JPRS ID: 9030 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200070023-7
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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H�ok oNNicint. IJtiH: ()NLv
JPRS L/9030
14 April 1980
Near East/North Africa Report
(FOUO 13/80)
.
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sPRS i/9oso
14 April 1980
NEAR EAST>NORTH AFRICA REPORT
' (FOUO 13/80)
CONTENTS
PAGE
_ AFGAANISTAN
- Afghan'Retz's Vow To Fight Until End
(Patrice Franceschi; L'EXPRESS, 23 Feb 80)
1
ALGERIA
New Directions of Economic Policy Reported
j ( MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITFRRANEENS4 1 Feb 80)... . 0
6
Briefs
Sa.udi Arabia Criticized
11
Cooperation With USSR
11
. Actively-Dnployed Residents
12
LEBANON
Consequences of Syrian Troop Withdxawal Discussed
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 15-21 F'eb 80) ..........o.......
13
Review of Crisis
Oppoeition to Deployment of Lebanon'Units
LIBYA
� Swedish FYrm Telub Sells Military Technology to Libya
(Goran Jonazon; VEGKANS AFFARER, 31 Jan 80)
26
_ a_ [III - NE E A- 121
FOUO)
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- CONTENTS (Continued) Page
MOROCCO
Paria Magazine Interviews Moroccan Communist-Leader Ali
. Yata
(Ali Yata Interview; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 2 Apr 80) 29
TUNISIA
Gafsa Incident Seen as People's Revolt
(Adel Wahid; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 3 Mar 80) 32
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AFGHANTSTAN
AFGHAN REBELS VOW TO FIGHT UNTIL END
Paris L'EXPRFSS in French 23 Feb 80 pp 95-98
[Article by Patrice Franceschi: "With the Afghan Rebels"]
[Text] Facing Soviet units whose troop strength is constantly in-
creasing but which so far have been confined to approaches
to the cities and main roads, the Afghan guerrilla fighters
are stepping up their harassment. Before and after the
Kabul coup on 27 December, Patrice Franceschi lived for
several weeks among the mountain soldiers, with a photographer,
Pascal Manoukian.
"I am fighting the communists because those people have no god and are try-
ing to prevent us from praying to Allah. The communists say that everything
should belong to everyone. I could not stand to share my wife with anyone
or to loan my trousers or my house! Those people are bad, very bad!"
Sadiq pauses to gulp down some scalding hot tea. It is cold outside and the
snow covers the infinite steppe, swept by the wind. The warmth of the small
fort lulls us. For several days, we have eaten and slept, rolled up in
heavy covers, in big earthen barracks, half in ruins. No fighting troubles
the silence of the immense plain, hemmed in by rugged mountains in the north
. and the south. Here, in the rebel camp of Hezbi Islami in the Afghan pro- _
vince of Zabul, everyone awaits the enemy. v
Sadiq is one of the 13 officers who lead the 300 men in the camp. He de-
serted from the Afghan Army. "Five months ago, I belonged to a mechanized
regiment. In our unit, there were 19 khalqui officers, supporters of Haf-
izullah Amin. For a long time, along with other officers and soldiers,
I had wanted to defect to the moudjahiddines [rebel soldiers]. One night,
we waited until the khalquis were eating together at the mess and we took
them by surprise and machine-gunned them. Then we came here, with the
equipment we could take, and those who wanted to followed us. Now we are
fighting the communists."
But with what means? This camp, one of the best equippea of the rebels,
is nothing but a bunch of old forts and underground pillboxes covered with
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sheet metal and earth. Heavy weapons are everywhere: in holes, aitches,
crevasses, all Riissian, taken from the enemy or brought in by deserters.
There are old field guns, outdated mortars, small-caliber antiaircraft
batteries and two armored troop transports.
In camp, life goes on as if the war were nothing but a distant rumor. Dur-
ing the day, the men roam about, sleep or share the chores of bringing in
wood and water. Impromptu bakers knead their loaves of bread in their
smoky cave. Cooks prepare the potatoes and corn, the main staples at meals.
A tailor cuts and sews in his dirt hut, without ever managing to make the
ill-matched clothes worn by the rebels look like uniforms. The garments
a*-e not adequate for the winter and the men cough constantly. They can only n
get warm in the evening, in their pillboxes, where makeshift stoves burn.
"We Follow the Crows" '
During the day, they march, or rather, float in wornout boot-;, without
stockings. They wrap themselves up in whatever coats they c:an find, wool
or cloth, civilian or military. Their entire fortune is in their pockets.
No rank insignias are visible, but they do wear party badges, keychains
with the effigy of *heir leader Gulbuddin Elcmatiar, the hero of the illiter-
ate peasant become a moudjahiddine. They believe in him as they do the
Prophet.
The Afghan rebellion is probably the poorest in the world. They fight with
everything they have and nothing. And yet, this camp is the best armed
one that we saw. Nearly every man has his Kalachnikov. Flsewhere, they
often have only old pop guns to pit against the tanks. Even getting enough
to eat is a problem. The men eat very little here. Al1 supplies come from
Pakistan, by truck. When the road is blocked becauae of winter weather,
_ they pray to Allah and wait.
In camp, they train only rarely. "It is useless," Sadiq explains. "We
are used to the terrain and to war. In our country, we learn to use weapons
when we are children." Nor is there enough ammunition. "We have very lit-
tle and we have to keep it for fighting. When we practice firing, we do ~
so without buJ.lets. The important thing is to aim and not to lean on the
trigger. With the antiaircraft batteries, we follow the crows as if they
were planes. That is sufficient." Sadiq is not joking. In his holy war,
he is afraid of nothing, especially of the Russians. He scorns them.
"They are very afraid of us."
What if they sent paratroopers against the camp? "We would be very happy. ~
We could make gloves and tents with their parachutes. But they have never
attacked us. Twice they sent planes. They bombed the Pakistania near us,
but they didn't kill anything but a dog." .
Later,'in the nearest foothills of the mountains, Sadiq disinterred two
corpses in a ravine. "They were khalquis (supporters of Amin) that we
captured. They managed to escape, but we caught them here. I crushed
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the first one's skull with a rock. The second one did not resist ve:�;:
much. We beat him so badly that he was completely black and blue and ery
weak."
The fate of the prisoners is always settled in this fashion. This nameless
civil war is cruel and merciless. The only prisoners that escape death
are those about whom some doubt remains.
When they are Russians or communists, torture is almost the rule. "When
we capture them," the rebels told us, "we kill them slowly, very slowly.
We put their eyes out and take their ears off with needles and then we cut
off their noses. We pull their fingernails out and then we cut off their
fingers, their forearms, drms, and then their legs. When they capture one
of our men, they pull out his beard by bits and drag him behind a cart
until he dies." The Russian prisoners are also very frequently emasculated,
but our comrades remain prudishly silent about this.
One day, we met*with the head of the camp in his command post, which was
connected by field te].ephone to dif.ferent positions. This "commanding
_ officer" is as young as his junior officers and does not conceal his ambi-
tions: "Making it to Kabul is not very hard; everyone in the country is
with us. But next we shall take Samarkand and Bukhara, where our Muslim
brothers are. Then wQ shall go as far as Tashkent and one day, we shall
reach Moscow. It will take a long time, but when we are done with the com-
munists, the whole world will be done with them!" We were to hear these
words often from the mouths of other officers in the Hezbi Islami Party,
both the most powerful and the most fanatical in the rebellion. The others
_ are more modest in their ambitions, more moderate.
Transistors are here, as they are everywhere. In the evening, the men in
their pillboxes religiously listen to the news broadcast by the Hezbi Islami
radio station. The party has its own transmitter, somewhere in the Konarha,
it is said. Kabul tries to jam the broadcasts, but without great success.
Seated around the radio are bearded Pashtos, wearing the traditional turban,
smooth-faced Hazaras fond of the Afghan Army caps, Nuristanis with blue eyes,
said to be the descendents of the soldiers of Alexander the Great, Tadzhiks,
Turkmen also. Most of the Afghan ethnic groups are represented here. In
the field, at least, the Hezbi seems to have achieved a certain unity,
much more than at the general headquarters in Peshawar in Pakistan, where
ane finds only Pashtos, the dominant ethnic group.
Frequently, rebels groups appear out of the night and come into the �ort.
They come from Pakistan and go to the different fronts in the region. The
camp is a relay station also for those who pester the Kandahar-Kabul road,
one of the country's vital arteries.
