JPRS ID: 9162 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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JPRS L/9007
31 March 1980 -
/ orth Af rica Re ort -
N ea r E ast N p
~ CFOUO 1 ~1 /80)
Fgss FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SE~VICE
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NOTE
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JPRS L/9007 ~
31 March 1980
~ NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT ~
(FOUO 11/80 )
- ~ CONTENTS PAGE -
INTER-ARAB AF~'AIRS
Special Report on the Gafsa Affair
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 6 Feb 80) 1 -
Libyan Role Questioned, Editorial
_ Tunisian Axmy Holds Ground, by Abdelaziz Ba,rouhi
On the a1-Qadhdhafi Trail, by Abdelaziz Da.hmani
Gafsa No Surprise, by Souhayr Belhassen _
United Front Needed, Editorial by Habib Boulares
From Tunisia to Morocco
Lessons To Be Learned From Gafsa Attack
a (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 8.Feb 80) 11
a� Review of Gafsa Incident, Impact by Various Authors
_ ' ( JEtT~ A~tIQUE, 13 . Fe~, 80 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Would-Be Liberators of Gafsa, by Abdelaziz Barouhi
Internal Front Consolidation, by Souhayr Belhassen
- French 'Hostages', by Francois Soudan
- Glance at Tunisian Forces
AFG~'(ANISTAN - -
Guerrilla Warfare, Soviet Intervention Methods Reported
(Pierre de Villemarest; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 28 Jan 80) 26
MOROCCO
Economic Acti vity Slower in 1979
( MARG'fiES TROPICAUX E~` MEDITF~RANEENS, 18 Jan 80 ~i 28
, Invest~ents Decline in 1979
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11 Jan 80) 31
- a- [ISI - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
Energy Savings Campaign Described
(MARG`HES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 25 Jan 80)..... 33
Energy Sect or Investments for 1978-80 Listed
~ MARG`HES TROPIC.AUX EI' MEDITERRANEENS, 25 Jan 80 35
Briefs
Contract With Poland 36
Tax Fraud Campaign 36 ~
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS -
SPECIAL REPORT ON THE GAFSA AFFAIR
Libyan Role Questioned `
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 6 Feb 80 p 44 =
[Editorial by B.B.Y.] ,
[Text] "Everything to stop the raiders." This is what the cover of this number
of JEUNE AFRIQUE proclaims, and it i.s what we wanted to present to you: The -
truth about this affair, the entire truth. _
In spite of our knowledge of the ground, out of the 6 days we have had at =
our disposal and in spite of the means that we have set into motion, we
have not com~leteJ.y found the truth.
_ Through the fault of the Tunisian authorities, one week after its beginning
_ the operai.ion is still badly known and too many questions hav~ not been
answered. It is not the good will.of those authorities that I am blaming
but rather their knowledge of how to handle information ~ind the real concern _
of the e~igencies of this information. After the lack c%f information which -
has not allowed those same authorities to ward off the lilow, another lack -
- of information does not allow the truth to be known. ~;~1
,
I know well that weakness is common to all coLntries in the Third World.
That being true, however, what is the sense of our claiming to be a"new -
world order of information"?
It is sti11 true, and it is beyond belief that in Kabul the Soviet Army has
~ permitted journalists--including Americans:--to cover its intervention,
wh~.le the Tunisian army, during five long days, has not authorized jour- .
nalists (ir.cluding our special envoy and our photographer) tc travel from
- Tunis to Gafsa (350 km), under the pretext of security, :
~
- Since the first day--Sunday 27 January--every evening the Tunisian. govern~
ment declares: "The affair is over, we have taken the s~.tuation in hand," -
to be contradicted by the facts on the~next day. Like the Saudi authorities
in Mecca. -
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The number of assailants given by the of~icials has �:aried from 110 on the
fixst day to 250 or 300 duriz~g the week and gone back down to ..~50. They
- have never felt the need to explain to public opinion why a raiding party
, of 50 persons was able to cause so much damaoe and to hold its ground for '
~ so much time against tfie Tunisian Army.
- National opinion was badly informed or no~ i.nformed at all up to *_he midsile
- of the week, left a prey to the most insane rumors.
_ What is th~ role of Algeria? If it is "stupefied" by the operation, why -
does it not condemn ~t? The "little piece" of Algerian territary borrowed
~y the raiding party, how many meters (or hundred~ of kilometers) does
it extend? See our map.
_ As for the Soviet Union, protector (aad arms supplier) of al-Qadhdhafi; why
do~s not the Tunisian government ask it what it thinks about this and why
~ doesn't it publish the answer? ~
As for French military aid, requested urg~ntly and obtained illicitly, why
was it necessary to deal w~th a raiding party of only 50 persons? Why
don't they say clearly to public opinion wfiat that aid has consisted of?
The same day when Tunisia sent liack Libya's ambassador and called its own
" from Tripoli, the Tunisian minister of the interior was still speaking of =
the compiicity "of a neigH'~~ring country": The fear of calling a spade a
spade is the opposite of information.
Why not, si.nc~ there are so ma.ny proofs of Libyan participation, resort to -
the Secarity Council, of which Tunisia is a member? Don't they know in
Tunis that Benin, what it did so in 1976, came out of it well? The report
of the commission of inquiry presided over by the Libyan Mansour Kikhya was
righ~ about general scepticism, inc?uding ours at JEUNE AFRIQUE. Why -
_ didn't Tunisia seize tlie opportunity of the IJlamic Conference which was
being held at Islamabad at the moment of aggr~ssion? And the Arab League,
of which we had been told that its presence in Tunis would be "buckler"
(sic) for. Tunisia? And the OAU several members of which know that they -
are menaced by the "foreign legion" o� al-Qadhdhafi?
Why were there so many inf~rmation failures and why is there so much
. diplomatic passivity? So many rewards for aggression and so much encourage- -
- ment for ~uxthe~ ~ffenses. -
_ Let's finish talkinf; about information'f In order to know the entire truth,
would it be necessary for the Tunisians--�and the others--�to read the French
n2wspaper LIBERATI~N, which.publi~hes the version, exaggerated but not =
groundless, o~ the attackers? ,
_ JE~UNE AFRIQUE, as far as it is concerned, will do everything that it can to
know and publish all of. the truth.
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_ Tunisian Army Holds Ground
' Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 6 Feb 80 pp 45-48
' [Artic].e by Abdelaziz Barouhi] '
- [Text] The surprise was total on Sunday 27 January. At 0200 hours, on
the Feriana road, some shadows travel furtively toward the Ahmed Tlili
' barrack, four kilometers north-northwest of Gafsa.
After the sentinel is rapidly disabled, the barrack is immediately invested
by several tens of inen in civilian dress who have no trouble at all in
taking possession. The fact is that most of the troop has been on manuevers
in the Medenine region nearly 160 kilometers from there. Some 300 young
recruits are suddenly wakened from their slumbers. They are not even allowed -
_ to get dressed. They are strictly watched over and one witness declares
that he saw them in drawers and tee-shirts ox in pajamas at the time of
their transfer to the Technical High School located near the center of the .
town which was Sunday morning at 0900 hours. The attackers wi~l make this
their general headquarters as well, it seems. At the very moment when the
Tli1i barrack was occupied, a second raiding party mounted a rocket attack
on the police post guarded by two policemen who were immediately killed.
The same group then went to the National Guard post. A third raiding
party invests another barrack not far from there. This barrack is much less
important than the fi.rst. In the space of an hour and a half, the three
raiding parties practically assured themselves of control of the town. _
Heavy Gunfire
It was about 0230 hours that the inhabitants were awakened by heavy firing.
a Lying on the floors of their houses, they hear short orders given with a
Tunisian accent: "~ire at anything tfiat moves:" And this is what in i'act
would happen during the insane day of Sunday 27 January and even on Monday
28 January. The actor Mohamed Tahar Soufi (Abdelkrim in the famous play
Hamma Jeridi) was wounded because he stepped out of his house. Po13.ce
Brigadier Brahim Khider was also wounded. A native of the city, he would
later be presented as a"hangman" in the mysterious communi~ue from the
Tunisian armed resistance liroadcast from Paris. .
