JPRS ID: 9096 EAST EUROPE REPORT POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080033-5
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• Document Page Count: 43
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• Sequence Number: 33
• Content Type: REPORTS

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FOR OEFICIAL t~SE: OtiLI'
JPRS L/9096
- ~ 9 May 1980
~
East Euro e Re ort
p p
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITA~Y AFFAIRS
CFOl~O 3/80)
FQ~~ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9096
19 May 1980 ~
EAST EUROPE RE~ORT
POLITI CAL, SOCI Of.OGI GAL AND MI L:TARY AFFAI RS
(FOUO 3f 80)
CONTENTS ~ -
INTERNATIONAI. AFFAIRS _
USSR, Poland Update Legal Aid, Representation Treaty
(V, Gridin; CHELOVEK I ZAKON, No 3, 1980) 1
BULGARIA
Lukanov on Limited Effecta of Economic Criais on Country
_ (Editorial Report) 2
- ~
POLAND
French Research Group Speculates on Poesibilities of
- Another Riot
(Jean Granduiougin; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 18-24 Feb 80).. 3
ROMANIA
Activities of Public Proaecutors I~iscussed
(Florin Dimitriu Interview; PENTRU PATRIE, Mar 80) 6
Violations of Law on Keeping Secrets Revealed
(Nichifor Pietris; PENTRU PATRIE, Mar 80) 14
Background, Training of I~iilitia Officera
~ (Eugen Teodoru; PENTkU PATRIE, Mar 80) 21
, YUGOSLAVIA
Djilas Questions Soviet Socialiam
(COMMENTAIRE, Spring 80) 25 -
- a - [III - EE - 63 FOUO] `
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IiVTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
USSR, POLAND UPDATE LEGAL AID, REPRESENTATION TREATX
LD191543 Moscow CAELOVEK I ZAKON in Russian No 3, signed to press 7 Feb 80 -
p 33 LD
[Article by V. Gridin: "USSR-Poland: A New Stage in Legal Cooperation"] ~
_ [Text] On 23 JanLary a protocol was signed in Moscow to the treaty b~tween
the USSR and Pol~:nd on legal aid and legal relations in civil, family and
criminal cases. 'The protocol was sign~d by USSR Justice Miniater
V. I. Terebilov on behalf of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and by _
Poliah Justice Minister J. Bafia on behalf of the Polish State Council.
The existing treaty between our countries was concl_uded in 1957. The main
provisions of this treaty have kept their significance even today. However,
~ during these years our countries' legislat~on has been substantially renewed _
and the friendly relations between the USSR and Poland have been further _
developed in all spheres, including reciprocal legal aid. Considerable
experience has been amassed in the application of the treaty.
Taking this into account, the need has arisen to introduce changes and. addi-
tions to the treaty, certain aims at developing and deepening cooperation
between justice institutions in the fraternal countries.
The protocol considerably expands the rights of citizens of one state on the _
_ territory o~ the other. Thus, Polish citizens appearing in USSR courts and _
other institutians which deal with civil, family and criminal cases enjoy
the same legal rights as USSR citizens, are exempt from legal expenaes,
enjoy free legal aid, and have the right to bequeath and inherlt property
on US5R territory. USSR citizens receive the same rights on Polish territory. _
The scale of legal cooperation between justice institutions i~ also broadened. -
In particular, it is envisaged that both states will be under obligation to
prosecute their owr! citizens who commit any crime in the other treaty state.
- The protocol provisions raise legal cooperation between the USSR and Poland
to a new level.
CaPYRIGHT : Cnelovel~ i Zakon, 1980
CSO: 1800
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BULGARIA
- LUKAA'OV ON LIMITED EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC CRISIS ON COUNTRY \
[LD100845 Editorial Report LD] Paris AFRIQUE-AS.T.E in Fr~nch on 31 Marc.h- ,
13 April 1980 carries a 41-page aupplement on Bulgaria containing reprints
= of parts of various offic{al speecnes made by Bulgarian President Todor -
Zhivkov, articles on Bulgaria's history and agricultural and industrial
achievementa, exports, culture, education and sports in Balgaria, an -
_ interview with Bulgarian Vice President Peko Tako~v on Bulgaria's socialfst
development and its relations with recently liberated peoples and an -
axticle on economic development containing a few apparently exclusive
statements by deputy chairman of the Council o~ Ministers Andrey Lukanov
and the following short interview i~lcluded as an insert:
- "The Western press, includir~g the presa ~pecializing in economic questions,
systematically talks of the 'world crisis' whenever it discusses inflation,
unemployment, stagnation and other such ilZs which have become chronic,
However, they are not caused b3� any so-called 'world crisis' but by
~ capitalism's international crisis. Socialism is pertectly healthy. Does
this m~sn, we asked deputy chairman of the Council o� Ministers Andrey
Lukanov, that the socialist countriea are not af~ected by the monetary chaos
and the economic recession affecting the Western countries?
- "'We have not completely escaped the consequences of the general crisis of
capitaliam,' he replied. 'All countries which have an economy open to
- the rest of the world--as we do--and play an active parb in the inter-
- national division of labor are suffering its effects in some way or
another.' -
' "But he added: 'The real question i.s not whether we axe affected by this
crisis but whether our economic sysrem enables us to better withstand its
consequencea. Thanks to our central planning and our e.;onomic stability
on the domestic plane and to socialist cooperatian on the external plane
our national product is growing at an annual rate of 6.5-7 percent, our
induatrial production by 7-8 percent and our foreign trade by 12-14 per-
cent. In short we are affected by the crisis hut we are not suffering
a crisis ourselves.
CSO: 2200
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POLAND
FRENCH RESEARCH GROUP SPECULATES ON POSSIBILITIES OF ANOTHER RIOT
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 18-24 Feb 80 pp 34-35
[Article by Jean Grandmougin: "Self-Criticism in Warsaw"]
[Text] Breaking wieh custom, Mr Brezhnev had cieclined, "on the advice of
his doctors to attend the Eighth Congress of the Polich Co~unist Party in
Warsaw, an absence which was instantly followed by that of the first secre- _
taries of all the communist parties of Eastern Europe.
. What was the reason? One sentence of the Polish vice minister fur foreign
- affaira was being repeated last week throughout the halls of the co:~gress:
Poland "is not happy with the situation" created by the Soviet invasion of
_ Afghanistan.
Mr Gierek did not make mention of it. His lengthy a~dress, customary for
such a congress, stayed on the subject of the "development of socialist
Poland."
--We cannot deny the fuifillment of the 70's, he declared.
The fact is that, during the 10 years since he became secretary general of
the Co~amunist Party, Poland has risen to the level of the lOth industrial
country in the world. Second in the Eastern bloc after the Soviet Union, _
its economic potential could now exceed that of East Germany or Czechoslovakia.
--We have not been able to provide for everything. We have not been able
to avoid shortages, admitted Mr Gierek nevertheless.
Last fall, in the mining basin of Upper Silesia, firedamp explosions and
fires cost the lives in one month of about 100 coal miners. A former
underground miner, Mr Gierek tried to sLep up work safety measures. However,
- aince half of its revenues goes toward repaying a foreign debt which is
close to 20 billion dollars, Poland exports as much coal as it can in order _
to make some gains. Thus there is a frantic mining dctivity, witn safety
suf.fering from it. The planning director and vice prime minister, Mr Wrzaschwyk, _
acknowledged that Poland's expansion has dropped to =he level of the postwar
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r
years. T}ie Communist Party admits in its reports that "electricity cuts
are reducing many workers to forced inactivity. Production is being decreased
before our very eyes and the country is being plunged into darkness."
Absenteeism affects 8 percent of the employees.
--If absenteeism were reduced by one half, it was said on television, we `
- would get back [he work of another 100,000 people. .
Mr Cierek restated:
--We must redouble our efforts. The most extensive and severest diagnosis =
on Poland was made by a research group of about ].00 mem~ers, whose initials =
"DIP" stand for "Experience and Future." In real.ity, it is ~ club comprised
of co~nunists (including two central committee members) and Catholicx who
are sometimes opposed to the government. DIP's report, 155 pages in length,
affirms: "The country is deeply in debt; with supplies sorely lacking.
Retalia*.ory strikes are on the increase. Disorganization in planning has
reached scandalous proportions."
1
The fundamental analysis: with "ideological values" crumbling, the "govern-
ment in itself," with benefits attached to it," has in fact become the
"princ:ipal motivation." Since the peasants' sons have no greater access to -
higher education than before, "social distinctions have increased," and a
new caste has been formed, which enjoys special privileges and favors,
including hous3ng, automobiles, or cards permitting access to "special
stores" reserved for party members. The fact that statisrics have been
faked from the beginning falsii~~s all decisions. "No one knows what we
- have. There is no balance sheet," complains DIP. People ~o not have any
idea who is really producing what: it all ends up in "social inertia and
aggressiveness."
Fewer births. A lower level of Pducation and institutions that are nbliged
to teach a history opposed to the truth. "Above all, *_he crisi~ we are
experiencing is political in nature," DIP warned.
"F onomic difficuliies are increasing. The social situation is getting w~rse,"
the Episcopate stated at the 71st Plenary Conference. Deploring "a shameless
method of assigning administrative, edvcational and cultural positions," it
mourned th~ fact that the criterion for recruitment "is not competence,
energy or honesty, but affiliation to an official ideology." And "the
corruption is spr.eading."
Since Poiac~d has had popular uprisings on three occasions--in 1956, 1970 and
_ 1976----the hierarchy senses that, in th~ case of a fourth uprising, the Russian
tanks ca~ald be brought in against Warsaw, and is trying to advocate patience
among t::r. faithful. In its last report, DIP warned: "In the next two or
three years, the decline in standard of living which awaits us will extend
- beyond the people's breaking point. Sooner or later an explosion will occur
in the style with which we are familiar. However, this time it will surpass
in intensity everything th3t we have seen in post-war history."
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Since the publication of that alarming report, DIP has been notified that
from now on it is forbidden to hold plenary se3sion. Only the Communist
~ Party is to have a congress.
- [Photo caption] The Palace of Culture in Warsaw, site of the Polish '
Communist Party Congress. A cautious departure from Soviet strategy,
which provoked a very firm restatement by Mr Suslov, Kremlin ideologist.
To the right, Mr Gierek at the platform: "We have not been able to
avoid shortages."
COPYRIGiiT: 198a "Valeurs actuelles"
- 9475
CSO: 3100
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xOMANIA
ACTNITIES OF P'UBLIC PROSECIITORS DISCIISSBD -
Buchareat P~NTRU PATRIE in aomanian Ho 3, ~'~ar a0 pp 6-7, 22
~nterviex xith Florin Dimitriu~ assiatan~C chief prosecutor in the munici-
' pality of Buchareet, by Aaralamb Zinca: "In a Continual Fight To Eatabliah -
the Truth, To Avoid Anr~ Errore"; date and place not givs~
, ~ez~ Haralamb Zinca: Comrade Proaecutor, right from the start I want to
thank you for having agreed to participate in our magazine'a "Conversa-
tione." We lmor ho~r busy you are and....
Florin Dimitriu, assietant chief proaeautor in the Prosecutor's Office of
the Municipality of Bucharest: No matter horr busy xe may be, we muet aleo
find time to hav~ a chat xith the repreaentativea of the gress. I thus
_ await xith pleasure the start of the conv~>reation.
~Questio~ From the high roatrum of the 12th congreae of our party, Com-
. rade Nicolae Ce~useecu reaffirmed the retributive principle~ that are put
at the baei~ of the coffiplez activity of the bodiee oP th~ Miniatry of the
- Interior, the Prosecutor's Office and the I~Li.niatry of Justice. What influ- _
ence have theee p~inciplee had and are thay having in the activity of the
bodiee of ths Proaecutor'e Office? .