Great Pashto leaders with richly embroidered garments, boys 15 to 20 years
old who affect a hardened air, spit on the walls and handle their weapons
all day long: The moudjahiddines come from a11 strata of society and all
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age classifications, but the poorest are always the ones who serve the rich
at meals, who do the chores. Even here, the prestige of having gone to
school or attended university, the power of money and family make the
difference.
On Ch*istmas day, we went to a second, smaller camp 15 kilometers further
north which defends an approach to the road to the main camp. Some 64 men
and two officers occupy the some 15 pillboxes overlooking the approach.
The leader of the position is a Turkmen. His assistant, called Aziz,
is a young Tadzhik with very kind eyes. Formerly an officer, he once had
in his unit a French professor. In his timid voice, he recites: "La
tour Eiffel a trois cents metres de haut, en bas on voit la Seine...."
With the announcement of the coup d'etat of Babrak Karmal, we returned to
Ka.bul and witnessed the last fighting between the supporters of Amin and
the Soviets. We spent the week in the feverish atmosphere created by the
Russian invasion. Stopped twice, we managed to rejoin the rebels. Dis-
, guised as Turkmen moudjahiddines, we reached Konarha Province after long
days of walking. T~ao men accompanied us: Tamim and Iaria. Tamim was a
young engineer who belonged to the Jamiat Islami Party. "Before," he says,
"when my mother asked me to kill a chicken, I always refused. I couldn't
stand it. Now I have killed two communists that we tortured with electri-
- city and it didn't bother me at all, really, not at all."
Vagabond of War
Iaria, his companion, is considered a hero. He is a Nuristani with blue
eyes, blond beard and Roman nose. He is the first to have declared the
holy war in his region. What did he do before? "He roamed around the moun-
tains and valleys," they say evasively. "Since that time, he has been
everywhere, a vagabond of war and violence."
In the valley of the Kunar Rixyer, the villages have been "liberated" for
several months by the guerrillas. Daily life goes on ag it did before,but
starvation zhreatens and the men trade their pickaxes for guns. Here,
there is no unity in fighting. Disorder reigns. The men fight for their
tribes, their villages, their parties, without worrying about others, but
their faith is the same. The sense of danger also.
"The worst thing is the a.rmored helicopters," Tamim explains. "They come
down right close to us and massacre us with rockets, guns and machine guns,
but we cannot bring them down with our rifles. We are also afraid of the
mines. We step on them without being able to do anything about them. But
we are not afraid of the planes. They have a hard time maneuvering in the
mountains. The tanks are very vulnerable. We 3ump on them and blind them
with mud. Then we can neutralize them 3ust with Molotov cocktails." A
little further on in the vall.ey, we found a man, alone, wearing a cape.
= Imprisoned for months in Djelalabad, he has just been released by the new
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regime of Babrak Karmal. He is returning to his village. The news of his
return spreads like wildfire. Along the way, men wait for him with open
arms, embrace him and make an escorr for him.
The city of Aeadabad in Konarha is occupied by the government troops and
the Rusaian advisers. The moudjahiddines hold the peaks around the city,
whence they harasa their adversaries.
But the rebela do not have the weapons they need to attack the city in
firce and the soldiers are not sufficiently masters of the terrain to be
able to venture beyond their positions. Une is therefore left with classic
guerrilla warf.are, harassments and hand-to-hand fighting. The Rusaians
4 have not yet crossed swords, except perhaps 'Ln Badakhstan, on the barder
of the Soviet Union.
"With Our Teeth If We Have To"
Winter's end is approaching. With the thaw, the moudjahiddines fear major
offensives from the Russians.
In Peshawar, they make haste alowly to achieve unity and obtain foreign
military aid. The six main parties discuss the terms of their alliance.
In the villages, pillboxes, caves and rrenches, on the other side of the
border in Afghanistan, the rebels wait, quite determined to attack the
enemy as soon as spring comes, if he comea to earth, determined to fight
until the end, "with stones, with our teeth, if we have to." "You will
see them in combat tomorrow," Tamim says. "They are not afraid of bullets
_ like noraial men are. They are something else." ,
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ALGERIA
NEW DIRECTIONS OF ECONOMIC POLICY REPORTED
- Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Feb 80 pp 248-249 \
~
[Text] Ten months after the establishment of the new Algerian administra-
tion springing from the fourth Congress of the FLN, which had brought
President Chadli Bendjedid to the head of the State and the party, a wind
of change seems to blow over Algeria. `
Nevertheless this change does not involve overturning policies, becauae
inatitutional structures and the philosophy of power remain untouched,
nor does it involve questioning economic strategy, whose objective re-
maina the establishment of socialism in Algeria under party and state
_ adminietration.
The changes that have just been announced in Algiers were expected by
everyone, desired by the majority of the people and in fact they are the
product of two years of policy consideration and economic suspension.
They are hardly explained by the tragic demise of President Boumediene,
_ who was said to have intended to adjust his economic policies to the new
national and international realities.
Since the end of 1977 Algeria was experiencing an economic transition
stage between two planning periods. The third 5-year plan under devel-
opment was to follow the previous 5-year plan and be accepted prelimi-
' narily by the FLN Congreas. 1`hen the long illness and subsequent by
the FLN Cangress. Then the long illness and subsequent death of the
former Algerian chief of state completely upset the plan and policy
prioritiea. The regular Congress, which originally was supposed to
- allow establishment of the new FLN structures and investigate the 5-year
plan, had to be convened hurriedly to resolve the problem of succession
to President Boumediene. A second, special Congress is anticipated for
next spring to approve the plan.
In fact, Algeria's new leaders, while setting in motion the administra-
tive system, chose to give themselves an extension to review the results
of 10 yeare of rapid industrialization, learn the lessons of the two pre-
ceding economic plans and make an inventory of the country's present and
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future needs and posaibilities, and as a result of all the information
thus gathered to determine the cauntry's long term economic goale.
This ie what, as a first atep, has just been done by the FLN Central
Committee, Algeria's supreme policy body, which during its second yeurly
seseion apecified the country's economic direction for the decade. At a
second stage this is what the special FLN Congress must ratify when it
calculates for the 5-year plan the financial expenditures for each area
of the national economy during this period.
On publicly disclosing the zesults of the debate on Algeria's economic
choices that has just unfolded at the highest pQlicy level, the Central
Committee only verified one of the basic principles of the new
Algerian leaders' policies, that of "coatinuity within change": conti-
nuity regarding the principle of industrialization indicated by all of
Algeria's basic policy provisions, continuity of the state's chief role
as the country's major economic instrument, continuity of the policy
economic independer.ce for Algeria and finally continuity within the sys-
tem of political and economic choices that are all directed toward build-
ing a solid foundation of socialism in Algeria.
Priority of Fulfilling the People's Needs
But beyond the political and economic principles, which of course remain
unalterable, the new economic directions as they have just been specified
by the FLN Central Committee demonstrate a clear will--previously
expressed by President Bendjedid--to grant priority to the people's daily
needs, Fthile redirecCing the rapid industrialization policies carried out
for 10 years in a leas restraining way for the people's standard of
living and the country's foreign finances.
In fact, it was verified, according to the Central Committee, that the
"distortions and imbalancea" that affect the economy after a decade of
rapid development have reached such large proportions that it became
necessary for Algeria to halt its policy of investment in heavy industry
to make up the slowdowns recorded in other areas, restore order to a
strong manufacturing system operating below its capacity.
From now on the era of rapid industrialization is finished--which allowed
Algeria to invest about 170 billion dinars in 10 years--appealing on a
tremendoue scale for foreign loans, excessive technology, and a cumber-
some technicsl aid. This experience, which cQrtainly allowed Algeria to
eatablish one of the most impressive manufacturing structures in the
third world, nevertheleas created disorders considered intolerable in the
economy: uae of hydrocarbons only as a meana of foreign financing, grow-
ing indebtedness, exceasive recourse to foreign personnel and financing,
run-away imported inflat;ion, sectoral imbalances worsened by the tentacle-
like growth of manufacturing over fertile agr_icultural land, without con-
sidering the persistent acarcity of widely consumed producte, a scarcity
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attributable as much Lro extreme bareaucr,atization of trade channels as
to a slowdown in production.
