JPRS ID: 9102 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080039-9
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 70
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 39
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9102
20 May 1980
~ Sub-Sc~har~n Africa Re ort
p
FOU~J N~o. 675
FBIS FOREIGN ~ROAD?CAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
~ _
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Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
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Other unattributed parentherical notes with in the body of an
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JPRS L/9102
20 May 1980
SUB-SA~IARAN AFRICA REPORT
FOUO No. 675
CONTENTS
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
= Mauritian Duplicity Over U.S. Yreaeace Hit
_ (Herve-Masaon; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 31 Mar 80).,......~,.~~,~ 1
FPPS Calls for Demilitarization of Indian Ocean
(Maryam Sysle; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 31 Mar 80) 4
Uaited States, Great Britain Scored for Diego Garcia
Occupation
(Emilie Ramey; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 31 Mar 80) 7
Frer~ch Industrial Exports to Africa Reported
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
11 Apr 80) 11
Economic Situation of Ceatral African Statea Reported
(MARCT~S TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
11 Apr 80) 13
Economic Status of West African Monetary Unioa Reported
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS,
11 Apr 80) 17
. ~
Briefs
South A�rican Traiui.ng for Mozaml?ique Dissidents 24
South African Corn to Mozambique 24
ANGOLA
Russian Progress on African Continent Discussed `
(Jonas Savimbi Interview; PARIS MATCH, 4 Apr 80) 25
Briefs
Nicar~guan Troops Preseat 33
- a- [III - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
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- CONTENTS (Continued)
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPU3LIC
Oubangui Front's Gouma Cited on Continuation of Liberation
Struggle
(Abel Gouma Interview; AFRIQUE-ASIE,
28 Apr-11 May 80) .......................o.......... 34
CHAD
Habre Reported To Be Responsible fc~r New Violence
(Mnhamed Maiga; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 2 Apr 80)............ 41 _
Military Action Alone Will Resolve Situation
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
28 Mar 80) 43
GHANA
Briefs
AD~ Cacao Loan 47
GUINEA
Briefs
USSR Railroad Cars, Locamotives 48
LIBERIA
'REUTER' Examines Stare of Nation's Economy
(Stephen Powell; REUTER, 7 May 80) 49
MALI
Domestic Situatioiz May Attract Undue Foreign Attention
(Sennen Andriamirado; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 7 May 80) 52
MOZA~IQUE
Briefs
ADB, ADF Agricultural Financing SS
Increased Cotton Harvest Expected 55
SOMALIA
Briefs
EDF Agricultural Financing 56
Irrigation Financing 56
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CONi'ENTS (Continued)
UGANllP,
Briefa
- Aid to Asian Refugees 57
ZAIRE
Human Rights Violatioua Charged
(Sylviane Kamara; ,TEUNE AFRIQUE, 16 Apr 80) 58
Bo-Boliko Mscusses ~coaomic Plans
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
4 Apr 80) 62
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
MAURITIAN DUPLICITY OVER U.S. PRESENCE HIT
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 31 Mar 80 p 42
[Artxcle by Herve-Masson: "Mauritius, Island of Lies"]
[Text] The double crosa is traditional for parties in
power. When it fails, it suffices to postpone elections,
and it ia time to prepare a new maneuver.
Perhaps because nothing very spectacular happens there, perhaps because po-
litical life is soft-pedalled there, internatioual opinion takes hardly any
_ interest in Mauritius. Very sm~ll (2,000 square kilometers with its depen-
- dencies, Rodrigues and some other small islands), overpopuiated (nearly 1 -
million inhabitants, with a galloping rate of increase), this former Brit-
ish colony, which became independent in 196r3, is neverthelpss one of
the atrategic keys in the southwestern part of the Indian Ocean. Economic-
ally and culturally more highly developed than its island neighbors, with
two good, well-sheltered ports (Port-Louis and Mahebourg), and with its
sovereignty extended over severa~l atolls where oil might be fouz~d very
_ eoon, Mauritius could have as much importance as its big neighbor, Mada-
gascar.
If Mauritius were to quit the Western alliance and adopt a truly nonal~.ned
foreign policy, the entire strategic balance preseiitly exiating in the In-
dian Ocean would be upset. But Prime Minister Ramgoolam (who has reigned
for a quarter of a centnry) and his sycophants of the Labour-PMSD (Mauri-
tian Social Democratic Party, conservative and resolutely pro-Westerr~) coa-
lition government do not intend to inconvenience the Western powera to whom
they are selling off their homeland bit by bit, in exchange for military
- support that may eventually be needed against the active leftist forces in
the country, the Mauritian Militant Movement (MhiNt) in particular. The MI~IIri
remains the bete noire of the West and its accom~lices in power in Mauri-
tius.
The double cross is the key to all Mauritian policy, foreign as well as do-
meatic. It is sometimes difficult to keep from being caught ~n it. When
the Afghan crisis broke out, Mauritian miniaters, including Prime Minister
Ramgoolam, the minister of finance, Vice Prim~ Minister Sir V. Ringadoo,
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the minister of agriculture, Sir Satcam Boolell, the regime's strong man
and Ringadoo's rival, lauched into ,*.hundering declarations. They protested
the reinforcement of the American ivavy and Air Force in the Indian Ocean, a
"zone of peace." They even went so far as to demand restitution of the is-
land of Diego Garcia,~ which they recently (1965) ceded to the British,
knowing very well that a nuclear base would be made of it. Only Gaetan Du-
= val,~former minister of foreign affairs and leader of the PMSD, was candid
enough to declare his attachment to the Western cause. He even threatened
to leave the government coalition if the Ramgoolam government adopted coer-
cive measures against the United States. What a joke!
Actually, the high flights of patriutism by the government were intended
solely for domestic consumption. The coalition in power was, in effect,
only flapping its wings.2 And the 1~II~M, a progressive party, close to pres- -
identa Ratsiraka and Rene, has always demanded the return of Diego Garcia
to Mauritius and the dismantling of the A.~+erican base. For the government,
it was quite simply a matter of "luring" the I~II~M: whence its declarations
in a very progressive tone regarding Diego Garcia and the militarization of
the Indian Ocean.
But the I~II~IM rejects any idea of a coalition with the Labourites. Its sec-
retary general, Paul Beranger, has expressly affirmed this. "It would be
suicidal to contract an alliance with Labour, which has led the country to
catastrophe and which is more and more detested by the electorate. It
would be madness to join company with Ram~oolam and his troops [o adminis-
ter the inflation, the devalued currency, the poverty and the corruption,"
There is therefore no MI~Il~1-Labour compromise. The government, disappointed,
has taken back its marbles. Boolell, who had gone into a stall after try-
. ing to supplant his friend Ringadoo, immediately reached an accomodation
with the prime minister. The latter, for his part, has initiated a rap-
prochement with his PMSD partner. The result was not long in coming: in a -
atatement to the conservaEive newspaper LE CERNEEN, of 4 March, Boolell ex-
plained that Diego Garcia could be left to the Americans if they paid a
good price! For only money counts for these professional discounC mer-
chants. The ludicrous progressive ploy is ended, and Mauritius is offici-
ally resuming its alinement with the West.
The Salary Freeze
Simultaneously, ~he government has hardened its positions vis-a-vis the
MTII~1, and at the s~,me stroke, with the electorate. After being postponed
once already, ti~e municipal elections that were to be held in April have
been put of.f to D!cember. If they really take placel The government knew
it was defeated i*~ advan:e. The prime minister, pulling in his horns, does
not consider it necessary to summon the Parliament, as should have been _
done in the present context of economic failure and after the ravaging of
the island by three cyclones. Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, who up to the
present has tried to give himself the brand image of a man who is respect-
ful of dAmocratic forms, no longer cares about them. For him, anytiling
goes in order ro retain power and the privileges attached to it.
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The government has decided to freeze the civil servants' salariea, but it
did not hesitate to increase the trasnportation allowances for its incom-
petent and uaeless ministers. Prestige expenditures and expensive minis-
terial junkets around the world will continue at a good clip. The Mauri-
- tian people, for their part, will tighter. their belta atill another notch.
Since the democratic way--the way of electiona in particular-~-is impractic-
able for the aoposition, e:nother way might tempt the Mauritian population:
the way of violence. Isnt' this what the government would want, so that it
could thus have the hope--with the sid of foreign forces, in readineas on
Reunion and on Diego Garcia--of reducing the 1~lM by force, on the pretext
of who knows what p'_ot?
But what 9ir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam and his sorcerer's apprentices do not
want to see is that on the day that the Mauritian people, discouraged and
desperate, take i~p arms, neither paratroopers nor Marines will be able to
overcome them.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
11267
CSO: 4400
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
J
FPPS CALLS FOR DEMILITARIZATION OF INDIAN OCEAN
Paria AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 31 Mar 80 p 39
(Article by Maryam Sysle: "The Peace Congress")
(Textj Calm waters, happy lands: these were the *_wo con-
cerns--with a thousand implications--of the most recent
meeting of the Seychelles Progressive Front. _
The expansion of the big powers' naval fleets in the Indian Ocean is arous-
ing sharp anxieties in the countries bordering it, and especially in the
Seychelles, where, as is known, this problem has been the dominant concern
since the installation of President France Albert Rene's progressive re-
gime. Thus some new initiatives, based notably on the recent United Na-
_ tions resolution asking that everything be done to transform this region
into a zone of peace, have recently been taken in Victoria. The kickoff
was given by the extraordinary national congress of the Progressive Frent
of the Seych211es People (FPPS)--the country's highest political body,
which also includes the representatives of the various sectorsof the popu-
lation--meeting in Victoria on 24 February last. At the conclusion of the ~
proceedings, a resolution was adopted condemning the militarization of the
Indian Ocean by foreiga powers--which, it is specif~i?d, are taking the re-
cent events in Iran and Afghani~tan as a pretext for strengthening their
dangerous presence--and calls for dismantlin~ ~f all the foreign military
bases in the region. The congress calls for restoration to Ma~iritius of
the island of Di~go Garcia, which is located some 1,~00 kilometers east of
the Seychelles and which the United States proposes to transform into a nu-
clear base; it asks that no country of the region grant military facilities
[o foreign powers,and that those which have already done so reconsider
their deciaion. Finally, it calls on the bordering atates to carry on per-
manent consultation, without which nothing can succeed, and to decide on
positive and effective measures to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, '
in conformity with the United Nations decision. �
A Uiplomatic Effort
This resolution, adopted after an intensive campaign of explanation by the
government and the press of the Sey~helles lasting several weeks, is not an
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act of pure form but marks the beginning of a vast diplomatic effort. An
expression of the will of the Seychelles people, it has been transmitted to
the secretary general of the OAU, for communication to the member states,
as well es to all the embasaiea accredited to Victoria. Moreover, and in
the same line of thinking, organization of the second conference of the
progresaive parties of t~e Indian Ocean is under study. In particular, it
was the subject of talka between the Progressive Front of the Seychelles
People and Paul Beranger, secretary general of the Mauritian Militant Move-
ment (MhIIri), on the occasion of the latter's recent visit to Victoria. We
; recall that the first conference of the progressive parties of the Indian
Ocean, which met aL Mahe in the Seychelles from 27 to 29 April 1978, had
- already asked for demilitarization of the Indian Ocean and denounced the
destabilization attempts to which the progressive countries of the region
are continually subjected. ~
But the extraordinary national congress of the Progressive Front of the
Seychalles People also concerned itself with the domestic problems, especi-
ally the proolem of improving concertation among the leading structures of
the population, as well as articulation between the party organisms and the
state.
