JPRS ID: 9064 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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JPRS L/906~
1 May 1980 =
West E u ro e R e o rt
p p
CFOUO 21 /80) -
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JrRS L/9064
1 May 1980
WEST EUROPE REPaRT
- (FOUO 21/80)
CONTENTS
THEA'i~'ER NUCLEAR FORCES -
FRc1NCE ~
Reliability of U.S. Defense 'Umbrella' Queationed
(Francois Schlosser; LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR, 18 Feb 80) 1 _
French Strategy in Next World War Debated _
(Georges Buis; LE NOUV~L OBSERVATEUR, 18 Feb 80) 4 -
s COUNTRY SECTION
INTERNATIONAL AFFAI:~S -
Former PCE Leader Semprun Questions Marchais' FCF Leadership
(LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 17-23 Mar 80) 8 =
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Schmidt Interviewed on Problem of 'Greens'
(Helmut Schmidt Interview; STERN, 27 Mar 80) 10
FRANCE _
Rocard Seen as 'Troubling Political Equation' -
(Robert Schneider; L'EXPRESS, 1 Mar 80) lb -
Candidatea Quoted on Economic, Military Strategies
(Claude Jacquemart; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 3 Mar 80) 20
Ariane Benefite Seen More Than Symbolic
(Yves Cintas; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 31 Mar 80) 24
- - a - [II~ - WE - 150 FOUO)
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..a+ivina.. u.~L VLVL1
CONTENTS (Continued) -
ITALY .
PCI Proposal for Small, Medium Induetries -
(Lorenzo Scheggi; IL MONDO, 21 Mar 80) 29
Condotte President on Business Deals With Iran
(Loris Corbi Interview; L'EUROPEO, 25 Mar 80) 32
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE -
- RELIABILITY OF U.S. DEFENSE 'UMBRELLA' QUESTIONED
Paris LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR in French 18 Feb 80 p 33 _
[Article by Francois Schlosser] _
[TexC] One by one, Jimmy Carter is reopening the cold war arsenals against
- the USSR, whose tanks have invaded a netghboring country in Asia. The extent -
of the American reaction contrasts so strongly with the moderation of nositions
taken in Paxis that some people are wondering whethe~ France is underestimating
the danger and whether it is not beco~ing too dangerously estranged from America.
Furthermore: Hasn't Paris made an error in judg=.nent in rega~d to both the
American position and the underlying intentions of the Soviets?
Since Jimmy Carter came to power, rhere have been only abortive economic summita
between Europe and the United States, German-American,misunderstandings, the
Elysee's polite indifference--an3 a great deal of distrust in European ~apitals,
caused by the inconsistency of American diplomacy. At the end of .1979, no one
hid the fact that the Democratic administration which had occupied the White _
House for 3 years was going into the 1980 election year in a totally desperate
situatioii. Rarely has a presidential team been forced into such a total ac-
knowledgment of the failure of its foreign policy.
The~~ the "Kabul coup" almost seemed like a blessing. And this is what dis- ~
turbed Paris as much as Bonn. Jimmy Carter seized the opportunity to make
_ a 180-degree turn and to reduce all of America's concerns to the confrontation
with the USSR. After underestimating the Soviet position in inter_national
relations--at the very time when the USSR was reaching the peak of its power--
he suddenly returned ro an exclusive bipolarity, asking the whole world
- to become alined with one side or the other. It seemed clear that this
new "cold waX," with its dramatic side--provided it lasts until November--
was becoming the only chance for American Democrats to win the elections. `
_ Avoid the Clash
But nothing will prevent the reelected President from sending his secretary
of state to Moscow on the day after the elections to "talk seriously." And
what will Europe do then if it follows Aaterica into this storm with a ques-
tionable election odor? How much time will be req~aired in turn to reestabli~b
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broker. ties with the East--for they are much more aumerous and deeper, we
could almost say even more vital, than those which America itself maintains
with Warsaw Pact countries.
- In this crisis, must France aline itself with Washington more than Romania
ia with Moscow? No one doubts that Western Europe's destiny in the next -
20 yeara might be profoundly changed by certain possible developments in
Eas[ern Europe. As the report of a Planning CQmmission team led by Jacques
Pelletier and Gerard Tardy* points out, regardless of the anticipated scenario--
- 1) hardening of the Soviet hold over Eastern countries as a result o~ a return
to ideological orthodoxy or post-Brezhnev "national bolshevism," or in the
- opposite case, 2) g:~eater autonomy granted to the "satellites" in their rela-
tions with the West tu alleviate the effects of the current crisis on already
discontent populations--Western Europe will be profoundly affected. This is `
why neither Paris nor Bonn wants to bring back unnecessarily--or too soon--
the cold war clash to the center of Europe.
But suppose the Americans are right? SupposE the "Kabul coup" were only
_ the prelude to an overall USSR offensive against the vital interests of the -
West, Europe and thus France? Suppose Afghanistan were only a springboard
for the Soviet army, from which it could soon change the policy of all countries
possessing the oil wealth essential to Europeans and the Japanese? Should it
then be left up to America alone to defend Europe's future? During a recent ~
visit to Switzerland, Kissinger warned some of those with whom he spoke that .
~uc~h a deaelopment could very likely set off the sirens of isolationism in
the United Staees and foster the temptation for neutralism in Europe, with
each of these prospects obviously involving serious long-texm dangers to -
_ European security.
- B~it it t~eenis that the Americans--and at the highest level--have been taking
pains for several days to minimize French-American differences. What has
impressed the White House--and which represents a new aspect of the French
polic; ~f independence--is its parallelism and, to a large ext~nt, its co-
ordination with the motivation, interests and political intentions expressed
hy the Germans. In other words, its "European" tonality. _
No Concession
J For the Americans, it is true that this German-French aspect of Giscardian
polir_y also constitutes a~u3rantee to a certain extent: indeed, what will
*_he Giscardian version of independence become when America decides to make -
- the Germans su~,mit? Paris will have no other choice except to make a small
"splitting revision." Small because, in reality, all precautions have been
taken to prepare for this po~sible disaster. Actualiy, by asking the Soviets
to "withdraw th~ir troops from Afghanistan" to make possible a further develop-
_ ment of detente, the French are keeping open the door which will enable them -
to return to the Atlantic fold without reversing their dec~sion.
~ *"L'Europe: les vingt prochaines annees" jEurope: The Next 20 YearsJ, report
of a long-term developmental forecasting group headed by Jacques ~elletier `
and Gerard Tardy, January 1980.
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- Nothing in the statements made by Giscard and his ministers for a month
and a half indicates an ii?tention of "neutrality" in the event that the
USSR ehould take the initiative to start up the cold war again in Europe-- -
whether in connection with Berlin or YugoElavia after Tito's death. Fiut
in that case, the French-German party will be over. With th~ increased
danger, Germany would seex its security in a cloae alinement with Washington. _
_ At the same time, Bonr. wou~d try to obtain the subordination of French atomic
weaponry to NAiO nuc'lear planning--an old German-American dream. But no
French government could allow such a concpssion and the efforts to modernize -
st:ategic nuclear forces, announced 10 daya ago, aeem to show that thia
ia by no means the int~ention of the cvrrent government.
In short, if a new cold war were to break out in Europe, France would retain
~ a~uch larger margin of action than in the fiities as a result of its atomic
weap~nry. No doubt the exercise of independence would be harder and more
dangeroLS than it was all during detente. But the continuation of an autono-
mous policy within the Western alliance would still not cause the French to
forgo the benefit ef the protection which America wi11 grant, in any case, -
to its vital interests in Europe--i.e., perpetuity of the status quo along
the boundariea which the previoua cold war did not even manage to budge
1 millimeter. -
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Observateur"
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE
FRFNCH ST}tATEGY IN NEXT WORLD WAR DEBATED
Paris LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR in French 18 Feb 80 pp 34-35
[Article by Georges Buis] -
[Text] The invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet armed forces has caused blunt `
reactions among American officials, a show of force by the U.S. NaW, ulti-
= mately decis3.ve pressure by the United States and China on the new buffer
- state which Pakistan has become and friction ~etween the United States and
its allies. This is because fear has taken a firm hold throughout the West,
particul.arly Yn NATO countries, fear of seeing the Soviets exploit their -
self-given advantage in the direction ~f the Persian Gulf and the Indian -
Ocean--either through Pakistan or through Iran or by bolting through the
area ~oining these two countries (_,.luchistan). -
I3oth sides, and especially the West, are worrying about distant i.ntervention
forces, as though it were a problem of the Northern Frontiers in Kipling's
time--forgetting, however, that G~:eat Britain and Holy Russia had carefully
avoided direct war, evEn in. the small-scale period of conventional warfare.
The possible confrontation of the gr~cund, naval and air forces of the two
great powers would certainly be technically impressive, but would make no
sense in a time of nuclear weapon systems. -
After the "1{abul coup," where are we? First theoretical case: The USSR ~
has managed to quickly subdue Afghanistan. It may now be satisfied with
' this or may consider making that country the center for launchi.ng its forces
toward the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. If it takes such a risk--which
is that of "full-scale war"--the USSR has na reason not to also act on the
gulf by departing from the Caspian Sea in the west (Yerevan military region)
and the east (Tashkent military region). With regard to the gulf, i~ must ~
_ not be forgotten that the USSR is linked by an aid-and-friendship treaty
with the most powerful bordering nation: Iraq.