~Anexe~ We have entered not anly a nex decade but also a nex atage of de-
velopment of our eociety. One of the le~ding ob3ectivea noted in the deci- _
- sions of the congresa refere to continuelly etren~gthening the apirit of
order and diacipline in all aectora of eocial life, the certainty that eve- _
rything that is accomplished is protected With steannesa, in a permanent
climate of 3uetice and legality, a climate that alloxe the full affirmation
of the human peraonality, of the neM man, a builder of the aocialist socie-
ty. The inetructiona of Comrade Nic~alae Ceaueeacu and the documente of the .
12th congresa aek the Prosecutor's Office to con~inually irnprove its activ-
ity, etarting from ita baeic taske: the providing of reapect for the laKe~
pazblic peace, the legitimate intareate and righte of the citizens, and so- -
_ cialist and peraonal property, the cambating and preventioa of any viala-
tione of the legal norma, aad the dafsnae of the aovereignty and integrity
of the homeland. In coneequence, the influence that you mantioned hae
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ahown us the necessity of proceeding, on the basis of the accumulations ob-
taine~., to a new quality.
= rQuRatic~ For the body of the Proaecutor'e Office at xhich you work, for
_ a proseautor, What doae the achievement of a n.ex quslity in their activity
guided by laxs mean? -
~9nsxe~ 7 believe that I xould ezhibit unxarran.ted ~hallorness if I felt
that thia ciialectical procees of proceeding to a higher etage of Kork is _
easy, that everything can be resolved by meaus of e aimple, routine etate-
ment. "Ready, comrades, tomorrox We are proceeding to a nex quelity." In
reality, xe are dealing xith e complez proceee, xith prafound implicatione
also in the areas of superstructure. You cannot obtain a nex quality in
your apecific xork except by means of a courageous, revolutionary fight
rith routine, inertia, incompetence and poor apecialized training. Ulti-
mately, you can obtain a rise in ezigency in your sector of reeponsibility -
- by vanquisl~.ing, firat inside you and then outside you, a certain bureau-
- cratic mentality.
'Phe coordinatee of a new quality are, in fact, the permanent aspecte spe- -
cific to the activity of the Prosecutor's Office. Within their framework,
the prosecutor is called upon to increase his exigency, :irmnese, spirit of =
justice, and concern for man...in the dual aenAe of legality: no innocent
person is to bear the rigors of the lax, but, at the same time, no viola-
tion of the lar? is to go unpuaiehed. The prosecutor seeke at the same time
to make his contribution to punishing the violationa and infringementa of
the lar+ in a varying manner, i.n relation to the degree of social danger of -
the acts and of the person of the cuYprit. Thus, a continuel atruggle to
, establieh the truth in all casea, to eliminate any errora in holding some-
one criminally responeible, to avoid any mistakes in deprivation of liber-
ty, to etrictly reapect the constitutional righta of the citizene, auch ea
the inviolability of the pereon, of the domicile, of human freedom and dig- _
nity.
~Questio~ Comrade Prosecutor, in may capecity sa a~ournalist and writer,
I sm in continusl contact with life, with the ordinary man in the atreet,
as they say, and I have often happened to note that thie ordinary man aome-
times 2~as a unilateral image of the Prosecutor's Office. For mar~y, the
Proaecutor's Office meane the man in a robe nc~: accueea. Look, We are of- "
fered the poasibility--of couraey xithin the limite of the space that we
hava--of correcting this unilataral image. In fact, rhat ehould the citi-
zen of our timea see in the inetitution at vhich you xork? ~
~Ansxe] The citisen ehould aee in the Proaecutor's Office that institu-
tion created by our socialiet atate, xith the misaion of being vigil~nt to
provide a climate of legality, order and discipline, the body empowered to
etep in promptly to eliminate abuae, illegalitq and ~njuatice, xhich, to _
the same end, acta firmly to ca11 to account those who disregard the norme
of sociai cohabitation and the laxa of the country. It ahould be knoxn -
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that the aocialiat humaniem ~'iat characterizes the policy of our party and
etate has nathing in common with toleration of the manifestations of vio-
= lating public order and paace, harming the public and personal property of
the citi~ene and xounding the human peraonali+.y and dignity.
The citizen ahou~d appeal xith .omplete trust to the bodiea of the Pro$ecu-
tor's Office, he being convinced that the only aim of this organization
conaiste of providing his righte and freedoma, guaranteed by the conetitu-
tion and the other laws of the countrq.
~Questio~ I have heard it said that if an ordinary citizen entera into a
conflict xith an inetitution or enterpriaes and suffere harm because of ~
this conflict he does not have a poasibility of t~king the other party to
~ court, that, e~yxay, he does not have a pos~ibility of xinning auch a suit.
~hat is true and Khat is not true in euch a vierrpoint? _
~AnsWe~ The question is eztremely interesting. I too liave noted, in my
practice~ the ezistence of euch opin~.one. The~ have their origin in the -
past abusea and errora, eaposed and condemned with principledness by our
party. Beyond doubt, the lax gives and guaraatees to the citi~en the right
to take a oocialiet unit to court. It dependa only on him, on the defenee
~ and evidence that he also providea, in order to really give proof that
- would ~ustify the putting of suah a auit on the docket. _
~Question,~ Ia it thus a queation of procedure? ~
; ~Ansr+e~ Once the trial has begun, the legal conteat is open. In fact, at
fi.rat sight, the dispute betweea an individual and an inatitution aeems un-
equal, risky. This is only at first sight becauae, in factf citizen g hae
entered into a conflict not xith the inetitution but Kith persona who rep-
reeent t~e institut;on anrl rrho can be right or xrong. But it is better to
- reeort to an example. Au older rroman could often be found in the corridora
of the Proaecutor's Office~ bustling about ri~h ineshauetible anergy. Nat-
urally, ahe rranted justice to be done for her. She hsa lost a suit with a
construation enterprise. What had happened? Her huaband, a worker on one
of the sites af the enterprise, Was fatally injured in a work accident.
The investigation at the acene of the accident, done superficially, eetab-
lished the fault of the victia. The suit Wae not decided in the xidow's
favor. The xoman did. not relent. She took many ateps. Ultimately, jue-
tice wea done for her. But, in order to achieve this, it xas neceseary for
_ the only rritness to the accident to admit~ tormented by pangs of con-
acienae. that he had given false teatimony. We thua come to the key of the
~uit. The xidow of the victim had entered ~nto a conflict not with the en-
terpriae but xith a few individuals: r?ith the chief engineer of the aite,
rr~th a~her peraonnel at the Workplace. They, as it eventually resulted,
were direc~ly at fault for the accident~ for the death of a man and, ac-
cording to the lar, they had to bear the consequences. Hoxever, they pre-
ferred to buy the cons~ience of the only eyexitneae to the accident, in
order to emerge acot-free fr~m the suit. -
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~ ~uestio~ This ezample ie very intereating and instructive. When it is -
a question of a fatal accident, the conaciences of peaple illegally in-
~volved in causir.g the event begin to waver. In ~y work of documentation I -
too have encountered such situations. In such circwnetances, the most
hateful element seema to me to be the deliberately untruthful witneas who
can hold justice in check. But I?rould like to noW approach another aspect
of the problem. The prosecutor too is like everybody elae. Thue, he.too
- is subject to mistakes.
_ ~Anexe~ In our work, it ia important that theae mistakes, by means of ~
_ rigoroue and strict aupervision of the responsible factore, be diecovere'd
in time, that they not be repeated, that there thus be avoided the ahort-
cominga that are of a nature to inflict harm on the most important socisl ,
values~ euch as freedam, dignity, and integrity of socielist and peraor~l
- property. The proaecutor can avoid theee mistakea by continually raieing _
his political and profeseional training, hig degree of conaciousness, the
- atrength of his aenae of responsibility. Hesidee theae things, however~ it
must be kept in mind that the very aystem of xork Within the bodies of the
Prosecutor's Office is of a nature to discover and eliminate the errore of
~ one or another of the proaecutore before they produce effecta. I have in _
mind the fact that a large number of documents and eolutions provided by
proeecutore are eubject to oerification or confirmatian by the higher-rank-
ing bodiee, and in other ceaee, not fex in number, the eolutiona adopted
are the work of the xork staff in. one eector of activity or another.
! ~Questio~ what doee a proeecutor encouater in his complez activity of re- -
eatabliehing the truth?
- ~nexe~ You can easily i.magine that acorea of pagee rould have to be -
filled for an at all complete answer to your queation. Consequently, I
xill be ea brief ae poasible. In his effort to establiah the truth, the
- proeecutor is confronted. mainly xith the attempts, sometimes desperate, of
thoae intereated in concealing the data of the tru~Ch aad even with the die-
honesty of those brought to make their contribution to eetablishing etates
of affairs. In other caaes, tho~e who took cognizance, in one xay or an-
other, of the act committed either did not perceive the eeent correctly,
due to~ eay, a siefect in one of the five senses of man, or the memory~ in-
~ fluenced by fatigue, age and so on, loaes accuracy, especially an the de-
tails, or aubjectivity enter~ into the description of the act that o~- _
= curred, xhich ia verq dangerous for establiahing the truth. Thia is what
kind of difficulties, put in a few xords, a prosecutor encountera in hia
complez activity. I would like to give an ezample. A young xoman of 17
yeara of age fell from the 4th floor of aa apartment houae, and shortly
after ehe xae tranaported to the hoapital ahe died. Initially, it not
being knorru if ahe had jumped9 had fallen or had been thrown, the bypothe-
eee iesued Were suicide, accident or homicida. If xe had analyzed the
- facta ~ccording to the atatemente of the two witneaeea xho eaid thut, com-
ing among the firat to the epot, they had heard the victim eaying that ahe -
had been throxn from the floor, ?re xould have come to a xrong conclueion:
homic~de.
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-
The investigation~ done carefully, eatablisha~, on the one hand~ that the
txo r+itneases had come to the spot when the victim had already been put in
the a:nbulance and, con9equently, the etatements made by them xere mere fab-
ricstiona. Thus. when it is a queation of estabZishir.g the truth~ no ef-
fort on our part ia ueelees. I xant to emphasize that, along r?ith the eci-
na nf
ence of investigating the ecene of the incident by ffiea....-- ~l~lnaliet cc~,
of taking at~tementa. of diacerning~ ~f etudying thoroughly, the proeecut~-
- muet elso ezhibit a high degree of perspicacity and maturity, of thoTOUgh
knoxZedge of aocial life, perseverance and. enthuaiaem in performing the
taske that devolve upon him. In my opinion, a proeecutor cannot thin~ of
the duties that devolve upon him only in the hours of work. The work of
the prosecutor presuppoees continugl concei�n and conatant efforts, som~2-
tir~es day and night, in the fight to eatabliah the truth.
~`uestion~ In order to eatablieh the truth, undsr conditions of c~mplete
legality~ certainly you collaborate constantly with the bodiea of the Min- _
iatry of the Interior. How do you rate this collaboration?
~nswer~ For strict reapect for the lawa, creative collaboration, in a
critical and self-critical spirit, from which the justice of our society
can only gain, is promoted. When more complez casea arise, such as, for
- ezample, the cases of Rimaru, Samoilescu and othera, joint investigatory
staffe that helped to diecover the truth and to adopt suitable legal solu-
tiona have beP:i organized. It is right for it to be known that in recent
yeaxa the young personnel of the Prosecutor's Office have benefited from a
- program of eztenaive, multilateral, thorough education. Many of the past
miatakea~ condemned by the party, also had their source in the poor profes-
sional training of ~ome of those called upon to defend the lawa, the truth.