To thia end, the reapective roles of the branches of the Progresaive Front,
on the one hand, and of the Popular Asaembly on the other hand, were speci-
fied. While the branches have the essential function of mobilizing the
people, the members of the Popular Assembly must also remain in close liai-
son with the inhabitants of the various districts, so as to be capable of
transporting their desiderata and their proposals either to the executive
committee of the party or Lo the government, or to any other state institu-
tion. In return, all propo~..~ls, such as bills, hav~ to be examined by the
_ "branch~s." In other words; all the resolutions adopted by the extraordin-
ary congresa are aimed at establishing a permanent and more effective dia-
log between the people and their leadera, through the structurea of the
party and of the state.
- "Unemployment Work Projects"
In addition, it is noted that the government has just taken a number of im-
portant measures in the social area in order to overcome unemployment,
which remains a crucial problem in the Seychelles, since at the time of the
overt}~~row of the Mancham regime in June 1977, two out of three persc~ns were
joblese.
Thus, by the terma of a bill announced by President France Albert Rene in
hia 1980 budget speech, a daily beiiefit of 20 runees will be paid to all
- persona who are jobless and do not already receive a social allowance or a
retirement pension. In exchange, those who receive the benefit muat accept
jobs offered to them by the labor service, in accordance with their ability.
For this purpose, a number of "unemployment work projects" devoted to vari-
ous projects such as construction of walls or roads, cleaning of the water-
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conduction systems, drainage of rivers, clearing of land, etc, will be
atarted. Among the propoaed projects are, in particular, the construction
of a wall 6 milea long along the eastern coast of Mahe, as we1Z as con-
atruction of a second road connection that will link Victoria, the capital,
with the airport some 10 kilometers distant. This initiative will thus en-
able persona without paid work to obtain the means for their ramilies to
live, while taking part in tasks of national construction. The Seychelles
government, as one sees, is striving to keep its promises.
- CO~YRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
11267
CSO: 4400
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INTER-AFP.ICAN AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN SCORED FOR DIEGO GARCIA OCCUPATION
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 31 Mar 80 pp 40, 41
[Asticle by Emilie Ramey: "Diego Garcia, the Eye of the Pentagon"]
_ [Text] For the Indian Ocean countries, this atoll trans-
formed into an American base is the symbol of the destiny
that eludes them: their own....
In the beginning, it was a miniscule archipelago, sleeping in the middle of
the blue waters of its lagoon: the Chagos. Living ~~ery modestly from pick-
ing and fishing, 2,000 "i~landers" inhabited it for several generations,
_ making elim profits from gathering coconuts for a Mauritian company whose
practices were a bit on the slave-driver side: Chagos Agalega Ltd.
But the archipelago became a base, for to its tlisfortune, it is located
right in the middle of the Indian Ocean, at a F,ractically equal distance
from the ~traits of Hormuz, Aden and Djibouti, the Mozambique Channel and
the Philippi.les. The British, who owned thes~~ island from the heyday of
their imperial expansion, had already used onE of them as a small telecom-
municationa base during World War II: the atoll of Diego Garcia.
And when the British government of Harold Wiison undertook to withdraw the
Union Jack from most o� the Britieh basea ''east of Suez," he wanted to keep
the Chagos, detached from Mauritius in 1965. With three other archipelagos
_ taken from the Seychelles, he formed in 1965 the "British Indian Ocean Ter-
_ ritory" (BIOT), and assigned the management of this group to the Royal
Navy.
The conditions of the ~ession of Diego Garcia by Mauritius are better-known
today, after 15 years of awkward silence on the part of the Labour govern-
ment of Port-Louis: the abandonment of Mauritian rights over the Chagos,
and compensation in the amount of 665,000 pounds sterling were in exchange
for London's renouncing the organization of a referendum on the indepen-
dence of Mauritius--a vote which the friends of the presenr prime minister,
Ramgoolam, were afraid of losing.
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Subsequ~ntly, events went very fast for the occupants of the archipelago:
_ in April 1967, London signed with the American government a 50-year agree-
rnent by the terms of which the two powers committed themselves to using the
_ IIIOT islands jointly for their defense. And in 1970, the two capitals an-
nounced their intention to establish a naval communications base on Diego
Garcia. It was then that the "islanders" were firmly asked to take the
road of exile: freighters loaded people and animals on in several waves,
leaving not a living sould on the island; the place had to be cleaned up
before the Americans landed.
In Washington, the Pentagon's strategists already had plans for the Diego
- Garcia atoll. When the American Senate obstinately refuspd funds for the
American Navy to start construction of the 13th aircraft carrier asked for,
i~ did grant the $200 million needed for transforming this Indian Ocean
atoll into a sort of "fixed aircraft carrier," with a runway 3,600 meters
lon,~, a telecommunications station, tanks and docks, an antiaircraft de-
fense 9ytem, etc.
An exceptional geographical situation, no natives, savings: the arguments
formulated by the Pentagon hit their target. In 1977, after 5 years of
work, the main job was finished, and a handful of carefully selected Ameri-
can journalists could note that the work was sometimes done at night, by
floodlight. Several naval reconnaissance airplanes--four-engine P-3C Ori- ~
ons crammed ~,aith listening devices--were already based there. ~
' Because of Iran's falling out of the American military orbit, and especial-
ly the aid of Soviet troops given to Afghanistan, the American government
decided to accelerate this ~aork and to look farther ahead: $170 million was
made available for the next 4 years, to lengthen the runway to handle the
big planes, 9UCtl as the B-52 bombers. It has also been decided to dredge
the lagoon, to permit big ships, such as the cruisers and aircraft carri- -
ers, to anchor in the Diego Garcia roadstead.
Thus, the atoll should gradually become a multipurpose base, capable of
serving as a relay for the Subic Bay and Clark installations in the Philip-
pines, where the main elements of the American Pacific fleet are based. An
ultra-advanced listening and data-analysis system will be able to track all
movement of ships or airplsnes in the region, like the South African Sil~
vermine. Maintenance docks will make it possible to supply and repair the
ships of the Indian Ocean squadron. The crews will be able to relax on
this "American land," without waiting for their ships to put in at the dis-
tant bases of the Mediterranean or the Pacific.
Thus, the American armed forces' permanent arrangement in the Indian Ocean
will be in place: the highly "deterrent" presence of one or more aircraft `
carriers, accompanied by their squadron in the latitudes of the Gulf and of
the Straits of Hormuz, with the possibility of using support points at Bah-
rein and Oman and in Pakistan; mare frequent visits by American ships in
the ports of ttie Red Sea (Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Djibouti), as well as on the
East African coasts (Kenya, Comores, Reunion); and the maintenance of a
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corps of 1,800 Marines in the region, or, board three troop transports,
equipped with land:ng materiel (helicopters and amphibious vehicles). This
i.s the outline of the famous "Sth Fleet" which the Pentagon dreamed of set-
tinb up, between the 6th Fleet of the Mediterranean and the 7th Fleet of.
khc~ 1'ac i Cic.
The whole will be articulated with the airborne strike force of 110,000 men -
being created in the United States under the co~nand of General Paul Kel-
ley, as well as with the bases of the Pacific (to which 320,000 American
soldiers are already attached). The Pentagon, profiting from the military '
"mobilization" decreed by President Carter, is studying means for cooperat-
ing more actively, west of this zone, with the Egyptian and Israeli armies,
and to the east, with the Australian army, so as to fulfill this old dream.
Several weak points remain, though: the Red Sea, where there is an active
Soviet presence (Yemen, Ethippia); India, which wants to remain nonalined,
at least on the military level; and the southwest part of the Indian Ocean,
with the existence of several progressive regimes hostile to the American
projects (Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania, Seychelles) and a South Africa
which is very embarassing to the West's brand image.
The Mauritian government--the same one that "sold" Diego Garcia to the
British and the Americans for a bit of bread--has belatedly arrived at con-
demnation of the atoll's transformation into a military base, as if this
development were just now taking place. Harassed by the opposition from
the left for several years, in January it took a position against the pro-
jects to enlarge its old island, for the first time since 1965.
The conference on demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, to be held soon in
Sri Lanka, will very certainly concentrate its attention on the atoll,
since many Indian Ocean countries want to challenge the American presence
on Diego Garcia. They will argue, on the one hand, that Great Britain had
violated international law by dismembering one of its colonies (Mauritius),
and then transgressed people's right to self-determination by deporting the
"islanders" despite their desire to remain in their home; and on the other
hand, that the existence af a base of such importance in the region turns
all their countries into marked targets. But tnore than this will doubt-
lessly be needed to deter the Pentagon from going ahead with its war prepa-
rations. _
The Islanders' Long Wait
"We, inhabitants of the Chagos islands, Diego Garcia, Peros, Banhaus and
Salomon, have been wrenched from these islands because the government of
Mauritius sold them to the British government to build a base there. Our
ancestors lived in slavery on these islands, but we are their heirs. De-
' spite our poverty, we did not die of hunger. Here on Mauritius, when our
animals were unloaded, an enclosure had been prepared to receive them, with
grass and water. For us half-slaves, nothing was done. We are disorient-
_ ed, not knowing what is going to become of us...." Thus do the "islanders"
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deported from Diego Garcia to Mauritius express themselves, in a manifesto
signed by 422 families (out of 434). For 15 years, they have been living a
nightmare: installed miserably in the lower-class outskirts of Port-Louis,
[hey have adapted poorly to urban life and have remained rootless. The
first financial compensation was not paid to them until 1978, whereas the
Mauritian government collected the profit from the sale of the archipelago
right after the transaction, in 1965.
Meanwhile, the opposition parties on Mauritius, and certain newspapers in
Great Britain and the United States, had called attention to their fate,
causing trouble for the administrations of the three .:ountries implicated
in this deportation affair. The Mauritian Militant Movement opened
fire in 1975, accusing Prime Minister Ramgoolam of having "robbed" these
unfortunates. Then the lawyer Gaetan Duval, activator of the Mauritian
Creole right, appealed to the High Court of Justice of London, maintaining
that Great Britain had to continue to concern itself with the fate of these
"islanders": he said they were still British subjects, since their island
had been ceded to London before Mauritius obtained independence.