_ Second theoreeical case: The United States is concentrating on a considerable
_ all-round aid effort to Pakistan and on military aid adapted to the particular
needs of the Afghan rebeilion. In this case, the USSR will find itself.facing
an "Algerian war" for an indefinite but certainly long period. I say an
"Algerian war" because the terrain resembles the Aures Mountains more than ~
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- the rolling vegetation of Vietnam, but with a big mult~plication factor.
~ It i.s not true that the huge jagged spurs of the Himalayas and Aindu Kush ~
will be easier to clean out than the Asian monsoon jungle. The armed heli-
copter which, in an instant, terrified the rebel fighting with his ba~e
hands will become a"sitting duck" in the high mountains for the rebel with -
a ~pecific weapon.
It is likely that this is the kind of war which we will wi;.r.a~s, for it
- ia the only possible one without danger of escalation for the two great
powers. However, public attention is being drawn by most of the media to
the "battle of the gulf." What forces can the United States set up there ~
in opposition to the USSR? Reporta are pouring in about the Rapid Deploy-
_ ment Force (RDF). How many days are needed for the American 82nd Paratroop -
_ Division to reach the gulf? Two days for the first battalion, according -
to Lt Gen P. X. Kelly, who com[nands the RDF, and 78 hours for a brigade
to go into action. The rest will take a month or months. Implementation
- of the appropriate logistics--land bases, floating ~ases, especially "roll
on-roll off" ships*--will require years. The first of the 15 ships ~f the
"rcll ~n-roll off" type~ already ordered, will be ciperational in 1983.
- Load Sharing
J The Sovi.ets would have to deal with more or less the same problet~s. Less -
in the begir.aing, perhaps, for reasons of geographic proximity, but quickl;~
~ becoming more serious for reasons of technical ability.
~ From then on, as many combinations are possible in the kriegspiel of the
~ "Cafe d~.i Ccmmerce" as in the tierc~ [French forecast betting system]. The
only condition for the combat preparations not to automatically lead to `
~ full-scale war but to talks between major powers, including Iran and
Afghaniatan at the same time, would be that the shows of military force
do not lead to physical contact between the armed forces--somewhat in the
{n which the American Sixth Fleet and the Soviet Eskadra spin arour~d
it? unisc~n in the narrow Mediterrunean, making polite gestures when they
are obliged to pass each other. We can imagine this ballet in the gulf,
with the US5R occupying the Iranian coast, thus the oil wells of Khuzistan
and the ports of Khoramchar and Abadan, and the United States on the west
ccast: Kuwait, Arabia, the.Emirates, and of course tne oil wells stretching
out on land and offshore.
- But this whole set of ~uppositions crumbles when we listen carefull}r to
whar American off icials are saying. In New Delhi on 1 February, Carter's
special envoy declared: "If the Soviets' plan is to move toward th~e Persian
Gulf, that means war." On the solQmn occasion of the "State of the Union
speech," in defining his policy President Carter particularly emphasized
that "any attempt by any foreign power whatsoever to gain controi of the -
*Ro11 on-roll off cargo ships always loaded with equipment and supplies `
and reroutable at any moment to a"hot spot."
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- Persian Gulf area will be considered an attack on the vital i.nterests of -
the United States. Such an attack will be repe~led '~y every possiule means, ~
_ including military force."
Regardless of Jir.uny Carter's emotionalism, he must be accorded the honor
that he has weighed his words before congress. And is it p~ssible to imagine
for 1 second--this also applies to Leonid Brezhnev, who knows that he would
launch an "all-or-nothing" strug,le by starting out for the gulf from the
north or east--that [.he President of the Urited States, in the case of a
vital interest, could stand for a sort of thirties' combat in the desert,
a Kolwezi raised to the 100th power and, should such a case arise, sportingly
accept defeat and the tie-up of the vital oil artery for its industr~~ and
_ that of all tts allies while iis planes, ships, submarines, silos and arsenals ~
are packed with about 60,000 nuclear warheads?
Thus in Frinciple, we are heading for an indixect war in the con*_ext of
~ a direct strategy. European governments know that, so sharpl_y accused by
- the United States of not being alert in this difficult time (except for
~ Great Britain, of course, which is again acting lik~ a vangu3rd American
state). At tiie Wohrkunde meeting in t4unich on 9 and 10 February, high American
officials also harshly dotted their i's, derianded the "sharing of the load"
and assured that the boys will not sacrifice their skins while the Europeans
play advisers.
No Esc:alar~on
34t what military aid can be contributed by a nonexistent Europe and an
antiquated, outmoded NATO with no missi~n co.~cering the Middle East and =
the Persian Gulf? Plug the hole in NATO caused by the withdrawal of
timerican units by supplying troops, in the way that the governor~s of
c;oianies led so many battalions of soldierG against the mother country?
_ Participate financially? No doubt. The FRG is already c.arrying Turkey
at arm's length. It ~ai11 have to do more. And why shouldn't France take
~ver aid to Greece? The Americans requested this in Munich. But is tha~
a task up to a Europe and Japan tragically affected--much more than America,
which also constantly r.epeats it--by the en~rgy source of the Persian Gulf? _
= At the same time that America is discovering that it can r~o longer act alone -
on the world '1eve1, it is discovering that its obstinate refusal to see
its natural allies organize into political and military decision-making -
_ centers is turning against i~ ~n a time of danger. This is what Kissinger
said i.n Paris on 3 February.
- Fortuaately, America is still by far the firrt economic and military p~-~er ,
in the world. It will win a~ain this time and the US3R know5 ;.t. That
is why Moscow will not trigger thP escalatior~. as for the Americans, whether
they like it or not, they know that they cannot ask for signjficant interveti-
tion in a remote theater of operations from the Europeans, who have a common .
burder with most Warsaw Pact countries, unless they have first been given
~anctuary by nuclear power or helped to become sanctu~ri.es by transfers ~
of technology. This is why France--by its very status of sanctuary--can ~
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- simultaneo~isly participate in a display of naval and air strength in the
Indian Ocean and retain its freedom of military action, in this case its
restraint.
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- COUNTRY SECTION I~ITERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
FORMER PCE LEADER SEMPRUN QUESTIONS MARCHAIS' PCF LEADERSHIP
Paris LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR in French 17-23 Mar 80 p 4?
[Excerpt] Novelist Jorge Semprun, former leader of
the Spanish Communist Party and former Frisoner in
Buchenwald, asks in this article why Georges Marchais
is the leader of the French Comm-snist Party. Ha has
an answer.
= We may await the results of histor~cal research, but a simple textual
analysis of Georges Marchais' own statements re~veals omissions, contra-
dictions and crying improbabilities. Also, the PCF general secretary's
lawyers should restrain�the ardor of the witnesses for. the defense, who
have suddenly become very wordy. Their fantastic precision may be fatal
to a defense st~ategy based on the fli.iid, the inexact, a quavery voice,
and demagogic workerism. Thus, we must ask ourselves an interesting ques-
tion concerning the letter of Mrs Paulette Noetinger-Marchais, Why does
_ she write that they stayed in Normandy "until 1945, sheltered sometimes
at the home of my husband's mother, sometimes with other members of the
- family, and sometimes with friends"? Were they s~ '~sheltered" that thev
did not find out that France had~been liberated? Didn't they know they
could move about, go back to work, settle the problems of an "irreconc~.lable"
who probabl.y had no papers, and live normally, at least since September 1944?
Why stay in hiding for so many months longer, while all of France was explo-
ding in the social and political upheaval of the liberation? Mightn't the
date 1945 be a revealing slip if it is remembered that the workers in Ger-
many began to come home in the �irst quarter of that year? When you know ~
of tne communist party leaders' assignments, especially in the cold war,
you realiae these questions must have been asked of Georges Marchais when
he began his climb up t~he party ladder. To put aside any doubt on this
subject, all ~he PCF would have to do is publish the various biographical
repor*_s that the present general secretary must have filled out and that
Plissonier sgeaks a~ in entirely too bucolic a tone.
_ However, the main thing now is to try to aanderstand why Georges Marchais
rather than someone else is the PCF general secretary. It is a party that
never stops preaching to everybody, a party of ~hieftains and chastizers.
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This question does not concern France alone; it concerns the whole European
left, given the PCF's specific gravity. If Georges Marchais did not hold
the position he 3oes and were not in power, his past woul,i be of interest
to no one. Unless, that is, a publisher attra~ted by the success of the
"Russkoffs" askEd him to write his picaresque memoirs. In that case, nohody
woi~ld hlame }iim for touching things up a little here and there,
l1t the 17th PCF congress in May 196~, Marchais said from the poditim, "You
, become a good communist in the party. No party member can forget that if he
became a capable and responsible party member, he owes it mainly to t~e party." -
Th at style is a ritualistic rumble, devout, pompous, and typically Stalinis*. �
- It may be wooden, but it does contain some truth: the present PCF general -
secretary is in f~ct a creature of the party, molded by the party in the
mudd�~ clay of the bad years. He is a person who has no biography as a party
member, conjured up out of nothing against all the absolutely unbreakable
' party rules, an automaton of correct thought propelled onto the stage of -
power ivhen the PCF political leaders who came out of the Resistance have -
- been pushed aside, forgotten, or kicked out.