Fatal Oversight
"He never did any harm to anyone," they repeated at Gafsa. The inhabitants, -
when they dared to go outside, discovered many corpses on the streets. The
raiding parties, loaded into private automobiles "borrowed'' from their -
owners, were patrolling caith arms sticking out the windows. They were
interested only in official buildings. They paid no attention to the
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populated sections. ~Taving arrived at about 0130, the van providing trans-
portation, 2 Sundays a month, between Bou-Chebka (Algeria) and Gafsa-Gabes- -
Medenine was waiting departure time. It was emptied of its 43 Algerian
passengers (one a woman), and, mounted with a b~zooka and machine gun, used
~ in the ensuing engagements. Seemingly very confident of themselves, the
attackers tried to "cain over" those who ventured out; pleading: "Join
- us in rising up against tyranny to free the Tunisian people." Some were
forced to go with them. These new recruits were issued weapons, which -
, they would hastily discard in quitting a little later as the security forces
intervened in strength. -
The alert was quickly spread. Indeed, the attackers appeared at the main -
tel.ecommunications center, but merely to demand they be handed over service
vehicles. jdhen those in charge delayed, they damaged the vehic:Les with
gunfire. Paradokically, they did not seize the station, so that Gafsa -
~aith a direct link to Tunis was able to maintain contact witlt the outside
c.orld throughout the incident.
Isolated, the capital of Chott el-Djerid could not be speedily relieved.
T~:z nearest troops c,~ere at Kasserine, GaUes and Sfak. As quickly as pos-
~i~:~, a~;r.or~d colu~s and traop transports from these cities, as ~~e11 as -
;r~~: i~.~-zis, some 330 km distant, headed for Gafsa. As of 0900 how-s, the
_~:~r _~3rted to seal off the Gafsa are3. President Bourguib~7 had been in
,~.i~~~e to the border G=ith Algeria and barely 100 kilometers a~aay, -
:.i 3azuan�. A few attackers reportedly headed in his direction by -
~?~F :=s.:~~ -~.>zeur 32oad, witheut success. Shortly before noon, the army =
~~i-~~:Z~c. :':ranes and helicopters overfl.e~a the city. Commandos fired
:~jm k-:.th au~ om~tic ~,*eapc+ns. 4t the same time, armor advanced, cau-
~-:~r�:~5.-., h~~.=et=er, szr.ce the com~andos fac.ing then had antiarmor rockets.
.
>>:'~r#~_:.=!:- i:i 7"jE~Lic
, ; _ ~ ~
=err: ~�r~,~ ~asi "t~,~ rec.aptured. ;~tidto~,m, tl~e occupar~ts of the police
a~c: ~ati_onai ~iard headc~uarters surrendered only after heavy encoun-
' ~n~- r'emaining objective was _ta _dislodge those holding the Sidi
v _
H Ben Yacoub.Mosque and lycee, directly opposite. It evoked ineinories 'of the ~
incident at the Great Mosque in Mecca, November 1979 (see JEUNE AFRIQUE
No 989). Some armed men held the minaret and, in the lycee, tha young
~ recruits. Authorities pondered whether to attack or not. Finally, a hole -
_ was blasted in the wall of the lycee and in the general confusion nearly
150 of the recruits were able to escape. However, before they could reach
the gap, 15 died and many were wounded by grenades thrown by the
captors. As of 1700 hours, on Sunday 27 January, the raiders had lost
_
` ~`the advantage. The authorities could then declare, in the first communi-
- que divulged at that same hour, that they had the situation in hand. How-
ever, the inhabitants heard reports of firearms until 2100 hours. Witnesses
declare the sporadic and localized shooting continued until Monday 28
January, and even a part of the day Tuesday 29 January while airplanes
' continued to fly over the town. In fact it was a question of a few in-
domitable soldiers hidden in the houses or of raiders who were intercepted
while they were trying to escape either toward the immense palm grove -
located on the western margin of the town or toward the mountains on the _
north and northeast. Early in the afternoon of Sunday 27 January the inhab-
- itants went out to buy food before the curfew announced for 1800 but they ~
hurried, because the firing had not completely ceased. The authorities
raised part of the veil on Wednesday 30 January on the number of inembers
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in the raiding group: Off icially they were only 50 Tunisians, 1U o~
- whom were already there several days before the attack. According to
~official sources, they would have arrived via Rome, Marseilles or Frankfurt.
Some emigrated workers wfio fiad returned to their coun~ry in some way. 3~ao -
- of them were in charge of preparing the det ails of the attack and of
_ gathering the necessary information. One of those two men was able to flee.
The other, a man named Ezzeddine Cherif, was arrested.
Master Mind of Plot
About 50 years of age, one-eyed, bald, this school teacher who was origin-
ally from Gafsa had already participated in the "Youssefist plot"~
in 1962, according to Othman Kechrid, minister of the interior. He served
10 years in prison, whil.e one of his friends, Akermi, also a native of the
= region, wouZd be executed. After his liberation, Cherif made several visits
to Libya. With a companion who succeeded in escapi.ng Cherif prepared the
"Gafsa affair." Ir was he who established the ground p3.an of the city,
- noting in particular in very careful Arabic writing the emplacement of the
barracks which were to be attacked and the lodgings of the off icers with
their guards. It was also Ezzedine Cherif who took charge of the transport -
and storage uf the arms introduced into Tunisia after the beginning of
January, before he went out in an automobile, ~till with his mysterious
companion, to meet the commandos coming from abroad. Those 30 other _
attackers with their arms had crossed the Algerian-Tunisian border at
Bir Hom Ali, opposite the town of Feriana, by following a path. According _
to the officials, the total number of attackers was 50 and t'~ey were all
Tunisians. Estimates put out earlier indicated around 300. And then the_._____._
p - y
~ w .
size of" the�'o' e~atioti� as :we-1T as' the i'tensit '":o t e ividual combats -
allows us to tfiink that 50 men were not.very many. Above all, if the rumors
that circulated at a certain time through Tunis are to be believed, the
, members of the expedition,. equipped with radio transceivers, would have been
commanded from a command post installed on Algerian territory. This permits
- the thought`thati'tne most battle-fiardened members of the commandos received
~ tne order ta go back through the mountains and there was o~zly one gath, ~
` which certain ones crossed. On Wednesday 30 January in Tunis the interior 6
~ minister presented the first elements of his file to the press. Documents i
- and plans found on the attackers; a delivery slip discovered in a box of
arms. The arms seized were 40 sutimachine guns, 73 automatic rifles, 53 _
automatic pistols, 9 tiazookas, 3 60-millimeter mortars, 10 long range type
1 100 radio units, 39 rifles and ammunition in quantity. The invoice indicates ~
the destination of tfie weapons: The Libyan purchasing department',, P. 0.
~ Box 2577, Tripoli. This document is on a lptterhead of the English Pressy
; Avionics and Communications Gompany, Ilford, Essex IG 4 AG Telephone '
~ 014-78340 and lists in detail the arms that were supplied. M~ Othman ~
~ Kechrid also computed the official nunber of casualties: 20 dead (S non- ~
commissioned officers and 15 conscripts) and 90 wounded (5 of them seriously) ~
for the army; 2 killed and 1 wounded in the police; 1 wounded in the ranks ~
- of the national guard; 15 dead and 16 wounded among the civilian population.
= The minister added that the aggressors had left 4 dead and 3 wounded on the
s,
`s ground in addition to 42 prisoners. -
. , . _ _ . . _ _ _
~ *From the name of Sala Ben Youssef, a�igure in.Tunisian nationalism, thrown
j out by Bourguib a.on the eve of independence and who tried several times to
~ seixe power be~ore~he was murdered in Frankfurt in 1961. His partisans
had not abandoned the effort in 1962. `
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However, no one was making either a direct or indirect accusation against
either Libya or Algeria. For Algeria, it is solely a question of interro-
gations on an eventual i.mplication, due to the fact that a"small part" of
- its territory served as a route for certain members of the raiding groups.
- As for Libya, other than the presentation of the documents, the prime
minister spoke expl;citly in an exclusive interview to JEUNE AFRTQUE, for
the first time, of the role of Tripoli in the training and in the prepara-
, tion of the members af the expedition. The Tunisian emigres in Liby3 are
= asked to "serve the cause of liberty" in Africa and elsewhere in return _
- for rewards. That is often brought to an end, unfortunately, with some
bodies strewn over the battlefield or haled before the security court of the
state, such as happened to the 42 arrested members of the unsuccessful
expedition.
On the al-Qadhdhafi Trail
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 6 Feb 80 pp 48-49
[Article by Abdelaziz Datcmani]
[Text] Arriving from I,ibya bY Way.of Algeria, some attackers followed the
"al-Qadhdhafi Trail," the trail tha* the Polisario convoys use when they
are heading for the Westez-n Safiara. -
_
In fact, ~or~several months the Tunisian "opposition" trained in Lihya
has ~ound an "objective ally" in the ~'ol~sario Front, which itself is solidly
estab.l3,sh.ed in ~1-Qadhdhafi.'s .regime. The experience ,of the front has .been
put at the sexyice o~ those Tunisians through the intermediary of its
military instructors, wliose principal conductor, a certain Gashatt, is an old
_ Libyan poet married to a Saharan~~who coordinates the "liberation movements" -
of the entire region.
