Cerman SPD obviously have greater weight than the communist parties in
these countries, but everywhere else in addition, with the sole exception
of Italy, the future in European-Soviet relations might well be determined ~
by the orientation of such parties as the French PS [Socialist Party~, _
the Spanish PSOE, the PSP [Portuguese Socialist Party] and the Greek _
PASOK.
Now the majority of these parties, precisely because of the recent nature
of their establishment, their change, their spectacular growth or their �
gaining a strategic position on the political chessboard, are particularly
variable and unpredictable in their attitudes on East-West matters.
Some, in particular those in the Mediterranean region, have again taken
up the ambitions of the "Two-and-a-Half International" founded by the
Austrian Marxists in the 20's, desiring to create a bridge between the
Sscond and Third Internationals--between social democracy and bolshevism.
- One of the aspects of this position involves an attitude of critical~
sympathy for the Soviet Union, recalling the effort of the Eurocommunists -
to avoid both unconditional support and total rejection.
Refusal to allow themselves to be assimilated by the social democrats and�
the ambition to create a bridge between the East and West are parts of
the historical tradition of the Italian socialists. ~
With the spectacular rise of the French socialist party and the apparent
prospects for revolutionary r_ransformation in southern Europe in 1975 and
1976, the idea of a bridge between the north and the south and the
See the interview with Romano Ledda by Joella Kuntz, LE MATIN
26 January 1980.
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concept of ideological and political unity in a"Mediterranean or Latin"
socialism--more or less under French hegemony, making a matching pair
with the social democratic parties in the north led by the SPD and the
British laborites--was the fashion for a while. It was utilized by
Fran~ois Mitterrand, but it was above all the CERES which gave it its
theoretic and strategic l~tters patent of nobility.
If it took little time for the Portuguese socialists first and then the
' Italians, to turn their backs on this idea, the fact was that the
domestic policy ~n their respective countries led them to oppose [he
communists and to seek the favor of the social democrats in the north.
Conversely, it is among these latter, and more precisely within the SPD,
that one can see a new trend toward unconditional support of detente and
granting priority to a dialogue with the USSR with a view to keeping open
the possibility of a reunification of Germany, indeed, in some cases,
the international workers movement. More generally, while certain
- Mediterranean socialists are tending to return toward the center, certain
social democrats in the north are seeking (in part to compensate for ehe
moderate policies of the likes of Schmidt and Callaghan) a leftist
foreign policy. The question is whether, contrary to the trend in the.
extraparllamentary New Left, this means a more accomodating policy
toward the USSR.
The French Socialist Party
Nowhere are these ambiguities and paradox~s more obvious than in the
case of the French Socialist Party. This'should surprise no one, for the
paradoxical adventure of this party between 1971 and 1978 was based pre-
cisely on ambiguity. Its source is to be found in what one could call ~
the paradox of the Frencti left, to wit the fact that it cannot wir~ power
either without the communists or with them. The more particular form ~
this paraslox takes in the case of the socialists is that, in order for
the left to win, the socialists must become visibly stronger than the
comrnunists. But to achieve this, and in addit~on in order not to lose
the support of the communists, they must pursue a leftist strategy, that
is to s~y one of unity with the communists, which forces them constantly
to give guarantees of leftist stability and to defend themselves against
the suspicion that they are preparing to betray their allies and~re~oin
the center. Precisely because their interests and those of the
communists in domestic policy are characterized as much by rivalry as
convergence, ideology and foreign policy are the realms in which it is
possible for the socialists to show at little cost--at least in the short
run--that the PS is closer to the PCF than the centrists. This explains
the form the socialist paradox has taken where our subject is concerned: ~
it was precisely in the period when the intellectual prestige of.Marxism -
and the moral and political prestige of the Soviet Union were tending to
decline in French public opinion that they were tending to increase in
one single sector--that of the socialist party, which itself was rapidly -
expanding un[il 1978.
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It is not that the socialist party has become officially Marxist or
favorable to the USSR. But it has become first of all more critical of -
the United States, of the multinational companies and even of European ~
~ntegration and German social democracy in their present forms. In
effecting this shifc in the name of the struggle against imperialism, and
in establishing its domestic policy under the sign of a break with
capitalism, it implici[ly adopted a view within which, since imperialism _
- is basically linked with capitalism, and the basic split in the world
opposes capitalism to socialism, the Soviet Union is on the right side.
The criticisms it deserves have to do with important problems, perhaps,
but not the central problem, and they are expressed within the same camp.
This view is seen again in the answers of the socialist voters in the _
surveys we mentioned above. Most frequently, in particular in connection
with the success of the Soviet Union where the standard of living and
_ worker participation are concerned, the sociali.sts surveyed were closer "
to the communists than other noncommunists.
Secondly, when the socialists criticize Soviet policy--in particular in
connection with such problems as the rights of man or Portugal--they do
so with hesitation and much moderation, out of fear of alienating their
communist allies, awakening their suspicions or encouraging their attacks .
upon themselves. This could be noted in particularly striking fashion ~
at the time of the expulsion of Solzhenitsyn.
Thirdly, when the communists attack them, the reaction of the French
socialists is often the same as that of the conservative governments.
They solicit the support of Moscow (which they regard as more reasonable)
to moderate these attacks. In the course of recent years,.a certain
number of contacts, visits and meetings have linked the French Socialist
Party and not only the governments of Eastern Europe, but the part;~ and
government of the Soviet Union itself, as well as experts at specialized
institutes.
Very often, the terms of their communiques are inspired by Soviet conceprS.
On the other hand, in international relatior~s, the French socialists,
who favor a vague and indiscriminate concept of disarmament and collec-
- tive security, can in the present stage find common ground with the
Soviet campaign for "military detente." The problem is that, in the -
ideological realm as well as that of international security, the French
socialists are in danger of being content with an appro~ch combining a
general vague and sentimental orientation with short-term domestic policy
calculations; while the Soviets have more specific ideas about the
symbolic means and specific use of these meetings and these communiques.
It is possible, however, that the breakdown of the Union of the Left, i
coinciding with the emergence of the theme of the rights of man, followed ~
by new military aggression on the part of Moscow, has begun to modify
the attitude of the French socialists toward the Soviet Union. The �
socialist party must reassert its identity, which should lead it to ~
retain its Marxist and more or less revolutionary rhetoric, but also to !
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have less fear of displeasing the communists and to seek out more of the
themes which might embarrass them. It is true that, at least for
~ Francois Mitterrand, the two immediate priorities (repelling the attack
_ by Michel Rocard and rallying the votes of the communists in the second
round ~~f the presidential election) would suggest not too much change in
attitude or language wich regard to the Soviet Union, and did in any
case lead, in 197$ and 1979 to adopting language close to that of its
new allies in the CERES. More than ever, tactics dictate.
The Spanish and Greek Socialists
In some of the Mediterranean parties, one finds some of the same contra-
dictions and davelopments leading to rather varying results. For two of ~
them, the PSOE in Spain and the PASOK in Greece, the problem seems to be
serving as the expression of:the dominant national climate. In the
Spanish case, it is a matter of being on good terms with everyone, and
Felipe Gon~ales has succeeded in fact in being on better terms both with
Moscow and Washington than with Santiago Carrillo. In 1978, he seemed
to move toward the West, but not to the point of acceptance of Spanish
membership in NATO. It should be noted, moreover, that he justifies his
position by pointing to the presumably evil consequences of such member-
ship for Yugoslavia's independence of Moscow.
~ For Mr Papandreou, the basic attitudes are anti-Americanism and support
of the Third World. They lead to an ideological sense of being closer
to Moscow, an anti-imperialist force, although national interest con-
sidera[ions (for example if Soviet-Turkish relations were to become too
close) might easily. also make this feeling anti-Soviet.
The Portuguese and Italian Socialists
For two other parties, the PSP and the PSI [Italian Socialist Party],~
the development was different. The Portuguese socialists moved in just _
~ few ~~~~eks to the direct experience of traditional communist methods,
f.rom the asual Mediterranean combination of Mar.xism, anti-Americanism
and suppor.t of the Third World to the resolutp defense of Western values,
the European Community and NATO. The same primacy of domestic policy
could however produce a certain return toward the earlier positions
- which might be revealed by the position of Mario Soares on Africa, in
particular Angola, and Nicaragua. If the main threat seems to come less
from the communists and the revolutionary captains supported by the
Soviet Union than from the right wing supported by the United States,
the anti-Soviet attitude of the Rortuguese socialists, however authentic
it may be, might be partially subject to review.
The case of the Italian socialists illustrates even better, if possible,
the way in which attitudes toward the Soviet Union can vary as a function
_ of the vicissitudes of domestic policy. Alone among the ~arge'soeialist
parties of the West, the PSI continued after 1948 to pursue unity of
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~
action with the communists. This policy led to numerous splits (the most -
- important resulting in the creation of the Italian Social Democratic
Party (PSDI) headed by G. Saragat), but it led basically to support of
the Soviet policy during the cold war, to the point of winning its
leader, Pietro Nenni, a Stalin Prize.
After 1956, the Italian socialists began to ;~ove away from the communists _
and toward an understanding with Saragat's PSDI and the Chri~stian demo-
cr,~ts. This development was to end in the "socialist reuni�ication" and
t.he f:ormration of "center-left" governments. In foreign policy, thc pc~i-
tion of the socialist party changed as a resu~lt. From then on, it
accepted ~the Western institutions (including NATO), wxth the proviso
that they be only of defensive significance and not go against the
ultimate goal of dissolution of the blocs. In the majority of the govern-
ments which followed, the socialists were the elements most favorable to
detente, just as on the domestic policy level, they began to complain ,
that the communists were now ready to participate in the government and
that the country, for its part, was ripe for a"leftist alternative."
However, as soon as the Italian Christian democrats and communists began ~
truly to engage in dialogue, and Italy began in fact to move toward a
"historic compromise," the socialists began to feel excluded. And the ;
path that they chose to regain their identity and a role to play involved
becoming the harshest criCics of the inadequacies of the communist con-
version to Western democracy. While the "creeping historical compromise" '
led the Christian democrats to be less and less critical of the Soviet
Union, it led the socialists to be ever more so. Just as they are the ~
most vigorous and polemic critics of the Gramsci tradition and the attach-
ment to him which the PCI continues to reveal, so they rail at the i
communists for their lack of clarity about the ~oviet Union and the '
inadequacy of their support of the dissidents in the East. And so the
socialists have become specialists in the study and the defense of the
dissidents (for example in connection with the Venice Biennial devoted '
to them, and for all practical purposes organized by the Italian
- socialists, as well as innumerable seminars and symposiums).
These undertakings are a part of the broad~r project of Secretary General
Craxi, which is to "Westernize" the PSI and regain'the ground lost on ;
the European level--particularly in relations.with the British labor
party and to a still greater extent with the SPD, because of the interest ;
shown by these latter in "Eurocommunism." The paradox lies in the fact ~
th~t at the same time, these impeccably Nordic and Western social demo=
- cr.atic parties seem to be more interested in detente than in dissidence, ~
in reassuring the Soviet Union than in attacking it. _
The Labor Party _
There is nothing new in this for the left wing of the labor party, in ~
which the discovery by the Webbs that the USSR represented the future !
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has never been completely forgotten, and ta which the most important
trade union leader in the country, Jack Jones, could say at the time of
the visit paid by Mr Chelepin: "'fhe.people should go into the streets
, to celebrate his visit. Has 1939 been forgotten? Of course, this naive
idealism about the USSR has very little practical results.
The Social Democratic Party of Germany
The situation is quite different for the SPD. There are few recent
developments in Europe more interesting than the new developments in'its
Ostpolitik. Indeed, the national interests and domestic pol.icy converge
to lead the West German government to strongly desire to pursue detente,
and thus to maintain the advantages it has provided for the security of =
; Berlin and communications between the FRG and GDR; to fear, no less
intensely, a har@ening and a polarization on the inter.national level, `
which domestically could only serve the opposition CDU [Christian Demo-
cratic Union] (above all, Franz-Joseph Strauss); and finally, to be
tempted to play the role of inediator or arbiter between the East and the
West, which it has already ventured to do in certain circumstances be-
tween the United States and the southern left wing.
But the~e are elemnts in the development of the SPD on East-West problems
which go beyond this general attitude. Let us examine a certain number
of isolated facts: The statements by Chancellor Schmidt on the subject
of weapons mastnry, his criticism of ~Ir Carter's policy_on the rights of
man and his publicly expressed resentment with regard to the Americans; -
the visits paid by Minister Wichniewski to East Berlin and the hope -
- often expressed by the f~deral government, in particulRr on the occasion
of Mr Brezhnev's visit t,o Bonn in May of 1978, that he could influence
Mr Honecker in the direction of moderation; the statements by Mr Egon
against the neutron bomb and those of Mr Herbert Wehner on the defensive
nature of the new Soviet medium-range missiles; the statements of the _
West German leaders minimizing the Soviet danger; the presence of Boris
Ponomarev at the spring meeting of the Socialist International and the
invitation issued to~Tnlilly Brandt, as its pXesident, concerning joint
studies and activities to promote disarmament in Europe; and finally the -
statements of.certain young SPD leaders (in particular Karsten Voigt) on
the need to overcome the schism in the workers' movement at the same
time as that in Europe--thus echoing a scheme ever more frequently voiced
by the Italian communists as representing the ultimate meaning of Euro-
cormnunism. Doesn't all of this have a logic which.stands out from this
political chiaroscuro.in which ideology and realism, long-term dre,ams and
short-term estimates intermingle without distinct~on?
Let us be on guard against lapsing intA too conspiratorial a view of
this ferment, either by reviving, like the German right wing, the mystery
ghosts and old debates (like the "Bahr plan" of the 1960's, revealed in
the 1970's as proof of the neutralist projects of its author, the
communist past of Herbert Wehner and his secret visits to East Berlin),
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or like certain of the French and Poies, by reviving evei. more
anachronistic images (such as that of the new Rapallo, leading to German
reuniEication, with the USSR abandoning the DDR 1n exchange for the
neutralization of the FRG). If the idea of a Rapallo is still present
in some German minds, it is in a noatalgic and not very influential
right wing group. Franz-Joseph Strauss, who made a point of noting, by
his cordial interview with Brezhnev and his visit to Budapest, that he
has his own Ostpolitik, is not planning any more than Helmut Schmidt is
on a reunification which neither the one nor the other is sure he wants,
but which both are certain the USSR could not allow.
~
It is on another level that the basic ambiguity of tlie Ostpolitik of the
SPD, expressed in such famous slogans as Egon Bahr's "Change through
approach" and W. Brandt's "To change the status quo, one must accept it,"
is to be found. The basic postulate is that to improve the relations
of communist regimes wi[h other societies and their own, it is necessary
to reassure them and to.do that it is necessary to help them stabilize '
their authority.
What is not clear is whether this increased confidence is supposed to -
lead the communist elite to lower their guard and to bring about a ~
structural change despite and unbeknownst to them, thus sawirig off the ~
branch on which they were sitting, or whether the goal was a real j
stabilization which would enable them to retain their domination, but _
also to do without the more pathological measures resulting from their ;
feelings of insecurity. There was no proof, in the former case, that
the communist leaders would not see through this maneuver and turn it ~
in their favor, nor, in the second, that their regimes were not
_ structurally unstable, and that conciliatory gestures, whether they be j
those of the West toward them or their own toward their peoples, could !
avert the cycle of explosion and repression. i
In any case, the experience of the 70's revealed a certain success for '
the Bahr-Brandt formula. It produced more concrete results, in terms of i
improvement of the fate of individuals, r~+ar ~f~.? ~rho,- policy. But it
also revealed its fragility and its dangers. In fact, it is highly
vulnerable both to general tension and to specific blackmail. It led ~
the leaders of the SPD to be extremely reticent about any change likely ,
- to alter the stability of the Soviet regime. ~
According to the statements collected by Barbara Spinelli,* the West ~
German attitude is the result in large part of the fear of Losing .
* B. Spineili, "Fear in Bonn--They Have Seen Bre2hnev Reduced Co
Extremities," LA REPUBBLICA, 29 July 1978. See also the same j
author's interview with H. Ehmke (26 July 1978) and the Egon Bahr ~
interview in DER SPIEGEL, 11 September 1978. !
~
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Brezhnev and having to deal with harsher successors, but it goes much
farther, since it implies a negative retrospective judgment of the
- spring events in Prague, hesitation with regard to the East German
dissidents and even toward the Eurocommunists--not, as in the case of
the conservatives, out of fear that they might be the tools of Moscow,
but for the very reason that they are of interest to Z. Brzezinski--
because they could create problems for the Soviet Union and thus have a
destabilizing effect in Eastern Europe.
A certain desire to avoid false hopes or useless frustration is without
a doubt a European reaction which is not only natural.but healthy, with
regard to certain American manifestations of irresponsible exuberance.