_ At the very moment when Stalin died, the astonishing palitical career began, _
_ the career. of a man trained by Moscow's international network to have a
Stalinist's elusiveness. This network is invisibie but easily discernible
- b;~ what it does. To what end did it train him? The breakup of the Left -
- ilnion, and Kabul are the answer to this question. The answer can also be -
found tomorrow, if he lasts till tomorrow--which seems ~ather likely, in
a sudc!en move by Georges Marchais towards a policy of broad alliances that -
the Kre~nlin might again feel a temporar}~ diplomatic need for.
In his ~peech to the 17th PCF congress, Marchais exclaimed fervently,
. "tve car, never repay the party as much as it has given us!~' Oh yes, you can,
~furchais. You ca.n give it much mure. You can die f.or it.
~ COPYRIGHT: 1980 "Le Nouvel Observateur"
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- COUNTF~Y S,EC~'ION FEDERAL REp'ITBLIC OF GERMANY
BCF~?iIDT INTERYIEWED ON PROBLCM OF 'GRE~NS'
H~umburg STERbT in Cernan 27 p3aur 8p pp 256-265
,~Interview xith Cbancellor Hel~at Sc.mmi.dt; da~e and place r~t given: "we Can -
Solve Pmriromoent Frobleme Wittwnt Help of Green~�~] ~
rTea] Helmut Scbmi~it diepatched a bouquet of red roses ae -
xell e~ the head of the Off~ce of t.he Chaacellor, (~nter _
Huonker, to Stuttgart. It wae SPD Bona headq~a,asrtere' w~r of ~
oomfor~ting L~rherd $ppler, ~rho had headed the SPD elate in
- Baden..Wurttembe~rg, For lo~ing t~hs electfor~ there. ~ppler,
in fact, had threatened to thror in the toxel.
Bat the eacouregement on the c.hancellor~s part, rhoee Quppor~
had not been fort'aooa~g during the campaign~ failed to chaer -
_ Eppler up. It xas a veritable flood of ~tiff npper lip appeals -
_ xhiol~ did the ~ridc. Friends said erupportexs by the thoueande~ `
- from hie okn party and the ranks of th,e G~reene im}~lor~d him ~
not to glva up. Epgler equarsd hie ehouldere and, laid down
the po6t of fracti on Q2~ati~an in the S+,uttgsrt LandtBg~ -
, an office he had long dialiked, but retained the politically
mor~ influential ~ob of SPD party cliaiz~ma~ Par Baden-Wvrttem-
_ berg, _
He hae no intention of chang3ng conrse, he says. Gommitted to
~ the ecology se he iet the anti-nuclear, pro..e~vixbnraent, anti-
bureaucracy position he has adoptg~ xill remain the eame. "M~y-
be I irill fail," Epplar e~p~. "But I xould rather I failed
- rhil.e giving all than suce~d vith a policq that hae no real
fl,tture. n
Tppler quite likely can do trithout the party; b+;~t tha party
_ cannot do witbout bim. What Chaacellor Hel~ut S;~hmidt thinks
of Eppler and hox he intends to meet the Greene~ chal,l~nge is
the sub~eot of interviex the cba~cellor ~;ave t~ STF~N~ -
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r~un ur~r�l~lEw u5~ U1uLY
STF~iN: ~ortly uefore he died, in December 1979, prof Carlo Schmid advised -
you on hox to xin the "dieaffected," oritical young votere over to the SPD:
"The partq leadere ahould vow that they xi11 make every ef�ort to ~ind a xay
that leada out into the open." Where ie that w~y y
3chm.i.dt; I have taken this appeal of n~r friend Carlo Scluaid to heart. At '~hs "
time he made it he combined it ~ith the earnc~et r8quest to aee to it that
_ yroung people leaving achool shoald not face the threat of unemployment aud an
uncertai.n ftiture.
During the paet fex years ~ve have made great efPorts to help eve.ry young pen~
son find his place in society and to pursue a career. `I'he riumber of occupa-
tiona?. training agreemente, for example, bas-increaaed by about 140,000 ox -
- 28 percent over the laat three yeara. We ~ri.ll contir~ue to work on thie.
rn our democracy, I Kould add, ev~sryone must also make an effort himself to
fina hie ps~oper place xithin the atate and xithin aociety. There is rw eueh -
thing as guarnnteaing him a place rrlt2~out ar~y pr~bleme and difficultiee.
~ Mar~p yowag paople have a very positive attitude, ae far ae I can see; they _
are txuly motivated. Thay have turned their back on es~gg+orated demaade; they
extend help to fringe groups and to the eecially dieadvantaged. I would like
to addrese a special word of encouragement to theee young people. I aould ~
appeal to them to attend to our oountry x3th all of ite pro~ilems. -
= STERN: P~rof Caxrl~ Sc2u~i.d aleo wrote; "Yourig people experience the state ae
g cold-blood.ed mon~ter xhich turne o~at questionnair~e instead of promoting
- human oontact. Youth desirea to be 'natural;' it looka for a certa.in warmth9 -
even in pnblic li.Pe; it xante lesa of the almighty state and more of human
brothenc~aod." Do you agre~ rrith thi~ atatement and if so, how does it aFfect
- your policies ?
Schmidt: Carlo Schmi.d muet also ~a,ve bee~ talking about his own ~outh, about
his w~y of looking at thinge as oppoaed to the conventiona set by the adult =
_ world of hi.s time.
_ Ta m,y mind, this attitude young people have ie not a sign of resignation. A
ciitical and watchft~l eye directed to possil~le faulte and shortcominge is _
part of the equipment every gc~od citizen needs. I can anpathi.ze t~.th a lot `
of their uneaae. But solidarity and humanity can exist in our society on].y -
insofar as every one ~P us xs willin~ to make a oontribution to it. Bq tradi- -
tion and on the basis of its glatform, ~y party ia att~mpting to intzvduce -
more democracy and humanity into politice and whoever ~ishes to support -
theee efforte ie more than welcome in our z~anks. _
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STERN: Sow eerioual.y do you take fihe concerns of the ~ Greens' ? Lb you have
ar~ lsind of fe~lin~ for their fears and rorMea ? _
Scbmidt; I take the caree of all oitizene eeriouely, regar~il.eas o~ their
origi.n, ~heir life etyle or their party affiliation. I am n~ot bzuehing t~e
anrieties in oonnectioa wit~k'i nuclear energy aeide. These anxieties must be taken
into accoun~-.. no~xithetanding the fact that in the nnolear energ,y field -
eafety takes precedence over eoonomio coneidera~ione anqxa`y. 9a for eafe- -
B~~nS a~' ~~~1. z"esources arid our emrimnment, that hae baen ~r pereonal
_ concern for a quarter ceni,iuy too. And the federal gr~vernm,ent ~nreues the same
policy, ae onr envir~nmental pmtection pmgrams eince 1970 clearly sltiov. And,
they have been succeBathl.. -
S~i; But that doee not mean that 3rou are in agreement with the Greens,
doee it...
_ Scl~midt: I differ ~ith the Greene in tao respecte. First: I do no~t ehare their -
pee$imxetic viex of civilization xhich holds that the environment canrwt be -
_ protected effectively in the long run unless xs rar133.ca? ly alter our eoonomic
eystem and our life etyle. The euvimnmental policies of the eocialiet-liberal
_ coalition prove �'chat the oppoeite in fact ia true.
Second: Ia protecting th;e envixbnment, we muet not disregard other, m~jor ir~-
terests of our fellox citizens; those of our indu~trial xor~cer~, for inetance,
who muet have 3ob sec~uz~ity in order to live; ~hose of retired peraons whoee
pensions depend on f.he pxn~ceed8 of a viable econo~4y, or those of the appren-
tices xho have a ri~t to insiet on occupational training.
9TERN: But can you do noth ? -
Schmidt: ~le cannot poesibly reach a11 envi.xonmenta], gnals at once unless of
course xe are prepared to endan~er our economic and social stability which ie
the basis of our eazziings and our joba. We have made some impressive gains so
far. During the caarse of tY~ ~970 ~ s businese and gnvernment spez~t some D14 120
billion on environmental protection, which is f3ve ti.mes as much as the federal. ~
and Land g~vernments jointly spen~ on public hnueing, -
STERN: Hot? do you pznpose to meet the challeng~e oP tha Greene ?
Sc,h~i.dt; First of all, xe r~rill try to make the voters understand that rre can `
do without the ~~l.p of the Greene, iP the justified demands are to be attained
_ in a step-by atep fashion and with a sense of resonsibility as regarde the in- -
teresto of the country as a whole. Secondly, we will point out that the Groens
hane no policy ~ith regard to Eumpean external eecurity, with regard to balance _
= and detente, to eocial eecurity and how to pay for it and to succeaetlx]. eoo-
nomic and eocial programs in the xidest sense. -
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- r vi~ vr r.~~ ~.r.l, u or, vivl, i
STERN: Erhard Pppler h$e characterized the Baden-4~uerttemberg election outcome
ae a pereonal defeat. In nuclear policy, he adopted ~ poeition oppoaed to -
youre. Do you viex Eppler~~ dsfeat ae a vindication of ycur policq ?
