JPRS ID: 8990 WEST EUROPE REPORT ADOLFO SUAREZ--HISTORY OF AN AMBITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 305
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 31
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-R~P82-00850R00020006003'I -9
. aF pN

21 MARCH 1980 CFOUO 14r80) 1 OF 4
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9
FOR OFFICLII. USE ONLY
JPRS L%8990
- 21 March 1980
West E u ro e Re ort
- ~ p
(FOUO 14/80)
- Adolfo Suarez--History of an Ambition
f
- FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFC?F~MATION SERVICE
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9
rtOTE _
_ JPRS p~sblications contain information primari'y from roreign
newsoapers, periodicals an3 books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
� sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the orig~nal phrasing and -
other characteristics retained.
= Headlinesp editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
[j are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] -
, or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or followino the
last line of a brie�, indicate how the original infcrma.tion was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
- maCion was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically ~r transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. ~dords or names preceded by a ques-
t~on mark and enclos2d in parer~theses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in conte~tt. _
~ther unattributed parenthetical notes within th~ body of an
item originate with the source. Times within i.tems are as ~
given by source.
T'he coztents uf tkiis pL~~lication in no ~aa; represent the poli-
_ cies, -rie~as or at-tittides of the U.S. Gove~r�nment. -
I'or further information on r.eport ccntent .
caLl (703) 351-2811 or 351-?_~O1 lGreece,
Cyprus, Turkey).
COPYRI~fiT LAWS AND REGtJI,.~,TI0N5 GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRQDUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT D'ISSEMINATION =
- OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR GFFICIAL USE ODTLY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY'
JPRS L,~8990
- 21 March 1980
WEST EUROPE REPORT -
(FOUO 14/80)
aDOLFO SUAREZ--HISTORY OF AN AMBITION
Barcelona ADOLFO SUAREZ--HISTORIA DE U1VA AMBICION in Spanish
Oct 1979 pp 1-392, back cover, inside front cover
[Biography af Adolfo Suarez by Gregorio Moran, No 5 in the
COLECCION DOCUMENTO series, Editorial Planeta, Barcelona, 1979,
30,000 copies, 401 pages]
CONTENTS PAGE -
~ Chapter 1. A Prime Minister Is AppointPd 3
Chapter 2. The Way of the Cross in Avila 37
Chapter 3. To Madrid i~~ Search of Fortune 63
Chapter 4. At Your Orders, Commander! or, the Apprenticeship..... 70
Chapter 5. The SEU Generation Asks Permission 104
' Chapter 6. Segovia, Rest and Pleasure Stop for Those in
Power 128
Chapter 7. Fidelity to the Pasc, the Present and the Future--
Four Years as Head of the RTVE 145
Chapter 8. Money Makes Failure Less Painful 187
= Chapter 9. The Year in Which Franco Died 212
- Chapter 10. Th~ Symphony of the Prime Minister 226
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
FOR OFFI~IAL USE ONLY
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9
- FOR UFFICIAL USE ONLY
,
PUBLICATION DATA
Document Collection Series
Edit~r in chief: Rafael Borras Betriu
Editorial board: Maria Teresa Arbo, Marcel Plans, Carlos Pujol and
Xavier Vilaro
Copyright by Gregorio Moran, 1979
Published by Editorial Planeta, S. A., Cortega, 273-277, Barcelona, 8, Spain
Publication supervisor: Ester Berenguer
Collectlon and cover design: Hans Romberg (Photo�raphy by i:uropa Press and
Printing by Jordi Royo)
Illustrations thanks to Archivo Planeta, Associated Press, Cifra,
Clemente Manzano, EFE Agency, S. A., Europa Press and Poirot
First printing, October 1979
LE;gal deposit: B. 32312-19 79
ISBN 84-320-3545-9
Duplex, S. A. Graphic Workshop, Ciudad de la Asuncion, 26-D, Barcelona 30 _
Dedication: To my sons, Guillermo and David, three years and two months
old respectively, with the hope that they will one day read this book and
can understand something of our recent history.
_ - b -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[Text] BACK COVER
In the month of July 1976, a prime minister named Adolfo Suarez, a man of
- key importance who in a very few months was to direct and orchestrate the
transition from dictatorship to democracy, was appointed in Spain. Three _
= years later, Adolfo Suarez was still guiding the destiny of the country,
and Spaniards were still wondering how it was possible that someone ap-
pointed to such a high post and having had such great influence on the
political changes in recent times could be a man without a biography, either
official or unofficial.