But this degree of empa[hy and solicitude about Soviet reactions raises
a certain number of objections. It leads the SPD to wager desperstely
~ on the existing situation, even though it is visibly very shaky (if only _
~ for biological reasons, as is the case with Brezhnev's personal power); _
to discourage and disappoint the forces which are moralZy respectable, -
like the Eastern European dissidents, or historically important, like
the development of the Western communists; and indeed even to have
recourse to doubletalk, giving the maximum of publicity to their concern
about President Carter's blunders and the minimum to their concern about
the Soviet military efforts and political expansionism. "
In the matter of the NATO missiles as in that of the reaction to
Afghanistan, the same motive is to be seen in Chancellor Schmidt: On
the one hand a real attachment to the military security guaranteed by
the United States and the West in general, which leads him, in real
decisions, to choose the Atlantic opr_ion, and on the other, language
more critical of the United Sta[es than of the USSR.
All of this is certain to reassure (some would~say pacify) Moscow, and
- would seem to justify Brzezinski's comment on the "self-Finlandization"
of Germany.
As always when "Finlandization" is involved, there is however another
side to the matter. Horst Ehmke himself was the politician who coined
the term "Sozialdemokratismus" to express the hope of a convergence of
the European left wing, from Palme to Dubcek, based on the combination
of socialism and freedom, beyond the Iron Curtain and the Wall. This
same Willy Brandt demonstrated the explosive effect his popularity
could have in East Germany during his trips to Erfurt and Kassen: One
, of his defenders, Peter Bender, was not wrong in speaking~of an
"offensive detente." If one considers the interaction of the SPD and
the East from this point of view, there is justification for posing the
' classic question: "Who is Finlandizing whom?"
From the point of view of a Soviet strategist or negotiator, the posi-
tion emerging from the social democratic left certainly offers great
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I
' . I
~
advantages, above all since a part of the SPD seems, for the first time
in many years, to be allowing its moral pacifism and its political con-
cern with detente to influence its positions on matters of NATO strategy
and the negotiations on arms control. But from the per.spective of an
East German government, a threatening and vengeful West Germany is
- certainly preferable to a smiling social democratic regime whose ~
embraces involve the greatest risk of all, that of "ideol.ogical con- ~
tamination" or "creeping subversion." !
European PrioritiPS and Soviet Priorities
There is not necessarily any conflict between the strategist and the .
ideologist, but there may be a difference in priorities. These are ;
found in the W~st because they are linked with the very essence of !
present era, which one might call a period of "hot peace," to indicate
that we have emerged from the era of detence without returning to that .
of cold war in the classic sense. The military concerns have to do
with the resurgence of the Soviet superiority or expansion which
characterized the cold war, but which does not eliminate the multi-
- plicity of conflicts of both national and regional interests which
. flourished during detente. ~
Also, the period which is beginning should see an increase in conflicts ~
of priorities and allocation of resources between butter and guns,
between military effort and negotiation effort, between economic j
interests having to do with the transfer of technology and a political ~
concern with controlling them, etc., these differences corresponding to
different attiCudes toward the Soviet Union.
A leftist Europe in which civilian priorities have won out could emerge
from an alliance of social democracy with Eurocommunism. This would +
imply maximal vulnerability for both sides, for it would present for ~
the Soviet Union both ideological dangers and military opportunities.
A right c~ing Europe, such as the Chinese want and such as Mrs Thatcher
and in.a more ambigious fashion F. J. Strauss embody, would be united
in resistance to the Soviet military threat, giving c~uropean defense a j
real chance for the first time, but it would come up against hostile
reactions both from the two great powers and major political and social '
forces within a number of countries.
~ Neither of these two Europes is however very likely.
First of all, neither resolves the current problems except in part. I
According to the formula of Uwe Nerlich,* reestablishing the military
~ I
* See H. Holst and V. Nerlich, editors, "Beyond Nuclear Deterrence," 'i -
New York, 1977.
i
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balance which has been dangerously tipped in favor of the Soviet Union
and integrating the social and political forces of the left are two
complementary rather than exclusive aspects of the same political
necessity.
Above all, neither of the two policies, nor much less a calculated and
~ flexible combination of them, have much chance of being adopted, because
the development of the different countries in Western Europe is likely
to be too different to allow a truly concerted policy. The most
probable prospect seems to be that of a relatively fragmented Europe,
in which different countries or groups of countries will continue to
maintain concurr.ent and contradictory bilateral relations with the
Soviet Union. That nation is likely to retain the initiative and to
make use both of its increased military weight and intensified campaigns
for peace in order to influence the development of the political forces
in Western Europe and their attitude toward it.
Then again, these efforts themselves could be paralyaed by the domestic
problems of the USSR or by its foreign ventures, which may very
possibly themselves cause shock w~~es. Above all, if they prove to
involve such countries as the Balkans which enjoy the dubious privilege
of being apart, like Afghanistan, of a zone which is both gray and red,
contiguous both territorially and ideologically to the USSR, and of
having a decisive symbolic and practical importance not only for the
military security of Europe, but for the ideological security of the
&oviet empire and the political development of the continent.
COPYRIGHT: 1980, S. A. Commentaire ~
~ 5157
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COUNTRY SECTION FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERriANY
MARKET SATURATION, IMPORTS THREATEN AUTO INDUSTRY _
- Hamburg STERN in German 10 Apr 80 pp 28-29 `
[STERN interview with BMW Chief Eberhard von Kuenheim: "The Japanese Du
Not Fight With the Same Weapons"]
[Text] STERN: Mr von Ruenheim, the car boom is leveling out, and at thP
same time more and more low-griced import cars are being pushed onto the
market--ie there no more future for the German auto industry?
Von Ruenheim: This is certainly not true. In the past 5 years the German
suto industrq reached the highest economic peak in its entire history.
� STERN: That is in the past. Today things are not quite that rosy any
more.
Von Ruenheim: After a boom of such duration and intensity, which we never
_ ~xperienced b~fore, it is Quite natural for a slump to occur.
STERN: flowever, a saturation of the market is beginning to be seen in the
FAG. Once every household has a car or even two, some day there will only
be a need to replace cars.
Von Kuenheim: This will already come about in this decade. Today 23 mil-
lion pasaenger cars are in operation here. We will probably reach a 26 or
27 million mark.
STEIiN: That would mean a ratio of 500 cars per 1,000 inhabitants.
Voa Ruenheim: If one assumes that the life of a car is almost 10 years, _
~ the replacement requirements can be eatimated at about 2.6 million cars
- per year. ~
STERN: However, at present abuut 4 million passenger cars are being manu-
factured in the FRG per year. ~t will not be easy to push a surplus and
a desirable increase in producti.on onto the export market due to stiff
competition, especially from Japan. ~
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Von Kuenhei~: 'I'hia is s serious problem. The challenge from Japan will
bring many things into question that we have become accustomed to in
Germany.
STERN�: Do you at times experience fears that you could suffer the same
fate as the watch/clock ma~xufacturers and the entertainment electronics
industry?
Von Kuenheim: In the worst case, which I do not even wish to imagine,
even that would apply. We, and not only the automotive industry, are
facing the question whether we can defend the FRG as a manufacturing
location at all.
STERN: How is that?
Von Kuenheim: We have meanwhile become the country with the highest per-
sonnel expenses worldwide, and thia is also the country with many of the
highest coets. We have the higheat telephone charges of all industrial-
ized countries, ae well as the higheat national air fares. A round trip
Hamburg-Munich by air costs almost as much as flying from New York to
Los Angeles, almoet four times the dietance. We have the highest taxi
fares, the highest utilities, and the highest energy costs.
STERN: This is why our switchboard operators, pilots, taxi drivers and
meter readers are doing quite well.
~Ion Kuenheim: It is the question of how long this will last. The FRG
The I
ae a location for industry is jeopardized if we continue like this.
act~.vities of the Japaneae, whose productivity in the,auto manufacturing
induetry is 36 percent higher and whose labor coata are 30 percent lower
than in the FRG, are a threat to our ~obs.
STERN: By saying that, are you not making it too easy on youraelf? Your ~
company is presently looking for 500 engineers for the research and devel- ~
opment department. Is this not an indication that you have grossly ne- ~
glected this area up to now? ~
Von Kuenheim: You are wrong there. We are the first to have electron- ,
ically ~ontrolled engines produced in series. We are the first, for !
instance, to reduce or stop the feeding of gasoline when going down a
hill in thruat operation. We are among the first to have introduced the �
anti-blocking system, and much more. .
STERN: It should concern you, however, that the Japanese 3ust took firet ;
place in the latest state inspection statiatics which examined the lack ~
of faults in 4-year-old cars. ;
Von Kuenheim: Tegting has its pitfalls. Only those cars are comparable ~
tha~ have received the same treatment.over 4 years, and the same main- ~
tenance. However, there are vast differences. ,
31 ,
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STERN: It is a fact that state inspections showed that 4-year-old cars
had more defects than Japanese cars.
Von Kuenheim: Did you ever see the list? The differencea are almost
marginal.
STERN: However, there are more than marginal differences as far as the
prices are concerned. According to the FRANRFURTER ALLGF~II3INE, Japanese
cars are on the average 20 percent cheaper than comparable German cara.
Von Ruenheim: For us this meana that ~ae, too, have to increase produc-
~ tivity. We will have to automate to a large_degree if we want to aurvive.
Then we will have to app~y the same strict laws here as are applicable in
_ Japan.
STERN: You cannot reduce the wages, though.
~ Von Ruenheim: But we can reduce the wages per unit...
STERN: ...by increased use of robots.
Von Kuenheim: That, too.
STERN: The Japanese, though, will not only be tough competitors on the
FRG market, but also on the eaport markets. How large of an eapart slump
are you eetimating the German suto induatrp will have to swallow in the
mid-1980s?
Von Kuenheim: The Japanese will probably produce more cars this year than -
the IInited Statea. You have to take into account that the Americans have
an average national market of 10 million unita per year. Japanese require- -
menta only amount to about one-third of this figure. The question arises.
ae to how long the w~orld will lc~ok on while someone deatroya other indus-
trialized nations through its mase production. The Japanese do not fight
with th~e same weapons. They are great masters as far ae utilizing all
possibilities of the free world market is concerned, and they have great
talent in ke~ping competitors' products awap from their own market. In
1979 they e~cported more than 3 m~llion sutomobiles, but only imported
60,000.
STERN: Would you go so ~ar as to advise the government to threaten trade
barriers in order to make the Japanese give in?
Von Kuenheim: Yes, I would if it were necessary for tactical reasons.
However, this would put to question our intentions of maintaining a free
world market. Therefore I would not like this idea, and if it were imple-
mented, it should be implemented by the European Co~uaity, not only by
the FRG. Action would have to come from this group.
~
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STERN: If we manage without a trade war, including government regula-
tions, how are the chances for German auto exports?
Von Ruenheim: I do not think that we will have a slump in exports. But
if our prices become exorbitant, which is already the case in some coun-
tries, the purchasera intexested in our products may forego buying them
and may be forced to purchase cheaper vehicles. -
ST$RN: Is this mere fear of what could happen, or is it already happen-
ing?
Von Kuenheim: It is already happening. In the United States our large
cars now cost twice as much as Cadillacs. We have customers abroad saying -
"Your product is exactly what I need, but I cannot afford it anq more."
STERN: This all sounds threatening. How do you plan on defending your-
self againat this develogment? Does relocating your production abroad
make any sense?
Von Kuenheim: We need not apeak about BMW. Take VW--they started a new ~
plant in the United States, because they could not handle the situation
by exportation alone. Possibly other manufacturers will arrive at similar
decisions. Ford or Ge~eral Motors no longer build plants here. They are ~ ~
~ meanwhile building them in Spain or Portugal. ~
STERN: Could a merger of German car factories be the solution? ~
Von Kuenheim: We are already cooperating to a large degree. Take the ;
antiblocking syetem which we developed in cooperation with Bosch. It will ~
be applied by Daimler riaing almost an identical design. This also repre- .
aents one form of cooperation. Aaother example: VW had a preasing mill ~
which was not working to full capacity. We were about to build our own ~
presaing mill for sheet metal, but we did not build it. VW has been sup- ;
plqing us with pressed parts for 2 years now. Thia is economically sen- I
sible. The cooperation extends much further than is known to the public. ;
i
~
STERN: Mergers of large auto manufacturers in the FRG, then, are not neces- '
sary aad therefore not to be expected?
Von Kuenheim: I believe that the cartel law will preveat such action, and '
besides, we do not plan on acquiring Daimler-Benz or VW. ~ ;
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co.
9544
CSO: 3103
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- COUNTxY SBCTION FRANCE
UNITED STATES SEEN IN NEED OF FRENCH, AI,LIED SUPPORT
Paris L'ERPRESS i~ French 29 Mar 80 p 98
- .[Article by Raqmond Aron: "America Needs Us"]
[Text] The die seems to be cast: unless there is an unforeseeable accident,
in apite of the New York vote, the opposing candidates in the presidential
campaign next November should be Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. The holder
of the title, as they saq in aports parlance, will start off the favorite.
The Democratic Party is the ma~arity party in the country; during the last
few yeara, the candidatea who represented the extremes, McGovern, on the
Democratic left, or Goldwater, on the Republican right; were crushed by a
moderate or a centrist. Reagan belongs to t~e hard-core conservative group.
of Republicans. ~
In spite of II.S. public opinion's swing to the right, Reagan needs, in order
to win, favors from fortune. From now to November, Carter may be the victim
either of some spectacular blunders or indeed,of events. A national defeat
would ruin the prestige of the President, whom a good many voters consider
incompetent, unequal to his obligations.
Why, the Europeans ask, is this great country, rich in.scholars and writers,
finally obliged to choose between two apparently mediocre men, whom no PDG
[President-Director General] of a large company would entrust with the
management of a department? Harrq Truman, before his arrival at the White
House, was also considered to be mediocre; he was transformed by hie respon-
aibilitiee. Neither Eisenhower, nor Rennedy, nor Johnson, nor Nixon was
mediocre. The election method~has been made more democratic; the number
of primaries has increased--which makes even more difficult the task of the
presidemtial candidates. The enhanced role of the primaries gives their
chance to politicians, such as Carter or Reagan, who know nothing of
~Tashington, Congress and possibly even the outside world.
Let us add that, among the Republicans in Washington, a number of senators
have more of the qualities needed to govern the United States and even to be
- elected. But the militante agree, it seems, to lose with /their/ [in italics]
man. .
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!
a Carter--why ~onceal it--is judged even more severely abroad than at home.
Now, without denying his weaknesses or his mistakea, I should like to
recall the attenuating circumatances, some particulars of the U.S. and
world situation that should impel to modesty the ministers and even the
~ournaliats who are so certain of their superiority.
Let us take, for example, the problem of the Near East. The European .
governments, led by the French president, are proclaiming the right of the
Palestinian people to self-determination and are eatablishing paraoffic~al
realtions with the PLO. Nothing could be easier, since they do not commit
themselvee either to achieving the evacuation of the territoriea occupied in
- 1967 or to guaranteeing the eurvival of the State of Israel. The Europeans,
incapable of their own self-defense, are not capable, a fortiori, of
defending Ysrael. What would Schmidt, Giscard d'Estaing, Lord Carrington '
do fn the White House? We would like to know the secret they definitely
hold to ensure peaceful coexistence between Israel and the PLO, which does
not hide its objective: t~ie~destruction of the Hebrew state. The Europeans -
arrogate to themselves cheaply the merit of lucidity, because they are
satiafied to talk and to reap marginal benefite, leaving it to the United
States to find a solution or to avoid the ~rorst.
Let us take another examp le: the Soviet Union's military intervention in
Afghanistan. There again, the French and the Germans have spoken, condemned
the occupation of the country by the Soviet Army. But both parties have
manifested their firm intention of preserving detente. Although in words
they have proclaimed detente to be indivisible, they wiahed to maintain in
Europe a pacified climate and trade exchanges.
So be it! Perhaps the Europeans should conduct themselves as regional
powers, as was said by Henry Kissinger. They tend to play the role of
spectators, to mark the shots and to attribute ~o Carter's weaknesa the
Soviet resort to arms. If they looked at the map, they would see without
difficulty that through the intermediary of the Baloutchi tribes dispersed
between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, the Soviets can destabilize three '
countries and reach Che sea of Oman. The Persian Gulf coricerns them as
much ae the United States.
The Europeans do not lack arguments to explain and ~ustify their loss of
confidence in the United States. But I wonder if they follow their thought
to ita logical conclusion. Is it a question of the President or of the
United SCates? Carter definitely gives the feeling of not being in control
of his team, of hesitating himself, of wavering between conflicting feelings ~
and advisere. But he inherited an America which for 2 years was reducing
ita armament effort~ while the Soviet Union was overarming: If we suppose
that there is an approximate equality at the level of strategic nuclear
arms, there is no doubt about the Soviet superiority in classical weapons.
