JPRS ID: 8992 USSR REPORT POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060033-7
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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~ POL I T ~ _ _ RF ~

21 MpRCH 1980 CFOUQ ?r80) 1 Q~F
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J!'RS L/8992
~ 21 March 1980
~JSSR Re ort ~
p
POLITICAL AND SOCI~LOGICAL AFFAIRS
CFOUO 7/80) _
_ FBIS FOREIG~1 BROA[~CAST IlVFORMATION SERVICE
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- JPRS L/8992
21 March 1980
USSR REPORT
- POLITICAL AND $OCICLOGICAL AFFAIRS
f,F0U0 7/80)
CONTENTS ~~AGE
INTERNATIONAL
West Tries To Use Vienna Ta1ks To Obtain Unilateral Advantages
(V.F. Petrovkiy: VOPROSY ISTORII, Jan 80) 1
International Probes Into Human Rights Re3ected
(S.V. Chernichenko; SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO,
No 1, 1980) 22
Need To P.egulate Means of Mass Informaticn ~.n International
Relations .
(5.0. Shevtsova; SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO,
No 1, 1980).......o 34
REGIONAL
Teaching of Russian Literature in Kirgizia Evaluated
(A.D. Zhizhina; RUSSKIY YAZYK I LITERATURA V KIRGIZSKOY
SHKOLE, May 79) 42
- a- [III - USS R- 35 FOUO]
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INTERNATIONAL
WEST TRIES TO USE VIENNA TALKS TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES
Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII in Russian No 1, Jan 80 signed to press 23 Jan 80
~ pp 44-60 ,
/Article by V. F. Petrovskiy, senior scientific worker of the Institute of
the USA and Canada and member of the Bureau of the Scientific Council for
Researeh on the Problems of Peace and Disarmament: "The Talks on Mutual
Force and Arms Reductton in Cer.tral Europe"/
/Text/ One of the most im~ortant directions of the foreign policy activity
of the USSR is the drive for mutual force and arms reduction in Central
Europe.l. Talks on this issue have been under way in Vienna since 30 Octo-
ber 1973. In accordance with the understanding reached at the preliminary
consultations in Vienna in January-June 1973, 19 nations are taking part in
them: 7 socialist countries (the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland,
l~omania, Czechoslovakia) and 12 western countries (the United States, Eng-
` land, Belgium, Denmarlc, Greece, Italy, Canada, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norw.3y, Turkey, the FRG). The composition of the parties to the agreements
on mutual force ~nd arms reduction in Central Europe has also been agreed
upon. They are four socialists countries--the USSR, the GDR, Poland and
Czechosolvakia--and seven western countries--the United States, England,
Belgium, Canada, Luxembourg, the Netherlanda and the FRG. As direct par-
ticipants in the talks these countries have been granted the right to make
decisions on the questions being discussed. The region of tf-.~ proposed
force and arms reductions has thereby actually been predetermined: it in-
cludes the territories of the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, as
well as the GDR, Poland and Czechosolvakia. The other participants in the
talks--the "flank nations"--will not reduce their troops and have a special
status which gives them the right to take part in the discussion of ques-
tions at the plenary sessions and to distribute documents on the questions
being examined. In c~nformity with the protocol adopted at the consulta-
tions on 14 May 1973, the immediate participants in the talks "make the
necessary decisions on the basis of consensus."
The Vienna talks became possible owing to the change in the political atmos-
phere in Europe, which was the result of the active peace-loving policy of
the Soviet Union and the other socialists count~cies and of the important
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actions undertaken by them. The agreements between the USSR and the llnited
States on the prevention of nuclear war and strategic arms limitation, as
well as the treaties between the USSR, Poland, the GDR and the FRG and the
four-power agreement on West Berlin, in particular, played an important
role. Detente in the relations between European nations was clearly ex-
pressed at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which drew
up a p1a*.form for further collective efforts aimed at strengthening secur-
" ity and developing cooperation in Europe. The conference participants
- unanimously affirmed in the Final Act "the interest of all of them in ef-
forts, which are aimed at reducing miliCary confrontation and at promoting
disarmament and are called upon to supplement political detente in Europe
and to strengthen security."3
The assurance of European gecurity is one of the most important probtems of
modern international relations. The particular importance of the region of
Central Europe is confirmed by historical experience. The seats of the two
world wars, which claimed 65 million human lives, emerged precisely here.
Strate~ically this region holds a key position, since it has a highly de-
veloped system of all types of lines of communication, which link it with
practically all other countri~s and regions of Europe, as well as with the
rest of the world. A military clash on the territory of Central Europe
could easily engulf any other region of the continent, especially if you
take into account the range of modern ccnventicnal and nuclear weaponry.
In Central Europe the most powerful armed forces of the NATO and Warsaw
Pact countries are concentrated and a large number of conventional and
nuclear weapons and combat materiel have been placed. This is the direct
result of the policy of the Cold War, which was conducted by the ruling
circles of the United States and the other NATO countries during the post-
war period, and their reliance on the use of military force or the threat
of force.
A sharp political and diplomatic struggle is being waged over mutual force
and arms reduction in Central Europe, the opposing interests, approaches
and concepts of the nations belonging to different socio-economic systems
are clashing. During the preparation of the western countries for the
talks in Vienna Gignificant differences between them in the common aspira-
tion to achieve a greater reduct~on of Soviet armed forces in Central
Europe than of NATO forces were clearly revealed.
The U.S. position was formed under the influence of a complex set of con-
tradicto~y factors and trends. On the one hand, the Nixon Administration
experienced earnest pressure on the part of a group of influential congress-
men headed by Senator M. Mansfield, who supported a substantial unilateral
reduction of American troops in Europe. On the other hand, neither the
Administration nor Congress were interested in having the reduction of the
the number of American troops in Europe entail a reduction of the troops
of the NATO allies of the United States. Moreover, the increase of their
contribution to the ovexall military efforts of NATO and the increase of
their military strength were regarded by American ruling circles as the
main goals of U.S. policy in NATO.
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'!he elaboration of the position of NATO toak place at a time ~ahen the -
United States was making an analysis of its foreign military commitments
with allowance made for the parity of the USSR and the United States in
strategic nuclear forces, as well as the lessons of the Vietnam War. For
political and strategic military reasons the Americar~ Government considered
it extremely important to link the problem of reducing its forces in Eur-
ope with the plans of the NA1'0 countries and to achieve, alluding to the
"geographic factor," a cozsiderably greater reduction of Soviet troops in
- this region. In the foreign policy report of the president ta Con~ress in
1972 it was indicated that since major unilateral reductions of the number
of American troogs in Europe would upset the balance between the conven-
tial armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe, U.S.
policy would consist in "maintaining and improving our armed zorces in Eur-
ope and not in reducing them, except through mutual,reductions which are
agreed upon during the talks with the Warsaw Pact."4
The United States began to exert ever increasing pressure on its allies in
order to change the position of NATO on the question of force redi.:tion.
' The point is that primarily the West European countries, first of all the
FRG, were behind the first proposals of the North Atlantic bldc, which were
advanced at the sessions of the NA~O Council in Reykjavik, Rome and Brussels
in 1968-1970. In particular, the NATO countries proceeded at that tir~e
from the possibility of reducing both the "positioned" (foreign) and the
"1oca1" (national) armed forces, as well as weapon systems. The U.S. policy
of closely linking the reduction of Soviet and American troops in tt~.is
re~ion made itself quite definitely felt in counterbalance to th3.s approach.
In 1972 the Special Subcommittee on North Atlantic Treaty Organization Com-
mitments of the House Armed Services Committee prepared a report. "Owing
to the relatively greater burden of the expenditures borne by the United
States," it was stated in it, "the subcommittee firmly believes that any
initial reductions in accordance with the agreement on force and arms re-
duction in Central Europe should provide for the witY?drawal of American and
Soviet troops."5
At the final stage of the elaboration of the position of t'ne NATO countries -
the United States was able to achieve from its allies an agreement to focus
attention on the reduction first of all of Soviet and American land forces.
The United States persuaded its West European partners tha~ an "asymmetri-
cal" reduction of the personnel of Soviet and American land forces in the
ratio of 2.5 : 1 and of tanks in the ;tati~ of 1,7~0 : 0 with the simultaneous
maintenance at the former levels of the air forces an~d tactical nuclear
weapons would cerrespond much more to the interests of the NATO countries
than any other possible models of reductions. The West German magazine ~
EUROPA-ARCHIV wrote openly about the interests of the NATO countries first
of all ir~ "pushing back the maximum number of Soviet troops several hundred
kilometers to the east, while losing at the same time the minimum number of
American troops."6
By submitting an "extensive" program of ineasures on the limitation of the
Soviet military presence in Central Europe, the United States was able to
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~
� diminish to some extent the negative reaction of the governments of the
West European countries to a possible reduction of the American military
presence in this region, and at the same time to persuade Belgium, the
Netherlands and the FRG to reject the initial intentions to take part in
the reduction of their troops ac the first stage, postponing this to a
later period. At the same time the inclusion of the question of the reduc-
tion of the American military presence in Europe in the unified NATO posi-
tion gave the West European countries a certain lever of influence on the
" United States in this process. Belgium diplomat A. (Villot), who took part
in developing the NATO po~ition at the talks in Vienna, wrote in early 1973
that by means of them it is becoming possible to slow and, probably, even
to check for a long period "the inevitable tendency to reduce American con-
� ventional armed forces in Europe."~
Having eliminated to some extent after the opening of the Vienna talks the
pressure on the part of Congress in favor oi the unilateral reducti~n of
American troops in Europe, the United States, like the other NATO countries
taking part in them, began to noticeably lose interest in the more rapid
Elaboration and implementation of mutually scceptable steps on force and
arms reduction in Central Europe. Some circles in the United States and
the other NATO countries clearly ob3ect to the use of the talks in order to
resto-re the shaken solidarity in their ranks and to step up the rate of
military preparations of the North Atlantic bloc. In this lies one of the
main sources of the difficulties which have ariaen at the talks in Vienna.
The USSR position at the Vienna talks is governed by the fundamental aim
of the CPSU at the strengthening of peace and the security of nations. The
Soviet Government considers it important and possible in ~~ie interests of
the assurance of security in Europe to supplement politi~~l detente with
military detente. Only the making of a mutual and equal reduction of armed
forces and arms in the center of the European continent will make it pos-
sible to raise the security of all the nations of Europe to a new level,
without giving anyone one-sided military advantages. The principles agreed
upon at the preliminary consultations in Vienna are the criteria for the
achievement of a mutually acceptable understanding, In the Final Communi-
que of 28 June 1973 it was indicated that the measures on force and arms
reduction in Central Europe "should be carefully worked out according to
the amo�snt and time so that in all respects ~d in any feature they would
confor.n to the principle of not endangering the security of any of the
parties."8
At the very start of the talks two opposing approaches to ~he solution of
the problems of the mutual force and arms reduction in Centra2 Europe came
to light. The initial factors for determining which of them conforms to
the task of force and arms reduction in this region with the strict observ-
ance of the agreed on principles, unquestionably are: the degree of con-
sideration by the parties of the realities existing in Central Europe, in-
cluding their estimation of the established balance of forces in this
region, on which the current level of the security of the nations taking
part in the ~talks is based; the notion of the parties on the end results
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of future reductions (that is, the goals which each of them sets for it-
self), the ways and means of achieving them.
It is.well known th.?t the structures of the military alliances of NATO and -
the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe are different: the general organization
of the armed forces and the individual branches of the armed forces and
arms and services, the number af c~rtain arms and combat materiel were de-
termined by each party with allowance made for their own military political
strategy, the assessment of the situation on the continent and many other
factors. When developing its armed forces in this region, each party took
into account the needs of defense support, the material and manpower re-
sources of the states belonging to the military alliances and so on. Back in
the 1950's the NATO countries primarily relied on the massed increase in
Europe of tactical nuclear weapons, which they regarded as the most effec-
tive means as compared with conventional arms. According to the data of
the American press, 60 percent of the entire U.S. tactical nuclear arsenal
in Europe, which numbers more than 7,000 nuclear warheads, is now concen-
trated in the region of future reductions.9 In spite of this approximate
parity of the forces of NATO and the Warsa~ Pact now exists.lb Precisely
this made it possible to begin the process of political and military de-
tente on the European continent. -
The socialist states are not making it their goal to gain any one-sided
advantages during the future force and arms reductions. They are not seek-
ing.a change in their favor of the balance of forces, which exists in this
region. The Soviet Union sees the goal of future reductions in that reduc-
tion of the present concentration of troops and arms, which is excessive
for peace time, in case of which the established balance of forces would
not change in favor of one side or the other, while the situation in the
_enter of Europe would become more stable. "Historically it has turned
out," General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Breahnev emphasized, "that enor-
mous numbers of treops and arms of the two military political blocs haye
been concentrated here against each other. Different in structure, the
forces of each side as a whole are approximately equal to each other. Such
- a military balance has existed in Europe for several decades now. But ehe
enormous build-up of armies and arms is dangerous in itself. It will be
much easier to form peaceful ties, if this build-up is reduced on both
- sides, without upsetting the established balance of forces. We are trying
to achieve precisely this at Vienna."11
~ Consistently supporting a reduction of the level of the military balance
in Central Europe, which would not upset it in favor of anyone and would
not endanger the security of anyone, the S~viet Union, unlike the NATO
countries, for a long time has not increased its ariaed forces in Central ~
Europe and does not intend henceforth to increase them either by one
soldfer or by one tank.12 Moreover, the Soviet Union, in trying to create
an additional stimulus for the talks, has already begun the reduction of
the level of military confrontation in the center of Europe: in conformity
with the decision announced by L. I. Brezhnev on 6 October 1979 in his
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speech in Berlin, on S December 1979 the USSR began the unl.lateral with-
drawal of 20,000 of its servicemen, 1,000 tanks and a certain amount of _
other military equipment from the GDR (its territory is inclu,ded in the
region which is being discussed in Vienna). Thus, the position of the so-
cialist states at the Vienna talks both in its essence and in its individ-
ua1 elements is characterized by the consideration of the existing situa-
tion and clearly demonstrates the lack of discrepancy between the goals, -
~ which were official declared at the talks, and the actual intentions.