3chmidt: It epeaks fbr E~.�hard Eppler that he felt that this autcomc~ x~ich
raight have besn more favorable ~or the SpD reflected upon hi~ as xell. But,
one muat also notF: that we succeeded in breaking the abs~olute CDU ma,jority ~
iri 1? out of 61 eleotion districte xhich previously had ret~zrned such a ma~o-
ri ty.
= STERt~T; But doean't it make your party think that the election turnout wag
lox and that mar~y of your euprport~rs must have at~ped at home ?
. Schmidt: The small turnout seeme to have had an effect. The i,urnout was 17
percent loKer than at the last Bunc?4stag election, E~reryone who knowe anything
about theae th3ngs eeys that thie had ari effect on the SpD particularly. In -
vie~w of Strauee' ranning for chaacellor and in view of inc~icationa that thd
CT1tJ~CSU is taking a p~eition oppoeed to the intereats u� th~ workers, I am
quite certain that the ~urnout for the North Rhi.ne-Westphalian Landtag eleo-
tion on 11 May, for example, and abova all for the Bundesta~ election trill be
_ a ~uod deal higher.
, That ie w2~r l da not believe tbat the reault of the Baden-4]uerttember~; I,andtag
election can be taken a~ a clear vote for or against the policies of the fede-
ral ~overnraent.
~TERN: The conflict between Eppler and Schmidt remains. Both of you are mea?-
bere of the presid3um. Eppler stays on as chairman of ths Committee on Basic
- Valtxoe. HA~ does the part,y pn~pose to make the votera understand th3.s con~lict ~
- dtu~ing the Bundestag campaign ?
Schmidt: The SpD is not a cadre party. Its members are supposed to aad pex~
_ mi.t~ced to think for thamaelves. Thst~ughout its history, it dz~ew much oY ita
- atrength from free discussi~n. Bnt, it is always a gr~od idea to know when the -
tirne comee to turn from discussiott to action.
In the SpD s~e have had different personalities and differenceg of opinion Por
a lcn~ time. We have never tried to make the votera believe that the major -
pibblems of our time and of the futltre can be analyzed xithok:: any controversy. -
~.rhard ~ppler has h.is place within this apectrum. N~y friends on the presidium
. share r~y ~riew in this rega:rd. 3ven pereiatent xaxning voices like Erha~cd Eppler
Rre themeelvee subject to criticiem...
ST~Rt1; But you d,~ not really have the reputation of being a decided friend of
Eppler'e...
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Sahmidt: Pbr all the differencee betxeen u$ in pereonality and style, Erhard
b~pler and I do agt+ee on the goals. Thie ~18o appliea to mo$t questione of
energy policy and energy conservation, en~ch as the priority of coal and the
~ead for developing alterlutive eourcee of energy.
There ie no point in overstating our differencee in nuclear policy; they are
- graduel rsther than 21~ndamental. ~pplsr widerstaads, ae I do, that xe csnno~
diapenee xith the linited ntilization of nuclear energq in the ehort xvn, de-
epi~te giving priori~y to ooal and prsctioing energy coneervation. -
S7.ERN: T'he $tu~tgsrt electiona bave shc,m that gppler cannot effectively -
come out for envin~nmental protection in Baden.Wuerttemberg, iP Bonn fails to
badc him up.
Schmidt: I do mt e,hare yoar interpretation of fihe election rea~lt. The -
Bundeetag election itt the fall xill ran a different course ~rom the Landta~ -
election on 16 Marah. gbove all, there ~vi11 be other iseues agafnet which the
- par~iee an8 their candidatee xill be mea~atarec~-- in foreig~a policy, eeCUrity ~ _
- policy, in economic policy and with regard to liberal ideas and justioe. dnd
_ the nntere xill be looking for ansnrera to a11 t,hese questione...
= S'I'ERl: The eoology iestue xill z~ec~in...
- 3c.hmidt; It will be our ~ob to mske clear to the ~rotere that we have alreac~y '
made important gai,na in the field of pr~tecting the environment and proteeting
na'ture. We ehail aleo have to infczm the electorate of xhat xe decided at onr
PartY oongreea in Berlin snd ~hat re included in our 1980 election platfo~.
Erhard Eppler catt help me a lot by th~ntt~tflil,ly and credibly directing the
- public~s attention to our achievements over the past ten year8 and our gnale
for the f~,~ture. I am sure ~e x~,ll gain the ~upp~~t oP m~y oP onr fellow
� c3tiser~e in the enviznnmental aseocigtions and the citi~ens initiatives in
this endeavor.
_ STERN: It seeme that you can no lon$er gmt a hearing fmm the Grsen votere.
You appear to be for a11 the things they re~ect. And that not only includee
nuolear power plants. Eave ynu xritten oif this bloc of voters for guod or
do ynu think they vonsider you "the leaeer e~vi7." ~,n viex of Stra~s~ candic~acy
and rill vote for y+nu after all ?
Schrnidt; ~'h.ose that are concerned abqut envir~nmentai pnotection, T think,
xill thin~; ver,~ serioiusly on 5 October about xho shoul,d be the next ehancellor.
- At thie t~.me, the polls indicate that a larg~e ma,~ority of the 18 to 30 yean.olde
are in favor of a~y re..election. The fact that Measrs Strause and Biedenkopf are '
_ making su ~ a ta-~do about the Greea Party these days must make t2wae xho voted -
for the Greene thi~k; thoee t~ro are obviously look3ng for xaye to obtain a
ma3oritY. -
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STERn: But among the Greene there is a larg+e group rhich disappxvves of your
polj :,ie~.
Schmidt: Perhaps there are certain gs~oups of people who disappmve of g+overr~.
ment ener~ policy. We must also txy to make the~e people understand ~hich
gnvex~nment and xhich of the parties ie in fact t~illing and able to act with -
, regard to preegrving peace, to maintai,ning grrodP.neighbor relations, to libex~.].
ideae, equal opportunity a.nc~, above all to aolidarity xith the di,,aadvantag~ed
- and to eociel ~ustice. '
I am sure that mar~y whO tilted over to t}~,e "green s3,de" at one pa3nt or au-
_ other in a Landtag election rtill realize the ~onaeque~nces of a wmng decieion
at the Bundeatag election and refLtse to take thie risk on 5 October. Last ~it
not leset, ~orei~ policy conaiderations xill make the voters realize xhat
their vote reallq means. _
COFJYRI(~iT: 1980 Gruner & Jahr AG & Co.
9478
cso: 3io3
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" COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
ROCARD SFEN A~ 'TROiIBLING POLITICAL EQUATION'
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 1*~Iar 80 pp 80-82
[Article by Robert Schneider: "Rocard Shows His Hand"] -
[Text] Fifteen months prior to the presidential election,
on Cards on the Table, Rocaxd upset the political game
whose only novelty and unknowu he is. Robert Schneider
analyzes l:is chances.
When on Monday 25 February on Channel 2, Michel Rocard asserted: "There will
be no confrontation within the Socialiat Party, for Franeois Mitterrand and
myself are very attached to party unity backing a candidate capable of
attracting a large crowd," no one doubted that, in his opinion, the name .
. of that candidate should be Michel Rocard.
How can be explained the quiet assurance of a challenger whose future seems
to depend enr_irely upon his rival'e good ~~ill? Could Mitterrand have con-
fided to him that he would not even run in the race for th~ Elysee? Not at ~
all. Rocard has aimply become convinced that, with 15 montha left before the
= presidential election, it is not he, the minority contender, who is pinned
in, it is actually Mitterrand, the historica~ Ieader, the gatherer of inen. -
- To such an extent, thinks Rocard, that the first aecretary will be unable to
, be a candidate in the fall when the militants must choose.
The Rocardian optimiam is based on a feeling and an analysis.
He derived the feeling from his 1-hour private talk with Francois Mitterrand `
_ on 18 December 1979. The meeting was requested by the first secretary. News
of the meeting wag leaked by him a few days later. Mitterrand was even will-
ing to go to Rocard's Parisian apartment, Boulevard Raspail. But the latter
preferred to visit the "boss" in his den, Rue de Bievre.
Usually, private talks between the two men--sufficiently rare to be con-
~ sidered eventa--go rather badly. They value but do not understand each
other. Mitterrand chills Rocard. Rocard irritates Mitterrand. However, ~
this time ~the climate was relaxed, a first. The Yvelines deputy confided
to Herv~ Hamon and PaCric~C Rottman ("The Rocard Effect," Stock Publiahers)
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that it was "exceptionally lucid and friendly." As stated by one of Rocard's ~
- close associates, their confrontation in the forthcoming presidential race
_ was approached "in a clinical ~anner." Mitterrand analyzed his and his
opponent's chances. He revealed that he had not yet made up his mind and, _
under those circumstances, his interlocutor could very well be a can3idate. ~
In any case, both men agreed to watch over party cahesion.
Is this a simple maneuver to lull the opponent? Rocard does not think so.