The nuclear threat, apart from the protection of U.S. territory, seema
less and less dissuasive.
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Thirty years ago, when the Rorean war broke out, the United States in 3
yeara tripled the national defense budget without i~posing sacri~ices on
the population. To increase this same budget bp 5 percent, the President
has to make cuts here or th~re in social expenditures. The Untted States
today hae neiCher industrial nor financial aurpluses. An increase in
armament production would require a transfer of workera and machines~ taking
them from induetry in the civ31 aector.
Certainly the United States remains potentially t;~e foremost economic and
military power--potentially but not actually. During the next few years,
the II.S. President, whoever he maq be, will trq to save th~ essential.
Simce 1965, since the dispatch of an expeditionary corps to Vietnam, the
United States has lost on all fronts: military force, prestige, moral unity.
Today, for the first time, D.S.public opinion is becoming aware of the
Bepublic's humiliation, readq to answer the appeals of a President whv
would inspire confidence. The United States, leRS imperious than humbled,
has more need of the support than of the criticiQm of its allies.
COPYRIGHT: 1980, S.A. Groupe Express
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COUNTF~Y SECTION FRANCE
~ _
- PAUL THOREZ DEBRIEFED ON SOVIET LIFE, ATTITUDES TOWARD WEST ~
Paris L~ NOUVEL OBSERVE~TEUR in French 7-13 Apr 80 p 44
[Interview wit;h former I'CF member Paul Thorez, son of former PCF
Secretary General Maurice ThorPZ, upon return from recent trip to -
USSR by Alain Chouffan: "Soviet Public Opinion and tr?e Boycott of. ' _
_ the Games"] ~
[Text] The second of the three sons of the former
secretary general of the PCF, born in Moscow in 1941, ~
during the war, he has visited the Soviet Union over.
20 times. "Anything having to da with that country i
affects me," he says. A party member from 1965 to
1968, he broke with the PCF following the May 1968 ;
_ events. Today he lives in Aise-en-Provence where he ;
~ is writing a book of recollectiQns of the USSR. ;
~
LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: You have just returned from Moscow. What do ~
the Soviets expect of the Olympic games providing that they are not '
I_
boycotted?
- Pau1 Thorez: Zinovi~ev has pQinted out that the.Carter initiative did I
not affect in th~ Ieast ~the position of the US5R in the world. On the
other�hand, he mentioned its mobilizing effect domestically. Actually ~
the American blackmaiL has turned the situation around. Dramatizing ~
the Olympic games, it triggered an integration mechanism which the
suthorities had been unable or unwilling to use and which, henceforth, ;
will be working in their favor. Until January, with the exception of .
the author�ties and the leaders, few people felt affected by the develop-
ment of the games which were considered an event for the benefit of '
foreigners. ' ;
~
The upset of the preparations and the bill to be paid became everyone's ~
concern: It was one year of work or study lost, an unlivable summer,
and the predictable worsening of the shortages in the autumn, after the
food stocks had been consumed by the tourists. In this respect th~
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present difficulties justify all worries. The fact that Pepsi-Cola
appeared on the market does not balance, for example, the impossibility
for a number of months to find table and household covers and most
prime necessity conaumer goods. They have been reserved �or the new
~ hotels and the Olympic village. The people do not refrain from voicing
out loud what they think of it. The threat of boycott has pushPd these -
realities into the background. _
Public opinion reacts to insult more energetically than the authorities
themselves wi~o, so far, have been quite cautious not to go one better
than the public. Henceforth, public opinion is waiting for the op~ning
of the gaiaes, with or without the participation of the Americans, as
the answer to their presumptiousness.
N. 0.: Does the criticism to which the USSR is subjected Coday affect
the average Soviet person?
P. Thorez: As far as the average Russian is concerned, the foreigner
does not understand anything about Russia, in any case. His criticisms
always seem to be "missing the point." They may be excessive or in-
sufficient but, in any case, useless. They co not really hurt him.
This is with the exception of some administrative and scientific cadres
and the intelligentsia, those whose minds are clouded by the West. Some -
of them are part of the establishment and seek consolation by running
- around the world in tha jets of Aeroflot and buying their clothes in
_ Paris; the others established, not so long ago, the nucleus of "demo- _
cratic" dissidence. Today they are dispersed in exile, whose witness
is Sakharov.
For the majority of Russians the temptation of the West does not go
beyond imported items which it is nice to acquire occasionally and whose
difficult access, perhaps determin~S their entire value. As to t:~e -
rest, the essentials, they cultivate with pride, willingness, or resigna-
tion, as the case might be, the myth of an identity, of a r.ational
destiny of which the rest of the world has no idea. This myth is the
most real feature of today's Russia. _
N. 0.: How do the Soviet people live today and withstand the diffi-
- culties and hazards of daily life?
P. Thorea: It is necessary to realize, first of all, that daily life
does not consist of difficulties and obstacles, at least not in the
eyes of those involved. On the material level, the experience of ~
absolute unhappiness and misery provides the generations familiar with
massive repressions and the war with a feeling of relative comfort.
This is a feeling which the youngest neither share nor understand.
However, those same youngsters find within the system and the social
ritual, whose faults seem to them, justifiably, inherent in everything,
means for the satisfaction of most of their ambitions.
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In today's USSR one can find everything if the means are there. Short-
ages have been replaced by inequalities by virtue of the importance of
- the priva[e sector,, legal or illegal, in the distribution of consumer
goods. Careerism, corruption, and scrounging are the law, triggering' ~
an equalit~rian discontent based on the myth of a peasant and patri-
firchal Russi.a, with empty pockets but with e rich soul and an inf.initely
big heart, rxther than on that of the revolution.
N. 0.: Could this disr_ontent crystalize in any way?
Thorez: The most revealing in this respect is the popularity of the
exogenous thesis of the socialist revolution. This idea, cherished by
Solzhenitsyn, was taken up and developed here and there, most officially.
The works of Fikoul, published in a periodical, drew only a rectifica-
tion in PRAVDA. They described the revoluti~on as the result of a -
Jewish-German plot with the Russian people as its victim. Discontent
and, more broadly, the need for a historical explanation and the search
for an identity had been channeled through a nationalism which shows up
both inside and outside the power structure. Here the nostalgia for -
Stalinism meets with Solzhenitsyn's prophecy. No one can predict the _
outcone of this marria~e.
leamPierre Rey
~
- I~~~~a ~ ~ ~
y r,~~.. ~ , f~': : ~ .
. . . ~r~ '
~ ......+~^-T""""""' . . .
fc ~
i
7~
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_
_r;v
Paul Thorez ~
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Observateur"
5157
CSO~ 3100
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COUNTRY S&CTION FRANCE
VOTE TO BE TAKEN ON ISRAEL BOYCOTT
Paris LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in French 14 Apr 80 p 2
~ [8epost: "St~ate Council's Decision on the Opinion of the Government
~p~xr~ring Implicitly the Boycott of Israel"]
[Text] The State Council will have to issue an opinion on recourse
against the "Barre Circular" which interprets the 7 June 1977 law
(Artic!e 32), better known as the antiboycott law." A masterpiece of
t?~rpo~r�isy, this artic~e would make any kfnd of interpre~ation possible
and the government wE?ich had been watching over it, has drawn a con-
clusion w~ich eliminated any substance from the text for all practical
purposes. Based on this opinion, Coface guaranteed contracts with Arab
countries stipulating that the signatory enterprises pledged not to
deal with Israel. Some companies may have even been banned~from
markets guaranteed by Coface because people of Jewish origin were mem-
bera of their board. Hence the appeal to the State Council. It seems
that the supreme ~urisdiction would lean toward the annulment of the
"opinion" of the prime minister (J. 0. 24 July 1977) indicating abuse
~ of power. .
Cotpment: At Matignon and Denisu this is considered a minor matter
withfn a text of the 7 June law according to which the new articles of
_ the penal code condemning boycott "are not applicable when the facts
considered in these articles are consistent with the governmental
directives adopted within the framework of its economic and commercial
policy, or else in the course of r.he implementation of international
agreements." Should the State Council annul the opinion of the prime
minister, other directives in the same sense.would be inmediately issued.
What is e~sential for the government is to protect French-Arab trade. '
COPYRIGHT: 1980~Groupe E~cpansion S.A.
5157
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COUNTRY SECTIGN ~~E ~
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CREPEAU ON POSSIBLE LEFTIST COALITION TO DEFEAT GISCARD '
Paris LE I~OUVEL OBS~RVATEUR in French 7-13 Mar 80 p 39 ~
I
[Interview with MRG (,Left Radical Mnvement] Secretary General Michel Crepeau i
by Thierry: Pfister: "Michel Crepeau: 'I Fully Intend To Play the ;
Part of the Spoiled Brat ~
i
I
[Text] LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR. Are you one of the many candidates for the
presidency of the repubiic? ~ ~
I
Michel Crepeau: There is no use in being a candidate ~ust for the fun of
being a candidate. If the left as a whole gets into the 1981 election with
the intention of winning and eliminating Giscard, the movement of the left i
wing radicals will be entirely ready to join in the fight. Shop intereate
will move aside. On the other hand, if each left wing party has in mind
presenting its own candidat~ with its own program and the election ends up ~
getting turned into a mere discuasion of ideas, why would you want us to
stay out of it?
N. 0.: To beat Giscard, then, according to you, the 1974 tactica would ~
have to be retained, that is, only one candidacy for the left?
i
Mr Crepeau: Up to now the left has gone into the presidenfiial election . ~
seeming not to know that it comprises two ballots. So it must be possible ~i
in the first round to give voice to the left in all its divera~ity�and, in
the second, to display its unity. All the same, priority would still have
to be given to the fight against Giscard and not the rivalries between com- -
muniata and eocialista. All French people know that except the party leadere,
who do not aeem to understand it. This political argument is someWhat ~
unrealistic, and it often gets out of hand. It is upsetting. '
N. 0.: For the left to be able to show its unity, such a thing would, at !
;
any rate, have to exist. ~
Mr Crepeau: The presidential election goes beyond the confines bf parties.
Besides, these confines are no longer in keeping with current political ~
_ realitiea. They are a reflection of the disputes and ideas of the 19th '
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century. The realitq~of today is that we are confronting a sort of elective
monarchy. nro ma~or trenda are in a head-oa encounter: on the one hand the
'forces of cDange; on the other those of conservativism. All thoae who have
- won or almoet won a presidential election have taken care to identify them-
eelvea with one of theae two trenda, while putting themselves above parties.
Such was the case with Georges Pompidou, Francois M~tterrand and Valery
Giscard d'Sataing.
The representative of the left wauld have to take his place above his polit- _
ical party, if he wanted to have a chance of winning. -
N. 0.: The Socialist Party will logically have to defend the options of
the "Socialist Pro~ect."
Mr Crepesu: The "Socialiet Project" has not substaatially changed the
approach which was that of the "Co~on Program." Everything goes right on
as if we had not, on four occasions, loat out in important competitions.
Where I am concerned, I have, since 1972, been very cautious about the
"Co~on Program," even though I have loyally played the game of unity of
the left. Our failing is that we were unable to mobilize youth, the
18-year-old coastituents who represeated an important portiQn of the voting
public. And if the left is not capable of mobilizing youth, it is because
it doea not answer questions of the future. It remains Jacobi~, technocratic
and centralizing. This policy produced EDF (Electricity of France), and
where the nuclear case is concerned, aayone can aee that nationalization
doea not neceasarily bring about democratization.
In fact, the left's talk remaina very conaervative. The left keeps ita old
valuee. To be aure theq are worth something, but I think that while princi-
ples are eternal, their application in a changing world muet also change.
Aa answer to the real queations of our times must be given. Which neither
the "Cammon Program" nor the "Socialist Pro~ect" really doea. -
N. 0.: It ie on record that you would carry out a campaign in 1981, if
you were to be a candidate.
Mr Crepesu: I fully intend to play the part of the "spoiled brat" a bit.
I am quite free to say what I think. This is a privilege of another kind.
I want to stir things up. The left really needs it.
- We are going to put out a aanifesto neat June which will not, I hope, be
~uaC another book. And we are going to say frankly what we think, even if
we have to offend certain left wing sensitivities. By showing, for example,
that the demoeratization of teaching is a failure. 2'~e teachers who talk
to you about self-management denq the pupils' parents the right to diacuss
the content of t~aching and programs.
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Another example: employers, the unions, everybody, in a word, accepts a
fiacal eyatem that penalizes employment. Even during a period of unemploy-
ment I do not hear anyone questioning this rule. This country has become
a big.dormitory. It ie about time it woke up. Ux~fortunately the people
in the'~.eft wing prefer to hem themselvea in, some in a cell, some in a
- section, and cut themselves off from the world. Others take refuge in
illusions, like the leftieta, or go in for angling. A reaction is needed.
We are at the crossrc3ds of an evolution. Straight thinking and telling
the truth are therefore required. That is what the MRG muat be used for.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Obaervateur"
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COtTNTRY SECTION FR~4NCE
SHIEI,DIN(~ COI~UTERS FROM TERROR29T ATTACKS DISCUSSED
~ Paris VAI~EURS ACT[TELLES in French 21 Apr 80 pp 43-44 _
[Article by Francois Lebrette: "Computer Fi1ea Under Protection"]
[Text] "The computer is the preferred tool of thoae in power. It is used
to exploit, claseffq, control, represe..." That eaplanation given by CLODO
(Comm.ittee to Liquidate and Deter Computers) to ~ustify the attacks the
other week in Toulouse on the IBM and CII centers, is hardly new. It is
a repriae of the myth of '!t~e totalitarien computer."
Another mqth mak3ng its reappearance at the tinae of those attacks: The
_ suppoaed fragilitq of a societp entrusting its memories to magnetic tapes.
These feara, oppoaed and complementary at the same time, hardly seem ~usti-
fied in practice. One could even defend the opposite theory: Computeriza-
tion has increased the security of the files ~as much as thoae in the files.
A paradoa Which the operator oP one of the 125,000 electronic files in
France aunmted up with a quip:
"If the STO [expansion unlaiowa] files in Augsbourg had been on a computer,
Marchais' past would not have come out so~easily."
Moreover,; it would have run less risk of destruction, accidental or not.
The safeguards are twofold: Technical in the duplication of tapes and legal.
In France, the 6 January 1978 Law very severely limits the conditions for
the creation and use of electronic files. The main objective: To prevent _
the ~ile fraw containing a"profile" of the sub~ect. A National Commission
on Co~puters aad Freedom, f inanced by the ~inistry of Justice budget but
anawering onlp to the State Council aad the court of accounts, is in charge
o� ir,s application. Membexs OP Parliament aad magistrates elected by their
peers maloe up the clear ma~j orftp: 12 out o~ 17 , two others appointed by
, the presidents of parliameritarp esse~tblies and the last three by the govern-
ment.
"In practtce, we watch to see that the information carried on the ~ile cards
does not go beyond the exgress purpose of the file," they say at the
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commission. For example, a aports association will not be authorized to
have ita membe~e' financial status appear on its lists.
All informat3on, even harmless, the accumulation of which would make it
possible to discern the personality of the aub~ect, is also banned. A for-
- tiori, the law forbids any mention of political, racial or religious af-
filiation (exceptions are provided for unions or political parties). The
commission's iavestigative authority is uniimitAd: No national or private
files can be concealed from it. _
Tn practice, how are thinga done? The files of the subacribere to VALEURS
ACTUELLES, ~or example, cax~ carry only the name, addreas and expiration
date of the eubacription. There is a duplicate file kept in a aort of ,
caetle atronghold at the head offices on Avenue Kleber, a tower aurrounded
by water with a drawbridge, protected from fire.
Since this kind of file must conatantly be updated, it has a weekly rotation
in a apecialized van. The human factor's revenge on the computer: The'ex-
change can take place only between per8ona who already know each other on
eight. In case of personnel changea, introductiona must be made.
The system is allowed to protect itself against aay threat of the destruc-
- tion of a tool vital to the campany, consequently reducfng markedly the
cost of insurance for loss of operation. Theft? Very much in fashion some
10 years ago w:~en files were on microfilm, this type of crime has become
extremely difficuft with the computer.
"I would be incapable of stealing my own file," says the man in charge of '
aubscriptiona to VALEURS AC2'UELLES. '
In fact, to use a tape, one muat know the proper "keys" for each card file
for each enterprise, analogous to the personal number of the magnetic cards
givirig access to the bank note distributora.
There is etill the problem of uaing this file. VALEURS ACTUELLES' case is
rather epecial. The company's policy i~ to refuse any utilization outside
of the aending of the magazine and subscription renewal foxms. It is thus
never used as a soliciting tool by a magnetoscope saleaman or an investn?ent
- campany, for instance. ~
This is an exception. The ma~ority ~f private files (and sometimea even
public files, fraudulently) are sold, rented or exchanged, moreover, with-
out the occasional user knowing any details about the names in the file.