In the position of the NATO countries at the Vienna talks the contradictori-
ness, which is displayed both in its very essence and in the specific de-
tails, attracts attention. For many years leading NATO figur~s, including
the former secretaries of defense of the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon admin-
istrations-~R. McNamara, W. Rogers and J. Schlesinger--admitted that ap-
proximate parity existed between the military groupings in Central Europe.
In the annual report to Congress in 1974, that is, when the talks in Vienna
were already under way, Schlesinger admitted that an approximate balance
existed between the available forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the
_ central region of Europe.13 Basing themselves on such an appraisal of the
balance of forces, the representatives of the NATO countries have more than
once come to the conclusion that the existing balance of forces provides
the Wect European coantries with an adequate level of security. The offi-
cial organ of NATO Headquarters declared before the start of the prelimi-
nary consultations: A simple list of facts confirn?s that since the signing
of the North Atlantic Treaty the membexs of the alliance on the whole and
its West European members in particular have had and as before have genuine
security, which is therefore acceptable. The problem, which arises on the
practical plane, consequently consists in assuring a situation in which the
MBRF will not lead to a decrease of this adequate level of Western secur-
ity."14 .
Iiaving come to the talks in Vienna, as the West German magazine EUROPA-
AR.CHIV wrote, with a quite definite goal--"to change the existing balanl5__
of armed forces in Central Europe,... and not to maintain this balance
the western countries in fact disawoved their official appraisal of the bal-
ance of forces in this region.16 The balance of military �orces, according
to their new approach, should be determined according to the ratio of the
personnel of the land forces of both sides on the basis that this branch of
the armed forces ostensibly plays the main role under the c~nc'.itions of
Central Europe. Here the NATO countries assert, basing thzu~selves on arbi-
trary data on the size of the land forces of the Warsaw Pact countries in
this region, that the latter as if have considerably more personnel in their
land forces. Consequently, they state, in this case there are "serious dis-
propartions," which are a"destabilizing factor," and, consequently, there
is no balance of forces of both military groupings as a whole.
The artificial nature of this assessment is obvious. It is now an utter
anachronism to determine combat effectiveness by "the number of bayonets."
Under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution the role of
modern weapon systems has increased sharply. Former U.S. Secretaxy of
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Defense McNamara said in this connection that "comparisons only according
to the number of personnel cannot serve as the decisive criterion for meas-
uring military strength."17 Hence it follows that it is illegitimate to
assess the balance of forces only according to one branch of the armed
forces--land forces. It is inadmissible to proceed only from the nu�*ber of
~ servicemen, while knowing that in the same region both sides also have
other branches of the armed forces--mighty air forces and nuclear weapons.
The experience of the latest wars, including in the Near East, confirms
that military operations under pr~sent conditions are inconceivable without
the close cooperation of all ~ranches, arn?s and services. Pioreover, the
different type of structures of the land forces of the NATO and Warsaw Pact
countries in itself cannot give an objective idea about their real rela-
tive strength. The point of the concept "disproportion," which is being
advanced by western countries, is to change the existing balance of forces
in cheir favor and to achieve military advantages at the expense of the
security of the socialist states.
~ Militarists in the United States are using even the very fact of the talks
on mutual force and arms reduction in Central Europe as grounds for raising
demands about the further increase and improvement of the American military
potential. "The Vienna talks," states J. Polk, wh~ has close ties with the
military-industrial complex, "require that we modernize our equipment, our
thinking and tactical alternatives, whici~ are available and required at the
lowest level of the nuclear spectrum."18 "The idea of reaching an under-
standing on r.eductions during the talks should be combined with the compen-
satory strengthening of the Fotential," American political scientist R.
Wesson echoes him.19 The practical actions of the United States also attest
to the aspiration to change in its favor the balance of forces, which has
formed in Europe. Whereas the Soviet Union during the Vienna talks did not
increase i~~ armed forces in Central Europe, the number of U.S. troops, ac-
cording to American data, increased by 17,900 in 1977 and another 16,900 in
1978.20
In this lies the main contradiction in the approach of the NATO countries
to the talks: it is impossible to seek a replay of the established balance
of forces in their favor and at the same time to pretend that they are not
_ attempting to obtain one-sided military advantages and are adhering to the '
principles which were agreed on at the preliminary consultations. It is
possible to overcome this contradiction only on the condition that the NATO
countries renounce their one-sided goals and groundless attempts to change
the existing balance of forces in Central Europe during the reduction. Soon
after the start of the Vienna talks the Stockholm International Peace Re-
search Institute (SIPRI) indicated: "A certain military balance already ex-
- ists in Europe, and the present talks, instead of ~eopardizing this balance,
should be aimed at its maintenance, although at lower levels of arms and
with fewer expenditures. The maintenance of this balan~e probably is im-
portant for the successful outcome of any talks between the NATO and Warsaw
Pact countries on mutual force and arms reduction in Europe."21
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By attaching grea[ importance to the elaboration of ineasures on force and
arms reduction in Central Europe, which would make it possible to augment
political detente on the continent with military detente, the Soviet Union
along with the other socialist countries has sought from the very start to
lend a business-like, specific nature to the talks in Vienna and thereby to
expedite the achievement of a mutually acceptable understanding. Guided by
the line agreed on at the Prague session of the Political Advisory Commit-
tee of the Warsaw Pact Member Countries in January 1972, the delegations of
the GDR, Poland, the USSR and Czechoslovakia introduced at the talks on ~
8 November 1973 a draft of the corresponding agreement.22 It contained a
detailed program of specific steps, the implementation of which would make F
it possible to reduce on the basis of reciprocity the high concentration of
= opposing troops of both military groups in this region and to ensure the
- security of the sides with Iower levels of armed forces and arms and fewer
military expenditures. This draft received a high rating even on tha part
of western specialists. Its "most logical consistency," in particular, was
noted.23
The plan submitted by the socialist stat~s fully accorded with the prin-
ciple of not endangering the security of any of the parties on the basis of
the strict observance of reciprocity and the equality of the specific com-
mitments, which the parties would assume as a whole and at the individual
- stages of reduction. The socialist states did not demand of the western
countries the assumption of any comanitments which they themselves are not
willing to assume. It was proposed to place at the basi~ of future reduc-
tions the method of reduction in equal number and equal percentage, which
covers all the components of the arms forces and arms, namely the land
forces and air forces, as well as t:~e units and subunits equipped with nu-
clear weapons. During the first year (1975) the armed forces of both sides
would be subject to a reduction by 20,000 men with the corresponding arms
and combat materiel, and the size of the reductions of each state would be
determined in pro*,ortion to the number of troops, which it has in Central
Europe. During the second year (1976) each of the nations participating in
the future agreement would reduce its armed forces and arms by 5 percent
and during the third year (1977) by another 10 percent. It was p�roposed
to implement the reduction on the basis of the agproximate similarity and
uniformity of the combined units, units and subunits being reduced, as well '
as the arms and combat materiel, with proper consideration of the differ-
ences in the structure of the formations, the number of personnel and the
combat materiel, which are available in the combined units and units of the
parties to the future agreement. Taking into account that the troops of
some of them are on their own territory, while the troops of others are on
the territory of their allies, the draft stipulated that the units and com-
bined units of. foreign troops being reduced along with their arms would be
withdrawn to within the boundaries of their states. The national troops _
subject to reduction should be disbandEd with the simultaneous demobiliza-
tion of the personnel. After the start of the reduction the states par-
ticipating in the agreement should not increase the number of their troops
in the region of the reductions.
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~
On ,s practical l~vel the reduction of the armed forces and arms of both
si.:ies in all by approximately 17 percent would mean that the total concen-
t~cation of troops and arms in Central Europe would be reduced with the main-
te,lance of the balance of forces existing here and the observance of the
princinle of not endangering the security of any of the parties. Such a
reduction would undoubtedly be an important contribution to the cause of
military detente in Europe and would impose certain restrictions on the
arms race.
However, the NATO countries took a different position. Their "Outline of
Proposals," which was introduced at the talks on 22 November 1973,24 dif-
fered sharply from the goals and principles they had agreed on. Citing the
ostensibly existing "disproportions" in the number of personnel of the land
forces and tanks of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe, which as i�
serves as the main "source of instability" in Europe, the NATO countries
insisted that the elimination of these "disproportions" become the goal of
the talks. They gave as the reason for their position the fact that reduc-
tions on a proportionate basis (that is, in equal number and equal percent-
sge) would only a~gravate the balance in land forces, which was unfavorable
to NATO, and would not lead as a resu].t to the establishment of approximate -
parity between the land forces of both sides. At the very start of the
Vienna talks the West stated that only land forces, and not air forces and
nuclear weapons, should be subject to reduction. Here the NATO countries
raised the issue that the socialist states should reduce three times as -
many personnel of their land forces along with arms (the West refused to
reduce the arms in its land forces).
The understanding on the reduction of land forces, according to the initial
western outline, should be worked out during two phases of the talks, at
. ~ach of which a separate agreement should be concluded. The connection be-
_ tween the two phases was established by the inclusion in the agreement for
the fir~t of th~m of a clause on the intention of the parties to achieve as
_ a result of the second phase "equal" collective ceilings of the number of
land forces. At the first phase the land forces of only the USSR and the �
United States c~ould be subject to reduction. Here it was proposed to the
Soviet Union to withdraw 2.5-fold more of its troops than the UnitEd
Sta.tes--an entire tank army. At the same time, as compensation for the
"geographic disproportion," that is, the greater distance from Central Eur-
ope as compared with the Soviet Union, the United States would receive the
right to withdraw 29,000 servicemen on an individual basis or in small sub-
units and to store the heavy arms and combat materiel, which were thus re-
leased, in the region of the reduction. After the conclusion of the first
- phase and only on the condition that the West European countries considered
its results satisfactory, should the second phase of the talks be started,
at which the reduction primarily of the land forces of the other immediate
participants in the talks would be discussed.
Some NATO theorists explained this pos~Cion by the fact that since the bal-
ance of forces in Central Europe is determined by the number of land forces
and tanks, the examination of other branches of the armed forces would be
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inadvisable, since this would complicate the already difficult talks. l3ut _
such an explanation does not hold water. The absolutization of any one
branch of the armed forces and especially its individual components cannot
be jus~ified under conditions when the combat strength of troops is deter-
mined by the close cooperation of 111 the branches of the armed forces,
arms and combat materiel. This also fully pertains to tanks. Moreover,
when assessing the arms of the sides one must also take into account those
types which, like tanlcs, for example, are stored at the depots of the
American army in the FRG for the units of "dual basing," as well as in the
re^erve of the Bundeswehr. It is clear that, by excluding arms and combat
materiel, as well as the air force from future reductions, to say nothing
of nuclear weapons, the United States and its allies were trying to reserve
for themselves freedom of actions for the further increase of the combat
strength of the air force and the improvement of their tactical nuclear
potential in Central Europe. Thus, the "asy~nmetrical" reduction proposed
by the West, that is, a reduction unequal in terms of the number of person-
nel and arms, and its different deadlines for the imanediate participants in
the talks contradicted the principle of not endangering the security of any
of the parties and was a serious obstacle to the achievement of a universal-
ly acceptable understanding.
The USSR and the other socialist states subjected the western outline and -
the tactical line of the NATO countries at the talks to well-reasoned criti-
cism. They convincingly showed the flaws of the concept of "dispropor-
tions." It was emphasized that its real point is to achieve a change of the
~ established balance of forces in Central Europe in favor of NATO by means
of unequal commitments and the "asymmetrical" reduction of the land forces
of the Warsaw Pact countries. Insisting that all types of armed forces and
arms would be covered by the reductions~ the socialist states cited numerous
arguments which show that only on this condition would it be possible in
fact to reduce the high concentration of armed forces and arms in this re-
gion and to prevent the possibility of their build-up. _
- In supporting a just solution of the problem of force and arms reduction,
the socialist countries called upon the participants in the talks on the
part of the West to assume firm and unambiguous commitments to carry out
on the dates,, which were strictly agreed upon, the reduction of the ar�ned
forces and arms, which they have in Central Europe. Consistently support-
ing the simultaneous reduction of both foreign and nationa3. armed forces and
arms, they have proceeded from the fact that the achievement of military
detente is the common cause of the immediate participants in the talks.
_ The granting of the right to ~the immediate participants to make decisions
on the basis of consensus at the preliminary consultations imposes upon them
the duty to directly participate in the mutual f~rce and arms reduction.
The significance of the achieved understanding consists precisely in this.
J.n criticizing the thesis advanced by the United States that the reduction
~ of American and Soviet troops in Central Europe is only their redeployment
within the boundaries of these states, while for those West European coun-
tries, including the FRG, whose territory is included in this region, a
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reduction essentially means partial disarmament, in ccnnection with which
they can begin the reduction of troops enly after the completion of the re-
ductions of the land forces uf the United States and the USSR, the socialist
countries cited the appropriate examples which show that the NATO countries
knew about the differences in the procedure of the reduction of foreign and
national armed forces wtien they consented t~ participate in the talks. l~or
a number o� years not vnly Che different status of tl~e armed forces oF tiie
participants in the talks with respect to the region in which they were de-
ployed, but also the fact that in case of a reduction the foreign troops
~ should be withdrawn from Central Europe, while the nazional troops should -
be disbanded, were taken into account in the studies of the NATO countries.