~ Today, the prosecutor studies legal medicine, criminaliatics, psychology, _
sociology, criminology and eo on. All this knowledge, in contact xith
life~ xith practice, has as a re.ault a masimum point that is characteT'.stic
of the competent prosecutor. Of course, the pasaing o~ the years also be-
- stows maturity and Wiadom. _
~Questio~ We are building socielism, we are building a new type of econo-
my~ of social relations. The party and the state are putting a big aceznt
on forming the socialist conscioueneas of the nex man. In fu].filling this
- noble ideal, our party and state have creat~d and developed an entire sys-
- tem of education and instruction. The arts too are called upon to work in
thia direction. We have also aeen recently that on the plane of the activ-
ity of the bodiea of the Ministry of the Interior, the Proaecutor's Office
and the Ministry of .TUStice there is also found a leadin~ task: populari-
zation of the laws af the country. Beyond doubt, the achievement of this
task is also part of the laborioua ~ctivity of forming the conaciousness of
the new man. Hox do you rate this matter?
~Answs~ As rre know, the documents of the 12th RCP Congress provide di-
versified forms for achieving a permanent link betxeen the bodies of ~the e
Prosecutor's Office and the citizens. Of them, I would mention especially
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the ~~eetir$a with the worker personnel in enterprises and institutions,
with the citizPna in many diatricts. In these meetings, we put an impor-
tant accent on popularizing the lawa, on knowing them, on ezplaining the ~
~ocial and political aenae of sll the regulatory acts. ~
~uestio~ I have attended several conferences on the topic of knowing the
lawa, and some of them aeemed rather boring to me.
~ rAns~e~ I too am of the opinion that, in some cases, the presentation of
the laws is done dryly, in a not very interesting foi-m. The audience, of
course, is not an informed, specialized one. Conaequently, I feel that a
greater effort shc~uld be made to find interesting and convincing forma.
f_._-r-~ L~tio~ Perha~s, therefore, the treatmente baeed on concrete casee have
a greater influen~~Q.on the audience. In nearly every enterprise there is
a�urisc r~_~
.~~111 taken together, they represent an army of intellectu-
specializing ::n the lak. HoK are they participating in the fulfillment
o: this i.mportant desire?
_ ~nswe~ Unfortunately, to a slight degree. In many cases, speakers from
outeide the enterprise or institution are depended upon. _
~uestio~ Da you feel that, in such meetings, the speakera explain the
indissoluble connection betWeen public property and the citizen's standard
of living't
~nerre~ No. It is a ehortcoming not only of thoee xho concern themselvea
with gopularizing the laws but also of the propaganda. Some people do not -
know thoroughly enough the economic mechanism that connecta the t~ro con-
cepte: public property and pereonal property, and they do not l~ow xhat
_ valuFfa they and their families lose xhen harr~ ie inflicted upon public -
property. On this matter, I feel that television, radio, the preas and
literature could make a bigger, more instructive contribution, periodically
initiating drama shoxe on the topic of "Let Us Bnow the I,awa of the Coun-
- try," starting, of courae, from concre~e cases. I believe that they would
- be highly appreciated shoxa.
~uestio~ Do you have a--let me say--specisl reason for regarding knoxl-
edge of the lawa by each citizen as an extremelq important matter?
~nawe~ I would mention~ first of all, the fact that knowledge of the law
confera personality and certainty on man. He will know, naturally, how
the lawa protect him, but, at the same time, he will also know hox they can
punieh him in the case of violating them.
~ueetio~ Ia ignorance of the laWa perhapa the basie of many infractions? _
~nexe] Unfortunately, yea~ and on mar~y planea. _
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~uestio~ Probably, negligence during the work schedule has its origin in _
this reality.
- ~Answe] This is so. However, negligence, from a viewpoint of the law,
- embraces various forma.
_ ~Questio~ Fr.om my journalia+ic ezperience I know that some young people
come easily an3 rapidly before! tl~e courts, because of negligence at the
xorkplace. Especielly in ti~e eocieliat trade netxork. I ask myaelf:
Would it not really be better for the profeasional and legal knoxledge to
be imparted to theae young people--naturally~ by a cammiseion of the enter-
prise from xhich the ju~isconsult ia not miesing--before being employed and
having values put in their hande, that is, for a rigorous brief ing to be
given to them?
~Answe~ Aa far ae I knox, something is also being done in this regard.
- But such e proposal is r+orth retaining, I believe. It can be useful.
~ueetio~ How is the capital'e life, seen from inside the Prosecutor's
Office?
~nswe~ In relation to other capitals in the world, I can s�ate that the
daily life of Aucharest is quiet, as it ought to be.
~~uestio~ The Prosecutor's Office can be compared to a aeismograph.
rAnsxe~ If you are referring to the fact that a prosecutor is present in _
- the city's life for 24 houre our of 24 houra, yes, xe are like a aeiamo-
graph, because the lax obligea us to be preaent where acts that could af- -
fect social order are produced, to maintain legality, to provide legal so-
lutions. From an analyeis of these eventa there result the aerious conse-
quences of phenomena that in everyday life aeem trivlal but, in reality,
produce, in certain situations, t:ue tragedies. I ahall give only two ea-
amples: a techni~ian, behind the ~heel of his car, was on the verge of se-
riously injuring a pe3eetrian--an old man who was violating the traffic
regulations--and avoided the accident at the last second. Upset, however,
he got out from behind the wheel and attacked the pedestri~n. The latter
fell, struck his head and died on the spot. It seema absurd, does it not?
You avoid the fatal aeoident, but you kill him in a moment of.nervous dis-
- order. Is it not a tragedy? Here is what happened to a student. He Was
returning home in the evening, from the department. A young man from the
- diatrict came up to him and asked him for a cigarette. The student an-
- awered, "I do not have one, I do not amoke." 9nd after three paces, he
- found himself with a knife stuck in hie back. Fortunately, the life of the
student could be eaved. Hoxever, ~rho will save the fate of the culprit and
hQx will it be saved? The tragedy struck t~?o families all at once.
Not ferr are the cases in Which devi$tions from work di~cipline or viola-
tione of regulatio:~s whioh aeem minor at first eight and which are eaeily
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overlooked have aerious consec~uences, resulting in significant harm in-
flicted upon the economy. A~iight ratchman, who Wae aupposed to stand in
front of an automatic fire alrtirm syatem, was playing backgawmon. When he
aWOke from the game the flames had covered the institution khoae protection _
against fire he was suppoeed to provide.
~uestio~ Criminology ahould have a big say in the activity of preventing
antisocial manifestatione. Is there a science of cri.minologq, does the
Prosecutor's Office appeal to ita generalizations?
~nsxe~ The need for a body that studies the causes of antisocial devia-
tions is being felt more and more in the field of prQVention of infrac-
tions. The bodies of the Prosecutor's Office have performed many atudies
- on criminology, but the findings made should have been thoroughly atudied
by specislists in other fielda, such as sociologista, psychologiete. educa- _
tors and psychiatrists. However~ we are still tributary to mistakea in the
past, when criminology as a science was ignored. We muat revitalize it.
Only it~ through the analysis of categoriee of infractions, can offer us,
on acientific bases, the eolutions for creating a atrong system of preven-
tion.
~Questio~ Comrade Prosecutor Florin Dimitriu, I thank you, on behalf of
the readers of the magazine PENTRU PATRIA, for the kindneas with which you
_ respo:3ed to our invitetion.
- 12105
CSO: 2700 ~
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ROr;ANIA
VIOLATIONS OF LAW ON KT~EPING SECRETS RTVEALF.D
Buchareet FENTRU PATRIE in Roma.nian No 3, Mar 80 pp 10-11
~rticle by Nichifor Pietris: "To Preeerve Secrecy Means To Apply the Pro-
visions of the Law...But Not Just...~
~e=~ l~iscueaion with the reaponsible factors in the
Ilfov County Inspsctorate of the Ministry of the Interior
xho are called upoa to xatch the manner of application ~f ~
the proviaione of the law that regulates the preservation
. of atate aecrecy brought out a pleasing fact: grePter
concern by the reaponsible factore for the activity in
thie field to be xithin the epirit and the letter of the
law.
- Ilfov County ie ezperi~encing uripreaedented development in
all fields. With a eignificant agrdrian percentage with-
in it there perform their activity a number of reeearch
institutes of the greatest importance for our agriculture .
to ezperience truly ecientific developm?ent.
In this field too, sa in so max~y othere, &omanian intel- .
ligence has maz~y prioritiee. 1 firsthand endoxment, com-
bining tha effort and the thought inepired by the elan of
triumphant communiem. An naset that muat alrays be in-
- creaeed. And protect~d. It, and the people Kho create
it. These eplendid people xho, by meane of their crea-
tive effort, by me:lns of ~heir searching reatlesaness,
make the fielda of xheat, of corn, more beautiful in the -
golden sun of the plain and of abuadance.
A Stopli ht at the Vidra ICLF ~eeearch Inetitute for Vegetable and Flaxer
Gror?ing~and a Le~~a~ Pleasant Memor9
The image that you find here, in thie institute, givea you the feeling that
order and diecipline are at home here. The room uaed for the protocol de-
partment ia suitable from all viexpointe. A place in xhich the guesta are
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.
received vrith hospitality and the proper, but also traditional, Romanian -
respect. Ghinea Marin, the head of the special department, performing du-
ties along a line of protocol~ atrikes me ea an example of civic conduct,
for xhom the proviaions of the lar are the letter of the law. The notea of
convereatione and the other documente etipulated by law are properly drawn _
up. In addition, the matter of inventiona, of research topics, is well
regulated, all in the apirit of Lax 23~71. The people know the proviaiana
of this law, and the responsible factora perform the duties that devolve
upon them along this line. The badge ie ~a~~ absent from ar~yone's chest, an
emblem resembling a decoration~ Which lends, it eeeme, eatra maturity to
each wearer. If there ie still need of eu^,r.
Al1 these thinga auggeet to the vieitor an invigorating air. This has been
achieved by meana of a collective effort, although aometimes it xas not un-
deratood that in this institute each department bears the responeibility
for applying the lax. And even if the event that was told to me refErs to -
- the past, it beara relating, since it shoxs a certain mentality that, I was
told, is encouxitered more and more rarely in the inatitutions in Ilfov
County.
Initially, there had been a discueaion. Queatione and answera about Lax
23~71, with examples and the relating of consequences of negligence or in-
difference. The meeting, interesting and inetructive, lasted far pas~ the
_ planned time. Both the lecturer--e aecurity officer--and the audience--em-
ployeee at the ICLF--had something to communicate.
- And yet chance brought an officer to the inetitute a few days later.
_ In mideummer, after the end of the xorkday.
Mere profeeaional curiosity.
"What else is new?" -
"Hardly anything," the doorkeeper eaid.
"Who is the duty officer?"
I
.
"But, the doorkeeper?"
_ "I, too." -
"Thie ia not ezactly in order," the officer said to himaelf and decided to :
make an inspection according to the regulatione.
In the inatitute, everyxhere, closed offices.
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But~ surpriae. In the office of the acientific director, everything unse-
- cured. The key in the locker, and documenta with a secret aharacter in-
aide. The acene wea also repe~ted aomerrhat in the office of the director _
of the ir.stitute. With elight diff~rencea. Here the door rae locked, but
the xindow xsa open. Without special effort, by climbing through the win- -
dox, one cou2d get inaide. In the uneecured office, documenta having an
official eecret character. -
There followed a report of contravention, which the scientific director rA-
fueed to eign, the payment, rrithin 48 hours~ of half of the minimum fine
provided by law, temporary anger and a laeting friendahip based on eateem
and underatanding.
A Poaitive Report and Txo Negative ~venta
The place of the inspection: the Agricultural and Food Induatrq Bank of
Ilfov County. The date: 4 February '1980.
The participanta: Adrian Munteanu, the duty officer, Otilia Roman~ chief
inspector, personnel department, an officer of the inspectorate. The re-
port notes that here the provisions of Lax 23~71 are followed precisely.
Among other thinga: there is a regieter for recorde of the atate aecret
documents; they are given only to those xho have the management's approval;
and thia approval has been given only to xhose rho, through officiel du-
tiea, have need of theae documents. The report also notes that the state
secret documente are kept is lockera located in a suitable room (provided
with bara on the doors and windoWe).