He therefore runa the risk of soliciting people who are already his clients.
Now a Frenchman, from birth to death, is documented on an average of 500
t3.mes. From the civil registrq of births to that of deatha, passing through
social security, the telephone directorq, his bank, the stores where be pays
_ by cl-,eck, etc.
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This explaine the proliferation of mail solicitations he may receive, some-
timea for the same product. A compaay must aimply have rented different
mailing liets with his name on them (for eammple, a school directory, a
private mutual insuraace ccmpany or sporta association rceter). An examin-
ation of the wording of the addreas can often deteYmiae ~the origin al liet.
Under the curreat legislation, an individual can, with difficulty, defend
himeelf againet auch eolicitations. He does have the right. The following
ezample waa given to the Commiaeion on Computers and Freedom:
If qou buy aa automobile and in the following weeks you are solicited by a
compan~:selli~xg accesaories or a specialized magazine, you can demand that
the autamobile company remove you from their mailing list.
La Redoute mail order compaay the largest private mailing list in
France has even made some innovationa in this area receatly. Its order
forms muet, from now on, contain a special space in which to indicate ac-
ceptance or refueal of subeequsnt commercial use of the client's address.
The ma~orftq of co~ercial files are verq imprecise in regard to the "tar-
get" ~imed at. Thus the tentation to "cross" aeveral lists, iaterconnect-~
- ing them. For example, by croaeing~the ~i$t:of a~~hfgh fashion house's ~
clients with the list of Air France's cuatomers who have taken at least
two trips a year, then with aa.-international credit card'e li8t, one can
choose a clieatele with a relativel~ precise "econamic profile." This is
done in the Onited 9tates. It is strictlq forbidden in Fraace.
"That is exactly the type of activity which f alls under the arm of the law
' prohibiting interconnecticros," said a commission member.
A draconiai la~: Even the aecurity~eervicea DST [Directorate of Terri-
toYial Surveillance] or SCBCE [Foreign Intelligence and Couaterintelligence
Service] do not have the right to conduct this kind of filtering. Dis-
truet of the rislcs of intarconnectioa goes very deep. Notably, it explains
the co~omisaian'e delay in giving ite opinion on the future electronic iden-
titp card. By carrying a code of an individual'e auxname, given names,
date aad place of birth, such a card would in fact give him a"lifetime
id~ntifier" and any file adopting the same code could be interconnected.
This leade thea to the myth of the "great file" capable of telling every-
~ thing about everyone's life. Tbat kind of eapasure would be totalitarian,
some futurists say. More~.probablq~that kind of system would not be ex-
ploitable and the strongest police atate in the world would be buried
_ quickly under the avalanche of irrelevant informatiot~.
Finally, one might wonder if the fear of camputer files is not more daa-
gerous than the files themselves. To car~y out their, task auccessfully,
since some 15,000 new files are created every year, the Comnnission on -
Computers and Freedom runs the risk of becoming an additional buresucracy.
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Already, to "manage" the 125,000 existing files, it has decided to resort... ~
to a computer. The files file, in brief, the only admissible interconnec-
tion.
COF'~CRIGHT : 1980 "Valeurs actuelles" '
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_ coux~Y sECTZOx r~nxcE
AI.AT iJNITS' SPEED OF REACTION DF~MONSTRATED IN 1979
Paris AIR ~ COSMOS in French 16 Feb 80 pp 42, 43
[Article bq Jean de Galard]
- [Text] As of 31 December 1979, ALAT's [Ground Forces Tactical AiX Support]
fleet included slightly more than about 1U0 planes, with about 60 on line,
and 550 helicopters, with alightly more than 500 on line.
The number of flight hours of tMis group of aircraft in 1979 amounted to
165,420: 13,800 in the case af the planes (about 15 Brouasards aad about
50 L-18s) and 151,620 for the helicopters, i..e., Alouette IIs and IIIa
(2b0, includiag a certain n~ber of Alouette III/SS lls), SA-341 Gazelles
(140), about 30 SA-341 Gazelle/Hots and SA-330 ~Pimnas (130). The helicopters'
total number of night flight hours was 10,300.
Expreased in percentages, the brealcdown of the four ma~or activity areas
of ALAT helicopters in ~.979 was the following: tactical forces, 51.6 percent;
drills, 30.0 percent; security for~es, 14.7 percent; overseas presence missions,
3.7 percent. .
Within the combat helicopter regiments, activity was divided as follows,
expreased in percentage of flight hours: 40 percent in the case of light
helicopters (mainly SA-341s); 28.5 percent for armed helicopters (Alouette
III/SS lls aad SA-341/Hots) and 31.5 percent for tactical helicopters.
Featuxes of ALAT Activity
The activity of ALAT uaits during the past year was characterized simultaneously
by an increase in the number of overseas presence missions, greater participa--
tion in volume in ma~or exercises over and outside national territorq, very,
broad consideration given to instruction and testiag, and a aharp increase
in missions performed for ~he benefit of civilian organizations., ~
The participation of the Fifth Combat Helicopter Regiment [RHC] and the
Third Light Helicopter Group [GHI.] in foreign operations conducted for the
benefit of countries linked with France by cooperative agreementa also earned
last year for these two units (as well as the Second Companq of the 17th Para-
chute Engineering Regiment) an honorable mention in army bulletins by
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the miniater of defense. The Fifth RHC, basad in Pau, amassed a total of
more than 1,700 flight hours in 18 monthz for its part in these operations.
The Third GHL, based in Rennes, flew more than 2,000 hours in less than
12 months.
This participation of ALAT in foreign operations during overseas missions
demonstrated the high availability level of engaged units and the strong
drive of their members, as well as the flexibility of the new ALAT organiza-
tion. The speed of reaction was considered particularly satisfactory by
- the high command. -
The participation of ALAT units in 1979 in ma~or national exercises--par-
ticularly "Exentia" and "Saone"--and in an overseae exercise ("N-Diambour II"
in Senegal) was marked by the diversity of missions performed and the number
of activity areas covered.
During the "Exentia" exercise, in which 75 aircraft of~security and tactical
forces participated from 21 to 27 April 1979, 1,230 hours were flown in
1 week.
During the "Saone 79" maneuver from 1 to 5 October, 110 aircraft of the
First Army Corps' tactical forcea ran up a total of 1,325 hours in 5 days.
Finally, during the "N'Diambour II" ~oint services exercise in Senegal from
8 to 15 December, in which Senegalese and French units participated, 12 heli-
copters of the Fifth RHC, engaged at the side of four Senegalese Forces
helicopters and two Cape Verde French Forces helicopters, flew 2I5 hours
carrying out helicopter tranaport operations in particular.
All of these large-scale exercises as well as smaller acale missions, per-
formed in the context of operational unit training, made it possible to
note greater continuous action by ALAT on the "battlefield" as well as greater
ability of ite crews for night flights.
Moat flights during the "Exentia" exercise were performed under very marginal
weather conditiona. The "Saone" maneuver enabled ALAT to move at night, -
uaing only its own mobile radio assistance units, a body of near1y.50 aircraft. ~
Finally, the use of light-intensification binoculars permitted the movement
of aircraft into the front zone under very discreet conditions. Experimenta-
tion in this area will make it poesible to determine the needs which will _
give rise to the third generation of this type of eq~ipment.
- Otherwise, on the level of efficiency, the gradual replacement of the SS 11
antitank missile with the Hot antitank missile, whose performance is auperior,
should make it possible to reach a higher level. Testing of the SA-341/Hot -
system with three flight units--the first of which made it possible to train
the first crews at the Luc school*, with the two others being set up at the
*The ALAT School of Inatruction is located in Luc in the department of Var.
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Third RHC based in Etain--has produced very positive reaults. T~ao target prac- .
tice drills were conducted last year, the first in May. The third drili began
= last week.
The f irst of the 120 SA-342 M helicopter~ commanded by the ALAT returned
on 1 February I980 to the ALAT testing center in Valance~ where it will
continue to be evaluated this spring. ~
"Instruction" activity spent in drills represented 30 percent of the total
flight hours af ALAT helicopters in 1979, but it must be noted that crew -
instruction also continues in the units. Within the units, about one-third _
of flight hours is devoted to operat~.onal training at the patrol, flight
or regiment level. Anothe~ gaod percentage of flight hours makes it possible
to assure that the technical conditioa of crews in units is maintained. -
Testing of new equipment also continues in units in the context of routine
- exercises or much more important maneuvers.
?,s we already mentioned, last year th~ testing of nighttime visual aid .
equipment, previously started and then continued by the night testing center
in Luc, was also perfarmed in units. It has led to tactical evaluations
conducted on one hand with the light helicopters of the First Army Corp
an~i the llth GHL.
With regard to inatructio~:~ and so that future captains will become accustomed
, to piloting under poor visibility conditions as soon as possible, ALAT is
preparing to make general use of operational flight with instrumenta. Nexr
year, every pilot coming out of the Dax school will have to have the VOI .
qualification = operational f light with instruments. The establishment -
at Dax for the time being and then gradually in the units (each RHC or GHL -
will have its own) of LMT 15~H flight trainers shoud help to make it easier '
and less expensive to obtain this qualification.
Finallyy 1979 was characterized by an increase in the number of missions
performed by ALAT for civilian organizations.
As road assistance, the thr~e Alouette III helicopters stationed in Di~on,
Montpellier and Toulouse for four s~er mcnths handled some 600 medical
evacuations.
Aa humanitarian missior.s, on requisition ALAT helicopters carried out about
50 evacuations last year, garticularly in the mountains.
In connection with fighting forest fires in the Mediterranean area, ALAT
planes and helicopters carried out many observation and liaison missions
in the course of more than 350 flight hours.
During ORSEC [Disaster Relief Organizationj operations (snowstorms and floods),
aLAT helicopters flew about 20 hours to provi~e assistance to disaster victims
or to evacuate them. Finally, in D,jibouti on 30 October 1979, following the
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derailment of a train about 40 kilometers from the capital, five ALAT Pumas
evacuated more than 100 persons at night, nearly 45 of whom were injured.
Easy Maintenance, Good Availability
For all ALAT helic~~ters, average overall availability reached 73.2 percent
l~st year; it was 73.6 percent in 1978.
- It is logical to think that ALAT has worked to obtain an availability level
close to the maximum especially for its aircraft participating in overseas
missions. As for the number of maintenance hours per actual flight hour,
it wae (not counting fourth-level operations performed by the manufacturer): _
~.5 houra for the Alouette IIs; 3.5 hours for the SA-341s; 5 hours for the
AlouQtte IIIs (including weapon system); 8.5 hours for the SA-330 Pumas.
~atisfactory Safety Level ~
Let's start by giving a definition of an air accident and a serious air
tncident, as used in the ALAT. ;
There is an air accident every time that equipment is destroyed or a crew
m~mber is fatally injured. There is a serious air incident every time
chat there is serious equipment damage (re~,uiring fourth-level ope:ations)
or serious injury to a crew member.
ALAT snffered two accidenta last year, resulting in a 0.12 rate per 10,000 ,
f.light hours, and four serious incidents (0.24 per 10,000 hours).
This rate of 0.12 is one of the lowest in ALAT's history; it was first reached
in 1974, but the rate of serious incidents that year was 0.47. In 1978, ,
the accident rate was 0.29 per 10,000 iiours and the serious incidents rate
was 0.23.
if we consider all accidenta and serious air incidents occurring over the
l.aet 16 years by classifying them all as a"serious air occurrence," a satis-
ractory development is note~. In 1964, the rate was 4.04 per 10,000 flight
tloura; in 1968, it was 1.03; beginning in 1972, it dropped below 1; last
year, it was 0.36.
- Statistically, this development is satisfactory to the ALAT command; it
~ is even more significant since the missions of crews are carried out on
~~oard more complex aircraft under more difficult operational conditions
_ and since the number of night.fligl-.t hours rose from 1,760 in 1972 to 11,20~ . ;
in 1978 and to 10,320 last year. Night flight hours represented about
7 percenr, of total hours (10 percent in the case of twin-turbine aircraft
3nd 6 perc~ent in the case of single-turbine) and correspond to the goal
set by ALAT commander Gen Maurice Cannet.
~everal factors may explain the iavorable development noted in recent years '
cancerning the level of safety: strictness of directives implemented in
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the units; strictness of maintenance procedures; improvement in continuing
instruction of pilots and mechanics; very great severity in punishiag any
lack of discipline; very great preventive effort.
With regard to flight safety, hawever, we must definitely be careful not
to expect constant improvements. The effort conaists of trying to maintain -
the lowest poasible rate below which no improvement seems poss~ble.
COPYRIGHT: A.&C., Paris, 1980
11915
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COUNTRY SECTTON FRANCE I
- PERSONNEL TR9NSFERRED FROM CNES TO ARIANESPACE
Paris AYR g~. COSMOS in French 12 Apr 80 pp 42, 48 ~
- [Article by Pierre Langereux: "Temporary Arianespace Organization for
Personnel Tranafer"]
[Text] The JOURNAL OFFICIEL dated 31 March carried the response of ~
French Minister of Industry Andre Giraud ~o a written question from
Deputy Antoine Porcu concerniag the principle and methods of establiahing
the new Arianeapace company, created as ~f 26 March for the production,
marketing and la~.mching of the European Ariane rockets.
The minister of induatry pacified the fears of the honorable ~arliamentar- '
ian, making it clear that the CNES [National Center for Space Study] and ~
the French national companies hold the ma~ority stock in the new company,
and annouacing that a prozocol of agreement between the CNES and the trade ~
uaiona calls for a temporary 4-year organization for the transfer of per- '
sonnel from the center to Arianespace. (The official name of the company ~
ie Arianespace and not Ariane-Espace, but we have reta3.ned the apelling ~
uaed in the JOURNAL OFFICIEL in quoting the question.)
- The complete text of the statement of Mr Antoine Porcu and that of the ~ ;
miniater of industry ~re carried in full below, because we believe that i
they wi11 answer the questions of many readers.
A "Legitimate Concern"
In his wrj.tten question submitted to the National Assembly an 4 February 1980,
Mr Antoine Porcu called th~ attention of the minister of industr3~ to "the ~
legitimate concern of th~ personnel of the National Center for Space i
3tudy with regard to the recent creation of the Ariane-Espace mixed company ~
(originally Transpace) and the consequences it may have both on the research ~
activities of the CNES in the launcher field and on the regulatioae and
conditions of work for the personnel, as well as our national independence
in the aerospace indi:stry sector. The development of the Ariane program, I
following the success of the launching at Kourou, thanks baaically to the
technological and human capacity of the CNES as well as the financial
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effort required of each French taxpayer, led to the establishment of a
mixed capital company in which French and foreign private groups play a
sigaificant role. If the CNES and ysrious na~-ional companies, such as the
SNIAS or the~~SEP [European Propellant Companq] occupy a keq place for the
time being frnm the point of vriew of awnership of the capital committed to
the estab liehment of this new etructure, the fact nonetheless remaina that
powerful private French groups such as Thomson-CSF [General Radio Com~any]
and Matra, as well as West German (Erao, Man), Belgian (Sabca), and
Swedish (Saab-Scania) groups are well situated. In addition, the current
pro~ect is only 95 percent covered, the remaining 5 percent being guaranteed
by various banking groups."
Mr Antoine Porcu eapressed the belief in fact that "the creation of _
Arianespace is in fact leading, despite its multinational nature, to a
masaive transfer of a specifically French technological and human potential
(managemeat of the CNES lauachers) on the one haad, as well as a substantial
portion of the public capital, on the other, toward the valorization of
private French and foreiga, including very particularly West German, capital."
The deputy voiced the fear that "the creative genius, the technological
experience and the vast financial effort crystallized in this specifically _
national structure which is the CNES is thus threatened with dismemberment
for the greater profits and the future prospects of large multi-national
financial groups. It is.pertinent to note that such a transfer is being
effected while the moat castly investmenta (lawaching base,~research equip-
ment, computer apparatus) have already beea made at the expense of the
French taxpayer. lrbreover, this traasfer comea ~ust when vast perspectives
for the future are developing in such little-explored realms as comnmmica-
tioas and direct teieviaion satellites which, it ia known, will have
multiple industrial effects and will create jobs. Ia this connect~~a, there
is a Whele ne~w industry such as that producing ground receiving~antennae,
ia which~France enjoya a clear technological lead, which is thus ia danger
of being shared to the pro~it of West ~ex~oan or Belgian industrialists
and bankers. Given. this prospect, the management of the CNES launchers,
with headqiaarters in Evey where the personnel is higk~lq skilled, is in
- danger of dismemberment and suthoritarian transfer to Ariane-Espace."