In fact, not only economic facrors seem to have induced the Algerian
leaders to curb the country's "advanced" induatrialization. Indeed it
became evident to them that this industrialization--using extreme tech-
nology on a large scale, the increasing recoursa to foreign technicians
and to western capital that industrialization implies--was really start-
ing to hamper Algeria's independence.
In a very well-observed report published several days before the FLN
Central Committee meeting, AFRICAN REVOLUTION the FLN publication, had
sounded the alarm: it intended to show with supporting figures how
"the multinational campanies" particularly American and West German,
~ succeeded during this industrialization period in "surrounding the stra-
tegic sectora of the national economy through loans, project studies,
profit-taking, providing equipment, technical aid, the export market."
- Illuatrating the "vulnerability nf the Algerian economy" which, the pub-
lication asaerts, "is existing today integrated into busineases divided
by internatioual capitalism" and made "the ob3ect of an agreement in the
imperialist system," AFRICAN REVOLUTION specified that "petrochemicals
, and computers have become the reserved domain of companies of American
origin, machine industry that oE West German companies, light industry
that of Italian, French and West German firms."
AFRICAN REVOLUTION brought very aerious charges against certain western
companiea which, it said, strove to syatematically thwart Algerian devel-
opment efforte by "~lanning"* abandonment of construction yards through
"arranged bankruptciea." AFRICAN REVOLUTION also disclosed mistakes in
design and inadequaciea in the construction of factories entrusted to
foreign firms. Lastly the weekly waxned the Algerian leaders against
increaeing foreign debt which, it asserts, has tripled since 1973, and
it denounced "the spiral of extra expenses" practiced systematisally, it
sayg, by the Western partners in building factoriea which, everything
consideredr often cost Algeria two or three times more than anticipated.
The above is the basis for the FLN Central Committee's recommendations in
this area: Draconian reduction of the "degree of dependence in relation
to foreign economies," restriction on appeals for foreign resources and
control over recourse ta forefgn cnoperation, Algerianization in all
areas, a more extended diversification of Algeria's economic partners
with a clear preference for third world and socialist block countries.
* AFRICAN REVOLUTION alludes to abandorment of construction yarda by two
West German companies following the bankruptcy of their parent company
in the FRG.
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The central axis of Algeria's development being directed from now on, at
leaet for this decade, toward fulfillment first of the peopie's needs,
indtistrialization policies are going to take a new direction favoring
conver.sion industries at the expense of heavy industry, particularly
metal and steel-working.
The development model chosen a dozen years ago will find itself greatly
changed. Development of heavy industry to which priority had been givea
then waa in fact aupposed to carry along the whole economy. Contrary to
expectationa it did not succeed in providing agriculture with the means
of increasing its production and its productiviCy.
Thue the economic area that will specificallj receive more attentiion
from the Algerian leaders ia agriculture, whose production is far from
fulfilling the food needs of a people whose number and standard of
living are growing at a rising rate. The development of this strategic
area, which has been until now one of the poor relations of investment
policies, will be the main topic of the next session in March of the FLN
- Central Committee, which at the time of its previous meeting had studied
the three other priority areas of Algeria's new economic and social
policies: housing, waterworks, education and trainins.
Agriculture and Housing
_ By favorir.g, agriculture and the conversion industry necPssary for producing
consumer gooda the Algerian leaders intend to maintain the country`s inde-
pendence in food, dangerously threatened by increasingly larger imports of
food products, and in the aecond place to protect Algeria from a possible
threat of use of "the fcod weapon" againat it.
A whole induetry tied to housing (particularly cement factories and con-
struction material) is called upon moreover to undergo an unprecedented
development, to set up a building program of several hundreds of thousands
of dwellings. The housing problem has reached alarming proportions during
recent years. Also it has hee.n determined from this mament that during
the present decade all means will be set in motion to deliver 100,000
dwellinga yearly to the extent that minimum building of 70,000 dwellings
would at best prevent the present crisis from worsening.
Similarly to the choice of priority areas that, like housing, agriculture,
waterworks and local manufacturing, will benefit from massive investments
in the next five year plan, vast improvements were strongly recommended
_ by all the policy authorities in the administration of Algeria's produc-
tion structure to improve production and productivity, considered clearly
inadequate.
The FLN Central Committee was quite resolute on this topic: "efficiency
in operations, strictness in management and better discipline in work"
are the present triptych of "the production battle" whose purpose is to
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involve Algeria during this period. To achieve this the Central Comnit-
Cee recommends "vigorous activity to remove obstacles to strengthening
_ the organization of socialist management of our economy and the smooth
working of the system of administration and management of thP economy
at all levels." This work must be strengthened by restructuring and re-
organizing state companies and ventures, whose huge size hinders good
, management, to "improve the technical, economic and financial results
of the production capacity for goods ar.d services." Lastily all the eco-
nomic forces are asked to carefully watch over "rules for production
growth, for reducing costs and improving quality especially by setting
up production plans for ventures."
To induce workers to improve production and productivity a series of inea-
sures has already been taken--and others are expected during the coming
months--tightly linking wage levels to production and profitability levels.
Moreover, from now on managers will be obliged to keep up a stricter exam-
ination as much on the scale of their business, within the framPwork of
socialist business management, as on the national level by establishing
a general surveillance of finances and an auditing office.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1980 1 _
9545
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- ALGERIA
BRIEFS
SAUDI ARABIA CRITICIZED--After the recer.t raise of $2 in price of Saudi
crude oil the Algerian agency APS vigorously criticized, on 28 January,
Sheik Yamani, Saudi oil minister, who had refused an equal price increase
for crude at the time of the OPEC conference in Caracas last December.
"One thinks that the price raise of a Saudi barrel is a fair transaction
today," APS particularly writes, "but one must admit that it is occurring
36 days after the OPEC conference, while the latter ended without results
at that time. The Riyadh government is applying the price raise that
Mr Yamani denied," adds APS, which emphasizes that "since tke Caracas
meeting this increase responded to market conditions that the Saudi
minister pretended not to understand." The APS believes that this _
"error of judgment" by Mr Yamani cost the Saudi treasury $20 millioa a
day. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in F'rench 1 Feb SO
p 249] 9545 .
COOPERATIaN WITH USSR--Before traveling to Prague the Algerian labor and
professional training minister, Mr Mouloud Oumeziane, made an official
- working visit ta the USSR, where he and the delegation he headed "ob-
served the organization of labor and the socia.1. sector, of the system,
of classification of jobs and salaries, all matters of great current
importance in Algeria." The measures to set in m.otion to examine and
to enlarge cooperation between Algeria and the USSR in professional
training and in other branches linked to labor and employment were
- studied. Mr Mouloud Oumeziane stated that it had been agreed wich the
saviet party to build in Medea a national institute for the training.of
teachers for 1,000 students, as well as apprenticeship centers in vari-
ouG regions of Algeria. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 1 Feb 80 p 2497 9545
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ACTIVELY-EMPLOYED RESIDENTS--As of 1 January 1980, the active population
' in Algeria was estimated to be 3,710,766 people, that is 20.03 percent
of the resident population thought to be 18,524,786, according to figures -
of the Planning and National Development Ministry. In the working-age
bracket (18 to 59) estimated to be 7,715,614, there are 3,524,243 workers
(45.67 percent)--3,279,915 men (89.95 percent of the resident male popula-
tion in this age bracket) and 244,328 women (onZy 6.31 percent of the
resident females in the same bracket). The 15-17 year-old active group
is 58,176 (48,404 male, 9,772 female) or 4.57 percent of the residents
in that age bracket. The active over 60 group is estimated at 128,348
or 11.83 percent of Che residents in the bracket. From these figureH,
APS concludes that the "gap" between the male resident population and
the active male population in the 18-19 age bracket is not significant
since the percentage of active males is 89.95. There is a significant
"gap" for females in the same bracket, for the percentage of active women
is only 5.31 and the women in this category represent more than half of
all working-age women. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITEI2RANEENS in
French 14 Mar 80 p 6151
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LEBANON
CONSEQUENCES OF SYRIAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL DISCUSSED
Review of Crisis
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 15-21 Feb 80 pp 18-21
[Article: "Lebanon, Difficult Withdrawal"]
[Text] The breath of the cold war has touched Lebanon. The Syrian decision
to withdraw the deterrent forces and regroup them in the Biqa' valley has
touched off a silent crisis of confidence between Syrian President Hafiz al-
Asad and Lebanese President Ilyas Sarkis.