- Arms Smuggline
Originating in Tripoli, the "al-Qadhdhafi Trail" is utilized for the trans-
port of weapons (in the beginning against the wist~es of Algeria) as far as
the border of Algeria w3tfi Mali and Mauritania. This necessarily crosses
Algeria from East to West. In the unusual cases where there is a critical
period in Algerian-Libyan. relations, the North of Niger (which has a common
border with Li6ya is followed, then the territory ~f Mali to the Ma.uritanian -
border. The most classic Algerian trail makes an end run around Tunisia by
th~ way of Ghadames (~thanks to an excellent road constructed by the Czechs),
the Tassili and Hoggar mountains and d2scends afterward to the North of
Mali.
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All the evidence permits the conclusion that during recent months a route has
~ been created to Tunisia (with assembly points and caches of weapons~, and -
- ends up at the "smugglers~ pass," north of Gafsa. On the Algerian part of
the trail the people who use this route must, unless they have accomplices,
avoid the controls of the E1 Ould and Tebessa regions where the traffic is -
~ heavy and active. Curiously, this Tunisian path runs close to the Algerian
Edjeleh gasline and to the E1 Borma oil line (in Tunisia). These works are
generally watched over very closely unless there is reciprocal confidence....
Hence the regrets expressed by Algerian authorities when their country was
cited at the time of the interrogations of the f irst prisoners at Gafsa.
Unite d Front Needed -
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 6 Feb 80 p 49
_ [Editorial by Habib Boulares] _
[Text] The Gafsa affair is unacceptable and unjustif iable. It was executed
entirely from abroad. It does not correspond to the line of any really
Tunisian opposition. From that fact, it does not indicate any relationship
with domestic force5. It was executed by men recruited, armed, trained,
equipped and sent to Tunisia to serve the designs of the neighboring country =
which dreamed up this criminal enterprise. _
_ Characteristic Aggression
It caused blood to flow in clashes of unheard-of ferocity
Neither the claim for the operation by a completely unknown organization _
nor the choice of the date should give us any illusions; sti11 less the -
designation of Gafsa as the battlefield. The tragedy of 26 January
1978 tizas the termination o~ an evolution of relationships among forces with-
in the Tunisian regime,~ and in Tunisia in a general way. The repression
, essentially had the city of Tunis as its theatre. �
Although th~ Gafsa region is an area with a high concentration of laborers,
the legitimate union organizations have lieen only slightly concerned there ,
and the mass of miners are not to be found in the major town of that region. ~
A seriaus misunderstandi.ng of the Tunisian situation and mentality is nec- '
~ essary to imagine that the inhabitants of the region were going to rise
; suddenly under the leadership of a commando that had come from the outsi~.e.
The city is rather administrative and commercial and the Tunisians, whatever
; the complaints that they may have against their government, do not want ,
foreigners meddling in the3r affairs. They have already reacted against
~ al-Qadhdhafi in the past, held together by a unanimous patriotism around the
~ state - ~
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In this affair the role of Algeria rema.ins to be determined. On the other
hand, the responsibility of Libya is directly in~icated. By recruiting and
training Tunisians in specialized camps, the al-Qadhdhafi regime has just .
reached a point of no return in its hostility toward the Tunisian government. _
- After having senr Tunisians to Uganda and elsewhere, it has j ust thrown them
onto their own country: As far as those men are concerned, they have co~itted
an unacceptabl~ treason; as far as al-Qadhdhafi is concerned, this was a
characteristic and premeditated ~ggression against Tunisia.
A Sacred Union
Up to 27 January 1980 Tunisia had problems. It now and henceforth has a
declared enemy who boasts over the waves of his radio about the "insurgents -
- who struggle to liberate their country." The new situation has imposed a
new definition of the international and domestic policies within the frame-
work of a sacred union against the i.nvader. It also supposes that all
opp~sition elements will speak out clearly and declare themselves ready ~
to form a united front against Libyan interventionism.
- Whether it be "a point of departure" or an isolated operation, the li~ttle of ~
Gafsa has fundamentally changed the nature of the Tuni~ian problem and will
- weigh on the evolution of the Magreb.
- Gafsa No Surprise
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 6 Feb 80 p 50
[Article by Souhayr Belhassen] :
[Text] The Tunisians receiving military training in Libya amount to between
1,500 and 2,000: Lodged in two barracks, Sounani (in Tripoli itself) and
- Zaouia (50 km ~rom the capital) they are lead by Palestinans and receive a
salary of 90.dinars (:about 1000 French.francs~. For the most part these
young men were born in the center and south of Tunisia and left for Libya
driven by unemployment and by a future that.seemed to them blocked off.
En~isted in the ranks of the "Libyan Popular ~esistance," they were
used to help along al-Qadfid:iafi's dreams of conquest and "liberation."
` Before the raids on Gafsa, some Tunisians had already been usE!d in more
distant thPatres of operations. Some 40 of them were killed du~~*!R~~~the -
Libyan intervention in Uganda, and a~out 15 in Lebanon.
i
Turning Aside � ~
~
:
Others participated in attacks, like the one at Orly in May 1978 against a ~
plane belonging to El A1. Muammar al-Qadhdhafi has also "used" then to i_
recall the Libyan Tunisian Union which was aborted in January 1974. Thus, 6_
= on 12 January 1579, five years to the day after the voiding of the Jerba ~r
Agreement, a Boeing belonging to the national company maintaining the ~
Tunis-Jerba connection was hijacked to Tripoli. The three air pirates
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- were Tunisians. "Well received" i.n Tripoii, according to the crew's -
- declarations, they were neither extradited nor tried. On 14 January t980 ~
again, or scarcely 13 days before Che attack on Gafsa, an Alitalia D~-9
~ was hijacked on the Rome-Tunis route. The destination (once again):
- Tripoli. However, the machi.ne stopped at PalPrmo (i.n Sicily) and, after long
' negotiations, the ctiieF of the hijackiag surrendered ta the Italian author-
ities. Hi~ n~e was Ferid Ben Mechri. Zaich. Ne was a 28-year-old
~ Tunisian, born in ...Gaf~a. His history is very interesting.
Zaich Ieft his country in 1y70, and did not return there until 1974 when he ~
had a short leave.
_ From Tunisia to Morocco
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 6 Feb 80 p 50
~ [Text] The events of 27 January at Gafsa also recall (see the comparison with
the Bay of Pigs on page 51) what happened in the Moroccan Atlas some seven
- years ago. -
During the night of 2-3 March 1973, some raiding parties amountirig to
several dozen of Moro`can dissidents attacked the mountainous localities of
Moulay Bouazza and Goulmina. As for the Gafsa operation, the date of the
attack had been carefully chosen; the reb els expected to celebrate the
national day which coincides with the ~east o~ the throne with blood.
The Moroccans--imitating their Tunis~an "disciples"---~iad infiltrated through
_ Algeria, Some cases.of weapons (~specifically 39 sub-machineguns) and some !
munitions were also to be discc?vered at Figuig near the Algerian border.
The~Algerian leaders could not lie ignorant of the operation which had been _ '
._...,___.,~_,.4..._..
prepared on tYieir te'rzitory and .which, moze~over, was . not th.e ~irst of its
kind, Howeyer,.thsy had:no.~llusic~ns on`the chances of success. If they "
had nevertheless~le~t the~.Moroccan opposition alone or even helped it in
their enterprise; it is_b.ecause tfiey~had'to take into consideration the
higher bid offered b.y. the~LiTiyans,~who~ granted tfieir largesse to the � f
'`revolutionaries" in the kingdom. Tn particular Mr Mohamed Basri, one of
the former leaders of the resistance under the French protectorate, who,
_ in spite of ttie repeated failures of his "plots" against the monarchy,
. wanted to'"try it again," ~ound an attentive ear in al-Qadhdhafi. A
proclamation broadcast on the waves of Radio Tripoli and...among Moroccan
students in Paris would tak~ credit for the attac.ks at Goulmina and Moulay
_ Bouazza in the name of the "Moroccan liberation front" of which nothing
more was heard, The Atlas commandos were rapidly neutralized. Three of
them, including a former captain and an engineer, found their death during
their clashes with'the forces of order. It must be reported that the
Moroccan forces had not.~been surprised by the operations prepared in
Algeria and in Libya. Of public notoriety, the activities of.f quih Basri
were attentidely f ollowed: Furthermore, tl~e infiltrated commandos had counted
, on the friendship of the population, and it was tragically lacking. On
_ the contrary, the residents sometimes helped the army to drive out the
_ rebels. The repression was not limited;, just to the partisans of Mohamed ~
. .