Therefore, Mx Porcu said, "it is legitimate to require, as was done with
the cadres and technicians of the CNES, that the creation of Ariane-Espace _
should in no way prevent the full maintanance of the activities of the
CNES in the launcher field and~that the procese of distributing tasks between
the CNES and Ariane-Espace should in no waq lead to a decrease in the CNES
research on lauacher guidance or a.revision of the regulations or the
working conditions for the personnel. More than ever, on the contrary, -
the prospects are great in the realm of industrial repercu~sions and com-
mercial uses of this research activity. The prospect$ for development
offered by the newly developing aerospace remote control and te~ecommunica-
tione industries requires more than ever that each researcher and agent at
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the CNES have exceptional working conditions and job security. Now in i
this realm, this requirement is seriously threatened. Doesn't the transfer
of a large part of the personnel to a mixed capital group augur a probable
challenge of the gains both in the realm of compensation and working con-
ditione?
Similarly, the deputy added, "the prs�tionderant role played by the ShIAS
(8.5 percent) a~3 the European Propellant Company (8.5 percent) in the
Ariane-Espace capital, if indeed it allaws domestic companies to hold
maJority stock for the time being, nonetheless involves the risk of '
generalizing ~ob instahility. In fact, in recent years, fixed-term
cont~acts (generally 2 years) have been routine with the SNIAS and the SEP,
pertaining both to cadre personnel and technicians. The management of
these companies argue the currently precarious nature of the marketing of
their products. This apparent short-range view is designed to conceal the
intention of generalizing job instability in this field in order to in- ;
crease the potential profit, which is the greater since the expected
American market is vast." ~
In conclusion, Mr Antoine Porcu thus asked the minister of industry "what ~
is planned in order: , ~
To guarantee the permanent predominance in the years to come of French '
public capital in Ariane-Espace;
To guarantee the development of the activities of the l~uncher administra-
tion at the CNES; and
- to guarantee the status of CNES personnel and prevent any deterioration I
in their working conditions or wages, both at the CNES and within the ~
framework of their baeic activities at Ariane-Espace." ~
Government Asaurance
In hie response, the miniater of industry noted that:
"The establishment ahortly (the creation of Arianeapace was effective as
of 26 March 1980) of the Arianespace company, a French legal corporation,
the atockholders of which will be mainly, along with the CNES, which will ;
hold a minority block, the leading industries (public and private, French
- and European) manufacturing Ariane, is designed to guarantee the mass pro- ~
~ duction and proper market~ng of the Ariane rocket launcher. This new
activity, which is the continuation of the development phase being com-
pleted, will come, like the preceding one, within the framework of the
Europesn space agency. A statement is currently being submitted for the !
end~rsement of the nations participating in development. The nations will
remain the owners of the research and assets they have financed. Addition-
ally, it is planned that the company will pay the state a royalty for the
;:se of the space center in French Guiana. It is thus not at a11 a question,
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as the honorable parliamentarian says, of transferring assets financed in
large part by the French taxpayers to private groups."
"The stock held by the CNES and French public capital companies accounts
for 51 percent of the total (Arianespace capital)," the minister noted,
while admitting that "it is not poeeible to include in the bylawa of a _
corporation having foreign stockholders any proviaion guaranteeing that
this percentage will always remain the same."
Thus, Andre Giraud went on to explain, "it is nonetheless clear that the
intentions of the government and the managements of the various establish-
ments and enterprises involved is to maintain this distribution which
reflects the role they have played in the development of the rocket
lauacher and a general balance resulting f.rom long negotiation."
Concerning the situation of the personnel, Andre Giraud stated that "the
provisions as a whole in no way lead taward the dismemberment of the CNES
lauacher administration which, in the years to come, will re*_ain responsi-
bility for na,jor new developments. Only the teams within this
administration responsible for the manufacture of the first promotion and
launching series (accounting for less than a third of the launcher admin-
istration at the CNES) will be gradually transferred to the company in
1980 and 1981. Their status has been the fo~us of great concern. Spe-
cifically, a protocol, which is being negotiated between the CNES -
administration and the trade wzion organizations, calls for a complex o�
- provisions guarante~ing the rights acquired and establishing a transitional
plan for 4 years allowing the employees to choose theix assignments on the
basis of known circ~nstances. Naturally, those who remain with the launcher
- adminiatratio~ of the CNES will retain their present status."
In conclusion, the French minister of industry said he wa~s op~imistic about
the future of the new Arianespace company.
"The credibility earned on the intemational level by the Ariane grogram,
wh{.ch has been further strengthene3 by the success of the first launching
last 24 Aecember, creates prospects for industrial production and marketing
which are of great interest, and may lead in the I980s and 1990s to an
average of 4 or 5 launchiags per year. Such a situation cannot but benefit
employment. The gnvernment, aware of the role played in this achievement
by the CNES engineers and technicians, clearly intends to reserve a icey
role for this body in the development which cannot fail to occur in this
sector of activity which is indispensable for our autonomy."
- COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 19$0
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COUNrRY SECTION FRANCE
UPDATE ON SUPER-ETENDARD DELIVERIES TO NAVY
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 5 Apr 80 pp 27-29
[Article by Jean de Galard; "33 ~uper Etendard delivered to French Nevy--
close to 80 percent availability"J
[TextJ Today, the Daesault-Breguet Company--which is building the carrier
aircraft called Super Etendard, of which 71 units have been ordered for
the French Navy--released 35 sircraft from its assembly line at Bordeaux- _
Merignac. The first two were prototypes end were never delivered to the
French Navy which took delivery of its firat aircraft--number 3~n the
seriea--in June 1978.
Thus 33 eircraft were delivered this day to the French Navy, equipped
with a SNECMA [Netional Corporation for ~ircraft Engine Design and
ConsCructionJ Atar 8K50, 5,000-kgp ~et engine. However, not all of them ~
ere as yet in operationa2 service.
Squadron 11F, based at Lendivisiau, received its first Super Etendard in
Auguet 1978; i~ is tod~y fully operational after having gotten all of its _
12 aircraft in February 1979. As of 20 March, it had chalked up more than
~ 4,000 flying houre, including 460 at night and more than 600 deck landings.
Squadron 14F, likewiae baeed at Lendiviaiau, received its firet aix air-
' craft in June; lsat month it took delivery of its 12~h and laet aircraft.
As of 20 March it had likewiee chalked up 1,650 flying hours; including _
140 at night.
The seriea No 35 aircraft was delivered Co Lendiviaiau on 21 March; thie
_ ia the first of the aircraft that wil~ equip Squadron 17F, based at
Hyerea-Le Palyveatre, currently etill equipped with Etendard IV M.
Squadron 17F will be op~rational wita 12 aircraft by Che end of Chis year. -
The activities of both aquadrons, 11F and 14F, in 1979 were such that
no pilot in both units flew lese than 15 hours per month. Moreover, in
tne course of three toure of duty on aircraft carriers representing a -
total of 30 working days in 1979, Squadron 1YF carried out one quarter of
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ite totel air operatione last year. Thie means that a maximum in terma of
coat-effectivenaae wea achieved during porioda of shipboerd duty. .
- Thie monCh, each of tha two squadrone will put in about 250 flying houre.
Overall, the producCion and operations schedulES were completely complied
- with. Leat y~r, the operations of Squadron 14F were oriented toward
"flight tests" from the aircraft carrier Clemenceau, f.ollowing release
from IPER (periodic maintenance and repair inspections), acceptance, on
this vessel, of the really operational aircraft carrier reference syatem,
and training of ita pilots. Squadron 11F in turn concentrated on assault
miesiona at sea and, during its perioda of carrier duty, demonstrated that
nevigation precieion, following a period of familiarization on board an
aircraft carrier, prior to the in-flight utilisation of the inertial -
navigetion ayetem, was juet as good as the accuracy obteined after familiar-
ization on land. The pilote of Squa~ron 11F furthermore laet year proved ~
that the Super Etendard was capable of carrying out a new mission: search
and fntelligence gathering, At the beginning of this year, Squadron 11F
recorded iCs first night-time carrier landings. The most recent ones took
place last week; they made it poasible to qualify another two pilota; the
squadron now has three qualified in this fashion, I,ast week's carrier duty - -
tour furthenuore made it possible to experiment at night and along with the
autamatic pilot and the automatic atick [control] not yet used in all of
the equadron's aircraft. Thia kind of experimentation is by way of a
supplement to the testa performed at CEV [flight r.est center] with aircraft
No 32. The resulta were considered eatisfectory, A method for night-time
. carrier landings to be uaed in conjunction with the Super Etendard ia now
being worked out.
In terme of armament, the year 1979 was uaed by Squadron 11F to go through
severel cennon and rocket firing programs as well as dropping live 250-kg
bombs and 500-kg practiae bombs. Overall, 20,000 rounda of canuon emmunition -
were fired, ae we11 as 1,400 rocketa end 250 bombs, including 220 practice '
bomba. This entire firing program proved the validity of the memory-
storage ballistica concept.
1Veither the AM-39, nor the Magic were fired in formation. As far as the
former ie concerned, one may say that the posaibility of simulated firing
makes it posaible to provide miasile firing training. Regarding the
latter, one may observe Chat the interception mieaion is not g priority
miesion. A first serieR of training sesaiona in firing this miasile was
to be held laet weeic in the Soutn-West (participation of the Mont-de-
Mersan base and the Landes test center). Last year, Squadron 11F of
course did participate in exerciaes using the aNT--the tactical nuclear
weapon.
The availability of this aircraft was very satisfactory; it was more than
80 percent in Squadron 11F which is more experienced; it was close to
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75 percent in Squadron 14F whose pilots--for the most part flying Crueader
aircraft recently--did npt have eny axperience with the Etendard ZV M.
Right now we are witneseing a riae once again in the availability co-
efficiant within Squadron 14F. ~
The commenders of both equadrons feel that the aircraft is quite in Iine .
with v~hat they have been expecting according to the specificationa on
the progrem card; the worriea they might have had ae to the operation of
the navigation end attack system dieappeared quickly; the general problema
encountered were of the aame nature ae all thoae which arise whenever ~
ndw aircreft is placed in service.
From the motor of the inertial ayetem via the Agave radar, which has -
been considerably improved over the years, the equipment on the Super -
Etenderd performed satisfactorily in overall terme. It took a lot of work
to get the motor qualified for "in-flight employment" but "today every-
thing ie fine." The TBO [operating time] of the 8K50 today is still what
it was 14 months ago: 180 hours. The VOR/ILS equipment has been mounted
on all aircraft ever since No 13. It is working satisfactorily. Aircraft
No 32 wae the first to be equipped with the "tandem" con~fsting of
auto~matic pi}.ot and automatic atick and the ~irst aircraft thua equipped "
will reach the aquadron by the end of AuCumn.
_ The permanent presence, at Lendivisiau, of a team of designers and the
regular arrival of technicians from SAGEM [Corporation for the General
Application of Electricity and Mechanic:s] made it possible to make big '
strides in the availability of systems.
- Pilota of Squadron 11F acted as instructors for the pilots of Squadron 14F
who are currently in turn training the first pilots of Squadron 17F. The
firet LMT flight simulator will be delivered in May. Pending their instal-
- lation and utilizetton, it wae neceasery to apell out the training criteria.
~ Three o~ cheee were defined: for pilota with long experience in the
~ Etendard IV (1,500-2,000 flying hours), ten flighta in the Super Etendard
~vere co~nei3cred sufficient; for lesa experienced pilots, who nevertheless
_ did alreedy have formation training, SO flights were considered necessary;
�or the young pilots who had juat come from Squadron 59S (carrier fighter '
school) wi.th 400-500 flying houra, more than 100 flights were apecif3.ed.
- The training of future Super Etendard pilots on the ground is taken care ~
of by the SIT (technical inatruction aection) at the base which has
worked out an inatruction method of remarkable effectiveness, involving ~
convantional reaources (inetruction sheets numbering 21, prepared by ;
six instructors in the Super Etendard), audioviaual aida (more than 300
slidPa and 500 posters), as well as four instruction and maintenance ~
aimulators, covering the engine, the electrical syatem, fue1, and SNA ~
[air navigationJ. The training courae for pilots on the ground takes
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3 weeka. For ~echanica aa~hore, the training courees vary accordin~ to
their apecial field: 2 Weeka for armorera, 5 weeke for SNA as ~ell aa
equipment apecialiste and mechanice. '
For trouble search and detection operations, the ATEC teat bench of
Aerospatiale plays a great role.
Next year,, the 71st Super Btnndard will be delivered to the Naval Air
Arm at the end of a production program tuming out tvo aircraft a month.
COPYRIGHT: A. ~ C. 1980
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- rux ur~r~lul~t, u5~; uNLY
COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
NEW MAINTENANCE SCHEDUIES FOR SUPER-ETENDARD REVIEWED
Parie AIR ~ COSMOS in French 5 Apr 8U pp 29, 31
[Text] The Aeronautical Subdirectorate of DCAN (naval ronstruction and
naval weapon6 directorate,) at Toulon was charged with "major mainten- =
ance" on the Super Etendard because of the experience which it has
acquired in connectic~n with fourth-echelon meintenance on~ EC~ndard IV ' -
and in view of the aimilarity of the a ir frames of the two eircraft: a
The firet two aircraft will come in at the end of:-1980.
For the Super Etendard, an inspection of the iRBF (repair inapection ~
through component maintenance) wa~ eelected; the content of thia
inapection emerged from an analyei8 inspired by the MAPIE (analyticel ' ~
_ method for preparation of initial maintenance program) guide, whoae
practfcal implementation involvea information ecience equipment. ~
Complete Checkup in Three Inapections
The basic principle behind an IREF applied to the Super Etenderd conaist~
of inepecting the aircraft every 3.y6ars (or 900 hours) and to check out
the �ollowing during each inapection: progranmaed ayatem operationa
(periodicity: one IREF); programmed noneystem operstiona (periodicity:
two or three IREF); random eample operationa (probes); occeaional opes- -
atione, deriving from orientationt inapection, or data processing from
documentatinn.
In the Naval Air Arm, meintenance ia apreed over four levels or echelone.
The IREF combinea the third and fourth echelons. Thie poLicy mekea it
poeaible to improve the operational availability of aircraft beceuse ~
it guarenCeea a better check on aircraft and gives ua the meintenance
voZume that is beat auited to flight safety end operational needs. The
- application of differant IREF inakes it posaible completely to.check the ~
eame aircraft in three inspeCtions or over a period of 9 yeara of ~
operationa. Besidee, the equivalent of one complete aircraft is checke8 -
_ out in three auccesaiva aircraft and the different inepections are -
applied through circular switching. 1~hie latter procedure mskes it
poasible to keep permanent teba on all of the aircraft in the inyentory.
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Fixed and Variable Asaignments
The content of the IREF inspections includes fixed assignmenta, connecte~
with tha arrivels and departurea of aircraft, and variebie aseignmenta
which involve maintenance tasks properly speaking.
Each Cask is defined by its nature, ita periodicity, ite coet, and ita
_ geogrsph~.~ locetion (the aircraft being cut up into sones). All of the
veriable caeks together are de~ined on the basis of a logic analyais
deriving from the MAPIE guide which in turn wae drafted on the besis of
the American MSG-2 standard.
The purpose he~r~ i~ to take care of only necessary tasks sufficient to
- guarantee flig,`~t aafety and operational employment of Super Etendard
- aircreft wittio~t any rnajor action to be performed between maintenance
~ inspecCions a~id s~so tn conduct these inspectiona aC minimum coet, realiz- _
ing that the aircr~ft idle time derives from that same ob~etive.
- Three Inape~tion ~pp?roaches
The analyti~cal study includes the following: a"structural" atudy, a
91syetem" study, and a"inapection of zones" study.
The "structure" etudy conai~ts of spelling out the meintenance program
to be applied to the importen"t elements of structure during the safe life- _
time of the aircraft Tahich ~s estimated at 4,000 hours, or 15 yeers. Only
- the primary elements, which are the atr~actura'i elementa th~~t involve
safety, are th~ aubj~et of st~dy. The othera, called ~econdary, are checked
during th~ ~on~ in~epe~tians. A raXing ay.~tem ba~sed on fetigue, aging,
- inspectabi~ity, a~d cocrspari~on to eimilar elements in the Etendard makes it
posaible to detercmine the periodicity of ection to be taken. _
The "systems" atuay ia int~~ded to s~~ll out a maintenance program to be
performed on the components o~ a sg~tem, following a logical process,
analysing the cause~ ~nd consequences of equipm~nt failurea in their
systsms. The atudy inu9lvea tw~o diatinct ~~p~oechea: (1) a study of
pasaibl~ fai~ure~ in t'he syst~~n, taken as a who.le, which makes it
poas~t.ble to determin~ the pr~pnnderant ele~en~o; (2) a study of failurea -
of each component, with pogeilal~ repercusbipns on the syatQm.
The synthesis of the~~ studi~~ im~ke~ it poasible to determine the tasks
to be carried out and th~f.r p~riodic3ty.
