JPRS ID: 9077 WEST EUROPE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 14
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= CIA-R~P82-00850R000200080094-6

i ) ' { ~ ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200084414-6
~ . . . . . . . . . ~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/9077
7 May 1950
- \l1/est E u ro e R e o rt
_ p p _
~ CFO~C~ 23/80~
. -
- F~IS FOREICN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
NOTE
JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
- sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
- other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets _
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [ExcerptJ in the first line of each item, or followirig the
- last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
~ Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed ir, parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes with in the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as ~
given by source.
- The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
For further information on report content
call (703) 351-2811 or 351-2501 (Greece,
Cyprus, 1'urlcey) .
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/9077
7 May 1980
WEST EUROP~ REPO RT -
(FOUO 23/80~
CONTENTS
THEATER :~TUCLEAR FORCES ~
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
FRG, Brandt Criticized for Nonacceptance of Cold War Policy
(Editorial, Jean Daniel; LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR, .
24-30 Mar 80) 1
COUNTRY SECTION
FRANCE
Presidential Ambitions of Socialist Party's Michel Rocard
(LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR, 25 Feb-2 Mar 80) 4
Style, Public Image; Editorial, Jean Daniel -
Political Strategy, 'Non-Candidacy'
Rocard Support Threatens Mitterrand's Presidential Ambitions
(Thierry Pfister; LE NOUVEL OBSERVAmEUR, 3-9 Mar 80)... 12
PCF's Marchais Believes 'Russians Will Win'
(Michel Gonod; PARIS MATCH, 7 Mar 80) 15
Alexandre Sanguinetti on Corsican Nationalist Movement
(A. Sanguinetti Interview; LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR, -
24-30 Mar 80) 20
Aircraft Defense Techniques, Methods Described
(Francois d'Orcival; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 24 Mar 80)..... 23
l
Briefs
'Real' Results of Gulf Trip 2~
Budget Cuts 2~
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CONTENTS (Continued)
SPAIN
- Briefs
PNV Contacts With ETA 28
ETA To Control Commandos 28
nxtremadura Nationalist Party 28
- ETA in Algeria 28
~
-b-
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
FUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
FRG, BRANDT CRITICIZED FOR NONACCEPTANCE OF COLD WAR POLICY
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 24-30 Mar 80 p 38
[Editorial by Jean Daniel: "Nonacceptance of Cold War"]
[Text] Are we in a state of cold war? In Bonn, the supersensitive barometer
of disturbing portents, the most varied personalities whom I encounter
there reply: No, not yet. The threat exists. It is in the minds of inen.
However, former chancellor Willy Brandt, president of the SPD, told me that
the pipeline which carries natural gas from the Soviet Union to the Federal
Republic of G~rmany has not been turned off; that hundreds and hundreds of _
thousands of West German citizens visit their brothers i~n the East every week; -
that coal from Poland is still coming into the country in grea*_ quantitq; and
that 30 percent of the FRG's exports continue to be directed toward countries
of the East.
~ Willy Brandt is in a good position to evaluate th~ threats which weigh upon .
the present equilibrium. It is his country which uast profits from detente:
detente alone permits the FRG *_o assert a policy independent from the United
- States. Aa mayor of Berlin for 10 years, he was able to form a number of ~
clear-cut ideas about Soviet behavior. It was he, finally, who instituted
Ostpolitik, the policy of interchange with the East, thanks to which he was
to become the "friend" of Leonid Brezhnev. Now Willy Brandt thinks that the
- two superpowers, the one in Asia with its colonial logic, the other with its
election logic, are incapable of resuming a real dialog. 911 the achievements
of Ostpoll.tik and detente could well be the price.
What, then, is there to d~? Wait and count the blows? Willy Brandt was given
assurance by Carter that "nothing would be done to complicate the lives _
of Europeans," i.e., first of all the Germans, the principal target of a
return to the Cold War. He saw high American officials "as dry and thirsty _
as sponges waiting for water": they are ready to listen to advice of any
kind. However, they are obsessed by the Kabul coup and refuse to place the
Soviet intervention within a more general framework. Brandt said: "Firumess
is required, doubtlessl,y and abso~utely. However, such firmneas is irrespon- _
sible if it is not accompanied by a wii.lingness to negotiate whenever the
- occasion presents itself."
1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
According to him, the occasion presented itself last October~ well before
the invasion ot Afghanistan, when Brezhnev delivered his ma~or addresa in
Berlin, proposing to withdraw a certain number of Soviet forces. It was said
that this was a symbolic withdrawal: that was true. And afterward? The
meaning of the symbol continued to be that the Soviets had a desire or need
to negotiate. Nothing would have been lost, in any event, had they been put
to the test. According to Brandt, on that occasion, NATO lost an opportunity
to know better the intentions of the adversary.
In disagreement with the apostle of Ostpolitik, some officials responsible for
German foreign policy feel that it is precisely the fact of too greatly
emphasizing the economic and political profit which the FRG derives from
detente which leads the Soviets to underestimate the Gernans' need for
security. According to them, the story of the "Pershing" missiles is the most
- obvir~us illustratZon. That speech by Brezhnev in Berlin which was brought up
- by Brandt was in fact intended to dissuade the Europeans from agreeing to the
installation on their soil of American medium-range missiles aimed at the
Soviet Union. However, the Kremlin leaders knew perfectly well the position
of Bonn. On four occasions, publicly, with a certain degree of solemnity,
_ Chancellor Helmut Schmidt had informed them that the deployment of Soviet
missiles, the notorious SS 20, aimed at the FRG was a measure which was not
very compatible with the climate and intensity of German-Soviet exchanges,.
_ Helmut Schmidt also told Moscow that it would be difficult for him to oppose _
the American proposal to install Pershing missiles destined to offset the
SS 20's. Leonid Brezhnev seemed not to understand this. He left it to his
ambassadors to reply first that the SS 20's did not exist, then that they
were not operational, ne.ct that they were not aimed at Germany and, finally,
that their deployment had only been decided upon after the news that the
Americans were themselves manufacturing medium-range missiles. In the
meantime, despite his age and infirmities, Brezhnev, in his charm offensive,
personally put all of his energies without reserve into increasing his
amiabilities, with Willy Brandt, of course, but also with the very reactionary
Franz Josef Strauss himself. Never had the Soviets shown themselves to be
so open, receptive, liberal in their relations with Europe. They allowed
veritable economic and cultural axes to be established between Warsaw and
Paris, Budapest and Rome, Berlin and Bonn...
This was the situation which prevai:_i until that day in December T979 in _
Brussels at the time of the NATO meeting when a positive vote was taken on
- acceptance of the Pershing missiles. Stupefaction for the Soviets: it was
Germans themselves who overcame the reticence of the Dutch and Danes. It
was thanks to the Germans that installation of American missiles was approved
by a large majority. The Soviet reaction was immediate, and the expreasion
- of that reaction was revealing: the "German betrayal" was denounced. One ~
does not betray unless one has made a promise. Who indeed had been in a
position to promise anything? The secret services, perhaps...
In spite of all that, which he readily acknowledges, Willy Brandt seems to
think both that negotiations on the SS 20's and Pershings should be sought
2 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
and that they are possible. The Europeans could explore tt:e possibilities of ~
such negotiations on condition that European affairs not be mixed together
with Afghanistan. The economic boycott, for the Germans, is a mistake which
could be turned against the Westerners. The Olympic Games is another mistake;
"however, there is no question of the German flag flying over the stadiums of
Moacow if th~^_ American flag is not there." The Eu:opeans suffered a setback
by propoaing guarantees of the neutrality of Afghanistan. That is because -
they did not understand the reasons for the Soviet intervention. Since Willy
Brandt is not in the government, he can be outspoken.