Containing the conclueions of the inspection made at the Ilfov Office for
Cadaster and Territorial Organization (OCOT), another report notea, howev-
er, diametrically oppoaed facts. Among other thinga: in office No 7--on
the thixd floor--there xae an open locker in xhich aecret documenta (19 in
number--our note) and documents having the character of officiel secrets
rrere left. The director xas informed by telephone. He came to the depart-
ment and in his presence these documents were noted in the report, then put
in a metal locker on xhoae door the eeal xaa affi.zed (according to the
lax---our note ) .
Naturally, the peraon guilty of violaicing Article 19~10 of I,aw 23~71--that _
is, Comrade Maria Vasile--Wae punished (she had taken these documenta from
the epecial department and had forgotten to return them).
- A mere accident? Let us eay so. But slso at thia inatitution~ in the last
2 yeara~ the archives located in the basement of the building xere flooded
tWice, xith one-fourth of the material, all having a aecret character, thue
being damaged. The uee of the basement for reasona of apace waa invoked.
But ae far back as 1978 it had been pointed out to the reAponaible fectora
of thie institution that the documents aere not etored properly and it had
been asked that the proper eteps be taken. It had been promised that they
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would be~ taken, but there rrae tardineee in putting theae measures into
practice. And the irreparable xas produced. _
An accident? No. Jt ia a question of ignorir.g the obligations provided by -
lax. The head of the institution--the lax atipu].ates--is responsible for
the proper ~reservation of the property of the institution.
Lav 23/71 apecifiea: "The heada of the eocielist organizations will pro- "
vide continusl control over the preserc~ation and handling of the documents
that conetitute state secrets, for preventing and discov.ering a~y loasea,
elterationa~ cieetruction, the~ts or tranemisaion or disclosure of them" ~
(Article 6~ Paragraph 2).
Finally, the proper atepe hsve now been takon at the Ilfov OCOT. Although
rather late, we too must say ~ith regret.
The Forgetful Pereoua Who Overahadow the Work of Others ~
_ There is a saying filled with r~isdom that xe all 3aiox: "Do not put off
till tomorror what you can do today." HoWever, unfortunately, in the con-
crete application of the provisiona of Law 23/71, sit,.ations are still
found when either these pronisiona are ignored or purel~7 and eimply they
are forgotten. Wk�lch, in eeeence, also meana "ignored." A mere shrug of
the shouldera, accompanied by the ezcuse :hat "Occupied with other tasks
purely and eimply I forgot them; I promise that the nezt time it will not
happen again~" is of a nature to shox that some of those invested xith the
right to have accees to secret documente do not honor in al]. circumetances
the ~ruat accorded them.
An inspection at the Water Management Office shored that on the respective
day the matters connected with the preciae obaervance of the legal provi-
slona on the preservation of atate secrecy were not even Well managed.
Thoee Kho ~ade the inepection noted firat the poeitive thinga. We too enu-
- merate them are they are in the report. The.re ie a regiater for ~ecords of
- the eecret documente, aompleted daily, and the register for delivery and
receipt of them. However, there aleo xere eecret documenta removed from _
the department snd not returned on time. The forgetful peraoae: Gheorghe -
Bucur, Nicolae Ciuca and Dionieie Gyorfi. Explana~ione and eYCUSes trere ~
found on the spot. But, aside from them, reality ahoxa that although the
provisiona of the law xere knox, the three had consciously ignored them.
"After all, wl~y ahauld xe bother to return them, wh~n rre will perhaps need
them again tomorrov ando..." And other such ezplanatione.
_ Conaequently, the report dota the "i." "It ie neceseary~" it eays in black
and white, "for the documenta to be returned on ~ime and for the leadership.
of the Water Management Office to control more cloeely the xay ir~ which the
proviaions of the law on the preservation of atate aecrecy are applied." _
And the nezt incident is also regarded as preservation of aecrecy. It is -
a bit out of the ordinary, but it i~ not unique. In the documentation done
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in institutes in ths range of Ilfov County I~.ave noted a few ca.sea that
bring to light, once again, the interest that some Western circles ez~ibit
in Romanian intelligence. In the account that folloxs~ I will reapect the
h~roine'e wiah to not give her name. I xill call her the engineer. But in
her etosy--I am sure--othere Will aleo be recognized.
The fellow had approached her xhen the engineer atill had 2 weeks of a
- atay abroad. She had come, 2 and ~ months ago, for specialization, and
everything had been going, until then, xithout incident. ~'he wuman xas in
the habit of te.king on foot the road from the hotel to the institute wnere
ahe w~a attending the apgcialization courae. The road did not measure more -
- than 1 and -'g 1Qn, and at the end of the program in the afternoon she was
trr:veling sloxly, tired after a c:ay of fe*reriah work. The man addreesed =
her first in French. She did not l~oW French. Then German. No, the woman
- ehook her head, surprieed by the fellox's behavior: a man sto~a you on the
~ etreet and wanta to talk with you. If not French or German, perhaps the
lady spoke English. Yes, the engineer knev ~nglish. Just fine. "Th~n it
will be a pleasure for us to talk." "A man xho wanta to approach a Woman,"
the engineer tbought, and the action amueed her. "I knox you," tY~e fellow
said, "I have aeen you passing by here." "It meane~ sir, that my pereon -
intereated you." And again ehe smiled, amuaed by the incident. She was a
_ woman past her prime, and even if this had not been eo, an affair did not .
interest her. All the more then and under such conditiAnss Since it vrae
clear to her that the fellow xho was then smiling at her xanted this. "I
have a Mercedes," he said~ "and we could spend the xeekend together. There
are places xorth aeeing. Here or nearby. In a fex houra xe can be in
Paris. Or elsewhere." The incident no longer amuae3 the xoman. 1~t dis-
gusted her. What did the indivi3~:a1 take her for and what xae he think-
ing?! That ahe burned for merrymaking xith him?! She thus said coldly,
aharply, aa eharply as she could, that ahe xanted him to not bar her xay _
_ ar~y longer because neither Paria nor anything elae intereated her. Without
paying him aqy more at'cention, ahe turned around and headed quickly toward
the hatel. However, the incident alarmed her, es~ecially as her memory -
told he~r that she had seen the fellox before. 'Where? She thought that
even aomeWhere around the hotel. Or even on t'he atreet. Had he follotted
her? Had it been a mere coincid~nce? She had almost forgotten the inci-
dent, because shs had tried to forget it. _
Trro days later, -
In the aecretariat of the inatitute, the profesaor's secretary asked har to
anter hia office. "The professor is still with a gentloman," the aecr~tary
reaponded to the er~gineer's question. In the profeasor'e office, however,
xas ~ust the fellox. And at that moment the Pngineer understood that the
- meeting on the atreet had not been an incident of a romantic type~
And her auppneition immediately proved to be true, The fellow revealed his
true ~dentity to her: policeman. 1�Wsa that so?" "And what does the gen-
tleman xant?" 1:he engineer xanted to knox.
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Routine matters. "For ezample," he aaid, "xhere she rrorks in Romania, xho
her hu9band is." He kne~+ sve~rything, he added, but he vanted to sea if she
xas sincere. "I rant to gather mati~riel on your country, because only by
knoxing some details can I propoae some actiona for you~- country's bene-
fit." "The embassy here has very good documentary material on my country.
lnd it ie the moet authoritative eaurce." "I knar+~ but I do not need of-
- ficiel thinga."
The policeman wanted eometh~ng elae. Hoxever, the Kom.an before him rae not
disposed to such a thing. The collaboration that had been proposed to her
did not interest her, although it had been done rhile iavoking the good re-
lations between the tro countriee. She refuaed ar~y talk on such a subject
and roee to leave.
"I hRVe not finished," the fellox said in a sharp voice. The axeetness had ~
= vaniahed from his voice. He underetood that he l~d no chance, and the fact
visibiy irritated hi.m.
The coin also had another sida. And this other aide Was e caacade of
threata. He ras going to aee that it ras l~ov~n in her country that ahe had
met xith a policeman. And then, goodby to the trips abroad. And so on,
_ and so on.
' rhe engineer listened. She bit her lipa. Fear had crept stealthily into
he: heart. Still, he vrae ttot a man xho would easily be put off. The indi-
vidual continued to show hia true colora. He threatened~ he apoke about -
the righta of man, about the engineer's lack of patriotism. .
"If you continue," the ~+oman roae from the armche.ir, xith a gesture that
~aid many things, "I Will inform the embaesy." She headed determinedly to- _
, xard the door and opened it.
"See you later. No, goodby forever~ eir." _
And ahe slammed the door. Hard. The rindovca ahook alightly. '
The eecretary was amazed. "What mannere," the ezpreseion oa her face
se~med to say.
After another 3 days.
"Pardon me for stopping you. Hoxever, I xant the things diecuased to re-
main betxeen ue. Or elee...." "Or elee, rhat, Mr Policeman," ras on the
engineer's lips. But ahe kept quiPt. She turned her back. With felloxa
of his type it is right to not prolong a conversation. _
- We etop here xith the account of ~he events. What follored meant true pey- _
chological xarfare. gach day, unti.l departure~ the engineer found her lug-
gage eearched.
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This is a typical case of an attempt at enticement into an activity inimi-
cal to our country. It should be borne in mind from the start that the en-
gineer was aeked not for data connected xith her rorkplace but for general
information. In other xorde. a~ apparently inoffenai~e thing. The requeat
- to aupply data about her xorkplace or her comrndee xae probably planned for -
the aecond etage. In thie onea, the attempt began rrith a 3uet aa inofisn-
sive romantic attempt. A walk, n meal at a reetaurant~ a little attention~
a piece of ~ewelry and so on are usually the beginning but not the end of
the path.
Once engaged on such a courae, you end by truly falling into the cleverly
laid trap. In our case, xith the first attempt failing, the seGOnd, more
subtle and thus more dangeroue, Wsa made. 2'hen~ from promisea to threats
or, if it had been posaible, to blaclaoail. Yet, to be aincere~ the threat
to which the engineer had been aub~ected fe also called blacl~ail. Then,
in the face of the engineer'a incorruptibility, her firmness and, if you _
wish, her patriotiam, the systematic searching of her luggage was undertsk-
_ en. That is, you xere not amenable, so just xait, rre r+ill ahoK you. A
vulgar matter, if you wish, but very effective, oftenti.mes, for bxeaking
someone's morale. Hoxever, here too, as in so many other cases, it failed.
And this is because each apecialist going abroad. for sp~cialization, a
symposium and so on, knoxe that he takea xith him property that belonga not
~ust to hi.~ but is the property of his fellox Workers, of the community ia
xhich he lives~ of the country. And eztremely Pew betray wheg it is a
question of the country.
12105
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` RUMANIA
BACgG&OUND~ TRAINING OF KILITL OFFICSxS
Bucharest P8FT8II PiTRIE in 8omanian No 3. Mar 80 pp 8-9
~Article by ~ugen Teodoru: "in Fmblem of Youth~
- ~ez] After a long time, I ceme upon the old accupntion of teacher and I
4elt flattered by this privilege that ~ae given to me. I xas offered a
talk on the eub3ect of folloxing the coordin~tea of life, from xhich the
plane aad ae iratione of a ner gene tion vere not abaent. I ras the gueat
of the UTC ~nion of Communiet Yout~ organizstioa of the echool and I .
notsd the contribution of enthueisem, of efferveecence, the end,oxmeat of
ideale Mhich eaimated theae youag psople full ot ener~q and xhich they put
forth rith their characterieti..c generoeity, in order to sbrve and eupport
concretely the comnuaiets found at tha head of all the initiativee for coa-
tinually improving the proceea of educatio~ and inatruction. I had i~efors
me as psrtnera in the diacuesion eoms young people in uni.farm, headful of
rrhat they eai3 to ms sad of xhat I impsrted to them in ray turn. They xere
curious to laioxn. ia particular, xhat impreaeion xae left in ms by the
viait to thsir achool, situa~ted ia a pictureeque mountain landaoape, xith
the life that buatled in tha big, apncioua, xhite buildiage and the acGOm-
pnr~ring courtyarde, xhere their human community rae preparing intensely for
- a career filled xith reaponeibilitiee.