_ Hie impresaion was confirmed by tiikterrand's conf idences to friends who were
visiting him. He told them in aubatance: "If the aituation doea not char~ge
' bet~aeen now and fall, I will not be a candidate." For the time being, he is
aware that, running against Giscard, he would ~et approximately 45 *~ercent
of the votes on the second ballot. There is no question of running into a -
bitter defeat in~ 1981 after having come within a hairbreadth of winning in -
1974. Should he choose not to run, the only socialist candidate should be
Rocard--the bearer of "a historical destiny," according to *iitterrand, -
"Released From His Pledge"
Mitterrand also thinks that an improved international situation and a worsened
French crisis could place Giscard in ~eopardy. Would he then hold the best
position? His historical image is linked to the Union of the Left whicYi he _
personified for 6 years. That is why, after the 1578 def eat, he clung to it
like a castaway to a. flotsam. That is why he hoped, for the longest time--
_ ar pretended to believe--that the September 1977 break would be short-lived
and the CP, specialiet of 180� shifts, would be forced--through the anchor-
_ age of PS [Socialist Party] to the Left--to return to the Union.
Today, he is fo~ced to admit that the break is irreversible. He is timidly
beginning to draw conclusions. On 21 February, in a lengthy interview -
granted FRANCE SOIR, he declared: "Since we are being denied the Union, we
will not eliminate the possibility of governing alone." The strong reactions
raised by this small sentence show the narrowness of his maneuvering margin.
Uidier Motchane--one of CERES' [Center for [Socialist] Studies, Research and -
Education] leaders, his cumbersome ally since the Metz Congress--called him
to order: "Defacto and de jure the Union stipulates equality with the CP," -
His faithful friend, Georges Fillioud, feels obligated to headline in RIPOSTE,
_ the PS' small-format newspaper which he heads: "No! There Is No Doubting
Mitterrand!" In other words, the f irst secretary still b elieves in the Union.~
~ -
How can this deadlock be brok~n? To persiat, as though nothing had happened =
to the Left, is to show evidence of blindness or weakness before the very eyes
of the PS' elect and militants. To draw conclusions from this communist
deadlock is to recognize implicitly that Rocard and Mauroy had been clearly
aware of tY~e situation 2 ye~rs before he was. -
What can Mitterrand do between now and fall? Piobilize his partisans throughout ~
France, as he had done prior to the Metz Congress? It would be tantamount to I
promising, as of now, to be a candidate. And on what grounds should Rocard be
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_ attacked? It is impossible to blame him for running as an opponent in the
presidential election: it is Mi*_terrand himself who invited him to do so.
- Af~ter the statements to FRANCE SOIR, it is difficult to accuse him of want-
ing to govern without the communists. Mitterrand who, so many times had
_ known how to create eventa must now suffer them. One of his close associatea
recognizes that ''Tt~e only epectacular act cap~ble of ahifting public opinion
_ back would be for him to announce Rocard's ~andidacy, thus committing hara-
kiri." -
On Wednesday 27 February, before the national aecretariea of hia party, Mit- -
terrand merely made the tart remark: "I had released Rocard from hie Metz's
pledge. It took him 5 weeks to answer me." Mitterrand did not appreciate
his opponent placing him in the same camp as those who favor the state's
apparatus opposite partisans of the decen~ralization of responsibilities. He -
appreciated even leas the tribute to h-!s "historical role," interpreted as a
posthumoua eulogy. However, he will leave it up to his lieutenants to answer. -
Having been accuaed on 1 March before the Leadership Committee of having aban-
doned the Union of the Left, Rocard already knows that he will have to take
on one or aeveral leaders, should Mitterrand faii to run. =
While hia opponents run after a ghost, Rocard will make the moat of the "
_ forthcoming 7 or 8 months to try to create an irreversible situation. =
I By fall he hopes to appear as the party's natural candidate, the one who has
- the most chances to win. It ti~ould then be--what a switchl--Mitterrand, =
foundinE father of the PS, who would ~nter the competition and appear as a
factor of division to the socialist voters.
The tactic is daring. According to the partisans of the Yvelines deputy, it
can succeed on two conditions.
Racard muat maintain hia high acore in the ~ublic opinion polls, while im-
posing the image of a man ready to assum: the highest offices. On 25 Feb-
ruary, the TV viewers of "Cards on tb: Table" discovered the "presidential"
Rocard, i.e., less apontaneous, mor~ responsible. He now tries ta ahuck con- ~
spiratorial winke, street-kid bar_~er and the atyle buddy. Delivery is now
disciplined even if, in ~i;: cnd, it speeds up. The style f its the new situa-
tion: before the public, the opponent is no longer Mitterrand, it is already.
Giscard.
Within the party, Rocard must convince a ma~ority of elect--they exceed 40,000,
almost one-fourth of the recognized militants--that he is their best bet for
reelection. The socialist mayors are pondering the future of Union-of-the
Left municipalities. They are weary of daily fighte with the CP. They are
worried by the poor ratio of votes CP-PS in local partial elections. For the
1983 municipal elections, many already favor preaenting homogeneous lists,
without communiats. It shows that the image of a homogenedus socialist -
government is far from shocking. Rocard's effart ia aimed mainly at 13 depart-
- mQnts, moat of them in the South, which voted for Mitterrand during the Metz
Congresa. His breakthrough is apectacular enough to worry the first secre-
_ tary`s friends.
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- The Yvelines deputy who, for a long time, has been accused within the party
of heading a Christian plot againat the laity, also obtained the discreet but
effective support of officigls from the academic world and the Masons. He is
now cloaer to his old friend, Pierre Mauroy. On 25 February, in the Channel Z
Studio, the mayor of Lille sent a warm measage to him. His two leading lieu-
tenanta congratulated Rocard at the end of the broadcast: "Bravo, you did not
make any blunders."
_ By showing his hand 15 months before the election, Rocard upsets the political
game whose only novelty and unknown he is. This time, he is becoming trouble--
_ some; and not only to the Socialiat Party.
The CP whict~. until now only attacked Mitterrard, is now taking him for a target.
- According to L'HUMANITE of 26 February, the broadcast--listed the day before
in the TV l~g without mention of the guest's name--was the occasion For Rocard
"to practice a funeral solo for the demise ~f the Union of the Left."
- "Television Is Like a Pinball Machine"
- Pierre Chaxpy concluded his editorial ir. LA LETTRE DE LA NATION, the official
paper of RPR [Rally for the Republic], with these words: "If Rocard gave a
- picture of his great sincerity, it was only the sincerity of his ambition."
Tt-ie Giscardian camp is also beginning to worry about the seduction that "the r
modern Left," personified by Rocard, exercises on centrists and radicals. In
short, Rocard disturbs. The attacks are now going to come from every d.irections.
The more so that, as he speaks, the Yvelines deputy will have to abandon the
vagueness in which he skillfully confines himself. His wowing making itself
felt across a large spectrum of the electorate, it will be difficult for him to -
continue to please both the reformists disappointed by Giscard and the leftists -
who recanted Mao. _
His stand in favor of a striking force has already shocked ecologists and paci-
= fists. Trade unionists badly reacted to his prudence concerning self-government.
Over the forthcoming months he will have to explain what he means by "socialism
of responsibility."
One of Rocard's close associates asserted on 25 February after the broad;:ast:
"Television is like a p:Lnball machine. When you score a point, everything
lights up." Still, one should avoid a tilt.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 S.A. Groupe Express
6857
CSO: 3100
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- COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
CANDIDATES QUOTED ON ECONOMIC, MILITARY STRATEGIES
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 3 Mar 80 pp 25-27 _
[Article by Claude Jacquemart: "Overlaping Speeches"] -
_ [Text] Giscard d'Eataing tries to organize the "consensus" _
by using the international crisis. _
Chirac remains prudent. _
Rocard elects to be clever. -
The lateat televised speech of ~)alery Giecard 3'Est~ing who tried to counter _
his political opponents in the race for the presidency of the republic by
- taking advantage of the international crisis, contained two key ideas--"con-
sensus" and "national independence."
On Tuesday 26 February, over Channel 1, the president of the republic declared:
"There is a consensus. Basically, it cancerns France's independent policy and a
_ action. Currently, a very large segment of French public opinion and its
l~adera approve the policy being folloc~ed." _
"Independent Action of France": from now on, it is this Gaullist-tinged idea =
- which the chief of state is getting ready to set against Jacques Chirac to
- draw the natural electorate of the mayor of Paris. Who could claim to be
- against "the independent action of France"? _
Last week, the chief of state, Chirac and Rocard engaged in an indirect dialog.
Speaking last, Giscard d'Estaing had the advantage of closing the debate. He
reviewed his opponents' themes: France's international policy, its defense
and attitude toward the Third World with an implicit call to ttie Fren~h to
rally around him.
Ttxe only issued which was shirked was the economic debate. To be sure,
Ra3~mond Barre was entrusted with explaining i~ to the National Assembly called
in extraordinazy session; he had two figures in mind: France's 7-billion
deficit (in gross figures) as of January and the 1.9 percent inflation rate
for the same period.
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On 24 February, over Europe 1, Chirac hintea in barely veiled terms that he
would be a candidate in 1981. He confirmed that, in his opinion� altiernation
in the ma~ority implied "alternation at the top," for "the impetus given by
- the chief of state" Was the only influential factor�~n French policy."
_ ~
T~aelve days later, in his press conference, he quoted Ecclesiates: "There -
is a time ta be silent, a time to talk, a time to sow, a time to reap." That -
Sunday he explained:
,
_ "After sowing we always hope far and expect the f.aetest poasible harveat and
_ rhe ~ost abundant."