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Basri. inside the UNFP (National Union of Popular Forces), It struck in-
distinctly all of the left wing, which was then o~liged, at the time of _
the Kenitra trials in 1973 and 1974, to publicly take its distan~e from the
military strategy w'hich was considered over-advazturo~ss.
= If it turns out that among the Gafsa attackers there are some mer. who _
sincerely wish to transform the order of things in their country, they
should meditate on the experience of the Moroccan left which spent 10 years
(1963-1973) in ge~ting rid of it's putschist demons and which certainly
paid too high a price. -
COPYRIGHT;. Jeune Afrique Grupjia 1980
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS -
LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM GAF3A ATTACK
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Feb 80 pp 296-297 '
[Article: "Tunisian Chronicle--Lessons of the Gafsa Affair: Increased
Vigilance of the Tunisian Government"]
[Text]. Responsibility for the bloody Gafsa affair (27 Jar.uary) can doubtless
be given to C~lonel Qadhdhafi. It was recalled-in these very pages recently
- that "the only method he believes to be effective is the Libyan revolutionary
model, whose"general adoption by the Arab world he thinks would be Salutary
(MTM of 18 January, p 118)." Everything known, both about the enterprising
- characlter of the leacier of the Libyan revolution and about the bitterness
he felt after President Bourguiba.'s disavowal of the unionist accord of
Djerba, would make the theory of a Libyan initiative plausible, even if
certain details of the condition of the arms and munitions seized did n~t
seem, in themselves, sufficiently revealing.
Perhaps, however, it is not necessary to assume a personal decision by _
Colonel Qadhdhafi. It is known and also documented in his orders that he -
installed in Libya a system of "revolutionary decentralization" of power, "
_ which encourages initiatives from the bottom and only o'rganizes a somewhat
loose control. iome revolutionary committee from the coast or the
Tripolitanian Mountains, where contacts and personal relationships.with
_ meridional Tunisia have always been numerous and close, may well have
- thought up the scenario for this surprise attack, persuading himself that
the fall of a provincial capital would suffice to shake the Tunisian regime.
This last deduction, ~n any case, was risky. However poorly equipped the
armed forces and security services of Tunisia, which has always perferred
the purchase of equipment to weapons, the Tunisian state had sufficient
resources to quell a putsch; and despite all the criticism poured out on
all sides against the government of Mr Hedi Nouira, public opinion was
unanimous in opposing such an adventure. Its goal was not chosen with
great perspicacity.
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Why Gafsa? -
Gafsa is at the same the center of a largp oasis and of a mining district.
The oasis, crowned by old villages of artisans, with its extended new
irrigation channels and its access to trails across the Sahara, is a
- typical ~helter for military units, former nomads poorly domesticated, and
irregularly employed day-laborers.
The mining district, which started nearly a century ago with the discovery
of phosphates and is situated in what was then a very sparsely populated
region, attracted from the start the manpower of mountain-dwellers of
- Berber origin, willing to migrate, from the Matmata mountains of Tunisia,
and especially from Libya's Djebel Nefousa, which constitute a single and -
unique mass of mountains surrounding the Gulf of Gabes.
Respected for their vigor and hard work, rapidly established, quickly
assimilated, the "Tripolitans" and their descendents, now become Tunisians,
soon formed the main working element of the mines and thus the dynamo, or -
rather the dynamos, of the first social movements. Their ancestral tribal
divisions were in fact reflected in the opposition of the two Tunisian
labor movements born almost simultaneously following the Second World War,
the USTT [expansion unknown] and the Tunisian General Federation of Labor
[UGTT]. The latter, relying on the Destour, was soon to supplant the first,
which was of communist tendancy and whose affiliates would then rejoin the -
sole federation, while at the same time introducing into it persistent
internal bickering. _
It will be recalled, moreover, that the Gafsa region was the nursery of the
fedayin~ who, starting in 1952, challenged the French Protec.torate. Soon
interrupted by the granting of internal autonomy, this resistance movement
nonetheless was typical of this energetic and adventurous people.
At the present time, unionists from the mining-beds, coming in large part
from this rude mountain setting, are among the elements which have for the
most part remained faithful to the "old path" of Mr Habib Achour, dismissed _
~ and condemned after the incidents of 26 January 1978 in Tunis and Sfax and
- their extremely harsh suppression.
Doubtless the near simultaneousness of the dates: 27 January 1980,
26.January 1978, is but a fortuitous coincidence. Doubtless also it is
but chance that the attack on Gafsa was unleashed while President Bourguiba,
who had just inaugurated the new international airport for tourist at
- Tozeur, was resting at the nearby oasis of Nefta. But the choise of Gafsa
seems, however, to have been resolved upon in terms of local support
arranged by its authors, and further support they hoped to arouse. _
- One of the conveniences from which the enterprise benefited was the presence
in Libya of a certain number of Tunisians with a taste for adventure for
- ~
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whom, in this respect, the atmosphere of their native country was unsatis-
fying. They were found among the "Libyan" contingents in Chad and Uganda. -
Nothing at all scandalous in this for the Libyan leaders; just another
example of realizing Arab unity from the base. After all, before Colonel
= Qadhdhafi's rise in Libya,young Tunisians had fired shots for Palestine in -
1948, in 1956, in 1967. The attraction of Libya, for these expatriate
Tunisians, is not only the high wages: it is also that of space, of action,
of movement, far from a small country whicli is too stable and too wise.
Insidious Crisis Within the Labor Movement
The authors of the surprise attack, to extend their movement, counted on
a certain discontent of the Tunisian population. They exaggerated the
extent of this discontent, and especially the willingness of the Tunisian
population as a whole to rebel. However they were correct in discerning,
among the Tunisian people, elements of malaise.
The crisis of the winter of 1977-1978 in the labor movement does not seem
to have b:een reabsorbed as much as the authorities had hoped. Certainly,
pacifying measures were taken; on the eve of the seco~d anniversary of the
events of 26 January 1978, two of the principal figures still incarcerated,
Mohammed Triki a.~d..Mohamed Ali Chaabane, were freed, and 138 detainees
received condit,ional release.
But the release of Mr Habib Achour, who seems to have remained very popular
in labor circle"s, remains incomplete; his return to his present domicile
has the character of being put under house arrest, with severe restrictions
on outside contacts. And his successor as head of the UGTT, Mr Tijani Abid,
- has not yet made a great impression on public opinion among workers; the -
violen~`attack he launched against Mr Habib Achour at the time of the
20 January celebration of the 34th anniversary of the UGTT, charging him
with "full responsibility for the crises and internal convulsions suffered
by the syndicate since 1956," seemed at the very least, lacking in elegance.
Very jealous of its external independence, a fact which led it several
weeks ago to "freeze" relations with the International Confederatio.n of Free
Trade Unions [ICFTU] [which it] judged indiscreet, the UGTT of Mr Tijani
' Abid is, thanks to the number of its adherents, too complacent.about the
Destourian Socialist Party [PSD], which could exercise over it a more and
more constraining influence.
- In addition, while the very praises Mr Tijani Abid sings to his own organi-
zation, "wisdom, moderation, objectivity," hardly imply the dynamism which
however he declares he wants above all for the "syndicates from the base,"
the PSD never stops innovating and perfecting its operational structures. _
Following the coordina*ing committees good for developing breadth of.:poli-
tical views, the "company cells," being organized for several months in the
very mi3st of production and workplaces, cannot fail to compete with the
syndicates on their own ground.
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The suppression of the moveinent of 26 January 1978 put an end, by a type of -
surgical opPratic;n, to an extended crisis of the Tunisian J.abor movement.
But it appears more and more cleariy that an insidious crisis subsists, -
_ generating diffuse discontents. -
Price "Readjustments" for Basic Consumer Products
Sensitized, to a certain degree, by the easily perceived problems of the
overall syndicate, Tunisian workers, on the other hand, have come to feel
strongly the "readjustment" of prices henceforth to be asked for "basic
consumer products," grain and its derivatives, "blended" oil, coffee, sugar.
Like a number of Arab governments, the government in Tunis comes to the
rescue of the most disadvantaged segments of the population by subsidizing
a part of the price of basic food products; and, also like them, ~t would
like to be able to reduce somewhat this burden, in order to be able to
_ dedicate directly to development the sums saued from the costs of the
_ subsidies. From which come the measures taken in the middle of January
- to increase slightly the price of these basic products, measures moreover
compensated by a corresponding increase in the minimum wage.
It has been noted that more than once increases thus decreed in the price
of basic goods brought social problems, This was the casP in Egypt in
January 197~, in the Sudan in August 1979. One is thus tempted to add
that in January 1980 this is again the case in Tunisia, but the facts
would weaken this theory. Because the Gafsa affair, even if it benefited
from complicity on the spot hatched in a climate which favored it, is
not in any sense a local uprising.