Should Europe, therefore, forego Atlantic ~olidarity? Obviously not, B~andt
says impatiently. The proof that there is no thought of this is the Brussels'
meetir?g and the presence on German soil of Amexicaii scldiers. However, it
is a question of knowing what one wants, if one r.eally wishes to recapture
the apirit of detente, appropriate methods must be used. The Germans are not
sure that the Americans really want to die ior Berlin and, before themselves
- dying for Kabul, they wish to know the real intentions of the Soviet Uiiion.
They do not believe in the premise of expansionism in all directions on the
part of the F~remlin leaders.
. `
Last week, we said that the Soviet Union adamantly refused any kind of
- compromise on the subject of its presence in Afghanistan, at least as long
as its armies, like those o� France previously in Algeria, are occupied
with armed "pacification" of the population, as well as by promises of reforms. '
Willy Brandt feels that if there is one country in a position, if not to
negotiate, at leaet to talk with the Soviet Union on Afghanistan, it is of
- necessity Indira Gandhi's India: it certainl.y ia not a European nation.
The r.onfirmation of these observations, more~ver, has been established almost
- everywhere--except in France, and particularly {n the audio-visual press
where the orientation of foreign policy seems to be effectively guid~d by
the government. Probably it is a question of demonstrating that the
initiatives--and discretion--of the Elysee are not in vain and that Paris
has some influence in I~oscow. Not inconsiderable assistance has been supplied
at this ~uncture by the communists, who are only too happy to put a reassuring
face on the Kremlin. Once again, it is the alliance of the gavernment and
the CP which is imposing the "line." It is once again this "domestic Yalta,"
which has been denounced with rare timeliness by Francois Mitterrand.
- COPYRIGHT: LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR, Paris, 1980
- 8143
CSO: 3100 -
- 3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COUN'fRY SECTION FRANCE
PR~:SIDENTIAL AMBITIONS OF SOCIALIST PARTY'S MICHEL ROCARD
~ Style, Public Image
_ Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 25 Feb-2 Mar 80 p 24 _
[Editorial by Jean Daniel] '
[Text] He is less feverish, less of a technocrat, less of a boy scout,
less of an imitator of Louis Jouvet. It is as if the immobility forced -
upon him by his injury had given him detachment and weight. He is no
longer the eternal extreme leftist student nor the perpetual candidate
for the post of undersecretary of state for the budget. It '_s as if
his disciplined silence, counterbalanced by increased popularity, had
c~used him to lose his greedy and voluble greed for words. He is ready '
for anything, save parracide. It is as if the immensity of the tasks
in the ocean of difficulties suddenly m~~de him fear solitar~ responsi-
bility. Such is this Michel Rocard, a possible contender for the -
candidacy, about whom everyone in Europe, however close to the dark
corridors of the ;~ocialist Party he may be, wonders what ~~iould differen-
_ tiate him from a Francois Mitterrand.
_ Every career requires a strategy. Even those which have supposedly
been preceded by an irresisttble calling. Baudelaire, ~3t the time he
decided he was a poet, said to himself quite plainly: I have genius .
but I must find the space left by Victor Hugo where I can flower. He
found it and Hugo saluted him. Similarly, Rocard is seeking a space
left empty b~ Francois Mitterrand. Because of his impatience, he had
not found it in the Soci~list Party. Had he played the game of the '
Eaithful lieutenantS he would probably have had only to take up the
legacy, or accept the donation inter vivos. But he found it, and with
what brilliance, in the nation, where one of his qualities worked
wonders--the total adaptation of the idea to the language, the
~ impression he gives of thinking exactly what he is saying at the moment
he is saying it. A mixture of rough spontaneity and precise competence. -
It is this freshness, in brief, which has made of this politician who
is n~~longer so young, a"different" man of politics. It is doubtless
a gift, unjust like all gifts, from which he benefits and 'which is
4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
- FOR OFFICTAL USE ONLY
such thar even when he claims to be "an apparatus man," one thinks
more of the militant than the leader.
But any strategy presumes a relentless analysis of the situation.
What is this situation for Rocard, as f.or any other candidate who might
seek to oppose Giscard d'Estaing? The Frencl~ are the prey oC three
blsic obsessions: economic deterioration augering a substantial drop
- in pur.chzsing power and an increase in both unemployment and inflation;
anguish and uncertainty as to the likelihood of. a world conflict; and
the conviction that tne leaders of the leftist parties are destroying
' each other, giving joy to the communists and bringing sadness to others.
In fact, the third element in this analysis, laughable to Frenchmen as
a whole, is certainly.the most important for this political society
which encompasses not only the category of apparatus ieaders but the -
militants and what is termed the mobile faction. It was known, in
fact, that Georges Marchais had no fonder dream than to guarantee the
reelection of Valery Giscard D'Estaing. But no one would have
suspected he would undertake it so far in advance or that, in trying
to achzeve his dream, he would evidence such untimely zeal. Henceforth
it is known that the Socialist Party is not only the Leading enemy:
~ for the PCF [French Communist Party] it is the only enemy. "We thought
we had joined a good soccer team and we find ourselves in the boxing
ring," Francois Mitterrand said cheerfully in the forceful interview
he just gave to a quite unsocialist daily newspaper. It would be hard
to put it better. Except that in the ring, the boxer who responds to
blows by appeals for reconciliation risks the imminent loss of his
title. The situation is clear, however, and two men, Edmond Maire and
Edgard Pisani, have said out loud what everyone everywhere ?s indeed
almost forced to think: Any socialist candidate must prepare to deal ~
- with the objective and powerful altiance of Giscard d'Esr.aing and
Georges Marchais. _
The great idea of the "unitarians" is that it is necessary at all cost _
' to recover the electorate which votes communist, without however seek- =
ing to put the communists in power. The surprising thing is that those
- who set forth their thinking in this way do not realize that they are
faced with an irrational, affective, almost ritual procedure. If the
communist electorate does not seek, f.or the most part, the victory of -
its elected officials, it must indeed be acting for reasons which lie -
outside reason. Despite Budapest, despite Prague, despite Kabul, the
- French Communist Party remains, in the eyes of a large part of the
wor.kers' class, the best defender of the interests and the rights of -
the most neglected strata. It is this myth, and it alone, which must
be overcome. The unitarian proclamations are likely, on the contrary,
to give the impression of weakness and tolerance. _
It is on this line of resistance that the likes of Michel Rocard may
continue to be judged "different." In view of the evidence, because
of his image, he will be able to allow l~imself neither reticence nor
5
- FOR OFFICIti:. USE UNLY '
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040240080014-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- deviation. The sinister clowning of Marchais gi.ves off a worrisome
force, which, in its populist truculencer should not enounter :s its -
only obstacles maneuvers which are too subtly skillful. This perverse
development must be opposed by a socialist vigor--if not violence, and
it is perhaps on this point that the highest hopes will be placed in
wha[ is expected of the deputy from Yvelines.
Whether it be a question in fact of the c~ndidacy of Michel Roczrd,
- Francois Mitterrand or any other representative of the noncommunist
left; whether it be a question of seeking victory or affirming a
presence; if we do not want this electoral campaign, already prematurely
begun 14 months before the election, to be time lost for the French and
for F'rance, aIl those with any responsibility whatsoever, must demand
clear language in the service of simple ideas. This is the only sign
by which orie ca~ recognize true democracy.
_ Political Strategy, 'Non-Candidacy'
Paris LE NOUVEI. OBSERVATEUR in French 25 Feb-2 Mar 8G pp 25-27 _
- [Article by Thierry PfistEr: "Is Michel Rocard Really Different?"]
[Text] On Monday, 25 February, on "Cards on the
_ Tab1e," the enfant terrible of the Socialist Party
will reiterate that he is not a candidate for the
presidency of the republic. but he will try to
provethat he h~~s the quatifications for the post.