The "islanders," bounced from one interlocutor to another and multiplying
their complaints, com.mittees and hunger strikes, are the bad conscience of
the Labour government of Mauritius, whose responsibilities are obvious.
But the Americans are also trying to exculpate themselves: according to the
Pentagon, the place was empty when the American Navy personnel began in- -
stalling themselves in the Chagos.
The British, for their part, want people to forget this inglorious episode
from the end of their colonial t~~istory: a London lawyer, Mr Sheridan, ar-
rived in Port-Louis last November bearing new proposals from Mrs Thatcher's
government for "final and definitive " compensation. He proposed to dis-
tribute among the deportee families a further sum of 1.25 million pounds
(10 million francs) on condition that the "islanders" sign a release where-
by they "abandon all titles and rights to return to Diego Ggrcia."
Finally, in consequence of the intervention of inembers of the Mauritian
left, most of the deportee families refused to sign this document, despite
the attraction of the sums offered. The Mauritian government itself offic-
ially kept its distance from the British attorney's proposal, to which,
tiowever, it had lent assistance at the beginning. And again, the "island-
ers" are asking for justice: quite simply, return to their home. ~
CUPYRTGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
11267 '
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INTER-~ICAN AFFAIRS
, FRENCH INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS TO AFRICA REPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Apr 80 p 851
[Text] On the occasion of the tecl~nical week which was held iii Abid~an on
14-18 April 1980, by the National Institute of Aigher Technical Fducation
of the Ivory Coast and the French Federation of Mechanical and Metal-
Processing Industries (FIMTM), an event of which we will speak at greater
length under the heading "Ivory Coast," the FIMTM distributed export statistics
for the French mechanical industries to Weat and Central Africa. We have
reproduced these statistics below. The figures given are expresaed in thousands
of French francs.
Key:
' 1. Conswner goods 17. Nigeria
2. Equipment goods 18. Senegal
3. Semiprocessed goods 19. Sierra Leone
4. ECOoWAS 20. Togo
5. Ivo~y Coast 21. UI3EAC [G~stoms and Economic Union of
6. Cape ~Jerde Central Africa
7. Benin 22. Cameroon
8. Gambia 23. Congo
9. Ghana 24. Central African Republic
10. Guinea 25. Gabon
11. Guinea-Bissau 26. Chad -
- 12. Upper Volta 27. Other countries
_ 13. Liberia 28. Burundi
14. Mali 29. Rwanda
15. Mauritania 3G. Sao Tome and Principe
16. Niger 31. Zaire
32. Grand total
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COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 9 0: "
8143 ,
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS -
ECONOMIC SITUATION OF CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES REPORTED
Paria MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Apr 80 p 852
[Text) The Bank of Central African States (BEAC) recently published an
analysis of the economic situation of states in its region of issue at the
end of 1979 and the beginning of 1980. We have extracted a number of reports.
In the agricultural sector, the resulte of the 1978-1979 season for the
principal export products were on the whole favorable, particularly in
Cameroon.
As regards forest exploitation, Cameroon experienced an advance in its
exploitations of undressed timber and lumber while in th~ other states
production and exports were short of their 1978 levels.
With respect to oil and ore production, 1979 registered an increase over the
preceding year, except for Gabon oil, whose production prospects for 1980,
however, are encouraging. In Cameroon, foreign trade caused a net improve-
ment in the balance of trade, as the result of inclusion of oil in foreign
trade statistics.
--Cacao--Purchases of cacao recorded in Cameroon as of 21 January 1980 by
the National Basic Neceasities Marketing Office for the 1979-1980 season
totaled 95,428 tons compared to 82,351 tons on the same date during the
preceding season; i.e., an increase of 13,077 tonsc on the same date in
19$0, exporta totaled 32,534 tons and deliveries to local factories totaled
15,887 tons. In Gabon, the reaults of the present season compared to those
of the previous season reflected a decrease of over half (337 tnns compared
to 834 tons), although the purchasing price went up. In the Congo, the 1978-
1979 season supplied 2,772 tons compared to 2,275 tons in 1977-1978.
--Coffee--The provisional results of the coffee harvest in Cameroon for the
1978-1979 season tot~led 106,784 tons, while forecasts for the 1979-1980
aeason call for 107,000 tons, including 30,000 tons of Arabica. The Central
- African Re~ublic hss exper ienced a continuing decline in coff ee production
since the 1975-1976 season, and the cormnercialized harvest in 1978-1979 _
totaled only 8,635 tons (-2,239 tons compared to the preceding year). In
the Congo, production also declined, with 4,839 tons in 1978-1979 (-275 tons
compared to 1977-1978).
13
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--Cotton--Good reaults were obtained in the 1978-1979 cotton season, with
increased tonnages totaling 46 percent in Cameroon and 14 percent in Central
Africa. In Cameroon, the 1979-1980 season, as of the end of December 1979,
produced 20,967 tona of cotton-seed (28 percent over the preceding season).
--Livestock raising--As of the end of November 1979, Cameroonian liveatock
- totaled 3.2 million head of cattle (divided among the provinces of Nord, Nord- _
Ouest and Est), 2.4 million goats, 2.2 million sheep and 1.5 million swine.
The two modern slaughterhouses in Douala and Yaounde showed increased activity
at year's end of 50 and 75 percent, respectively.
- --Tobacco--For the last 3 years, tobacco production in the Central African.
Republic has experienced a net decline and the number of tobacco growers
continu es to decrease. '"he 1979 harvest was 1,799 tons (including 764 tons
of wrapping tobacco and 1,035 tons of cut tobacco), compared to 1,972 tons
in 1978 and 2,753 tons in 1977; the market value of the harvest was 216
million CFA [African Financial Community] francs in 1979 (426 million in
- 1977).
--Timber--In Gabon, the drop fn the production of okoume which was 3.8 percent
in 1978 compared to 1977 was aggravated in 1979. Production in the f irst 10
months of 1979 totaled 972,835 cubic meters (-6 percent); the decrease is
attributable in part to the defective road system and the insufficiency of
investments. The placing in operation of the Libreville-Ndjole trunk of the
Tranegabonese Railroa~ should permit more rational exploitation of the second
forest region. As wit1:~ okoume, the production of ozigo in Gabon is also on
the decline with 46,489 cubic meters for the first 10 months of 1979 (-16
percent).
In the Congo, purchases by the Congolese Timber Office during the first three
quarters of 1979 totaled 29,519 cubic meters (-42 percent).
In Cameroon, exports of undressed timber recorded at the Port of Douala as
of the end of October 1979 totaled 302,115 tons, an increase of 8 percent; '
shipments of 78,885 tons of lumber represented an increase of 23 percent.
In the Central African Republic, exports of timber in the firat 6 months of
1979 totaled 18,848 tons, a decrease of 36 percent compared to the corresponding
6-�month period in 1978.
_ --Oil--Oil production in Cameroon in 1979 totaled 1.7 million tons; twn new
f ields were placed under exploitation. In Gabon, production totaled 8.1
million tons for the f irst 10 months of 1979 (comgared to 10.6 and 11.3 .
million tons for the 12 months of 1978 and 1977, respectively). In the Congo,
crude oil production in 1979 totaled 2.5 million tons (5 percent). ~ao new
deposits, which se~ pramising, will be placed under exploitation in 1980
and 1981.
--Mineral products--During the first 11 months of 1979, manganese ore
production in Gabon totaled 2 million tons, an appreciable increase over 1978.
The exploitation of Gabonese uraniwtt ores supplied 1,028 tons of concentrates
during the same period, also an increase. In Cameroon, aluminum production
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amounted to 21,367 tons during the f irst 6 months of i979. In the Central
; African Republic diamond production in 1979 totaled 314,100 carats (10.80
percent over 1978) and exports totaled 300,200 carats.
--Industry--In Camroon, tY;e industrial sector, for the period April 1978-
March 1979, experienced a~~retax turn4ver of 164.4 billion CFA francs (6
- percent).
--Prices--The rise in consumer prices for the African family was generalized
in 1979; the increase ranged from 7.80 percent in Yaounde, to 11.1 percent
in Libreville to 15.7 percent in Bangu i.
--Trade--Camroon's trade during the first 9 months of 1979 reflected an
appreciable improvement in the balance of trade, whose deficit was reduced
from -39.6 billion CFA francs in September 1978 to -27.3 billion in September
1979, a reduction of 31.08 percent of the deficit. This favorable development
resulted from an increase in exports (24 percent in worth) and from the more
moderate increase in imports (12.37 percent); exports of crude oil, totaling
38.7 billion CFA francs, were in third place during the period under
consideration, after coffee and cacao, on the list of Cameroonian exp~rts.
In the Central African Republic, the positive balance of trade for the first
6 months of 1979 totaled 1.5 billion CFA ~rancs, a slight decline (-0.1
percent) compared to the corresponding 6-month period in 1978.
--Finance--As of 31 December 1979, paper money and coins in circulation in
the five states of the region of iasue of the Bank of Central African States
totaled 166.3 billion CFA francs (15.91 percent above the end of 1978).
The volume of deposits in the banking system (excluding Ct~ad), as of the end
of November 1979, totaled 180.7 billion CFA francs, an increase of 12,1
percent above the end of November 1978. The increase in deposits was
particularly marked in Cameroon (22.7 percent), and Gabon experienced a
decrease of 3.6 percent in bank deposits.
Also as of the end of November 1979, the total credits in the economy
(excluding Chad) amounted to 498.3 billion CFA francs compared to 446.7
billion 1 year earlier (11.6 percent); expansion has slowed down (19.6
percent for the corresponding period in 1978). The economy of Cameroon
experienced a more rapid flow of export products, reflecting an increase of
credits to industry; and of import and consumer products. In the Central
African Republic, a drop in activity affected the development of credits in
the economy. In the Congo, the advance w~s moderate. The decrease experienced
in Gabon basically affected the building-public works sector, as well as
import trade.
The overall def icit posture of. the national treasuries (except for Chad) as
regards monetary institutions has been reduced from 62.1 billion CFA francs
as of 30 November 1979 to 29.4 billion as of 30 November 1979. The Cameroonian
treasury has a net credit posture of 43 billion CFA francs, while the Central
African Republic and the Congo have debit positio~s.
15
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- Finally, the net foreign holdings (excluding Chad), as of the end of November
1979 reflected an overall debit balance of 3.2 billion CFA francs, a _
signif icant improvement over November 1978 when this debit totaled 31.3
billion CFA francs. Although Cameroon and the Central African Republic
have a credit posture, the Congo and Gabon are debtors vis-a-vis foreign
countries.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980.