There are some facts beyond dispute. Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez was born in
Cebreros, in the province of Avila, on a day in September 1932. On another
~ day in the month of July 1976, he was chosen by the king to take charge of -
. the cabinet. Between these two dates lies the truth, but as someone has -
said, the rest is opinion, and this myster~ous biographical lack--very
difficult to fill, because the greater part of this lire transpired under
: a system which allowed very little information to flow, and the balance
while he himself was in commaad. It is that gap this book attempts to fill.
Gregorio Moran interviewed about 200 persons, almost all of them individuals
in public life, in an e�fc~rt to grasp the slippery truth concealed behind
the facade of one of the modern European politicians about whom least is
_ known. And the fruit of.this colossal effort is an impassioned and care-
fully documented book which for the first time brings to light innumerable
- facts and circumstances which are indispensable in order to understand
today's Spain.
- c -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9
~
- � FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[Text] INSIDE FRONT COVER
Gregorio Moran was born in Oviedo in 1947. After completing his secondary
studies he enrolled in the School of Dramatic Art in Madrid, specializing ,
in stage direction. His militant opposition to Franco :ook him to Paris in _
1968, where he enrolled in courses at the Theatre Studies Ce~ter at the -
Sorbonne. In that era he worked with dramatist Armand Gaty on th~~`,production
- of the work "The Passi.on of General Franco," and at the International
- Studies and Documentation Center in Paris. He lived for some time in
Heidelberg, Germany, and traveled through Sweden, Finland and Czechoslovakia.
He was a part of~the founding staff of the periodical OPINION; he wrote for
the periodical ARREU, published in Catalan, and ~oined the editorial staff
of DIARIO 16 with a series of articles entitled "Superagent Conesa,"
dedicated to the de~ystification of the image of the veteran political~poli.ce
figure of the Franco era, Roberto Conesa. . -
In July of 1977 he wrote five articles, "The Blsck ~rood," focusing on the
extreme right wing in Spain and its internatior:al connections. These ~
articles were to be published in DIARIO 16, along with another series of
- investigative reports on right-wing terrorism, cont.ributing to the discover,~
- of those allegedly responsible for the a~tack on the pPriodical EL PAPUS.
For several munths he worked on.a history of the Spanish radio-television
network, which was published in a lengthy report in the Sunday supplement -
of EL PAIS (January, 1~78), under the title "Spanish Television: The Men ,
of the Shadows." He also wrote the subtitles for ,3uan Antonio Bardem's
film "Seven Days in January," which won the Grand Prize at the Moscow Film
I~estival.
- d -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9
I
~
FOR OFFICIAL iJSE ONLY
[Text] Preface
_ It was in January of 1979 that I realized that Sp~in had a prime minisl.~.l _
_ without a biography, either official or unofficial. He was appointed to
- that high post~in July of 1976, and thre? years later, no one seemed
interested in explaining this curious phenomenon in Spanish 20th-century
- history, inv~~lving having a prime minister whose personal background was
unknown.
In less than two years this :.~ountry of ours passed from dictatorship to
democracy in a fashion so special that one may well wonder what type of
dictatorship we left behind and what kind of democracy we ga~ned. ihe
questions, thus formulated, exceed the limitations of this volume. We are
too close to the events to have the cold objectivity needed to observe
them as a whole. ~
There are some facts beyond denying. Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez was born in
Cebreros, Avila, on a day in September, 1932. On another day in July 1976,
he was appainted by the king to take charge of the government. Between
these two dates lies the truth, but as someone has said, the rest is
- opinion, for the truth is not the same when stated by Agamemnon and by
his swineherd, and it remains for each reader to decide which of the two
to support.
Writing about living history, which is precisely what the tale of the rise
of Adolfo Suarez is, can be done in two ways, by using written documents--
statements, periodicals and records, or by faithfully gathering the
opinions of witnesses. I have tried to combine thP two formulae, re~og-
nizing that historians dealing with subjects in t' past are limited by
nothing but their capacity to search and assemble the facts, while the
1
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9
~
~ r~oK ur~r~lt;ltu. us~ UIVLY
investigator of living citizens always has one more person to see, some
data whi~h we have no way of verifying, or some lie we accept because ~f
the simple fact that it was firmly stated.
