JPRS ID: 9179 TRANSLATION MANUAL ON SHIP ACOUSTICS BY I.I. KLYUKIN AND I.I. BOGOLEPOV

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• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
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JPRS L/9016
3 April 1980
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JPRS L/9016
3 April 1980
~
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 16/80)
CONTENTS .PAGE
COUNTRY SECTION
FRANCE
Miche~ Poniatowslfl.: Man Behind Giscard~s Reelection Campaign
( Thi erry Pfister; I,E NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, l~-10 Feb 80 1
U.S. Alleged M..istakes Interpreted as Possible Slyness
(Arthur Conte; PARIS MATCH, 22 Feb 80) 4
DTCA Government Aeronautics Ihrector Tnterviewed
(Georges Bousquet; AIR & COSMOS, 12 Jan 80) 9
Armed Forces~ Radiatian Protection I}iscussed
(Pierre Thieblemont; ARMEES D~AUJOURD~HUI, Dec 79) 18
Plans for ~.iture Ariane I,aunches Announced
(Pierre Zangereux; ATR & COSMOS, 16 Feb 80) 22
CFDT, CGT Labor Union Reaction to PCF~s Pro-Sovietism
(I,E NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, L~-10 Feb 80) 25
~ SWEDEN
U.S. Trade Boycott of USSR To Affect Swerii_ ;~i Industry
(Gunilla Dahlqvist; VECKANS AFFANER, 31 Jan 80) 29
OPEC Countries Circumvent Companies in Sa1es to Svenska
Petroleum
(Ake Zandquist; VECKANS AFFARER, 14 Feb 80) 3b
State~s Foreign Debt Doubles in Yeax
(VECKANS .AF'FARER, 14 Feb 80) 41
Brief s
Exports Down 1~L~.
- a - (III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
MICHEL PONIA`TOWSKI: MAN BEHIND GISCARD'S REELECTION CAMPAIGN
- Paria LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 4-10 Feb 80 p 30
ti
[Article by Thierry Pfister: "The Recruiting Sergeant"]
[Text] Ponia ie back. The canary yellow sweater, which emphasizea his
imposing portliness, attracts the eye of everyone who enters the Strasbourg
hemicycle, ae he aurprises television viewers on occasion. An sctual trea-
tiee ahould be written on the relationship between Giacardiam and the
eweater. This garment recently made it possible for Finance Miniater
Valery Giscard d'Estaing to dietinguiah himself, to project a relaxed
image, the same one Jimmy Carter and his entourage later sought using the
same method. Today, wearing a aweater is the rule for everyone who works
at the Elyaee, perhaps because the preaident imposea minimal heating.
- Faithful to the role he has played for 20 years by Giscard d'Estaing's side,
Michel Poniatoweki may currently be aeeking to popularize that Giscardian
trade mark, while at the eame time aupporting the official publicity cam-
paign in favor of eaving energy. For the prince has taken up hia pilgrim's
etaff again and has already gone back to~work to insure ~he reelection of
hie friend Valery. He ie going to cover France, mobilizing the Rotary and
Lion's Club rosters, inviting the univeraity ataffs and people in the lib-
eral profeseions to come and hear Che conferences he orcga~.nizes, flanked by
a member of the govervment, in behaif of the InsCitute of Political Perapec-
tive which he founded 2 months ago. The goal is simpl~: To make officials
and opinion leaders aware that the international sicuation is serious and
that it ia thue advisable to play the safe card and keep at rhe head of the
' country a man who ia familiar with the great isaues of the times.
Above all there is no question of any talk about domeatic policy. In Mont-
pelier, where the firet meeting of that electoral precampaign was held, the
local officials of the UDF [French Democratic Union) and the Republican
Party thought they had done well in decorating the hall with their poatere.
Before the conf~rence began, Michel Poniatoweki's team had made all thoae
partisan traces disappear and put up the little, soberly red, white and blue,
Ineti+tute of Political Perspective poeters. Isn't the chief of state presi-
dan~ of all Frenchmzn?
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At this type of ineeting Ponia unreaervedly indulges himself in his pet
subject: futurol.ogy. Standing in front of a planisphere, he jugglea with
geopolitics, economic and miliCary balances, de~ography and biology. He
doea it with enough asaurance to impreas is audience, but not with enough
~orce to canpel conviction. The report on the superpowers is detailed at
length. They have been unsuccesaful in running the planet. It is time to
take our own des~iny back into ~ux hands before the military machines that
control the Soviet Union and the United States set the fatal gears in mo-
tion. And if the current crisis should only be a period of tenaion before
the return uf detente, the French attitude would make it possible to gather
the fruits of r~ormaliz3tion first. ~
One slogan could sum up the developed diplomatic analysis: "The planet
wante to be governed at the center." In the au~er of 1970, by establi~sh-
ing an identical diagnosis for France, Michel Poniatowaki provoked one of
those political tempesta that he loves. At the time r,e could enjoy him-
self becauae his prognoais was correct. Even if that ia the case once
again, it remains to be seen whether France has the wherewithall for that
policy. To Cake up the leaderahip of a nonalined movement, it is still
necessary to offer it other goals besides a selfish withdrawal to the
safeguarding of national intereats. In addition, there must be a vaice
capable of making itself heard before trying to rally people. Now that
. voice is terribly lacking in France.
Documents and Teatimony
Moreover, the Giscardian electorate is hardly ready for that behavior. It
" remaina profoundly affected by Atlantiam and in Montpelier several voices
were raised in the t~all to reprosch the conference-goers bitterly for
France's lack of solidarity toward the United Statea. Margaret Thatcher's
etyle obviously suited them be~ter than the Elyaee's caution. And when
Michel Poniatowski lampooned Jiu~y Carter as "that cowboy who remaine by
hie horse's side," there was much gritting of teeth.
Finally, the speech given by Poniatowski was far from endorsed by the Ely-
see. The prince, once more, is taking artistic license. Of courae, he
doea see the chief of state two or three times a month, not to mention
hunting parties. But doea he express the thoughts of the Elysee to the
exteat that he lets on? There ia some doubt. Valery Giecard d'Estaing
did not heaitate to take his friend out of the government after Poniatow-
ski's repeated political failurea. He did not forgive him the election of
Jacquea Chirac as mayor of Parie. Today he allows him to prepare the
ground for his future campai.gn but he still reserves the poasibility of
3isowning his loyal swordsman.
Poniatowski does not seem to take offense at this. He has chosen to exist
through Giecard d'Estaing and be satisfied with it. He takes advantage of
it by amasaing docwnents and testimony which he transfers to the National
~.rchiaes from time to time. Having written several historical treatiaes
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and woxkin~ currently on a life of Louis-Philippe, Michel Poniatowaki is
convinced ti~at a man's place in history is a function of the written tracte
he has left behind. Thus, he is groaming his image in an attempt to stand
out, which ie hardly easy when one counte:among hia ancestors a French
marshal, an Au~trian field marahal, a Poliah king and archbishop, not to
- mention d'Artagnan, nay Talleyrand.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Observateur"
" 11937
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
.
U.S. ALLEGED MISTAKES INTERPRETED AS POSSIBLE SLYNESS
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 22 Feb 80 pp 34-35
~ [Article by Arthur Conte: "An Unaettliag Idea: What If Carter Was a Pawn?"]
[Text] What if the turkeys were foxes? And if the Americans, far from
being marionettes on a string, were pulling the atrings themselves? And
� if Jimmy Carter were a simple pawn, moved around on the chessboard by the
real "powers" in America, four or five remarkably poised and shrewd
operators?
And if, far from being naive, American policy was to the contrary one of ;
exquisite cynicism and rare virtuoaity? If the "Eatabliehment" which guides
it were so Machiavellian se to exploit for ite owa purpoaea, Carter's
weakness--using it, in fact, ae a royal alibi?
This theory exists, and has serious defenders: that a amall group of inen,
in the Pentagon, in the State Department, and at the head of the clandeatine
services, who hold "the real seats of power" in America, have in fact
remained in complete coatrol of events around the world from start to
finish for at least the last 4 months. The Saviet Union, Irana and Islam,
would all have been manipulated. But, surprising as it would be, such a ~
theory has been developed with arguments so telliag and with auch striking
internal consistency, that it deaervea to be more widely known--and ia any
case by our readers. ~
So here we go.
Deliberately, and with cold calculation, to obtain an end conaciously chosen, ~
four or five of the "strategists" in question, could have decided to avail
themselves of the firstTpretext to come along to bring the shah from his
first Mexic,s.*~ residence in Cuernavaca to American territory. This would ~
have been c~lculated to provoke an immediate violent reaction from IQiomeyni's
aupportera and to ignite a grave Iranian-American incident, which could
then be ~~asily exploited to unleash the patriotic furor of the whole
Americar~ pe~~ple. It could have been foreeeen, ideally, that this would
provide a w~~rthy excuse for freezing Iran's eaormoua assets ia American banks, .
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send sizeable air and naval forces to the Persian Gulf and, manu militari
[tranalation unknown], guarantee the security of the wells and refineries
in southern Iran.
'~"he ~cenario at the Embassy Foreseen Befoie the Crisis
The "powera" would have be~n aure from the start that Khomeyni's Iran would
react brutally. They could have been sure, also, of getting a green light
from Carter to bring the ahah to American territory: both because of his
humanitarianiam in genera~, and more particularly because a demonstrably very
ill monarch wae in need of care, the pious Carter could not Qppose such a
requeat; and, for good measure, Governor Nelson Rockefeller and Richard
Nixon would intervene with all their moral suasion, to have the o,ld sover-
eign welcomed to an American haspital. The reat would happen by itself...
Suppose this is true.
Let us imagine the plot is unfolding as foreseen. Under pressure from
Rockefeller and Nixon, Carter gives his endorsement. The shah is hospitalized
in New York.
W3,thi~ 48 hours, eatremely violent demonstrations oreak out in Tehran.
Ame~ican authorities make no move toward either evacuation or e~~en serioua
protection of the American Embassy in the Iranian capital. (One detail,
reported by c~rtain aubsequently repatriated diplomats, is even more
troubling: the Am~erican diplomate had been under ordera as early as October
to take refuge in the Ciut.~dian Embasay in case of an attack on their own.
Thia eays that all contingznciea, posaible or even imaginable, had been
contemplated before the crisia,--inc~uding direct attack on the American
Embassy.
In the event, the said embaesy is attacked $nd taken over in one stroke by
a mob that will be described as deme~uted,.and which in large part will be,
but in whose midst several escellent agents of our strategiste would also
be working.
. Moreover, the diplomats taken hostage are treated in the most inhumane way, ~
eyea blindfolded, wriats bound, while spokesmen for the "conquerors" make
haete to proclaim themselves ready to ~udge them as war criminals.
The scenario from this point unfolds ineluctably.
Indignation spreads through the whole American populace.
Carter can call for public prayers for the victims.
Worldwide indignation is such that in one single stroke Khomeyni's revolu-
tion loses all its preatige.
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The Soviete, unable to give moral aupport to the embaesy seizure, loae the
complete confidence which up to the~ Khomeyni and hia supporters reposed
in them.
Carter begins to get into the spirit of�the game as he sees his popularity
curve taking a audden upward swing.
Iranian asaets in "civilized" banks every~.here can be freezed effortlessly.
The turn-around in the American people is so complete one can even easily
i.magine the Congress voting a sensational increase in the military budget
and funds for the CIA.