8143
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
ECONOMIC STATUS OF WEST AFRICAN MONETARY UNION REPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in Freach 11 Apr 80 pp 849-851
[Text] CBWAS, the Central Bank of West African States recently published
its annual report on the development of the economy in the West African
- Monetary Union countries (WAMU).
The overall improvement of climatic conditions which prevailed in the member -
countries of WAMiJ during the year 1978-1979 led to an increase in agricul-
tural production in comparison to the preceding year. Variations in the
trading of main products are listed in the following chart:
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION OF WAMU
(in 1000 t per growing season)
1975-56 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79
PEANUTS:
In the shell
Senegal 1177.8 956.9 441.7 781.7
Shelled
Benin 7.0 7.9 2.7 1.3
Upper Volta 13.1 4.7 1.8 1.0
Niger 3.8 7.2 14.0 10.0
COCOA:
Benin 1.1 2.3 1.4 3.7
Ivory Coast 234.6 235.8 306.0 318.0
Togo 17.8 14.1 16.7 12.4
COFFEE:
Benin 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.1
Ivory Coast 308.1 291.3 195.7 275.0
Togo (trading) 6.2 9.4 4.1 4.9
COTTON SEED:
Benin 20.1 17.5 13.9 18.7
Ivory Coast 65.1 75.4 103.0 114.9
Upper Volta 50.7 55.3 38.0 60.0
Niger 11.1 7.2 3.8 4.4
Senegal 39.0 45.4 37.1 33.8
- Togo 9.7 7.0 4.5 12.6
KARITE:
Benin 12.4 2.9 8.3 0.2
- Upper Volta 48.5 32.4 56.7 7.3
Togo 5.4 1.2 6.7 1.2
17
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In 1.979 raw material prices followed an upward cur~~�~ through the year, the
increase being however more marked in industrial products, minerals and
metals than in agricultural products. The index in CFA francs of the main
basic products exported by WAMU countries after slight gains between January -
and April, going from 286 to 290 points, registered a strong rise in May and
June reaching 301 and 324 points respectively, but, later, this index shrank
and was at 295 points in November 1979.
The recovery of peanut production in Senegal after the drought which seriously
crippled the yields from the 1977-78 harvest led to a marked increase of
quantities traded. For the whole of WAML1 the sale of peanuts in the shell
amounted to 797,700 t against 469,000 t in 1977-78, that is an increase of
70 percent.
A slight rise in cocoa production from the Ivory Coast showed, despite the
_ decrease in production in Togo, an improvement of rougr~ly 3 percent in the
total trading amounting to 334,093 t. Benefiting from the recovery after
a year of drought the coffee trade increased by 39.5 percent with a harvest
of 279,488 t>
With the exception of Senegal the trade of cotton seed registered a rise
with a total of 224,366 t(+ 22 percent).
The expansion of foodstuff crops has been helped by good climatic conditions
- and by nromotion movements started in certain states.
- Industrial act~vity developed satisfactorily in certain countries notably in
Senegal and Benin where the activity of oil mills benefited from adequate
supplies after the 1977-78 drought. On the Ivory Coast the industrial sector
continued its development. In Upper Volta and Togo progress was not so
marked and the activity of the secondary sector was maintained at a level com-
_ parable to that of the preceding year. Niger industries, consisting mostly
of oil mills, had a difficult year because of insufficient supplies of pea- -
nuta and, for the spinning mills, of cotton.
Concerning the mining sector phosphate extraction has shown a slight rise
despite the slump which continued on the international market. Uranium pro-
duction registered a significant improvement with the start of production of
a second exploitation plant of the Niger deposits.
African consumer prices followed a moderate course during the first trimester
of 1979. Starting with the second trimester, a rising tendency developed -
under the double influence of the increased cost of imported goods and the
increased internal demand for specific local products.
Benin--Thanks to better climatic condi.tions Benin, in 1979, had a more
satisfactory economic development than in 1978.
Measures to start up agricultural production again obtained convincing re-
sults, notably for cotton and palm oil. In food crops, maize production
reached 250,000 t, a level leaving a surplus for the needs of the future
maize factory at Bohicon. 18
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During the year 1978-1979 the specialized State comF~any put on the market
18,740 t of cotton seed (+34.9 percent) which furnished 7,154 t of fiber
after ginning.
Trade of palm products consisted of 58,443 t of palmetto 10.5 percent)
and 20,574 t of areca 98.1 percent). Consequently oil production, the
main industry of Benin, returned to a normal activity level and Sonicog
(National Co of fat industry) was able to export part of its production.
On the industrial plane the completion of the Save dam constitutes the pre-
liminary phase of the Benin-Niger sugar project. The Onigbolo cement plant
and the mixte oil mill of Bohicon had a start in the domain of civil engineer-
ing. Petroleum research was strengthened by the participation of Norwegian
firms and the building of a refinery of crude (cost estimate: 45 CFA
billions) is provided in the 3 year-plan.
The building and public works sector showed a sustained activity in 1979.
For the year 1979 the growth rate of the GDP is estimated at roughly 14
percent in current terms.
On May f irst 1979 the guaranteed minimal interprofessional wage per hour was
raised and prices for African consumer goods reinained stable for the greater
part of the year.
Ivory Coast--The strong economic expansion recorded for 1976 and 1977 was
followed in 1978 by an ad~ustment period. The significant improvement in
climatic conditions in 1979 bringing about a renewal of agricultural pro-
duction for home consumption as well as for exportation led to a definite
amelioration of economic activity.
Thus, estimated at current rates, the GDP ahould indicate for 1979 a growth
of the order of 12 percent, near the growth rate noted for 1978.
With 275,019 t marketed 79277 t) during the year 1978-1979 the coffee
producers earned a total revenue of 68.8 CFA billions against 48.9 billions
the preceding year. The low world price of coffee during the first 4 months
of the year was followed by a sharp rise, then a stabilization in the last
months, which permitted the stabilization bank to increase significantly its
export earnings in comparison to the preceding year.
. Ending on 30 September 1979, the cocoa marketing�campaign reached 318,049
t and the Ivory Coast kept its position of first world producer which it
snatched from Ghana the preceding season. Producers shared a revenue of
79.5 CFA billions 3 billions).
Benefitting from climatic conditions and from the increase in cultivated
acreage, the traded harvest of cotton seed consisted of 114,886 t(+ I1.5
percent).
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Forecasts of banana and pineapple production for 1979 were only partially
fulfilled; pineap~le growing is hurt by a problem of profitability, the
costs of production increasing steadily while selling prices remain stable.
The harvest of palmetto and the deliveries of areca will yield an oil and
cattle-cake production at least equal to that of 1.978. The "palm plan"
whose implementation is entrusted to Sodepalm aims on completion at a pro- _
duction of 250,000 t of palm oil, that is more than twice the present pro-
duction which already puts the Ivory Coast in the rank of fi_rst African
exporter and Third World exporter of palm oil.
In the north of the territory the implementation of the sugar program goes
on. For the year 1978-79 cane sugar productidn reached 53,000 t against -
32,210 t for the preceding year.
Still insufficient to cover the country's needs, rice production for the
year 1978-79 totals 507,000 t(+ 32,000 t).
With financing by the World Bank, the reafforestation plan on 20,000 ha of
forest reservations is pursued. In the context of limitation measures pro-
mulgated to reduce the production of 5.1 m3 millions in 1976 to 4.2 m3 mil-
lions in 1980, exports of rough timber and sawn logs will indicate in 1979
a shortfall from 1978.
Petroleum production, up to now on the research level only, is going to take
on concrete form, starting in the second semester of 1980 by the exploitation
of recognized petroleum deposits. During the year the capital of SIR (Ivory
Coast Co of refinery) was raised from 2 to 7 CFA billions in order to finance
the doubling to 4 millions of t of crude of the refining capacity of the
Vridi installations.
After a sustained progress until April with a rise of 10 percent, the index
of industrial production (apart from energy and public works) initiated a
sli.ght reversal. The textile industry, first in the secondary sector on the
basis of its turnover, suffered from the international crisis in textiles
and the expansion programs foreseen for 1979 were postponed because of un-
certainty in the disposal of production. Among the actual achievements of
the year the agro-industrial complex of Sinematiali came into production;
_ its annual output of 3000 t of tomato concentrate should cover a third of
the internal consumption.
During the year the tourist infrastructure was augmented by the opening of
2 new hotels in Abidjan (6.5 CFA billions).
As in 1978 salaries were raised starting January first 1979. After a moder-
- ate progress in the beginning of the year, African consumer prices registered -
a eudden increase during the course of the second trimester, then they
stabilized: a rise mostly due to the increase in price of foodstuffs.
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Upper Volta--In spite of poor climatic conditions agricultural production
came out with better results than in 1478 and the shortfall in cereals was
diminished from 176,000 t to 100,000 t. The trading of cotton reached the
record level of 59,957 t of cotton seed 57.6 percent), which furnished
after ginning 20,099 t of fiber. -
In consequence of its cyclic character the harvest of karite almonds con-
sisted of only 7263 t(against 56,653 t the preceding year). Peanut pro-
- duction showed a new low with only 1000 t of nuts traded while sesame trading
greatly picked up (4251 t). Fruit and vegetable exports showed a decrease
~ of 15 percent (1157 t).
During tlie year 1978-1979 Sosuhv (Sugar Co of Upper Volta) produced 31,018 t _
of sugar 3.3 percent).
In cattle raising the year 1979 was marked by an improvement in trading
markets: outlets for export were diversified (Benin, Ghana Liberia, Ivory
Coast and others).
Initially foreseen for the beginning of 1978, the exploitation of the marble
and limestone deposit in Tiara started only at the end of the third trimester
of 1979 with the objective of obtaining 10,000 t of marble and 30,000 m2 of
mosaic a year.
The Tambao railway project was relaunched in 1979. The project, revised on
a more econamical base foresees a reduction of the exploiting capacity for
the manganese ore deposit and the construction of a cement plant of 150,000
t capacity annually, whose cost is estimated at (9 CFA billions).
The installment of a touristic infrastructure continued in 1979 with the
construction of a hotel of international standing at Ouagadougou (3.5 CFA
billions).
In January 1979 a graded salary raise was decided upon. Thanks to a more
abundant and better distributed food production the price index for African
consumption registered a drop for m~st of 1979.
Niger--Niger economic expansion was strengthened in 1979 thanks to the ex-
ploitation of uranium ore deposits.