On Monday, 25 Februar~, Michel Rocard has set aside three hours. With ~
some colleagues, including Christian Blanc and Jean-Paul Ciret, he
will deal with the press ancl settle the final details before going
before the public that same evening on the Channel Two program, "Cards
' on the Table." A number of preliminary meetings have already been
held to select the sub;ect and draft responses. A new and revealing
detail is that Rocard is no longer content to mobilize the mobil
socialist faction. He is turning to the experts, in particular in the
, field of defense and with regard to international athletic problems.
All are willing to call upon him, whatever their personal politi~al -
- options may be: His proEile as a"presidential likely" outweighs any
= other recommendation.
On Monday evening, the deputy from Ytjelines will be accompanied to
Studio 102 by journalist Claude Marti, the man who was the kingpin in
the f.amous "image group" which unciertook the task of initiating Rocard
, in the techniques of television. The training period is over today
and R~card is content with a test run each month, using a video circuit.
Above all, he owes it to Marti that his gifts as a teacher are no
longer restricted to the universe of the militants alone. He now
, undertakes to carry his message to the whole of the country, to speak
~ 6
FOR OFFICInL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200084414-6
I
~ FOR OFrICIAL USE ONLY ~
to that "t4adame Michu" invented by the journalist who symbolizes
Mrs Everybody. -
Blocked by the Socialist Party apparatus, Michel Rocard has made the
definitive choice to play to the nation. Commenting on this choice
himself as an expert in political sociology, the deputy from Yvelines
points out banteringly: "This is a great European premiere. An
apparatus joined together as a blocy internally, but by the pressure
of an outside opinion. This has never occurred so clearly. The fact
remains that the apparatus is not the party, far from it, and that
happily, it is the par.ty which will make the decision." There is no
question, then, of yielding to those of his friends wtio are impatient
and who, d~~sirous of pressing on, are asking when and how a faction of
opinion de:~iring Rocard's candidacy should be organized and should
appeal dirc~ctly to the members and the officials of the PS.
Nor is it a question of remaining within the confines of the internal
interplay in the PS. To seek the nomination against Mitterrand would
be to allow the dramatization of the conflict and to take the risk of
attempting some sort of parricide. "There will he no primary elections
within the PS." Categorically, Michel Rocard reiterates this con-
stantly. In no case will he seek the candic~acy against Francois
Mitterr.and. And this despite the fact that the first secretary has
solemnly released him from any commitment and even urged him, last ~
December, to declare himself. The PS would not be able to tolerate
such an internal crash, Rocard explains. "This woul~l, of course, be
the normal play of democracy. But the PS is a young party. Moreover,
it is not a problem of personalities but of the coloring of socialism. ~
Thus it is not desirable to make antagonisms more acute, for there
would not be time for the necessary reconciliation. I value the unity
o~ the p~rty highl.y."
In voicing this opinion, the mayor of Conflans-Sainte-Honorine is also
t hinking of himseZf. If the first secretary of the PS should decide
not to try his chances a third time, a possibility which cannot be
excl~~ded, Rocard hopes to be able to avoid an internal fracas. For
the main obstacle standing in his path remains his own party.
He has abandoned the hope of reconciling the PS apparatus. He even
claims never to have sought to win control of it for himself, with the -
complicity o~ Pierre Mauroy. The conditions during preparations for
the Metz congress might challenge this. Today, however, Michel Rocard
' says categorically: "In Metz, I chose divorce in order to be able to -
breathe." In fact, he allowed himself room. His broken leg even pro-
vided an opportunity to stand aside from the political quarrels, and
- to avoid in particular finding himself cramped in the mediocre European
election campaign. While absent, Michel Rocard was perceived as
different. '
7
FOR OFFICIi~;. USE UNLY
,
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
For examplc, he h~zs not appeared on any major telecast fc~r 13 months.
This is why he is devoting particular care to his return. Perhaps too
much. One of the main trumps the deputy from Yvelines holds lies i.n his
spontaneity of expression. This has won him a reputation of sincerity. .
If he seeks to weigh all his words too carefully, he will run the risk
oE being classed back with the "politictans" ag~tn, In f.act, the tape-
recorded repetition of his pathetic appeal just after the second round
in the 1978 legislative elections contributed to depriving this address,
after the fact. of a large part of its emotional effect. One cannot fail
then to think of the p~=iod following the events in 19Eg, during which
as national secretary of the PSU [Unified Socialist Party] he endorsed -
an address the contents of which he disagreed with intellectually,
_ This aptitude for double language is moreover one of the main arguments
used by the adversaries oE Michel Rocard within the PS. It is also said ~
that he is the main tool in a"Christian plot." Francois Mitterrand is
persuaded that such a peril exists. "The forces which come together in `
him are those which have always confronCed me when it came to rebuilding
the PS, laying the foundations for unity on the left and setting up the -
, 'joint program'," he explained to Kathleen Evan in September of 1978
("Michel Rocard, or the Art of the Possible," Simoen). Rocar~ is in a
way the heir of Pierre Mendes France. The two men have in common, in
addition to their economist training, a taste for responsibili~y and =
administration which fails to exclude a prophetic and sometimes moralistic
dimension. They atso have in common a very individual approach, even
when they find themselves at the hea~ of a political structure.
~ When he refers to the coming presidential election today, Michel Rocard
never speaks, for example, of the PS candidate. He prefers to speak of
"the socialist left" or "the candidate endorsed by the PS." He has
integrated the logic of institutions perfectly, and he knows that a -
presidential candidacy should not appear. to be strictly partisan. In
- addition, he does indeed hope ta sweep along in his wake, if nominated,
the PSU, the leftist radicals and, in addition to the PS, all oE those
orphans in what was formerly called "the nonco?nmunist left."
He is not unaware that the basic element which led to the electoral
advance of the PS between 1972 and 1978 was the shift toward ihe left of
a sizable portion of the Christian electorate. This was a particularly
clear phenomenon in the western and eastern parts of the country. The
si.gning of the "joint program" suddenly gave back its virginity to the
noncommunist left. Much more than Che r.adicalization of the advance of
the PS, it represented its moralization, symbolized by a contract in
good and proper form which won over. an increasing number of voters,
particularly among the Christians. As of that time, any reappearance of
' "political" practices, became particularly serious for the PS, because -
it represented a challenge of its m~in original feat.ure. Now it is pre-
cisely this image which gives rise to uninterrupted internal struggles. -
8
FOR OFFICI~w USE UNLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
A Possible Blind Roller
_ To this is added the awakening of the "lay" reflexes designed to block
Rocard. The socialists, by the same token, find themselves in the wrong -
with regard to a number of their new sc~pporters. In seeking to exclude
one of its own, the leadership of the PS is in danger of sawing off the
branch by which it g~ined ascendency. For Rocard, for more than 20
years, first went along with and then embodied this movement of the
Christian faction toward the left. As of 1958, he had joined the CFTC
[French Conf.ederation of Christian Workers], from whi.ch he was able to
popularize his analyses in the political world. Subsequently, the
definition of "self-managing socialism," which became the official
doctrine of the PS, was developed through a kind of continuing exchange
between the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor]--in particu- -
lar its chemical federation, which produced Edmond Maire--and the PSU.
However, it is not possible to aline Rocard completely witti the CFDT,
even though the mayor of Conflans-Sainte-Honorine maintains, unlike
, Francois Mitterrand, trusting and friendly relations with Edmond Maire.