"Saoil" Rabul for the Cummunist Camp
Already the AmQrican fleet is heading toward the Persian Gulf.
If such was the intention of the "powers", the operation succeeded right
dowa the line.
Let ue imagine now another operation going on at the same time.
Let us auppoee that CIA agents had the ability tu complicate at will the
relations among the Afghan Communists in Kabul. Let us try to tell ourselves
that the Americans were so successful in their meddling in Afghanistan, so
effective, that th~ey ended up making the country ungovernable, all the
communiata suspicious of each other and massacring one another. The idea
was to "spoil" Kabul for the communiet camp, as Tehran had been "spoiled"
for the American camp after the shah's def eat.
Would not a country so great, which had successfully presided over the
atunning miracle of a Sino-Japanese alliance, and which accom~liehed the
feat of creating a"greater Asia" right in Moscow's face, have sufficient ,
reaources to upset a capital as sensitive and natur~lly tumultuous as Kabul?
In any case, let us make believe this was the case.
So, the scenario continues to unfold with impreseive precision.
The Soviet Union is obliged to intervene militarily in Afghanistan.
In turn, to incur the indignation of the entire world.
In turn, to incur the deadly wrath of Islam.
Pakistan rides high on ita "atomic" spurs.
Rhomeyni himself has to disavow the Ruasian intervention. ~
Global uproar is so great that the hostage incident in Tehran suddenly
aeems insigaificant in comparis~n to "the death of a whole people."
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Carter becomes more and more enamored of virile speeches and the "powers"
have the chance to get everything they want.
The proteet against Moacow is such that, for a while, Ielam wae ready to
call America to the reecue: Fakistan, in fact~ did.
Hatred of the Soviet world would almoet eclipse the hatred of Iarael and,
in paesing, it is even poaeible to rea~sert NATO's dominance over the West
European countries.
To conclude, nothing else remains but to send the shah to Yanama where, in
order no doubt to facilitate negotiations f or the return of the hostages,
he is kept on a"pocket island" as in a deluxe prison, an island cell.
Incredibly Naive or Masterfully Calculating
In such a hypothesis, it is obvious that America wins acroas the board;
America that_counts its winninga, Russia its misadventures. Ironically, at
the very time when one hears it said that the Army has i:aken power in
Moscow, it is in a way the American Army which really pulled it off in
Waehington.
This is only a theory, and therefore hae only relative meri~s, and certainly
ahould not be accepted as revealed truth. It is open to quite a few doubts
and criticieme. For example, it is difficult t~ imagine the ahah having
a cancer which requires au~gery, at ~ust the ri, ` time and just the right
place, in order to facilitate the diabolic desigas of our new Jamee Bonds.
It is also difficult to imagine great responsible leaders toying with the
lives of 50 hostages in such a cool and cynical way. In bringing the shah
to Aa~erica for his operation, no one could have foreaeen the reaction of
the Iranian people, much less the form this reaction would take. Even
though Carter b e wealc and bewildered, it is hard to go from there to
thinking he would be an ins:.rument of euch designs, like poor Rubempre
in�-the claws of *he new Vautrin. Finally, the Soviete in their owa right
would have been very naive to have been "taken" in so spectacular a way.
- But, as long as we realize that in our ag~ anything is posaible, we cannot
fail to see in this theory a certain coherence. To thie extent, at least,
it should be understood. Even if it does not help to dissolve the mista
that envelop us, it at least has the merit of clarifying some unexpected
aspects of the problem.
Nevertheless, it in no way chaages the general. lessous we have been able
to draw from the events. Quite the ~ontrary, it bids us, for our pwn part,
to exercise even more caution and reaerve.
If it be true that there is "conspiracy" everywhere, then we should be
more circumapect than ever.
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Let's face the facts: either America is incredibly naive, or masterfully
calculating.
Either it is the plaything of a president who ie weak and demagogic~ among
other thinga, or it is in reality led by five or eix men of the firet ~
caliber, a"junta" of rare talent.
Let it also be understood: either Russi.a is in a strictly defensive posture,
or it is laying the groundwork in A~ghanistan for a policy of vastly
greater scope.
Either Russia, ravaged by a bitter succession struggle, doesn't know which
way to turn, or the succession has already been resol~ved, without our
knowledge, and the new master is already exercising in Afghanistan his
new power.
We cannot be absolutely sure eithEr in Washington or Moscow, where the truth
lies, or which forces in either country are dominant.
Chess Games With Poker Chips
In one case as in the other, this is all the more reason for us, the French,
- to remain on the sidelines of these prodigious and all too somber cheas
games, with their surrealistic poker chipe. Let us remain content to see _
what happens while waiting for the akiee Co clear up.
We ahould hoYd ourselves apart, in reserve, all the more becauae we could
at any minute have to employ our good offices--infinitely precious if the
situation should suddenly deteriorate--in the service of peace.
We will never get tired of saying it: for us, this is not the time to
tie ourselves down.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 by Cogedipresse SA
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COUNTftY SECTION FRANCE
DTCA GOVERNMENT AERONAUTICS DIRECTOR IN'iERVIEWED
Paris AIl3 & COSMOS in French 12 Jan 80 pp 10-13
[Interview with Gen Georges Bousquet, director of the DTCA (Technical Direc-
torate of Aeronautical Construction); date and place not given]
a
(Text] Engineer General Georges Bousquet, technical director
of aeronautical construction, kindly agreed to comment, for
the readers of AIR ET COSM03, on the very important reform of
his directorate, which took effect on 1 January, in an inter-
view which we publiah below on the new arganizati.on of the `
DTCA. .
[Question) The DTCA has just been radically reorganized. Can you give ua
the reasons for this reorganization?
[Answer] First of all, I should make it clear that the missions vf the DTCA
have not changed. Its functions remain identical with what they were be-
fore. Within the General Delegation for Armament (DGA), its activity, which
involves military and civilian aeronautical equipment as a whole, is carried
out in close liaison with, on the one hand, the general staffa and the Gen-
eral Directc~rate for Civil Aviation, and on the other hand, the various
brr~nches of the aeronautical industry.
The preceding organization had been set up some 30 years ago. Many changes
have occurred since that time, among which ~~e can mention, in addition to
the evolution of equipment and fhe increase in its performance cgpabilitiea
and its complexity, the appearance of the notion of weapons systema inte-
grating equipment and weaponry, the international dimension of most of the
p~rograms, and the evolution of the industry itself. Moreover, the organiza- -
tion of the departmenta of the Ministry of Defense has been greatly modified
with the creation of the General Delegation for Armament,
In the face of all these changes, it was necessary to aeek the beat poasible
adaptation of the structures of the DTCA and ita services, and thia is the
purpose of the new organization that was juat established on 1 January 1980.
y [Queation] Wha~ does this reorganization consiat in? _
i
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[Answer] This reorganization concerns the central administration of the
DTCA and the services ottached to it.
As regarde the Central Administration first of all, the ministerial decree
of 12 December 1979 puts th~ official atamp on an organizational change al-
ready in effect, in experimental form, aince 1977. The purpoae of this
change was to adapt the DTCA's orgsnization bettar to that of the DGA.
In thia spirit, there are now four subdirectorates: plana-programe-industry,
international affaira, personnel-eatabliahments, and general affairs and ad-
ministrative subdirectorate. The innovation here conaists esaentially in
the creation of the plans-programs-induatry subdirectorate and the subdirer_- ~
torate of international affairs, and it is justified by the growing impor-
tance of these two sectors. Adaptation to the functional departments of the
DGA, to which these subdirectorates are homologous, is thus improved. -
The reorganization of the services goes deeper. It takes the form of the -
creation of three new services that replace the old ones (STAe [Aeronautical
Technical Service], SPAe [expansion unknown], STTA [Air Telecommunicationa
Technical Service]). Overall, the assignments of the new services are the
same, but the distribution af missions is considerably modified.
[Question] How was this new conception arrived at?
[Anawer] The previous organization was certainly very well-adapted to the _
situationa that were encountered in the past and that were characterized by '
more syatematic and sharper separation of development and production. On
the other hand, the prior organization also corresponded well with the Qr-
ganization of induetry, in terms of technical branche~. This organization `
by technology is therefore being preserved, just as it is obviously necea-
sary to preaerve the competence and experience.of the former aervicea. Care
has therefore been taken, in the preparation of the new organization, not to
seek change for ita own sake, but only better adaptation to the evolution of
the context. The guiding principles that inspired this approach are the
following:
--the importance of the program directorates has appeared greater and great-
er in the last several years. It was therefore necessary to create for the
programs directorates a receiving structure ac'apted to the d~fferent aspects
(development, production, maintenance) of a program. This aearch for new
receiving structures has led to a strengthening of the link between develop-
ment and production, and consequently to a closer association of the two
functions within the same functional units;
--the notion of system is the second guiding principle that has inspired us.
It is especially important at the weapons-system level. The growing inte-
gration of the systems has thus led us to make regroupinga, mainly with re-
gard to equipment and weaponry;
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--finally, after concentrating all the functions relating to the aeronautic-
al programe and the varioue technologies for them into two aervicee inetead
of three, a central service was aet up to combine the coordination functione
com~?on to the DTCA as a whole and covering prices, produc;tion and mainten-
ance.
[Queation] You have thua created three new aervices. What are the misaiona
of each of theae aervices?
[Answer] The DTCA has, in effecC, three new services: two technical ser-
vices--the Technical Service for Aeronautical Programs (STPA) and the Aero-
nautical Telecommunications and Equipment Service (STTE)--and one central
service, the Central Production, Pricea and Maintenance Service (SCPM).
_ The two technical services have responsibilities of the same nature in each
of the technical areas that they are asaigned--responsibilities that encom-
pass preparation for the future, studies, development, production and indus- .
trial maintenance of materiel. To outline the distribution of technical
areas between the two services, it can be said in a very general way that:
--the STPA is in charge of the conduct of military sircraft programa and
programa for weapona syetema based on aircraft, and is responsible for the
civilian-program taska that are aeaigned to it. It is in charge of the
technologies relative to aircraft as vehicles--that is, thoae which concern
the airframes of airplanes and helicoptera, the enginea, the materials, and
the circuits, the gener8l syetema and inetallatione;
--the STTE is reaponsible for the conduct of the equipment and weaponry pro-
_ grama under the DTCA's competence, both on board aircraft and on the ground,
and for the re~.ated technologies (piloting, navigation, systema integration,
airborne detection, countermeasures, weaponry, reconnaissance, ground detec-
tion systems, communications);
--the SCPM, for its part, is responsible for synthesis and general-policy
action in the matter of production, prices and maintenance, for questions
concerning price surveys and the general elements of prices, aid to the
technical services in negotiation of contracts, and the DTCA's general re-
lations with users and the SIAR [expansion unknown] with regard to mainten-
ance.
[Question] You have stressed the importance of the programs directorates in
the working-out of the new organization. What is the relationship of these
directoratea to the new services?
[Answer] The programs directorates are.divided between the STPA and the
STTE in function of types of equipment.