The eincereo qouthful facea, reddened by that healt~y moun~ain sir~ snd the _
wide-a~caks eyee trained on me abliged me to frams my remsrke ae nicely ae
po~aible, to cover ths things ]movn to ~hem, in language that attracted
- them.
I reaorted to counterpoint. I deacribed the conditione of txo dec:adee ago,
Mhich ~sre more restricted, and the level xhere military adueation in gen- ~
eral and, it goea xitho~t ne~ring~ that in their iastitution are. :~hese re-
slitiee, put isce to face, brought out conviacing~r the obvioua pro~greee ~
achieved by their eohool aad the coordinatea that it ia fallo~ing d~~ne to -
i;he many endo~rmente that heve oceur~ed over the years and to tt~e ria~e ia
the tsaching qualitjr of the etaff of officers. The teach~?rs and inetruc-
tora, the everyd,ay ~duca~or~, the direct commanders and the leaturers~ are
moatly young aad very xell traiaed, eathueed purely aad eimply by the3r
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mission, 3ince the human material that they have on hand assures them of a
teaching success slmost xithout fai2. All that remains is for the teaching
ataff to leaven this dough, apiritually apeaking, as carefully as possible, -
so that it risea vi.sibly.
I obeerved the officers aud etudents at xork, in claae hours~ oII the firing
rangee. in the gymnaeiume, on the aporta grounds, and I immediately real- 1
ized that areat flors in abundance here~ so t:~at the effic~ency in practice
rill be ae complete as possible. To be a noncommiasioned officer in the
militi8, or in ar~y departsent specific to ~ha Ministry of the Interior,
meaae to have a mat~u
e character, a clear conscience~ patience coupled with
eelf-deniel beyond regroacb, a apirit of eacrifice, an ezsmple of conduct
before the population, xhich ratchea you and judgee every gesture, every
vord, eince you represent on the atreet, at intersectione of roads, in eir-
porta. railroad atatiAna, ports and marketplaces, in cities and commusea,
on highraya, the vivid eYpreseion of reapect for the lar and pu.blic order, _
. a sentry called upon at any hour of the day and night to come to the aid of _
the citizen xhen he asks him ta protect hia phyaical, ~oral ar.;i material
integritq, his femily and home. I believe th3t there ia no instant in the
- 24 hours that measure an earthly day that one or more nor_~ommiesioned of-
ficers are not on duty at a hotapot, near the citizens, in order to atep
- in, to maintain order in a moae or leas eomplicated csae. In all these
circumatancee, hoxever, he muat ezhibit ability, competence, aince kno~rl-
edge of the lars and of the dutiee that devolve upon ite representativee
conetitutea a baaic obligation. In addition, he muet be endored xith much
- tact, diecretion and humanit~r, ao that partielity s.nd arbitrariaees are not
established in the place of ].egali~y and objectivity. It is known that the
preeence of the man in the blue uniform and cherry-colored epaulets accure
pe~rticularly in the unbroken commotion of the street, of the events that
take place there, and the flagrant is produced v~en you do not ezpect it,
in euch circumetancea. The virtuee that the studente acquire in thia nec- -
eesary school are accumulated through effort (no one is born educated).
Consequently, tY:e "great laboratory," deployed sad ~ompartimented in ac-
cordance srith the current educetional requirementa, bears the atamp of
theae immutable laxe, xhich govern the relations betxe~n the teachers and
the atud~nta. Among the schooZ's achievements are the facilitios of the -
spc3cialzzed halls, for the social and political sciences, for the specific
disciplinee, th~ crime labs, the halls for teaching traffic regulatione, _
the firing rangee, the military training grounde, the huge hall where it
saye "l~ena eana in corpore sano" on the arch of the entrance. And many _
. otner thinge. The ma~ority of the teaching and teeting halle are equipp~d
- rith electronic apgaratus, illustrative p4stera, ma.pa, aketches and black-
boarde. Projection apparatue ia nnt abeent. Y~ ~eproduces aequences froffi _
the gxeat ~aperience of the milit~a appar~tus, the hard caaea e~lved by ~t. _
The varioua psablems an which the bod..es of penal prosecution act and �he =
meaeures that mu~t be applied., de~ending on the terrazx. end the cir~um-
atancee in xhich the ?.:�xac;yion occurred, are ia the aight of these lea-
sona, ezcellently org~::..zec. xhe feeling that you get from visiting tti.~
eroxk halls rhere t4~e etudents ~xe trained ie that acience and t~Ghnology,
-
~ � ~i
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j the modern methodology, the lateat achievementa in this field have made a
subetantial contribution to the fie~~ ~f the Pight against soci~:l evil and
ita beareza. One concluaion comes forth by itself: xhatever deceptioa~
xhatever rusee the lawbreakers may uae to hide the tr~ces of their harmful
- acte eventually prove futile. The handling of the techanology by theae spe-
cic~liats, plus the capaci~ies of diacernment and intuition that are devel-
= oped and perfected here, are of a na~uxe to form reliable peraonnel for
preven~ing ianhuman acta ar, iY th:~y hsve been produced, for eliminating tha
conseouencee of' the infraction. _
I apoke earlier of the human materiel, of the degree of perception of the
etudenta. Yell, you find that theee aepiring youag people are equipped for
, this profeaeion, have the neceeeary qualitiee.
The overwhelming ma~ority of them come from a xorking-clase environment.
They are~ gradu~tea of general achools, even of secondary achoola, to vhich '
are ad.ded the achools for vocational training, xhich have taught them a
= t~~~ie: diemakera, milling machine opera~ore, lathe operatore, conetruct{on
xorkera, mechanics and ao on. As a reeult, they 1mov the murmur of the
couatry~ the pulae of the big and emall urban or rural eettlements, the _
mentality of the people a-rcund them, becauee they come from the people,
then becoming the pro~actors of their gaine. In this fericiZe ground ia
planted the knowledge of the profaeeioa of militia noncommiasioned officer,
xhich auddenly changes the viexpoint of their intellectual and moral val-
uee. From thia angle, re underataad xl~y a part of them then go to the
ac~xool for of~icere, climbing to higher ranks. ~e e reault, I xae not de- ~ '
ceiving myseli rrhen I eeneed the open, chivalrous competition betxeen the
atudente of the achool, engandered by the qouthful ambition that is natu-
rally opening up ao many pathe to the eona of these people. ~
I xsa impreased by the ~act that the salid profea~ional training is com-
bined xith an esaential requfrement f.or a aervaat of contemporary law:
training in ha~ling motor vehiclee,, which can no longer be absent from the
stock of kaoxledge of a militi~aa aoxad~rs. I admired xith my orn eyer3 an
eatraordinary ball of automobile aimulat~are.
The ~chool feeda on its o~rn learaing, driulcs from the hop@a that flourish -
in theee hearts loving the homeland, its F~eople, the communiet creeds of
the country; the fervent need to also sharo theee feelinga in rarm worda,
caueing some of them to faahion their thoughte into verees~ to comanit them
- to the loge of this "mountain ehip," rhich ie aecending to the heighta ot'
apeclfic education.
Here~ f~r inetance, is the revelation of one af the most gifted atudenta of
~ th~ ~;noo1, diatinguiahed in the political anc, military training, in the
spf:' ~lized d~sciplinee, a aecretary of the IIT~ organization, a very good
c~=.,+ague and eager for ezcellent reaulte for his aubunit: Student 3gt
~~s , _ ~ . ~ ~.riue 6nghel.
~
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"Give a shout/ From the huge silver step~, Toward the huge golden step~.
Take your gaze from one column~ Aud direct it to another columxi~, To the
column of the infinite!"
The climate of the achool at the foot of the Carpaths.ana is also part of
- the climate of the homeland. Charactera are rorked and formed here, and
this atmoaphere of work, of molding of opirit, is du~ to a aelect ataff of
_ teachere, in the unit where officer Constantin Pavelescu works, along with _
the aecretary of the party committee, officer Remus Motorga, and young of-
ficer Ion Nastase, the secretary of the UTC committee.
The invigorating air of the locality drifted among the white pavilions.
Impeccable cleanliness prevailed everywhere. In the courtyards, the stu-
denta ehorred respect for euperiors, marching in parade formation. The rig-
ors of voluntary discipline predominated everyrrhere.
~his educational institution, rrith people taken as from an album with lac-
quered pages, added a thrilling element to my activity as a reporter. The
green silhouettes of the fir treea that border the walke of the echool and
the cresta of the mountaine that cut the skyline bear, to the young people
here, the emblem of the splendid Romanian landacape.
~ t2105
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YL~GOSLAVIA
DJILAS QUESTIONS SOVIET SOCIALISri
Paris COMMENTAIRE in .Frenc?i S~rir.g :i0 p;.~ 3-1?
(Article: "Is the Soviet Union a Socia'ist Country?"]
[Textl We are pleased to publish the article that ;`tilovan
Djilas has kindly written for us. Need we remind our readers _
who he is?
Born in 1911, he became 1 member of the Yugoslav Communist
Party in 1932. He belonged to that party's politburo from
1937 to 1954. In 1954, he was vice president of the Yugo-
slav Republic and presic~ent of ti,~ National Assembly. The
experience he accumulated during 22 years of militant life
and observation of "socialist" reality hrought him into con-
f.lict witt~ his party. He is one of the rare Communist lead-
ers who stopped being one without being expelled. He gave
up all his functions i.n 1454. -
Since then, he has been arrested twice and ha~ spent 9 years
~ in Marshal? Tito's prisons. He has been able ta leave his
country only once, in 1969, to Qive some lectures in a large
university. After that, his passport coas taken away from him.
He continues to assert and declare with absolute moral and
intellectual independence what he believes to be the truth. ,
His latest book published in France is "Une Societe Impar-
- faite":le Communisme Desintegree" (An Imperfect Society: Com-
munism Disintegrated] (Calmann-Levy, 1969). His war memoires
will soon be published by Robert Laffont.
Is the Soviet Union a socialist country'
This question should seem a senseless one today. Let us postulate that the
Soviet Union is a socialist country. Does this designation make it better
or worse? Does the Soviet reality thereby change? Naturally, certain things
remain what they are, without reference to whatever political or ideological
description it gives of itself or what others assign to it. But the answer
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r~ux ur~r'L~lAL u~~ U:uLY
is not and cannot be so simple where the Soviet Union and socialism are in-
- volved. For not only in the USSR but throughout the i~orld there exist move-
= ments which cannot help but believe that the Soviet Union is socialist--
with deficiencies, perhaps, but socialist in spite of verything. Today,
this faith is neither "scientific" nor unconditional, as it was: everything
is now known about the USSR, although not everything has been explained.
That is why it would be more precise to talk today about the necessity of
asaerting that the USSR is socialist, not by the effect of an instinctive
belief, but out of a need to defend the faith, even if one does not believe
in it. If the communist movements did not have at least this belief, they
= would lose the meaning of their existence, of their activity. Even more,
the Soviet order would lose its significance if it perceived that it is not _
socialist. How would the camps, with the millions of lives destroyed, the
insane trials and the mad ideological liquidations be justified? What would
be the rhyme or reason of the domination over Eastern Europe and the expan-
sion elsewhere in [he world? For the more violent and closed that powers
and systems are, the more firmly they stick to ideologies.
Yet all this barely touches the reason why the Soviet leaders and the Com-
munists of the entire world have to believe--partly ~ustifying the Soviet
"defects" by the "imperatives" of the "stage considered"--that the USSR is a
socialist country. For this question has already become an empty one even
wi;:hin the framework of communism itself, by the fact that there are already
a multitude of communisms. Which is the true one? Which is the most soci-
alist?