On the one hand this is because the more likely Rocard seems as a candi-
date, the more the secretary general of the CFDT takes pains to maintain
_ the autonomy of his organization. And on the other hand, because the
CFDT, f~ithful in this to the traditions of the French trade union move-
ment, has a tendency to limit the role of political organizations
singularly in the process of transition to socialism. In the past it
was opposed to Rocard, when the PSU sought to establish itself in the
_ enterprises. ~
The fact nonetheless remains that the deputy from Yvelines remains the -
man in politics who is most heeded in this union, as he knows how to -
- make himself heard by the owners and cadres and to retain the respect of
the majority of the "veteran combatants" of May 1968. Thanks to this
- audience, Rocard can pursue his main goal, which is--and this is the
message he will try to communicate in his television address--to revive
the hope of a leftist victory. "Everything is still possible," the
supporters of the deputy from Yvelines never cease to repeat. He
- willingly relates a comment made by Valery Giscard d'Estaing to a
journalist. "I would say that Mitterrand is the most dangerous adver~
sary, but Rocard is unpredictable. Some of my colleagues say that he
might fade away during the campaign but that he might also be the source
of a blind roller. Against waves of this force, taere is no defense.
The presidential election is too important to allow such unknown
factors."
- ModiEi2d Dreams
To justify this hope, Rocard will, in his own style, resume t~ constitu-
tional analysis pursued by Edgard Pisani with the Press Club of Europe 1. -
The presidential election will make it possible to avoi.d any negotiations
9
FOR OFFICItiL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
FOR OFFICTAL USE ONLY ~
a~ith the p~F', aven beaaeen the two ballots. The PS can simply commit itself
- to refrain from profiting from the campaign to attack the communists,
asking them in exchange to observe the same rule. For the rest, the
sor.ialists will have an opportunity to develop their analyses and their
propos~~ls in autonomous f~~shion. On this level, Roc:~lyd is quitc docided
tc~ r_onrinue h~mmering .~t [he nails AS he h~~s for some years. -
As an e~onomist, he is suspicious of "economism." The current crisis
contirms this view. 'The science of economics, official ar otherwise, is
unanswerable. It only provides us with disparate and contradictory
, advice," he stated in a plea for more pragmatism. For his part, he has
- always, in matters of social change, emphasized democratic procedures,
and access to power Eor the greatest numbers. This was the language he
- used as earl.y as 1966 in the Grenoble ~.ollaquiun , when he expressed his
distrust of nationalization. This is a thesis he never ceased L-o defend
= in the course of the development of the "joint program," when he ex-
plained that the concepts of ownership and power must not be confused.
This is what he is repeating today when he differentiates the functions -
- af ~3dministra[ion and those of management.
- Finally, in economic matters, he admits that the dreams of the left m~~st
be modified. The volume of the national income which can be distributed
for "social purposes" each year will be much less thai~ was hoped at the '
time of the drafting of the "joint program." Consequently the inertia,
- the social antagonism caused by any redistribution, any substitution,
will also be more acute than the left had thought. Yet a further reason,
therefore, to emphasize reforms in methodology, to organize real admin-
istrative decentralization and deconcentration.
But if Rocard wants to restore the hope of victor.y to the le�t wing, he
must at the same time reassure it. He knows that insecurity leads ~~oters
to change their minds. Also, he was not pleased by the mention of the
"threat of war" in Valery Giscard d'Estaing's rnessage of greeting. "We -
are in a country protected by strategic nuclear weaponry," he explained,
"and thus in my view relatively removed Erom the threat of war with
direct involvement." Which does not dispel all the worry. As early as
the national convention of the PS which adopted the "socialist project,"
Michel Rocard had the opportunity to develop the main guidelines of his
- analysis in the realm of foreign policy. "The soviet military apparatus,"
he stressed, '~aas still still totally defensive 15 years ago. Today it
is totally offensive." Its mission? To exercise an overall and con-
tinuing power of intimidation, such as to control the status quo with
the wesr, in positive imbalance for the USSR.
The European Void
In view of this situation, the deputy from Yvelines urges for France
diplomacy based on four guidelines:
' 10
FOft, OFFICIAL USE UNLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
l) A clear reaffirmation of French fidelity to the Atlantic ALliance,
although, to be sure, without plans to reestablish the NATO military
skructure. It would in f.act be well to avoid raising any doubt with the
Americans as to the attitude of Europe.
2. The establishment of a military structure adapted to the pareicular
threats which weigh upon the old world because of its exceptional
vulnerability in terms of oil supply and the elements of instability
r.epresented by such countries as Yugoslavia, and even Austria and the
FRG and GDR. Now Europe, a fact Rocard never ceases to bemoan, "repre- _
sents a void, a gap." France is the only country capable of establishing
the necessry military structure. Which means, for example, that it
would not plunge massivel~y into the nuclear submarine policy urged by
Jacques Chirac. Without daring to admit it, the mayor of Conflans-
Sainte-Honorine is still weighing, as far as he is concerned, the advan-
tages and disadvantages of Che neutron bomb.
3) A policy with regard to the Third World such as to limit the poten-
- tial for Soviet penetration. Now at the present time, any country
seriotisly under.taking noncapitalist development must enter into relations
with the USSR and become dependent upon it. And this is the reason for
- the need of the Western countries to develop aid for these countries =
more oriented toward equipment than consumption, without seeking too
much profit in exchange.
' 4) The intensification of exchange of all kinds, intellectual and
cultural in particular. For example, Rocard asserts his faith in _
Olympic activities, even if, for his part, he has decided not ro go to
Moscow although he had planned to. "I support the thesis that one _
should not go," he has explained, "but also the thesis that it is not
for the politicians to decide."
It remains to be seen if this address will be of a kind which will con-
solidate the Rocard image in the public opinion, and even start him
_ moving forward again. The latest polls reflect a certain decline in his ,
- popularity. Speaking means risking accentuating this trend. The deputy
from Yvelines differentiated himself from the politicians by his silence,
but his profile remained vague, based more on his style than on his
political choices. Now that he has decided to set forth his positions,
he may offend some of his listeners and disappoint others. Hawever, he
- needs to comfort his partisans and to mobilize that portion which
supports him, if he wants, through them and the socialists elected, more
- sensitive to the country's sCate of mind than the apparatus is, to '
succeed in imposing his will on his own party.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Observateur"
5157
CSO: 3100
11
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COUNTRY SECTION ' FRANCE
ROCARD SUPPORT THREATENS MITTERRAND'S PRESIDENTIAL AMBITIONS
_ ~
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 3-9 Mar 80 p 24
(Article by Thierry Pfister: "The Rocard Effect"]
[Text] "The speaker who preceded me (Georges Marchais) said: 'Never Gis-
card!' Well, then, let him not leave him where he is! There aren't 36 -
ways to do this, Of course, there is revolution, the big day of upheaval,
but these conditions are far from being fulfilled by those very persons
who are ac;vancing in that direct at, I would say, a snail's pace. It is
not suffic:ient to say 'make the revolution,' as Popeye would say 'eat spin-
ach.' On another side, there remains democratic combat. It requires the -
adding of votes. Those who subtract votes betray the interests of the peo-
ple. They say 'never Giscard.' But they leave him at peace." Francois
Mitterand, caustic, took advantage of a new censure debate in the National
Assemhly on Wednesday to recall these clear and true realities. The first
secretary feels at the top of his form--whence his irritation when he hears
, his age mentioned or when he sees Rocard, on television, stressing his
"historic role." He has no desire to beat his retreat.
Yet Francois Mitterand nurses no illusions about the situation of the left. ~
If the vote for president were to take place now, he would not throw him-
self into it. Tamorrow, things may be different. Once the American pri-
mary elections are over, the international tension should decrease, he -
hopes. The economic and social difficulties will then come back to the:
forefront, and Giscard will again be vulnerable.
But it is still necessary for Mitterand to be in a position, at that time,
to be the candidate of the Socialist current. Since Michel Rocard went in-
_ to "Cartes sur Table" [Aboveboard], he has known that his rival has offici-
ally started his campaign. Never had the deputy from the Yvelines declareii
so clearly that he was aiming for the Elysee. And there is a"Rocard ef- -
fect," to use the title of a book by Heve Hamon and Patrick Rotman which is
just being published by Stock. This is why the first secretary and his -
- partisans immediately their counteroffensive via the pree3~, and then this
weekend, on the occasion of the steering committee meeting. The confronta-
tion is polarized on three themes. -
12
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Can the PS [Socialist Party] Candidate for the Elysee Be Nominated by
Conaenaus?