~ In abandoning this false parallelism, however, one should not for all that
ignore this little Tunisian event, the readjustment of prices of basic
consumer goods, because it seems very characteristic of Tunisia today. ~
The readjustment was long considered, calculated with care, maintained -
within reasonable limits, and copiously explained by the written and spoken
pzess. The authorities emphasized that the economies to the public trea-
sury would permit the creation of 30,000 jobs.
To this convincing argument, government information added other considera-
tions: the total of expenditures by the Bank of Compensatiion will still
represent, despite this alleviation, 17 percent of the operating budget of _
the state; national consumption of some products has grown in a way that
evidences :an~. ever growing affluence; in the course of the last two years,
30 percent for coffee, 20 percent for sugar, 10 percent for oil; and this
at a time of cQnsiderable increases in the international price of these
commodities, increases estimated at 100 percent for sugar and 50 percent
for grain and coffee, in just one year.
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_ ~
Fina~ly, import statistics, technical details, and authorized cammen~aries =
have been furnished ta the Tuni~ian public,which in this case could not
complain of not being treated as adults.
The criticisms are rather directed to the "accountant mentality of a
- decidedly bourgeois government," more capable of calculation than of
spirit, inept at arousing enthusiasm, and which tomorrow may be too
lustreless to inspire any more devotion and loyalty. A tendency, one
could say, perhaps. For there is in Tunisia a characteristic division
of functions: the labor movement moderates, the Party organizes, the
Prime Minister administers, and it is the president who excites.
Renewed Activity of President Bourguiba
Recovered, the health of President Bourguiba allows him once again to play
his role of sovereign animator. His moves, always conceived in terms of -
the good of the state and the Tunisian people, nevertheless retain an
extremely personal character, which gives to his authority a human aspect,
certainly conducive to arousing affection and adherence.
On 31 December, President Bourguiba receives members of the government and
the Politburo accompanied by their spouses: he insisted on and stressed
this last detail. Thus in effect he gives a lesson to Muslim fundamenta-
lists, or simply to traditionalists who try to maintain and even reinforce
the confinement of women: to encourage the modernization of mores, the
president puts his own we~ght once more into the balance.
In the course of the speech given on this occasion, the president makes -
statements in support of his "prime collaborator," Mr Hedi Nouira. Even
more than the present efforts and successes: of the Prime Minister, he
recalls the old friendship which links them, the circumstances in which
they fought and suffered together. President Bourguiba is in fact more
and more sensitive to the evocation of the past; he receives, with a ten-
derness hardly dissimulated, his old comrades in arms; and among their
juniors, too young to have militated before independence, he is quick to
honor those who at least have made themselves historians of the Destourian
movement, such as Mr Mohammed Sayah, the head of the Party.
And certainly, if on 22 January President Bourguiba goes to Monastir, no
doubt this move to his birthplace contains for him a powerful sentimental
attraction. But on this occasion he insists on clearly pointing, by a
personal gesture, the direction in which the Tunisian elite should go: he
inaugurates the Department of Sciences and Technology, in the entryway of
which moreover there is a plaque reproducing a passage of one of his speeches,
underlining the importance attached to these domains of study and action.
After having shown in the Sahel his interest in the most modern projects,
a piscicultural unit and greenhouse cultivation, the president lands, two -
days later, on the very long runway (3,225 meters) of the new international
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- airport of Tozeur-Nefta, which he had just inaugurated. Thus he showed his
interest in this important new element of touristic enterprise, which is
one of the master resources of Tunisia~
The day after next, 27 January, President Bourguiba stays again in a large,
recently renovated Nefta hotel, where he spends several days resting.
Nefta is only 65 km from Gafsa. The Tunisian chief of state does not
_ interrupt for all that his stay in the country, and he pursues peacefully
his pedestrian promenades, which reassuring photographs capture for the press.
If there had been some probability of a general conspiracy, would not the =
chief of state, despite everything, urgently returned to the capital? But _
if it was only an isolated attack, what foreign leader would have had the
frivolity to expect of it a decisive shock to the Tunisian regime? The
interest of the Tunisian government in any case, in the present situation,
is to use this threat, great or small, which it has endured, to get from =
the West an abundance of military gr~ods at small cost. The Tunisian army, -
whose quality is sure, was not sufficiently well equipped; tomorrow it will
have what it needs.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris,_19$0
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- IIvTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
REVIEW OF GAFSA INCIDENT, IMPACT BY VARIOUS AUTHORS
Would-Be Liberators of. ~afsa
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 13 Feb 80 pp 31-34
[Article by Abdelaziz Barouhi, special correspondent: "Tripoli-Gafsa via
Algiers: The strange itinerary--by airplane and tourist coach--of a group _
= of Qadhadhafi commando ',~iberators'--passages between slantlines published
in italics]
[Text] Tuesday 5 February, 1330 hours. In a eucalyptus clearing near
Gafsa, I stop in the midst of a group of soldiers listening to...Radio
Tripoli. /"The armed people's revolution extends throughout the south
of Tunisia and is battling the French invasion,"/ the Libyan radio announces.
General hilarity. The Tunisian psychological war experts could doubtless
- have found no more efficient way to galvanize the troops.
Tuesday and Wednesday, 5-6 February, I covered nearly 500 lan in the dis-
trict of Gafsa. In complete freedom. Gafsa, Tozeur, Nefta, Metlaouri, El
Hamma, Degache, Bir el-Haf ey...I took all the roads and I never saw a trace
of fighting. Not a trace, nor any of intervention by the French either,
except, stationed near Gafsa, the two Transalls which had after the attack
assured logistic support between Tunis and the combat zone. I also learned ?
that a small group of commandos (three men) had been actively pursued the
last 6 days in the mountains, in Djebel Ouled Ben Omrane, near E1 Guetar, ~
some 20 1~ east of Gafsa.
� Wednesday evening 6 February, news from official sources came of the sur-
render of the military chief of the attackers in the Gabes region east of
El Hamma.
Ahmed Mergheni was with two "accomplices," Larbi el-Ourhemi and Mohamed
Ali Zlassi. The three men, who were barricaded in a hovel in fihe Jerouala -
zone, surrendered at 1100,.after a quarter of an hour of combat with ele- .
ments of the national guard. The giiard Ali Achour Triki was killed in -
the course of this engagement.
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Br.own, bearded 30 to 35, Ahmed Mergheni left the Gafsa region Monday or
T_uesday 28 or 29 January, to cross the mountains and attempt to get to
the coastal village of Zar7is, where he was ~orn. _
I visited, this same Wednesday morning, the lair of the Gafsa cammandos.
~ I made some surprising discoveries there. The commando unit, formed of _
Tunisians, was called the "Amr-Ibn-el-Ass Brigade," f'rom the name of the
great warrior who joined with the prophet after having fought against him,
and next conquered...Egypt.
1'his "lair" of Gaf sa is an Arabic style house, composed of three rooms
opening onto a small yard, number 109, situated in the populous Moualla
quarter. It is near the Tlili barracks and the technical school the com- ~
mandos occupied Sunday 27 January at 0200. I discovered, written in red
chalk on the wall of one of the three rooms, the following proclamation:
/"The Amr Ibn el-Ass Brigade goes forth with the blessing of God. No -
revolutionary movement without revolutionary thought."/ Or again:
- /"With the blessing of God, the f irst revolutionary brigade of militants
against the reactionary regime has been created. Written Saturday
9 rabii el-awal, year 1400 of the Hegira, corresponding to 26 January
1980 of the Christian calendar."/ -
It wa s here that 28 members of the commando unit waited nearly 3 weeks
af ter crossing the Algerian border south of Tebessa. It was here too
' that the weapons introduced well in advance via the "Qadhdhafi trail" -
were stored. The ground is littered with packages of weapons, of plastic
capsules for the protection of bazooka tubes, of cartridges. Also some
- household debris predominantly boxes of canned goods of Tunisian manu- _
facture. There are also fragments of the jute sacks made by the comman- _
dos themselves on the scene, filled with grenades and carried like bando-
leros at the hour of the attack. The room reserved for weapons has a
- grilled garret window which gives onto the street at ceiling level.
How could these men remain unnoticed in this populous quarter with narrow
streets? The mystery remains. But, according to information collec�ted
at :Gafsa, the house belongs to a customs off icial and had been rented
out through an intermediary, a...police lance-corporal. Complicity at
all levels seems established. We have learned that two customs officials
and close to six policemen have been arrested and transferred from Gafsa =
to Tunis.
Beyond the "Amr Ibn el-Ass Brigade," there were close to 30 youths, job-
less or workers for the most part, natives of Gafsa and the region.