Moreover, they knew that not only the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands and
Luxembourg, but also the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia would disband the
armed forces being reduced. Thus, the arguments in favor of granting some
special rights to the West European states located in Central Europe are
unfounded.
In connection with the attempts of the United States and other western
countries to exaggerate the significance of the "geographic factor," that
is, the unequal distance of the USSR and the United States from the center
of the European continent, and an this basis to demand the "asymmetrical"
reductions of Soviet troops, the socialist states showed that this factor
was constantly taken into account by the sides when arranging their armed
forces in this region and developing means of transportation. The United
States is offsetting its distance from Europe by developing means of long-
distance rapid troop and arms deployment. Moreover, it has in Europe, otit-
5i~le itti central region, an extensive network of military bases, at whicl~
arms and combat materiel are located. If we examine the "geographic factor"
Crom the point of view of the mobilization capabilities of the sides, as the
tvATO countries do, in this case it is illegitimate to take only it into ac- -
count, while ignoring other important factors, including the size of the
population of the countries, their military and economic potential, the
system of communications and the defense expenditures of both military al-
liances.
The constructive proposals, the firm fundamental position of the socialist
states at the talks and the well-reasoned criticism by them of the approach
of the western states in the problem being examined at them forced the NATO
countries to make some adjustments in their position. On 16 December 1975
they expressed the willingness to reduce a portion of the U.S. nuclear po-
tential in Central Europe: 1,000 nuclear warheads, as well.as 36 Pershing
launchers and 54 F-4 carrier aircraft.25 On its part, however, it was
stated that the proposed measure was of a"one-time" nature and did not
provide for any further steps in this direction. The western participants
in the talks also emphasized that the nuclear weapon deliverj~ systems,
with which the other direct western participants were equipped, would not
be subject to reduction. The remaining provisions of the ~*estern plan re-
mained unchanged.
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In spite of the narrowness of the western proposals, for the purposes of
.ichieving ,1 comprc~mise on 19 Fehruary 1976 the socialist qt~tes met the
western countries halfway.26 Consent was given to divide the process of
force and arms reduction in Central Europe into the two phases. In the
first phase the armed forces of only the USSR and the United State3 would
be reduced~-by approximately 2-3 percent of the total number of troops of
the Warsaw Pact and NATO in Central Europe. The types of weapons, which -
were proposed by the West: nuclear k*arheads and some of their delivery sys-
. tems and tanks, would also be reduced on an equal basis. The other direct
participants of the talks should "freeze" the number of their troops at the
existing level and reduce them in the second phase, so that as a result all _
the states, which are a party to the ~~greement, would reduce their armed
forced by an equal percentage, as the socialist countries proposed at the
very start, namely by approximately 17 percent.
The western countries refused to take the proposals of the socialist states
as a basis. They attempted in every possible way to evade the discussion
of the main issues and in fact directed the matter toward the dragging out
of the talks. And only on 19 April 1978 did the West make some refinements
- in its init:Cal outline of the reductions, which do not change, however,
its sense and direction.27 The demand on the withdrawal of an entire tank
army of the USSR was "substituted" for the conditton of the reduction of
five Soviet divisions and 1,700 tanks (in exchange for 1,000 American nu-
clear warheads and the number of their delivery systems, which the NATO
countries mentioned in December 1975). The deadlines and the total amounts
of the reductions of the land forces of the West European countries and E
Canada were included in the agreement on the first phase (and as before it
was not indicated by how many each of these states individual would reduc2,
whether this reduction would be carried out by military units or on a se-
lective basis and so on); with respect to the United States it was indi-
cated tha~ it was withdrawing two-thirds of its troops in units and subunits.
Although the proposals made by the West to some extent took into account
the considerations of the socialist countries, the western approach con-
tinues to preserve its former nature and is clearly aimed at obtaining mil-
itary advantages to the detriment of the security of the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries. The western side, as before, is attempting to achieve the accomp-
lishment of significantly greater reductions of the land forces of the
socialist countries. It is conditioning the changes, which it made in the
initial outline of reductions, on the achievement by the participants in
the talks of an understanding on the number of troops of both sides in
Central Europe, that is, in fact the agreement of socialist countries with
- the estimate, which was overstated by the West, of the number of their
troops in this region. As before, the West refused to discuss the question
of reducing arms, apart from the above-indicated number of Soviet tanks and
American nuclear weapons.
For the purpose of stepping up the talks, on 8 Jun~ 1978 the USSR, the GDR,
' Poland and Czechoslovakia advanced new important proposals, wrich took into
account in a constructive spirit t~e essential elements of the western
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approach to the problem in question.28 In these proposals there is ex-
pressed the willingness to establish as a result of the reductions equal
collective levels of the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the
center of the European continent--900,000 men each, including 700,000 men
each for land forces. Provision is made here for such conditions which
would not enable any of the parties to the agreement, on the pretext of
"maintaining the overall ceilings," to restore and, what is more, to in-
crease the number of troops which they had before the reduction. So that
it would be truly equal, the troops of all the direct participants in the
talks should be covered by the overall levels, and no individual limita-
tion on the number of USSR troops, which the West supports, should be set
within these general levels, or "ceilings." The USSR, the GDR, Poland and
Czechoslovakia expressed the willinoness to limit the reduction of the
size of the armed forces to land forces, if at the same time a maximum lev- -
el of the number of personnel of the air forces would simultaneously be
- set. Meeting the western countries halfway, the Soviet Union, in particu-
lar, was willing to carry out the reduction of its troops in the first
phase by divisions with the simultaneous withdrawal of American troops from -
Central Europe by brigades. In the first phase provision is made to carry
out the reduction of troops of the USSR and the United States in proportion
to their present number in :his region. The proposals of 8 June 1978 also
take into account a number of other elements of the western position.
The particular significance of these proposals consists in the fact that
they retain those elements of the approach of the socialist countries, with-
out which a truly effective force and arms reduction in the center of Europe
cannot be ensured with the maintenance of the balance of forces, which has
been established here. Among them there is first of all the recognition of >
the fact of an approximately equal ratio of the size of the armed forces of
?vATO and the Warsaw Pact in this region: the assumption of specific commit-
ments by the immediate participwnts in the talks on reducing their troops
and arms approximately in proportion to the levels of their military poten-
tials in the second phase; the need for all the immediate participants in
the talks to take part in the force reductions. While agreeing to the
establishmeat of collective levels, the socialist countries envisage a
mechanism of their maintenance and operation, which, first of all, rules out
the assumption of any "special" commitments by the Soviet Union and, second,
does not enable the individual states to exceed the level of the number of
their troops, which existed before the reduction. Without this it would be
impossible to speak about the effectiveness of reductions and fulfillment
of the main principles of the talks, first of all the principle of not en-
- dangering the security of any of the parties.
Characterizing the new proposals of the socialist countries, L. I. Brezhnev
stated on 25'June 1978: "The socialist countries are offering their partners
a reasonable, realistic compromise. Having made their proposals, they have
gone even farther than halfway. We appeal to the NATO countries: let us
at last get down to business. A basis for agreement undoubtedly already
exists. Everything now depends on the political will of the West."29 TY~e
proposals of the Warsaw Pact countries creates a practicable basis for
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.
elaborating the principles of the future agreement on force and arms re-
duction in Central Europe. It is not by chance that leading figares of the
United States, England and the FRG were forced to emphasize the construc-
tive nature of the approach of the socialist countries to the talks. U.S. _
President J. Carter characterized the proposals of the socialist countries
as "a very concrete step in the necessary direction." FRG Chancellor H.
Schmidt called these proposals "a major basis for achieving the goal of
the Vienna talks."30
AEtcr the proposals ot 8 June 1978 were made by the socialist countries, -
the group of controversial issues at the talks was narrowed considerably.
Now on the whole there is a mutual understanding concerning the fact that
the reductions will be carried out in two phases, and the USSR and the
United States will be the first to undertake them, the establishment of
equal collective levels of the number of troops of NATO and the Warsaw Pact
in the center of Europe will be their result, only the land forces will be
subject to reduction, the reduction of Soviet and American troops in the
first phase will be carried out in proportion to their number of Central
Europe. An understanding has also been reached on a number of other is-
sues. It would seem that the western participants in the talks will at
last display political will and perhaps will undertake the direct elabora-
tion of the appropriate understandings. However, the NATO countries have
dragged out for a year and a half the official response to the proposals of
the socialist countries, placing in the forefront issues of a secondary na-
ture. The West is artificially putting in first place, for example, the
question of the number of troops of the immediate participants in the talks
in Central Europe.
_ In spite of the fact that the official data, which are provided by the
Parties, on the size of their armed forces in C~ntral Europe as of 1 Janu-~
ary 1976 convinc3ngly attest to the approximately equality of the troops
of the socialist and western states, the delegations of the NATO countries
as before are disputing the data on the troops of the socialist countries
~ and are stubbornly sticking to their estimates, in conformity with which a
disproportion in land forc~s in favor of the Warsaw Pact states in the
amount of 180,000 men, including 150,000 more in land forc~s, ostensibly
exists.31 It is quite obvious that it is simply impossible to conceal such
a mass of troops. And the discussion during the talks of the numerical
- data on the number of troops of the countries taking a direct pa~rt in the
talks quite obviously showed that the NATO countries cannot cite any facts
or arguments, which support their estimates.
Hoping to find a solution to the situation which had formed, the socialist
countries invited the western side to expound its methodology of calculating
the number of troops, in order to establish by joint efforts the source of
its overestimation of the size of the land forces of the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries, especially as different criteria of the cal~ulation by NATO countries
of the size of the land forces and air forces in the armies of the NATO and
Warsaw Pact countries were detected back in 1975. For these purposes it
was proposed to exchange data on the degree of full strength of the
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~ forces of the individual states in Centrai Europe.32 However, in response
the NATO countries demanded the rejection of the above-cited real figure of
the size of the land forces of the Warsaw Pact countries and a~reement with
~lu~ .ir. b.t c rary NA'PO est ~maCe, moreover, the West is trying lo uchlev~ Ll~c
replacement of the discussion of the number of troops with the examination
of the organizational structure of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact
countries, which has nothing in common with the agreed goals of the talks. ~
- Judging from comm2ntaries of the western press, the question of figures is
being placed by the NATO countries on such a level in order to complicate
the working out of an understanding and to impose on the socialist coun-
tries conditions of the reduction, which would provide the West with one-
sided military advantages.
In characterizing the situation which was forming at the Vienna talks, L. I.
Brezhnev noted that they "have bogged down in disputes concerning the meth-
ods of calculating the personnel of t'tie armed forces of the parties--down
to the last cook and medic. Frankly, this is simply a tactic of the western
countries, an attempt to evade an understanding precisely when the posi-
tions of the partiFS on the essence of the matter have drawn considerably
closer. In the end it is a fact that an overall military balance exists in
Europe, even if the structur~ of the armed forces of each side has its own
differences. We must proceed from this fact."33 This is obvious to any
sensible politician. The leading disarmament expert of the FRC Bundestag,
A. (Pavelchik), reasonably advises "to put an end to the 'numbers game' and
to set down to serious work: to reduce the level of military confrontation
in the center of our continent on the basis of the established balance of -
power and to work out criteria of equal security."34
The so-called question of commitments of the immediate participants in the
talks remains another problem whic.'n is impeding the progress of the talks.
Since the very start the West has been stubbornly pursuing a policy of
artificially dividing them into t~vo groups: on the one hand, the USSR and
the United States, which should have assumed the commitments which were
worked out in detail during the talks, and, on the other, the remaining
countries, whose specific commitments on farce reduction should ostensibly
be assumed within the corresponding alliances. In fact this means that the
West is willing to discuss only the problem of withdrawing American troops
from Central Europe, while the question of ~educing the main component of
~ the military potential of NAT035 is to be solved at its own discretion in
conformity with its plans and programs. Precisely for this reason the
West European countries and Canada so far have refused to assume any indi-
vidual commitments and oppose the reduction of their troops by military
foxmations and the reduction of arms. This approach contradicts first of
all the principle of reciprocity of the assumed commitments, as well as the
principle of not endangering the security of any of the parties.
It is true that in December 1978 the NATO countries stated their willing-
ness to make some modifications in their position on the question of the
assumption of individual commitments by the western immediate participants
in the talks on the reduction of their troops, having proposed to include
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in the agreement for the first phase a reference to the f.act that these
countries would make "a significant contribut:ton" to the overall western
reduetions in the second phase, as well as to inform the socialist states
- prior to signing the agreement on the first phase of the decision which
would be made in NATO with respect to the specific extents of the reductions
of the troops of the individual countries.36 However, this step tnade no
changes in the position of the West, since the West European countr~es and _
Canada as before refuse to assume within the framework of the agreement
commitments on the reduction of their troops in proportion to their number
in Central Europe.
An exchange of opinions on the state of affairs at the ta~ks with respect
to the mutual force and arms reduction in Central Europe was made during
the Soviet-American summit meeting which was held in Vienna in June 1979.
The parties emphasized that the solution of this problem would be a ma3or
contribution to the strengthening of stability and security. They came out
in favor of taking new steps which would lead to the successful conclusion
of the talks in the area of arms limitation and disarmament.3~
Only 10 days had passed since the signing of the joint Soviet-American com-
munique, when the Soviet Union along with the GDR, Poland and Czechoslo-
vakia introduced a new compromise proposal at the Vienna talks. It ensures
the convergence of the positions of the countries participating in the
talks on the important question concerning the nature of the commitments of
the states on reducing the land forces in the center of the European conti-
nent. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, taking into ac-
count the unwillingness of the West European states and Canada to assume
individual treaty commitments on the specific extents of the reductions of
their land forces, in the new proposal expressed the willingness to agree
;:hat the individual contributions of all the states taking a direct part in
the overall reduction of troops would not be set down in the agreement on
- the first phase. The specific extent ~f the reduction in conformity with
the initiative of the socialist countries of 28 June 1979 will be determined
by each state individually within the alliance to which this state belongs,
and will be approximately proportion to the total number of its troops in -
the region of the reduction. The socialist states also accepted the wish of
the western side that the number of troops being reduced by the USSR and the
United States in the first phase would be the greater part of their total
contributions to the reductions which they would carry out during both
phases. At the same time, all the provisions, which are contained in the
document of the socialist countries of 8 June 1978 and are not affected by
the proposal of ~8 June 1979, continue to remain in force.