Syria is demanding that the Lebanese government cease its vacilation, begin
the dialogue among the Lebanese, deploy the army evenly throughout the south,
and take a decisive position regarding attempts to drag Lebanon into "Camp
David."
As for official Lebanon, it is said that tRe determination to withdraw gives
it difficult options and justifies its hesitation, given the expansion of
the gulf between the Lebanese parties to the dialogue and the armed Palestinian
presence. While the Maronite "Lebanese Front" and some of the Islamic forces
support Sarkis' position to deploy the army to the south and to substitute
it for the Syrian forces in the event of their withdrawal, the lef.tist
' "Nationalist Movement" was quick, to protest that it has no confidence in
the army, "because it was built on the same sectarian basis which led to
its collapse in 1975 during the war." The Palestinian Resistance says
- that the decision to deploy the arnry ignores its legal presence which was
guaranteed by numerous agreements with the official authorities.
On the foreign level, Western diplomats are trying to create the impression
_ that Gromyko's visit to Damascus last week was behind the sudden Syrian
decision, along with Syria's desire to shift world attention from the
issue of Afghanistan to the Middle East question.
While Washington is betting that the Syrian withdrawal will not happen,
Israel is hurrying to play the withdrawal card alsc. Its protective
umbrella is being spread, "not only over the Christians in the south but
also in the north as well," to use Begin's expression.
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In the midst of these public and privat2 positions, a tornado is stirring
the skies over Lebanon. Will it be overcome by peace? Or, will it touch
down, causing damage once more over the land?
A1-Asad's Ten Objections to Sarkis' Position
This report, received by AL-WATAN AL-'AREIBI from its Beirut office, contains
the complete story of the dispute between Presidents al-Asad and Sarkis,
and the surrounding circumstances and secrets of the meetings and political
movements between Damascus and Beirut, which accompanied the announcement
of the Syrian decision to withdraw.
Tf the events of Lebanon were measured by weeks, with each week being
symbolized by an issue or crisis and then ending, in order to begin
another week with a new issue ox crists, then the first week of February,
1980, carried the symbol of all the weeks of ~ebanese crises and issues
for the past 4 years up to today.
If dealing with the weeks of crises in Lebanon has become a habit among
some of the parties to the dispute or the factions concerned with the
- situation, whether Lebanese or Arab, then the first week of February was
very concerned with a meeting of all parties and groups, in which all
the political and military cards and various types of pressures were used
to settle it, and in which all the words were spoken. Old accounts were
a part of it. Truth also reveals the past in the hope that it will light
up a ray oi hope toward the futura.
What happened in Lebanon in the first week of February, 1980?
It is a long story, born with the start of the crisis in Lebanon, growing
along with developments and becoming entangled in its complexity, in a
climax of delicate, highly sensitive circumstances. Were the introductions
of relaxation to be found in the climax of developments?
It is a story of relations between Lebanon and Syria, and a story of
relations among the political forces in Lebanon. It is a story of how
the Lebanese crisis became so involved with developments of the Middle
East crisis, and a story of labor pains which some are afraid will end
in the ruins of some settlement or other in tha.regiotr. Is it the desired
settlement,: or~a plot to solve the Arab-Israeli struggle at the expenge
- of that little bit of Arabism still remaining?
= It is the tale of a crisis of confidence in i:Ls broad outlines, rearing
its head between the basic elements of government in Lebanon, and the
various political forces, between some of them and the Lebanese army, and
between the government in Lebanon, or some of it, and the government in
Syria. Did the developments of the first week in February settle this
confidence crisis, and who were those who paid or will pay the price for
that, and how?
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To understand all that has happened and is happening, a quick analysis
of events is not enough. Some of them are connected with issues which the
people in Lebanon have forgotten. Some of them are little bits of a
picture which cannot easily be put together so as to form a complete
picture, and some of them alsn fall within the category of half-truths,
of which half remains and the other half was unknown to most of the
people, we could even say unknown to all the people.
The story f.rom the beginning of the explosion.
_ To the extent that the withdrawal of the Syrian forces, acting as Arab
deterrent forces, from the coastal region extending between Beirut and
al-Zahrani, and their regrouping in the area of Jizayn and the Biqa'
. valley, was an issue having ramifications in connection with the!.likeli-
hood of Israel carrying out a commando military attack, so to the same
extent the announcement of the Syrian forces' determination to withdraw
- from Beirut and its suburbs, and to forsake the police role, is an issue
having ramifications connected with the heart of the relatively silent
crisis between Lebanon and Syria, and the latter's campaign to unfold
events with all ttieir explosive possibilities and dangers on both the
security and political levels.
To the extent that the first Syrian withdrawal confused all the factions
on the Lebanese scene, so to the same extent the coming likelihood of
the senond Syrian withdrawal is confusing all the factions at first, and
then causing everyone to face the most difficult choices with regard to
the nature of relations between Lebanon and Syria, the role of the Arab
deterrent forces, the role of the Lebanese army, and last but not least,
the role which President Sarkis must play in confronting all that.
On 26 January, the [authority] for the Arab deterrent in Lebanon was
renewed. The Tunis reports about the meetings of the League council
referred to the fact that the six months renewal did not pass without
heated debate over what practical achievement these forces had made in
ending the Lebanese crisis. Tunis news reports also stated that the
Syrian delegation.had not let such questions as these pass with comment.
- They said that Damascus was not responsible for the government in Lebanon's
lack of desire to achieve steps toward accord, so as to put an end to the
deterrent role in the Lebanese regions.
Despite the fact that renewal of the deterrent was done by unanimous vote
of the nations in the League council, officials in Damascus considered such
- posistions to be a negative feeling of sympathy regarding their role in
Lebanon.
Syrian officials felt that behind the tone of the Lebanese foreign minister,
Fu'ad Butrus, in his televised speech on 21 January, was something that
fortold Lebanon's determi.nation to request withdrawal of deterrent forces
from specific areas in Lebanon, so that these withdrawals would be as if
- they were conditions for the continued presence of the deterrent, and as
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points which the government in Lebanon woulii score for the benefit of the
Maronite "Lebanese Front," in accordance wita Damascus' thinking.
Perhaps thi5 wai what c..lused the Arab detcrrent forceg ta begin a move ta
regroup Its forces and ro stop its pol.ice actic,n role along the southern
coast of Lebsnon. This situation generated sucF, headlines as, "Probable
Dangers From Israeli Commando Attack." However, it was the harbinger of
warning for those with ears ta hear and eyes to see.
. These first steps were taken on Sunday, 27 January, and left extensive
reverberations and apprehensions, which did not go beyund a search for
alternatives to',fill the security vacuum. This cacsed those Lebanese
and Palestinians who were making efforts to get to the bottom of these
moves to be afraid that it was the beginning of a"disciplinary action"
against thP Lebanese and Palestinian sides, and a Syrian attempt to maice
everyone understand that the Syrian role in Lebanon was still as "first
and final authority."
The Syrian moves and the assemlbing of its forces in the south aborted
all plans to deploy the army to the south and left the nation facing a
closed road. How could the state send the arny to the south after the
road to Tyre had been stripped of security all the way from Beirut to
Tyre, the whole length of the coast, with the assistance of the Syrians
_ and without cover from the Nationalist Movement and the Palestinians?
Division Within the Cabinet
The cabinet met on Tuesdqy 29 January 1980, and reviewed the situation and
recent developmen*_s. At this session, the details of which were conveyed
to the Syrian officials, the ministers debated the benefit from the presence
of the Arab deterrent forces when they were behaving irt such a way as to
embarrass the Lebanese state.
The cabinet, in this debate, split into two factions: one of them included
President Sarkis, Foreign Minister Fu'ad Butrus, and Minister of Pu.blic
Works Butrus Harb; the other side had Prime Minister Salim al-Huss and
tiinister Talal al-Mar'abi.
The debate in this session of the cabinet went beyond debate over specific
circumstantial developments to such a degree that Minister Butrus Harb
called for the withdrawal of the Arab deterrent forces and the deployment
of the army to fill the security vacuum in sensitive areas of the capital
and the suburbs. Prime Minister al-Huss refused to continue such a debate
immediately after the renewal of the deterrent authority. He also refused
to debate the legality of their presence at a time when the ink was not
even dry on the document sent to the secretariat general of the League of
Arab States in Tunis requesting renewal.