Among the faces in the photograph of the 42 first prisoners, Gafsa fami-
lies have recognized their children. They joined the brigade at H-Hour. .
Counting everyone, the number of commandos seems not to have been as
high as 60. But they were able to appear as more by reason of their
mobility on the first day of the attack...and by reason of the number of -
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urchins who came to surround them out of curiosity. They were waiting
for so~ething eise: a massive upsurge of the population. /"We were
told in Tripoli that the Tunisian people were waiting only for a shot to
_ be fired. Well, shots were fired! But the Tunisian people did not join
_ u's..."/
In the Ti.me of King Idriss
These disillusioned words were spo~ten by Mohamed Ali, 21, member of the
"Amr Ibn el-Ass Brigade." According to the words of him and other pri-
soners, Col Qadhdhaf i came in person to salute them before their depar- -
ture and told them: /"Libya is in your han~is, ask what you will. Only,
f ollow my/ Green Book..."
The men of Amr Ibn-el Ass had been enrolled indoctrinated, trained, and
tempered according to th~ now "classic" technique of Libyan recruitment
(see JEUNE AFRIQUE No 996 and the article by Mohamed Selhami p 26).
Through the good off ices of the Arab Liaison Bureau [BAL], whose second
_ in command, Bechir Chaaroun, had as his alter ego the Tunisian Ahmed
Mergheni, he who led the operation.
Before the "Gafsa strike," they betook themselves to South Lebanon, where
the Tunisians had been sent to become accustomed to the hardships of war
_ with L'he extremist Palestinian movements. There, Chaaroun and Mergheni
~ saw these men one by one, telling each that the Fath [translaiion unknown]
of Yassir 'Arafat ;aas watching them and their lives would be in danger...
Another Tunisian, Amara Dhaou, occupies a place apart in the BAL, where -
he is "the politician," responsible for recruiting and indoctrinating his ~ _
youthful compatriots. Forty, heavy face surrounded by a shaggy beard,
he was born into a respectable family in the Tunisian south. Amara
_ made up for the brevity of his formal education by long reading of Arab
writings on all the revolutions. A Youssefiste, he was among the first
_ opponents of Bourguiba and fled into Libya,in the time of King Idriss.
At first an admirer of Nasser, he next turned to Kaddafism.
In 1978, he became one of the assistants of Omar Hamdi, permanent secre- _
= tary general of the Committee of the Arab People which is headquartered
- in Tripoli in an old palace of Idriss I. The aforesaid committee has it-
self, given birth to an Arab People's Progressive Front (FPPA), whose
Tunisian wing, the FPLT (Popular Front for the Liberation of Tunisia), is
directed by Amara Dhaou.
Under the cognomen of E1 Hadj Amara Naili, Chaou, who is known for his
- asceticism, owns a store in the Etrok market of Tripoli which serves
him for cover. It is he who presented Ezzedine Cherif, who arrived in
- Tripoli in October 1976, to the Libyans of the BAL.
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January ~978: the planning of the "Gaf su strike" begins. The training
' of the young Tunisians is intensified. Oldest of the Tunisian guerrillas, _
trained, a native of Gafsa, Ezzedine Cherif, 50, calls himself "Boubaker
~ the One-Eyed" in the field. He disposes of a budget of 20 million French ~
francs. His knowledge of the Gafsa region, of people, and of the border
will enable him to organize the movement of arms originating at one end
of the "Qadhdhafi trail." He knows the smugglers' paths and, at need,
bribes men who will look the other way. New stores of weapons have been
discovered elsewhere, at the beginning of February, near Bir Om Ali: one
in Tunisian territory, the other in...Algerian territory.
The 28 men of the "Amr Ibn el-Ass Brigade" arrived by a different route.
At the start of January, they lef t Tripoli for Rome where they took a
connection for Algiers. They were armed with Libyan passports which the
Algerian authorities kept, except for one. The young people then took a
bus for Tebessa (400 lan from the capital, taward the Tunisian border).
Not far from there, to the south, their point of entry into Tunisia: Bir
Om Ali. Some had put on tracksuits: a sports team on a weekend trip,
- what could be more normal? But these "sports" had taken a very lang trip.
It was, let us realize, thanks to the counterfoils of the ai~:plane tickets
found on the prisoners that the Tunisian authorities were able to recon-
- struct the Tripoli-Rome-Algiers itinerary.
Another discovery: the members of the commando group were wearing -
"pataugas" [translation unknown] of Algerian manufacture which are very
good practical shoes for trips into the mountains. In this detail, Tuni-
sian off icials would see in fact a diabolic maneuver by Kaddafi~to convince
them Algeria was implicated.
_ Another diabolic tactic of the Libyans: to have massed, from early
January, troops including three tank batallions in the extreme southern
part of the border with Tunisia. This is why the Tunisian army moved _
toward the Medenine region (to the southeast of Gafsa).
This also explains why Gafsa was able to be taken so easily. But the
expedition failed above all because, as several witnesses insisted,
/"the population did not rise up."/ The members of the commando unit,
- however, did all they could to bring along the inhabitants. They piled
up weapons in Msilla Square and invited the civilians to use them to "make
the revolution." It is true that some people took advantage of this impro-
vised self-service. But in order to hold the weapons in their houses in -
order to return them to the authorities: /"They were friendly and
correct,"/ one Gafsian avows, /"But we knew we were taking a chance."/
This explains why, several hours after the start of the operation, the -
attackers had no thought beyond falling back. But for many it was already
too late. Even tne artful Ezzeddine Cherif will be taken. Barricaded
with two of his men in the house where he was born, a small ramshackle
house in the old Arab style with a green door, situated exactly opposite
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~ th` police station and beside the Sidi Ben Yacoub mosque, he resists
until the afternoon of Tuesday 29 January. The armed forces had unleashed
a barrage of fi~e t~ prevent liim from climbing to the roofs, and had thrown
- teargas grenades to dislodge him. '
- In turn, two other members of the commando unit, surrounded 27 January
not far from the government house, preferred to be killed point blank
rather than to surrender. One of them, a youth whose id~ntity has not
been disclosed, shouted to the soldiers who were ca.'~ling to him: /"I am
a son of La Marsa..."/ (the name of a residential suburb of Tunis).
Gaf sa, covered now with inscriptions such as /"Qadhdhafi Zionist"/, can
- now breathe again, as can the region. President Bourguiba, with the air
of one who has seen this kind of thing before, kept cool. Remaining at
Nef ta, he did not interrupt his walks in the marvelous, sunny palm grove,
nor cease to mingle with the crowds he found in Tozeur and Degache. The
- European tourists, numerous in Djerid as at Gafsa, young adults for the
most part, also remained imperturbable.
The "Gafsa strike" thus failed. But all is not finished. Weapons c~~~ild
well be still hidd~n in the country. Close to 10 tons have already been _
discovered. And the social discontent persists in the South. All the
while condemning the Libyan intervention, one young Gafsian told us: -
/"Sometimes bad things can lead to good. These events can bring a
chance for the region, which up to now has been neglected on the economic ,
and social plane."/ _
/(Research in Paris and Tunis by Souhayr Belhassen and Abdelaziz Dahmani)./ _
Imternal Front Consolidation
Paris JEUNE AFRIQU.F, in French 13 Feb 80 pp 34, 35
[Article by Souhayr Belhassen: "After Gafsa: Everywhere, the attack
against Tunisia comes as a revelation--~`: clear warning"]
[Text] Leaders and activists of diverse opposition groups condemned
vigorously the foreign meddling and aggression in Gaf sa. But it is only
haltingly and gingerly that these opposition elemeZts, under cover of the _
recent events, app.roach the process of rapprochem ent with authority.
Thus, the declar3tion of the ex-minister of Tunisian foreign affairs,
Mohamed Masmoudi, considered in Tunis as the instigator of that Tuniso-
- Libyan marriage of which he was the first victim, constitutes a virtual
- /mea culpa/. The ex-head of Tunisian diplomacy, still under house
arrest, tenders his off er of service by stating in a telegram addressed
to Bourguiba: /"The most urgent task is to close ranks behind you, in
order to block the way of any foreign intervention."/
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Bahi Ladgham, right arm of the chief of state until 1970, also says he =
is putting himself at the service of the regime. This does not impede -
him from casting a critical eye on the situation. In a statement to
JEUNE AFRIQUE, he discusses in fact /"the grave shortcomings in the main-
- tenance of the security of our territory."/ Tunisia, he adds, should
consider itself /"in a state of legitimate defense and act cunningly and
without pity."/
/"Consolidate the Internal Front"/
For the Socialist Democrat Movement, the Gafsa attack is a real ordeal, -
because it allows cleavages to appear. It was not as one body that the
founding members of this movement, excluded from the Destourian Socialist -
Party in 19 74, will come to Nef ta to express, as Hassib Ber. Ammar puts
it, their support to the depository of legitimacy in the country. Accom- -
panied by Sadok Ben Djemaa, ex-minister of social affairs, and by Radhia
- Haddad, ex-president of the National Union of Tunisian Women, Hassib Ben
Ammar thus clearly diff erentiated himself from Ahmed Mestiri who wants
to transform the Socialist Democrat Movement into a party.