Thus, the new initiative of the socialist countries, which was advanced
with allowance made for the point of view of the western countries, once~
agai.n clearly confirms the genuine aspiration of the socialist countries
to achieve progress at the talks and to lend them a more dynamic nature.
, Under conditions when specific agreements on mutual force and arms reduc-
- tion do no exist, the socialist countries attach great importance to the
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taking of at least partial steps which are aimed at the checking of their
increase. Precisely for these purposes they advanced back in December 1974
the proposal to freeze the number of troops of the NATO and Warsaw Pact
~ countries in the center of Europe ~~ir.ing the conducting of the talks.38
On 30 November 1978 the delegations of socialist countries introduced sup-
plements to this proposa1,39 which provide that the commitment against an
increase would pertain to the total size of the armed forced of each of
the sides and can be drawn up as two parallel declarations--of the Warsaw
Pact countries, on the onE hand, and the NATO countries, on the other. The
desire of the West for a collective method of maintaining the overall level
of troops within each military alliance was taken into account in this pro-
posal. At the same time its implementation would not harm the positions
of the sides, since it would have the nature of a temporary measure which
would create, however, an atmosphere of trust and thereby promote progress
at the talks.
Under present conditlons, when the official data submitted in 1976 con-
firmed the existence in Central Europe of approximate parity in the armed
forces of both sides, such a step is especially urgent and easy to imple-
ment. At the same time it would promote the strengthening of stability in
the center of Europe and would attest to the sincerity of the intentions of
the participants in the talks to make their contribution to the cause of
limiting the process of the build-up of armed forces and strengthening
peace and security in Europe. Sober-minded figures in the West realize
this. Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee F. Church
declared while speaking at the University of Utah in December 1978: "What
convincing arguments, for example, can be opposed to the suggestion to
freeze the armed forces of the countries par~t~icipating in the Vienna talks
on force and arms reduction in Central Europe for the period when these
~alks are being condu~ted? None. Back in June 1978 the socialist coun-
tries presented in Vienna detailed proposals which were aimed at bringing _
the views of the parties closer and called for the creation of a basis for
quick practical results. Many government and political figures in the
West were forced to recognize the constructive nature of these proposals.
But where is the response? Nothing followed except vague promises to draft
it. Meanwhile the tone of western commentaries on the essence of the June
initiative of the socialist countries is changing for the worse."40
Without responding to the set of compromise initiatives of the socialist
states, which were advanced in 1978-1979 and which create the conditions
for a breakthrough at the talks, the NATO countries have been undertaking
steps which are clearly aimed at stepping up the arms race and aggravating
the international situation. The adoption of long-term (up to the 1990's)
military programs for the modernization of their armed forces, the results
of the December (1979) session of the NATO Council, at which the United
States in fact imposed upon its allies the decision to deploy new American
intermediate-range nuclear missile systems in a number of West European
countries, the latest January speeches of J. Carter--all this attests that
the United States with the support of its allies in the North Atlantic bloc,
first of all England and the FRG, intends to take an even harder line in =
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building up in Europe the American military potential and the armed forces
of NATO in general.
In light of this aspiration to achieve at any price one-sided military ad-
vantages over the Warsaw Pact countries tt~e internal logic of the position
of the western participants in the Vienna talks, at which they are hamper-
ing in every possible way the achievement of practical understandings, be-
comes clear, for the latter would be a restraining factor in the implementa-
tion of the plans of their military preparations. The latest proposals of
the western countries of 20 December 1979,41 in which they not only did not
_ respond to the constructive proposals of the socialists states, but even
made a significant step backward from the position which they held just a
year ago, are also subordinate to this goal. Whereas earlier the western
countries, apart from the United States, were will{_ig to give guarantees,
be they even of a general nature, that during the agreed period they all
would reduce the number of their troops in the second phase, now, by with-
drawing these guarantees, the West is unambiguously demonstrating its as-
piration to withdraw from tY:e reduction six of the seven immediate western
participants, whose troops constitute 75 percent of the total combat poten-
tial of NATO in the center of Europe.
The aspiration of certain West European states in essence to evade the re-
duction of their armed forces is also attested by the fact that in the new
proposals they refuse even to limit the number of their troops during the
implementation of the Soviet-American reductions in the first phase. Hav-
ing withdrawn their old proposal on the reduction of a certain number of
American nuclear weapons, the NATO countries have cut Che ground from under
another element of mutual understanding, namely the idea of reducing arms
and combat materiel on a selective basis. Moreover, the West is making the
conclusion of the first agreement on Soviet-American reductions conditional
upon the adoption by the socialist countries of a comprehensive system of
so-called attendant measures. These measures, which do not have the slight-
est bearing on the agreed goals and the region of reduction, are aimed at
establishing strict control over the activity of the armed forces of the
Warsaw Pact countries not only in the region specified in the communique
of the consultations, but also on the territory of Bulgaria, Hungary and
Romania, as well as of Soviet troops on a considerable portion of the ter-
ritory of the USSR. From this it quite obviously follows that in the
western proposals of December 1979 little is left of the compromise. On
the contrary, they are in essence bringing the Vienna talks to an impasse.
The socialist countries, however, will henceforth hold to the understand-
ings and principles, which were agreed upon at the preliminary consulta-
tions, and wi~l not allow the Vienna talks to be turned into a tool for
the achievement by anyone of one-sided military advantages to the detriment
of the security of the other participants in these talks. A basis for the
achievement of understandings exists, and whether it will be taken advan-
tage of depends on the realism and political will of the West. No threats
and political blackmail will be able to sway the Leninist foreign policy
line of our country, which combines consistent peaceableness with the firm
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repulsion of aggression. As L. I. Brezhnev noted in his responses to the
questions of a PRAVDA correspondent, this cours~ "proved its value in past
decades, we will follow it henceforth. No one will put us off this
course."42
- FOOTNOTES
1. The Vienna talks have been covered quite extensively in the press. In
the literature an entire set of questions pertaining to these talks is
examined in general form in the book: V. Basmanov, "Za voyennuyu raz-
ryadku v Tsentral'noy Xevrope" /For Military Detente in Central Eur-
- ope/, Moscow, 1978; see also A. Sandstrom, "Prospects of Mutual Force
Reduction in Europe," Stockholm, 1976; T. Fifka, "Windenska jednani
(1937-1977)," Prague, 1978.
2. "Sovetskiy Soyuz v bor'be za razoruzheniye" /The Soviet Union in the
Struggle for Disarmament/, a collection of documents, Moscow, 1977,
PP 73-75.
_ 3. Ibid., p 94.
4. "Foreign Policy Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of
the United States," White House, Press-itelease, 1972, p 49.
5. "The American Commitment to NATO, Report of the Special Subcoimnittee on
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Commitments of the Co~nittee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session,
~,ugust 19, 1972," Washington, 1972, p 74986.
Fi. EUROPA-ARCHIV, I~sue 15, 1974.
7. NATO REVIEW, No�1, 1973, p 7.
8. Ibid., p 76.
9. "Annual Defense Department Report FY 1979," Washington, 1978, p 130.
10. This approximate equality of the forces of the two opposing military
groupings in Central Europe is based not only on expert estimates of
_ the overall balance of forces in the strategically crucial region of
Europe, but is also confirmed by the official data on the number of
personnel of the armed forces, which the participants in the Vienna
talks exchan.ged in 1976. According to these data, the total number of
armed forces of the Warsaw Pact in the region of the reduction is
987,300 men, including 805,000 men in the land forces; NATO--respec-
tively 981,000 and 791,000 men (see V. Basmanov, Op. cit., p 71).
11. PRAVDA, 16 January 1979.
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12. See L. I. Brezhnev, "Speech at the 18th Komsomol Congress on 25 April .
1978," PRAVDA, 26 April 1978; A. A. Gromyko, "Speech at the Special
Session of the UN General Assembly on 26 May 1978," PRAVDA, 27 May
1978.
13. "Annual Defense Department Report FY 1975," "Press-Release," Washing- ~
ton, 1974, p 88.
i
r
14. NATO REVIEW, No 17, 1973, p 5. MBFR--mutual and balanced force redu~- ~
- tion--is a term used by NATO in official materials and studies. ~
15. EUROPA-ARCHIV, Issue 15, 1974. '
16. But after this admissions of the existence of approximate military .
equality in Europe were heard more than once in the West. This is at-
tested, in particular, by a study of prominent American figures, in-
cluding current Secretary of State C. Vance, which contains the con-
clusian that "at present there is approximate military equilibrium in
Central Europe" ("Controlling the Conventional Arms Race," "UNA-USA
National Policy Panel," New York, 1976, p 31).
17. "Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on FY 1969-1973. ~
Defense Program and the 1969 Defense Budget," ~Jashington, 1968, p 80.
18. J. Polk, "The Realities of Tactical Nuclear Warfare," OFtBIS, No 17, ~
Sur~mer 1973, p 447.
19. R. Wesson, "Foreign Policy for a New Age," Boston, 1977, p 59.
20. PRAVDA, 26 January 1979.
21. "Force Reductior.3 in Europe," A SIPRI Monograph, Stockholm, 1974, p 68. ,
V. Basmanov, Op. cit., pp 50-51.
23. EUROPA-ARCHIV, Issue 15, 1974.
24. V. Komlev, "Around the Vienna Talks," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEO- ,
LOGIYA, No 7, 1974, pp 45-48.
25. ATLANTIC NEWS, 19 December 1975. ~
26. V. Komlev, "Four Years of the Vienna Talks," MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, No 11, 1977, p 115.
27. V. Basmanov, Qp. cit., pp 122-124. ,
28. PRAVDA, 27 June 1978.
29. PRAVDA, 26 June 1978.
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30. PRAVDA, 11 December 1978.
31. PRAVDA, 26 June 1979.
32. V. Basmanov, Op. cit., p 71. ~
33. PRAVDA, 3 March 1979.
34. PRAVDA, 11 December 1978.
35. About 50 percent of the number of NATO armed forces in Central Europe
ie made up of troops of the FRG, while the number of troops of the
West European states and Canada, which are immediate participants in
the talks, is equal to 75 percent of the number of all NATO troops in
this region (calculated according to "The Military Balance 1978-1979,"
London).
36. PRAVDA, 14 December 1978.
37. PRAVDA, 19 June 1979.
38. See V. V. Viktorov, A. V. Stoleshenikov, "The Vienna Talks: Two and a
Half Years Later," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 4, 1976,
p 34.
39. PRAVDA, 14 December 1978; 23 March 1979.
40. ZA RUBEZHOM, No 8, 1979.
41. PRAVDA, 22 December 1979.
42. PRAVDA, 13 January 1980.
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo PRAVDA, VOPROSY ISTORII, 1980
7807
CSO: 1800
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INTERNATIONAL
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F
K
}
INTERNATIONAL PROBES INTO HUMAN RIGHTS REJECTED
Moscow SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 91-99
[Article by Prof S. V. Chernichenko, doctor of juridical sciences:
"International Procedures and the Struggle Against Violations of Human
Rights"]
[Text] The adoption of the United Nations Charter established in modern
international Law the principle of respect f~r humar~ rights, reflecting
the states' acknowledgement of the necessity of conferring on individuals
a particular complex of vital rights and f reedoms and regulating inter-
national cooperation to promote the effective exercise of such rights.
However, international-legal regulation of inter-state cooperation i.n
thc ficld of hum~~n righrs has definite frameworks. Thcy are c~nditioned,
first of. alt, by social factors (cooperation between socialist and
capitalist states in the field of human rights has timits retating to
the differing social-economic structures of these states) and, secondty,
the fact that individuals cannot be participants in inter-state rela-
t.ions. This means that although international law recognizes certain
rights to be basic and essential for all people, they are conferred on ;
particular persons not by the international community as a whole but '
by the respective state. Because of objective laws governing social
development, consistent exercise of human rights is possible only
under socialism, which creates conditions for all-round development o�
the individual. The~23 November 1978 Declaration of states participating
in the Warsaw Pact asserts: 1"The banner of human rights and freedoms
is the banner of socialism." '
r
:
In the field of human rights, the ideological str>>ggle between socialism '
and capitalism is especially acute. On the one hand, we have here a `
collision of class-based opposing ideas about democracy (including ?
human.r.ights), and on the other this spher~ vi inter-state cooperation `
touches upon the internal competence of the stat~s. It is the
theme of 'concern' for human rights," emphasizes L. I. Brezhnev, "that
has been.chosen in recent times by leading representatives of the
capitalist world as the main thrust gf their ideological assault ;
against the countries of socialism."
i
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,
Oiie c~f thc~ mc~st imp~rr~nt dir~ctions In inter-St~le cc~operr~t ton in thr
field of human rights is the struggle against massive and gross viola-
- rions. A definitc role here is assigned to r-e?nvant international pro-
cedures. Mention must be made of'certain fundamental postulates3
affecting international cooperation with respect to human rights : a)
human rights and basic freedoms com~rise an aggregate of vital (that is,
essential to characterize the legal status of the individual) general ~
democratic rights and freedoms: general democratic in the sense that
conf.erring them does not touch upon the social-economic structure '
existing in the specific states; consequently, [he social content of '
such rights and the extent to which they are exercised in the various
states will differ depending on which historic type the states belong
to; b) according to the principle of respect for human rights, the
states are bound to confer such rights on persons located within the
bounds of their jurisdiction; but the specific content and volume of
the rights conferred by the states' internal legislation; c) massive
_ and gross violations of human rights (a particular political-legal ,
situation) constitute a violation of this obligation (the principle of
respect f.or human rights), entailing international-legal consequences,
whereas the question of liquida[ing individual, isolated violations of
the rights of specific persons relates to the internal competence of
the various states, because it does not require inter-state efforts
for resolution; d) human rights are indivisible and constitute a
unitary complex (in the sense that no right or freedom or group of ,
rights and freedoms can conflict with another right or freedom or
another group of rights and freedoms); e) the full exercise of the
whole complex of human rights and basic freedoms is possible only under
conditions of the consistent exercise of social-economic rights--which,
of course, does not diminish the significance of other categories of
rights and f.reedoms; f) the principle of respect for human rights
should be taken only in the context of other basic principles of inter-
national law and not conflict with them; g) inter-state cooperation in
the field of human rights is a component part of international coopera-
tion to strengthen peace and security.