On the agricultural plane the situation has been satisfactory on the whole;
the country managed to insure from now on its selfsufficiency in the field
of cereals (in 1974 its needs were covered only to 72 percent). The cotton
harvest of 1978-1979 allowed to trade 4,412 t of cotton seed 16.1 percent)
giving after ginning 1486 t of fiber. The situation is less satisfactory
for peanuts whose production cannot reach the level of 100,000 t regularly
attained before the period of drought.
A program of restocking of cattle, undertaken after the drought of the years
1972 to 1974, was completed to 68 percent by the end of 1978.
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In the course of the first nine months of 1979, uranium production rose to
2,533 t versus a forecast of 3,550 t for the whole year and compared to a
production of 2,109 t for 1978; the increase is the result of the start of
activity of Cominak (Mining Co of Akouta). With the creation of the Mining
Co of Tessa N' taghalgue (with a capital of a billion CFA) Niger finds
itself endowed with a third exploitation plant of its deposits of uranium
ore.
The fall in peanut product.ion seriously compromised the activity of oil
presses; the supplies of auts represent nnly a tenth of the milling capa~ity.
~ In 1579 the cement plant of Malbaza was able to maintain its production
level of cement and clinker.
A new hotel (4.7 CFA billions) will soon double the reception capacity of -
the capital Niamey.
Starting May lst 1979, the guaranteed minimal interprofessional wage rate -
was raised. The general price index for African consumption progressed
_ slowty and regularly during the year 1979, the increase being slightly less
than in 1978, that is 8.8 percent against 10.1 percent. ,
~enegal--Senegalese ~~conomy in 1979 initiated a phase of moderate recovery
`ollowing the overa?_1 favorable development of agricultural production by
reason of better climatic conditions. If production shows a decrease for
_ eotton, it indicates a rise of 77 percent for peanuts and 6I.9 percent tor
' millet.
Economic activity on the whole was better served, notably the oil mills which
constitute the dominant sector of industry.
Estimated at present rates, GDP registered an increase of roughly 18 percent
compared to 1~78. .
_ Senegal regained in 1978 its normal level of peanut yield with a total of
_ 917,300 t(trading and seed refunds). Deliveries to oiI mills consisted of
668,Q75 t*_hat is 72.8 per~ent of the controlled volume against 270,627 t
the pr?ceding year (57 percent). The increase in production permitted to
share a total revenue of 32.4 CFA billions among the farmers (against 17.7
billions in 1977-78).
With 33,802 t cotton trade showed a shortfall of 8.8 percent; revenues dis-
tributed to producers amounted to 1.8 CFA billion.
~ Industrial fishing suffered in 1979 from the scarcity of tuna and catches
were inferior to those of 1978; the part of supplies to the French represents
89.6 percent of the yields.
- Cndustrial production on the whole showed a clear improvement over 1978
mostly because of the renewal of activity by the oil mills.
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_ In spite of the slump in the international market of phosphate the extrac-
tion of Senegalese deposits furnished in 1979 1.65 million of t of calcium
phosphate, a quantity roughly 5 percent greater than in 1978.
Salt production from the salt flats of Sine Saloum in 1079 was maintained
at 140,000 t.
In the Senegalese economy tourism is growing each yea~~~ total receipts pro-
vided by tourism exceeded 13 billions in 1978, thus situated in third rank -
in foreign currency inflow, after peanut products and phosphates.
On the wage plane an interim subsidy of 10 percent was authc~rized in the
private sector in March 1979. The consumption price index ~~rhich had remained
= relatively stable through the first 5 months of the year shoWed then contin-
uous tension and the rise comes to 9.5 percent for the year against 2.9
' percent for 1978.
Togo--~A new rain pattern did not permit in 1979 the necessary recovery of
agricultural production in Togo. Trading of coc~a during the year 1978-79 -
consisted of 12,366 t(- 25.9 percent). The policy of replacement in coffee
plantations is beginning ro give results: trade totalled 4,330 t(+ 5
percent).
Recovering strongly, cotton seed production showed 12,610 t against 4,517
t the previous year. The spreading of the Bon variety expressed itself by
a 93.3 percent proportion thereof in the total quantity traded in the year
1978-79. Greatly increased palmetto yields consisted of 5,499 t.
The main mining activity of Togo, the exploitation of phosphate deposits
- feeds the processing installations of the Office togolais des phosphates
(Togo phosphate Co) which totalled 2.7 millions of t(+ 3.1 percent) for
the first 11 months of the year 1979 (the demand of EEC countries remains
constant). Cimao, the multinational company of West African Cements, could
not start working in 1979 as initially scheduled.
After a strong expansion registered in 1978, the building-public works
sector registered a certain slowing down.
In industry, alone, brewing enjoyed a significant growth of its production
in 1979. Iti view of a decline in local sales, ITT (Togo textile industry)
had to proceed to a diversificatfon of its production, oriented more and
more towards the making of knitted articles destined for European exports;
_ the proportion of exports went from 36.8 percent to 53.2 percent during the
first semesters of 1978 and 1979.
Togo Petroleum Co whicl: had suspended its activity in September 1978 follow-
ing managerial difficulties proceeded to the restarting of its refinery in
April 1979.
Over the first 8 months of the year 1979 the gene~~al price index for the
African family consumption increased by 8.1 perrent against 1.8 percent
for the corresponding period of 1978.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris 1980
8696 23
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
SOUTH AFRICAN TRAINING FOR MOZAMBIQUE DISSIDENTS--Mozambican dissidents are '
_ planning to eatabliah training campa in South Africa. Following Robert
Mugabe's victory in Zimbabwe, whence their "Voice of Free Africa" was broad-
- cast, they took refuge in Malawi. However, President Hastings Banda would _
like them to leave the country. (Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French
No 1009 7 May 80 p SA]
SCUTH AFRICAN CORN TO MOZAMBIQUE--To combat shortages~ the World Health
Organization (1rH0) has approved a ne~+ prograai of food assistar~ce to
Mozaanbique in ~he amount of 32 million escudos. Most of the assistance--
rrhich will consist of 733 tons of powdered milk arr~ 235 tons of butter--is ~
destined for schools and coma~unity institutions. An a,~eement xas also '
signed in late Februa,ry for the delivery by South Africa of corn to
Mozambique. According to South African groverntaental sources~ this contract
is of the same type as the one concluded last year b South Af.r.ica for the
delivery of 200,000 tons of corn to Zanbia. ~Text1 Paris MARCHES
TRO PSCAUX ~T MEDITERRANEENS in F`rench 7 Mar 8 p 5~3 10992
C50 : 4~00
. . ,
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ANGOLA
RUSSIAN PROGRESS ON AFRICAN CONTINENT DISCUSSED
Paris PARIS MATCH in French No 1610, 4 Apr 80 pp 69, 102-103
[Interview with Jonas Savimbi by Jean Larteguy: "The West Is Handing
Africa to the Russians"]
[Excerpt] Larteguy: Have the Chinese helped you?
Savimbi: Yes. They sent 350 tons of weapons to Dar-es-Salaam for us. But
the Russians exerted pressure on Nyerere, the president of Tanzania, and
the weapons never reached us. They are still there.
= Larteguy: What is your situation today?
Savimbi: We hold all of the South of Angola and a part of the North,
except for Luanda, the provinces of Molonge and Lunda and the Benguela
railroad. Out of a total population of 6.5 million inhabitants, we control
in fact 3 million. We have 15,000 regular armed men and 10,000 militiamen,
who still have only rudimentary ~reaponry. All that we lack is modern -
weapons.
We are encircling the cities and the posts held by the Cubans and the
militiamen of the MPLA. They have to be supplied by plane. But we have
nothing with which to shoot the planes down. Our defeat has been in the
West. And this ?~?ttle we are ~.~aging is yours. 'i'he Russians have made of
Angola their base for expansion, where they are maintaining ma~or reserves
in men and materiel. They did not do this until they understood that the
West would let ti~em do it. When Mengistu was last in Ethiopia, they rallied
5,000 Cubans from Angola and sent them there as reinforcements to save him.
Through Angola the Russians are on the Atlantic, and through Ethiopia and
Aden they have access to the Red Sea. Little by little, the neighboring
countries are coming under their influence. Egypt has escaped but the Sudan
is seriou~ly threatened. Tanzania has fallen prey to the talons of the
Soviets. Zambia is in a delicate situation. It purchases substantial
military materiel from Russia, but has no personnel to make use of it.
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There is not a single MIG pilot. Then came the advisers, and then the
Cubans. And it will be as it was in Angola.
Portuguese decolonization effected under communist party control enabled the
Russians to establish themselvea in all the former colonies: in Angola, but ~
in Mozambique as well. In 1977 and 1978 the Soviets tried twice to take
over Zaire. They only failed thanks to the intervention of the French and
- the Moroccans. Then they began again, despite all the agreements signed
between Luanda and Kinshasa. It will take them 10 years but they will
succeed. Kenya is still free of their influence, but they have just g3ined
a foothold in the Seychelles ~ust opposite. If Rhodesia slides into the
Soviet camp--and I greatly fear it--it is the end for Namibia.
' The Russians are coming dangerously close to their final goal which is to
take over South Africa, to control its riches, and the Cape, which would
allow them to block passage between the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean.
Larteguy: Can Zaire resist Soviet pressure for very long?
Savimbi: Z know President Mobutu. He is a man for whom I have enornwus
esteem. But he is alone, desperately alone. The situation in Zaire is
tragic. It is for this reason that the West should not hesitate to support
- Mobutu, whatever criticisms of him there may be. It is not a question of
the man himself. The fate of Africa is at sCake. If Zaire slips into the
Soviet orbit, the Sudan is lost and Egypt cannot resist for long alone.
The Fate of Europe Is at Stake in Angola
~ Morocco is threatened and so is Tunisia. The Polisario Front admirably
fits into the plans to destroy stability in the northern part of the
African continent. Qadhafi is the financial backer, the KGB is the foreman
and Algeria, naively, hopes to snatch the chestnuts from the fire. But
when one dines with the devil, one should have a long-handled fork--and
Algeria's is not long enough. The Russians want to cut Africa in two, to
isolate the moderate countries--Cameroon, Upper Volta, the Ivory Coast and
- Senegal--and smother them. In the midst of the Maghrib which it will have
won, a Sahel where it is already well established, and a tightly controlled
Black Africa which will have to toe the mark.
Larteguy: But what then do they want?
Savimbi: To control all the wealth of Africa in raw materials, to control
- all the maritime routes to bring Europe to its knees. It is Europe which
is their target. And what is Europe doing to defend itself? It is waiting.
It is in Angola that the fate of Africa, and thus that of Europe, hangs in
the balance. The Russians are ready for any crime in order to win out.
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- Larteguy: Aa in Afghanistan, where one by one they had their faithful
followers assassinated when they refused to become their slaves: Daoud,
Taraki, Amin--and tomorrow Karmal.