_ Having been prudent during his press conference, this time, he showed more
_ for~efulness. He noted "a sort of deterioration and general weakening of our -
_ economy," and he expressed the wish tr.at Fr~nce's ch~ices would be expressed
"within the framework of truly well-thought-out planning." He denounced zhe
aerious risks of a trade policy which aimed French exports toward countries
- "whose solvency was doubtful." He stated that the North-South dialog so dear to
to the chief of state was nothing but "chatter," and, about the Third World, he
declared: -
_ "We will have to perfect a mod~rn version of the Marshall Plan. This system
- ehould allow oil producing countries to make long-rar.ge and low-interest rated -
' investments w�ith their unaffected petrodollars which would be szuaranteed bv
the industrial councri~s."
What about defense? Chirac reiterated that "the onlv invulnerable comuonant" ~
of our nuclear force o� dissuasion. i.e., the submarine componant. had to be
develoned and, in broader terms. France's military potential had to be reinforced.
- But what does he say about the crisis created by the Soviet invasion of
- Afghanistan? -
He explained: "I am not one of those who believe that we must simply and purely _
a_lign ourseives with the Uni*_ed States or reenter NATO. Auy m~ve away from
detente drives the co~d war closer, that is to say, alignment with the blocs."
That was the chief of state's exact statement on 26 February.
J "We have an alliance; we follow an independent policy; we also have ~oint
obligatic~ns (with "regimes of freedom"): those are the three pole~ of the
presidential policy. _
- Giscard d'Estaing further explained: "Fra~nce does not practice a scouting -
policy" (this seemed to r~fer implicitly to Jimmy Carter without nau~ing him).
It will not become the "provfnce of a superpow~r," implying by that the United
States. _
This language was for the Gaul.lists' benefit arid it tried to catch.Chirac -
off balance.
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Already, 2 days before, while awarding their prizes to the best of France's
- workers, the chief of state had annaunced the Yelaunching of the participation
concept, another Gaullist idea. By the same token, when, on his order, i.t was
announced a little later that the ceremonies commemorating the anniversary of
the end of World War II on 8 May wauld be reinstated this year after having `
been cance2.ed i~ 1975, the int~nt seemed clear.
Hia whole televised speech of 26 February moved toward this "recuperation."
What about detentel He declare~i: "We never understood it as supplying uni-
lateral gains or advantagea to the partners." That was in answer to CY:irac
_ who, on 12 F~bruary, had atresaed that, ~ith the Soviet Union, "everything was
- measured and negotiated against relations of strength."
And alignment within the blocs? "It is a very dangerous idea for balance and
- pe3ce."
Europei "Its worl3wide influpnce must be restored," and the joint French-
~ German declaration ~on Afghantstan) "stands out in the reappearance of Europe
aa a new w~rld-wide center of influence and decision." It is another Gaullist-
like speech. Did not General de Gaulle bas~d European development on the
French-German alliance?
The French retall~tory� xorce? In 1974, it could deploy a 20-megaton nuclear
force (1,000 times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb); in 1980, 75 megatons
to be increased to 90 megatons by 1985, which makes Frai~~e the third-ranking
nuclear p~wer in the world.
In thia recuperation of the Gaullist speech, Giscard d'Estain is obviously
helped by the fact that, on the main issue (the new situation created by the -
behavior of the Soviet Union), Chirac hesitates to take a tough stand. He
ref.uses to boycott the Moscow Olympic Games. He also xe~ects the reassessment
of all the things which, for many years n~ow, have wovex~ the fabric of French-
Soviet relations (particularly economic agreements).
~ Involuntarily, Rocard too reinforced the idea that a"consenses" over a few
essentiai issues was appearing around the chief of state. As a matter of fact, -
h~.s speech overlaps Giscard d'Estaing's: ~aybe because, having lost the com-
munist vote, he is aiming fpr the electorate defined. bv the chief of state in '
his book,French Democracy, as a"huge central group" away from le~tist and
rightist extremes, thus ~ustifying the expression "Rocard d'E~taing" once used
by one of Mitterand's close assocYates, Jean Poperen: furthermore, it expreaes
less an idea of comr~lementarity than of competitlon. _
On 25 Februar.y, Rocard appeared on Channel 2 on C2rds on the Table. He con-
- firmed that he was keeping himself xeady for the 1981 deadline.
- Which of his positic~ns is overlaping those of the chief of state? Rocard
"strongly condemns" the invasion of Afghanistan, but he asserts that it must
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' be understood in context." Poniatowski who mir:cors Giscard d'Estalnt~'s
- thoughts, says no more than that (our emphasis).
Rocard also declared: "A peace policy consists in being able_t~ launch a
- detente policy, a human rights policy and a policy of aid to the Third World."
There again, even if his methoda are different, the Yvelines deputy is develop-
~ ing themes similar to those of the chief of state.
What about sanctions against the Soviet Union? He does not believe tha.t they
are the "only possible soluti~n," and furthermore "one can very well be firm _
while keeping relations opened" (what Giscard d'Eetaing calls maintaining
"open communication~ with the Soviet Union"). -
And the boycott of the Olympic Games? He answared:
"Please, let's not ask this type of question."
The Atlantic All.iance? He firmly favors it. Ti:e developff.ent of the French
striking force? He approves of it as he approves the existence of an inter-
vention force "developed on the basis of what it is today." _
To be sure, candidate Michel Rocard differs from Giscard d'Estaing on his
cciticism of tl:e economic situation or the desirable level of nationalization.
Aowever, he sees self-government only as a"lengthy, very lengthy dynamics~"
IE elected, he would accept to govern with the present majority, counting on
- its capacity to adapt and its generosity to promote a few important reforms.
In LE MATIN of 28 February, the policies thus defined by the Yvelinea deputy
arouse ttie aharp criticism of Lionel Jospin, the Socialist Party's second-rank-
i,ig official and a friend of Mitterand. Jospin noted in Rocard a"doctrinal '
_ forsaking" (self-government) and a"forsaktng of atrategy" (with the exclusive ~
_ ,.heory of a homogeneous socialist government).
_ He said that if it~aere not a fanciful notion, it wo~uid mean that, fundamentally,
- ~ae could govern with the Right.
' In reality, Rocard is trying to promote a strategy of the possible, by reassuring
the centrist voters who ~aill sway the deciston in 1981. Knowing that he cannot -
- count on the communist vote, he is not ignoring ei.ther that, should the Socialisic
_ Party choose him as its candidate, he will have to face some differences. ?ean-
Pierre Chevenement, the Belfort deputy and leader of CERES [Center for [Social-
ist] Studies, Research and Education] (the PS' left wing), threatens to run also -
should Mitterand withdraw in 1981. =
Itocard's course of action is si.ngularly narrow and it drives him to going
prospecting in the territory of his leading possible opponent. Thus, their
speeches overlap whereas Chirac, determined to define an "alternation in the
majority" without offering a victory to the opposition, cultivates his dif-
ferences while camping on the banks of tHe Rubicon.
CUPYRI(JHT: 1980 "Valeurs actuelles"
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~
- COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
ARIANE BE~IEFITS SEE~1 MORE THAN SYMBOLIC
P~ris VAI~EURS ACTUELLES in French 31 Mar 80 pp 56-58
[Article by Yves Cintas]
- [Text] A new company, named Arianespace on 26 March, will
soon take over re3ponsibility ~or tfie fate of the Ariane pro-
_ gram; it will produce the sister versions of the rocket wh~ch
- was launched at Christmas. -
~ The European, and mainly French, space adventure is now really
- beginning, 20 years after the start of the American and Ru~-
sian space pr~grams. There is no great enthusiasm outside of
the scientific world; the public at large is still sceptical--
as sceptical as the politicians were not so long ago. _
_ In 1973, the man who is now president of France, then ministar
of the economy and finance under Georges Pompidou, opposed the �
- French launch vehicle project; he considered it only a new and
_ worse Concorde.
In fact, Ariane and the satellites it will carry into space d
appear to be the best economic card our country has played
~ during the past decade, along with its associated Europ~an
partners.
- Ariane's first flight is the crowning touch of an ambitious
and difficult undertaking. People outside don't realize that
a launch vehicle can remain tied to th~ ground indefinit~ly,
and for insignificant reasons. A single defective part can -
cause the launcher's destruction.
In 3ddition to the design problems faced with Ariane, it was -
~essentia~ to harmonize the products manufactured and the work -
:
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_ schedules o~ about 50 businesses all over Europe, to create
totally new produ~tion tools, such as an assembly plant near
the SNIAS [National Industrial Aerospace Company] facilities
at Les Mureaux, and to develop a great many computer programs. -
Simulations
The simulations, which were used for the final checkout before
the first launch, before the test, required a perfect mastery
4f data processing techniques.
~ `Phe most interesting feature is that these calculations will
enrich th~ data banks and~may be used in fields other than
space, such as the managetrient of vast and complex programs
_ in nuclear technology, engineering, aeronautics, naval con- -
struction, etc. Tfie initial "loss planning" for the Ariane
, rocket included 40,000 events that could each prevent a launch.
What is true in general is also true for the details, for the
calculations needed for structures applicable to nuc~ear tanks,
ship hulls, etc. The Frencfi discovered the Pogo effect (vibra-
_ tior~s of propulsion systems harmful to the solidity of the
en~tire unit) with the Diamant rocket. Through the data avail-
able, the~~ were able to "model" this effect for the Ariane
launch, to verify the model by computers, and develop a cor-
rective system which was found to work.