A subject of sharp diplomatic struggle is the matter of criteria for
distinguishing violations of human rights that are of an international
character and violations relating exclusively to the states' internal
competence. The examination, in the United Nations and other inter-
national organizations, of questions concerning human rights violations
must not lead to interfecence in the internal affairs of the various
states, to encroachment on their sovereignty or the imposition of any
resolutions contrary to their will. On the other hand, references to
sovereignty and the principle of naninterference must not serve to -
cover up human rights violations. In the practice of inter-state
cooperation in this sphere a rule has developed which provides the
sole possible interpretation of the correlation of the principles of
respect for state sovereignty, noninterference in the states' internal
affairs, equality, and respect for human rights: massive and gross
violations of human rights are recognized as human rights violations
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having an international character. The wording "massive and gross
violations oE human rights" is a criterion which makes it possible to
distinguish questions of human rights violations of an international
character from questions of violations of. such rights relating to the
states' internal competerce. In the former case, references to
sovercignty and noninrerference cannot be considered substantiated,
because lt is a matter oE situations that have gone beyond the bounds
of the states' internal affairs. As a rule, these are situations which '
present a threat to peace, acts of aggression, and other disturbances
uf the peace, f~r example the political apartheid practiced by South
Africa, Israel's violation of the rights of Palestine's Arab people, 4
the crimes of the Pol Pot and Yeng Sari regime in Kampuchea, and so on.
Attempts to raise in the United Nations the question of real or
imaginary isolated violations of the rights of individuals should be
qualified as interference in the internal affairs of various states.
True, there have been cases in the United Nations of sending in the
name of the Human Rights Commission or other organs telegrams to the
rulers of particular states, mentioning the p~ames of specific persons
(for example, to the Chilean junta in 1974). But these telegrams con-
tained or assumed demands to halt massive and gross violatiuns of
human rights, in which the names of the particular persons were cited
only as the most glaring examples of such violations. It is of course
possible that voluntarily, via the conclusion of an international
aKreement, particular states may also agree to raise as an object of
discussion in internarional organs what are known as "individual cases,"
that is, questions of actual or supposed violations of the individual
rights of specific persons. But outside of the framework of agreement--
that is, where particular states impose the examination of such cases
on others in some international organ or other, this is unacceptable,
- because such actions constitute a violation of the principles of -
respect for state sovereignty, noninterference, and equality.
At the present time, imperialist circles are attempting to create in
internationat organizations conditions for examining "individual cases"
without the consent of the states concerned. For this purpose they
are doing ever~~thing they can to establish corresponding international
procedures (or to utilize existing ones). Attempts are also being
made to raise such questions in circumvention of any procedures,
directly during plenary meetings of particular international organs or
at international conferences. This took place, in particular, at the -
33rd session of the United Nations Commission for Human Rights, when -
the United States delegation attempted to get the commission to send
in its name a teiegram to the Soviet government with an inquiry rela-
" tive to measures undertaken by Soviet organs with regard to particular
persons portrayed in the Wester press as "fighters for human rights,"
but who were in reality brought to justice for violating Soviet laws.
The United States delegation, having been rebuffed by the USSR delega-
tion and finding no support from most members of the commission, could
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not bring i.tself to insist on voting for its motion.6 Attempts to
rai.se the question of imaginary violations of human rights in the USSR
were also undertaken by the American delegation in Belgrade, at the
meeting of representatives of the countries participating in the All-
European Conference. The political aim of such actions is to lay down
a legal basis for unleashing a propaganda campaign directe~' ~gainst the
USSR and other countries of the socialist commonwealth at the inter-
state level. ~
Most often, however, attempts to create for these purposes precedents
of examining in international organs the affairs of individual persons
are undertaken by Western delegations utilizing various kin~s of inter-
national procedures, generally in a veiled form, under the pretext of
discovering massive and gross violations of human rights. These are
the goals that were aimed at in creating in the United Natibns and
certain other international organizations procedures for examining so-
called reports concerning human rights violations. In attempting to
substantiate the necessity of examining particular complaints in order
to detect massive and gross human rights violations, the Western dele-
gations generally utilize the following argumentation: Establishing
f.acts o� gross and massive violations of human rights requires reliable
information, and this requires the creation of an international proce-
dure making it possible to objectively evaluate incoming information;
information of this type, moreover, comes primarily from the victims
of. alleged human rights violations--that is, from individual persons
and nongovernmental organizations. Hence the conclusion that it is
particular complaints (individual or collective petitions, appeals,
reports--they are called various things) which constitute the decisi.ve
source of information concerning human rights violations. Ultimately
this leads to the creation of procedures allegedly designed to estimate
and determine what number of complaints allegedly constitute proof of
massive and gross human rights violations. We can predict in advance
the result of this kind of "estimation" in international organs where
capitalist states have a greater number of votes than socialist states
and where resolutions are passed by a majority vote.
It is not a question as to what kind of resolution (in terms of its
juridical force) will be passed with respect to such matCers. Without
the consent of the state concerned it will always remain merely a
recommendation. The main point is that such procedures make it possible ~
to discuss questions of isolated, sporadic violations of the rights of
individual persons, matters relating to the internal competence of the
various states and, moreover, to raise and discuss questions of
imaginary human rights violations that never did occur. In the latter ,
case, inevitably the burden of proof of its innocence rests on the
accused state--thaC is, it gives rise to a kind of presumption of the
state's guilt. Regardless of the outcome of discussions of "questions"
of this type, the very fact that they were discussed should be viewed
as interference in the internal affairs of the respective state, because
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without its express consent the state should not have to explain itsetf,
much less justify itself to other states with respect to its own
internal affairs. Such discussions do nothing but worsen inter-state
retations and thereby damage international cooperation in the field of
human rights. :
It should be mentioned that the Western states are striving to limit
the discussion of such questions within the framework of international f
procedures just to violations of civil and politicat rights, ignoring--
- for understandable reasons--even a hint of the possibility o� dis-
cussing violations of social-economic rights. They attempt to repre-
sent international cooperation in the field of human rights as an ,
isolated sphere of inter-state relations standing "above" politics and
pursuing the aim of securing "genuine freedom" ("pure" democracy) to
atl people, and they attempt to represent the relevant procedure as
the best internationat-legal means to secure such "freedom," which {
allegedly can in no way hinder the process of detente. ~
It must be kept in mind, however, that no international procedure can :
promote the securing of greater freedom than is possible under condi-
tions of the social-economic structure and political system prevailing ,
in a particular country, nor can it substitute for the activities of a
state's organs of jurisprudence and other organs with respect to
securing human ri.ghts. Since cooperation in the f.ietd of human rights ,
is an inseparable part of inter-state cooperation as a whole, it cannot
exist outside potitics, and any attempts to interfere in the internal ;
- af.fairs of the various states under the pretext of securing human ;
ri.ghts must inevitably have a negative effect on the general condition i
of inter-state relations. Moreover, massive and gross violations of '
human rights are so obvious in character that it does not take the
creation of a special procedure of examining information about them to
determine whether they have been committed, much less a procedure to
examine one source of such infor,ration, because this would, objectively,
entail disregarding other, more substantial sources. It was not the
comptaints of individual persons that brought to light the politics of
apartheid or the terror of the Chilean junta. Reports concerning them
came in from a variety of sources, and it was unnecessary to "filter"
them via various international procedures in order to evaluate them
properly. Such sources, in particular, fnclude the racist laws cf
South Africa, the terrorist laws and decrees of the Chilean junta,
declarations of officials, and so on.
Summarizing the above, we may state that as far as international pro- ~
cedures in the field of human rights are concerned, the diplomatic
struggle frequently revolves around questions as to what character they
should have, whether questions of procedure rather than substance can
or cannot be placed in the forefront within the framework of inter-
national cooperation on such matters, whether to deal with the examina-
tion of obvious, generally-acknowledged gross and massive violations
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of human rights or whether to accord crucial significance to the formal-
juridical aspects of detecting human rights violations, and so on. The
political content of this struggle consists of the efforts of the USSR
and [he other countries of the socialist commonwealth on behalf of
peaceful coexistence and strict compliance with generally-acknowledged
principles of international law and the principtes of the United
Nations Charter and against attempts to hinder the process of detente
via interference in the internal affairs of states under the pretext
of "protecting" human rights. Behind all of this, of course, stands
the ideological struggle of states having different social-economic -
structures. It is of interest, i:herefore, to make a general survey o�
international procedures having some relation to the legal status of
the individual, primarily human rights, also revealing tendencies of
their development.
International procedures on matters involving various aspects of the
legal statss of the individual differ considerably; in the past 20
, years, moreover, their number has increased noticeably. Normative
material now available, and existing practice, make it possible to
classify them by various criteria. In terms of legal foundation, such
procedures may or may not be based on agreement. If not, they are
created by decision of an international organization (for example, the
procedure adopted in UNESCO to examine reports). In terms of goals,
the procedures may be subdivided into those designed to obtain informa-
tion concerning positive aspects of cooperation with regard to questions
affecting individuals (for example, periodic reports concerning the
implementation of human rights pacts) and those designed to obtain
inEormation concerning violations of international-legal norms affect-
ing individuals (f.or example, violations of statutes of. the Convention
on Liquidation of all Forms of Racial Discrimination). Appropriate
procedures may be instituted to examine a specific case or group of
cases (the Nuremberg Tribunal) and to examine a particular category of
cases as they arise.
In terms of the rangp of qucstions i~ivestigaceci, all procedures of
interest here can be subdivided into those dealing with basic rights
and f.reedoms (for example, in the Committee for Human Rights, provided
for by the Pact on Civil and Political Rights) and those dealing with
the special status of individuals (for example, the administrative
tribunals of international organizations). Many existing procedures
deal to some extent with basic rights and freedoms (promoting the
exercise of them, or making efforts against violations of them, or
both). The functioning of such procedures may be activated by periodic
incoming information (usually of a general character, for example
reports), by resolution of an appropriate organ to examine a particular
question at the motion of a particular state, group of states, higher-
level organ, and so on (for example, the human rights situation in
Chile), the receipt of a claim (complaint) from a specific state, a
complaint from a nongovernmental organization or from private persons,
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[he presence of a special agreement between the states concerned with
regard to examining some question in a particular way, and so on.
In terms of. the nature of matters to be examined, the procedures in
question can be subdivided into those dealing with international
questions and those which to some extent deal with matters essentially
belonging to the internal competence of the various states. Depending
on the form of examination of the particular matters, the procedures
can be subdivided into those invotving court procedures and those that ,
do not. The latter, in turn, have a tendency to fall into two
varieties: quasi-judicial (for example, in the European Commission on
Human Rights) and the general political (for example, on the basis of
Economic and Social Council resolution 1503 (XLVIII)). Representatives
of the capitalist states prefer to call both of these varieties humani-
tarian procedures, attempting to emphasize its allegedly nonpolitical -
character, and to represent the matter in such a way as to assert that
the defense of individual rights is its sole purpose, ignoring the fact
that unless social-political factors are taken into account--especially
the status of relations between states--no formal procedure can even
encourage the exercise of individual rights, much less secure them.
Practice has shown that attempts to absolutize the formal aspect of the
matter in this regard at the present stage are utilized by reactionary
forces for specifically political aims. Finally, depending on the
nature of the judgment to be pronounced, the procedures in question can
also be subdivided into two categories: those which end with the
handin~; down of an obligatory judgment and those which end with the
handing down of a nonobligatory judgment.
Ir must be noted that the above listed typical features of the relevant
procedures are encountered in various combinations. Frequently, _
~ various procedures may be used within the framework of the same organ.
Clearly, it would be purposeless to attempt to find optimal combinations
of. these features in order to create the most effective procedure.
First of all, effectiveness cannot be based only on the formal features
of a particular procedure. It is essential to take account primarily
of social factors and in general those conditions in which the par-
ticular procedure is to be followed. For example, in relations between ~
states of differing social structures such a procedure should be
different than in relations between states of the same historical type.
Secondly, the effectiveness of a procedure generally relates to the
characteristics o� the object af in�luence of international law, which
is to be made more effective by means of it (that is, the character-
is[ics of the particular rights and duties of individuals). Third,
effectiveness depends on the political goals the creators and partici-
pants in the procedure have set for themselves. In reality these goals
may require not strengthening but only the creation of the appearance
of such effectiveness, contrary to official declarations, as can be
seen clearly in the work of the European Commission an Human Rights.