Ahmed Mestiri has conducted himself like a lead~r of the opposition by ~
, going to see Prime Minister Hedi Nouira at his request prior to meeting
- with President Bourguiba. This attitude remains closer to that of tra-
_ ditional opposition parties, whether they be communist, socialist
(Popular Unity Movement), syndical, or integrist. A common denominator
among all the opposition groups: the willingness to think through the
implications in the aftermath of Gafsa.
They all stress the necessity of /"consolidating the internal front"/. _
These events should /"sound the alarm to government and move it to
resolve the real social problems posed by Che absence of public liberties,"/
- says one labor f igure from the "legitimate" UGTT [Tunisian General Federa-
tion of Labor] leadership.
Logistical support from France is not without its risks, and Ahmed
Mestiri as well as Brahim Hayder, a member of the Popular Unity Move-
ment, are more than reserved about the appeal to Paris. Mohamed Sayah,
director of the Destourian Socialist Party, explains thus the "French
intervention": /"While still remaining nonalined, Tunisia lacks logisti-
cal resources comparable to those maintained and used by its adversary."/
The Tunisian authorities at the same time are not neglecting the task
of consolidating their relations in the Maghreb and throughout the Arab
world. Thus, af ter having sent an emissary to Algiers, where, it is said
in Tunis, the leaders assured their interlocutors of /"all the sympathy -
and solidarity of Alg~ria,"/ Tunisia insisted on praising, in an official
communique, /"the clarity which characteriies Tunisian-Algerian relations,
_ and the concern of Algerian leaders to strengthen the fraternal relations
between the two countries."/
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But in private circles there is talk of local complicities, regional -
complicities, even of the support of certain Algerian political factions.
~ Obviously the French intervention was not of a nature to be appreciated
by Algeria, nor by other Arab countries. From which comes their slow-
ness in reacting to the "aggression" and to show their solidarity. From
which also comes Tunisia's decision to send special envoys to the cou:.-
tries most sensitive to explain the context, especially the Libyan com-
plicity, of which some, such as Morocco, were already convinced. Once
obtaining the support of Saudi Arabia, Tunisia will ask for a meeting of
the Council of the Arab League to examine the culpability of Libya in
~ the Gafsa aggression. Meanwhile, the last bridges are burned: af ter
_ having recalled its ambassador and closed down the Libyan cultural cen-
_ ters, Tunisia called on its 400 volunteers stationed in Liba to return.
And, af ter the arrival of the 1,200 expelled Tunisians, President
Bourguiba would prepare himself. to recall the 80,000 emigrees who live
in Qadhdhaf i's land.
French 'Hostages'
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 13 Feb 80 pp 35, 36
- [Article by Francois Soudan--passages between slantlines in italics]
[Text] /"Sir, if Tunisia were attacked, the duty and the mission of the _
French navy would be to protect the towns of the Mediterranean Club."/
This joke in the f orm of a prediction, appearing in::,the Parisian daily
LIBERATION, just riight furnish the key to the remarkable indifference of
- French public opin,ion in face of the "events" at Gafsa...For many,
Tunisia is a matter of small import, to borrow an expression from CANARD
ENCHAINE, a/"vacation colony,"/ about which one only concerns oneself .
_ lietween June and Septemb er. /"jde got three or f our telephone calls f rom
clients who had reserved rooms in a hotel or cottage,"/ explains an offi-
cial in one of the'~ravel agencies. /"We reassured them: No one lost
, their rooms."/
Qadhdhafi? His distinctive image is nearly as black among "average -
Frenchmen" as that of Ayatollah Khomeyni. A few shades lighter perhaps:
the Qom patriarch evokes fear, while the master of Tripoli still provokes _
a li.ttle bit of a smile. The latter elusive aspect doubtless explains _
the`uneasiness of French political parties (and particularly those of the =
opposition) with the Gafsa affair. But the aid sent to the Tunisian -
army:provokes var ious remarks which hardly rise above a whisper: social-
ists see in it the continuation of the "gunboat diplomacy" of Giscard in _
`Africa. The Communist Party [PCF] blasts the "interventionism" of the
Elysee. It's a small thing. After all, French aid at Gafsa was only
- limited and logistical in nature. No paratroopers. No deaths.
But a certain "slippage" in public opiriion happens on Monday 4 February,
_ when Libyan demonstrators sack the French missions at Tripoli and Benghazi.
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The affair is no longer between Tunisia and Libya; it is between
France and Libya. The average Frenchman begins to b e interested. And
to become indignant. Words heard in a subway car: /"A nut, a real ne~t,
_ and with the bomb!"/ _
/"A Nut, A Real Nut"/ -
There are also voices on the periphery, however, like that of the French
philosopher Roger Garaudy, a member of Franco-Libyan Friendship. Ques-
tioned by JEUNE AFRIQUE: /"I understand the anger of the Libyan dp~nonstra-
tors. The French are detested throughout Africa. Libya an imperialist?
But who gave it the~',nilitary means for its imperialism: France!"/
On television the evening of 5 January, a speaker announces: /"There are
- 1,800 French citizens in Libya. Will they become 1,800 hostages?"/ At
the Quai d'Orsay, a"crisis group" follows events hour by hour. A precise
evacuation plan is mapped out. Ready to be activated, it is said. But
secret. A reassuring bluff, or reality? Those f ew who would still like
to pass their vacation between the sand and the derricks are being coun-
selled to postpone their departure date. The ambassador is recalled, and
Qadhdhafi is asked to reciprocate. Honor is almost safe, and France is
already thinking about something else. Well, admittedly the "Club"~does
not extend ta the mining towns. But where is Gafsa, anyway?
Glance at Tunisian Forces
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 13 Feb 80 p 31
[Article by H.K.: "Why French Military Assistance"--slantlines indicate
published in italics]
[Text] In the Gafsa aff air, did the Tunisian army and paramilitary
f orces need external assistance to overcome assailants numbered by the
authorities at several.hundred, indeed /"several dozens" of "bandits"?/ _
At a strength of 22,000 men (estimated in MILITARY BALANCE 1979-1980), the
Tunisian army can count on the support of 2,500 National Guardsmen, and -
on some tens of thousands of reservists recruited by conscription in the
- course of 24 years of independence.
The army has meanwhile acquired MB 326K chasseurs d'attaque au sol _
[translation unknown] from Italy, very,eff ective in counter-guerrilla -
operations, and several dozen Kuerassier chasseurs de chars [translation
unknown]. It also has some 20 helicopters and sufficient ground transport _
to enable it to get emergency aid or wounded men within a few hours on the
road to or from the main cities. It can, with its own resources, hold back
sup~rior enemy forces and even a possible Libyan military invasion, until -
. the arrival of allied troops, French or otherwise. -
_ Thus, what is the purpose of French military assistance--even if it is
only logistical?
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~ Algeria lmplicated
' Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 13 Feb 80 p 34
_ [Article by O.S.: "Question to Algeria"--passages between slantlines in _
italics]
_ [Text] For the Tunisian Governmen t, that of Algiers /"is not implicated"/
in the Gafsa affair. Neither directly nor indirectly. It is just that
Algerian territory was traversed, unknown to the authorities, by members _
of the commando unit.
Now one of two things is true: either Algerian territory was used without
the security forces realizing it--a theory that Algeria rejects categoric-
ally--or the operation against Gafsa benefitted from the connivance, if
not of the highest authorities of the state, then at least of groups
within the Algerian power elite--a theory which Algeria also rejects
categorically. ,
Thus there is a disagreement between Tunisia and Algeria. Which one is -
right? It is diff icult to say. We can only proceed by means of "inter-
rogative aff irmations." For example: Why did Algeria fail to show prompt
solidarity with Tunisia, like distant Morocco? Why did the Algerian
authorities fail to prevent--since they had the means to do it--the appeal
by Brahim Tobal, a Tunisian "opponent" sheltered by Algeria for years, _
/"to all progressive movements in the world to /(support)/ the struggle
which the Tunisian people have been waging for 25 years against oppression
and servitude"/?
These questions do not imply, obviously, that Algeria is implicated in the
Gafsa aff air. It is clear that it is not...