Aa regarda airplanes and helicopters (with some exceptiona--for example, the
transformation of an sirplane to a specifically electronic function), the
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programs directorates are all in the STPA. Within an interlocking organiza-
tional pattern, the program directors are supported by ~eams composed of
J apecialiats from different areas belonging either to the DTCA itself or to ,
cooperating departments, and tliua covering the entire aircraft and weapona
system. The program director's responsibility extends to all aspects of the
program: technical problems, production and maintenance problems, interna-
tional aspects, etc. The great flexibility of the approach adopted should
be mentioned. Depending on the case, one ma~ find, within the STPA, program
directorates which, because of their magnitude, are outside the normal chain
of command and programs directorates inside airplane, helicopter, or engine
departments. Likewiae, in order to economize on the means available, the
poasibility of grouping several programs of lesser importance under the re-
sponaibility of the same engineer is ~aintained. .
Today, the pr.ograms falling outside the usual hierarchy but within the STPS
are the Mirage 2000, rhe New-Generation Atlantic, the antitank helicopter,
the Airbus. For Concorde, a special structure was set up in the DTCA, in
the iorm of a technical and industrial director. In contrast, light air-
planea and gliders, for example, are still assigned to the same engineer in
the airplanes department.
In the new organization, further flexibility results from the closer associ-
ation of development and production. Thus it will be possible to go without
discontinuity from one phaee of a program to the following phase, and it
will be possible to make better uae of the competencies of the teama at the
different stages,
[QuEStio~ You have just reviewed the regrouping of technology and produc-
tion. Doesn't thia regrouping contain a danger--losa of apecificity--aince
the functions, in the last analysis, are quite differe~t?
[Anawer] Thank you for raising this very important point, to which we gave
our entire attention. The technological side and production will continue
to be taken in hand with all their specificity intact and with the deairable
level of competence. The two functions do in fact subsist, and the new de-
partments--airplanes or engines, for example--composed of units from, for
example, the STAe and the SPAe, bring all their experience and all their
_ means into activities that are entirely similar to those of the past. Con-
tinuity, which is very important in these fielda, will thus be ensured, and
in moat cases the teams will be preserved, so as to deal with the problems
in a specific way in function of the experience accumulated in the aervicea
that existed before. On the other hand, it should be noted that each of the
new aervices encompasses all of the administrative and contractual functions
in its area, as as to provide for direct action in relation to industry.
In the new departments, a very important and very positive element should be
streased: the grouping of a11 the specialists in the same technical field
with the corresponding activities, from thp projects stage all the way
through service support for the equipment during its use. This grouping of
the means in a given sector ahould make it poasible not only to improve li- ~
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aison between the differenz aspects concerned but also to deal better with
certain priority tasks such as preparation for the future.
[Question] You have already pointed out the fact that one of the ideas on
which the r~oganization ie based ~,a the importance of the developments in
the area of eyateme. Can you explain how thie concept ie expresaed in the
reorganization of the aervices?
[Anewer] In the new organization, the notion of system appears at two lev-
els:
--at the level of the complete system--a weapons system when a combat sir-
plane is involved--the development of the system is directly associated with
the notion of program directorate. The program director has overall re-
aponeibility for the totality of an operation. Thus, the program director
within the STPA is responaible for the complete airplane, and especially for
the weapone aystem, and he thus covers all the correaponding activities of
the directorate and of the cooperating directorates.
But the notion of system appears also at the level of integration of equip-
ment and weaponry. The reorganization that has just occurred makes it pos-
sible, in effect, to group the major part of the equipment and weaponry
within a single service, the STTE. Such a grouping should facilitate the
implementation of technical solutions in which the role of the computer and
data-procesaing is becoming more and more deciaive.
Thus, the STPA has general responsibility for syetems for sircraft, and the
- STTE has overall responsibility for the equipment and electronics systema at
the construction level, and for the corresponding integration technologies.
It goes without saying that the two technical services are obviously comple-
mentary, which should facilitate close and permanent cooperation.
[Question] So far, you have spoken more particularly of the technical ser-
vicea. Can you now define the role of the central service, the SCPM?
[Anawer] As I indicated above, we felt the need to group within a central
service the functions that are common to the two services and for which a
synthesis should be made at the level of the DTCA. I would like to go back
to the nature of these functions and indicate first of a11 th~t, contrary to
the two services that we have just spoken of, which largely take over exist-
ing functions, the SCPM has a very new role in certain respects.
In the area of prices, the SCPM takes over the responaibilities of the Ex-
pert Valuation and Prices section of the SPAe, although, in this field, it
is now planned to extend certain of its activities--on the one hand, with a
view to helping the technical services in negotiation of their biggeat
transactions, and on the other hand, in order to deal with the increasingly
international context of aeronautical affairs.
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In the area of production, special effort should be given to examination of
all the aspects that make it possible to achieve cost-reduction, while in
the area of induatrial maintenance, the aervice will be given the task of ~
working out general policy and establiehing the elements for aynthesie that
are more and more necessary at the level both of the DTCA and of the armed
forces that uae the end products.
(Question] Is this reorganization leading to a geographical regrouping?
[Anawer] The reorganization of the services will, effectively, lead to a '
gradual regrouping in the Welvert building of the Cite de 1tAir of the
teams that are responsible for most of the on-board equipment, whether they
belong to the STPA or to the STTE. This regrouping, which will take effect
in a few weeka, wi11 also make it possible to improve the very close rela- ,
tions that should exist between the two services. Unfortunately, this re-
~ grouping cannot be a total one in the present state of affairs, and the STTE
will keep its headquarters and part of its services at 129, rue de la Con-
- vention. In the longer term, it is still planned to group all the services
in the City of the Air, but fulfillment of this objective depends on the
construction of new buildings, and this is not ~o be expected for several
years.
[Question] I thank you for the information you have given ua on the prin-
ciplea of the new organization of the DTCA. But how, in the future, will
one be able to get a point clarified regarding the measures that you have
juat explained, and in a more general way, how will one be able to obtain
more detailed information?
[Anawer] On the occasion of the reoganization, the DTCA put out a brochure
which it distributed widely among the official organisms and industry. This
brochure should give those interested a succinct idea of the changes that
have been made. In addition, interested organisms can obtain more detailed
information from the correapondents they are normally in touch with. Final-
ly, with regard to special needs, even more complete information can be ob-
tained by applying to the DTCA's Office of Organization of Establiahments,
at 26, boulevard Victor, Paris.
[Question] From the information that you have kindly provided for the read-
ers of AIR ET COSMOS, it emerges that it will still take some time for the
new organization to be fully in place and for the reasons behind this quite
far-reaching change to be better understood. Can some initial conclusiona
be drawn today from the information given?
[Anawer] As I told you, the concern of the DTCA, at the conclusion of a
period of thinking that lasted several years but went into ita deciaive
phase in 1978 and 1979, has been to try to adapt the structures of the ser-
vices to a context evolving rapidly both on the technical level and on the
level of the conditions under which the main part of their activity is now -
carried out. This adaptation has been sougt:= in such a way as to preserve
l~+ ,
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_ as much ae poeaible the traditional basic qualities of the organization, and
in particular, the technical competence and experience of the exiating
teame.
We are now entering upon a traneitional period--one which I hope will be as
ahort as poesible and during which the services and their many correspon-
dents will have to establiah new basea of relationa.
I hope that once thia period has paeaed, the improvement factora sought,
which are numeroua and important, as you have seen, will be fully evident;
but it is obviously too soon to draw any conclusions.
TECHNICAL DIRECTORATE OF AERONAUTICAL CONSTRUCTION
Organization as of 1 January 1980
26, boulevard Victor - 75996 PARIS ARMEES - Tel: [phone]
Director: Engineer General Georges Bousquet .
Assistant Director: Engineer General Gay
Special Asaiatants
Air Force Asaistant: General Aubry Standardization: Engineer
Navy Assietant: Commander Prazuck General Theron
Civil-Aviation Assiatant: Engineer -
General George, Concorde Tech- Advance Planning and Research:
nical and Induetrial Director Engineer General Louchart
Operation8 Asaiata~nt: Engineer-in- ~
Chief Ripoll International Programs:
Engineer-in-Chief Audran
Miasion Chiefs
Security Department:
Studies-Investigations: Engineer Lieutenant Colonel Alvernhe
General Buisson
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION OF T~iE DTCA
I. Plana-Programs-Industry Sub- II. International Affaira Sub-
Directorate Directorate
Sub-Director: Engineer General Sub-Di.rector: Engineer General Sellea
Sandesu Asaiatant Sub-Director: Engineer-in-
Assistant to Sub-Director: Chief de Bignicourt
Engineer-in-Chief Lasserre Office of Research and Gran'ting of
Plana-Programa-Budgets Office: Licenaes: Mrs Grisoni
Engineer-in-Chief Laeserre Fo~eign Trade Office: Mr Philippe
Principal Engineer Pouliquen Office for Coordination of Asaistance
Mr Alfonsi to Foreignera: Mr Rodary
Engineer-Technician for Studies Office of External Relations:
and Fabrication Jamet Mr Pizzini
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III. Peraonnel, Establishments and Industrial Sub-Director: Engineer-
- General Affairs Sub-Directorate in-Chief Lamy '
Sub-Director: Engineer General Program Directors
Gaillardot
Asaiatant Sub-Director: Engineer-in- Mirage 2000: Engineer-in-Chief
Chief Durollet Tamagnini
Office of Military Engineers: New-Generation Atlantic: Engineer-
Mr Dupuy in-Chief Bonnevalle
Office of Civilian Personnel: Antitank Helicopter: Engineer-in-
Mr Caporal Chief Lureau ~ '
Office of Military Armed Forcea Per- Airbus Technical and Industrial Di-
' sonnel: Lieufenant Colonel Bastgen rector: Engineer-in-Chief Bruneau
Office of Initial and Ongoing Train~
ing: Engineer-in-Chief for Technic- Airplane Departments
al Studies on Weaponry Baquey Chief: Engineer-in-Chief Megard
Office of Organization of Establish- Assistant: Engineer-in-Chief
ments: Engineer-in-Chief Durollet Terrazzoni
Off ice of Methods and Data-Processing:
Engineer-in-Chief Evrard Engines Department
Office of Domain, Construction Pro- Chief: Engineer-in-Chief Ferrandon
jects, Investments: Mr Robert Assista~t: Engineer-in-Chief
Office of Materiel and General Af- Lauriac
faira: Mr Guelin
Helicopters Department
IV. Adminiatrative Sub-Directorate Chief: Engineer-in-Chief Berthault
Asaietant: Principal Engineer
Sub-D*rector: Mr Vuillier Sintes ~
Assietant Sub-Director: Mr Maudry-
Gauvin Circuits-Installationa Department
Office of Financial Management of In- Chief: Engineer-in-Chief Peard
duetrial Ordera under International Production Aasistant: Engineer-in-
Cooperation:~Mr Chretienneau Chief Gremond
Office of Financial Management of Development Assiatant: Principal
Establishmenta: Mr Picon-Dupre Engineer Martelli
Office of Financial Maagement of In-
dustrial Orders: Mr D'Emmerez General Studiea Section
Office of Contracta and Legal Af- Chief: Engineer-in-Chief Leblanc
faira: Mr Puisoye
Materials Section
TECHNICAL SERVICE FOR AERONAUTICAL Chief: Principal Engineer Auvinet
PROGRAMS
4, rue da la Porte d'Issy - 75996 Standardization-Codification
PARIS ARMEES - Te1: 552-43-21 Section
Chief: Colonel Vincent
Director: Engineer General Guenod Administrative Service
Assistant Director: Engineer General Chief: Miss Heraud
Deforges
Technical Sub-Director: Engineer-in-
Chief Givois
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AERONAUTICAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND Budget and Materiel Management
EQUIPMENT TECHNICAL SERVICE Section
129, rue de la Convention Chief: Colonel Michault
75731 PARIS CEDEX 15 - Tel: 5~4-97-14 Adminstrative Service
Director: Engineer General Bergougnioux Chief: Mias Lemoyne
Aesistant Director: Engineer-in-Chief CENTRAL PRODUCTION, PRICES AND -
Jacques Bouaquet MAINTENANCE SECTION
Technical Sub-Director: Engineer-in-
Chief Blanc 4, avenue de la porte d'Iasy
Industrial Sub-Director: Engineer 75996 PARIS ARMEES
General Herry Tel: [phone]
Technical Coordination Group: Princi-
pal Engineer Garnier , Director: Engineer General
Production and Maintenance Coordination Beringer
Group: Principal Engineer Guimonet
Production and Maintenance
Piloting, Navigation and Integration Section
Department Chief: Engineer-in-Chief
Chief: Engineer-in-Chief Scheller Dubresson
Aasiatant: Principal Engineer Moreau
Airplanea
Airborne Detection and Countermeasurea Principal Engineer Ga:~dillet
Department
Chief: Engineer--in-Chief Bertagna Enginee
Asaietant: Engineer-in-Chief Engineer-in-Chief Ducret
Kleinknecht
' Equipment
Reconnaiasance Equipment Department Equipment Engineer Chancel
Cliief: Engineer-in-Chief Forget
Aasistant: Engineer-in-Chief Dejean General Affairs
Mr Normand
Co~unicationa Department
Chief: Engineer-in-Chief Pelosse Expert Valuation and Prices
Aaeietant: Principal Engineer Mollie Section
Chief: Engineer-in-Chief
Ground Detection Syatems Departmenta Laborde
Chief: Engineer-in-Chief Basset Assiatants: Engineer-in-Chief
Asaistants: Engineer-in-Chief Gert- Gloria, Principal Engineer
hoffert, Engineer-in-Chief Bouillon, Equipment Engineer
Morriset Tisnea
On-Board Inatallation Section
Chief: Engineer-in-Chief Darricau
Asaistant: Principal Engineer Peuchot
COPYRIGHT: Air & Cosmos, Pari,s, 1980
11267
cso: 3ioo 17
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
i
ARMED FORCES' RADIATION PROTE~,TION DISCUSSED
Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Dec 79 pp 30-31
[Article by Dr Pierre Thieblemont]
[Text] Radiation protection is a medical responsibility.