Possibly this session could have remained under the seal of secrecy, but
what happened was that it had important significance, and something very
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very like the minutes of the session was conveyed to Syrian officials in
Damascus, who considered it to be an act of violence by a part of the =
gove nlment against the legality of the deterrent force and its presence
during the coming stage. These words made the situation worse and compelled
the Syrian leaders to try to settle this issue once and for al'L. _
On Saturday 2 February 1980, Syria informed its allies in the leftists
Lebanese Nationalist Movement that it would withdraw its forces from the -
area oC Beirut and its suburbs, in order to regroup them in the nearby
mountain areas. It told them that this step would be taken within 48
hours and urged them to take measures to take over the vacated places.
Syria conveyed the same infortnation to the leaders of the Palestinian
Resistance and also informed Brig Gen Sami al-Khatib, comnander of the
Arab deterrent forces, so that he could inform the Lebanese government,
out of consideration of the fact that its police role had ended, although -
its deterrant role would remain so long as its forces were still in nearby
areas and capable of moving quickly to settle any clash or security outbreak.
Here the crisis reached its climax. The government in Lebanon understood
that Syria had, in one stroke, faced it with difficult options, and that
the talk ab,.,. requesting withdrawai the deterrent from part of the
Beirut area had become null and void, after Syria itself had raised this
issue of withdrawal, with all its ramifications and c.angers facing Lebanon.
President Sarkis felt that a Syrian move such as this was a"teacher's
slap" to embarrass the government and to confront it with its difficult
responsibility. President Sarkis called an urgent meeting on Sunday,
3 February, which was attended by Prime Minister Salim al-Huss, the
foreign minister, the defense minister, Lhe commarider of the Arab deterrent
forces, and the commander of the army.
An attempt has been made to evaluate what happened. The prime minister's
view was that this step went beyond the question of security arrangements
and tactical deterrent withdrawals, and brought the whole issue of the
nature of Syrian-Lebanese relations to the test, as well as raising the
issue of where this crisis could lead, in terms of relations, from the
reprecussions on the security situation and the possibilities for dis-
ruption with all its ramifications.
Prime Minister al-Huss' sources say that he felt President Sarkis' view of
the crisis did not necessarily reflect a desire to achieve an urgent
solution. He told him that dealing with the situation does not merely
require ascertaining the extent of the security vacuum which the with-
drawal of the Syrian forces would create, but rather it warranted "an
indepth search for the motives for what has happened, what might happen,
or what will happen in the near future."
Prime Minister al-Huss said that he would undertake contacts with Damascus
in order to learn the facts, although discussion of this subject "would not
go into the question of the army's ability to assume its duties when the
deterrent leaves."
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A1-Huss' Mediation Between Sarkis and Damascus
The most difficult political action with regard to any crisis is the action
which occurs in the midst of a contr_ary calculation which warns of an
explosion, the dimensions of which no one icnows. This difficult action
faced Prime Minister Salim al-Huss when he began his action with regard
to Syria. The Lebanese prime minister felt that the basic problem was
not what was happening, but that there were accumulations from the past,
It about which the Syrians had talked, regarding relations between them and
President Ilyas-Sarkis. Accordingly it was incumbent upon him to inter-
vene, acting as a conciliator between the two sides, in the hope that hhis
conciliation would result in putting an end to the grave crisis.
The story began with a visit to Damascus.
SuzZday evening, 3 February, Prime Minister Salim al-Huss contacted Syrian
Prime Minister 'Abd al-Ra'uf al-Qasim, from the office of Brig Gen Satni
a.l-Khatib, commander of the Arab deterren-L. forces. Minister Talal al-
Mar'abi was present.
A1-Huss told al-Qadim that he would like to visit Damascus to pay his
respects on the occasion of his [al-Qasim] forming the new government.
A1-Qasim welcomed al-Huss, who told him he would visit him tomorrow if
there were no objections to that.
A1-Qasim replied by welcoming him, indicating that he had aimeeting of the
cabinet at noon. A1-Huss said that he would be in Damascus at 1000, and
that he also hoped to meet with President Hafiz al-Asad to discuss matters
of the hour, especially the new security factors in connection with the
Syrian forces' desire to withdraw from certain parts of Beirut and its
suburbs. At this point, the Lebanese prime minister felt that his Syrian
~ counterpart was not aware of all the details of the Syrian move, but the
commitment to the"following day's visit would be an incentive for him to
learn more.
Prime Minister Salim al-Huss says that his visit to Damascus began with
the customary meeting with the Syrian prime minister and the minister of
foreign affairs. Although this meeting was frank in reviewing Lie crisis,
the indepth discussion and any decision-making was'left to President Hafiz
al-Asad in the second mePting that same day. In his meeting with Prime
Minister al-Qasim and Minister 'Abd al--Halim Khaddam, al-Huss touched on
three factors dominating the crisis:
1. The spector of a miscalculation and the pressure of time which was
running out, particularly since Monday coincided with the end of the 48
hours whi.:h Syria had set to begin its withdrawal.
2. The considerable rigidity in the positions, especially Prime Minister
al-Huss' inability to move his two arguers from their positions in defending
the need to continue implementing these military steps no matter what the
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circumstances. 'Abd al-Halim said that he had conveyed a similar position
to th.e Nationalist Movement delegation thQ previcus day with no result.
3. The vagiieness of the goals behind these Syrian military steps, and
tlie vagueness of the reasons which led to choosing this time for imple-
mentation. A1-Huss tried to discuss some of the justifications raised
by al-Qasim and Khaddam, but he was unable to work out a complete picture
of the alternatives desired by Syria, in the event a desire existed to
go beyond the poinis about which it complained.
A1-ksad's Case Against Sarkis
Prime Minister al-Huss had to wait ucitil 1600 to meet with President Hafiz
- al-Asad. He began to write down in his notebook the points raised by al-
Qasim and Khaddam, in the hope that h.is discussion with the Syrian president
would touch on them.
In the meeting with al-Asad, al-Huss had no need to open his notebook to
refer to the points raised by al-Qasim and Khaddam. The Syrian president
saved'him the trouble. He began to delineate a group of complaints that
Syria had regarding the conduct of the government in Lebanon, while always
emphasizing the Prime Minister al-Huss was not the one about whom the
compaints centered.
President al-Asad said a great deal about the crisis in Syrian-Lebanese
relations. He said that Lebanon "had not been friendly in its discussion
of the need to keep the Arab deterrent force on its territory." He said
that this was manifest at the Tunis summit, and during the opening of the
last session of the UN General Assembly. Moreover, visitors and envoys
from meetings with President Sarkis and Minister Butrus had conveyed [the
same thing] to him. A1-Asad said that some of those visitors had heard
from President Sarkis a description of the deterrent troops which made
them appear to be occupation forces.
The Syrian president opened President Sarkis' dossier, summarizing what
he believed the Lebanese president's position to be. It can be summarized
by the following points:
1. He does not want to take steps to settle the matter of acc:ord, but
rather he wants the views of the Lebanese Front to prevail.
2. He does not want to end the "peculiar position" which the Lebanese
Front is following in its relations with Israel.
3. He does not want to rebuild the united foundations of Lebanon.
4. He does not want to build a balanced, national army, but rather he
wants to complete a sectarian army as was the case in the p.st.
5. He does not want to settle the matter of dealing with Israel within
army circles and political forces, and he does not want, in effect, to
put a stop to "the traitorous officer" Sa'd Hadad.
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6, !ie does not want to put an end to the activities of forces hostile ta
the Syrian regime, the most notable being the Moslem Brotherhood activities
from Lebanon, under the protection of the Lebanese Front.
7. He does not want to mobilize the Lebanese army against the Zionist
foe, but on the contrary he leaves room for organizations to fill the
_ army with hostility against SyrYa.
8. He does not want to be a ruler nor an arbiter, but rather a faction
- within the framework of the Lebanese Front.
9. He does not want to grant legality to the Arab deterrent forces, but
rather he constantly seeks to create doubts about their role. .
10. He does not want to apply all the agreements which have been reached
in the Lebanese-Syrian summit meetings in Damascus and Latakia.
The Syrian president was not content just to enumerate the points of the
dispute about the Lebanese issue, but on the contrary he dealt with the
quesLion of the Middle East crisis in some detail. The Syrian president
said that the tendencies of the government in Lebanon are in harmony with
the Camp David plans, and that they want to enter into the peace movement,
at which the United States of America is hinting. A1-Asad said that he
has advised President Sarkis several times to stay away from such a policy
as this, and he requested that in their last ueeting in Tunis, when he felt
that Sarkis wanted to get into the peace movement, whenever Jordan entered
it.