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique Grupjia, 1980
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AFGHANISTAN
GUERRILLA WARFARE, SOVIET INTERVENT~ON METHODS REPORTED
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 28 Jan 80 p 25 -
[Article by Pierre de Villemarest: "Cold Guerrilla Zones"]
[Text] Could Afghanistan be the USSR's Vietnam? Doubtful, at least con-
sidering the conditions which will prevail until next March's thaws. The
some 80,000 rebels currently fighting the Red Army risk dying until then in
a type of genocide similar to the one practiced by the Vietnamese commu-
nists in the Lao_ mountains.
Unlike the Americans in Vietnam, the Soviets are not handicapped by a de-
stabilizing of their own public opinion. Furthermore, the intervention is .
taking place at the very borders of their country. Finally, the USSR has
already set up a system aimed at the total isolation of the mountaineer -
guerrillas.
Seven armored and motorized divisions, two airborne divisians, and units
specializing in radar surveillance have blocked the Atghan fror.tiers and
skies. In a second phase, the Russians isolate areas wh~.ch threaten the
_ scarce strategic roads, using armored comb~t helicorters.
Life in winter at elevations of 3,000 or 4,000 meters calls for warm
clothing and instant canned food and drinks (as it is imposs~ble to make a
fire without being immediately detected). The Afghans have no such
_ facilities. Furthermore, in order to avoid bombing and shelling, the
~ rebels must operate in small groups instead of conventional units of
several hundred men with ground-air and anti-tank missiles.
Five or six provinces only, such as Paktia, in the western part of the
- country, are both mountainous and forest covered, therefore offering
"cover" to the guerrillas. -
Elsewhere, they ar.e at the mercy of Soviet radar and intervention units ~
equipped with napalm and, above all, a new type of shell conta3ning r~d
and yellow gas, which, according to the dose,,could paralyze or, ~radually,
kill up to 2,000-3,000 people in suspect agglomerations. This terrifying
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weapon was experimentally tried last year aga3.nst the Meo guerrillas in the
Lao high plateaus.
The rebels do not have hundreds of two-way radios, which they would need to
keep in touch with the valleys, and, therefore, to coordinate their intel-
ligence and their actions a~ainst the3r opponent. Unless provisions and
advanced materials are parachuted, the rebels, therefore, would be forced _
less to fight the invader than to engage in an "operation survival" until
- next March.
Eighty percent of.the rebels belong to some 60 Pathan tribes. However, the
Sov-Lets have coimnitted on their side Uzbek and Tadzhik elements, which are
racia'lly and culturally close to the populations of the Afghan Northwest,
once dominated by the Pathans of the Southeast. Moscow seems to have
- decided to base its intervention on a"settlement of accounts" among ethnic
groups.
~ COPYRIGHT: 1980, "Valeurs actuelles" ,
5157
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MOROCCO
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY SLOWER.IN 1979
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 ,Tan 80 p 131
[Text] As it usually does at the end of the year, CEDIES [Socioeconomic
Research and Information Center] reviews the development of various economic
sectors. It recalls first of all that the expected weak growth of the
gross domestic product in 1979 (3 percent in volume) derives from the poor
results of agricultural production, but also from the stagnation or decline
that has characterized certain industrial and commercial activities for
. 2 years.
_ The general circumstances of the 1978-79 agricultural season were in fact
again dominated (as in 1975 and 1977) by unfavorable climate conditions.
Grain production in particular was poor: 36 million quintals, representing
a 21�percent drop in comparison to last year's production, which itself
was very mediocre. With the country's needs estimated at 60 million quintals,
- the grain deficit for 1979 will therefore be about 24 million quintals,
to be made up by imports.
Moreover, in view of the effects of this situation on the income of the
fa~ning population, public authorities have decided to raise grain prices
paid to producers, to the level of 105 dirhams per quintal (instead of
85 dirhams as before) for hard and soft wheat, and 80 dirhams (instead ~
of 60 dirhams) for barley and corn. This was also done in the case of
production prices for beets, sugar cane and oilseeds.
These increases, which were devised to encourage farmers, were also brought -
about by the ~.ncrease in production costs following the r.'ise ot fuel prices,-
the 40� �percent tn` farm wages established in May 1979 and� the 15 ~>to 20� percent
increase in chemical fertilizer prices. The increases are mainly borne
by the government, particularly in the case of grain, whose consumer prices
have not been affected. On the other Nand, the sale prices of sugar and
oil, frozen since 1973, were raised in September by 20 ta 30 centimes per
kilogram of sugar and by 40 centimes per liter of oil.
With regard to industrial operations, if export sectors have somehow continued
to weather the international economic situation, those oriented toward the
~ 2g
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domestic market have felt the effects of the decline in the general level .
of demand and of zhe austerity policy that has been in effect since 1978.
With regard to exporting industries, their performances actually appear
to be good despite the unfavo~able trends of foreign markets (development
of protectionist measures and prospects of EEC expansion to include Morocco's
principal competitors). For example, textile sector forecasts estimate _
an export turnover of 80 billion centimes in 1979, as opposed to 75 billion
in 1978. Some recovery of foreign demand for canned fish has also taken
shape in recent months. But this sector is facing many problems limiting
its prospects because of structural problems in the regular supply of raw -
materials, inadequate procurement of equipment and cold storage facilities
- and increased production costs reducing the competitiveness of Moroccan
prices in relation to foreign competition.
The development of industrial operations or~ented toward the domestic market
~ (private and public) in 1979 was characterized by a tendency for stagnation
_ or decline, depending on the case. The reduction of public orders, following
_ the decline of government investment, has actually had a serious effect
on operations such as public works and metallurgy, which have had to make
job cuts. The case was the same in the electrical industries, which watched
their order books shrink by 10 percent. -
Recovery of these types of economic activity is closely related to the
resumption of investment and, among other things (which is expected for
1980), shelved or postponed programs (road and port nperations, sugar,
phosphate and cement projects, the housing construction program, etc.).
. Moreover, if import restriction measures have proved to be beneficial for.
_ certain types of production (such as household appliances), their application -
has hampered the operation of a large number of businesses due to the problems
- in acquiring raw materials, semifinished products and capital goods.
The general decline in the level of demand and the rise of prices have
likewise had a strong effect on sectors such as the automobile industry,
whose assembly and sales operations have been cut almost in half, particularly
in the case of commercial vehicles.
Otherwise, the 1978 level of activity has at best remained the same or
increased slightly, as in the case of general industrial engineering, cement
- consumption (+3 percent), sugar production (589,000 tons) and carbonated
beverages.
The mining industry continues to be dominated by the hazards of the world
economic~situation. Overall, export turnover in 1979 rose by about 3 to
4 percent due to the increase in the price of most ores. However, the ~
situation continues to be worrisome for other materials such as iron, zinc -
and copper, and particularly phosphates. In fact, the latter's sevenue .
has continued to decline despite the increase in the volume of~sales. For
- the firat 8 months of 1979, phosphate sales rose to 11.4 million tons with
~ an exchange value of 1.196 billion dirhams in comparison to 10.9 millior_
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tons with an exchange value of 1.331 billion dirhams.in 1978, or a drop "
in value of more than 10 percent.
IndustriaJ. and household energy consumption in 1979 seems to hat*e risen
_ less rapidly than in the year before. In the first half of the year,
gasoline sales (regular and premium) rose only 1.66 percent in comparison
to 2.3 percent in 1978 for the same period; sales of gas oil increased
5.7 percent as opposed to 8.2 percent; fuel oil sales rose 13.9 percent
instead of 19.7 percent.
This development is the result of a general decline in the growth rate
of demand as well as the continued increase in sales prices, which went
_ up again in July 1979. The incrsasing burden of imported energy costs,
due to the rise of oil prices on the world market, also led to the launching
of a national energy savings campaign in October. -
Marketing and service operations have also felt the effects of the decline
in the rate of general economic activity as well as the restrictive policy -
on finances and imports. In this respect, 1979 is_considered by professionals
as a turning point between the satisfactory development of previous years
and the situation that has developed concurrently with problems in other
industrial operations.
Finally, in the case of tourism, the number of tourists seems to have dropped
again in 1979 foll~wing the upswing that began in 197.7. In the first half
of 1979, in fact, resort tourism showed a decline of nearly 18 percent,
with visitors',numbering approximately 614,000 in comparison to 747,000
the year before. This is partly due to the world economic situation, to
which this sector is particularly sensitive, but also to the disturbances
during the year in tourism in Spain, through which a large number of tourists
travel en route to Morocco. The shorteomings characterizing the policy
of promotion and solicitation of foreign markets would probably have to ~
be added to these various factors.
- COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris 1980'~ -
11915 �
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