There is no valid criterion that makes it possible to measure social sys-
tmes. Discussion about the socialistor nonsocialist character of the Soviet
Union is purely dogmatic. Either can be proved, depending on what one un-
derstands by "socialism."
As for myself, I consider ~and it may be *hat this is the ultimate conse-
quence of my dogma2ism and my Utapias) that the Soviet Union is not a soc-
ialist country. And I believe this because its reality, with its unpredict-
able variations, cannot coincide with the theoretical abstraction. Why ex-
oect from the Russian Revolution and from Lenin more fidelity to the hopes
~nd the theories than from the previous revolutions and revolutionaries?
The fact that the USSR is obliged to state precisely the reasons for the
teachings that it has not fulfilled, or been able to fulfill, because of the
fatal divergence between theory and practice, is itself the proof that the
USSR is not what it claims to be. Even the Ottoman sultans were not the
_ most just, the most brilliant and the most Islamic, despite their declara-
tions. The fact that it cannot get out of the hopeless that encloses it -
forces the Soviet order to justify itself by the socialist and doctrinaire
hopes that had inspired its advent. Everything about it is perverted: one
cannot distinguish constraint from ideology, prison from liberty, or free
labor from slave labor. There is no country without police, of course but
the ideological police dominate in the USSR. Whatever one thinks of social-
ism, it is all the same so fine a thing, at least in theory, that it would
be unreasonable and inappropriate to identify it with the monstrous Soviet
reality and with the disfigured ideology that inspires it.
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Soviet Power and Russian Histor;�
Theoriesserve more often to justify faiiUre than to inspire success. Thus
in recent years--by reason of "detente"--the West has been swamped by theo-
ries according to which the Soviet Union is only a continuation of czarist
Russia. This theory appears in different variants, such as, for example,
the one that says that the Russians have alwa~~s lived under a despotic re-
gime and should be left free to live that way: so long as they leave us in
peace, we shall do the same for them!
There is in this theory, or these theories, a grain of truth and a mountain
of naivete, precisely because they have a catch in them that is contagious -
and dangProus, both for itself and for others.
Any ruling power, even a communist one, is based on realities and cannot
help but be national: even the cor.ununists, desp:te their pretension, cannot
"construct" a cult~re, a language, a past and a national character. Let us
simplify: the longer a communist power lasts, the r~ore it has national char-
acteristics, whether it likes it or not. tiaturally, L speaic of those that
go well with communism, and vice-versa, and which, in today's world, arise
in an}~ manner in all nations. _
~ One could thus con~lude ti13t the 5oviet-Russian com~:unists are more nation-
alistic than the other communists--this for the simple reason that they are
still "yo 1" today: that is, the strongest and the most industrious in the
propagation of communisn~.
Today, this national trait of the Soviet--rore particularl.~~, the Russian--
- communists is expressed in tne Leninism thac de~~eloped, in the past, as a
Russian variant of Marxist and internationalist ideolo~y and that presented
- itself as such to itself and to the ot~ers. This was the situation up to
Stalin, who codified this ideolog~� and imposed it as an international form
of the expansion of the Soviet state. Those who adopt ~iarxism-Leninism to-
day condemn themselves by their own hand to submission, at least ideological
submission, to the USSR. But ~ahere is the dividing line between what is
Russian and what is Soviet, between heritage and innovation, in the USSR?
This question divides even the most recent Soviet emigration (ti~e third
one). Some, of na!~ionalist orientation, argue that Bolshevism--or Commun-
ism--was imported from Europe, and that not unl~~ does it have nothing in
.:ommon witt~ the Russian "national spirit," but it has also distorted this
- "spirit" and desrroyed tradition. The o[hers, of rationalist and democratic
inspira:ion, consider that co~~munism is an internationnl phenomenon, and
therefore a Russian one also, and that it took root first in Russ=a because
of specifically Russian condi[ions.
Each of the two postulates of the Soviet opposition contains part of the '
truth, even though they are fundamentally irreconcilable.
But do ideas have frontiers? And where has communism not been "imported"?
Likewise, is the fault of the Russians less that they impose on others an -
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idea that is not "purely Russian"? In such case, we are turning in the vic-
ious ~:ircle of dogmatism. Modern communism is the product of the industrial
_ era. But some of its roots go deeper: they should be sought in the reli-
_ gions, especially orthodox Christianity. Or perhaps in human destiny, in
human existence, in man's aspiration to equality and fraternity through a -
perfect, Utopian ~rder. Today, of all those beautiful dreams there remains
only the policy of a military-industrial power--that is, of the privileged
dominant soci~l class of the party's bureaucracy, with nationalism and in-
ternationalist ideology at its ba~e.
No multinational state, not even the Soviet Union, can permanently and firm-
ly apply a policy of hegemony and national assimilation. Even czarist Rus-
_ sia did not do so in a systematic manner, although it was the "jail of the
peoples" and did its best to achieve denationalization (especially of the _
- Ukranians). But any multinational state, especially if it is absolutist, is
forced in time to resist the principal social strata of the most powerful
nation or to reach a settlement with the "liberties' of the minor nations.
This is happening in the Soviet Union. The Sov:et power is not imposing de-
nationaiization by force. Even Stalin's displacement of the Tatars was not
a denationalization but an uprooting on account of "treason." Likewise,
Rus~ification--even though adoption of the Russian language and recognition _
of the Russians as the dominant nation are insisted upon--is but the Soviet
power's fundamental principle on the national question. Stalin, although a
Georgian, stirred up Great-Russian chauvinism. For him, the essential thing
was power, personal power an~ that of the party's apparatus, power that con-
solidated and rooted itself all the more as it based itself on the tradition
and form of the Russian state. The Soviet leadership acts in a similar way
today. This leadership, by its composition and its methods, is presently -
"Great Ruasian." The Russian elements in the party bureavcracy are given a
helpinK hand. nut the "unity" of the Great-Russian buresucracy of the party
with the bureaucracies of the minority parties is more readily encouraged, _
just as czarist Russia encouraged the unity af the aristocrar_ies. Bolshev-
ism, Sovierism, are essentially Russian: could they triumph and maintain
themselves if they were not? But "sin" is not uniquely Russian; everyone
is steeped in it and has shared its "merits." The national discontent today
is far more an aspiration toward a way of life that corresponds to the spir-
itaul and material desires to live in a noncommunist, "non-Russian" manner
that resistance to Great-Russian exploitation and denationalization. For
all suffer from the same sickness: even the Russians desire a personal form,
more Russian, less communist. Political centralism, achieved through the
centralist and monolithic party, corresponds best to the "Russians," the
party's biggest snd most privileged nucleus. This centralism is related to
the centralism of the czarist bureaucracy, but they are not identical either
in their ideas or in their social position, and even less in their possibil-
ities. Czarist absolutism was inspired by an apathetic orthodox faith, it
was largely based on the aristocracy, and il was greatly limited by the ag-
rarian character of the country.
Today, everything is different, but the bond with "holy Russia" is not and
could not be broken. Antisemitism is professed today--under the "Len~nist"
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mask of anit-2ionism--as a symptom of the firing-up of the most fanatical
and most violent forces. It would be absurd to accuse or to justify the
Russians more than others. The peoples are victims, but not entirely inno- -
cent ones: even tt~e Russian communists are Russians, just as much as the
Chinese communists are Chinese. They have to be shown their chimeras, among
which the belief in their specificity is the most freq4ent, and in the last
analysis, the most disastrous for themselves. These illusions are most of-
ten expressed by force: one wants to impose one's models and or.~'s ideas on
the others. In the face of force, arguments, no matter what they are based
- on, are valueless if they are not founded on force. One has to be ready
- even fcr armed resistance in order to oppose the Russo-Soviet illusions, _
which are violent and armed.
Will the USSR Become a Rightist Sta[e?
The Soviet state, although grafted onto the czarist state, is quite a new
phenomenon by virtue of the ideas and the social base which it has built for
itself and maintains for its needs. Czarism was heading, somewhat irregu-
larly, toward a constitutional monarchy. From Alexatider II oa, Russia was a
rightist state, with many defects and inconsistencies, of course. The con-
stitutio�al forms were consolidated under the reign of Nicholas II after the
1905 revolution. The czarist power and system were heavy with their despot- _
ic and Asiatic heritage, but a good many people do not know, or do not want
to know, that the Bolsheviks were printing their organ, PRAVDA, 1Qgally, and
had their deputies in the Duma.
The Soviet state is not undergoing any kind of evolution. The rare changes -
are imposed by circumstances or by the ambition of the ieaders, but there is
no evolution toward a more rational and more open order. Thus, the Stalin-
ian constitution of 1936 only dissimulated, by means of purely verbal liber-
ties, an immense and monstrous Cerror. The new constitution, that of Brezh-
nev, represents a step backward by comparison with Stalin's constitution.
The expression "Soviet people" is an attempt to dissimulate the strengthen-
ing of Great-Russian hegemony. Law is subordinated to "s~citilism." The
Communist Party is instit~itionalized (in this regard, the Yugoslavia of
"self-management" has seniority) as the directing and dominant force. _
- The Soviet state is not a rightist state. Furthermore, no communist state
is. I would even dare, in this case, to make a prophecy: the USSR will nev-
er become a rightist state in the true sense of the word. Not only because
no dictatorship is or could be a rightist state in our era, but because the
Soviet Union, by its nature, by the way in which it was conceived, by the
means and ends of its existence, cannot become a zightist state, if "right-
,
ist state implies the obligatory character of la~�, obligatory for the rul-
ing power as well. In the USSR, there is no real legal and juridical power.
Power, property and ideology belong to the party. Even if the laws exist,
they serve to protect and regulate the power and the interests of this
single social force. States are forced, by international law and int~rests,
to behave toward the USSR as toward other states. But it would be naive and
dnagerous to believe that the USSR is a legal state, a state in the image of
other legal states.
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A Petrified Ideology
The Soviet ideology--Marxism-Leninism--has been sterile since Stalin. Stal-
in understood that ideological creativity prevented the installation of the
party's privileged and state-centered bureaucracy. He therefore codified
the ideology. Stalin put the final touches on the symbiosis of Leninism and
statism begun h;~ Lenin. Ideology is petrified, but it is in this way that
it has become usable as a means of puwer and expansion. The power and the
shadow of Stalin are propagating over the world despite the anathemas and -
criticisms aimed at them. This is why it would be wise and realistic to
evaluate the possibilities for utilization of ideology of ideology, rather
[han its degree of fossilization. The communist bureaucrats of the entire
world, whether they are in power or hankering after it, do not presently
need a coherent ideology, based on facts. Ideology is by its very essence
superficial and empty, even when it appears to express profound and rational
fluctuations of life. At the time of Hitler's invasion, the Soviet leaders
had the iaea of decreeing--quite so; for in the USSR, ideas are decreed!--
the orthodoz faith in the place Marxism-Leninisrn, but they never dreamed of
renouncing their monopoly of power. The gloominess and simplistic character
of the present ideology favor precisely the dominant class that is stabil- =
ized in the :5oviet Union and the movements that tie their fate to it in one -
way or another. The orthodox faith became too "old hat" and ineffective to
build a world empire, just as the other religious and philosophical techings
= are too "old ha[" for those who want to monopolize power so as to construct
a"new man" and a"perfect society."
The Center and the Periphery
Communism as a worldwide, centralized movement does not exist.
Communisms exist everywhere, different in each country by their day-to-day _
policy, but with identical "ideals": totalitarian power "in order to" build
a"new" society. Local conditions continue to force the communists to ob- _
tain support from--even to submit to--the Soviet Union. The common and in-
ternationalist ideal is presented as the major reason for these relation- _
ships, even though what is truly involved is an irresistible aspiration to
total power. No communist party so far has ever shown itself ready to re-
nounce this nonideal ideal in the interest of its people, of its homeland. _
The national communisms remind one of the rebel vassals who often remain
more feudal than the suzerain. There are variants, of course, but variants
of the initial model, of the Soviet model. Wars are possible between com-
munist states, and they are already occurring ~Vietnam-Cambodia, Somalia-
Ethiopia). But for the time being, ~~~Ca~ ~ars for domination, never for
a change of the system. The Saviet Union can count everywhere--even in the
most independent commun_st states, such as Yugoslavia, Aibania and China--on
patential "ideological" fifth columns.