Its purpose is to preserve the health of persons who are
exposed in their work to ionizing radiation, or who may
be victims of its effects. In the Ministry of Defense
it has been the responsibility of the Medical Corps which
has been advising the High Comnnand in theae mattera.
During the last two decades the uae of sources of ionizing radiation in the �
Ministry of Defenae has increased considerably as a result of the produc-
tion af deterrenta. Therefore it has been necessary to coordinate radia- '
tion safety measurea for more effective implementation. The uniform na-
tional regulationa on this sub~ect are based on a decree of June 1966,
issued on the initiative of the health minister. This decree defines the
general principles for protection against ionizing radiation. These prin-
ciples are based on recommendations made by CIPR [International Com~ission
for Radiation Protection] in 1959 and adopted by the European Co~unity in .
1962 at the time of the treaty which establishe3 Euratom.
At the Ministry of Defense, in an order dated 6 December 1971, the minister
has asaigned to the Director General of the Armed Forces Medical Corps the
~oint affairs and expert inspection related to the radiation safety of in-
stallations and the protection of personnel from ionizing radiation. Thia
duty ia specified by a ministerial directive and delegated to the Armed
Forces Radiation Protection Service (SPRA) (established by Dec~.sion No
349/DN/DCSSA/3/ORG/2/RT, 5 February 1973).
Range of Activities of SPRA ~
This range is relativel;~ wide because of the considerable increase observed ~
in recent years in the introduction of ionizing radiation sources in the
armed forces and in installations. Two sources are traditionally recog- ;
nized: ~
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[1] sources related to defense activities (classified). They are under
a special atatute. This category comprises:
- --Nuclear weapons assigned to units of the three branches of the armed
forces, some nuclear equipment intended for the Ministry of Defense, and
weapon prototypes under test at nuclear test centers;
--Nuclear reacCora of weapon-launching submarines (SNLE) and attack aub-
marines (SNA).
; A miniaterial co~ittee ia engaged in the elaboration of rules applicable
to the radiation safety of theae basic nuclear installations. An SPRA
representative participates in this work and, since he is informed of the
riaks incurred by personnel involved in the use of these means, he is in
a poaition to recommend protection measures for adoption. His powers also
' extend to the nuclear safety exercises conducted in the environment of
these installations and to their inepectioa by competent authorities.
; Finally, in the medical field, he recommends measures for action in case
of incident or accident, and verifies their appli~ation and effectiveness.
, [2] sources not related to defense requirements are governed by uniform
law r~gulations, for example:
~ --Ionizing radiation electric-generation equipment for medical uae (X-ray
diagnoeis, radiotherapy, etc.) or for induatrial use. The procedures for
~ the uae of these sources are atrictly regulated se will be aeen below;
I --Sealed or unsealed radioactivity sourcea used in clinical, radiotherapy,
; and nuclear medicine services and medical biology laboratoriea; and
;
~ --Industrial gammagraphy sources and radio elements contained in various
! devices or in research equipment in institutions, schools, educational
i centers, and laboratories of the Ministry of Defense.
i
i The Duties of the Armed Forces Radiation Protection Service
~
; The first is an administrative duty since the service is responsible for
~ the elaboration of the uniform regulations governing personnel protection
from radiation and the radiation safety of inetallations regulated by the
uniform law.
i
i In respect to the radiation safety of installations the central agency:
~ --Is informed of all plans for the acquisition or modificati~n of ionizing
i radiation sources. It must control the effectiveness of radiation protec-
~ tion measures and modify them if necessary. Under the regulations in ef-
~ fect it tranamits with a substantial opinion applications for the acquiai-
i tion of radioactivity sources~to the Health Ministry in cases of inedical
! use, and to the Interministerial Conmm3.esion on Artificial Radio Elements
I (CIREA) in the case ~f industrial application sources;
I
!
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--Conducts the ini*_ial inspec.*.ion at the time of installation of ionizing
radiation sources, and verifies the effectiveness of protection;
--Conducts the periodical safety inspectiona provided for in the regula-
tions, inspecta medical installations every 3 years and industrial applica-
tion sources every 2 yeara;
--Aacertains the satisfactory operation of installations by continuous
dosimetric monitoring (with dosimetric films or the like) of ~he inspected
zone and possibly of the monitored zone, and sees to the observance of the
applicable rules; and ~
--Finally, is empowered to initiate lnvesrigations in case of nonobservance
of the rules.
Protection of Personnel From Radiation
SPRA. is responeible for the coordination, use, and implementation of inea-
sures for the protection from radiation of personnel assigned to work
directly under ionizing radiation. These measures are defined in the
uniform regulations. For this purpose it provides for and coordinates:
--The dosimetric monitoring of personnel and the verification of the ob-
servance of the applicable rules; and �
--The medical radiobiological observation, medical fitness checkupa,
periodical checkups, and follow-up specific examinations.
The documents conc~rning this observation are standardized and addressed
to SPRA by the physicians of the units concerned for filing and use. For
this purpose the service has a minicomputer in which all data received
are stored and preserved. The service conducts the investigations required
in case of nonobservance of the rules or deliberate exceptional exposure,
and conducts the preliminary investigation in disputed radiation cases at
the requeat of civilian or military organizations.
Subaidiary Duties
Primary teaching function since the regulations provide for special quali-
fications for source-operating personnel. The service has been induced
to set up training coursea for "persons qualified in radiation protection"
and technicians designated to operate industrial radiography equipment
(X and Y sources). These training courses, given periodically at the Cen-
tral Technica~ Equipment Installation, ar~ used by the inetallationa and
the Armed Forces to prepare the necessary personnel. The service also
participates in training courses organized in the Armed Forcea Medical
Corps for personnel designated to operate in units aseigned weapons or in ;
hospital units called upon in radiation accident cases.
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Finally the service is the intermediary between the Ministry of Defense
and the organizations (interministerial commissions and co~ittees) con-
cerned with radiation safety and protection of personnel from radiation.
Resources Available to SPRA
Located on the premises of H.I.A. Percy at Clamart (92), the service con- _
sists of about 15 persons and is divided into four apecialized sections:
--A medical problems section under a physician qualified in problems of
personnel protection from radiation;
--A physical problems section under a weapons officer specialized in
physical radiation protection and concerned with the safety, compliance,
and inspection of installations;
--A data processing section concerned with the acquisition, storage, and~
use of all the informations supplied to the service, and with documenta-
tion; and
--An administrative section.
SPRA is assisted by two expert agencies:
One is a component of the Armed Forces Medical Corps. Some divieiona of
the Research Center of the Armed Forces Medical Corps (CRSSA), also sta-
tioned at Clamart, act as radiobiology and radiotoxicology experts. Some
radiochemical tests and spectrometric analyaes are conducted in these
laboratories for personnel expoaed to particular radiation disturbances.
The other agency is under the General Armament Delegation (DGA) which is
skilled in detection and physical protection, the Medical and Safety Ser-
vice of the DPN (Nuclear Protection Division) of the Central Technical
Weapona Installation (ETCA) located at Arcueil conducts for SPRA the
doaimetric monitoring oY inatallations and peraonnel, the technical in-
apection of installations, and is concerned more generally with physical
problems eubmitted to SPRA (specific tests, effluent transport, adminis-
' trative control, etc.), and has the necessary physical reac~urces and
suitable technical teams.
These two expert agencies are in a position to act promptly on the site
of incidents and accidents.
Radiation protection of personnel expoaed professionally to ionizing
radiation is conceivable only if all the persons who are active in the
conception and use of radiation sources operate in close cooperation.
The duty of SPRA is to define the methods for the use of these sources,
and to provide for the coordinatiom of protective measures. The preserva-
tion~of the health of exposed personnel must remain aa eesential and con-
stant concern of the supervisors to wiiom these resources are entrusted.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 - Revue des forcea armees francaises "Armees d~Au~ourd~Iwi"
9456
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
PLANS FOR FUTURE ARIANE LAUNCHES ANNOUNCED
Paris AIR ~ COSMOS in French 16 Feb 80 p 53
[Article by Pierre Langereux: "Second Ariane To Be Laimched Between `
20 and 30 May"]
[Text] The second launch of the European Ariane launch vehicle is now
acheduled for between 20 and 30 May 1980, according to the announcement ~
made by Roger Vignelles, CNES [National Center for Space Studies] Ariane
program manager, at a meeting of the AAAF [Aeronautical and Aatronautical
Aseociation of France] in Paris on 12 February. The second Ariane flight
vehicle, designated LQ2, will be sent to Guiana by ship on 15 March and
the L02 launch campaign will begin 31 March. Because of the experience
gained from the first launch, the L02 campaign will be shorter--35 working
days-- than the LO1 campaign of 54 working days. The 8econd Ariane launch
will carry the small Oacar-9 amateur radio communications satellite and the
German Firewheel scientific satellite.
Roger Vignelles also announced that the third Ariane launch (L03) is
scheduled for late September or early October. He explained that this will
be a quasi-operational flight in that it will launch two large satellites:
India's Apple experimental communications satellite and the European Meteo-
sat 2 weather satellite.