Syrian circles say that this point might be the real reason for all the
positions which Syria has taken, particularly the latest one pertaining
to regrouping its forces in Lebanon. These circles say that Syria chose
the timing exactly, because Lebanon is not capable of choosing between
accepting the Syrian stipulations or rejecting them.
These circles consider that what has happened is tantamount to imposing
the problem, with all its dimensions, on Lebanon, so that it can only go
taward an understanding with Syria and, consequently, reject the Annerican
plans. These circles give an example of that by saying that Lebanon might
be better able to make a move after completion of the discussion of self-
determination which might be achieved by the middle of this year.
As for Lebanese circles, they think that there is a Syrian-Soviet agreement,
caused by the Afghanistan crisis, and that Syria wants to concentrate
world attention on the situation in the Middle East. These circles say
that agreement between the Syrian and Soviet positions does not necessarily
mean congruity right up to the end, and that Syria is still a free-agent,
capable of action, provided that it possesses a basic few of the Middle
East crisis cards. .
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Sarkis: He Waited and Watched
We return to the Damascus meeting between President al-Asan and Prime Minister
al-Huss. The Lebanese prime minister returned to Beirut and went directly
to the presidential palace to apprise President Sarkis of what he had heard
from the Syrian officials and in order to tell him of the possibility of
obtaining a few days delay in the implementation of the Syrian withdrawal,
in expectation of a solution to the crisis of relations between the two
coiintries.
Prime Minister al-Huss sensed that President Sarkis was somewhat upset
because of the deteriorating situation in relations with Syria, but he
also felt a desire to wait for matters to crystall.ize more clearly, since
the Syrians wanted action from him. A1-Huss tried to encourage Sarkis to
contact the Syrians to set a date for a summit meeting, but he sensed the
president's dESire to broach the matter in a routine way through the foreign
�ninister, and not as a matter of urgency which would preclude any other
developments.
It is worthwhile to refer here to the fact that President Sarkis, during
al-Huss' visit to Damascus, was secretly receiving the American ambassador
in Beirut, John Gunther Dean. President Sarkis' circles say that the _
ambassador brought him something which caused him to be reassured that the
Syrians would not allow matters to react the explosion point in Beirut,
and that they would not allow�the line separating east and west Beirut to
revert to confrontation lines as was the situation 3 years ago. The betting
is on the extent to which the Syrians go with their step. This assessment
was in accord with that of Talcott Seeley, ttie American ambassador in
Damascus, after his meetJng with Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam 2 days befo;e.
The most prominent points which observers are trying to determine regarding
the current crisis are:
1. The extent to which relations between Lebaaon and Syria must go and,
consequently, what is necessary to satisfy Syria that Lebanon has changed
its position and no longer rejects its presence, and that they are bound
together in regard to the Middle East crisis.
2. The practical role of the Arab deterrent forces in Lebanon; must they
re-assume the role of policeman but not the role o.f the-inilitary deterrent?
3. The government's desire to take or not to take any step toward.acc41Lrd
among the Lebanese factions. ~
It has clearly emerged from all the positions of the Nationalist movement
parties that, in practice, they do not support the position of the govern-
ment in Lebanon. It has been clearly demonstrated that what support they
had shownfor giving the army extensive, security in the south and in the
security gaps has markedly diminished.
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Moreover, it has become clearly obvious that the Lebanese Front positions
have been aimed at creating a broad current against the Syrian presence
in Lebanon.
As regards the Palestinians, it has become evident that they prefer not
to revert to military confrontation and prefer not to be forced to assume
security duties in areas of the capital, which would in practice result
, in their being 3istracted from their role in the Arab-Israeli struggle.
American circles in Beirut say that the Syrian betting was that Lebanon
could not refuse the offer they made. This might not be a practical bet,
because of the dangers that any explosion in the crisis could engulf the
entire region. Other'Western circles think that any compromise would only
result in increasing the internal struggle in Lebanon, because Sarkis
would find himself once more facing the difficult choice of abandoning
the Lebanese Front in exchange for improving relations between himself
and the Syrians.
Sarkis has been through this crisis before, and he almost resigned. Does
the idea come through that there is something more than meets the eye
behind these new deyelopments? Is the solut~::n to the crisis contained
in them, or will they lead to a bigger, more widespread crisis which,
consequently, would result in the dangers of that very partition which
Syria has said it intervened in Lebanon in order to prevent!?
Or will the government, the government of Dr Salim al-Huss, pay the price
by compelling the two to resign by means of withdrawing some of its
ministers?
The solution remains--a point in the middle, but the extremism of the
positions of all the forces can only encourage increased convulsions,
unless what is going on is pressure being supplied by all the forces,
on the basis that; "intensifying a crisis is my relaxation."
Opposition to Deployment of Lebanon Units
Paris AL-WATAN AL-ARABI in Arabic 15-21 Feb 80 pp 22-23
- [Article: "Sarkis Pleads: My Hands are Tied; the Resistance and the
Nationalist Movement Oppose the Government's Decision to Replace Syrian
Troops With Lebanese Army Units"]
[Text] Beirut has interpreted the Lebanese government's decision to
replace the Syrian troops, in the event they are withdrawn, with its
army as tantamount to a challenge to and refutation of Damascus. While
the Maronite Lebanese Front and the traditional and liberal Islamic
forces supported the decision, the leftist National Movement and the
Palestinian Resistance were quick to protest agalnst it.
Those around Lebanese President Ilyas Sarkis respond to Syria's placing
the responsibility on him for the crisis, which has recently broken out
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between the two countries, by saying that "certainly one acknowledges the
- existence of errors, but it should also be acknowledged that President
Sarkis' hands are tied, and he is unable to act, neither on the level of
building a balanced army, nor on entering the south, nor on controlling
security in all areas, nor in using Arab and international assistance to
get the specific Lebanese factions moving toward dialogue."
These circles add that those who put the responsibility on him for the
situation's deterioration, "know better than anyone else why he has not
acted. They are the ones who kept and are still keeping him from success.
The protest over the mere deployment of the army along the demarcation
Iines in Beirut constitutes a clear and recent reply to the fact that there
are forces operating in Beirut that do not want Lebanon to have the power
to protect itself and stop the bloodshed."
- At a time when republican palace circles are still uncertain about the
deep motives behind the Syrian decision to withdraw, they are beginning
to accept the view of the European diplomats here that the Afghanistan
crisis, the disturbance in the international balance, and the eruption
of the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union have all
cast their shadows over the Lebanese crisis and the internal situation.
Beirut Stocks Up, Calls Upon Its Militias
Beirut witnessed widespread uneasiness as a result of the report of Syria's
decision to withdraw, and the civilian population began to stock up on
food supplies, while Lebanese militias called up their forces in both the
eastern and western sectors. The Palestinian Resistance did the same.
When the leftist National Movement confirmed the seriousness of the
Syrian decision, it sent a delegation ro Damascus to represent it. In
addition, Prime Minister Dr Salim al-Huss went to the Syrian capital, as
well as several.prominent Lebanese, including former president Sulayman
Franjiyah, who is bound by warm, personal friendship to President al-Asad,
Mr Rashid Karami, the previous prime minister, Mr Kamel al-Asad, president
of the Chamber of Depuries, and Mr Walid Jumblatt, the senior Druze leader
and head of the Socialist Progressive Party. Yasser 'trafat and a number
of Palescinian Resistance leaders also held similar meetings with Syrian
officials, in order to ascertain the motives and reasons for the sudden
decision to withdraw.
T'he Nationalist Moti-,ment and the Resistance Protest
- A significant development unexpectedly befell the position of the Palestinian
Resistance and its ally the Nationalist Movement. That was the Lebanese
cabinet's decision "to task the Lebanese army to make the necessary,
emergency preparations to fill any security vacuum, along the entire
length of the demarcation lines, at the vital public utilities, and at
all state offices and organizations, and to give priority to the coast
line extending from Tripo.li through the commercial center of Beirut and
to the rest of the vital public facilities."
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The Resistance and th2 Nationalist Movement declared reservations about
that, while the Maronite Lebanese Frant and the liberal and religious
Tslam[c groups (Sunni and Shiite) were quick to support it.
Some observers interpreted the decision to deploy the army to replace
the withdrawing Syrian troops as tantamount to a refutatian of the Syrian
cleclsion, or a ctiallenge tn it, to the effect that "if you withdraw, the
state will be able to fill the vacuum that you leave."