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It can be stated that procedures which are to a large extent what is
known as supranational in character, as broadly proclaimed in the
political and legal literature of the capitalist countries, in general
deserve only negative evaluation. In the broad sense of the term they
are also inter-state procedures, because they are based on inter-
national agreement or the decision of an intergovernmental organizati.on. -
'1'hey are supranational in the sense that quesGions whi.ch are examined
~ by means of them by their nature belong to the sphere of states' %
internal competence. If such a procedure, moreover, functions as ~
complaints come in from individuals, nongovernmental organizations, or
, even, at best, various states, if it is set up on a non-agreement basis
(that is, contrary to the wishes of certain states which are drawn into
it), then it leads to interference in the internal affairs of~the
various states and, consequently, is of an illegal character. If such
a procedure does in fact influence the status of individuals, it is
only a negative influence, quite aside from the fact that it cannot be
effective, f.or the reason that it is not able to substitute for the
state mechanism, as its advocates in practice claim.
It is difficult to predict the paths of development of international
procedures in the field of human rights. Of crucial importance here
_ will be the dynamics of the correlation of social forces in the inter-
national arena and the attendant characteristics and nature of the
id~ological struggle. '~here is no doubt that the capitalist states
will continue to attemr~t to develop procedures giving individuals
direct acc:ess to international organizations which 9.nclude st.ates
having difEerent social-economic structures for purposes of utilizing
them chiefly to interfere in the internal affairs of the socialist
srates. Proof of this is seen, in particular, in their attempts to
revive the idea o~ creating the post of United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights, and also their attempts to standardize criteria of
acceptability of petitions from nongovernmental organizations and
~ individuals. In order to see this, it is enough to focus attention on
the relevant provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights,
parti.cipated in by most of the Western European states; also on the
criteria established by the Subcommission for the Prevention of
Discrimination and the Defense of Minorities in accordance with United
Nations Economic and Social Council Resolution 1503 (XLVIII), which
the USSR delegation voted against; and on criteria established by the
Committee for Human Rights with regard to individual appeals specif~ed
by the optional protocol to the Pact on Civil and Po~itical Rights.
Ultimately this is a manifestation of the more general efforts of the
Western states to universalize procedures of examining individual
petitions in order to achieve political goals, as mentioned above. The
procedure specified in Economic and Social Council Resolution 1503
�(XLVIII) dated 27 May 1970, which established confidential rules
governing the examination of so-called reports concerning human rights
violations coming into the United Nations, was a not very successful
attempt at such universalization. First of all, the procedure was not
universal, because many states objected to it; secondly, in the long
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run, it permitted the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to
examine only human rights situations rather than "individual cases.~~10
In the sphere of cooperation between states having different social-
economic structures, it is obviously most advisable to apply the pro-
cedure provided in the Pact on Human Rights. The basis o� this pro-
cedure is a system for submitting and discussing reports--in effect,
reports ~~om states concerning their implementati.on of the pacts' pro-
visions. At the same time, the Pact on Civil and Political Rights, .
and the protocol to it on an optional basis, permit the examination of
inter-state and individual petitions. This procedure is generally
characterized by flexibility. It encompasses a number of va*ieties of
existing procedures and makes it possible for the participating states
to select the procedure most acceptable to them without imposing their
- own point of view on other participants, because in all cases the
relevant procedures function on the basis of th~ general consent of
all concerned. The Soviet Union, for example, does not participate in ~
the above-mentioned optional procedure of examining petitions.
It is already possible to observe the attempts of certain participants
in the pacts to free themselves of all human rights procedures pre-
tending to universality t~ot provided for by the pacts themselves. A
definite step in this direc*ion was made by the Economic and Social
Council in resolutions 1988 (LX) dated 11 May 1976 and 1978/20 dated
5 May 1978, which respectively released participants in the Pact on '
- Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the Pact on Civil and
Political Rights of the obligation to submit repor.ts concerning their
implementation to the Periodic Reports Committee, because according to
the pacts such reports were to be submitted via a different procedure.
At the same time, the capitalist states clearly do~not wish to allow
the release of participants in the Pacts on Human Rights from the pro-
cedure established by resolution 1503 (XLVIII) (this also applies to
those taking part in the pacts), obviously hoping that it will still
give them a small chance of utilizing it at least against the develop-
ing states of socialist orientation. It should be noted that the
Soviet Union is in principle not participating in the procedure
established by resolution 1502 (XLVIII).
In recent years there has been a certain increase in the number of
report-givers and special task forces dpaling with various matters
affecting human rights, especially in the ilnited Nations, chiefly on
the level of the Human Rights Commission and the Subcommission for the ;
Prevention of Discrimination and the Defense of Minorities. Clearly,
such practice may promote a deeper study and condernnation of massive
and gross human rights violations, for example, tr~e policy of apartheid,
the aid provided by a number of capitalist states to the racist regimes
in the sourthern part of Airica, and so on. It must be kept in mind,
however, that the mandate of each such task force or report-giver is
determined by the specific decision of the organ which designated them, t
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and the procedure for selecting and examining the in�ormation to be
scudicct is determined by the report-givcr or nc~ task. force itsclf.
It is perfectly clear that the mandate of any such group or report-
giver should not go beyond the bounds of the United Nations Charter.
Here again, however, we may detect on the part of th~ Western states
an attempt to create the same old procedure of examining "individual
cases," with all its negative political consequences, as mentioned
above. We also cannot fail to note a desire on their part to confer
corresponding powers on the United Nations Secretariat.
The i.ncreasing complication of forms of inter-state cooperation, and
the worsening of the ideological struggle under present conditions,
entail further complication of the international-legal regulation of
inter-state contacts. At the same time, the materials discussed here
give grounds for concluding that attempts to make use of a special `
international procedure to determine, on the basis of analysis of
appeals (complaints) from individual persons and nongovernmental
organizations, whether gross and massive violations of human rights are
being committed in some state or other, do not guarantee objectivity
and pose the danger of interference in the internal aff.airs of other
states; they may worsen the international situation and thereby also
damage cooperation in the field of human rights. It is also perfectly
clear that matters of substance of international cooperation in this
sphere must be given preference over matters of a procedural nature,
otherwise the cooperation itself will be meaningless.
FOOTNOTES
1. Soveshchaniye Politicheskogo konsul'tativnogo komiteta
gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo dogovora" [Conference of the
Political Consultative Committee of States Participating in the
Warsaw Pact], Moscow, 22-23 November 1978. Moscow, 1978, p 23.
2. Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskim kursom" [by Lenin's course], Speeches
and Articles, vol 6, Moscow, 1978, p 531. -
3. Various aspects of these matters were discussed in a number of
monograph studies by Soviet authors (see Movchan, A. P.,
"Mezhdunarodnaya zashchita prav cheloveka" [International Defense
of Human Rights], Moscow, 1958; Ostrovskiy, Ya. A., "OON I PRAVA
CHELOVEKA" [The Unite3 Nations and Human Rights], Moscow, 1968;
Chernichenko, S. V., "Lichnost' i mezhdunarodnoye pravo" [The
Individual and International Law], Moscow, 1974; Kartashkin, V. A.,
"Mezhdunarodnaya zashchita prav cheloveka (Osnovnyye voprosy
sotrudnichestva gosudarstv)" [International Defense of Human Rights
(Basic Questions of Cooperation Among States)], Moscow, 1976;
~ Chkhikvadze, V. M., "Sotsialisticheskiy gumanizm i prava cheloveka"
[Social.ist Humanism and Human Rights], Moscow, 1978.
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4. Uni[ed Nations General Assembly Resolution 32/130 dated ,
16 Decr~mber 1977 presents as examples of gross and massive human -
ri~;hts vi~1.lClOlls rhose which "result from apartheid, all focros of
racial discrimination, colonialism, foreign dominance and occupa- .
tion, aggression, and threats to national sovereignty, national
unity, and territorial integrity, also the r.efusal to recognize
the basic rights of a people to self-determination and the rights
of each people to exercise full sovereignty over thei~r own wealth
and natural resources" ("Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the i
General Assembly at the 32nd Session, 20 SeptemLer-21 December 1977.
Supplement No 45 (A32/45), p 166). This resolution also emphasizes `
the indivisibility of human rights and the special significance of
social-economic rights (Paragraph 1, subparagraphs a and b).
5. See United Nations Document E/5464, E/CN.4/1154, p 78.
~
6. See United Nations Documents E/CN.4/SR.1416-1418; E/CN.4/L.1352;
see atso Zorin, V., "Human Rights From a Realistic Standpoint," ~
NOVOYE VREMYA, No 15, 1977, pp 18-19.
7. On the concept supranationality see Valki L., "Sovereignty, Supra-
nationality, and Decision-Making in the Common Market. Questions
of International Law," Budapest, 1970, pp 251-252, 259, 270. ,
S. See United Nations Document E/1978/34; E/CN.4/1291, pp 60, 63;
E/CN.4/1320 (paragraphs 49-51), pp 13-14. ~
9. See United Nations Treaty Series, vol 213, 1955, pp 236-238; United %
Nations Documents E/5464; E/CN.4/Sub.4/1154, pp 79-80; Report of
,
the Committee on Human Rights. General Assembly. Official Reports, E
32nd Session. Supplement No 44 (4/32/44) pp 69ff (the Soviet Union
did not sign the protocol). For the text of resolutfon 1503 ~
(XLVIII) see Official Reports of the Economic and Social Council, i
48th Session. Resolutions. Supplement No 5(E/4621), p.0.
10. Attempts by Ghe capitalist states to create a system for examining
~"individual cases" in other international organizations can be seen,
for example, in the following UN~SCO documents: 77/EX/Decision, -
p 6; 98/EX/Decisions, p 44; 102/EX/19 (this document, dated
7 April 1977, is a survey of all procedures of this type and '
contains detailed proposals on their "implementation" in UNESCO"; ;
<
104/EX/3. ~
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11. For a discussion of the first USSR report concerning measures to
implement civil and political rights at the Fifth Session of the
Committee on Human Rights, created in accordance with the Pact on
Civil and Political Rights, see: Chizhov, B., "Complete Concord
of the Law and the Will of the People," NOVOYE VREMYA, No 47, 1978,
pp 14-15.
~ . .
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo Nauka, SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO, 1980
6854
CSO: 1800 .
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INTERNATIONAL
NEED TO REGULATE MEANS OF MASS INFORMATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Moscow SOVE'fSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 99-103
[Article by S. 0. Shevtsova, junior scientific staff inember, Institute
of Scientific Information on the Social Sciences, Academy of Sciences
USSR: "International-Legal Regulation of Mass Information�']
[Text] The sharpening of the ideological struggle in the internationat
arena is making more timely the question of legal regulation of the
use of the mass media in international relations. Normal, good-
nei.ghborly relations between states serve as the basis for such funda-
mental principtes of international law as that of. respect for state
sovereignty and that of noninterference in the internal affairs of
orher states. States are obliged to observe these principles when
carrying our any activities, in particular the use of the mass media
on the international levet. Compliance with basic principles of t.nter-
national law in this sphere is especially vital, because the mass
inf.ormation media are actively used for purposes of the ideotogical
struggle. One feature of this struggle is that it is inevitable and
logical, and there can be no compromises and covenants. But the un-
compromising nature of the ideological struggle does not allow the
possibility of using forms of it which are incompatible with peacefut
coexistence.
Soviet jurists proceed on the basis that "the ideologicat struggle can
be and to a certain extent already is subject to international-legal
regulation. but in these cases it is not a matter of compromise
with respect to questions of ideology but rather "the norms of
international law which bind states not to allow the propagandizing o�
certain concepts directed against peace and peaceful coexistence but
, to utilize only means permitted by in~ernational taw in the ideological
struggle in international re~lations." Further development and deepen-
ing of detente sets before the states the task of using the mass infor-
mation media in accordance with the basic principles of international
law; this requires bringing international mass media into the main-
stream of peaceful coexistence, the rejection of propaganda leading to
international conflicts, the rejection of interference in the internal
affairs of other states or encroachments on their sovereignty.
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Under such conditions, great importance and practical significance
attaches to the Declaration adopted in November 1978 at the 20th ;
session of the UNESCO General Conference concerning the basic principles i
governing the contribution of the mass media toward strengthening �
peace and international mutual understanding, toward development of ~
human right~ and the struggle against racism and apartheid and incite- ~
ment to war --the first international document summarizing general f
principles governing the international use of the mass media. The ,
idea of drawing up such a document came from the Soviet Union, which
proposed it within UNESCO as early as 1972. The declaration resuLted
from lengthy and complicated negotiations which took six years. The
necessity of adopting it arose from the fact that in today's world the `
dissemination of mass information exerts a substantial influence on !
the shaping of public opinion, and through it the development of inter- .
nati.onal retations and the level of detente. "The establishment of
firm law and order in the sphere of cultural and ideological exchanges
would help to prevent friction between states and, in the long run,
would be directed toward maintaining the general peac~e and further
development of the cultural progress of all nations."
The socialist and developing states have come out in favor of banning
the propagandizing of war and racial and national hatred, against
interference in the internal affairs of other states, and in favor of
bal.ance in the international flow of information. This is especiatly '
vital in the case of the developing states, because at the present time
' the amount of information coming into them from the bourgeois states
is 100 times greater than the information coming out of them. This ,
sharp disproportion confronts the developing states with the task of
developing and strengthening their own national mass media, setting up ~
their own information agencies, and also activating the mass informa- ;
tion organs they already have. Combining their efforts, in 1976 the
developing countries set up a pool of information agencies of the par-
ticipating states.
The developing countries have evaluated the Declaration adopted at the
20th session of the UNESCO General Conference as an important step in
the struggle against "information imperialism"--that is, the major
imperialist information agencies' use of the mass information media to '
disseminate information beneficial only to them--in the struggle to
eliminate the disproportion in the conveyance of information between
the developing and the capitalist countries. Since they possess power-
ful technical means and material capabilities for a successful competi-
tive struggle with the newly-forming mass information media of the
developing countries, the Western states do not wish to bind l-hemselves
with any juridical obligations whatsoever in this sphere. For a num-
ber of years the United States and its allies were against the adoption
of the Declaration. Only the fear that they would be completely
isolated among the overwhelming majority of the UNESCO member states
compelled the Western countries to compromise and adopt the Declaration.