Savimbi: Like Agostinho Neto in Angola. -
Larteguy: Neto died of an illness.
Savimbi: No, he was eliminated by the Russians like Amin and the others,
when he sought to make contact with the West and with me.
When they learned that Neto had approached me through the intermediary of
President Senghor and that he wanted to arrange peace, they became very -
concerned. Already the ~ood neighbor agreement they had signed with Zaire
was a source of displeasure to them. The Russians needed war to achieve
their plans for conquest and they wanted fires to break out everywhere.
Without war, they no longer had any pretext for remaining in Angola. War
requirea weapons. These they could funzish, as needed, with mercenaries
to use them. But peace representa a threat t~ them, for it ahows them up
for what they are--blunderers and blockheads. They cannot supply bread,
much lesa make wheat grow. Their experts in farm mattera have proved in-
competent everywhere. And in economics, it was the same thing.
Neto wanted peace, and in making plans for it, he condemned himself to
death.
Larteguy: It was said he had cancer of the liver. They had only to wait
awhile.
Savimbi: The Russians were in a hurry. They did not want Neto to pick up
speed. Let us say that at best they hastened his death. Neto had not
been well for a long time. He knew about his condition. He was a physician
too. He was not dying, far from it. He had just made a long tour through ~
the country, or at l~ast to the places which he could visit, those which
he controlled or which the Cubans controlled for him. He had held meetings
and gatherings in each tawn. I listened to him on the radio and I can
assure you that his voice was that of a determined man, in full possession
of his faculties, not at all weakened. He was attempting to strengthen his
popularity, to show that he stood clearly apart from his burdensome pro-
tectors. And all of this before making the plunge, for he was preparing -
to go over to the Western camp. On his return, he was much fatigued.
What happened then we know from his personal physician, Eduardo Dos Santos,
an Angolan who had been forced to take a Portugues~ name and who is now a
refugee in Uganda.
After examining him, Dos Santoa advised his patient, who was himself a -
physician, to consult a French, or at least not a Rusaian, specialist. He
suggested that he ask a Parisian endocrinologist whose atudent he was when
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he did his specialized study to come to Luanda. And he asked the Central
Committee about it and obtained its agreement. There was never a question
even for a moment of hospitalizing Neto, except to make some tests on him.
Which indeed shows that his condition was not serious and that there was
_ no urgency.
Peace Is a Threat to the Russians
The Russians learned that a Frenchman was to be called in. They opposed
this, and loaded Neto onto a plane for Moscow. With Dr Eduardo Dos Santos,
since they could not very well insist that he abandon his patient. Neto's
wif-e always went everywhere with him. Had his condition been thought
aerious, she would not have left his side. But in this case she stayed in
Luanda. It was to be but a quick round trip. At the Moscow airport, the
physician and his patient were escorted to separate cars and taken to
different hotels.
Santos was left for 2 days without news. At the end of the second day they
sent for him to take him to a clinic; to the bedside of Neto, who was dead,
as a result, he was told, of an operation to which he had agreed. He was
asked to cotm tersign the death certificate.
Neto had always told him that he would never undergo surgery. Dos Santos
found it intolerable that he, the attending physician, an Angolan like his
patient, wha was after all a chief of state, had not been consulted before
such serious surgery. He refused to sign the document.
~ Later, to put an end to the constant rumors circulating in Lua.nda about the
assassination of Neto, and after Santos had told the whole story, the
~ Russians proposed that an investigation co~ission be sent to Moscow. Which ~
was never done.
, An unknawn, one Eduardo Dos Santos, who bore the same name as the physician
but was in no way related, was put at the head of the country. Raised in
Russia and married to a Russian, he had never fought for the liberation of
his country. Unknown to anyone, he only exist~d for the Russians, and thus
offered every guarantee.
Larteguy: Do you really believe that Neto was assassinated?
Savimbi: Absolutely. Neto could no longer tolerate the Russians. He was
looking for a way to get rid of them. The Russians knew that. They did
not want to commit the same error as they did with Sadat. They killed him
--and without taking too many precautions either.
This is the new Soviet tactic, perfected after they were forced out of
Europe, and utilized in Afghanistan. All of the leaders who show the
slightest inclination toward independence are assassinated. For example in
Kabul, Daoud, Taraki, and Amin. They want nothing now but "gauleiters."
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The Russians manipulated the liberation movements. They wanted to appear
in the eyes of the Africans as the defenders of freedom from the various
imperial and colonial empires. When these liberation movements had won
power thanks to Soviet help, they could only, they believed, prove their -
graCefulness by entering into their zons of influence. But these movements,
once they gained power, soon realized that the Russians, if they might have
been uaeful for achieving liberation, by pro+~iding weapona and advisers,
no longer served any purpose and were a burden now that peace was restored.
And they turned to the West, which alone could provide the economic aid -
they needed. After some failures, the Ruasians reached the point, as in
Angola, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and tomorrow Zambia, of a brutal and military
colonialiam. Each victim was made to sign an aid and solidarity pact
covering 25 years, ~ustifying intervention by the Red Army and the execution
of traitors anyone who revolts, from the pre~ident to a simple
soldier, anyone who refuses to exchange one kind of colonialism for another,
vastly more ferocious, brutal and racist. And merciless.
In Angola, the people want only to rebel against the Russians and their
mercenaries, even the partisans of the communist MPLA. If a communist
leader begins to feel solidarity with his men, to lend his ear to their
complaints, to attempt to achieve a little independence, he becomes suspect.
He is liquidated and replaced by another.
- Larteguy: What is it that you need?
Savimbi: Individual miniaturized missiles. The situation in Angola could
= be changed radically in our favor if we had only a few Milan or Sam 7-type
- missiles, ground-air missiles which are not very costly. And anti-tank
= missiles which cost still less.
We have held the brush, more than half of the country, for 4 years, against .
Cubans, Russians, East Germans, against the troops of the MPLA. We have
laughable weaponry, while they have automatic machine guns, tanks, planes,
helicopters and artillery.
They occupy all of the large cities, all the key points, but they are
trapped there. The Cubans do not risk sorties unless they have at least
company, if not battalion, strength. With the support of artillery and an
armored escort. And they never venture very far.
Tl~ey are surviving only thanks to the planes which bring their supplies of
foodstuffs and ammunition from Luanda. We are not very far from the air-
ports. It would suffice for us to be able to shoot down three or four
. planes and the pilots would be unwilling to make any further landings.
- They organize convoys with armored escorts. If we destroyed.their tanks,
who could they find to act as escorts?
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Larteguy: Who could supply you with the missiles?
Savimbi: The French or the Americans. If we have theae missiles, the
battle is won. We could isolate the Cubans in all their garrisons, and
also the troops of the MPLA. A soldier who is left 2 weeks without food
supplies, as is well known, either cannot fight or flees. I have eought
missiles everywhere, and found none.
The Cubans Are Bad Soldiers
Larteguy: The French are ignoring you for reasons of domestic policy. In
the case of the Americans it is because they have no interest in Africa.
But the Americans, following the seizure of the hostages in Tehran and the _
invasion of Afghanistan, seem to be waking up. _
Savimbi: If the Americans act on two fronts, in Afghanistan and Angola,
the Russians are likely to find themselves in a terrible bind. But the
Americans seem to want to concern themselves only with the Middle East.
We hold two-thirds of Angola, from Namibia to the gates of Luanda, the
capital, and we are adjacent to Zambia. We can go to the aid of Zaire and
Zambia, which are particularly threatened. Zambia is not moving toward
the Russians because it is afraid, it does not feel protected. The Russians
are in Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania.
Larteguy: Don't the South Africans have miniaturized missiles?
Savimbi: No, because of the arms embargo. They were not prepared for a
war of tanks and planes. They did not expect the massive arrival of the
Russians.
Larteguy: What are the Cubans worth?
Savimbi: In the field, nothing. In 1975 and 1976, they won out over us
because they had tanks and we had no anti-tank weapons, because our men -
lacked military training. Today the Cubans do not dare venture into the
brush. And also they do not leave their tanks. They are afraid of us. In
4 years, they have not succeeded in reopening the Benguela railroad. And
yet they have gone flat out in the effort.
We have questioned Cuban prisoners. Some of them believed that they were
coming to fight the South Africans, and others had no idea at all where -
they were going. They are very divided among themselves. There are black
Cubans and white ones. Fidel Castro first sent whites. But when indepen-
dence was proclaimed, all those whites made a poor impression. They seemed
to want to take the place of the Portuguese and the people gave them a
very cool welcome. Then Castro sent blacks. But when these blacks realized
that they were there to kill other blacks, they became supporters of our ,
cause. They passed information to us. On such-and-such a day, a certain
column will pass here or there. Watch out, they told us.
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When a zone is firmly held by the UNITA, the Soviet commanders prefer to
send white Cubane who lead the MPLA militia. They have no confidence in
the black Cubans any more, aince they systematically try to contact us.
The Cubane are not good soldiers. If they attack, one has only to hold out
againat them 30 minutea, and they relent and withdraw. The Portugueae,
who were not exactly supermen, were much better fightera, and at leaet they
knew the terrain. -
If we were but given a few missiles, the situation would be entirely
different in 6 months. Unfortunately for us, East Germans are arriving.
At the beginning, there were only 600. Now there are 2,500 and they have
taken over all the police, security and intelligence services. Before we
knew everything that happened within the party, the general staff, the
government. Since they have come our sources have almost dried up.
The Soviets are making a tremendous effort to establish and organize an
Angolan communist party. The MPLA has changed its name and become the
Labor Party. When they realized that the Angolans did not understand this
kind of organization very well, the Soviets took 6,000 children, by force,
between the ages of 7 and 15, and sent them to Cuba for a period of
7 years. They are taking a very long view. These 6,000 children cut off
from their roots will be the party cadres of tomorrow. They think that
the Angolans who are already adults are not re-educable, and that they make
very bad comm~ists.
Portuguese Colonialism Was Much More Tolerant
Larteguy: Why don't the Angolans take to co~unism?
Savimbi: The Angolans are all believers. They are Catholic, Protestant
or animist. The Cubana tease them, saying that their MIG aircraft explored
the sky and found no God there. And the Angolans began to ask themselves:
Why are the communists attacking our God? Because they want to impose
theirs upon us." And they ceased to trust them. They are attached to
their family structures. An Angolan is very attached to his plot of earth,
his village, his tribe, his forest. He is a great homebody. Threaten an
. Angolan 100 miles from his home, even if his family and livestock are
with him, and he is lost. He thinks that he is no longer in Angola, be-
cause he has left the land where his ancestors are buried. He is displaced.