Michel Rocard has hoped that the PS would epare itself an internal confron- _
tation and therefore a"primary" aimed at deciding on the candidates for
- the candidacy. A pious wish. To be sure, the mayor of Conflans-Sainte-
Honorine never stops saying that he would leave the way open to Francois
Mitterand if the latter wanted to try his luck again; but this rule would
not hold in the other direction, in favor of Rocard. Jean-Pierre Chevene-
ment, chief of the CERES [Center for (Socialist) Studies, Research and Edu-
cationJ, and Lionel Jospin, the first secxetary's trainee, have been cate-
gorical. They will not in any case leave the way open to the deputy from
the Yvelines. If he wants to be chosen, he will h~ve to promote himself
through the voting of the sections against the present PS majority. What
is more, Francois Mitterand mentioned again on Monte Carlo radio that the
leadershi_p of the PS will remain in place until the presidential balloting.
Even if nominated, Rocard would therefore be a candidate under tutelage--
a fussy tutelage, one can readily imagine.
Upon Coming to Power, Must the Socialists Set Up a Homogeneous Government? '
In a FRANCE-SOIR interview, Francois Mitterand declared: "Since we are re-
fused union, we will not eliminate the possibility of governing alone." A
little sentence that might have led one to believe that the first secretary ,
was drawing close to the point of view of the minority. Whence the initia-
tive by Pierre Mauroy and his friends, who submitted to the steering com-
mittee a text through which they are trying once again to impose a synthe-
sis among all the currents, to the exclusion of the CERES. One nuance re-
mains in this debate (a very theoretical one!) on the composition of an '
eventual government of the left. Whereas Michel Rocard declares that it
was the PCF who shut the door and that it is therefore up to the PCF to re-
turn, Francois Mitterand indicates that he would take the initiative in
proposing to the Communists that they join the government, and that the PS
would form a cabinet by itself only in case of refusal by its former part-
ners.
What Becomes of Self-Management?
Un "Cartes sur Table," Michel Rocard sharply reduced the importance of the
self-managem~nt dem~and by speaking of a long-term process and favoring the
notion of "socialism of responsibility." He is indeed not unaware of the
facC that if he manages to impose his candidacy, thr right will not fail to -
_ remind him of his inflamed pleas in favor of "worker control" that he de-
veloped from the time when he was secretasy general of the PSU [Unified So-
cialist Party]. Already, Rocard's moderation and prudence are drawing no-
thing less tha~ tears from his comrade Liorr.al Jospin. "I have been a lit-
- tle sad," he explained to LE MATIN, "to see tha* the representative of a
current that has done so much to help convince us of the reasonableness of
self-management appears, in the face of the perspective that he is setting
for himself, to be suddenly abandoning it."
13
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Michel Rocard can therefore nurture no illusions. He will win over his
party only by triumphing poli.tically over the present leadership of the PS.
Did he really have any doubts about this? In mid-December, he paid a dis-
creet vieit to rue de Bievre, to the firat secretary's home. At Mitter-
and's requeat, the two men had a face-to-face talk centered on the problem
of the candidacy for the presidential election--a lucid conversation but
without a conclusion, if one believes Herve Hamon and Patrick Rotman, who
disclose this meeting.
The logic of confrontation therefore seems to be set in motion once again.
As before the Metz congress, an implacable race for support is under way.
The first targets are the party's elected officials. To succeed, Rocard is
counting on a fear reflex in their ranks. They need the representative of
the PS to get the best possible score, under penalty of finding themselves
in a position of weakness in their geographical districts. And one-third
of the members of the Socialist Party are elected officials.
It remains to learn what state the PS will be in when it comes out of this ~
confrontation, which will 'last at least until autumn. Will it still be
capable of mobilizing itself completely in favor of its spokesman?
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Observateur"
11267
CSO: 3100 -
~ 14
FOR OFFTCIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
FOR OFrICIAL USE ONLY
COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
PCF'S MARCHAIS BELIEVES 'RUSSIANS WILL WIN'
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 7 Mar 80 pp 74-75, 77
- [Article by Michel Gonod]
[Text] This is the general opinion: if Georges Marchais is often seen on -
television it is due to the fact that he wins votes for the Head of State
and the ma~ority. He is so bad, so caricatural that each of his appear-
ances increases the popularity of the President. ManS French people
believe that it was at the request of the Elysee or Matigonon,[i.e., the
president's or the prime minister's office]--or maybe both--that Marchais -
spoke for fifty minutes direct from Moscow last 11 January. However, ~
Giscard having recently met some television officials complained to them ,
about this communist invasion. He regretted the program schedule changes
that were made that day to allow the Secretary General of the Communist
Party to express himself longer. Of course, the Head of State knows that
the language excesses of Marchais only reinforce his own position and that
of his supporters. However, he realizes also that the French people could
be asking themselves the following question: why the apparent weakness on
the part of the state in facing a man that spends his time on national
television insulting those who do not think as he does, that is the
ma~ority, and who turns a democratic debate into a masquerade that is on "
the borderline of being grotesque? Is it normal for the Communist Party
security to lay down the law with the televieion networks as it happened
on 21 January when Marchais was the guest on the show "Cartes sur table"?
Is it normal that it did not occur to any single member of the government
to reprimand the secretary general of the Communist Party after having heard ~
_ his delirious press conference on 20 February on the sub~ect of liberties?
Ho~ever, on that day, Marchais spoke out as much as he possibly could,
describing our society as apocalyptic and disqualifying, on the issue of
liberties, "the representatives of the French bourgeoisie" and "the conser-
vative and social-democratic ma3ority of the European Assembly". Marchaie '
throws those persons that are not co~nunists all into the same bag and in
the same "oppression and exploitation" camp, that is the "enemies of mankind" ~
camp. He sees freedom reigning only in the socialist countriee, as he said
on 20 February, and he explains the American boycot of the Moscow~ Olympic
� :15
FOR OFFICIt~L USE ONLY ;
;
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
FOR OFFICIAL I?SE ONLY
Games as the fear of imperialiam at having 500,000-600,000 visitors discover
Ruasian reality. Yes, you have read correctly, and if, some day, you
learn that since the last world war, more than 5 million men and women (3
~ million of whom were German) have fled socialist regimee to ~oin the -
- capitalist camp, that 35,000 of them risked their lives while attempting to
ecale the Berlin wall and that 180 were killed by the Eaet Berlin police
while doing so, aither you have been dreaming or you have been a victim of
imperialist propaganda. In the last decade, 80,000 French have visited the
tISSR each year and if, of this [nearly] million persons, you know of one
who has chosen to remain in Russia by seeking asylum, please write to
- Marchais, for his statistics are obviously not up to date.
Finally, and maybe this is why no one from the government has wanted to
respond to the communist leader: what kind of language can one use when
confronting a man who affirms that it is daytime at midnight and who, no
less, insults you for holding an opposite view? What really counts, beyond
the appearances, is the reason for which the French Communist Party leaders =
have chosen this attitude. What magical potion was Marchais steeped in
- during his last visit to Moscow? Has he read into the Russian cards and
does he know something that might ~ustify this insane policy? It is c:.ear
that there is a link between Ruasia's foreign policy and the hardening of
the French Communist Party. Rivalry has increased between the East and
the We3t and it has at the same time worsened in our own country between
the two blocs, by the mere fact of the Communist Party. In the expectation
o� a worsening of the international situation, the French communists have
chosen '.ieir camp. As Marchais said in December 1978, "our own strategy -
finds c,.~e of its essential foundationa in tlie worldwide reality, in the
change that has occurred in the relation between forces in favor of aocialism,
independence, and peace. To forget this, he continued, would ba sutcidal."