;
Ariane's first f light is also a methodological success.
The management used, the same as that used for the civilian
- Airbus program, is based on a pragma~tic approach. There is `
no reason for a plane to exist unless it sells, provides jobs,
and maintains an industrial program. A launch vehicle's pur-
pose is to carry payloads, satellites. If it stays on the
- ground, the financ~s]. efforts it required are a total loss.
- And it then causes delay3 in all the areas of research which
depend vn its good operation for the pursuit of their work.
Unlike the promoters of the Europa III rocket, the Ariane
promoters voluntarily cut back on their ambitions insofar as
technological innovations were concerned, in order to have -
greater security. Major innovations, such as the cryogenic _
propulsion system used in the third stage (:liquid hydrogen and
liquid oxygen) were few iri number. ~ .
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For that reason, Ariane was said to be a"pri~nitive" rocket.
But it works. And becaus�e it works it will, like the Airbus,
give rise to a family of launcfiers with better and better per-
formances�, which will make an ef~ective contribution in crea-
ting the European space industry.
- Management of a program on such a scale demands a single
_ decision-maker. The Ariane p:~amoters learned a lesson from
the repeated technical and financial setbacks of the last
Europa program.
_ This time there was only a single prime contractor, the CNES
[National Center for Space Research], and only a single indus-
- trial o-rganization, the SNIAS, responsible for "standardiza- _
tion of interfaces" (putting the parts~ of the rocket together)
and for integration of its own products and those of the five ~
major partners: the SEP jEuropean Propulsion Company], Air ~
Liguide and MATRA in France, ERNO in the Feder..l Republic of
Germany, and Contraves in Switzerland. -
- The concentratian of decision-making authority in France had _
an historic basis. In 1973 the Gaullist "old guard" was only "
able to get its launch project, tfie L III S program, accepted
by its European partner.s by agreeing to have France pay for
most of the financing (62.5 percent of the budget).
An Effective System _
Time (from the middle of 1979 to the end of 1980) and cost
(2.5 bii'lion francs in 1973 prices) restricta.ons were respec-
ted. For that reason, the system will not be changed. The
Arianespac~ con,pany will operate very much like the Airbus
Industrie join~ venture; it will hold all powers, particular-
ly for sales.
The value of the Ariai~e program, for a country like ours, may -
- also be measured by the number of direct jobs and by the sales
volume it produces.
_ For the 1980-~990 decade, the market for the launcher is -
estimated at about SO units. This includes the four experi- -
' mental launch vehicles, the last of which will be launched
- in early 1981, and the six launchers scheduled between 1981
and 1983. Eacfi of tFie vehicles costs about 175 million francs.
_ This price is comparable to that of the satellites it carries.
The total figure ~herefore represents about 15 to 20 billion ~
current frar~cs in sales over a 10-year period and from 5,OA0
to 7,000 permanent jobs during this decade. ~
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These figures may seem deceptive. In fact, the situation is
_ a little as i~ space were a research laboratory for other in-
- dustries. The consequences of tfie space program are not im~ne- -
diate, nor are tfiey easy~ to predict, but they are certain. An -
example is the present use of aerodynamis~n (an old invention
. of aeronautics) to rednce consumption.
The French space scientists and industrialists are beginning
to glimpse new possibilities. They range from the storage
of energy without batteries (through the development of kine-
tic wheels with magnetic bearings by the SNIAS) to increased
_ safety in nuclear facilities (with the improvement of seal
techniques and the invention of antivibration and antiseismic
absorbers). From petrolewn extraction in very deep waters
(new equipment, remote guidance) to medical diagnoses based
on an instant observation of a great many parameters). From
the elimination of friction in znacfiinery to more efficient
prospecting for mineral, ~narine, and ather resources.
And the final result of the Ariane program: the rocket has put
an end to the American monopoly on launche~. The European _
satellite industry had been kept within very narrow limits:
_ meteorology and astronrnny~. _
The Americans had 5locked not only the inilitary use of satel- -
lites, but also their cammercial use, particularly in commu-
nications, in whicfi tield the Europeans could only launch -
experimental satellite~.
Ariane Has Opened Up This Field
Now Europe will no longer be barred from a huge potential
market, that of business communications: telematics, telex,
video conferences, data transmission, etc. In the latter ~
area, in a few years they would have run up against a monopoly,
the IBM monopoly. In 1978 IBM asked for authorization to
launch its own satellites, the SBS (Satellite Business System). -
Another huge market as yet untapped is image broadcasting.
- Once in orbit, satellites can cover vast geographic areas
without the use o� the very heavy in~rastructure now needed on
the ground: radio relay systems, retransmitters, etc.
- This new market is esti'mated to be between 75 and 100 billion
francs a year tfirougfiout tne world between ~now and the year
, 2000. Simply in launcfi vefiicles, satellites, and ground
transmission stations. And this does not include receivers
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_ (television sets~, which will have to be completely replaced ~
in the industrialized countries. This happened in France wi~h
the introduction of three channels, and with the switch to
color.
Ariane came late. But still in ti~nne to enable the Eur4peans
_ to try to get a good share of the pie.
The French Share
About 50 businesses are involved in the Ariane program. Most
are French, and they s~ubcontract for six major contractors,
four of which are French.
a. The SNIAS. This is the industrial architect of the pro-
. gram, which has provided for 10 percent of the sales of
its ballistic and s~pace systems 3ivision (250 million
francs of a total of 2.5 billion). Program-related
come to 600 of a total of 1,000 jobs
5,700 for the arent com an ~space activities) and
division). P P y~17,000 for the aircraft
~ b. The SEP. The program lias been quite important to this
company, the engine developer. In 1979 it accaunted for
281 million francs of a total volume of 773 million.
The prograrn employs 1,000 people of a total staff of
2,563.
MATRA. Svpplying the nose cone and its e~quipment ac-
_ counted for approximate sales of 70 million francs in -
1978, or 4 percent ot consolidated sales. The Ariane
workforce was 65 people (plus 80 from subcontractors) of
a total of 5,500 in 1978.
_ d. Air Liquide. Ariane-related activity is considered
marginal in relation to its consolidated sales (over
7 billion in 1979). About 40 people are assigned to
space activities. _
COPYRIGHT: 1980, VALEURS ACTUELLES
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COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
, PCI PROPOSAL FOR SMALL, MEDIUM INDUSTRIES
~ Milan IL MONDO in Italian 21 Mar 80 pp 21-22
[Article by Lorenzo Scheggi: "Let the Children..."]
- [Text] At Bottegue Oscure [Comimxniat P~rty headquarters in Rome] the
Co~unist Party leaders meke no mystery of it: The problems of small and ~
medium businesses will be one of the communist we.rhorses in the spring -
adminiatrative elections. The ob~ective is to revive the pulicy of
alliances among the working classes and what the conmrunists call "productive
- middle-class groups." Attother ob~ective is to try to b~come a point of
reference for amall industrialists who feel they were abandoned by
' Confindustria [Oeneral Confed~ration of Italian Industry] an8 Confapi
[Italian Confederstion of Small and Medium Industry]. The PCI maintQins that
these organizations were hypnotixed by the problems of change of leadership
and are dedicating very little attention to the pr~blems that grip the ~
- medium-small businesses. (In regard to the change of leaderehip, 5 months -
_ were not suPficient to find an heir to Guido Carli, ~hile the atmosphere in
Confapi is heating up becaus@ ot' the expiration of the mandate of it$ ~
current preaident Giuseppe Spinella).
Thus, aIl the energies of the Economic Department headed by G~srardo Chiaro- _
- monte, and particularly the medium-small section headed by Guido Cappelloni,
have been ~nobilized. A Tuscan regional conference on small and medium
industry has been scheduled for 22 and 23 March at Florence. The following =
week, a similar program is scheduled f~r Bologna to cover the Emilie area.
In April at Turin there will be a seminar in prepaxation for the Piedmont
regional conference (planned for the beginning of autumn) on "Sma11 Business
and Ignorant Fiat." Two similax programs Were held in recent ~eeks in
Calabria and in Puglia.
~
_ The communist offensive in support of small industri~s atarted by Giorgio
Amendola and Eugenio Peggio in 197k seema to h ave entered a new, decisive
phase. (The first national canference was held in 1976 and tk~is was follo~red
by the Milan conference pro~aoted by the lc~cal CESPE [Center for Studies in
Economic Policy] and with the second natiunal cAnference pro~oted by Fernado
di Gii.~lio at Bologna in 1978). Z'he communis~s explain that the ob~ectives of
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thia program "are not to enter the internal struggle for succession to
leadership of' Confindustris and Confapi. Nor, muah less, is it to get the
electo.ral support of the industrialists." Even if, they admit at Com~munist -
Headquarters, "there are now mar~y communist industrialists" (but they are not
able to say ho~ men~y and a survey ie being prepared for this) that e3ther
belong to business aseociations ar participate openly in the lifE� o:F the
pe,rty: Industrialists ere on the federal committe;es in bnilia and Tuscar~y;
at Turin the federation haa promoted e apecial ~:~~rking group of industrialista E'
which meet r~gularly e~t party headquarters; even though on the nstional
level, finsll,y, there are frequent meetings of coaununiet industrialiets.