Now the communists sent the people from the North to the South and vice
versa, syatematically, in order to break up their lifestyle and destroy
these solidly anchored tradiCions. As eoon as they can, those who have
_ been sent away from their homes escape in order to go back again, to return
to the tombs of their ancestore. In A~rica, one is nothing without an-
ceators. Some 85 percent of the Angolans live in the rural sector and
adhere to these structures.
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The residenis of Luanda know nothing of life in the bush. They were born
in the city, spent their youth there, later went to Portugal and speak no
African diai ect.
This is the case with Neto, who was born in 1922, knew no language but
Portuguese and could only communicate in that tongue. Now 80 percent of
the Angolans neither know how to read or write nor do they speak Portuguese.
When the MPLA leaders want to speak to the people, they have to do it
through an interpreter. And they needed yet another interpreter to under-
stand what the Russians were saying to them.
The Portuguese left, and immediately the Russians and the Cubans came. For
the Angolans, colonialism continued with different colonizers. They had
never had independence. They discovered that the Portuguese colonialism
_ against which they had fought for 15 years was vastly more tolerant and more
tolerable than that of the Russians, the Germans and the Cubans.
Larteguy: What do you plan to do?
Savimbi: We must act very quickly before the communist regime, which is
not tolerated and is imstable, has time to strengthen itself. And the
Russians are determined to use every means up to genocide. Look at
Afghanistan. Africa began to slide taward the Soviet sphere after Portu-
guese decolonization. Angola was occupied by the Cubans. It was a test.
The West did not react, which encouraged the Soviets to go farther. They
gained a hold ovex� the former Portuguese colonies thanks to the help of
the Portuguese Communist Party. In order to chase these new colonialists
out of Africa, it is necessary first of all to liberate Angola.
I have spoken with a number of African chiefs of state. They have told me:
"If you succeed in correcting the situation in Angola, if you can obtain
- aid from the West, we will be reassured. We will no longer fear the
Russians. We will knaw that it is possible to oust the~."
Just Give Us a Few Missiles
- We Angolans have provided proof that, very poorly equipped, we were able
for 4 years to hold at b ay 35,000 Cubans, 2,500 East Germans, 2,000 Soviets
and 80,000 Angolan communist militiamen and soldiers. There were 25,000
of us, including only 15,000 regular soldiers. Without even a single DCA
_ [anti-aircraft defense] weapon. Because the people were entirely behind
us, and continued their battle for the liberation of Angola. Give us ~ust
a few Milan or Crotal missiles, whatever. And we will chase the Russians
and the Cubans out of Angola. Zaire will be safe, and the Sudan, and all
of Africa will be liberated and will turn toward the West again. Help us _
to push the Soviets and the Cubans out of Africa, to defend ourselves
against this new colonization, more merciless than what it replaced because
it hides behind the mask of an ideology urging the pseudo-liberatian of
the black continent. Or else we are lost, and you Europeans will be lost
with us .
COPYRIGHT: 1980 par Cogedipresse SA
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ANGOLA
BRIEFS
NICARAGUAN TROOPS PRESENT--London, May E REUTER--Guerrillas fighting the
Cuban-backed government in Angola said today that 500 Nicaraguan troops
had joined the Cuban forces there. The National Front for the Liberation
of Angola (FNLA) said in a communique issued from its London office that
the Nicaraguans had gone to Angola after Luanda asked the Cuban Government
for an increase in military aid. The communique said the Angolan Government
made the request because of what it called the failure of a Cuban offensive
begun in March against FNLA controlled areas. [Text] [PA061939 London
REUTER in English 1922 GMT 6 May 80]
CSO: 4420
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
OUBANGUI FRONT'S GOUMA CITED ON CONTINUATION OF LIBERATION STRUGGLE
LD080945 Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 28 Apr-11 May 80 pp 38-40
[Interview "In February" with Abel Gouma, chairman of the Oubangui Popular
Front by Ginette Cot Cotonou: "It Is not Over"]
[Text] (Question] Mr chairman, how did your movement react to the French
_ intervention of 20 September 1979?
[Anawer] In my capacity as a WHO official I am dutybound to display "re-
straint and tact." But since this international organization atates expli-
citly in its peraonnel regulations that inernational officials "do not have
to renounce their national feelings or political or religious convictions,"
I am happy to meet with AFRIQUE-ASIE.
The extent of the struggle that the Central African people were waging--a
struggle unleashed by the Central African young people--was such that we
in the Oubangui Popular Front [FPOJ knew that Bokassa's despotic and bloody
regime was.going to fall. But, as I have already had occasion to state;
the FPO's reaction to the French interventian was one of surprise.
[Question] Yet certain people in Africa considered that this operation had
a positive aspect insofar as it resulted in the overthrow of a dictator
whom people did not know how to remove....
[Answer] To consider that the French coup d'etat in Central Africa had a
_ positive aspect would tend to lend credibility to the assumption that France -
was a stranger to the political situation which prQVailed under Bokassa.
What was this situation, in fact? The government of Bokassa the tyrant
deprived citizens of the most elementary freedoms--trade union, profession-
al, political and so forth. He built mnre and more prisons, set up more
and more administrative internment centers, ordered more and more house
arrests and maintained a plethora of scandalously highly paid vile police
infarmers when our people were greatly in need of schools and hospitals.
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His political regime was characterized by abuses of power, favouritism,
corruption of traditions, a spirit of division among the communities and
arrogance. And it was France that provided him with the means--political,
economic and military--necessary for the application of such a policy di-
rected against the Central African people and their needs but oriented
toward the satisfaction of foreign--in this case, French--interesta. We
Central Africans say rather that the French military intervention and occu-
pation in Central Africa--our country--smacks of an interventionist strat-
egy for the defense solely of French interests, which Bokassa was no longer
suited to administer.
- [QuestionJ Finally, it appears that the sole arguments of the "public safe-
ty" government and its supporters to ~claim legitimacy for President Dacko
are his election as head of state 25 January 1964 and Bokassa's armed coup
_ on New Year's Eve 1966. What is your view on this?
[Answer] The complaint which we lodged with the OAU in October 1979 and
which we also brought to the attention of the United Nations and the nonalined
movement--a complaint of "an attack on the national independence and aover-
eignty of the Central African people"--destroys Dacko's purported legitimacy
on the basis of the 25 January 3.964 election. It states: "...considering...
that the French Government, like many other governments, recognized the
Bokassa government which ousted Dacko 1 January 1966; that this recognition
signified in legal terms that the Bokassa government was the sole legitimate
representative of the Centr~l African state on both the national and inter-
national planes; that Dacko's mandate had thus become void; that, further-
more, it is undeniable that Dacko was Bokassa's political adviser, a func-
tion he performed until the latter's downfall; that llacko's acceptance of _
- this function was tantamount to the relinguiehing of his mandate by him-
aelf...."
[Question] How do you explain the fact that Bokassa was able to last so
long?
[Answer] In my 4 December 1979 appeal to the Central African people I tried
to answer this very question. The prime reason was the lack of democratic
freedoms which the ousted leaders imposed on our country for over 20 years in
order to exploit its riches all the better for their own profit and, above
all, for the profit of the foreign masters who ins~al~ed and supported them
and of whom they were never more than puppets.
I said that instead of creating the conditions which would have enabled our
people to defend themselves against fascism of any kind, these leaders
plunged back into obscurantism this people which had barely emerged from the
brutalizing period of colonialism [indigenat] and forced labor and forced
the young into perverted practices such as alcoholism. To further accentuate
this obscurantism while they were "lining their pockets" with "foreign aid,"
they banned newspapers and the provision of any information to the public.
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The reeults of this criminal policy against thP spirit are clear: 20 years
after independence a foreign country decided to overthrow the bloody head of
atate that it had hitherto supported. With the aid of its own troopa this
state organized and etaged a coup d'etat and got ite paratroopers to install
the man whom it itself had choeen. Theee paratroopers' first action wae to
- grab our national archivea in order to take them eleewhere, while occupying
the country militarily and, Tahert neceasary, lending local troops a strong
hand, as on 29 October 1979, in crushing any manifestation of discontent by
the humiliated population.
The second reason which explains what happened is th~t the elite circles which
should have dissociated themselves in one way or another from a regime which
they knew to be doomed in the long term had sunk so far as to employ terms
like "papa" and other nicknames, the better to show their submission and -
- servility with respect to leaders whose ludicrousness they were aware of.
If all this was able to happen it is becauae these elite circles allowed the _
installation of "presidents for life" who did no~ hesitate to go to the ab-
surd lengths of getting themselves crowned "emperor." You can serve your
country at the technical level but you are not bound to serve it at the
political level if you consider that its policy do~s not correspond to the
national interest. And this can be manifested in various ways. As this _
ki,nd of stand, which requirea a certain aense of responsibility, has not been
_ t~ken, there is nothing surprising in the fact that our country's policy is
decided in Paris.
[Question] In your view, were there forces in existence on the eve of
_ 20 September capable of seeing through to the end th.e ~ight started by the
young in January 1979?
(Answer] It is certainly too early to identify our organizatioa's role and
place in the development of the process which was intended to lead--and did
lead--to the downfall of the dictator Bokassa. This means that, as far as the
FPO is concerned, the fight for our people's effective liberation from the
yoke of the despot and our country's liberation from foreign domination must -
continue after Bokassa�s ouster, as berore. _
The FPO is a national liberation movement rooted among the Central African
- people's masses, But from the moment that, following the tragic events of
January and April 1979, other organizations which also calimed to advocate _
liberation (of Oubangi or Central Africa) were formed, it can be said that
_ the political chessboard or chessboard of resistance to Bokassa's dictator- ~
ship broadened. This is why, before 20 September, people referred to
Sylvestre Bangui's Oubangi Liberation Front [FLO] and Ange Pattase's Central
African Popular Liberation Movement [MLPC]. As soon as they emerged the FPO ~
- propo~ed thatwe form a united front to overthrow the tyrant, irrespective
of possible political differences between us. If tha existence--albeit
short iived--of the opportunist FLO was unable to mislead us, the MLPC
through its methods--notably certain clamorous declarations and initiatives
� --did not help us in our political quest for the formation of a joint front
of atruggle.
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[Question] Wl~at is your view of the accusations leveled against Libya at the
time of the September intervention and subsequently against the Soviet Embaeay
--accusatione which, moreover reaulted in the recent severance of relations
with theae two staCes?
[AnewerJ The FPO's ob~ective is real independence for Central Africa. This
is of great political importance for us: our people's inalienable duty to
determine its policy in a sovereign manner and thus without outside inter-
ference. As soon as there is interference in our affairs--as in the case
with France--there is of necessity an attempt on its part to tell govern-
ments in place, such as the Dacko clique, which partners to choose on the
baeis of what it regards as its private preserve. What disdain for human
rights!