The fourth Ariane launch (L04) is still planned for December 1980 and is
supposed to carry the European Marecs-A communications sate111te.
Ariane's program manager revealed that, contrary to initial estimates, the
- Ariane�s firat successful launch on 24 December now counts as a succeaeful
qualification flight. Consequently, under the terms of the agreements with
ESA [European Space Agency] which require two auccessful qualification
flights to declare the launch vehicle operational, CNES has to have only
ane more succesaful flight to meet this requirement. Hence, according to
Roger Vignelles, the Ariaue launcher may become flight qualified immediately '
after the third test flight (L03). There are no plans, however, to stop the
series of test launches before the L03 launch. Neverthelese, if the next
two test flighta are as successful as the first, CNES and ESA may probably
asaign the fourth launch vehicle (L04) to an operational flight.
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Roger Vignelles presented the initial report on results of the launch ~
vehicle's first qualification flight en 24 December. This report covered
a preliminary analyais of some 1,200 parameters collected during the
flight, an analyeis made by QdES and the manufacturera from 3 to 11
January 1980: A:more detailed evaluation begun on 13 January will continue
until late March 1980 for preparation of a final report.
Confirmed Succeas of First Launch
But preliminary analysis already confi.rm~a t~at the first launch was
extremely successful. All specifications connected with the payload
(position, velocity, injection into orbit, acoustic environment, etc.)
were met within designed tolerances, with the exception of the dynamic
environment and a brief heat-flux peak and pollution peak at the end of
the second stage. burn.
In comparing interfaces with the payload according to the general speci-
fications in the Ariane Vehicle System (STIA) and the generally higher
specificatior.s in the Ariane Users' Manual (MUA), it was ascertained that -
loads corresponding to maximum dynamic pressure at first stage burnout
were below specifications.
The pogo effect noted during the last 10 seconda of the second stage burn
was above (1.85G) MUA apecifications (1.SG) for 2.5 aeconds. Hence it is
planned to actuate the second stage's anti-pogo device during the next
launch.
Noise under the fairing (135 db + 2db) was below MUA specifications
(142 db). Nevertheless, an acoustic shield will be installed for.the
second launch in order to better satisfy future users.
Heat flow showed a peak of 1.2 kw/m2 during operation of the firat stage
retrorockete. T'his phenomenon will be studied in greater detail. On
the ~~other hand, when the fairing was ~ettisoned, the recorded maximum
flow (875 w/m2) was below MUA specifications (I,135 w/m2).
Pollution which reached 4.5 mg/m2 on separation of the fairing and i
4.8 mg/m2 upon ignition of the second stage retrorockets will also have to
be corrected.
Performances of the three stages, equipment bay, and fairing were better,
by and large, than expected. No irregularity was reported, except th~
second stage pogo effect. Control of the mixture ratio~~of the firat
stage's Viking engines, which had aroused some apprehension, wae much more
accurate (0.2 percent} than expected (1.2 percent). It was even better
for the aecond sCage engine. ATtitude and velocity exceeded theoretical
' performances by 200 meters and 8 metera per second at first stage burnout
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and by 1,400 meters and 60 meters per second at second stage burnout, but
these were still within expected deviations. Third stage burn time was
23 to 25 seconds lesa than expected on account of a chamber preaeure clos~
to the upper limit. The 90-degree pitchover and the spinning of the third
stage at 10 rpm after payload separation were accomplished normally. The
kinematics of separation was almost perfect: the payload's axia was "off"
by 0 degree and transverse angular velocity by 0.2 degreea per aecond.
Under theae conditions, the orbit achieved by the first Ariane launch
, vehicle was close to nominal: perigee of 200.8 kilometers (nominal: 200 '
kilometers~, apogee of 36,021 kilometers (nominal: 35,800 kilometers)
and an inclination of 17.555 degrees (17.5`deffirees). The apogee was ,
slight3y hi~her on account of a pessimistic estimate of the third stage's
specific impul.ae at thrust cutoff. This point can be corrected but the
flight program of the second launch (L02) will not be modified.
Roger Vignelles stated that in the first (LO1) launch, Ariane demonstrated
it had a payload capability of 1,737 kilograms (nominal: 1,700 kilograms).
Thia for a transfer orbit conforming to the MUA (ir.clination of 9.65
degrees), by adding to the 1,602 kilograms of the LO1 payload actually
placed into orbit, another 75 kilograms of telemetry equipment specific
to the flight tests plus 60 k~lograms as a"handicap" in~order to inten-
tionally incline th e LO1's flight path southward (for telemetry acquisition).
This thus confirms the payload capability (1,770 kilograms) required to
launch Intelsat 5 satellites. '
To conclude, very few modifications need be made in the launch vehicle
or launch procedures for the second launch. The release sequence is being
modified to take into account the problem encountered on ~15 December. The
anti-pogo device on the second stage will be activated and the addition of
heat ahielda is being considered as a means of reducing heat flow and
pollution. The SEP [European Propulsion Company] is conducting additional
teats relative to the problem which arose on 23 December and the synchronized
aequence's automatic procedures have been simplified because of the problems
encountered on 23 and 24 December.
COPYRIGHT: Air & Cosmos, Paris, 1980
8041
CSO: 3100
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~
COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
~ CFDT, CGT I~ABOR UIVION REACTSON TO PCF'S PRO-SOVIETISM
Paris LE NOUV~'I, OBSERVATEUR in French 4-10 Feb 80 pp 27-29
' [TextJ It was inev~table: after the parties--those of the left anyway--it
is the French labor unions' turn to be struck a direct hit by the Afghan
affair, and its complement, Sakharov's exile to the interior. One would
think that the powers would be delighted--in silence--about these new dis-
sensions as they even further avert the "risks" of a serious contestation
against its social rolicy, however aberrant it is. Here is the communist
party, under the pretext of drawing up an official statement, arrogantly
casting out into the outer darkness in an incredible medley, ~11 those who
, refused to swalla~w the "coup of Kabul" and then pouring a new and generous
~ brim-full of oil on the fire.
I
~ This is indeed an extraordinary "declaration" by the political bureau pub-
lished by L'HUMANITE on 31 January: Calmly reversing the chronological
facts--following a very ancient method -the PCF when alluding to the present
tension only mentions "the urlleashing of anticommunist propaganda" used by'
"Giscard d'Estaing, the employers, all the reactionary forces" to try and _
~ "obtain the submission of the workers." And it concludes: "The Political
Bureau observes that the leaders of the socialist party cooperate directly
with this undertaking. Those of the CFDT (French Democratic Confederation
of Labor), FEN (National Education Federation) and the FO (Workers Force)
also work in a consensua.l manner and at the same time txy to assiat the
socialist party...
The brutality and universality of this curse is surprising. Indeed, these
, three pilloried labor union organizations have, in the past few days severely
censured the Soviet machinations as well as those who absolved them in France,
through the voices of Andre Henr~ for FEN, Andre Bergeron for FO and Edmond
Maire before the National Council of the CFDT. But in spite,of the gravity
of the debate and the crudeness of the remarks, the labor~unionists raade
' every effort not to commit the irreparable and preserve, even for an uncertain
future, the smallest chance for "unified" action. Apparently the communist
party does not indulge any longer in such absorptions.
~ *see page 29 in Zucien Rioux's article
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A Bitter Statement: It is true that the labor union world does not conform
as easily as the communist party to warlike simplifications. The CGT con-
tinues to bear witness to the above; in fact, the uneasiness created among
the members by the alignment with Soviet positions has not been dispelled.
Even the CCN (National Confederal Committee), which met on 23 and 24 January, ,
suffered from its after-effects although the communists are in an overwhelm-
ing ma3ority in this organization. Yet, the communist party framework had
done everything possible to impress the indifferent and isolate the chal-
lengers, who were violently attacked this time. But when it came time to ;
vote three federations refused to approve that part of the Lomet report 1
which pertained to Afghanistan; the penitentiary personnel voted against
the total report, finances abstained and the powerful chemistry federation
voted for the report bu~t expressed its disagreement with the part under dis-
pute. However, the last two federations have two communist secretaries:
Robert Gevaudan and Jean Vincent.
It is not the report of their voyage to Kabul on 28 January by Pierre
Gensous, Jean-Claude Laroze and Joseph ~acguet which will be sufficient to
dispel their doubts. These "investigators" saw nothing abnormal in the
Afghan capital "the majority of the Afghans were breathing and were going
about their normal business" they declared. Will it be emphasized that this
trip had been made under the auspices of the FSM (World Federation of Trade
Unions), an organization whose last committee meeting had been "cut" by
Georges Seguy because the CGT considered it to be too much in line with
Eastern countries...?
Nevertheless, respective positions have hardened as the days went by. The
communist party tightens its hold on the CGT. This was an incentive for
the other groups of affiliated trade unions to drive the nail in.
"The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is a fundamental event. For us in
France it ruins for a long time the possibility of a united government of
the left; it is a severe blow to the union of the people's forces." This
bitter statement, which reverses PCF's statement, was made by Edmond Maire
on 24 January before the National Council of the CFDT. Sweeping away the
Soviet version that this was an appeal by the Afghan Government--"Marchais
lied on this point--..." Ma.ire drew a conclusion from this event that com-
munism arrogates to i+,self the right to "a preventive intervention" un3er a
revolutionary pretext, at the same time negating the alternative. It will
be necessary then, future fantasy, to define another socialism "which will
assert itself at the same time against the capitalist system and against
this other expansionist system of oppression, exploitat?.on and alienation
established in the USSR and in the satellite countries."
However, in the immediate future the "regressive evolution of the French
communists" presents a formidable problem in any action concerning the
demands of labor. Yet Maire is positive. This action "must remain abso-
lutely unified" and he even makes it a matter of principle: "We will never
surrender to any campaign which will tend to thraw communism back into the
ghetto."
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Contradiction? In any case there is a corresponding pressing need which
impells the CGT not to go as far ae a total break. This was easy to observe
at the end of the meeting of the CGTists and the CIDETiets on 29 Janu~ry.
Four hours of confrontation without any results, not even a~oint communigue,
when even a negative result, "no accord, no break-off" would have been greet-
ed as srnne sort of success. Just as though unity of action had been saved ~
while taking care not to proclaim it.
An agreement was certainly not being considered. For many months the CGT
had accused CFDT of not "being present at the struggle" while ~FDT denounced
' CGT's submission to the political ob~ectives of the communist party. No
illusions, therefore, when on Tuesday 29 January CGT received CFDT on the
, seventh floor, at 213 rue de I~a Fayette. Geor~es Seguy accampanied by four
members of the confederal bureau--Rene Lomet, Jacqueline ?~ambert, Rene Buhl,
Gerard Gaume--and his secretary Jean-Zuc Destrem, greeted Edmond Maire and
his delegation; Jacques Cheregue, Robert Bono, Jeannette I,aot, Georges Begot, -
; Albert M~ercier and Guy Gouyet. The climate is tense.
But faithful to its habits the CGT decided to act as though the differences
were written in parenthesis. Right away, in presenting CGT's project--very -
short, 20 lines--Georges Seguy declared: "let us not waste any time discuss-
ing our differences. No philosopho-political discussions..."
Nevertheless the CFDT delegation is startled when it reads this small docu-
~ ment: "The first mission of tre,de unionism is to ensure the defense of -
~ professional workers' claims The divergencies which separate the CGT
' and CFDT on some national and international problems cannot reflect again on
their unity of action." Finally, "the above remarks express the devotion of
both c~rganizations to the independence of the unionist movement and to the
~ autonoa~y of its activities." In addition the text is presented as a"prelim-
inary" to any discussion.