The change in the relation between forces that Marchais spoke of over a
year ago is an issue that is presently being brought up often at the Quai
d'Orsay. What is being said? That the Russians have attained "nuclear
parity" with the Americans. That we are no longer in a time when a frown ~
from the White House would make the Russian bear behave and go home (for "
example: Cuba in 1962). The USSR is very strong militarily and this fact
should be kept in mind. However, as Jacques Chaban-Delmas reported having
heard directly f rom Leonid Brezhnev, the Russians consider themselves
threatened in Europe by the setting-up of Pershing rockets in Pakistan and
China where, they believe, the Americans are playing with fir~. To avoid
- having this fear really harden, our diplomats believe that the dialog must
be maintained, even if it appears to be weakness or blindness. Under
other circumstances, one would stiffen up while waiting for better days.
- Many "kremlinologists" and most French communists, in conflice with the
leadership of the Communist Party, denounce this aa being wrong. Just as
rloscow wants to destabilize the world - take a look at Africa for instance -
the French Communist Party wants to destabilize our democracy. Marchais is
ready to encourage any kind of disorder to prove his point: namely, that
capitalism is dying, the energy crisis is going to precipitate its fall,
16
FUR OFFICTr~L USE UNLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ODiLY _
and socialism will soon triumph. He believes this to be true. A communist
"critic," as it is said nowadays, recently met with a member of the political
buresu of the French Communist Party who informed him that important changes
were about to take place and that it was a ehame that he was in the wrong
camp. This leader was speaking of this bright future with such passion
thst he could not understand how one could Y~emain indifferent to thia -
certainty. In effect, it ~ust ao happens that this leader was present with -
Marchais in Moscow this past January and that his information is thus -
first hand.
If one goes along with this analysis, the attitude of Georges Marchais,
television superstar, becomes more comprehensible. Since there are important
changes about to take place and landslides are expected, it is necessary for
the Communist Party t^ be ready, and therefore united. However, the party
is being shaken by a deep crisis. The leadership must, in order to keep
things under control, adopt a siege policy that is expressed in the '
audacities of Georges Marchais. Playing on the party's patriotism, Marchais
is well aware of the fact that the ranks get tighter when the party is under
- attack. And the party is unquestionably being attacked. The leadership _
- knowingly organizes this anticommunist offensive by multiplying the pro-
voc~tions. And it works. One communist, not at a11 sectarian, whose friend
was trying to explain to him that one of Marchais' argumercts was wrong,
replied in the following manner: "I am not really interested in knowing if -
it is true or false; what counts is the fact that it is being used to fuel
the anticommunist campaign." This type of reaction shows that the Communist
Party leaderehip is on the right track. By practicing the policy of one
against all, it is strengthening the unity at its base. All communists that
have become challengers will tell you that when the party is under attack,
no criticism is tolerated. At the cell meeting, the militant that reasons
and contests the analysis of the federal delegate will never find support
amongst hia other comrades, even if they are strongly in agreement with
him. The reasoner, thinking that he is clever, discovers however, to his
amazement, that between his indisputable argument and the opinion of the
leadership, it is always the latter that prevails, even if it is absurd.
Ti~,is explains why at each change of direction, the Party prefers losing -
members rather than concerning themselves with lukewarm, hax3-to-convince
people. It is a filtering party which has a record of losing 15 percent
of its membership each year, compensated for by new members whose average -
longevity does not exceed 6 yeais. The etable nucleus of the party never '
goes beyong 25 percent of the total membership. The others are only
transient. This is valid at the lower level as well as at the head of the
garty.
In the 180� turn that Marchais has imposed ~spon his party s~nce 1977, some
of yesterday's stars have been left by the wayside. Paul Laurent or Roland
Leroy, considered only three years ago as possible successors to Marchais,
are now very rarely seen in the entourage of the Secretary General.
- Presently, the new strong figurea are Charles Fiterman and Maxime Gremetz.
17
F~R OFFICIE~L L'~E ONLY ,
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
The latter is especially rising f ast. Following the death of Jean Kanapa,
he has become the party's "Foreign Affaira Minister". Strangeat destiny,
_ tiiat of thia 40 year old man whom the intellectual communiste in the
oppoeition describe as a non-educated "mztal-worker", who would have not
even become foreman had he remained in the factory, a man who does not ask ~
questions of himself. and of others, who owes everything to Marchais and who
doee not waver in the slightest from the official direction. He is made
of flexible wood, which is needed to obtain seconds in command that are
submi.ssi~~e and without excessive ambition. He travels often but without
much publicity, which allows him to carry out secret missions for the
Communist Party, namely in Lybia, turning plate for world destabilization.
It is interesting to follow the influential struggle that he is having
with Charles Fiterman in the last few months. The latter should logically
- feel threatened. He had been promoted to first rank in 1977 by Marchais
to brush aside Paul Laurent more effectively. Today, isn't Gremetz
incidentally commissioned to eliminate Fiterman, guilty of having been
respon,ible for the actualization of the common program with the socialists.
In these conflicts of persoas, the Party leadership is merciless, even -
Machiavellian. Jean E1leinstein who has received several letters from
militant communists requesting him to "spontaneously" resign from the Party
where he would no longer have a position, noticed that one of the letters
came from the cell in *_he 19th district of Paris, the one of which Paul
Laurent is a member. It is a well-known Stalinian rule to entrust a -
militant in disgrace with the task of bringing about the fall of a parent
or a friend that has become undesirable. El~.einstein and Laurent are, in
fact, childhood friends. In 1978s when Rene Piquet, member of the polit-
ical bureau, was asked to complain to the author of this article about the
use of some pictures of Marchais that had been published by "Paris-Match" -
- and that were ~udged devaluating by tt:e Party leadership, the party was
applying the same rule, all things considered. Rene Piquet has since been
reduced to a lower rank, thus being puni~hed for having maintained an almost
friendly relationship with an "enemy" editorial staff, for nothing ~udtified
his taking this step, the Party press service being responsible for this.
However, behind this impressive discipline facade, and in spite of the -
- famous "democratic centralism", the Party does take action, is moved and
becomes anxious. The cases of public dissension are multiplying. The eight
federal secretaries of Paris, one being Henri Fiszbin, ex-deputy who is
completing a book recounting his disgrace, have all resigned, and 9 out of
17 ~ou~nalists have left the weekly "France Nouvelle". The crisis ie evi-
dent. "People have become perturbed, says Antoine Spire, an ex-permanent
from the Communist Party, who has also recounted his own experience in a
book. One is finding more and more incomprehension and dissension but, he "
adds, the consciences of the people are out of step, which means that the
evolution will be slow." Antoine Spire, put on the blarklist, receives, -
y like E1leinstein, letters from other militants condemning ~is conduct, but
four members of the Central Committee of the Co~unist Party have also
written him to encourage him. Four out of 150 ia few, but if one takes into
account the intellectual terrorism exerted by the leadership on the whole
~ 18
- FUR OFFICIl~L USE UNLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
FOR OFrICIAL USI~ ONLY
system, it is a number that would have been unheard of several years ago.
In the book "Under the Communist Party, the communiats" that she wrote in
collaboration with Jean Tornikian, the ,journaliet Yvonne Quiles defines
the communist malaise as follows: "Yeaterday, we were content with be-
lieving, today we want to understand and our eyes are being opened. Thia
is the reason for the present crisis."