World communism has disintegrated into national parties and the Soviet zone.
There is no longer a world center of the "party." Nonetheless, Moscow re-
_ mains the center in its capacity as the communist superpower. The totali-
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tari.+n forces of the world, communist and other, turn toward ~toscow and find
supc:ort there. The totalitarian aspirations in the world join in the hegem-
oniam and military expanaion of the Kremlin. These forces have [he wind at
- their bscke: Muscow is unconcerned and behaves in an ostenaibly contemptuous
manner toward the cotnmuniat renegades--Eurocommunism, national communism and
uther revisionisms. From being a world ideological center, Moscow has be-
come--this transfarnation began already under Stalin--an expansionist world
force. The occupation of Afghanistan could be a turning-point in awareness,
in getting rid of illusions about the USSR, but for Moscow this constitutes
only one link in the long chain of its expansionism.
Revolut:.ons are inherently aggreasive. They ~magine themselves to the ex-
_ pression of "eternal truths." They believe they have monopolized the happi-
ness and light of the future. Each communist revolution claims to play a
world role, or. at least, to enrich the "treasury" of Marxism-Leninism and of
socialism. But such a possibility is really 6iven onlv to the USSR, by
reason of its power and its capacity to propagate its Messianism, by arms if
need be. The Soviet party was the first to brandish this "truth," but it
could not fulfill its world and historic role without recourse to arms.
The other parties have not had this chance, this privilege, and this is why
they belong to the lower order. There can only be one "chosen" party, like
the "chosen people": the others can be independent or play a role only pra-
visionally or imaginarily. For in3ependence is above all a spiritual atti- _
tude, a creative awareness. It will be seen--for that matter it has already
been seen--that Yugoslavia, with its anti-imperialist role denuded of ori- -
ginality and semidependent, has not done anything very much within the nan- _
alined movement except to pave the way for Soviet expansionism. This is _
true also for the revolution~ry and aggress.ive actions of Vietnam in Kamou-
- chea and of Cuba in Africa. Revolution and ideology are part of politics.
And the booty is divided up according eo power and wealth.
The Soviet System Is Changing--But How? _
The Soviet system is changing. Slowly and irregularly, but it is changing.
If it were not changing, the Soviet system would have stirred up against it
those who constitute its support and enjoy the privileges that it offers
them. But what is this change?
'The Soviet system, by modifying its internal structures, does not affer any ,
propsects for the evolution of other "non-Soviet" social. forms or forces.
The Soviet system is a closed one, even for its own citizens. In it, one
cannot choose either a different government or a different society. There
are no revolts, class revolts or ideological ones. Only personal protests
can arise: the madneas of heroes. There are no classes with clearly defined
limits. This is true also for ideologies and interests. Ideological power
is the only source of privilege and the only way that le,ads to paradise.
The majozity are discontent, it may even be that the vast majority are dis-
cantent, but no one can undertake anything, for no one knows what he should
undertake. Let someone propose the introduction of stockhclder companies or
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elimination of the kolkhozes, and an immense majority of economists and
philosophers will take him for an oddball despite the fact that state owner-
ship and the kolkhozes are unproductive. All are incorporated into the sys-
tem, "absorbe~?" ~y the power and by the ideology. This gives the Soviet
system a terrifying collective force that one finds anly among conquering
tribes in the periods of their transformation into peoples.
This Soviet system cannot be changed by itself. Manifestations of opposi-
tion, "standing off" from the system, lead to a void or take one backward
_ toward the vicious circle of the syatem.
Any new social formation--and this is doubtlessly the case with the Soviet
syatem--clarifies the past eras in a new way. Many other military empires
did not change essentially: they rotted from the inside, and once their de-
- compoeition was started, were destroyed by inssrrections. This fate lies in
- wait for the USSR also. But meanwhile, a lot of water will flow in the Vol-
ga and a lot of blood will be spilled in the world.
The Soviet leaders know that they cannot catch up with the West on the tech-
nical level. But they can force the West militarily. They have alre~dy
forced the Eurapean cauntries to work for them. They cannot--for the moment
at least--succeed in this by means of direct mili.tary action. This is why
tF~ey are applying a policy of "detente" in Europe, while they approprite to
~ themselves the raw materials of the underdeveloped countries by means of al-
liances and military and revolutionary interventions.
The closing-o�f of society, economic inefficiency and Messianic ideology
lead to military expansion. The Russians and the other peoples of the Sovi-
_ et empire have to get themselves killed in order for the system to be able
to Tive. The internal forces ~f the Soviet system are such that not only do _
t:~ey not brake mili.tary expansion, tihey push it. Expansi~~n and oppression
constitute the base, the force of the system, inseparable� mutually depen-
dent, without taking into account the internal .fluctuatior.~s and the degree
- of te~hnology. The dominant class has no objective or justification other
than increasin~ its power over people.
I had called (in the TIMES of London) the Soviet intervent'r.on in Czect:~oslo-
vakia in 1968 the passible beginning of World War III, but a war that could -
still be prevented. Now, after the occupation of Afghanist,an, I wonder: is
it dlready too late? The Soviet Union could be stopped solE~ly by a superi~r
force. Such a power remains to be built. And the Soviets must also p~r-
ceive that this force is superior to them. It is very unlikely that these
two conditions will be fulfilled before the cataclysm.
The Class Struggle in the C]SSR
The classes and the class struggle were not first remarked by Marx, but it _
was he who formulated them as a fundamental law of history--of history up to _
Marx, naturally. Although I have long considered that there is no "funda-
men2al law" of hur.?an society, I often tell myself that m~ny of Marx's the~o-
' ~
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ries, including his theory of the classe~. are most applicable to the USSR.
As I have already stressed, there are not any clearly defined classes in the
Sovie~ Uni~n. Only the party's professional bureaucracy is clearly delimit-
ed, rooted and extended to all th~ cells 3nd all the for~!s. Whar is this
social atratum, thi~ "new class," to be called: a caste, a partitocracy ~Av-
torkhanov), a political class, apparatchiks? For someone, like myself, who
does not go in for the systematic, scienti~ic fashion of thinking, it is all
the same. The essential fact is that this stratum has a monopoly on society
and that it draws from this monopoly material and other privileges which it
awards to itself at is pleasure. The dominant and monopolistic ideology is
the ideology of this stratum, quite precisely as Marx said. Now according to
Marx and Lenin, this stratum, by the fact that it holds a special and privi-
leged position in production, does not work,but has means and income at its
disposal and transforms itself into a power set above society. This social
stratum's view of the world is in effect the image that it has of itself and
of its mission, a distorted, ideological perception. In brief, Marx would
have had a lot to say about the Soviet system if he were to review his own
analyses of early capitalism and the Oriental despotisms.
~ Soviet Pragmatism
- Which is more pragmatic: the United States or the USSR? Indisputably, the
USSR, despite the fact that the Soviets rule out pragmatism as a philosophy.
Although their mode of production is irrational, it is mainly their con-
quests that are senseless. Although they were doctrinaires, and precisely
because they were doctrinaires of a"particu2ar stamp," Len~n and Stalin ~
rank among the most realistic, the most pragmatic of politicians. The roots
; of t}~is pragmatism lie in Marx's thesis that interpretation of the world has
~
; no usefulness if it does not mean changing of it. According to Marx, there-
- fore, doctrine has meaning if it goes hand in hand with action, if it serves
a purpose. The Soviet leaders have neither prejudices nor ideals, neither
fail-h nor hope: power has nothing to do with all that. Every action, espec-
ially external ac;.ion, is weighed, calculated, prepared for. But they are
not exemp~ from human weaknesses and er~ors, with the reservation that for
them, errors do not constitute a~in but rather a misstep to be corrected in '
the following phase, by the aid of experience. AnC since they too are human,
_ [hey will commit an er~ormous, ~a catastrophic error: their cunqu~st wi?.1 one
day prnvoke the anger of the ~+3jority of humanity, and people will oecc~me
aware of an unsuspected evil, i.iever befQre seen, that propagates rashly
_ through the world.
= Power and Ideology
The economic weakne~ses of the Soviet system are c~ften o~rerestimated in the
- West. Some even think that the system could be so�tened by technelogical
and cultural cooperation. The Soviet economy, amr�ng other things, is really
inefficient--perhaps the most inefficient in the ~~orld--a~nd not only in ag-
riculture but in industry too. This leads Co a s~andard of living that is
incomprehensibly, unjustly low for a country that abounds in c~atural an~
- human resources. The "error" is at the heart of the system, in the monopoly
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. ~
of the party oligarchy and apparatus. But this does not mean--as is too fre- -
quently and malevolently stressed by the professional anticou~unists--that
the Soviet suthorities desire the misery and unhappiness of their people. -
Every power wants well-being, success, but those that achieve them are rare.
This is true also for the Soviet rulers. The trouble is that they identify
well-being and the good with their concepts and their interests. That is ,
- why the Soviet criteria are different: there is no misfortune or evil great
enough for the party buresucracy to beat a retreat from its "historic" aspi-
rations. This means also that it is possible to do business and reach com-
promiees with the Soviets to the extent that it does not threaten their ex-
clusive possession of power.
Westerners or Slavophiles
- Politics is life, a concentrated, rationalized life. It is for this reason
that political ideas can become vital in proportion to their degree of sym-
biosis with the spontaneous and irrational aspirations of the masses.
Now let us set aside the theories. Who has greater prospects in the Soviet
Union--the "Westerners" or the "Slavophiles": Sakharov or Solzhenitsin? I
would say right off (though my views are closer to those of Sakaarov) that
Solzhenitsin--that is, the national and orthodox current--has greater
chances, at least at the beginning of postco~unist Russia. It is incorrect
to think that Russia has been and has remained a"servile spirit" and an "en-
- slaved country." Even in Russia, the aeed of democracy had germinated. All
of Europe's 19th century was illuminated by the freethinking Russian writers
and heroes. Even the absolute Stalinist terror could not stifle the spirit
of liberty. But it is also true that in Russia, thp dominant structures of
= politics and ideology have remained autocratic. The passage from orthdoxy
and czarism to Bolshevism was not so incomprehensible and unacceptable to
the lower strata. The fa.ltering Church and the sutocracy were replaced by
ideology and the police state. Europe has not been and is not immunized _
against the totalitarian forms. No one has a patent on liberty, not even
Etirope. Liberty is always created in a new, concrete manner.
, R~saia is Ec~ropean without being so: everything depends on one's point of
view. Europe attracted the so-called enlightened strata, part of the in-
- telligentsia and of the aristocracy. The lower strata and the pawer nave
remained Russian, as at the beginning. I think that these strata would ac-
cept Solahenitsin more readily thaa Sakharov. Sakharov is too rational, too
de~mocratic, for a Russia that has not known the rationalist philosophies and
the parliamentary era. ~
" Let ua not try to figure out what such a Russia would signify for Europe.
For the moment, it suffices to hope that it would not desire to impose its
beliefs and forms on the world by force, although Soviet ideologues xre al-
ready appearing who corisider that the camps and the purges are only Messian- _
ic sacrifices for Russia and that only an all-powerful Soviet power can
create the conditions for conversion of the entire world to the orthodox
faith.
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The Distress and the Future of the Opposition
The fatal petritication and progression of the Soviet system oblige one au- -
tomatically to conclude that the apposi[ion is sterile and in distr~:ss. In
fact it is difficult to give the dissident currents any chance whatsoever,
if we take it to mean coming to power or even a change, a reform of the sys- -
tem. The system is the result of innumerable and varied programs: ita one
has any clarit} or consistency on essential questions ~the mudes of owreer-
ship, the forms of power, the national question).