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The Declaration's preamble lists the already well-known international-
legal documents which to some extent apply to the activities of the ,
mass information media in the international arena. Special emphasis
is placed on the importance of the contribution of the mass information
media toward strengthening peace, trust, and friendly relations among
states. Thus, the UNESCO document officially acknowledges that the
international community ascribes great importance to the character of
international mass information. All of the articles of the Declaration
embody the premise that the mass information media must serve the 1
cause of peace, mutual understanding, and mutual respect among nations.
At present, scientific, cultural, artistic, and economic development
gives rise to the objective necessity of exchange in these spheres, ,
leading to more intensive use of the mass information media in inter- .
national relations. The sharpening ideological struggle between the _
two social systems does not constiture a barrier to cooperation among
the states in the sphere of exchanging international mass information
and the use of the media. One feature of international mass information--
that is, information transmitted to other countries--is the influence
it exerts on the population of not one but many countries, on the
shaping o� public opinion on an international scale. Its content
depends on the particular goals set for itself by the state or the
organs under its jurisdiction invoived in the dissemination of informa- ~
tion. Depending on this, international mass information may serve the ~
cause of peace and social progress or reactionary aims. Just such aims, .
attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of other states, are -
served by the mass information media of the capitalist states which are ~
conducting foreign policy propaganda directed against the USSR and the ~q
countries~of the socialist commonwealth. 't
s
There are possible cases in which a state, under the guise of national y
domestic transmissions, transmits mass information specially [o foreign
states. In terms of the technique used, such transmissions can be used
by the transmitting state to interfere in the internal affairs of
foreign states, to create situations posing a threat to the internal
order and security of the other states. Such transmissions entail the
international-legal responsibility of the transmitting state. +
hThile a state has free dissemination of its national domestic mass ~
information, the dissemination of international mass information should
be based on cooperation among states in this sphere, which requires
concluding appropriate agreements and achieving certain accords with
regard to this matter. The activities of various states in the sphere
of exchanges of mass information should be based on principles of
respect for state sovereignty and noninterference in the internal
affairs of other states. This postulate is especially vital in connac-
tion with the development of new, powerful mass information media, in
particular television satellites.
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4
Promotion of the free exchange of information by the various states,
as specified in the UNESCO Declaration, proposes that such exchanges
be carried out on the basis of appropriate constitutional provisions
and international agreements. This reflects the position of the
socialist and the developing states, which are against the uncontrolled
ftow of international information. The principle of respect for state ;
sovereignty requires that mass information exchanges on the inter- r
national level must be carried out in accordance with the constitutions '
and other laws and customs of the countries cooperating in this sphere.
Because of the fact that the mass information media, especially radio
and television, exert a strong impact on people's consciousness, the
shaping of public opinion, no country can permit itself a"free, un-
controlled flow of information" on the national level; this assumes
internal regulation of the activities of the mass inf~rmation media by
all states, without exception. The dissemination of national domestic '
mass information in the socialist countries is based on the relevant
provisions of their constitutions and on compliance with their domestic
legislation. All the mass inf~rmation media in the socialist countries, ,
which belong to the state a.rd tr social organizations, are obliged to
promote the development of iriendship and cooperation with the peoples
of other countries, to support and strengthen the general peace. The
propagandizing of war is prohibited by the USSR Constitution.
F
In the capitalist countries, contrary to the claims of. bourgeois propa-
ganda, there is not unrestricted freedom of information; the mass .
cor~nunications are essentially a sphere of Big Business. It includes
both state and priv~ce mass information media, but in ef�ect control
over their activities is in the hands of representatives of financial-
monopolistic capital, who allow the dissemination only of information
beneficial to themselves. In addition, the owners of the mass informa-
tion media make extensive use of veiled censorship, which is a particu-
lar form of limiting freedom of information. Limiting freedom of
information is in fact stipulated in the national legislation of the
capitalist countries. In the United States, for example, the 1967 ~
federal law on the freedom of information lists all categories of ,
information that are classified. And the other capitalist states
directly or indirectly exercise legal regulation of their mass informa-
tion media, subordinating it to the interests of the country's ruling
circles.
In most of the newly developing independent states, t!~e mass informa-
tion media have been nationalized, and the states themselves regulate ;
~ them on the national level. As yet, however, the d~veloping states
have only a weakly developed system of mass information media; schis
allows the big capitalist states to carry out policies of "information ~
imperialism" against these countries. Article 6 of the UNESCO Declara-
tion states that a beneficial conu~tion for improving mutual exchanges
of information, establishing a just and firm peace, and ensuring the
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economic and political independence of the developing states would be
to eliminate inequality in the dissemination of information "intended
for and coming out of the developing countri.es, and al.so between these
countries." We may assume that this wording expresses the gist of the ~
requirements of the developing countries concerning the establishment
of a"new interna[ional information order" in the world. The Declara- i
tion sets forth the appropriate ways to achieve this goal, emphasizing '
the necessity of providing the mass information media of the developing
countries with conditions f.or strengthening and expansion, also the ~
various states' Eostering of mutual cooperation of the mass information
media of the developing countries with the information organs of the ~
developed states.
The Declaration states that the mass information media should make an '
effective contribution to the cause of human rights. For thesz pur-
poses, in accordance with Article 2, Paragraph 3, of the Declaration ,
the mass information media should help "to hear the voice of oppressed
peoples struggling against colonialism, neocolonialism, foreign
occupation, and all forms of racial discrimination and oppression and
lacking the opportunity to express themselves in their own territories."
The mass information media should also serve the cause of indoctrinating t
- youn~ people in the spirit of peace, mutual understanding, and mutual
;~spect. In analyzing the Declaration's provisions concerning the '
activities of the mass media with respect to developir.g numan rights,
it must be stated that the rights and freedoms of each individual can-
not be viewed as unrestricted. In present-day international law a
complex of norms and principles h~.s been formed which appty to basic '
human r.ights and �reedoms; in particular, they include tl~e right of
each individual to freedom of s.peech and expression. These norms and -
principles do not confer right~~ directly on individuals but merely
sti~ulate the obligations of the states in the sphere of exercising ,
these rights and freedoms. The s~ssignment of the individual's right _
to freedom of speech and expressi.on to the internal competence of the
state presumes that the exercis~ of this right is regulated by national
legislation and means that the principle of freedom of speech and
expr~ssion is more of a national-legal than an int~rnational-?egal
character.
In promoting the principle of "freedom of information," Western jurists
clas~ify it as a basic human right. "Freedom of informaCion," in their
o~inion, entails the individual's unrestricted right to convey and
recei~~ information and ideas regardless of state borders, rEgardless
of the state. In this, how~ver, they do not take account of the par-
ticular obligations and the particular responsibility involved in
exercising this right. This is why Article 19 of the International
Pac[ on Civil and Palitical Rights stipulates the possibility of
establishing by law restrictions that are essential in order to respect
the rights and reputation of other persons, in or.der *o protect state
security, public order, and the health or morals of the population.
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In carrying out their professional duties, journalists are obliged to
obey the laws of the country in which they are working. Neither
Ereedom of speech nor freedom of the press give the right to propa- !
~andize w~~r, national and racial hatred, ar apartheid. This provision
i5 precisely stipulated in Article 20 of the International P~1ct on
civil and political rights. More than strange, therefore, is the
assertion of THE NEW YORK TIMES that "for. Americans there can be no
freedom of speech or 'balanced' information unless those who come out
in favor of racism ~nd apartheid, or even for war, are also given
freedom of speech."
The UNESCO Declaration lacks any prouision concerning states' responsi- !
bility for the international activities of all mass information media '
under their jurisdiction. The draft declaration's article which deals
with states' responsibility for the activities of national mass infor- ~
mation media has evoked the fierced attacks by opponents of the ,
Declaration, who are against any kind o� control over the activities
of such media. But the Declaration's lack of an article dealing with
states' responsibility for the activities of mass information media :s
~
does not mean that the states are free of all responsibility i.n this
matter.
In accordance with the principle of state sovereignty, all physical ar~d
legal entities within the territory of a particular state are under its
jurisdiction, and the organs of that state are obliged to see to it
that the activities of these entities do not conflict with the inter-
national obligations of the particular state and international law and
order. This provision applies fully to the activities of all mass .
information media within the jurisdiction of a state.
The generally-acknowledged imperative principle of noninterference in '
the internal affairs of other states obliges them to take the necessary ~
legislative measures in order to ensure that the activities of all mass -
information media are in strict compliance with provisions deriving
from this principle. Violation of this principle by the mass informa- '
tion media must be viewed as violation by the state itself, because a i
state is obliged to halt unlawful activities of all its mass informa-
tion media, regardless of their affiliation. 1.
;
In an article dealing with the Declaration, THE NEW YORK TIMES was
obliged to acknowledge that the Declaration adopted at the 20th session
of the UNESCO General Conference "requires that all signatory countries .
be guided bu the 'relevant principles' of the International PaGt on ~
Civil and Political Rights, which stipulates that propagandi~ing of
war and incitement of discrimination are prohibited by law." It must
also be said that the ban on the dissemination and propagandizing of
certain reactionary ideas and views is embodied as law in a number of '
fundamental international-legal documents. Thus, the preamble of the
United National Charter stipulates that tne states are obliged "to ;
. . ~
~
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:P
,
manifest tolerance and live together as good neighbors at peace with
one another. .
In accordance with the United Nations Charter, the states are obliged ~
to carry out internati.onal cooperation in resolving international pro- +
blems of an economic, sacial, cul[ural, and humanitarial nature, and 1
also foster and develop respect for human rights and basic freedoms for
each individual regardless of race, sex, language, or religion. i~
Article 2, Paragraph 7 of the United Nations Charter prohibits inter- '
ference in matters which are essentially within the internal competence ;
' of any state. Article 4 of the International Convention on Liquidating
All Forms of Racial Discricr.ination, adopted by the United Nations `r.
General Assembly in 1965, declare as illegal any propagandizing based
on ideas or theories of racial superiority, also any dissemination of i
ideas based on racial superiority. Article 4 of the International �
Convention on Stopping the Crime of Apartheid and Punishing It, adopted -
by the United Nations General Assembly in 1973, specifies the states'
obligation to undertake any measures of a legislative or other character
in order to halt and also prevent any encouragement of the crime of .
apartheid and segregationist policies or manifestations similar to it.
The Declaration of Principles of International Law affecting freindly 3
relations and cooperation between states in accordance with the United
Nations Charter, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1970,
emphasizes the indivisible right of each state to choose its own ;
political, economic, and social system without any kind of interference
on the part of any other state. The Concluding Act of the All-European ~
Conference stipulates that "the participating states are to refrain ~r
from any interference, direct or indirect, individual or collective,
in internal or external affairs falling within the internal competen~e ~
of another participating state, regardtess of their interrelation~." ~
All of these provisions relate directly to the activities of the mass
information media on the international level, which must be carried
out on the basis of strict compliance with the basic principles regu-
lating relations between all states. For violation of these principles,
states bear international liability.
The llNESCO Declaration concerning basic principles affecting the con- ?
tribution of the mass information media toward the strengthening of '
peace and international mutual understanding, toward developing human
rights and the struggle against racism and~apartheid and incitement to ~
war, is an important step along the path of utilizing the mass informa- ,
tion media for purposes of peace and social progress. The Declaration
is a convincing example of the possibility of working out international-
- legal norms and principles of activities for the mass information _
media. ~
~
~
i
;
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i~Uh Ol~ f~ LC I ~1, (Itils l1NLY
F00'fNOTES
1. 'I'unkin, C. I., "Ideologicheskaya bor'b~ i mezhdunarodnoye pr~vo"
~ [The Ideologiczl Struggle and International Law], Moscow, 1967, p 28.
2. UNESCO Document 20/C/20Rev, corr., dated 21 November 1978.
~3. Kol~sov, Yu. M., "Massovayn informatsiy~ i mexhdunarodnoye pr~vc~"
~M;iss ln(orm~tion and Interna[ional Law], Moscow, ]974, p 5.
4. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 27 November 1978.
r). ~h1C~.
E~. "Sbc,rnik dcystvuyushchikh dogovorov, soglasheni.y i konventsiy,
z,~klyuchennykh SSSR s.inostr,znnymi gosud~rstvami" [Coliccrion of
'frr.,~cies, Agrcements, and Conventions in Effect Between thc USSR
nnd Foreign States], Issue 31, Moscow, 1977, p 547.
COPYRICFiT: Izdatel's[vo Nauka, SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO, 1980 ~
68~i4
CSO: 1H00 -
!
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_ ~
RCCTONAI.
~ TEACHING OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE IN KIRGIZIA EVALUATED
Frunze RUSSKIY YAZYK I LITERATURA V KIRGIZSKOY SHKOLE in Russian No 5, May 79
pp 61-64
[Article by Candidate of.Philology A. D. Zhizhina (Moscow): "The System of
Textbooks and Accompanying Methods Literature for the Sub~ect 'Russian
Literature in the Kirgiz School
[Text] A new curriculum in Russian language and
literature in Kirgiz for the republic's schools
has been approved. Kirgizia's Russian philology
_ specialists are embarking on an improvement in our
programs and textbooks in accordance with this plan
and also with regard for the modern requirements of
the theory and practice of teaching the sub~ect. It
will be useful for this, naturally, to evaluate ob3ect-
ively what has already been done in this field. In
publishing the brief problematical-critical survey
of the Moscow methods instructor Alevtina Dmitriyevna
Zhizhina the editors appeal to the readers to send in
their reviews of and observations and proposals con- '
cerning the current programs and textbooks and also
concerning paths for their improvement or the crea-
tion of new textbooks for individual grades (con-
centric cycles) of the Kirgiz school.