The "inapectinn by zar?e" comFle~es rhe logical studies pe~formed on the
level of the airframe snd th~ sye~ems. Tt ~akes it possible to check on
the aecondary eleu~ent~ of the .eirframe. This inepe~ction involves the
general etate of the equip~ent ~n~s~ n~akea it pasa~ble to pgrfar~ min4r :
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operations justified in economic terms. On the level of systems, inspection
by aone makea it poasible to establieh the good condition of connections,
as well ae the outaide appearance of components. This surveillance also -
makes it posaible to detect minor defects that could lead to developments
cauaing unexpected failures.
The varioua studies performed lead to the establishment of a tas:c library
which must be arranged in the form of inspections. The combinations of
the varioua taeka are put together as a function of the following objectives:
reducing the number of operations to be performed in the same zone by
regrouping tasks with the same periodicity; standardizing the overall costs
of the varioua inapections (in order to come up with a regular expenditure)
= by breaking nonsystematic work with the same periodicity up into essenCially
equivalent parts.
~he codification of all taska makes it possible to handle ~he varioua com-
binationa by meaea of information acience which facilitates operations.
= This procedure mskes it poasible to define the following for each IREF:
a11 of the tasks to be carried out; the distribution of tasks by zone,
by phase, by aubcontractor, and by specialty; the cost of different oper- ,
ations; the necessary spare perts: equipment, elementary componenta;
the controlled taeka. .
The sampled taska are added on top of the programmed tasks as a function
of the frequency of sampling and the ranking of the aircraft concerned.
Occaeional tasks, springing from the inspection of the aircraft or�~he
proceasing of documentation (viaual equipment inapection) are handled
manually and are added on top of the taska defined earlier, Where
occasional tsaka assume a repetitive character, they:-ere then inserted
in the programmed activitiee as a whole. .
Well-Adjueted Program
- The lengthy experience acquired by the Aeronautical Subdirectorate of
DCAN at Toulon, in the matter of carrier eircraft maintenance, particularly
on the Etendard IV, mede it possible to prepare a maintenance progr~m
which is we11 adjusted to the characteristics and employmenC of the Super-
Etendard by'8~plyf~g~naw maintenance methods ro i.t.
- COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1980
5058
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COUNTRX SECTION FRANCE
SINGLE REPLACEMENT FOR AIR FORCE, NAVY AIRCRAFT
. Paria AIR & CUSMOS in French 12 Apr 80 p 27
~ (Article by Jean de Galard: "The Same Aircraft for the Air Force and the ~
Navy"~ ~
[Text] Aa the French goverrnment prepares to choose the light twin tutbo-
jet, of foreign construction, slightly fewer than 40 of which will soon be
in service in the Air Force for training its transport pilots and in the
Navy for training its patrol-plane and lisison pilots, it is of interest to
review the route that the general staffs of the two armed forces followed to
arrive at the situation as it stands today.
For a long time, the Air Force has been conducting the baeic training of its
future tranaport pilots ~iith the Daseault 1~-312 twin-engine planea used at
Avord by Training Group 319. The student pilots fly them for- 100 houra if
they come from Salon (the "officers" program) and 135 hours if they come
from Cognac (the "noncommiseioned officers" program) before being awarded
their wings as military pilots. _
These planes, powered'b~ SNECMA [National Aircraft Engine Design and Con-
atruction Company) 12 T piston engines, went into service in...1952. This
means that the problem of replacing them was first raised several years ago.
The co~and of the Air Force schools knew that despite several improvements
- made in the meantime, there would still be some 20 MD-312's at Avord in 1981
that could prov,ide 12,000 hours of flying time during the year, but that
the end of their flight potential would definitely come in 1982.
To replace these MD-312's, it was out of the question to have a specific
plane developed (whence the absence of a program plan), in view of the small
quantity (abc~~t 25 planes) needed by the Air Force. The Air Force was
- therefore led, quite naturally:
--in an initial phase, to examine the foreign twin-engine jeta on the market;
--in the second phase, to eliminate those that did not appear suitable~. for
carrying out the various missions enviaioned (or whoae unit cost appeared
too high) and conaider only those which, by their inherent qualities and
their performance characteristics, seemd most capable of providing what was
expected;
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~
--in the third phase, to proceed, at the same time as the Navy, which had ,
adopted the same poinc of view, and jointly with the CEV [In-Flight Testing i
Center], to carry out trials of three possible candidates for the succession
to the MD-312; they are desqribed in the following pages. I_
~
The resulta were brought to the attention of the minister of defense. The I
final decision is not up to him. Credits were earmarked in his 1980 budget '
to finance the purchase of an initial batch. ~
i
FQr the Navy, the route fol;.owed was a little more winding.
i
For a long time, the 56 S squadr~n, based at i~imes-Garons, served the Flight ;
Personnel School ~EPV) of the Nav;~ Air Force (otherwise known as the non- j
pilot flight personnel) and the air controllers school with 17 C-47 tw~in- i
engine planes, while the 55 S squadron, based at Ajaccio-Aspretto and ;
equipped with nine Nord 262 turbojets, served for the twin-engin~ specializa- !
tion training, otherwise known as future-pilot traini.ng, for the Sreguet i-
Atlantics, the P2V Neptunes and, of course, the N-262's.
When the problem of replacing the C-47's of the 56 S squadron arose, the ~
Navy first considered buying a number of Nord-26?_'s,reaumption of production ~
' of which was being envisioned by AEROSPATIALE [National Aerospace Industrial '
Company; at that time. Since this idea of resumption was not followed i
?:hroug~, the Navy considered, in a second phase, buying either British
HS-7.48's, or greferably, Dutch F-27's, on the assumption of an order by the ~
Netherlands government, of New-Generation Atlantica (ANG). When the Ameri- ~
can Orion was finally chosen over the European ANG to equip the Dutch Navy
(the decieion was made in December 1978), the French government decided to ~
end the negoti~tions with Fokker to replace the DC-3's of the EPV. Qnly the ~
HS-748 solution remained. ~
Some thinking was then done, within the aeronautical di.vision of the Navy i
- general staif, to reexamine the problem as a whole.
Was it in the last analysis judicious, at a time when the successive rises
in the cost of fuels was beginning to weigh heavily on the budgets of the
ar.med forces, to call on airplanes wi'.h the tonnage of the HS-748's, equip- ~
�ped with turbojets of more than 2,000 HP (eSHP [effective shaft horsepower]),
to replace the C-47's? ~
The needa ~f th~ ~'..jaccio specialization school appeared identical to those '
of the Air Force, and since the latter was considering, for its part, re- ~
- placing its MD-312's ~with a light twin turbojet chosen from among various
foreign planes, the Navy came quite naturally Co adopt the following solu-
tion: (1) the C-47's of the 56 S squadron will be replaced by 12 Nord 262's;nfix~e
~~f them will be those of 55 S squadron ~Ajaccio) and the other three w311 be !
~ t8K2'1 irom among the 10 other Nord 262's that the Navy has and which are ~
gres~ntly scattered in other units; the Cuers shop will be asaigned to =
change over these 12 planes, which will be equipped with a radar, a naviga-
. tion system ~nd consoles before being assigned to the EPV; (2) the,
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Nord 262's of 55 S squadron will be replaced by the same twin turbojet as is
decided on by the Air Force (the ordering of a dozen aircraft ia envisioned),
which will logically lead to aingle maintenance; (3) the Nord 262's taken
from the other Navy units will be replace3 by planea of the same type, the
purchase of which, on the aecond-hand market, hae been entr�uated by the Navy
to AEROSPATIALE. .
Th~ Navy would hope to have its first two light twin turbojets delivered to
Ajaccio at the end of the year.
At Avord and Ajaccio, the same twin turbojet will therefore be used for the
training of th~ future pilots of the~Transall, the Atlantic, and the Nord -
262.
COPYRIGHT: A. ~ C. 1980 =
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
~
~
~
i
i
I
_ COMMENTS ON NATTONAL MILITARY POLICY COLLOQUIt~M i
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 5 Apr 80 p 42 '
_ [Text] The colloquium sponsored last Saturday by PARADOXES*
on France's military policy came just at the moment when de-
bates are ;~eginning on the foundations of this policy. ;
Chaired by Micfiel Debre, led by Professor Dabezies, this col- '
loquium consisted of a discussion of three reports on the fol- ;
lowing topics: "National independence and defense" by Jacques (
Vernant and sean Klein, "Tfie adaptation of the military de- i
fense apparatus" by Gen (CR) Pierre Gallois, and "Technical, -
industrial, and financial capability" by ~ger Chevalier and
Pierre Dabezies. ~
~ i
,
It would be impossible for us to summarize these three reports, i
which cover approximately 80 pages; here we can only give I
some impressions of this meeting that was followed very at- ;
tentively by a select audience, which included Pierre Messmer i
and Air Force Generals (CR) Francois Maurin and Michel i-
Fourquet.
i
The..Policy Followed for 20 Years Does Not Need to be Changed
In the ff rst report we hear~ that nothing in th~ international
situation justifies a revision of our security policy which
has been defined and followed for about 20 years. France has ~
the technical and financial capability to pursue such a policy i
which is supported by a national consensus. Attempts to seek
~ ;
~
* A camplete r~:port on this meeting will be published ~
in the next issue of the journal PARADOXES, 120 '
Champs-Elysees, 75008 Paris. ;
' i
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a European policy are impeded by the fact that Germany is
barred from having a nuclear capability. The Europeans will
certainly play a larger role in coming years, but they will -
_ remain divided. France, with its independent nuclear forces,
~ - will be called upon to play an even more important role.
The "Inspiring" and "Disturbing" Report by General Gallois
The report given by General (CR) Pierr~ M. Gallois, described
by Mr Debre as "inspiring" and "disturbing," reminded us that
the initiative lies yvith the East, that the Soviets only en-
- gage their forces wfien tfiey can be certain of the outcome, and
that thezr doctrine and tfieir means are in harmony. General
Gallois distinguished between missions conducted in defense of ~
. France and its essential interests (defense of the national
territory and defense of overseas departments and territories),
and missions wTiich are essential but not immediately vital,
among which he included tfie use of interv~ntion forces out-
side of Europe. ~
To carry out its first missions, the strategic nuclear forces
must have at least eig:~t to 12 missile-launching submarines
and also another category of strategic deterrent weapons.
General Gallois pointed out the interest inherent in solutions
such as the use of commercial planes converted into missile
transporters, o~ bom5ers extending t~ieir flight range by a
- supersonic air t~ surface-missile. Such possibilities can
~orm an added two or even tfiree aspects to the French deter-
rent force. He mentioned the conditions for the use of the
French.ANT jTactical Nuclear Weapons] and asked that the for-
ces responsible for the defense of overseas territories be
strengthened and given high quality equipment. For interven-
tion missions outside of Europe, he recommended the develop-
ment of the conventional resources of the Navy, the formation -
of two or three intervention units with airbor�ne materiel, and
the provision of the Air Force with transport and combat equip-
ment enabling it to intervene at a very long range.
In a noteworthy commentary, discussing the report given by
General G~llois, Pierre Messmer supported this presentation,
Except for the section vn tactical nuclear weapons, which he
conside.rs essential for reaching moving targets. He also
supported the cons~truction between now and the year 2000 of
about 15 nuclear submarine~', which would demand a tripling of
the egforts made between 1960 and 1980. The comments made
by Generals Fourquet and Maurin, and those by Mr Debre and
Professor Huntzinger, generally agre~d with the aonclusions
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reached by General Gallois which challenge the concepts of
national service and the relative shares of the thre~ branches -
of the armed forces in the budget, and which stress that pri-
_ ority should be given to mobile weapons over stationary wea-
pons. All these remarks lead to a return to predominance of
Title V over Title III in the budget.
A Policy within French Capabilities
_ The Chevalier-Dabezies report pointed out a number of facts
that are not always appreciated for what they are actually
worth, such as the synergy existing between military and
civilian products, particularly in aerospace--both in the
nuclear field and in aircraft construction--the different
types of cooperati~ used, and tfie absolute need for exports
to ensure the survival of our national weapons industry.
Lilee General Gallois, Mr Chevalier showed the present invul-
nerability of the missile-launching submarine system, and he
asked that efforts be made to develop this system even fur-
ther, to harden the warheads, and to produce a military ob- -
servation satelli*~e in order to avoid any surprise.effect in
case of hostile initiatives. Mr Chevalier pointed out that
the creation of these systems is within France's technical
and financial capabilities.
~ He rejected the cruise missile, because France can not, with
its resources, manage to reach a saturation effect with arms
of this type and, in any event, the saturation effect crea-
ted by the United States is forcing the USSR to create a spe-
cialized defense system. Mr Chevalier then pointed out the
lesser vulnerability of the S-X mobile missiles in relation
to silo-based missiles.
COPYRIGHT: A.&C., 1980
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
BRIEFS
EXOCET MM-40 MISSILE--Aerospatiale has just published the -
first photograph of the launch of its antiship missile,
Exocet, in its MM-40 version. This launch wa~ made on
27 February 1980 at the CEM [Mediterranean Test Cen-
- .
_ _ - -
ter~ from the test sfiip Tle d'Oleron, which has been made
available to the missile developer by the~PIavy.:fsee A~R &
COSMOS no 805). The MM-40:missile int~rcepted its target
perf~ctly, and tfie shot confirmed the flight performances ex- -
pected from tt;i;4 test: in particular, the range of the mis-
sile (ober 70 kn~?. Aerospatiale says that the production of
the MM-40 has alrt~ady begun for the three foreign countries
which have ordered tl~is missile, The Exocet in all versions
has been ordered b~r a total of 23 countries, including France -
(MM-38, AM-39, and SM-39j. jText] jParis ATR & COSMOS in
French 5 Apr 80 p 5:3] 7679
- PORT EQUIPMENT AID--France may participate ir. providing some port equipment
to Saudi Arabia. [Transport Minister JoelJ le Theule will soon go there to -
iook into this poseibility. [Text] [Paris LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in
French 28 Apr 80 p 51
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COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
TRADE WITH CHINA LAGGING BEHIND OTHER EUROPEAN PARTNERS
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Ital~an 3 Apr 80 pp 1, 2
[Article by Piero Ostellino: "The Italians Are Not Very Enterprising in
Their Trade With China"J
[Text] Beijing--Italian-Chinese trade in 1979 amounted to $600 million
(a little over S00 billion lire). French trade with China amounted to
$700 million, English trade to $807 million and German trade to over _
2 billion (2026). Among the ma~or Eur.opean countries, we are, therefore,
in the last place in trade with China, while the Germans, as.usual, are
in the first place. But this is not the problem. What concerns us above -
all are the prospects.
For 20 years, we have been exporting to China almost always the same pro-
ducta: chemical fertilizers (approximately 45-50 billion lire), laminated
iron and ateel and other ateel products (approximately 80 billion), motor
vehicles (14-16 billion), slmost monopolized by Perlini, a medium-size
induetry in Verona which produces trucks and other means for land movement.
In ahort: we have not diversified our exports, as the others are doing,
nor do we give any indication that we are planning to. The risk is that
the competition from some Asian countries in the chemical field will subse-
quently increase the difficulties of exporting to China.
The French export 450 million francs worth of steel products, that is, more
or less what we export, but also 31b million francs worth of machinery and
othPr mechanical apparatus, to say nothing of 150 million worth of office -
machines and electronic equipmeut. The Germans, who also export $284 million
. worth of pipes and $225 million worth of other steel products, have an
exAOrt total o~ $427 million worth of machinery of all types, that is,
equal to almost three-quarters of our entire trade. The English, finally, _
export 21 million pounds sterling worth of machinery for the production of
energy, 46 ~illion pounds sterling worth of specialized machinery (29 for
the mines alone), 31 million worth of industrial equipment and 13 million
worth of instruments for measuring and control. _
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.
The figures for England and France are not even large, while those for
Germany ~re beginning to become tmportant. But they indicate that between
theae markets and the Chinese one something is happening, while Italy
continues to fight a rearguard action, that is, continues to export to
China products with a vPry low added value. Big business, which would be '
- necessary to make our trade with China rise, is lacking. The same actors
are always on stage: Montedison and ANIC [National Agency for the Hydro-
generation of Fuel] for fertilizers, the steel industries of the IRI
[Industrial Reconstruction InstituteJ, Perlini for trucks. The rest is made
up of ~mall and medium firms, not of single businessmen.
We are the only ones to register a negative balance in the balance of
trade with China (approximately 30 billion lire, which i3 stupid). The
French register a positive balance of 55 million francs, the English
76 million pounds sterling, the Germans $958 million. Even in this case,
we are not talking about big figures. But we are still talking, however,
of figures which are indicative of a difference between the other European
, countries and ours which should be corrected.