COPYRIGHT'.~ 1980 par Cogedipresse
9592 -R
CSO: 3100
i
19
FOR OFFIGIr,;., L'SE UiVi,Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200084414-6
~
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
ALEXANDRE SANGUINETTI ON CORSICAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 24-30 Mar 80 p 48
[Interview with RPR Central Committee and Politburo member A. San-
guinetti, by Thierry Pfister, place and date not given] _
[Text] Alexandre Sanguinetti: "You don't understand a
_ thing about Corsica:r'
Le Nouvel Observateur: You recently addressed an "open let-
ter~~ to your fellow-Corsicans (Albin Michel), but one gets the
feeling that you were writing it at least as directly to readers
on the continent.
Alexandre Sanguinetti: People on the continent have never under-
stood a thing about Corsica. Just listen to them talk respect -
fully about "Corsican nationalism," and then dismiss the Afghan _
fighters as "rebels." I should like all kinds of nationalism _
Corsican, Basque, Flemish, whatever to be impartant; but
French nationalism? Is it the only one that should be scorned?
To draw distinctions among ethnic groups is to be guilty of ra~
cism. I am a committed advocate of universalist civilizations.
And you have to admit that they have got at least as much as
they have given. So what's the problem? Corsican is not a
language solely because we are French. If we were Italians~ our
language would ~e treated as merely another Tuscan dialect.
Besides, all of Paoli's writings, for example, are in Italian.
N.O.: The fact remains that land purchases by non-Corsicans
can beget a feeling of being dispossess~d.
Sanguinetti: Who is buying? Non-Corsicans. But who is selling?
- Corsicans. And they don~t even put their money to use on the
is`1and. I can, in spite of everything, understand the "Pales-
tinian reflex'~ of my coixntrymen at the influx of "pieds-noirs"
[French colonists in Algeria] whose arragance is not the most
lovable trait you can think of. And I admit even more.readily
20
� FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- that these pieds-noirs have been granted moratoria, while the
Corsicans ar~e stuck with their debts. You really have to grasp
the f act that there is a little bit of everything mixed into
what is going on right now: the determination to get a mora-
torium, the desire t;o get rid of the competition, not to men-
- t;i.on plain old-1'~.ishionF~d racketeer~i.n~;�.
N.O.: How doe~ it make you Peel when you see young countrymen
of yours sent to prison oii the mainland, and then turning up -
at Fort de 1~ Est?
Sanguinetti: I sympathize with them because I am Corsican. That
doesn't mean that I approve of what they are doing. They must
admit that no government in the world would tolerate anonymous
bombings. Kids who act like damn fools are lucky to be in WES-
_ t.ern Europe. The risk they run is minimal compared with the
repression they would encounter under other re gimes. And yet,
even with that, these two-bit heroes haven~t even got the guts _
to takE the responeibility for~ their actions. You can't have
- it both ways win the martyr's palm and expect to be let alone.
N.O.: Y'ou don't think their clisgust at political and electoral
customs peculiar to Corsic a is genuine?
- Sar~~;~iai.netti: The Corsican problem with elections does exist,
or usec~ to exist. That is our ~roblem. It stems from our cus-
toms. The young separatists are dreaminb of doing the same
thizi~ t;hemselves. Tlie reason they are so furious is that they
can't bring it off. We shali see where they are 15 y~ears or so
rr~om now. The instigators play on this feeling of utter power-
lessness among the very young: that's why they do most of their =
recruiting in the high schools.
_ N.O.: Who are these instigators?
Sanguinetti: Once again, let~s be frank. Everybody on the is-
land knows very well who they are. This is the revenge of the -
7.943 losers, the diehards and the former "collabos" [people who
collaborated with the nazis]. And it~s revenge, too, for peo-
ple who have never been reconciled to the loss of the empire,
particularly the loss of Algeria.
N.O.: And 3~et ~here is a ma~aise, at least an economic malaise, _
these days.
Sanguinetti: From 1914 to 1962, Corsica declined steadily. And
yeL thei~e has been neither genocide nor deport ation, and we have F -
enjoyed all the rights of French citizens. Nothing, for example~
like the situation of the Muslims in Algeria. Corsica was ci.rained -
_ because its young people le�t to make their careers far away,
21
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY � f
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200084414-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
in the vast reaches of empire. What a paradox, when you come
_ to think of it: Corsica is essentially a colonizer. What can _
you do, as an Ajaccio city councilman said to me: "We are a
people of middle-managers, and we need people to manage." To-
_ day this situation has turned around. It~s not nearly so much
_ fun to be a customs inspector in Moselle as it was in Laos.
And so the youngsters stay home. And the result is that they
are at loose ends, suffering from identity crises and losa of
self-conf idence. This is one of the aftereffects of France's
r~lative decline in the pecking order of power. It's a pheno-
menon that affects all the o1d nations that go back to the days -
before there were nationalities: Spain and Great Britain are
examples. -
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Observateur'
6182
Cso: 3100
22
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
AIRCRAFT DEFENSE TECHNIQUES, METHODS ULSCRIBED
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLE~ in French 24 Mar 80 pp 28-29
[Article by Francois d'Orcival]
[Text] At 0930 ~ours the weather is clear. An unknown aircraft is crossing
France on a north-south line near the Rhone Valley. The radars of the air -
- defense command describe its speed--Mach 1.9 (a.bout 2.000 ki.lometers per hour)
and its altitude - 48,000 feet (16,000 meters).
From his underground command post at Taverny, in the Val-d'oise, the chief of
- the a1r. deFense command's operations center iLsues the alert and orders an
- interception mission. The 2nd Fighter Squadron based at Dijon has two of its
_ Mirage III E aircraft take off. Execution time: 1 minute.
_ The Mirage airplanes proceed to meet the unknown aircraft, locate it, and
get ready to intercept it. By firing. But a red indicator lights up on
their on-board panels--poor alignment? Distance from the target too great?
Bad firing angle? Ins~ifficient speed? Or even electronic fog coming from _
the "hostile" airplane? In any event the red light means: interception has
failed, 'The unknown aircraft continues on its path.
This took place on I'riday, 1 February. On the 18th VALEURS ACTUELLES stated
_ that between 29 January and 2 February a Mirage patrol based at Dijon unsuc-
cessfully pursued a Soviet spy plane above the Rhone Valley. The Ministry
of Defense made a formal denial. In its following issue, on 25 February,
VALEURS ACTUELLES maintained that the incident had been observed by several
air detection centers and stated that the aircraft in question could only be -
a rlig 25. -
The Ministry of Defense and the Air Force general staff then broke their
silence, An event did indeed take place at the time, and of the general
nature, which we described.
But it involved an exercise (usual) and not an actual incident. It was not
a Mig 25 but a Mirage IV (simulating a hostile airplane), interception of
which (by means of practice missiles which reproduce the maneuver but without
~ being f~red) was aborted.
23
FOR OFFICIl~L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The informat.ion published in our weekly was therefore misinterpretation of
_ an event actually seen upon radar screens at 0930 hours on 1 February.
Present detection capabilities are such that everybody knows what everybody
else is doing, says General Phil.ippe Archambeaud.
_ Fifty-three years old, graduated from the War College before becoming director
of the Air School, General Archambeaud has been commander of air defense for
~ less than 1 year. Defense of the air is defense of all French sky, 24 hours
every day.
He has his warning radars, 140 Mirage airplanes, and missile batteries. And
_ in his command post a television screen--the direct connection with the Elysee
[President's official residence]. His previous command, for 2 years, was of
the strategic air force: the Mirage IV airplanes with nuclear bombs and the
rockets on the Albion Plateau.
His command post constitutes the heart of the underground installations in the
- Taverny limestone. Air conditioning, subdued lighting, light walls, at the
center of th'e command post, a console with its orange screen. On the right
a coni:rol lever; on the left the indicator boards upon which the computers
display their data. -
Upon the screen, the whole of the European sky, from Brest to Prague, from -
Glasgow to Rome. The French radars are linked to allied listening posts (those
of NATO, and also those of Spain). They see the movements of airplanes from
the GDR or CzechosZovakia as well as those from Italy or Southwestern France.