Sarkis and A1-Huss: Who Will Pay Che Price?
Political sources have said that the cabinet's decision to deploy the _
army was the result of American advice. The Nationalist Mpvement says that deployment of the army in order to
plug "the security vacuum" in the uost dangerous of its gaps, i.e., on
the demarcation lines in Beirut, would expose the army to the danger of
complete collapse as happened in 1975.
The Movement believes that the arnry with its present composition could
not play an unbiased security role between the factions. The Nationalist
Movement's motive behind this is to emphasize its belief that the army
was rebuilt on the same sectarian bases which led to its downfall. To
put it clearer, they mean that the Maronite sect still dominates it.
The other objection that the Nationalist Movement has to deploying the
army to Beirut is that it would occupy the deterrent forces' positions,
most of which are an integral part of the defenses and positions of the
western sector, which were occupied by Mnvement militia and the Palestinian -
Resistance, whereas the Lebanese Front refused to allow the army to deploy
in its zones or to concentrate in its positions along the demarcation line.
Who Will Occupy the Syrian Positions?
From here, the import of the Syrian position was that the deterrent forces,
in the event of their withdrawal, would call upon the Nationalist Movement
to occupy the positions which they would vacate along the demarcation lines.
The position of the Palestinian Resistance has been no less strong than
the Nationalist Movement's position. Its protest was directed against the
fact that the decision to deploy the Lebanese arnry ignores the fact of
the authorities' recognition, through its agreements with the Resistance,
of the armed Palestinian presence. This conviction continues to be prevalent
despite assurances which Prime Minister a1-Huss hastened to issue.
Military experts within the Resistance and the Nationalist Movement beiieve
that Syria's withdrawal of its forces from the coastal road from Beirut
south to Sidon and al-2ahrani was tantamount to a practical expr.ession
of its dissatisfaction with President Sarkis' attemprs to deploy army
troops in those sections in the south controlled by the Movement and the
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Resistance, but not in the border strip controlled by the troops of the
renegade Maj Sa'd Hadad whom Israel supports.
They add that the Lebanese government has not understood the significance
of the Syrian withdrawal from the south, and therefore it was surprised
by the decision t-o withdraw from Beirut, wtiich is a supplementary part
of the first decision.
As regards the Lebanese Front, it was quick to welcome the Syrian decision
to withdraw, despite the deep feelings of anxiety over the possibility of
renewed civil war. The Front, in its communiques and its leaders' state-
ments, supported the government's decision to deploy the army in Beirut.
The Front's leader, former president Camille Chamoun, was quick to endorse
the Syrian decision to withdraw, by issuing a group of "reassurances" to
the Palestinian Resistance and the Moslem inhabitants of west Beirut, to
= the effect that the Front wished them no harm and that it had no desire to
renew the fighting in the capital.
The Lebanese Front necaspapers were very anxious to publish joint pictures -
of the leaders of their two main parties, the Kata'ib [Phalangist] and the
Liberals, in order to suggest their solidarity with the Christian residents,
However, violent clashes are still continuing 40 km northeast of Beirut,
" between the two parties' militias, in which 13 have been killed and twice
that number wounded.
COPYRIGHT: AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI 1979
7005
CSO: 4802
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LIBYA
I
SWEDISH FIRM TELUB SELLS MILITAAY TECHNOLOGY TO LIBYA
Stockholm VECKANS AFFARER in Swerlish 31 Jan 80 pp 23, 25
_ CArticle by Goran Jonazonl
[Text] At the same time as the little-known Telub
firm in Vaxjo was gearing up for a wide-ranging pub-
Lic relations campaign to make itself known the firm
became the center of mass med,ia interest. It was re-
vealed that Telub had undertaken to give special
training to handpicked students from Libya.
The formal client is the Libyan armed forces. The explosive foreign
policy area where Libya is located is not on the Swedish green list for
defense materiel exports. Many would classify the training in the same
way as a rifle or a machine gun.
Suddenly everyone was talking about little unknown Telub (which started
out as an electronic service firm for the military). ,
In practice this satisfiecl the requirements of applying one of the basic
principles of public relations work--the principle of perception and
recognition. _
"But we're not really that clever," said Telub president Benkt Dahl-
berg. "It was more of an accident that the technical school and the
Libya contract came to public attention at the same time as we launched
our pitch to industry. But naturally we have nothing against it if the
reports about the school lead industrial people to take an extra look at
our campaign material. I don't think anyone regards us as a controver-
sial or dangerous cooperating partner. At any rate we haven't run into -
that sort of reaction."
What Telub is trying to do today is let industry know that the firm's
personnel and equipment constitute a unique area of competence that
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_i
in the long run industry can't do without. Primarily in the area of
microdata technology, but also in areas such as project analysis, main-
tenance planning, education and technical documentation. _
Telub is trying to profile itself as the leading technological consul-
tant for Swedish business firms. The slogan of the campaign is "comp,"
short for "compunications," which they claim is a word for the 1980's,
an amalgamation of "computer" and "communications." The word is said to
have been coined by futurology scholars at Harvard University in the
iJnited States.
That is a minor issue--Telub is in the midst of an advertising campaign
(costing roughly 1 million kronor) with full-page ads and four-color -
campaign leaflets.
60
1) Produktionochtordelni
mellan fonvar och civil
ng"
t.
Procern.
70
Forsv
. i0
ar 2 r
~

10
30
ZO _Civih
3
10
Budget
1976 18
76 19
71 1l71 18
19 1510
Production and Distribution Between Defense and'Civilian Production
Key:
1. In percentages . 3. Civilian
2. Defense
Under the presidency of Benkt Dahlberg Telub has increased civilian
- sales so that they now exceed military sales. 27
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Sharply increased sales o� technical services on the civilian market are
an "absolute.must" for Telub. In reality Telub is a consultant firm
with sales amounting to 242 cnillion kronor.
Only 75 million kronor of total sales by the parent company can be as-
signed to production of its own goods.
Thus Telub is in practically the same predicament as almost all other
defense industries. The company can keep afloat in the technolugy area
but it must have new customers.
Telub first saw the light of day in 1963 on paper but it didn't really
get started until 1955. A study had shown that demand for military
materiel maintenance resources would increase and ifi was decided to put
a unit in Vax~Oexpansion and give it the form of a company. At first Telub was
owned by FFV unknown] (51 percent) and the defense-oriented
electronics firms Philips, L.M. Ericsson, Siemens, Aga, Decc;a, SRA,
Saab and Standard Radio (49 percent). Since 1976 Telub has been a sub-
sidiary of FFV which bought out the private electronics firms at a
cost of 16.2 million kronor.
COPYRIGHT: Ahlen & Akerlunds Tryckerier, Stockholm, 1980
6578
CSO: 3109
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MOROCCO
PARIS MAGAZINE INTERVIEWS MOROCCAN COMMUNIST LEADER ALI YATA
LD030705 Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 2 Apr 80 p 29 LD
[Interview with Ali Yata, secretary general of the Moroccan Party of Pro- -
gress and Socialism in Paris by Jean-Louia Buchet: "The USSR Is not Sup-
porting the POZISARIO"--date of interview not specified]
[Text] JEUNE AFRIQUE: Your party press gives the impreasion that you are
vacillating over Afghanistan....
Ali Yata: Our position is moderate. We support the Afghan people's right
to independence and sovereignty without foreign interference. The Soviet
troops must leave Afghanistan as soon as poeaible. Nonetheless we are try-
ing to understand why these painful events have taken place. We have to
point out that some imperialist powers have not hesitated in intervening
in Afghanistan aince the April 1978 changes. (Note) (Date oi Taraki's pro-
communist coup d'etat--JEUNE AFRIQUE editor's note)
JEUNE AFRIQUE: How?
Ali Yata: By financing, training and arming Afghan counterrevolutionary
elements. There were bases, particularly in Pakistan, with U.S., Chineae
and Egyptian instructors.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Are all the Afghan rebels counterrevolutionaries?
. Ali Yata: Not all. But those who are carrying out actions are. They
train poorly-educated people from the lower classes. They rouse them
- against the government by using religious feelinga. �
- JEUNE AFRIQUE: Does it not bother you that Karmal arrived in Kabul in
the wake of the Red Army? �
Ali Yata: I do not like that expression. Babrak Karmal is a well-known
Afghan politician who has been waging an anti-imperialist and antireaction-
ary struggle in his country for years. His battle cost him dearly. Hence
= his exile after the 1978 changes.