Deep Mistrust. Inacceptable say the CEDETists, who feel that the CGT is out
~ of order when it proposes such ~ conception of unionism. Edmond Maire
deplores CGT's refusal to disc~ss their differencea and adds: "We are not
; in the habit of ~:eting on a preliminary text." But Georges Seguy confirms,
~ "the Segetist program actually is a prelimir~ary text." Therefore no discus-
sions on the objectives and modalities of this action. CFDT refuses. The
, meeting is suspended.
After a full hour the CGT's return with an expanded text. The CFDT has "an
essential nission to defend the material and moral interests of the worker
' that is to say, including at the same time immediate claims, individual and
collective liberty, broadening of rights and emancipation of the workers and
the people." Kabul's shadow has just spread over 213 rue ?~a Fayette. CFDT
further recalls its adherence to the agreement of 26 June 1974 which estab-
lished the unity of action, and to the agreement of 17 September 1979 which
defined the three ranking claims: increase in low salaries, reduction in
working rours, right of expression by the workers. New suspension.
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One hour later the CGTists return, they amended the preceding text, they
are presenting a third document. In fact, this is an impasse. An agree-
ment is evidently impossible. Nor will the disagreement be published...
for the only purpose of being able to say that there had not been a break-
down . ~
Actually a real fragile balance which in addition is being menaced in the
future by the deep mistrust pervading between two courses, not to mention
between two worlds.
What a mess: This week Pierre Eeregovoy, who had been one of the socialist
negotiators, recalled that the 1972 "common program" had established the
follawing as principles for the foreign policy of the state: the non-
intervention in internal affairs of other countries, refusal to have recourse
to force or threaten recourse to force, including the use of force to impose
the choice of alliances on a nation, establishing or maintaining a political
or social system against the wish of the majority of the people." Yes, the
PCF had signed this program. And then, Kabul....
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Observateur" ~
7993
CSO: 3100 '
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COIII~TRY SDCTION SWEDEN `
~ ~
U.$. TRADE BOYCOTT OF USSR TO AFFDCT SWEDISH INDUSTRY
~
Stockholm VF)CKANS AFFARER in Swedish 31 Jan 80 pp 29-33
CArticle by Gunilla Dahlqviet]
' [Text7 At the same time ae the cold war and rearmaments are again being
' atepped up, there is a growing realization that modern warfare, with itB
Binieter consequences, appears to become more and more uafeasible. It,
therefore, is likely that economic warfare becomes increasingly important.
VDCKANS AFFARER shorre, in thia article, how Swedish enterprisea can get
~ into a tight corner, and how Sreden prepares its own economic defene~e.
,
"If you plan to go to the Olympica in Moscow this eummer, you have better
take your oan bagged lunch along from home," U.S. Minister of Agriculture
~ Bob Bergland eaid a week ago on the program 'Face the Nation' of the II.S.
TV corporation C85.
Thia half-3oking etatement, nevertheless, illustrat~s the belief of the
: II.S. adminietration in the effect of the grain embargo, which waB launched
! by President Jimmy Carter after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A
~ number of uncertain factore, auch as the readiness of other grain exporters
~ to compensate for the shipmenta su$pended by the IInited States of 17 million
! tens o~ fodder grain, however, contribute to the doubts of many evaluatore
as to the effectiveness of the efibargo as a weapon againet the Rudaians. -
~ "I do not believe that this vrill bring the Soviet IInion to ite kaeee. The
~ Rueaians~ nc~ doubt, have been reckoning rrith this development. /tt any
~ rate, the embargo may, at woret, have the effect that every tenth steak
Mill diae~ppear from the Soviet dining table," says Profeesor Gunnar Adler-
~ Karla+eon, author of the standard Mork on economic warfare, `Weetern Economic
Warfare 194~-i967�' Gunaar Adler-KarZsaon's conclugion is that the embargo -
' policy which~ under the leaderehip of the IInited Statea~ was being puraued
; by Mestern countr.ies and Japan against communist countries after World War
i II~ hardly fYxlfilled its purpoae of rreaketting the Eaet Bloc.
~
i
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No matter whether the world's other grain exporters will support the embargo
policy of the United States, the fact remains that the Soviet IInion will
never be able to fill the gap of approximately 34 million tons of fodder
grain which. according to U.S. eetimates, arose after the failure of the ~
latest Soviet crop. If the West continues to supply the same quantities
as ueual~ the Soviet Union will be able to import approximately 5 million
tona of grain beyond the approximately 8 million tons which have already
been contracted for from the IInited Statee.
Among ~hose who may get to contribute to the Soviet grain supplie6 ie Sweden.
Our official policy is to join only such embargoes as are sanctioned by the
U.N. "We thus continue our traditional export of grain for the time being,"
IInder-Secretary of Trade IIlf Dinkelspiel explains. To be sure, Sweden has
no large quantities to deliver-"only approximately 380,000 tons of fodder
grain remain," Lennart Forsberg told the Society of Swedieh Grain Merchants.
The latest orders received after the embargo decision of,the IInited States,
have come from Finland and international trading houses.
"The freights are based on a cost rrhich applies to Poland/the German Demo-
cratic~Republic and may quite conceivably go on to the Soviet IInion. That
ia beyond our control," I,ennart Forsberg says. However, the role of Sweden ~
in the international grain war is very insignificant. r
However, the other economic weapoas of the II.S. arsenal againat the Soviet
Union--such as the embargo on high technology and electronics--create a
certain amount of concern among induetrialized countries~ also in alliance-
free Sweden.
Although Sweden hae ttever officially endorsed the conditions of the ao-called
COCOM statee ~+Tapan and the NATO countries except for Iceland, i.e., the
countriee whic~ in 1949, on the initiative of the United States, adopted a
liat of 'prohibited' export articles to the Communist Bloc), Swedish trades
and industrieg have become dependent on U.S. approval in order to be able
to reexport products which contain U.S. components. The moet recent example
of the influence of the United States is the II.S. rejection of Sweden's
planned export of the fighter aircraft Viggen to India. Another case which
arose recently but which Mas solved after prolonged negotiations r+ith
Yashington, ie the marketing by Stansaa.b (which later on hae merged with
Datasaab Inc.) of traffic control equipment, containing U.S. components,
to Moscorv.
"It is etill too early to make any statement as to what the reeult may be
of the latest U.S. initiative. So far, we have, however, had no particularly
great difficulties with the U.S. export restrictions," says Ulf Dinkel8piel.
"The moet eensitive products in this context are electronic component6."
At Dataaaab, which, on an average, exporte for a value of 60 million kroner
per year to the Soviet IInion, there i$ no feeling of alarm at present.
"Ye asaume that the licenses which are now being granted to us, will also
apply for some time to come. But if we should become sub~ect to pressure
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~ from eome quarter or other, it is clear that our relations with the United
F States e~re of the utmost importance. Approximately 95 percent of all
~ electronic equipment originatee in U.S. patents," says Ber.gt Guetafsson,
~ chief of the IDS division at Datasaab.
I
~ Data proceseing equipment and electronic control parts now form part of
; ngerly all equipment produced ia the power field and within other heavy
induetries. Aaea, which, eome montha ago, got an order worth 150 mi~.lion
j k.~onor irom a Soviet steel worke pro~ect, ie anxiouely aWaiting the effects
! of the crieia between the Eaet and the Weat.
"Ae you kaor+~ we r,ave continual order8 from the Soviet Union, and the
regulations governiag reexportation have been tightened considerably,"
says 411e.Keding, e~tport director at Asea. "We are concerned~ among other
things, about contracts that we already have."
' "We muet be prepared that the situation m~y become tougher," says Sven
Lonnetrom of I,M Ericsson, rrho is responsible, among other things, for ex-
port licenae contracts with the United States. Lt~ recentl.y delivered a
, telex station for 25 million kronor to the Moscow Olympics. "The formalities ~
in connection with export license applications are complicated, and if
things start becoming tough, there is a great risk that deliveries ma,q be-
come delayed," says Sven Lonnatrom. LM Ericsson exports to the entire
East Bloc. The Eaet European market, however, has not come up to expecta-
tions. Only approximately 1 percent of the total turnover of approximately
9 billion kronor of the concern goes to the East Bloc. "It ie the foreign
exchange ehortage which ie the main reason for the poor result," aayB Sven
Lonnstrom.
However, the U.S. move against the East Bloc may, paradoxically, reeult in
an improvement in the foreign exchange situation of the Soviet Union, at
least theoretically. For the world has already shown its distrust of all
- paper currenciea, not least of the U.S. dollar. And the U.S. embargo, on
top of the increaaed economic tension in the world, hr~s quite naturally led
to an increase in the gold rush. The price of gold reached over 800 dollars
per ounce in mid-January (compared to slightly more than 200 dollare a year
ago). And one of the biggest gold producers in the world is the Soniet
Union.
Soviet Tru~p Card: Gold, Oil and Strategic Metals
However, it is not only gold that weighs heavily in Soviet resources. The
Russians have acceas to the majority of the strategic metals and enen oil
(6 percent of Sweden's oil imports come from the Soviet Union), which can
be ex~loited in the situation which has now arisen.
A week ago, Japan, a U.S. ally, which, at the same time, has very large
trade intezests in the Soviet IInion, for example, received an offer from
Mascow to purchase from the Sotriet IInion the raw material of titaniwn vhich
is very much in demand, and which, for a long time~ has been difficult to ~et.
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"What the Russians may have up the sleeve in the form of demands for services
in return, we do not know yet," says Mr N.Yonemura of the Japanese trade
oifice Jetro in Stockholm. Titanium is uaed, for example, in the steel
induetry, and in Sweden it is the Aveeta Ircn Works which is the biggeet
buyer of thia raw material,which is difficult to obtain. Aveeta, subaequently
reeells part of the titanium to other Swedish industries. ~
It was hardly by chance that Eric Gauffin, purchasing engineer at Avesta, i~
December for the first time, went to Moscow in order to purchase personally
a secret quantity of titanium directly from the Ruseians. "The Ruseians
~ euddenly raieed the price of titanium to a shocking level in the fall," says
Eric Gauffin, who refrains from making any further comments on the matter and
preYers to stress the excellent trade relations existing betrreett the Johnson
concern (which orms Avesta) and the Soviet IInion. According to a spokesman
within the Swedish engineering industry, who wants to remain anonymoue, one
of the reasons for the restrictiveness of the Soviet IInion in re8pect of
titanium is that they want to prenent the British from buying titanium for
the production of fighter aircraft which would then, subaequently, be Bold
to China.
It is, of courae, very sensitive for the export industry to make statements
on the economic warfare between the two Great-Power bloce, eepecially if the
enterpriee, like Saab and Bafors~ importe parts for military strategic pro-
ducts.
At Saab-Scania, buainess is at a low lenel after the setback r+ith Viggen, ~
18 percent of the value of which ia made up of imported parts, especially from ,
the United States. Hans G.Anderseon, d-irector of the information department:
"We do not expect at all to get any export license for our military products,
and that also applies to the scheduled SK2. For our aircraft are primarily
intended for the Swedish defense."
Bofors importa~ among other things, electronics components from the IInited ~
States for the production of defense u+ateriel.