All movements between 400 and 40,000 meters altitude.
- Each aircraft in flight is signaled by a luminous line upon the screen: '
a"track," The officer constantly in front of the console designates the
"track" with his control lever: the computer immediately provides him with the
speed, altitude, and identity of the aircraft. .
I was able to observe the track of an airplane above the GDR: altitude 69,000 ~
_ feet (23,000 meters), speed 1,600 nautical miles (2,960 kilometers) per
hour; it was a Mig 25. The only fighter capable of such performance.
_ The screens at Taverny and the whole of our radar network record 400,000
"tracks" per year in French air space.
There are no longer any unidentified movements, General Archambeaud says.
But 20 years ago a reconnaissance airplane could still, sheltered from detec-
_ tion or interception facilities, fly over foreign territory and photograph
objectives. The American U2 spy planes flew over the Soviet Union for 4 years
before a missile brought one of them down on 1 May 19b0. -
Today the controllers at Taverny know the identities of their 400,000 "tracks."
Except for five or six which escape them. Five or six que~tion marks. Liter-
_ ally, unidentified flying objects.
� 24
FOR OFFICI6I. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
In the opinion of the Air Force General Staff the development of detection and
ground-air missiles preclude Soviet Mig 25 airplanes from engaging in recon-
naissance flights over countries of the Atlantic Alliance. Not without risk
of an adventurous or hostile act. Possibly, for a"test" of NATO air defense. ~
Where, then, r~re the Mig 25 airplanes with their cameras going when they leave
Sc~vlet a:irspace'? Over Cerritories with littl.e or no defense from radar net-
works. They have flown over central Asia, as our Mirage IV airplanes have
eFfected reconnaissance missions over Africa. And there is tihe ocean; there
one can observe the positions of surface ships, of aircraft carriers an~l record
radio transmissions from any fleet, possibly even from submarines. -
A simple fly-over by an unauthorized foreign airplane above French territory �
is not necessarily a hostile act, General Archambeaud says. ~
Even if it is a Mig 25, it would be up to the chief of state to decide. Things
would be different in the eVent of several fly-overs. The air defense command
has a sort of precise code of actions which call for immediate interventi.on
~aith orders to fire.
Upon an immense panel in the command post at Taverny which frames a map of -
France and two boards giving the situation of all availabl~ interceptor air-
- craft: The Mirage airplanes ready to take off in a minute upon each of their
bases. And the time required to pressurize squadrons.
In toto the whole of the air arms can count 470 fighter aircraft (as many as
- West Germany or Czechoslovakia). The ambition of the air force was to have
650 fighter airplanes (as many as Poland). An ambition cut down by lack ,
of funds.
On 1 February, west of the Rhone Valley, the Mirage III E airplanes which
failed in their interception knew that their adversary was a Mirage IV. What
if it had been a Mig 25? No airplane either French or European can equal its
- performance. None can fly so fast or so high. Only the American F 15 (itself
based in Europe) can keep up with it. Our aircraft cannot get near enough
to threaten it; they can only attack it with missiles. In particular, the
Matra Super 530 with which the Mirage F1 is armed.
_ The airforce had specified the characteristics of an interceptor for the '
1980 decade. The air force chief of staff, General Grigaut, made them known,
on 6 April 1975, to the Institute for Advanced Studies of National Defense,
as follows:
- The performance essential were for interception, the ceiling, 20,000 meters,
and the radar range, 100 kilometers (all this in order to intercept the most
modern aircraft now in service). The capability for air combat, on the other
hand, necessitates a high thrust-weight ratio (thrust of the jets and weight
of the aircraft). As much as to obtain this ratio as to house a radar capable
of a range of 100 kilometers we found that we were obliged to build a twin
engine airplane. `
25
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The Mi.~;25 is a twin cngine airplane; so are the American F 15 and F 14.
C;eneral Grigaut's airplane was the ACF. Nine months later it was abandoned.
The government gave the air force a choice: with the same funds it could
have either 200 single engine Mirage 2000 airplanes or half as many ACF air-
- planes. He took the Mirage 2000.
Today that Mirage 2000 is flying. It has the best performance possible from
_ a single engine airplane. It obviously cannot have the radar of a twin en-
gine (because of the airframe dimensions).
Marcel Dassault all the same wants to build his twin engine Mirage 4000.
_ A prototype which rhe aviators can look at but not touch. Too expensive.
- Only the Arabs, it is said, are interested in it. The French twin engine
fighter aircraft has been put off to the 1990 decade.
[Photo captions]
Air Defense Command Operations Center at Taverny. Survillance of European
airspace from Brest to Prague by means of its links with allied systems.
A Mirage F 1 being refueled in flight. Four refuelings to connect Corsica
with Djibouti. _
- Mirage IV bomber escorted by two Mirage F 1 aircraft armed with Matra missiles
under the belly.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "Valeurs actuelles"
_ 11,706
CSO: 3100
26
_ FOR OFFICI~'iL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- COUNTRY SECTION E'RANCE ,
~
BRIEFS
'REAL' RESULTS OF GULF TRIP In economic and business terms,
` the "true" results of Giscard~s trip around the Persian Gu1f
turn out to be pretty meager, when compared with expectations.
Oil: France wanted to expand its share in Kuwait with at least
a letter of intent to back it. All it got was a vague "MOral
_ guarantee." (The Emirates, though, provided more concrete gua-
rantees on that score.) Cantracts: nothing sure for the Air-
bus sale to Kuwait, and a flat no on the (Technip) refinery at
Qatar despite strenuous efforts to make the price irreais~ible,
as well as on the (Heurtey) ammonia-urea plant in Abou-Dhabi. '
Cooperation agreements (sought to enable our salesmen to back '
company efforts in the future) : no firm commitment. Text]
Paris LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in French 31 Mar 80 p 2~] 6182 !
BUDGET CUTS--Some serious budget cuts are foreseen for the information ser-
vice of the prime minister's office. The funds used for investigations and
polls will probably be considerably reduced. [Excerpt] [Paris LA LETTRE
DE L'EXPANSION in French 21 Apr 80 p 3J �
CSO: 3100 ~ .
~
27
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
COIiNTRY SECTION SPAIN
BRIEFS
PNV CONTACTS WITH ETA--Leaders of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), the
ma~ority party in the Basque parliament, have already established contacts _
_ with the two wings of ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty GroupsJ (the ETA
Military and the ETA Politico-Military) with a view toward obtaining a cease
fire. [Text] [Madrid CAI~IO 16 in Spanish 30 Mar 80 p 5]
ETA TO CONTROL COMMANDOS--ETA Military has begun a w3de-ranging investiga-
tion concer~ning the autonomous comII?andos. These have acted, at times, out-
side the control of the terrorist organization. One sector of ETA is con-
- cerned over the lack of coordination within the armed organization, especial-
ly given the new political situation in the Baaque country. [Text] [Madrid
CArIBIO 16 in Spanish 30 Mar 80 p 5] _
_ -EXTREMADURA NAiIONALIST PART'i--Preparations are underway for the creation of
an Extremadura Nationalist Party [PNE] which will overcome the present dif-
ferences existing within the centrist party. The man whn reportedly will
bring this party into being is Che form UCD [Democratic Center Union] de-
puty for Bada~oz, Antonio Masa Godoy. He is currently the president of
the Agrarian Enterprise Union. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 13 Apr~
80 p 5] .
- ~TA IN ALGERIA--T[ie Spanish foreign minister ia awa~ting a detailed report
from State Security regarding those ETA.Politio-Milj.tary militants'.who were
recently detained. Those militants had been training in the Algerian police
- school. After [receiving] the technical report the Spanish Foreign Miniszry -
will take the necessary steps. [Text]rjMadr3d CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 13 Apr 8~0
p 5] -
CSO: 3110
END
_ 28
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080014-6