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JEUNE AFRIQUE: In short, you do not share King Hassan II's theory that
the Afghanistan affair, like the Sahara affair, is part of an overall
Soviet Bloc offensive in the Third Wor1d?
Ali Yata: No. There ia undoubtedly an offensive but it ig being launched
by the imperialist West led by the United Statea which is trying to regain
the positions it has lost in recent years. In this context it supports
regimes which are on the point of collapse. For instance it intervened
in Shaba to help Mobutu maintain his power. Unfortunately Morocco took
' part in this foreign imperialist intervention in Zaire. However events
in the Sahara must not be confuaed with events in Afghanistan or with
- other African affairs. In the latter cases the Weat is defendi.ng its privi-
leges but here Morocco is still waging a national liberation etruggle.
An Unpredictable Man
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Is Angola's role in Shaba not comparable with Algeria's -
role in the Sahara?
Ali Yata: I do not think so. Angola did not intervene directly. The
Zairian rebels played the main role in Shaba. Algeria however is inter-
vening in our affairs through the POLISARIO and even directly. In order
to impose Algeria's leadership Boumediene and the present leaders tried
to prevent Morocco from rebuilding its territorial unity. Then there is
al-Qadhdhafi. He dreams of building a vast and umiiable Saharan entity.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: The POLISARIO's weapons are mainly aupplied by the Soviet
Bloc.... '
Ali Yata: The USSR sells arma to Algeria and Libya. Not to the POLISARIO.
The USSR did not refuse to sell arms to Morocco. It wae Morocco which re-
fused to buy them.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Could the Soviets be innocent in this affair? They certainly
~ voted againat Morocco at the United Nations....
Ali Yata: The socialist countries did indeed join the movement at the
United Nations. That was becauae the Algerians were cleverer and more
active than us. They succeeded, by various means, in giving the POLISARIO
stature and passing it off as a national liberation movement. That doas
not mean that the USSR or the socialist countries support an Algerian solu-
tion. I recently had discussiona with the socialiat countries' leaders:
They want an all-embracing aolution which takes Moroccan and Algerian
rights into account.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: However Algeria has for years aCaked a great deal on the
- POLISARIO. Why should it suddenly siop? Ali Yata: Because this atrategy, drawn up by two men who haee now vanished
from the political scene, Boumedienne and Bouteflika, hae not succeeded
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deapite vast resources: Morocco has not been brought to its kneea. At
the same time Boumedienne's economic policy has not produced reaulta.
Algeria is experiencing serious social problems despite its oil. In addi-
tion the people, brainwashed by vast campaigne, have not espoused the
POLISARIO's case. Then...as for Libya, al-Qadhdhafi has made blundera.
Politic:iana in all countries are now worried: How, they say, can we co-
overatrz with an unpredictable man who changes his friends and opinione at
every turn?
COPYR.IGH;: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
CSO: 4400
i
h~
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TUNISIA
GAFSA INCIDENT SEEN AS PEOPLE'S REVOLT
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 3 Mar 80 p 17
[Article by Adel Wahid: "The Calm Before the Storm"]
[Text] "I don't need anyone; France is with me." This phrase, delivered
like a slap in the face to Ahmed Mestiri, leader of the "social-liberals,"
who had come to express his loyalty, is in its conciseness the consummate
expression of both the person and the policy of the Tunisian chief of
state. Pretending to remain calm after the shock of Gafsa, Habib Bourguiba
and his seraglio are in fact profoundly disoriented. They still fear the
worst because the domestic and foreign repercussions of the revolt in the
- southern mining city are far from dissipated.
Evidence of this fact is the skirmishes which on 20 February still contin-
ued in the regions of Kasserine and Djebel Khemir (100 kilometers north of
Gafsa). Further proof, in Tunis itself, is supplied by the student demon-
strations, the slogans hostile to French and American intervention and
to the king of Morocco, particularly at the Schools of Liberal Arts, Law
and Economics, still closed and guarded by the police. Additional evidence
is the veiled hostility of the trade unions, whose silence takes on the
value of unequivocal censure, or the malaise that has emerged in the govern-
ment machinery, particularly the armed forces,police and customs, where
the discovery of sympathies for the Gafsa insurgents partially explains
France's intervention. Finally, there is the failure of the official
campaign attempting to blame foreign countries for the revolt and to 3us-
tify to national and international apinion the appeal for help sent to
Paris.
The single success is relative: recovery of part of the "opposition," whose
sole ambition is to be swallowed up in the corridors of government or, in
the case of the small groups, to gain official recognition. The old en-
lightened dictator, who has always used illness as a political asset, has
once again taken advantage of the ambitions of the Mestiris and other
social democrats, whase vacillating political moves should surprise no one.
As is his wont, Bourguiba pulled strings...in a vacuum, even within certain
leftist circles, which, however, he has never spared.
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Wtiat danger can then be threatening Tunisia, causing students with known
progressive opinions to sign a motion denouncing "the.odious aggression
against our nation" and declare themselves ready to "defend the nation's
territorial integrity and its gains"?
One may wonder whether the motion already disputed, it would appear
is not the result of a machination of the Destour, which is now trying to
rake on a nationalist image by stirring up a xenophobic campaign against
Libya and also against Algeria, but in a shameful, roundabout way. It
always finds complacent pens in the foreign press to distill insinuations
that are bandied about and that, wiien amplified by other periodicals
such as the Tunisian weekly known for its Western and neocolonial affin-
ities have become precise accusations buttressed by arguments taken
from the reports of Bourguiba's police.
The efforts made by the Tunisian Government are contradictory. On the one
hand, it tries to make people believe that the Gafsa revolt was completely
organized abroad, whence the justification of French intervention. Then
it tries to minimize that same revolt by presenting its protagonists
all Tunisians, it scornfully admits as being politically weak, puppets
manipulated by adventurers. 1LS arguments are so contradictory, so feeble,
that it has not been able to convince a single African nation.
The position of the OAU Council of Ministers reflects the general circum-
spection with regard to the T,unisian position on Libya's role. The list
of countries that have manifested their support is significant: Morocco,
Saudi Arabia, Gulf countries, China, all customers or allies of the United
States and France, protectors of the Bourguiba regime and the real masters
of Tunisia. The postponement of the first council meeting of the Arab
League, which was to examine the complaint filed by Tunisia, is due to the
reticence and skepticism of many member countries, which asked for time to
ref lect and obtain "clarifications" on the conditions of French interven-
tion and the underlying reasons for the Gafsa affair.
It now appears obvious that the Gafsa events are the pretext allowing these
two major imperialist powers France and the United States to define
their plan for encircling the progressive regimes in the region, making
- the "mild and liberal" Tunisia an offensive springboard and a hotbed of
tension particularly interesting for the strategists in Washington and
Paris, for it makes it possible to achieve a bond between Morocco and
Egypt. The promptness of the French intervention (requested by the "French
, party" headed by Mrs Bourguiba and the Tunisian ambassador in Paris, Hedi
Mabrouk, according to the "supreme combatant") and the acceleration in the
supplying of Atnerican'arms to Tunisia are not so much an illustration of
the inability of the Tunisian Army to meet an armed action at hom2 as they
are of a will to occupy a position rapidly, thereby creating the conditions
for a strengthened presence. As early as 7 February, in fact, American
transport planes unloaded M113 tanks at the military airport in Tunis.
On 13 February, Prime Minister Hedi Nouira announced the delivery of the
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first "defensive" weapons. These arms, 3oined with those "spontaneously"
offered by Moroccan King Hassan II, will serve to beef up the Tunisian -
Army, which the government keeping its eye on it because of the role it -
might be tempted to play in the crisis is mobilizing against Libya.
In this context, the matter of the continental shelf between the two coun-
tries takes on a new dimension. As soon as the anticipated cooling off of
the Gafsa uprising, the affair could well serve as a pretext for armed _
tension already foreshadawed by the war on the air being waged by Tunis
and Tripoli. The entire problem consists precisely of quelling Gafsa. _
This will apparently be difficult because it is not only all of southern
Tunisia that is in turmoil particularly the inhabitants of Gafsa, who
are counting their dead but the entire country of Tunisia, hunkered _
down in the calm that precedes the storm.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie,
11,464
CSO: 4400 END
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