The textbooks on Russian literature and the reading material for the Kirgiz
school consf:itute a definite unity. The material becomes more complex grad-
ually, thanks to which it succeeds by and large in avoiding the abrupt
leap in the transition from the fifth to the sixth grades rypical of
many national schools and also from the seventh to the eiohth and, most
important, from the eighth to the nint~ grades. Thus the transition to a
systematized course of literature is better prepare~' than in the schools
of many republics.
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One perceives in the group of textbooks for the Kirgiz school an aspiration
to cater for a unified method of familiarization with the sub~ect:
l.--A compr.ehensive problem-clarifying discusaion with elements of reseArcli
reading is employed.
The montage-discussions in the textbook for the eighth grade--the discussion
on the novel "Yevgeniy Onegin," for example, which extends to the reading c~f
the minimum number of particularly significant stanzas (episodea)--serve
this purpose. One notes in the textbook for the ninth grade the section de-
voted to a study of N. A. Nekrasov's work "Komu na Rusi zhit' khorosho" [For
Whom Life Is Good in Rus'], whose apprehension is difficult for a student of
a national school: the content of the poem is surveyed, and there is a
brief description of the chapters from which the quoted eactracts have been
taken. Fragments which are ideologically and artistically the most signifi-
cant have been selected for textual presentation. The extracts are given
headings, which lends them a certain completeness. The montage is supple-
mented by questions and assignments organizing the students' reading and lead-
ing them to independent conclusions. The questions and assignments are var-
ied: "Choose quotations from the poem for the pictures portraying the peo-
ple's difficult life"; "Compare the si~uation of the people and the nobles.
Support your comparisons with examples" (p 205; here and subsequently the
page numbers of the corresponding textbooks are of the latest editions -
thereof); "What judgment did Nekrasov pass on the landowners of his poem?"
(p 235); "What did Nekrasov bring that was new to the portrayal o� the Rus-
sian peasantry in the character of Saveliy?" (p 238); "Compose a short oral
or written composition entitled 'We will live for the happiness of our native
parts!"' (p 311). The subject concludes with a final analysis (pp 235-237).
There is also an accompanying annotation of the text in the process of the
clarifying discussion. However, the comprehensive clarifying discussions
are not squally successful in all textbooks (or in individual chapters of the
above textbooks). This applies particularly to the readers for the seventh
and lOth grades.
2--There is an orientation toward the unified structural pedagogical organi-
zation of the material and the methods of its presentation.
The majority of textbooks has adopted a common system of adapting program
works of art (abridgments, the additional division of the text into separate
parts, providing headings and so forth). Unifarm typesetting and the use of
parallel and intratext vocabularies are bring~tg these books into closer
resemblance. Tr.ue, the latter requirements are not kept up in all textbooks;
the above-mentioned methods of presentation are not employed in the textbook
for the lOth grade, for example (a parallel vocabulary has only been intro-
duced in the lOth edition and only for certain texts).
The structure of the textbooks as a whole provides for a gradual transition
to a systematized course of Russian literatiure which begins in the eighth
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grade. However, the structure of the textbooks of the seventh and eighth
~rades in this plan prompts certain questions. ~Thus the textbook for th~
seventh grade opens with the section entitled "Order-Bearing Kirgizstan,"
which features two poets: Alykul Osmonov and Raykan Shukurbekov. The follow-
ing is given as the reason for the insertion of the section: "To arouse the
children's interest in literature on the bas~s of material of their native
republic which is close to the students and to create a certain emotional
and linguistic baais for studying the works of Russian prerevolutionary and
Soviet writers" (K. V. Mal'tseva, Ye, N. Kurbatova, "Metodicheskoye _
rukovodstvo k uchebniku 'Literaturnoye chteniye na russkom yazyke dlya VII
klassa kirgizskoy shkoly [Methods Guide for the Textbook "Russiar, Reader
for the Kirgiz School's Seventh Grade"], Frunze, Mektep, 1970, p 7). But
this reasoning, it seems to us, fails to take due account of the fact that
in the system of textbooks material from native literature is presented in
the sixth and even fifth grades. The textbook for the~ eighth grade, on
the other hand, has partially assimilated the structure proposed by Latvian -
authors: the texts and an analysis thereof are gart of feature stories on
the life and work of writers--which has its positive and negative aspects,
which the xeviewers mentioned at the time.
3--The textbooks realize the aspiration, not to an equal extent everywhere,
it is true, to continuity in the work on vocabulary support for the courses.
The following rubrics have been introduced for this purpose: "You and I
Met.... Where?" (sixth grade), "Vocabulary Practice" (eighth grade) and
"Familiar Words" (ninth grade), which makes it possible to trace the move-
ment of the words in the texts and educational articles, that is, reflects
the life of the word and the possibility of its use. For example, in the
textbook for the ninth grade: "Slave Qkul], p 5). After the victory in the
war of 1812, the peasants again became...their own landlords" (Bio. of Push-
kin, eighth). "And...blessed fate" (Pushkin, "Yevgeniy Onegin," ch. 2,
eighth). "And I will die, as I have lived, on foreign soil...an erpnan" ~
(Lermontov, "Mtsyri," ch. 4, eighth). "And in the face of authority the
contemptibles..." (Lermontov, "The Duma," in the bio., eighth), (p 7).
The vocabulary work is varied. Attention is paid to the development of both
the spoken and written language: "Paraphrase the lesson "Meeting and Friend-
ship With Belinskiy" (on Nekrasov),."Which Russian word might convey the
Kirgiz term...? "Fill in the gaps in the following sentences: 'Turgenev
reflected his childhood...in "Zapiski okhotnika" [A Huntsman's Diary] (text-
book for the ninth grade, p 197). Word and phraseological tables are used
(ibid., p 214).
The textbooks employ a differentiated approach to works of the active and
passive word stock. Sufficient attention is constantly paid to consolidating
the vocabulary.
At the same time it has to be mentioned that the interpretation of words in
the textbooks is not always successful. For examplefl in the textbook for
the eighth grade: "Confession--a frank avowal ~ust prior to death" (p 29;
compare the Explanation given in the S. I. Ozhegov "Slovar' russkogo yazyka"
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[Dictionary of the Russian Language]: "1. A frank acknowledgment of some-
thing, communication of one's thoughts, views... 2. Among believers: re-
~~entence oC sins before ;i priest..."); "Legend--traditional tale, account of
a real...or imaginary event which occurred long ago" (p 5; but legends about
Chapayev appeared during the civil war).
4--The intention of the pedagogical juxtaposition of two national cultures
(Russian and Kirgiz) is typical of all the testbooks on Russian literature
for the Kirgiz school, but it far from always achieves its aim to an equal
extent. Thus the interconnection of the literatures (more precisely, their
coexistence) is shown even in the textbook for the sixth grade; however, suf-
Ficient consideration of the psychology of the Kirgiz school students' appre-
hension of Russian literature is not perceived here. The textbook for the
eighth grade elucidates the following questions: "Gogo1' and the Kirgiz
Theater" and "Ch. Aytmatov on the Significance of Pushkin's Prose and His
Creative Life"; there is a comparative-stylistic analysis of translations
into Kirgiz of Pushkin's poems "MemoriaZ," "I loved you" and others. The
textbook for the ninth grade shows the beneficent influence of the revolu-
tionary democrats on the progressive part of the intelligentsia of the op-
pressed peoples of Russia (Chokan Valikhanov, Ibragim Altynaarin); there is
a description of the performance of A. N. Ostrovskiy's plays on the Kirgiz
stage and the actor's p~rtrayal of Catherine, which helped in the struggle
against vestiges of the bai attitude toward woman. The textbook for the lOth
grade contains sections of the type "Mayakovskiy and Kirgiz Literature"
(pp 194-195) and others.
S--Uther "standardizing" factors may also be mentioned; for example, unity
of approach to the use of pictorial materials ("videostimulants"), which is
also not effected consistently everywhere, in our view.
The textbooks solve the problem of the comprehensibility of the material in
planned but unequal manner. The chapters of the textbook for the ninth
grade are typical in this respect. Complicated wording (?...lyric poetry is
characterized by a special type of construction of image representing...")
(textbook for the eighth grade, p 71). However, the complaints about com-
plexity usually from methods instructors of certain republics with respect
to Kirgiz textbooks are to a certain extent made without regard for the en-
" tire system of previous years of tuition, including the fourth and fifth
grades, where abridged or summarized texts are introduced (in'the fourth
grade--S. Ya. Marshak, S. V. Mikhalkov, V. M. Garshin's "Signa.l," A. P.
- Chekhov's "Van'ka" and others).
The ideological-political full-bloodied nature of the basic material in the
textbooks is not in doubt. The authors avoid works which are artistically
weak. The texts incorporated in the readers possess serious educational
potential.
An attempt is made to link the study material with the present day (see the
examples cited above). .Ti~us the section "Korchagins of Our Day" (pp 246-
249) ha~ been inserted in the textbook for the lOth grade.
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The authors of the textbooks aspire to take account of the contemporary state
of inethods and literary-criticism thought, particularly the recommendations
(and also research) of the Russian Literature Teaching Methods Sector of the
USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences Scientific Research Institute of the
Teaching of Russian in Public Schools. The textbook for the ninth grade is
distin~uisl~ed by literary critical soundness. It should at the same time be
mentioned that the Kirgiz nethods instructors c~o not always realize modern
requirements at a sufficiently high level. Thus the textbook for the lOth
grade sets the assignment of preparing an oral reproduction of "Lines on the
Soviet Passport" (p 152) and even provides a plan of the reproduction. An
assignment such as "prepare a comprehensive description of the character of
V. I. Lenin from Mayakovskiy's poem 'Vladimir Il'ich Lenin'..." (p 192) would
hava been more meaningful and interesting, in our opinion. If in the text-
book of the seventh grade the biographical data on Pushkin has been presented
skillfully and is successful, Lermontov's life has not been described en-
tirely successfully (p 73). The textbook for the ninth grade contains the
section "Singer of Russian Rustic Nature" (pp 192-193), but, as a whole,
there is insufficient stress on the poetry of peasant labor so magnificently
conveyed by Nekrasov.
Work is underway in Kirgizia on the creation of an educational package. It
will include textbooks and methods guides for the textbooks. Methods guides
are being published, but, unfortunately, these are books of very slight
volume (approximately 6 printed sheets or even, which is more often the case,
far less); if this were to be augmented,.it could be of more solid help to
tt~e teacl~ers. Short brochures of a monographic nature like, for example,
L. A. Sheyman's "Discussion on the Writer-Citizen (for Study of the Life and
Work Path of the Russian Classical Author in the Kirgiz School)" (Frunze,
Mektep, 1970) and also articles pul~?.ished in the journal RUSSKIY YAZYK V ~
;:TRCI'LSKOY SHKOLE, in the collections 0 PREPODAVANII RUSSKOGO YAZYKA I
LITERATURY V KIRGIZSKOY SHKOLE and VOPROSY PREPODAVANIYA RUSSKOGO YAZYKA I
LITERATURY V KIRGIZSKOY SHKOLE and in other publications of the Kirgiz Sci-
entific Research Institute of Pedagogics supplement the methods guides.
Brochures from the "Kirgiz Schoolchildren's Library" series (see, for exam-
~ ple, E. A. Polotskaya, "Rasskazy A. P. Chekhova. Uchebnoye posobiye dlya
. vneklassnogo chteniya v IX klasse kirgizskoy shkoly" [Stories of A. P.
Chekhov. Study Aid for Home Reading in the Ninth Grade of the Kirgiz School],
(Frunze, Mektep, 1970) cauld also prove a certain help to the school. How-
ever, these are only individual editions and, like the methods guides, are
not reissued in good time, and, consequently, far from all teachers can
take advantage of them. Among ather components of the package, mention should
be made of the companion readers (prepared for each grade) intended for the
students' independent reading, compulsory class discussions.on home reading
envisaged by the program and also for elective classes. These readers are
linked in subject and language with the basic textbook. The book "Po
stranitsam sovetskoy literatury. Uchebnik-sputnik (chrestomatiya) dlya IX
klassa kirgizskoy shkoly" [From the Pages of Soviet Literature. A Companion
Text (Reader) for the Ninth Grade of the Kirgiz School] may serve as an
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example. Its authors are E. Sh. Abdulina, I. P. Karaseva and L. A. Sheyman
(under the general editorship of I.. A. Sheyman, Frunze, Mektep, 1973). The
book includes the sections: "Beneath the Labor Red Banner," "The USSR
at the Construction Site," "People's War," "To Be a Human Being on Earth--
A Splendld Office!" and "Ttme, forward!"
Literature for home reading is also included in the basic textbooks (in the
textbooks for the sixth and seventh grades, for example). The creation of
packages and other auxiliary material,is planned.
The current textbooks will be issued in an imporved layout in 1980.
The methods literature being published in the republic is devoted to ques-
tions of school practice and (which is the case in far from all republics)
questions of the creation of the theoretical basis for the further develop-
ment of the corresponding fundamental and applied sciences.
It would be desirable for the above-mentioned remarks to be taken into con-
sideration in the subsequent perfection of educational-methods material with
respect to Russian literature for the Kirgiz school. It would also be
useful, as mentioned by the republic's ~ethods instructors themselves, to
increase the attention paid to elements of linguistic-poetic analysis and
to the various types of the students' comments and creative quest.
(:Ol'Ylt[CFI'L': Izdatel'stvo "Ala-Too", 1979
8850 -
CSO: 1800
END
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