"We only plan," said Mauro Meruzzi, deput~r chief of the Middle class Section ~
of the PCI, "to advance specific proposals to support amall and a.edium
industries. Because where we like it or not, both the Confindustria and
_ Confapi are not doing anything for this very important sector which needs
- rasny things." .
But what do the communists specifically propose? What will they say in the
streets during the election campaign in regard to medium and small industry?
The central point of the proposal is simple: Rather than continue giving
these plants financial aid on~}r, it is necessary to provide them with real -
services on the regional level. It was not an idea that came from nothing:
"Experiences of this type," Meruzzi explains, "already exist: It is merely
- a matter of generalizing them." This is the case, for example, in Piedmont
where. with the aid of the regional financiel organization, Finpiemonte (which
entered as a minority member), a amall group of ema11 electrical planta, each
wi`h a maximum of 100 employees, establish~ed a consortium to purchase patents -
ann ~nologies, for sales snd specialize,tion in individual producte. Or
in Emill~. '~ere collaboration between the regional administration, the -
- charaber~ nf conunerce and industriel or srtisan asaociationa led to the
creatian Qf Ervet, a specialized regional organization which in cooperation
with the University of Bologna has promoted a technological center for
metals for the use of a11 members requiring experimental data and consulte,tion. -
- Or again, of the consortilm? developed at Carpi and Correggio between the -
: tiextile plants Which have lawnched an ambitious "feshion pro~ect," and that
of Ferarra for the sale of agricultural machinery, and those final],y, promoted
- by the thnbris e,nd Lazio regions in the industrial zone of Aprilia.
According to the PCI proposal, therefore, every region should have "regional
development centers" Khich would draw upon. the experience of regional _
financing institutions. They should be mixed-participation corporations ~
and regional and private corporations (that is associations of businessmen, ,
chambers of commerce and credit institutions), to which w~ould also flow the
centers of the CNR [National Research Council) which cooperQte in some
- pro,jects resulting from the diffusion of technologies, the Industry Ministry's
- experimental stations, the consortia for developm~ent areas, and with which =
- the organizations promoted by the F~nd for the South, (Institute for the Aid
~ of the Development of the South] and Formez [Centers of Training e,nd Stuc~y _
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on the South] ahould harmonize their efforts. The function of the southern
~ fY nancial institutions such $s FIME [Southern Financial Trust], FINAM [Agri-
cultural Fine.ncial Truet t'or the South], and INSUD [New Initiativea for the
South] ahould also be revie~wed in i~Znction of the establishment of the
fore8oing centers, according to the coaununists.
The servicee offered by theae centers, which would be paid for by the users,
are: Prwnotion of consortiwne; acquiBition and spread of technoldgy; sale -
of product; cexe of ir.tercompar~y relstionehipg toward a common policy in ~
handling order.s; preparetion of sreea equipped for industrial plante; dif-
fl~sion and knowledge of da~a uset~l to buaineas; promotion of factory
planning, pra~otion oP up-to-date proFessional training of lebor and of
management. ~
Instead the entire policy of incentives should be handled by national
authorities, bu~ only after reorgaaization and coordination of various laws
governing them. The PCI leadership recognizes that "hawever, the road is
atill long because the DC [Christian Democratic Party] prefers different
- solutions that would leave flznds to the regions to be administered directly,
in short, creating so maqy sma11 Gepi [Industrial Managemsnts and Holdings]
- With Which to finance clients, but also b ecause the entire south is still
very bsekward." For this reason the coaununists have decided to launch a
particularly strong offensive in the south presenting in a11 the regional
aouncils draft legislation for the creation of these develogment centers
(thie has a7.reac~y been done in Puglie, Campania, Abruzzi and Basilicata) and
furthermore propoaing the trana~ormation of financing companies operatin3
in the southern regions on the 'oesis of a specigl statute.
~ Haw wi11 bueinessmen react to these proposals? The communists do not hide
_ the Pact that they are fair~}r optimietic. Thia is because they are con-
vinced that their effort is right, but elso because, together with the
regional centers, they believe they can offer sma11 and medium industrielists _
advantageous proposals even on the trade-uniott level. SpeciPically (but the
idea ia for the time being on~y in draft form) they seem to be oriented toward -
making a commitmettt with the trade unions to approach labor contracts in
the flxture which in saane respects will be common to all plants , but in other
respecta differentiated between the ama.ll and medium plants on the one hand -
and the large onea on the other. F'or example, these diFferences could be in -
the area of qualifications and wsge pa.rameters; in ~erms of ,jobs for youth
- (law on appr,enticeship erid Law 285); as well as in terms and flexibility in
the use of labor, and, finally, in regard to wages. For sma11 plants there ,
- . ~aould be a massive taxation program to fund the welfare burden. Meruzzi
said, "We do not in the least think that the contracts for the small plants
- can be made at a discount. But it is inconceivable that all regulations that
apply to Alfa Romea can also app~y to a plant that has only 100 workers."
COPYRIGHT: IL MJP1D0 1980
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COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
~
~
_ CONDOTTE PRESIDENT ON BUSINESS DEALS WITH YRAN
Milan L'EtJROPEO in Italian 25 Mar 80 pp 8-9
[Intervierr with Lo ris Corbi by ~,'EURppEp; "Why the Iranians Don't Love Us
_ Any More"; date and place not given] -
[Text] On top of ~he pa,pers strewn about the Roman office of Loris Corbi,
president of Condotte, there is a book bound in red. It is an essay on the
- Iale.mic revolution which the author, the governor oP the Central Banlc of Iran,
~ Nobari, signed and dedicated "with friendship" to the pre~ident of Cond.otte. -
Corbi knoWS the art of diplome,cy. A year ago it seemed that he wo~uld go ~
down together xith this compaqy in the crash oP the Persian F~npire. Today
he is the Italian who travels most often to Tehran. His most recent visit
~ to President Bani Sadr and other Iranian leaders xas on 1 Maxch.
[Question] Profeasor Corbi, can you explain thts miracle? ~
~ [Answer] Easy. Durin the sto I
6 rn~r months oP the Iranian affair, from
- ~ecember 1978 to Ma,y 1979, the Italians in lran--let me s~y that Condotte ~
was at the top of the list--we;e the only group thst did not yield ta panic.
A:fter the Workers'famili~es were evacuated we tried to overcome the diPficultiea '
of the moment but we continued to work. Z'he site oP our afFiliate which is
building the Port of Bsr~dar Abbas, Italcontractors, was never closed. We--
I speak Prom personal experience--continue to seek a direct dialog with the
emerging leaders. The Iranians became aware of this and they appreciated it.
[Questian] Nevertheleas the ne~w regime canceled enormous orders. FIow flid -
W e res c ue ours elves ?
[Answer] Through ou;~ attitude and because the ~rork contracted to the Italians,
like the Bandar Abbas Port, are peacefl~l works and as such Were recognized
as val.id even by t'~-~ new leaders . We in The Condotte firm, Por example, in
- Septe~mber had alre;ac~r agreed with Tehran on the confirmatinn of our plans
and f1i11 resumptiun of xork. ~
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[Question] At that time you had a credit of more than 200 billion lire. Did
they pay you?
[Anawer] We opened negotiatior.s saying clee,rly that we could not extenc3 even
1 dollar more of credit. If we returned to work, that meana we obtained what
Wae neceseary to continue operations: We are now tQking steps to collect
- large amounts owed us.
- [Queation] Does this mean that Iran is extending privileges to Itely?
_ [Ansver] I would sey yes. At least it Was that way until a few weeks ago.
_ With every new trip I made, before and after the occupation of the American
E~nbassy, I noticed a grawing opening, a clearer friendship toward us. There
Was not one Iranian leader up to the highest level who did not setiy: "We Will
_ do great things together." For two xeasons: Because Italy was consi dered a
politically "clean" partner, without the attitudea of the great powere and
less inaidious than other E~aropean nations; because Italy is capable of
ofPering a high degree oP technology in the four sectors tha,t the new regime
considers to have priority and that ia agriculture, petrochemicels, civil
engineering and communications. I might note that the fr3.endly attitude
toward us is very different from that accorded to others.
[Question) And noW?
[Answer) There ha.s been a clear and sudden change. The friends hip I had
- found at Tehran in January disappeared early in March. With regret, ~ut with
firmness, Q11 the Iranian leaders accused us of having disappointed thpm, by
blocking supplies already paid for auch as helicopters and spare parts. They ~
are things that Bani Sadr himself said repeatedly in public in the days when
I was at Tehran. An unpleasant situa.tion was created. -
[Question] A broken r~ance?
[Anawer] I'am afraid so. I have confidence that in a fe~r days Italian
authorities will overcome the obstacle, taking steps so that our relations
With Iran xill continue as they Were before. The de,mage has been done:
And it shou~d not be worsened. There is even a reciprocall,y advantageous
_ opportunity for the t~ro countries that should be developed.
[Question] Did you personally approach Italian a~sthorities to overco~e the
crisis?
[Answer] I did all I could. I certainly cannot be suspected of not being a
_ friend of the West and I know that a state agency cannot fail to t~ke into
account the policy lines of its vwn government, khich hawever should take
responsibility far the consequences. However, in this as in other cases, I
_ am accustomed to (WOrds misaing] I consider above all our national interests.
_ COPYRIGHT; 1980 Rizzoli Editore
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