[Question] What is your assessment of the new government's activity, parti-
cularly in terms of the recovery glan elaborated by Paris?
[AnswerJ Given that the installation of the Dacko government was a pure
operation of colonial reconquest to which certain elite political.~and in-
tellectual circles unfortunate~y lent themselves, it is clear that the
new president--who, moreover, is no more than a returned stranger--and his
government are engaged in activity which is disastrous for Cenb.ral Africa's
- social and political future. We are heading increasingly toward a social
catastrophe which Bokass's "imperial" adviser is preparing for us along with -
his internal and external accomplicea.
Do you know that in the weeks following his installation Dacko stated that
there was no lor.ger a state in Central Africa? In his view, Central Africa
must become a French department of which he would be the governor appointed
and protected by the mother c4untrq, with all the ensuing social, economic
and political consequences. Dacko and his gover.nment are playing with the
future of an entire peogle. This is a criminal". ac:t.
Aa for the econamic "recovery plan" for Central Africa, it has to be said
that colonialist France is consiatent. It intervenps in a foreign country _
at the request of no legal authority and installs a government there irre-
- spective of the sovereignty of the people in question. It prepares plans
dre,amed up on the banks of the Seine by people whose concerns have nothing in
common with those of the colonialized people.
This plan--the "Central-Africanized Barre Plan," to use the terminology of
one of our communiques--places special stress on the development of trading
crops (cotton, coffee, tobacco, rubber and so forth) to the detriment of
food crops.
If France wants to contribute to a real policy of economic recovery for the
country, let it demonstrate its desire to really cooperate with our peo~le
- by first ceasing to interfere in our internal affairs via measures impeding
the Central African people in their quest for a political solution to their
prob.lems, which is a precondition for any plan whatever.
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[Question] What is your view of the trials and sentences currently going on
. in Bangui?
[Answer] It must be said immediately that the real trial has not yet taken r
place. At this tim~ nobody can fool the Central African people on this
point. The Dacko government is arreating and trying stooges who, it must
be said, do bear responsibility in the intrigues and tragedy experienced by
' the country. But the real culprits--Bokassa, his personal adviser Dacko and
their principal accomplices--are still spared. Popular pressure on this
puppet governm~:~t to see that ~uati�e is done is growing. This is why, de-
spite the pitiful diversionary and intimidatory maneuvera, the Central Afri-
- can people and elitE circles, or at least some of them, are re~ecting--and
will, increasingly do so--servile collaboration with a regime which has been
imposed from outside and is un~ust to boot.
[QuestionJ What prospects can be envision?
[Answer] The sacrifices of our Central African children, like those of the
children of Soweto, continue the example of our glorious warrior ancestora
who, throughout the continent, knew how to fight to defend every inch of
Africa against the foreign invaders and their external [as published] col-
~ laborators. In Central Africa, the war of Komgo-wara against the Frenctr
colonialist and exploiter in 1928-1930 is the most recent example of the
Central African people's fighting spirit. That was a war against domination
and in~ustice and for freedom.
You will aee that I can't stop mentioning the word freedom. The liberation
, struggle of dominated and colonialized peoples stems from this concept,
whose significance in the Central African sociopolitical context is different
from that in West Europe. It is more realistic in our country. We Central
Africans want to live free lives. We want to be liberated from colonialism
--that French colonialism which, according to recent but incomplete informa-
- tion, has over 4,500 soldiers occupying our country to insure the implemer~ta- _
tionof a policy decided in Paris. Maybe the French people will understand ~
what freedom and independence mean if they rem~mber their fight against
German Nazism and the policy of the Vichy goverrunent, the collaborator .
of the German occupier.
All the vital forces of the Central African n~ation--be it on the political,
trade union, professional or youth planes--are waging a decisive struggle
for a free and independent Central A�rica.
[Question] Could you identify the FPO's place in this fight?
[Ans~aer] The FPO is a national liberation movement born in 1972. We re-
cently demanded its recognition as such by the OAU liberation committee.
It is a movement of patriots who, outraged by the abuaes of power, extra-
vagances and stupidities of Bokassa and his regime, decided to engage in
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action to save the country. Comrade Yangongo Barthelemy, a courageous man
who always directed the internal and clandestine branch of the movement at
the cost of a thousand and one difficulties, effectively summarized our ob-
jecti.ve: "General insurrection with a view to overthrowing the tyrannical
regime at large in the countrq."
Open to the most courageous, active and honest Central African citizens,
embodying the common and permanent interests of the oppressed masses, united
by iron discipline and a selfless devotion to ~ust causes and based on a
progressive ideology, the FPO proposes to establish a more just, free a,id
independent Central African society. At the moment its program consists in -
this all-embracing response. The FPO is a Central African national opposi- -
tion movement. Therefore it is political. If it has to unite with other
national forces in specific conditions to continue the struggle it is now
waging against the Central African people's exploiters, it will do so. _
The Dacko government has been installed exclusively to serve the interests of =
colonialist and imperialist France. We are struggling to preserve our people's
interests in freely agreed and mutually advantageous cooperation both with
France and with any other country which respects our political independence -
and national sovereignty. We in the FPO think that these are base~ on which
_ agreement can be reached.
[Questian] To wnaL extent can Africa in particular and the Third World in ~
general help the Central African people in their struggle?
[Answer] The charge which we mentioned above and which our movement submitted
~ last October to the OAU, the United Nations and the nonaligned movement aims
both in form and content to ask that no independent African or Third W~rld
country worthy of this name recognize the Dacko government imposed by France ~
on the Central ~lfrican people, who have been fighting dictatorship since of-
f.icial independence in 1960. Bokassa's dictatorship is continuing with Dacko.
We think that until the French troops withdraw from Central Africa and free
elections are held in which our people can choose their leaders, nonrecognitian
of the Dacko government constitutes aid [to us].
This illegal government constantly pushes its despotism further by arresting
and deporting dozens of opposition politicians. We must make every effort
to secure the immediate release of all Central Africans arrested for poli-
tical acetvities, including Patasse. In this connection we also need help
from Africa, the Third World, international organizations and all democrats.
[Question] On 21 January 1980 the Dacko government published a communique
entirely devoted to you and which seems to make threats toward you. How
do you react to that?
[Answer] Thank you for mentioning this aspect of my life which is connected
with the political struggle I have been waging for 20 years for my people`s
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real independence and dignity. This communiyue which you mention and whose
political significance was quickly noted by our movement was slanderous and
threatening. For it to stoop to such steps, the Dacko government must have
no political arguments to put to the FPO and the Central African people other
than the lies and threats with which they aim to attack me personally.
This is an old story. For Dacko and his French protectors I am a threat and
I have been ever since the death in 1959 of Barthelemy Boganda whom I was
about to succeed had it not been for France's opposition to me. As he did
before, Dacko would like to stop me expresaing my feelings on the misfortunes
of my country which has now been recolonialized.
My strength and that of the FPO lies in the support we have from our people in
the battle we are fighting for real independence and national dignity against
our oppressors and the exploiters of our natural wealth and, today, againat
the usurpers of the fruits of struggle for which the young martyrs of January
and April 1979 were massacred.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
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CHAD
HABRE REPOR'TED TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR NEW VIOLENCE
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 2 Apr 80 p 30
[Article by Mohamed Maiga: "Hue and Cry Qver a Strong Man"] _
[Text) The military truce observed between the different Chadian factions
since the agreement concluded on 11 August 1979 in Lagos (Nigeria) has re-
portedly been short-lived. Since the break of dawn on 21 March 1980,
Nd~amena, the capital, has lived by the sound of gunfire and shooting by
automatic weapons. No longer does anyone doubt the possibility of another
civil war. This time, the battle for control of Ndjamena has begun.
Trivial Incident ~
One man seems to be at the root of the renewed tension: the famous Hissein
Habre, minister of defense of the National Union Government of Chad (GUNT,
headed by Goukouni Oueddei), accused of having awakened the old Chadian
demons so recently laid to rest. All the armed forces are now converging
on the capital: reinforcements coming fram the east to back the men of the
minister of defense; from the north, elements of the People's Armed Forces
(FAP) to support the head of the government; from the southeast, soldiers
from the Common Action Front (FAC) of Acyl Ahmat (minister of foreign af-
fairs) and Mahamat Abba Said (minister of interior). Finally, since 23 March,
after being hastily equipped, the troops of Col Abdelkader Wadal Kamougue,
from the south, reached the outlying districts of the capital. Just as in
February 1979, all the protagonists are hemming in Nd~amena, but this time,
a common enemy has been identified: Hissein Habre.
A trivial incident of the kind one sees every day ignited the powder: On
the night of 20-21 March 1980, a FAC military patrol encountered elements
from Hissein Habre's Northern Armed Forces. At about 0500 hours, the first
volleys were fired and on the morning of 21 March, the FAP of the head of -
the government and those of the hot-headed minist~r of defense took up
positions at various locations in the capital. The FAP-FAN battle was
beginning, wi.th Hissein Aabre's men going so far as to attack the residence
of Goukouni Oueddei. The two truces obtained on 22 and 23 March thanks to
the mediation of Marcel Beaux, French ambassador, and Colonel Ladry, command-
ing officer of the 1,200 soldiers of the French Expeditionary Corps, were
41
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never observec? and the "line of demarcation" between the two armies, which
Rrosso modo confined the FAP to the European sector of Ndjamena and the FAN
t~ the African district, was rapidly crossed.
Devoured by Ambition -
Actually, the slight hope of stabilizing the country by the Lagos accords
- began to dwindle away as early as the end of January. According to his
colleaRues in the National Union Government, Hissein Habre is allegedly
tl~e person mainly responsible for this new outbreak of violence. Devouced
by ambition, the fiery minister of defense is evidently not contented with
_ ;~ny but the to~~ post, which is why he reportedly rejected and then sabotaged
- the complete clemilitarization of the capital decided upon by the Lagos
accc~rds and delayed the arrival of ttie inter-African neutral force.
Tn date, o~ily 550 Congolese have entered Ndjamena, where they scarcely dis- -
tinKuist~ed tliemselves in recent f ighting. The Guinean and Benin elements
~ire sti11 absent. C~ntinuing his march to power, Hissein Habre went on the
~i~r.r~ck c~n lh Marcli, when his men, scorning the 11 August agreements, drove
_ Ma~ham~t Abbn Said's men out of Bokoro, in central Chad.
Sf~~~rtly tl~ere~Cter, the FAN occupied Mongo~ in the same region, constantly
impruviag ttieir positions and undertaking a"cleanup operation with a radius
ol~ 100 kilomet:ers." Will the minister of defense resist the combined at-
t~?cks i~i;~i~ ~>i:3:~: i~: i~i�`:~:;~: i~:~: i~�':��: ~
t.':: . ~.,.~y..
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