The Chinese have not yet made a definitive decision about the sectors to
entrust to Italy within the range of their imports. But our own uncertainties
contribute to a great extent to increase the Chinese uncertainties. Aft~r
the visit by Hua Guofeng to Italy, last November, people expected that a
few important leaders of our public and private industry would try to seek
to put into effect the good political premises created by Hua's visit. -
Instead, nobody ahowed up. The Italian industrial environment, both pubiic
- private~ still seems paralyzed with the fear of compromising their business ~
with the Soviet market. In the absence of a pro-Chinese industrial lobby,
- even the government remains passive. ;
- Nevertheless, something could be done. The margins for maneuvering are
the following. Some 30 percent of the ChinESe trade is practically mono-
polized by Japan. For their part, the Chinese do not conceal the fact that ~
they nouriah very strong hopes from their relations with the United States,
which today has a trade with China which is more or less analogous to the
German trade. The rest of the pie can be had by Western Europe, where the '
Germans have the lion's share, the English and the French are politically
and promotionally very active and dynamic and the Italians continue to
stagnate, both from the political and the promotional viewpoint.
For the next 2 years, the advice fro~ the experts on the Chinese market
to the Western operators is this: to adapt the approach itself to the
Chinese financial. restrictions, that is to the impossibility for the Chinese
to pay in cash for what they purcha~e. To aim not so much at the sale of
new equipment as at the sale of machinery ;~hich can modernize the equipment
already in existence in China. We must, therefore, propose the purchase
of machinery which is not very advanced and if necessary even used, but
which can be e2sily absorbed by Chinese industry. Not to give up negotiating
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contraets of greater breadth, but knowing that it will take a lot of time
and no little patience before reaching an agreemen~ (even more than a year).
To study the possibility of combinations which would allow the utilization
on the international market of the products paid in compensation by the
Chinese. To examine the various poseibilities offered by the Chinese pro-
vinces, one by one, avoiding generalizing and accepting the reticences and
the difficulties opposed by the central organisms.
One such example is offered by the so-called "commercial banks" which are
fairly actiue in the entire area of Southeast Asis and, now, even in the
Ch~.nese market. They identify posaible busineas, aerve ae mediatora between
the partiea and, often, provide the financing for the agreementa.
Antonio Belloni, 34, a Valtellinese, the very active representative of
- the Credito Italiano in Hong Kong for Asia (with the exception of Japan),
maintaine that to win the trade war over the Asian market and the Chinese
one in particular, Italian management must first of all win two battles:
the first one consists of the identif.ication of the real problems of the
countriea of the area and of the true interlocutors to whom it must address
_ itself; the second consists of finding suitable financial solutions to the
industrial pro~ects to be carried out.
It is especially during the last year--maintains Belioni--that we have
begun to see the fruits of the research by the possible spokesmen for
Italian industry possibly interested in China (State commissions, local
administrations, institute for the management of the credits with foreign
countries, etc.) after the chaos of the Cultural Revolution and the
launching of the programs of rationalization of the economy itself on the
part of the new Chinese leaders. As manager of Orion, the "commercial
_ bank" which groups banks of the aix countries (Great Britain, Jagan, United
Ststes, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, represented by the
same Credito Italiano), he promoted the financing of civil projects in
Thailand (for the account of the Vanini), in the Philippines (for the GIE
[Economic Interest Group]) and he does not exclude the possibility of being
able to do as much, some day, in China.
Asia, and China itself are, for Belloni, a unique opportunity for Italian
industry to reacquire a competitive mentality, that is to rediscover the
market, with its hardships, but also with its certain advantages. But for
that to happen, we must create the political premises even before the
commercial ones, we need channels of a general nature even before the
specific.
Finally, the Italian businessmen in Beijing, the representatives of our
~banks in Hong Kong have done their best and even more. But it is not enough.
We need a strategy on the pa.rt of our industry, we need a policy on the part
_ of our government.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
8956
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COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
COST, AVAZLABILITY, CONSUMPTION ~F ELECTRZCITY IN PIELMONT
Rome ENERGIA E MATERIE PRIME in Italian Nov-Dec 7~ pp 55-62
[Article by Francesco Corbellini: "Consumption and Availability of Elec-
trical Energy in Piedmont"]
[Text] Only the utilization of nuclear energy will be "
able to cover the Piedmont region's energy deficit for ~
the 1990's--a deficit equal to more than 60 percent of
the demand, which is growing at a rate of about 5.3 per-
cent per year.
Within a few weeks will begin the dry-run tests of what we at ENEL [Nation-
al Electric Power Agency] call the alleviation plan and the newspapers call ~
"prngrammed blackout." Nothing serious will happen this winter, especially
here in the north; but these first difficulties are a warning signal of a
deeper crisia that may occur within a few years.
In the graph of Figure 1, the lower line represents the maximum load that
can be aupplied in the coming years on the assumption that only the power
plants presently under construction and ~~hose for which we already have
authorization are built. The upper line represents the foreseeable demand
up to 1990, the target year of our operational program. As you seel, we
are already in a slight deficit, we will have a short breathing-space in
1982-83, and then the situation will get gradually worse and worse and--in
the absence of new construction--will become completely ungovernable to- -
ward the end of the 1980's.
If we consider energy rather than power and it is not possible to start
construction of new basic power plants, the national energy deficit will
reach 109 billion kWh [kilowatthours) in 1990, equal to 30 percent of the -
expected demand. This expected demand (364 billion kWh as against 167 bil-
1. The text of this article constituted the opening paper, read by the
president of ENEL at the Regional Conference on Energy called by the
. Piedmont Regional Council together with the Council Intercommission on _
Energy ProblPms and held in Turin on 19 and 20 October last.
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MW , -
~ ~ I i i I '
60.000 , ; ~ �---.1.-- 1 - . t
58.000 . . . , ,
~e�opp - ~.~j-�--~- (1) r~stA
~ . ~ _i ~ ~ I ~ _ . PREV~SiA
5~.000 . � i ; ~ . 1
52000 � - - ~ .f-, l --I . .
so.ooo = ---~t- I - -1- . _ ~ .
; ~
48.000 - � ~ . L- --.i - -
, ' i_ i . . .
, , ; ~
f6.000 _ . ~ - ~ - ~
~ -
' r ) ! ' ~ ~
44.OOp - r-- - � � - ~
r -
~2.000 - - ~ - CJIRICO
. ; } (2) ~
~E
~o.aw - - - . - _
- ~ - - .
38.000 ' - - '
~ -
36.000 . ' ~
- ~ ; .
. , ~ ' t
. 34.000 .
~ ~ ~ :
32.000 _ . - - � -
30.000 - - � . _ . .
28.000
19~5 '80 '81 '82 '83 '81 '85 '88 '87 '88 '88 1890
Figure 1. Forecast of power demand in continental Italy and maximum load
suppliable with existing installations and tnose under conatruc-
y (Key]: tion or already ordered.
_ 1. Forecast demand 2. Maximum load suppliable
lion in 1978) has been calculated by very restrictive criteria: indeed,
even in the absence of an expected 4-percent increase in output, in line
with the government's medium-term indications, it considers that appreci-
able reductions in electricity coi~sumption will be achieved with a strong
energy-saving policy, among whose anticipated strong points is a substan-
tial expansion of combined electricity-heat production and significant de- -
velopment of solar power in the south. In relation to a spontanec~us growth ~
of electric-power demand under pre-oil crisis conditions, the new scenario
shows a 10-percent reduction in 1990, with a saving of 40 billion kWh.
Piedmont's deficit,.'which in 1978 was almost 5.5 billion kWh (31.5 percent
of total regional demand), as indicated in Table 1, would in 1990 exceed 19
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_ Table 1. Regional Distribution of Energy Deficit in i990 (on average as- ~
aumption of demand growth and building only of inetallationa un-
der construction or authorized as of 31 December 1978)
~ -
Surplus (+)/Deficit in Relation to Electric-Power Demand
- 1978 (actual consumption) 1990 (escimate)
Re ions billions/k~lh deficit % billions/kWh deficit %
Piedmont - 5.465 31.5 - 19.200 60.2
Valle d'Aoata + 2.348 + 1.200
Lombardy - 8.293 23,5 - 25.200 37.8
~renCino-Alto Adige + 4.266 - 0.100 1.1 ~
Veneta - 2.193 15.1 - 1.000 3.4
Friuli-Venezia Giulia - 0.367 8.1 - 2.200 ~ 22.9
Liguria + 9.200 + 8.700
Emilia Romagna + 2.953 - 8.600 30.7
Northern Italy + 2.449 - 46.400 25.0 -
Tuscany - 1.982 18.1 - 10.500 48.6
Umbria - 0.207 6.2 - 3.400 53.1
Marche - 1.678 64.1 - 6.000 8.,.3
Lazio - 0.055 0.5 + 8.900
Central Italy - 3.922 14.0 - 11.000 17.1
Abruzzi - 0.151 5.9 - 4.400 63.8
Molise - 0.322 60.7 - 1.200 75.0
Campania - 6.583 68.6 - 20.500 79.5
Pug~ia - 0.248 2.6 - 9.100 41.6
Basilicat~ - 0.249 22.4 - 2.100 55.6
Calabria + 5.529 - 0.300 3.0
- Southern Italy - 2.024 7.7 - 37.600 54.3
_ , Sicily + 1.443 - 7.000 24.5
Sardinia - 0.072 1.0 - 7.000 42.5
Italian islands + 1.371 - 14.000 31.0
Total for Italy - 2.126~1~ 1.3 -109.000 30.0
(1) Deficit compensated for, in 1978, by the�positive balance from ex-
changea with foreign countries, made available in northern Italy.
The regional distribution of deficits is indicative in nature, in view of
the ~reater uncertainties regarding demographic and economic developments
~t the level of each region. It should be stressed that in addition to the
imposaibility of supplying the quantities of energy indicated, the situa-
tion forecast for 1990 would be accompanied ~y an extremely low level of
quality of service for the demand rate suppliable; in addition, under such
conditiona, annual consumption of hydrocarbons for thermoelectric produc-
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tion would reach, throughout the second half of the 1980's, a level of
about 40 Mtep (expansion unknown], as agzinst 23.6 Mtep consumed in 197f3.
billion kWh, corresponding to more than 60 percent of the forecast demand,
growing at a rate of about 5.3 percent per year.
The figures involved therefore make it unthinkable to be able to cope with
this situation by importation of energy from other regions or from abroad.
In addition to everything else, the insertion of the European interconnec- ~
tion presupposes the maintenance, by each participating country, of compar-
able standards of "quality" of service; a drop of quality in a given coun-
try would result in its exclusion from the interconnection by the other
participants, who would not tolerate the repercussions on their networks of
frequent service deficiencies in the ttetwork of the partner in difficulty.
To meet the countrv's future electric-power needs, we intend to operate by
taki.ng as a point of reference the guidelines indicated by Parliament in
the resolution of 5 October 1977, "aiming at a percentage reduction of the
~il component and increasing the contribution from and exploitation of the
alternative sources," therefore pursuing the revival and development of hy-
droelectric uses, broadening geothermal energy wherever po5sible, greater
uee of coal, experimentation with new integrative sources, combined elec-
tricity-heat production, and various other actions for energy-saving, as
well as "balanced and controlled use of nuclear energy," with the maximum
guarantees for protection of health and safeguarding of our natural patri-
_ mony.
As regards the residual hydroelectric resources, an up-to-date review was
made, at the conference which we held in Siena at the end of June, of what
can atill be actiieved in this field in Italy. The possible new contribu-
tions in Piedmont can be summarized as follows:
(1) Work in Progress
--Construction of the new Quincinetto plant, with an annual 80-million kWh _
increase in basic production capacity, ever and above the production by the
old small power plants of Carema and Quincinetto. -
--remodelling of the Bardonecchia plant, already nearly complete, and of
the ~cceglio plant (additianal 20 million kWh/ year).
--A~to Gesso production and pumping plant, with a power of 1,190 MW [mega-
watts]. It will also have a basic production capacity of 190 milZion kWh
per year, but this is in large part dependent on obtaining authorization
for connecting subsidiary basins with the Rovina olant; it should go into -
service by 1980-81.
--In addition, the concession proceedings for the new Piedilago pumping
_ plant in the upper Val d'Ossola, wYth a power of 1,000 MW, are in progress;
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this plant too could contribute a basic production capacity--about 100 mil-
lion kWh/year, not including several subsidiary capacities--if connection
of the Cairasca and Bondolero runs is author~zed.
(2) Confirmed Availabilities Relative to Plants Studied by ENEL
These involve 14 new utilizations--indicated in detail in Table 2--with a
total productiori capacitz; of ahout 1.4 billion kWh per year (including the
capacity of the plants under construction as indicated under heading (1)),
with a cost of more than 740 billion lire.
(3) Other Availabilities Sa Far ldentified by ENEL Relative to Ylants Cur-
rently under Study `
These involve 10 new utilizations--indicated in detail in Table 3--with a
total production capacity of a little less than half a billion kWh per
year.
Study of the residual availabilities is proceeding in accordance with a
general program that is being developed for all the regions.
(4) Minor Resources
This is a question which has aroused public interest far beyond its effec-
t~.ve importance and on which, therefore, it is advisable to furnish de-
[siled and exhaustive information.
' In recer~t days, ENEL's board of directors has considered the restoration of
all small inactive Italian power plants with a power of at least 100 kW,
p~oduction cpaacity of at least 200,000 kWh per year, and production cost
of up to 50 lire per kWh--therefore double the present cost component of
- fuel oil in the cost per kWh produced by the thermal plants--thus a very
open criterion for reutilization. As regards Piedmont, the situation with
r.he small inactive and abandoned power plants is summarized in Table 5.
The small inactive power plants with power of more than 100 kW all fall� �
within the established limits that I zeferred to, and therefore they will
all be restored.
We are now studying the way to recover a certain proportion of hydroelec-
tric production capacity from the abandoned small power plants also.
- As regards those which it appears to us, on initial examination, should not
be reactivaCed, either because of cost too high at this time or because of
power or production capacity lower than the minimums, or for other reasons,
we intend to carry aut a joint study with the reg~ons, in order to evaluate
' and decide together, for each case, what the most suitable use of the water
is: that is, whether it can or should be put to other hydraulic uses--irri- _
gation or city water--or whether it can be put t~ hydroelectric uses; and
- if so, to see whether there are projects by local or private bodies inter-
7$
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ested in exploiting it. From this joint examination effort we should _
therefore end by leaving out only those potential utilizations that are not
economically feasible for anyone.
Table 3. Residual Hydraulic Resources of the Piedmont Region
Identified Plants Currently under Study
Estimated Average
Hydrographic Basins Used Annual Basic Pro-
and Names of Plants Province duction Capacity
(GWh )
Upper Stura di Demonte -
Corburant Run
Callieri Cuneo
Terme Cuneo
Total 74
Upper Stura di Demonte -
_ Rio Freddo
Rio Freddo I Cuneo
Rio Freddo II Cuneo
Total 65
Vinadio-Demonte
(Stura di Demonte) Cuneo 95
Moiola (Stura di Demonte) Cuneo 50
Ge~manasca Run
Prali Torino
Perrero Torino
Total 68 _
Combanera (Stura di Viu) Torino 84
Malesco (Ticino-Melezzo run) Novara 34
Escimated Total Annual Production Capacity 470
(5) flydroelectric Plants ~f the Public Utilities of Turin
' In addition to constr;iction of new plants and restoration of inactive
plants, we must also concern ourselves with better utilization of the ex-
isting plants. I refer in particular to the Turin Public Utilities' Valle -
Orco plants, the concessions for two of which expire in 1981.
According to the law, EN,:L will succeed to these concessions; on the other
- hand, the Orco plants constitute a unitary system from the point of view of
hydroelectric operations, and therefore it is not economically suitable, or
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Table 4. Production Cost of Electrical Energy in Lire per kWh ~1~
Power Plants
Nuclear Coal Fuel Oil
Cost Categories 2 X 1,000 MW 4 X 640 MW 4 X 640 MW ~
Capital costs, operations ~
and maintenance 10.97 6.50 5.00
Fuel 5.83 14.80 25.00
- Total 16.80~2~ 21.30 30.00
(foreign-exchange component) ~6.46) (13.80) (22.45)
(1) At constant currency value.
_ (2) Including fuel reprocessing and power-plant dismantling.
Table 5. Small Inactive and Abandoned ENEL Hydroelectric Power Plants in
Piedmont (Situation at 30 September 1979)
Annual
Total Unit Production Capacity
Small Power;Plants Number Power (kW) Power (kW) (millions/kWh)
Inactive
--with unit power
le~s than 100 kW 1 55 55 0.2
--with unit power
equal to or hi her
than 100 kW ~1~ 6 2,688 448 11.0
Total for inactive (7) (2,743) (392)[sic] (11.2)
~,bandoned
--with unit power.
less than 100 kW 20 994 50 3.6
--with unit power
equal to or higher
than 100 kW 29 11,601 40Q 45.2
Total for
abandoned (43) (12,595) (257) (48.8)
Grand Totals 56 15,338 274 60.0
'1) This does not include: the Crava I and II small power plants, for which
restoration and automation are already in progress; the Carema small
plant, which wzll be subtended by the new Quincinetto II plant (which
will furnish a net production-capacity increase ~f 80 million kWh/year);
and the Spineto small plant, which is being retu.ned to the Cavour
Can~als Administration.