"High technology is one of the corner stones in the II.S. security policy, but
so Par we have had no difficulty getting export licenses from the United
States. The reason is that we export only to Yugoslavia rri thin the East Bloc,
= and, so far, the United States have regarded that country as distinct from
other Eastern countries in the export context," says Martin Ardbo~ marketing
~ director for the ~lefense materiel division at Bofors. "Our most acute problem
is now Iran where we were forced to discontinue a pro3ecting job for an in- '
definite period of time." e
Economic warfare ie no new phenomenon. There are a number of examples in
history of Great-Power xarfare with trade embargoes and boycotts as the
main weapon. Aowever, in recent evaluations and analyses of economic warfare
- actions, such actione have often been regarded as ineffective. Peter
Wallensteett~ a peace and conflict researcher at Uppeala University, sums up
the effects of the erobargo policy more or less as follows in his much noted
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study, "Economic Sanctione," (1971): "An embargo is usually only a symbol
that the one impoaing the embargo dislikes what is being done by the one
agaittet rrhom the eanctions are imposed, and that he is utterly incapable
of doing anything about it."
Ignored Effect: Economic Weapon Often Has Recoil Effect
- Walleneteen. hor?ever~ aleo poittte out that economic sanctione can eucceed,
- provided they are carried nut through well-organized cooperation on the
part of the preeaure group. No rreak links, like Japan, ~ance and West
Germany in the existing conflict, can thus be allowed to exiBt.
Another aepect cauaing economic sanctiona to become doubtful as weapons
is that the 'attacking' nation may experience a recoil on the country's
orrn economy.
Gunnar Adler-Karlason: "I coneider, more or less, all embargoes ae in-
effective, for reason$ auch ae those described by Wallensteen--except in
one aingle inBtance, and that is oil. If our oil supply is reduced, it
hurts.f0
; The oil supply conBtitutee the center of gravity in the reports which will
~ form the basis for the 1982 Sredish defenee deci8ion.
' "In the year'a budget, 387.5 million kronor have been estimated for in-
creaBed oil etocke, but it ie Btill doubtf~l if we ahall reach the goal
' for 1g82/83 on account of the high prices and the government'e financial
~ aituation," eaye IIlf Dinkelapiel.
However, it ie not only the oil atock rrhich muet be considered in the
defenee planning. In a recent report for the Defense Reeearch Iastitute,
Gosta Tompuri gives an example how oil can come to be ueed as a meang in
power politic6 during the expected oil shortage of the mid-eighties.
"Resource policy factors roay drive a wedge into the present constellatione
' of power politics,� he gays.
~ Such scenarioa will be illustrated, for example, in the eubstudy (Perspect-
~ ive Study, Part 2) of the 1982 defenee decision which will be presented
next eummer by the National 3redish Board of Economic Defense. The National
~ Swediah Board of Economic Defenee is the coordinating authority for the
economic defenee. The study, now in progreae, analyzes the economic
instruments of force arid discueses. for example, the roles played by
~ foreign exchange reserves and foreign borrorring in economic rrerfare, as
' well ae the significance of the trade policy. Credits obvious3y are in-
~ cluded ae weapone in the conflict between the East and the West. For
example, a consortiure of Weatern bankers, the other day, reduced a planned
~ Eurodollar credit for the F,aat (3erroan foreign trade from 150 rtiillion dollars
~ to 100 million dollars. The meaeure is interpreted as a hint from the
~ Weatern World ag to what the East Bloc can expect.
~ 33
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~Srs~rjningsl~g~t c 1 ~
Dieselbr~nn~olja c 2 ~
Eldningsolja 1 c3~ ;
11000 m') Brirt i: c 5>
~:2 000 ' ~ Komme~sieNe
~ .:w,,,~ra,b�t- I~ger (6.)
~ vw ~a~ r
i.~~~wr~ ( 4 ) ( 7 )
Nortn~Neger
':1000 1
w
,
- ~
ap,; ,1:,-
M' `
f:
_ r ( /
\
~ ~ 100~1 (iN"tli~t) ( 8
197g,: - 1980
J)-~�A 8 N D J F ~ J
The oil etockpile in Bweden is loweet when it comes to
- light i~el oil. Comniercial etocke are far below normal
levels, and even stockpiles have become short.
Key:
1. Supply situation 5. Shortage of
2. Diesel oil 6. Conuaercial stock
3� F1ie1 oil 1 Stockpile
4. Average consumption per 8. Secret
month during January/
February
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~
"It is obvious that it is becoming increasingly difficult to start _
military Wars on account of the ainister consequences such wars would
have today. It, therefore, is likely that economic warfare will come
to play a greater role in the tliture, and we are allowed to prepare
ourselvee to roeet it," says Aane~ Wehlin, department head of the National
Srredieh Board of Economic ~elenee.
The taek may become quite tough against the background of the international
economic development~ ae depicted by evaluatore in varioue parte of the
world, and, ae n conaequence of which, the monetary syetem will hardly
be nble to withatand any Further etrain at the moment--especially not
aiter the additional etrain which haa reBUlted from the crieie in
Afghaniatan and its consequencea. This is the way in which a defected
member of the Carter administration, according to Tf~ WALL STREET JOIIRNAL,
the other day deecribed the sensitive situation: "The international
monetary syetem may juat now be compared to a aki slope where an avalanche
may be started at any time and by anything."
COPYRIGHT: Ahlens & Akerlunds tryckerier, Stockholm, 1980
7262
CSO: 3109
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COUNTRY SFCTION SWEDEN
OPF~C COIINTRIES CIRCUMVENT COMPANTES IN SALES TO SVENSKA PETROLEUM
Stockholm VDCKANS AFFARER in Swedish 14 Feb 80 pp 52-55 _
[Article by Ake I~andquist] ~
CExcerpt7 International oil companies keep lo~ing the power play on oil.
The OP~C countries are, to an ever increasing degree, entering into agree- ~
ments directly with states or national companiee. This increasea the
poaaib:ilities of OP~C countries to uee oil as a political weapon of preseure.
In exchange, induetrial countries get a more reliable oil supply.
When the.etate-owned Svenska Petroleum signed its first crude oil coatract
in Iraq, one oi the representatives o~ the etate-owned Iraqi company. the
Iraqi National Oil Company said: "Tell the government and the press in ,
your country that this ie the first contract of its kind. We waut to sell ~
directly to national, state-or+ned companies. You would never have got this
contract if you had not been a state-owned company."
The first shipment of Ir~qi oil reached Sweden on Christmas Eve of 1g78.
Thie was a detail in the course of events which, in 19'79, led to the
collapse of old channels in the oil trade. A new pattern crystallized,
a bilateral pattern--the etate-to-state trade in oil. This has meant leBS ~
oil to the international oil companies. This, in turn, has caused nearly ~
all international oil companies to cut off their oil supplies to third
parties~ i.e. independent refineries and oil companies.
Before this development started accelerating in 1979, approximately 80
percent of the international oil trade went via the big oil companies. ;
At the end of 1979, the volume had dropped to approximately 65 percent. ~
The state-to-state trade corresponded in 19']8 to only 6 to ~ percent of
the oil trade. In 1979, it increased to approximately 20 percent. The
ma~or por~ion of the remaining oil f~as been sold on $pot ararkets.
- The evente in Iran have had a great influence on developments. When the
shah was onerthror~m, all oil production in Iran Btopped. Six million
barrels a day disappeared from an export market which comprisea slightly ~
36 ~
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more than 30 million barrels a day. In March of 1979, Iran's production
was reeumed. It was a critical moment to the oil trade of the world.
HOM Mds Iran to eell ite oil?
Iran choee other channele than before the crieie. The international oil
_ companiee of the Irania~n coneortium lost large volumee of oil. In the
first place, the production wae cut back from 6 to approximately 3 million
barrels a day (a volume which corresponds to more than 5 times Sweden's
coneumption.) Iran started eelling part of this oil to Japanese bueiness
enterprises and etate-ormed oil companies. _
At the same time, an important thing happened in the tWO OPEC countries
which increaeed their production of oil at this time, Saudi Arabia and
Iraq. The policy of Iraq hae been oriented toward state-to-state trade,
r~nd Iraq now choee not only to sell the increased production bilaterally
but aeized the firet opportunity that came along to reduce the volumes to
the international oil companies. These companies lost both the increased _
production and part of what they already had.
Also Saudi Arabia Circumvente "Seven Sisters" in Sales of Oil
Saudi-Arabia, finally, paseed quite a lot of oil by Aramco--the U.S.-Arab
coneortium compoeed of E~ocon, Mobil, Texaco and Standard Oil of California--
to it$ oxn Btate-owned company, Petromin. Alao Petromin started s~~-ling
bilaterally directly to state-owned companies in the consumer count~�iee.
In this way, between 2 and 2.5 million barrel$ per day ~ere passed by the
. international oil companies to bilateral state-to-state trade.
This development, a rapidly accelerating bilateral trade in oil, is
reflected in the rapid grorrth of Svenska Petroleum in the Swedish market.
The 5-year plan which was prepared by Svenska Petroleum (SP) in 1978 was
realized already in 19'79. This year Svenska Petroleum will be in a
poeition to iraport nearly one third of the Swedish oil requirements, or _
approximately '7 million tons out of an annual consumption which in 1979
was 25.8 million tons. This is the same quantity which OK-Texaco [OK .
Oljekonsumenternas F~3,bund: the Swedish Oil consumers Union7 import for
Scanraff CScattraff - Skandinaviska Raffinaderi AB: the Scandinavian Refinery
Company~ (of which Svenska Petroleum is now a copartner).
After the agreement with Iraq (lesa than 20,000 barrels a day), Svenska
Petroleum, moreover, concluded a direct agreement with Iran (20,000
barrele a day, i.e. 1 million tons a year), Nigeria (20,000 barrels a
day) and Saudi Arabia (more than 20,000 barrels a day). The efforts to
enter into direct agreements were inteneified at the end of 1979, when a
Swedish crude oil pool xas formed. It was, inofficially, called the ONS
group, OK-NynaB-SP. The combination of a state-owned, a cooperative and a
privately owned national oil. company is unique. In Denmark, the Danieh
Cooperative Oil Company recently ~oined together with the state-owned Oil
Company of Denmark to purchase crude oil. The Swedish crude oil pool has
been attracting a certain amount of attention internationally. Srritzerland,
among other countries, has been making inquiries as to how the group t~nc-
tiona. 37
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The advantage is that the three Gompanies together constitute a larger
counter-party and account for a larger share af the market. It is still
a question of a trial period. "We feel right now that we shall have to ~
eee how thing~ ~o later on," eays Gunnar Nermark of Svenaka Petroleum.
Han~ B~urling~ OK: "We shall see what Libya and Angola will give. Also
Mexico and e number of ather countries are interesting."
Gunnar Nermark claims that it is an advantage being able to present one-
eelf as a representative of a state-owned company. It is an advantage
a~ well to come from Sweden, a neutral country which is part of the alliance- -
free group. In the state-to-state trad~, the priority list looks ~s follows: ~
,
1. An alliance-free country
2. A state-owned company
3. A national company.
The head of Svenska Petroleum, Sture Agnald, says on his company's develop-
ment: "We knew that this trend toward state-to-state trade ~?as on its way,
and we exploited it. Things have turned out welld It is as if the Powere
Above have been shielding us. Or, as an Arab said.: "God loves you: I hope
that he will continue to do so."