N ne has trnl du dee into the reas~~ns for the opposition and the repu- ,
0 o y g P
_ diation. Furtherctore, tr.is was not possible in~the face of the monolithism
of the system: even the opponents of the 19th-centruy Russian czars had no
realiatic visions, no program. The system had begun to rot, but it did not
decompose. In itself, by the fact of i.ts decomposition, it offera no cred- 1
- ible prospects to anyone. In the aba~ence af any moveme~nt, it has heroic
men. This is Russia's "trouble": and Russia has always cherished them,
But the opponents are not uaeless or without any future, any more than they
were in the czarist epoch. Bani.shed from the system, they stir up awareness
by their protests and their sacrifices, and they wrench the most creative
- and most considerable minds away from the system. They lay bare the imper- -
fection of the system's monolithism. They show that faults and ferments of
decomposition exist. They diminiah the insolence of the powerful and unmask
the fraud of their "truths." Even more, they consti~ute a link, the only
link between their people and the frce peaple of the entire world. Life has _
not stopped, If tl.,ey do not have their chance today, they will have it to-
morrow, when they will belong to a"gloriaus past." rinzlly, they are
brothers and comrades in suffPr:ing of all those who struggle--as they are
able and in the name of any idea whatsoever--ta~ improve the human condition
and extend the liberty of man. Solidarity is their duty and tr,eir right. '
Without it, men would have mutuslly destroyed one aaother. Those who con- =
sider--because they are without influence, alc+ne and persecuted--that "this
is simply better than nothing" commit an error and a sin: they are the only
good that Russia and the peoples of the Soviet Union can offer to the world
and to their future. The visions and sacrificea of today are not always the _
future reality, but the reali~ty has always been preceded by visionary sacri-
fices. -
Heraclitus says that nature loves to hide itself. Thus the "new" Brezhrevi-
- an reality has mystified the worl~d. Yes, the world, the entire world, Sovi-
et and non-Soviet.
After Khrushchev's removal, followed by the enthronement of Brezhx?ev, there
was a let of talk about "re-Stalinization," The system inas been quite sim-
ply corrected and adapted in various ways. In an initial. phase, Khruah-
chev's franknese was pleasing to the dominant stratum, anxious to reduce the
, protagonists of the Stalinist terror to powerlessness. But Khrushchev's
ambitions went farther. He had begun to impose confuaed ideas and carried _
out some ill-considered, unverifiabYe experiments. The enthronement of a
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_ different leader was required in order to balance and rationalize the -
� eysteu~. _
K.~rustachev's overzealous "de-Stalinization" deprived the party bureaucracy ~
- of its~ "glorious" past, and by the same token, of a"radiant" future.
_
Brezhnev's personality--unimaginative, heavy, unintellectual and spiritless
_ --satiafir~d the needs of the party's dliga:chy. If it made him a dictator,
_ it is because the centralist and nondemocratic political stracture require$
its .
.
The personage and the epoch coincided. T'he pol~ical reality was dissimu-
laCed and fooled the politicians of the West. Ir was thought, it seemed,
- Ctrat so monotoneus an epoch and so drab a personage could not engender any- -
thing important. Bu~ things did happen, in an indiscernible and impalpable
manner: the bureaucracy of _~he Soviet party cons~lidated itself, and the So-
vieS-Russian state's seizures turned into worldw~de expansionism.
= Evaluation of Brezhnev's reign, as of any historical phenomenon, dQpends on ~
one's point af eiew; and from the point of view af the pa~ty bureaucracy and
Soviet imperialism, this reign, still uncomplete:i, has succeeded, even if it _
could have been crowned with more successes.
Peoples anci their eminent protagonists manifeat, depending on the conditions
- and the necessities, sometimes one quality and sometimes another. The Rus-
sian people are obsessed--always, ceaselessly--~y their missionary labor.
This characteristic ic valid for others too and should not be considered -
necessarily negative. But the Russians are the most coherent in this re- =
; gard, the most "consistent," rerhaps because of their irresistible bpnt for
final, ideal, eternal solutions. Russia is not separated from the West
solely by its system and political aspirations but also by something deeper:
- by its way of thinking, its manner of reasoning. 1'he Russians--not all of -
them, to be sure, but those who occupy the sumnit of the hierarchy--start
from absolute, a-priori truths, while the "Ylestern" way of thinking only
tneda toward (line missing] entire, especially when they want to be benefic-
= iaries. Russian literature, which is incomparable in the depth to which it
= probes p~ycho:ogies ana fatality, is entirely, almost enti~ely, prophetic.
= The Russians continue to believe in the prophets, and follow them. The
West, on the contrary, has understood at times that the prophets are a nec- -
essary additive for enrichment of understanding, but that followin~ their
teaching leads t~ misfortune and defeat. No one has fabricated the destiny
' of the Russians. When it ~rrives, they will perceivQ clearly tt?at, like~the
~ermans, every people has :~ts own Measianism and that for this reason, it
- will not want to adopt their "truths" and their "assistance." Messianism,
- though not a malady sp~cific to the Russians, is a typically Russian malady. -
The obverae of Lhis ~e~alady---its remedy--is found in the West, in pragmatism.
= Messiariism is only at first sight more apiritual, less vulgar, than pragma-
- t~am. We now have the opgortunity to perceive the madneas of the former and
the futility cf the 1aCter. -
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~ The Soviet Union and Western Europe
I do not believe that r.he Soviet Union i.ntends to occupy Western Europe by
force, but I am convinced that it would like to enslave it. Occupation
wir.hout war wou2d be the most de~irable for it, the most ideal of forms.
The Soviet power knows perfectly well that it cannot rival the West: such
rivalry has never existed, each has followed its own evolution. The Soviet -
soul is force, power. Why not subjugate Western Europe, since for the time
being it is not possible to subjugate the United States and force it to pro-
duce for Russia? The expansion in Africa, Asia and elsewhere is only a gen- _
eral repetition of the subjugation of Europe. Raw materials are, natural.ly,
welcome to the Soviets, alt~hough they are not short of them for the moment.
- But it would be foolish to believe that the Soviets will set themselves to
aiding Africa or Indochina, since they themselves have no shortage of
dearths and penuries of African or Indochinese type.
The Communists and the Soviet Union
_ It is the Chinese who best judge the Soviet Union, its intentions and plans.
However, the Chinese do not have a bigger or smaller brain, still less a
different brain. The Chinese--in terms of system and ideology--come from
the same stock as the Soviets, they have the same social "ideal," but at the
same time, they are separated from the Soviets and in conflict with them.
They have had intimate contact with them. The Yugoslav estimations are not
very sure, even though the Yugoslav political system is close to ttie Soviet
one. Weak, isolated, bewildered and carried away by thz Utopia of non-
aZinement, the Yugoslavs hope that SoviPc intentions will not one day be so
mischievous and so perverse. In this specific case, it would be better.not -
to nourish hopes, not to have illusions.
Communism and the Soviet Union are linked historically, spiritually, funda-
mentally. However, it would be wise to separate them in political practice.
Communists revolt against the Soviet Union, although communism has been and
still is the instrument most heavily used for the expansion of the Russo-
Soviet state. Communist states are ready to resist Soviet aggression.
Uprisings, wars and revolutions are part of humanity's current history.
What can the peoples, the social.groups, do except take up arms when the
dominant power, by its irrationalism and its violence, impedes their evolu--
tion toward greater liberty?
The Myth of Revolution ~ ~
Idealizing revolution--revolution as fate, revolution as last enchantment,
_ as midwife of history--is the fruit of European thought, a relatively new
creation. The cold, rational, "scientific" analysis of the French encyclo-
pedists first of all, and later of the Marxists and the anarchists, created
- this myth and the mystique of revolution. This mystical discovery is large- -
= ly at the origin of the gloxification and idealization of the French Revol.u-
tion and especially of the Russian Revolution. This belief implies not only
the necessity of revolution, but also the most ardent eschatology. It leads
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to the most disastrous illusion of tr~e industrial era and of modern thought.
In eEfect, revolution and its consequences are not separated from the revo-
lutionary mystique. In plain language: the profound vulgarity of power and
of the new oppressors is justified, even identified, with mystique ani Utop-
ia. At the same time, mystique and Utopia are presented and accepted as the
proofs of the triumph of revolution. -
Russia received this mystique from Europe an~l, "Russifying" it, imposed it
on the entire world. But Europe did not thereby rid itself of its spiritual -
daughter. There are many admirers--especially in the Latin countries, where
the "celestial kingdom" and revolutionary rhetoric are appreciated--of the
"achievements" of the Soviet comrades and of the "historic importance" of
the Russian Revolution. Even worse, *_hey treat the Russian Revolution as
the "historic" sequel of the French Revolution. There is as much truth in
this ideological scheme as in identification of the French with the Rus-
sians: that is all there is ~o i.t. Thus, Europe is disarming spiritually in
the face of "Russia"--in other words, in the face of Soviet expansion.
The Soviet Union has adopted the myth of revolution as its own. Even more,
it make~ use of this myth to dupe the West, especially the European commun-
ists. Reproacl~ing "certain parties" for their incomprehension (this holds
true for the French CP also), NOVOE VREMIA ~Ne~r Times) e~cplains the inva-
sion of Afghanistan this way: "Does the internationalist solidarity of revo-
lutionaries imply only moral and diplomatic support, wishes for success, or
~ does it also involve...offering material aid, including military aid?
_ In fact, when a system of socialist states exists, to dispute the right to
such assistance would be quite simply incoherent. Renouncing the possibili- .
_ ties at the disposal of the socialist countries would in fact mean avoiding
- doing one's internationalist duty and making the world return to the era
when imperialism could at its will stifle all the revolutionary movements
- with impunity" (according to POLITIKA of 17 January 1980).
Aristotle quotes this verse from an unknown poet: "Truth is one, deceit is
x~ltiple." Conquest and enslavement have multiple motivations, but there
can only be one struggle against them. -
The Soviet Union, the West, and War
'I'he West fears war more than the Soviet Union does. Perhaps because the
Western societies of today ~this "today" is important, because it has not
been thus always snd everywhere) can exist without war. This fear is accom-
panied in the West by a profound fear of atomic war. There is something fa-
talistic in thzs fear, but even more, it is demoralizing. Obviously, this
panic does not come from awareness of an atomic cataclysm. People think the
- same way in the East, in the Soviet Union, this fact is well-known, although
one does not fir.d antiatomic demonstrations or "revolts of conscience" by -
- atomic researchers there. Therefore, something deeper, more existential,
must be involved. Living in the Esst, in Yugoslavia, I have not succeeded
in deciphering this enigma, even in part. I would only say that there is
- less fear of atomic war in the East because people are convinced thaC the
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- Soviet government would reply with the same weapons and perhaps with even
more terrifying weapo~is if the West were to use the atomic weapon. Isn't
~ this the reason for the Western panic? In the West, one is not convinced of
tlie cynicism of th~ governments in power.
I recall that when the Americans dropped the first atom bombs on Japan,
Kardelj prophesied that the atomic weapon could rule out war in general.
Tito showed himself more prudent, more imprecise in his conclusions. I did
not believe that atomic weaponry would succeed in eliminating war as a means
of policy, because I started from the Marxist dogma on the fundamental in-
compatibility of capitalism and socialism. I continue to think the same
thing, though _ do not believe very much in an atomic war and though I have
abaondoned the doctrine of irreconcilable antagonisms. Today I simply con-
_ sider that it is not possible to invent a theory, a system, that satisfies
_ everyone: there will always be some "special" people or "geniuses," social
groups, ideologies, beliefs, entire peoples discontent with the situation
and the existing relationships. War is at least as human as peace. As for
fear of war, and even of atomic war: those who cross the frontier of death
survive and triumph.
Milovan Djilas
Belgrade, December 1979-January 1980
(t~anslated from the Serbian)
C(~PYRIGHT: 1980, S.A. Commentaires
11267
CSO: 310~ ~D . '
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