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manageable, for the national collectivity to consider the separate opera-
tian of a part of them. Therefore the problem now arises of finding a so-
' lution which--while adhering to the prerogatives that ENEL cannot renounce,
for reasons of an institutional nature--make it possible to continue with
unitary operation of these installat~~ns, and also with a view to substan-
tial restoration of them, in order to increase their productivity, and es- -
pecially their power, and to new uses of the caatercourses that supply them,
while safeguarding, obviously, the interests and requirements of the Public
Utilities.
These objectives ~ould all be achieved with the transfer to ENEL in 1981 of
all ths Valle Orco plants--those reaching termination dates and those with
deadlines to come--upon compensation of the Public Utilities with ade~uate
indemnification, comensurate with the value of the "nonreversible" projects
transferred, and with supplying, until the concession termination dates, of
the quantities of energy that the Public Utilities would have produced in ~
all its power plants in the residual period, at a price corresponding to
operational costs only.
' For these new projects and for others under s*udy, considering the magni-
tude of the financial commitment related to them and the pact r_hat part of -
the power obtainable would be in excess of the needs of the Public Utili-
ties and would be very useful to the national network, the establishment of
_ a mixed company could also be considered--a company in which the interests
of all would be safeguarded, and with the participation of the Regi.~z or of
whomever the Region will wish to designate.
I suggest this solution on a person~l basis, because, among other things,
it would require an amendment of the law on which ENEL is established.
In point of fact, Piedmont's hydroelectric potential that is still technic-
- ally uti?izable, as regards the installations studied or identified by
ENEL, can be evaluated, in round figures, at~little less than 2 billion kWh
per year. Therefore, activation of all these plants hy 1990 would cover
- only a tenth of the energy deficit forecast for that year.
The picture does not change substantially aeven if one takes account of the
additional input that could result from initiatives under study by third
parties, which, to the best of our knowledge, wo:ild be on the order of sev-
eral hundred million kWh per year.
The new input from other renewable energy source~--solar, wind and biomass
--will be able to contribute energy production in 1990; solar energy, in
particular, is expected to help cover the low-temperature thermal needs.
Moreover, Piedmont's geothermal resources are of modeat importance, and in
any case.are not economically usable for production of electric power.
There follows from this the necessity of using nonnational sources, and
basic installations, to cover the major part of Piedmont's additional elec-
tric-power needs--as, for that matter, the rest of the country wi11 have to
do also.
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The turbogas plant under construction at Alessandria, equipped with two
90-MW sets, which we count on putting into service in the coming months,
will be able, because of its intrinsic characteristics, to contribute to
coverage of the peak loads, but with a very marginal input in terms of en-
ergy (200 million kWh per year).
The same is true for the Alto Gesso and Piedilago pumping plants. For the
new basic power pZants that will therefore have to be built in the coming
years, the greatest possible use of coal is one of the energy-policy direc-
tiona fixed by Parliament in the October 1977 resolution, as is combined
production of electric power and heat for urban heating.
ENEL is pursuing these objectives with commitment, and in Piedmont, a spe-
cific step toward them is the planned expansion of the Chivasso power
plant, already provided for in Law 880 of December 1973, and in relation to
that expansion, the plant for remote heating of the city has also been -
studied.
As is known, contacts and negotiations with the Region and the Commune have
been under way for some time with a view to an agreement on the modalities
_ for establishment of this new plant--composed of two sections of 320 MW
each, with a production capacity of more than 3.5 billion kWh per year--and
in order to obtain the necessary authorizations; there have been contacts
and negotiations aZso with the parties interested in ensuring the supply of
~oal--and in the Po Valley, the question of supply presents serious tech-
- nical and economic problem~ of transport. It is to be hoped that a solu-
tion can be arrived at as soon as possible, considering also the fact that
the problem of remote heating is preaented in a more favorable way today
oecause the recent decree-law No 438 on the restraining of energy consump-
tion has provided incentives for remote-heating plants in the form of sinlc-
ing fund contributions.
For ENEL's part, I can only confirm that all possible scope is being given
to thia project as well as to other remote-heating proposals that might
take specific form in the Region. ~
~ven with the input from the new Chivasso units, we will in any case still
be far from a balance--or at least from an acceptable deficit situation--
between electric-power availability and demand in the Region, with alI the ~
consequences on regularity of service--and therefore on productive activi-
r_ies and on civil life--that such a situation involves, and as regards also '
t.he plan for prograrmned withdrawals. -
Tt is therefore necessary to arrive quickly at a decision on the siting of
the planned nuclear power plant.
'~lithin the nationa'l framework, law 393 has proved very difficult in appli-
cation beca~~se it has thrown onto the small Commune the enormous responsi-
_ bility of deciding a question of national importance and because differ-
ences of behavior have arisen between the center, the Farliament and the
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~
national parties, and the local administrations and the parties at the ,
local lev,el.
f3efore emergency solutione are considered, with Parliament taking the deci- ~
sions upon itself again, in the absence of decisions by the regions and the
- co?mnunes, all means must be tried to obtain consensus at the local level.
First of all, with greater incentives that those given so far. It is nec- ,
essary to change from so-much-per-unit contributions to a system that in-
volves the Region in the life of the power plant also: in other words, an
incentive related to the kWh produced. One form of incentive could be
based on interregional trade in energy: a region that produces energy for
the rest of the country must be compensated for the part exported.
Another incentive, related to the kWh produced, should be given to the de-
velopment areas.
~ The power plant will thus become a continuous generator of induced activi-
ties.
The incentives should be used for improvement of the ecological environment
of the zones affected by the power plants, and at the community level,
should counter the disadvantages resulting from the territorial restric- ~
- tions imoosed by the presence of the power plants.
Naturally, development of nuclear power is tied to the unalterable condi-
tion of achieving the highest standard of safety, a standard that takes in-
to account not only what has been done in other countries, but also our
particular local conditions, so as to guarantee protection of the workers,
the population and the environment, not only during normal operating condi-
tions but also under conditions of any eventual incidents.
Ocher speakers will talk about these problems. It seems to me that as the
person respor~sible for the electric-power agency, it is up to me to review
the reasons that make it essential to use nuclear energy to cover Italian.
electric-power needs. '
There are substantially three such reasons:
(1) Nuclear power is destined to become increasingly the most economical
system by far for production of electrical energy. As indicated in Table
4, the cost per kW'h of nuclear origin is evaluated at 16.80 lire (in con- .
stant 1979 lire), the cost per thermoelectric kWh produced from coal is
21.30 lire, and the cost per thermoelectric kWh from fuel oil is 30.00 lire.
Within a few years, Italian industry will find itself in conditions of
gross inferiority in relation, for example, to French industry, which at
thattim~ will be able to count on low-cost energy supplied from nuclear
power plants.
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(2) The foreign-exchange component of the cost per nuclear kWh is about
6.50 lire, as against about 14 lire per coal-produced kWh and 22.50 lire
per fuel-oil kWh. A nuclear kWh therefore has a foreign-exchange component
barely 30 percent of that far a kWh produced from fuel oil.
(3) Nuclear fuel is not subject to momentary supply crises. The supplying
of nuclwar fuel begins yesrs before the time of use; the physical dimen-
sions generally permit easy storage, and therefore the proportion of energy
produced from nuclear power is not subject to the sudden changes of humor
of the oil-producing countries and thereby helps increase a country's de-
gree of real independence.
A problem that has been given special attention with regaru' to the instal-
lation of a nuclear power plant in Piedmont is that of the cooling water.
I will not dwell on the details of this problem, which have been examined
in various specific aspects with reference to the areas presently identi-
fied in the Region..
I would only like to mention that the water resources available for the
- area along the Po downstream from Tanaro appear sufficient, while for the
area near Trino Vercellese, rationalization of uses should be carried out
in a coordinated program that pr~vides, among other things, for releases
from our hydroelectric reservoirs so as to maintain the minimum values with
an appropriate integration flow. For the area involved by the Dora Baltea,
, the cooling water should be tapped both from the river and from the irriga-
tion canals.
Naturally, whatever siting ?~iay be decided on, I want as of right now to
give the fullest guarantees of the safeguarding af the minimum flows--guar-
antees that will be expressed in a formal commitment with the drawing-up of
an appropriate convention.
The objective should be to arrive a: an agricultural-water situation that
in several respects is better than the one before the installation of the
power plant. Furthermore, the energy crisis makes it necessary to reach an
understanding between ENEL and farmers, because it is the duty of all that
the residual warm water from the ther~r.al and nuclear power plants, which
today is wasted, should have an ultimate use in agriculture and piscicul-
ture. This ailiance between ENEL and farmers should find application also
in intensification of rural electrification, in strengthening the under-
electrified zones, and in electrification by new sources (solar, wind, bio-
mass) of houses that it would be extremely expensive to connect to the net-
work.
This year's report of forecasting and programming shows clearly the govern-
ment's desire to reward, not only in terms of inc~ntives but also in terms
of securely available electricitiy, those Regions that have collaborated in
the past and that propose to collaborate in the future for resolution of
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electric-power problems. There is therefore a choice that each Region will
have to make: whether to rank themselves among those which, when the verbal
activism is over, resign themselves to living on the energy charity of the
other ~~arts of the country--for as long as that will be possible--or among
those that work concretely to solve their own problems by themselves.
The discipline with which this conference has been organized leads one to
hope that Piedmant, in its tradition of seriousness and industry, will set
Italy an example of how, with denocratic consensus, one's own energy prob-
lens and the energy problems of the country can be solved.
COPYRIGHT: 1978 "Energie e materie prime"
11267
CSO: 3104
.
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COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
?IZODI R~PORT ON STATUS OF AUTO INDUSTRY
Ti~rin LA STAI~A in Italian 4 Apr 80 p 8
~Article by Eugenio Palmieri: "Italian Auto Industry Has Resources;
Higher Productivity Neede~ for Recovery"J
;Text] Rome--T~aenty-eight typewritten pages represent the pitiless (but
with much hope of recovery) x-ray that the Prodi Commission put together
on the automobile crisis. Timeliness was respected and the document was
handed yesterday to Budget Minister Andreatta who will turn it over to
the CIPI [Interministerial Industrial Policy Coordinating Committee].
T~iere is widespread crisis in the sector and it is tied to a constant loss
of the Italian industry's competitive position which was unable to bear
the heavy and repeated blows by foreign manufacturers: In terms of share
the market we have returned to the 1960 levels by a progressive drop
i:~ pi~oductivity (which risks becoming irreversible) and to the tardiness
with which social, political and government forces became aware of the
looming threat.
~ere are the most significant parts of the document: _
Market in a Nose Dive--After having affirmed tr,e auto industry's role as
z propulsive force, the document notes that in the 1970 to 1979 decade
the market position of Italian producers weakened considerably compared
with that of maj or foreign producers. In 1970, the document repo:ts, about
b.6 million aiitomobiles were registered in the nine EEC nations (including
Grea* Britain, Denmark and Ireland). Of these, 1,228,000 were Italian.
~pe~ifically, Fiat captured 18 percent of the market and was the foremost
!:~'C producer: Tt~is position deteriorated until it dropped below 10 percent
at the end of the decade.
'v,rhile Italian industry lost ground, Japanese and non-EEC European producers
entered the market at first timidly and then more boldly.
On European markets, Fiat's position is equal to 3.5 percent of the French
marKet, 3.25 percent of the German, and 4.5 percent of the British.
R~~nault's p~sition in Italy is now about 10 percent; that of Peugeot-
~ ~~Lt_roen, 7 percent; Volkswagen-Audi, 3.5 percent; Ford, 5 percent; GM,
4,2 percent.
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Japanese industries have now acquired between 2 and 3 percent of the French
market, more than 6 percenr of the German market and more than 10 percenf
of the British market. In Italy, so far they have a negligible share of
the market.
Productivity--However, what is most striking is the progressive drop in
pro3uctivity of our industry despite technological progress and the quan-
tity of investment. ISRI [Institute for Industrial Research] data show
that Italian industrial productivity has dropped 12 percent; British,
7 percent, while production in France and Germany increased 24 and 26
percent respectively. The position seems to have worsened in the past
_ 2 years. This statement is valid even in light of strong differences
in the cost of labor which on 31 December 1979 equaled 7,402 lire per hour
at Fiat, 8,971 lire for a representative French factory and 11,375 for a
representative German plant. Despite these differences in the cost of
labor and the similarity of facilities, the cost per unit produced is
much higher in Italy compared with foreign competition and this is trans-
lated into a growing loss of competitive position. All this is due to
factors of an organizational character, to the limited hourly utilization
of facilities, to different production schedules and the frequency of
unforeseen interrupti~ns. The differences in the cost of production,
together with the difficulty of delivering the product required in the
time required" was sh~wn in the loss of percentage of market.
World Clash--The automobile oligopoly is on zhe eve of a clash which will
establish future market shares for an entire generation: In the front
lines of this battle will be the productive and public administration
etructures of the world's four strongest industrial nations: The United
States, Japan, Gern?any and France.
~ Participation in this f.ight, with an active role by Italian firms, will
be conditioned mainly on the choices made in the coming month~.
The Conditions--The Prodi Cou~ission is convinced that Italian firms can
still be in this iight on condition that: They continue (and even �
accelerate) the pace of innovation and investment; radically increase
Lhe use of facilities and overall productivity; accelerate the testing of
innovative models in production in Italy; proceed to a profound restruc-
turization of the parts industry; introduce substantial improvements in
administrative policies both in the field of production and sales and
services; make gradual changes in the strategies of placement of plants, -
easing congested situations as much as possible and favoring movement of
plants toward the south. -
T'he r'arts Industry--The need to strengthen our parts industry seems to be
of primary importance. A similar instrument, in the view of the con~:ission,
cuuld be the promotion of new plants in the south both through jaint
ventures between Italian producers and through similar ventures with
foreign producers (namely, British and American) who have experienced
.
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_ difficulty in their entrance into the continental market due to opposition
of the French Govemment and obj ective difficulties in entering the German
market. _
However, it is the view of the commission that cooperation in the field
of parts should be broadened among all Italian automobile firms since the
rationalization of this sector is a necessary condition for the economic
balance of the automobile industry.
Public Financing--The commission notes first of all that public resources
destined to innovation in Ch~ automobile sector are extremely low both in -
absolute terms as well as in comparison with what occurs in other countries.
Consider, for example, that from the time the IMI [Italian Credit Institute]
fund for research was established until today the number of applications
for the sutomobile, parts and accessories sector (including tires) totaled
no more than 50 billion 1ire.
The Sector Plan--The commissicn believes that this matter would require
a still more detailed study of the problem of the sector which could not
- be the subject of the present an zlysis. This refers particularly to an
examination of factory stra[egy plans, their productive programs and the
financial resources of plants for the purpose of establishing the congruity -
of ineans with the objectives adopted and particularly the possible need
ior outside aid.
It also seems to tiie co~issian that the new cognitive phase can be
r.~rried out through the instrimment of the sector plan provided f~r in
Law 675. In this sector plan it would be possible to analyze the capa-
c~ty o� aid offere3 hy present legislation and eventual innovations
necessary to designate public policy in regard to the automobile industry.
Balance of Trade in Automobile Sector
(in millions of dollars)
1975 1976 1977 1978 Sep 79
Federal Republic of Germany 7,708 10,101 11,888 13,345 12,075
~
France 3,356 2,964 3,946 5,018 4,460
Italy 1,667 1,472 1,653 1,556 889 -
G?'Q.at Britain 1,974 1,713 1,282 539 1,004
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Productivity in Automobile Industry
(base 1972=100)
Country 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Great Britain 98 91 92 96 93
France 103 101 100 120 124 -
Germany 107 103 112 119 126
Italy 95 93 83 89 88
Sweden 107 117 109 97 100
Japan 106 97 107 126 135
United States 92 88 85 97 108
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Editr. LA STAI~A S.p.A~
~034
CSO: 3104
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COUNTRY SECTION SPAIN
BRIEFS
TROUBLE FOR ENCLAVES--The intelligence services of the Kingdom of Morocco
are encouraging the creation of nationalist groups in Ceuta and, above all,
Melilla. In the latter city, claimed to be part of Morocca's territory,'a
so-called "Muslim Association" is being formed and it is indirectly con-
trolled by the authorities in Rabat. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish
27 Apr 80 p 5J
CSO: 3110 END
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