Svenska Petroleum hae joined together a total of 30 local oil companies
under its le~dership, four of which are relatively large. The foL~, big
ones have recently eigned a 3 to 5-year contract with Svenska Pet~~leum,
- and 30 municipalities have done the same thing. These long-term agreemente ;
_ compriee slightly more than 1 million tons of light and heavy fuel oil. It
, means that Svenska Petroleum obtains a secure market for its import without
appropriating the share of the market.
- ~'he question is how big a share of the market Svenska Petroleum can get.
Alf Bergman, deputy reanager of Svenska Shell, has been eagerly awaiting
information from the government as to how big a share of the market Svenska
Petroleum will get. Sture Agvald has answered that also Shell can buy oil
- from Svenska Petroleum. This aspect has aroused interest in oil circles in
London. The view there is that the big dil companies are interested in
buying from state-ownec3 oil companies. 10That would mean that they will get
more oil to other quarters," an ind~pendent oil consultant in London tells
vDCxnxs ar~a~x.
But a rapid g.rowth in state-oxned oil companies in consumer countries is a
threat to the subsidiary companies of international oil companies. Shell
was hard hit by cutbacks in Iran. A supply of 845,000 barrels per day was -
in 1979 first cut back to 195,000, later on to 95,000 barrels per day.
Durin~ the same period of time, Shell was hit also by other cutbacks. The
effects also hit Svenska Shell~ which was forced into the spnt market. The
year 1980 will become a difficult year to Svenska Shell, which has given
~ notice of a cutback in sales.
~`rom several quarters, warnings are ~neing heard to safeguard the inter- ~
national oil companies in the Swedish market. "Sweden must not obstruct
3$ ~
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the internati.onal oil companies in Sweden. Their competence must be ex-
~ ploited. Their system, so far, has been unsurpassed. Positive coopera-
~ tion is the only way," Pehr G Gyllenhammar, head of the Volvo concern,
said recently at an oil conference. He is also chairman of the board of
directors of ilolvo Petroleum.
Oil Companies Will Soon Have Only Half the World Market Left
H~ns Bjurling, OK: "The Swedish supply situation has become stronger
during the last 12 months. But it is important to maintain the trr~di(.ional
supplies via the big oil companies. They are important ctiannels. They
must feel that they have got a role to play."
but the trend toward increased bilateral trade is expected to continue.
There are plenty of evaluators in the oil markets who expect that the
ratio of bilateral trade to trade via international oil companies will be-
come 50 to 50 already in the eighties, or at least in the early eighties.
During this period, the COMECON countrie~ will, for example~ appear as
buyers in the international markets. The Soviet Union will no longer be
in a position to manage the supply of the East Bloc. An oil company
director in I,ondon: "It will be like losing Kuwait." The production in
Kuwait was 130 million tona in 1979�
The fact remains, however, that the international oil companies control
65 percent of the world trade in oil. Even if the ratio shifts to 50-50,
the oil companies r+i.ll sti.ll remain extremely important sources to mo~t
countries.
The effects of the new pattern to the oil trade will, according to evalua-
tors both within and outside the international oil companies, be higher
costs and inereaaed political risks. The cost~ will increase through a
deterioration in the economies of Bcale due to the fact that the shipments
will increase in number but decrease in volume (see interview on page 54
_ Cwith Robert Hart]). The advantage of the flexibility of big oil companies
will also become less.
But the int~reet concentrates on ~he political risks. It is primarily
concentrating on the conflict in the Middle East between Israel and the
Arab countries. Frank Parra, former secretary-general of OPEC and now
act~ve, among other things, in the International Energy Development Corpora-
tion, in which Volvo Petroleum participates: "The Palestinian queetion will
have to be aolveii for the West to feel some emall measure of eecurity in
its oil supply situation."
The Arab Amirate oil minister, Dr Mana Saeed al Otaiba, has stated what
the expectations are in Abu Dhabi in connection with the increaee in the
state-to-state trade: "We expect that Europe will recognize the right of
the Palestinians to a homeland and a state on the West Bank and in G~za.
And they ought to obtain a dialogue with the PLO, talk to them and fi~d out
what their problem is.'~
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Iraq is one of the countries which has been pressing the question of the
oil weapon the hardest. In a Beirut newspaper, the Iraqi foreign minister, ~
Dr Sadoon Hammadi answers the question as to the best way in which to use ~
the oil weapon: "It will have to be used in every conceivable way. We have
friends in the world who need to secure their access to oil. It is our
task to see to it that this is done, provided i:hey underr~tand our political
position, share it and stand on our side. We also have enemies, and we
must give these enemies a chance. But if they do not safeguard it, they
will, most certainly and definitely, have to be punished for this with less
oil. There is no reason for us to help our enemies if they do not help us." ~
~
Iraq, for examp~.e, black-lis~ed Canada as purchaser of oil when Canada
moved it Israeli embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. It has also been
s stated that Iraq has threatened Japan that it will cut down its oil supp-
lies to Japan if Japan increases its economic aid to Egypt.
As far as Sweden is concerned, the news that a U.S. civil servant was kept
hidden at the Swedish embasey in Teheran might have the effect that the
contract of Svenska Petroleum with Iran would be jeopardized. At the time
of writing~ however, no reaction has been felt from Iran. Gunnar Nermark,
Svenska Petroleum: "The problem would have been the same if we bought :
Iranian oil via an international oil company. They might then have for- ~
bidden tankers to be bound for Sweden.'~
The oil industry has managed the Iranian crisis better than the crisis in
19'73/74. "We have got into the knack of it," an oil company director in
London tells VECKANS AF'FARER. Another one: "Nothing is certain in the ~
market. Contracts are concluded without stating prices, without stating
volumes. All contracts may suddenly be cut by 20 percent. One never ~
knows what one gets. Any terms whatsoever may be included in the contract."
The terms may, for example, be that one has to invest in prospecting in
order to purchase oil. Or purchase oil of inferior quality in order to
be able to purchase good oil. Or pay extra to compensate for other
countries' retroactive price increases. Or accept lower payment for -
technical sexvices. .
One of the leading executives in the London oil world tells VECKANS
AFFARER: "There is a complete chaos. One loses one's hair. One does not '
know how much oil one gets, nor what it costs. One cannot predict the
demand. We still plan ahead--but ~usiness is being managed on a day-to-day
basi.s. Our attitude toward planning is very, let us call it,.humble."
COPYRIGHT: Ahlens & Akerlunds tryckerier, Stockholm, 1980
7262 ~
CSO: 3109
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COUNTRY SECTION SWEDEN
STATE'S FQREIGN DEBT DOUBLES IN YEAR
Stockholm VECKANS AFFARER in Swedish 14 Feb 80 p 75
[Text] The indebted economy of Sweden continues to run riot at a fast
rate. The foreign debt of the gorrernment has, in 12 months, nearly
doubled to ?_1.9 billion kronor and is expected to increase to 35 billion
kronor by the next turn of the year. The Central Bank of Sweden now wants
Swedish enterprises to take on a largex share of the foreign loan burden.
But, despite the increase in the discount rate in January, the capital flow
out of Sweden continues.
Last year, the entire deficit on the Swedish balance of paymenta on current
account was financed through government borrowing abroad. In addita.on,
there was a cunsiderable outflow of capital from banks, corporations and
other private sources. This development has continued,this year.
Between the end of 1978 and the end of 1979, the foreign exchange reserves
of the Central Bank dropped by 3,169 million kronor. During the same period,
the government's borrowing abroad increased by 9,048 million kronor to
slightly more than 20 billion kronor. This means that 12,217 million kronor
went out of the country elsewhere.
The major part of this outflow was due ta the fact that the Swedish people
lived beyond their means. The balance of payments on current account for
commodities, services and transfers of capital had a deficit o.f 8~562 million
kronor, according to the government's budget. Such a deficit must always
be financed through a reduction in the foreign exchange reserves and/or
through borrowing abroad. Ir., this case, the foreign exchange reserves and
the government have financed the entire deficit on the balance of payments
on current account--as well as a foreign exchange outflow from elsewhere of
3,655 million kronor.
Much disagreement exists on the calculation of the balance of payments on
current account 1979. According to the annual report of the Central
, Bank, the deficit amounted to between 11 and 12 billion kronor. In that
case, the outflow of foreign exchange from other sources becomes smaller.
~+l
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The conclusion remains the same: the government clearly considers it
absolutely right for the state to finance the Swedish people's overcon-
sumption of goods and services.
Tn the year's budget, Minister of Economic Affairs Gosta Bohman reports .
the deficit on the balance of payments on current accoiint 1980 as being
1?.2 billion kronor. At the same time, he writes that the government ~
wil]. have to borrorv another 10 to 15 billion krorior abroad this year.
FIe thus appears to be fully prepared to continue paying for the import
surplus with government loans.
Governor of the Riksbank Lars Wohlin, however, is content neither with
the level nor with the rate of the government's borrowing abroad. In a
debate within the Swedish Export Council last week, he asked for increased
borrowing abroad on the part of the trades and industries.
But, despite repeated increases in the discount rate ever since last summer,
t.he private capital outflow has continued (see graph). The increase on 1$
January of this year--from 9 to 10 percent--was of a somewhat new nature.
Here, the Central Bank states outright in its press release that it is "an ~
incitement to the non-government sector, in the first place, to corpora- :
tions, to cont;ribute actively to the financing of the growing deficit on ~
the balance of payments on current account by increasing their borrowing
abroad."
But that effect is still late in coming. During the last 2 weeks of January,
the f~reign exchange reserves dropped by more than 200 million kronor. At
the ss~me time, the government took up new loans with international banks '
for 828 million kronor. The private capital outflow thus amounted to
slightly more than 1 billion--in 2 weeks.
Corporations, banks and persons and noncorporate business thus clearly con-
tinue to find foreign interest rates more attractive than the Swedish ones.
If the Gentral Bank wants to reverse the trend, it will probably have to in- :
crease the discount rate further.
The question is how long the government's external debt can continue to '
grow. In early 1979, it increased to 11.2 billion kronor. In late January ~
~f this year, it had increased to 21.g billion kronor. According to the
prognoses of the minister of economic affairs, it may increase to nearly
35 billion kronor by the next turn of the year..
Interest payments on the government's foreign debt cost taxpayers 1.2
billion kronor last year. That amount increases rspidly and will probably
be between 3 and 4 billion kronor in 198L
It is one thing to get the private sector to finance a larger share of the
deficit on the balance of payments on current account. But a more important
goal for the economic policy ought to be to reduce this deficit--especially
42 -
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. as it will quite soon--for one-third or more--consist of interest payments
on government loans abroad.
~ ~ T) F
Mil~t- ' + ~
.:2 ~ 1 13 1 rd~~ 1 : t j ~.f t _~k..~3 l.t .
4 f . } ~ ~ ~ ~ . .
. ZO )1 '.~t +~S h ~ f .+`~~C$~'W~~ ~ : : 9 t - . kt ~
: ~~~r al�t i t rr~~t`�
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~ i tr ~ r. .'2,:'' tr.l! Sri:t:~ ~ 4r n_ ~sir{ t}
t ,.s` ?'v) . T .a tiM1 Jt x ,e
~ ~ ~ ;
~ c f ~ ( ..f: ~,y .j~ x~` ~~.:~i ~ ~-.e y ~k~�~~ �*~v~.=~~~:' f~S.~ I`~~ ~
r ~ ~ ~ ~ ~F,dS f ti