The f~cts are stubborn, and we ha~re sometimes thought that this is in ~
order to resist simplistic interpretation. To reconstruct the biography :
of a prime minister in offic:e is not an easy task, if we start from the
premise that the greater part of this biography occurred ur?der a system -
- impermeable to info~rmation, as the dictatorship was, while he has been in
- command during the balance. I have had more than 100 interviews, some of
~ them humorous and others dramatic, almost always with individuals in pub-
lic life. There have been events witnessed by five persons who firmly
set forth five different versions, vaiidating the aphorism to the effect
that the coucealment of the truth is the difficult task of the professional
politician.
This book does not analyze in depth the three long years Advlfo Suarez has
served as prime minister. It could be sa9.d that it stops on the threshold.
The constitution, the Moncloa Pact, the autonomy issue, the elections--
these require another volun:e.
I think that a detailed analysis of the last two years will introduce the
reader to another world very different from that described here. It would
_ not then be a biography of Suarez but the history of three years of democ- `
racy, much more than a prime minister and a party.
In January of 1975 I was aware that President Suarez lacked a written
biography and that this simple fact needed an e~lanation. I realized
too late, and I regrPt that some of the experts familiar with this very
~ simple fact did not warn the rest of us of what they had discovered. Many -
of those who pride themselves on having the history of the political
~ transition in the recent years at their fingertips maintain a silence
which may be due more to shame than to conviction. -
= The history of ~iving persons has among its limitations the bzlief that
personal testimony is a secret so long as the i.ntereste~ party does not
want it publicized. What we journalists know as "the confidential nature
of information sources" takes on connotations with historical implications
here. There are facts which ~annot be proven for tl~e moment other than =
on the basis of the historian's efforts and insistence. -
- The research notebooks based on personal interviews are divided into two ~
parts: that which is published and the other, which regrettably belongs
only to the personal knowledge of the investigator. There are so many =
h.istorical witnesses who have lied that one sometimes feels it is a per-
sonal failing to include them in the footnote references at the end of the :
page. I have purposely omitted scholarly references to books and personal
- statements, in some cases to protect the confidentiality of the sources
2 r
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
_ and in others to make ttie text more readable. In some cases I have made
exceptions since I did not want to break the thread of the narrative.
I have taken some literary license in the choice of phrases and surround-
ings to make these pages into something more than a personal political
story. Adolfo Suarez as a personage must sometimes be evaluated more in
terms of his context than the man himself, because of the limited impor-
tance of the individual.
This book was written between the months of January and August 1~79, thankti
~ to the aid of two good friends, Fs.r.rella and Juan, without whose help i~~ -
all respects these pages could not have been written. I also had the
collaboration of Braulio Calleja, whose faithfulness and constancy in the ~
work of documentation is worthy of note. There are others whose names I
will not, with their own interests at heart, mention, but who made an in-
estimable contribution in tolerating my impertinent questions for a number
of months.
Chapter I. A Prime Minister Is Appointed
3 December 1975
`The new president of the Cortes b2gan his address at 5:05 in the afternoon,
with the purictuality of a bullfighter. Torcuato Fernandez Miranda took
, office with his upp~r lip some~~h~t more curled than usual, i.n an ironic
and challenging rictus, reflecting, the illustrious representatives -
- gathered there supposed, his pride in the situation so many times post-
_ poned. Torcuato gazed at them again with that look of his, that of one
who has se~n many things happen. He also reiterated to them those curdling
r~hrases revealing the r.ontempt he felt for tl:~ir lordships. "You vote or
you go," he said on one cccasion to the'Count of Godo, frightened because _
his tongue-tied form was the focus of the scoffing glances of his col-
_ leagues. And the truth is that no one knew exactly who voted and who left
- in the monotonous history of that chamber.
_ Five times the representatives in the Cortes interrupted his speech--the
same men who so often turned their backs upon him when he began to be
ostracized in 1974. He was prime minister for a hundred hours on the
death of Carrero. Franco,dismissed him and his family because he had been
too much influenced by his new responsibility. In his place, after un-
fortunate consultations and assessments involving Giron, who was then in
a wheelchair, Nieto Antunez, a naval man tempted by the possibilities of
the Sofico collapse, and finally and in conclusion Carlos Arias Navarro,
this man with the fixed gaze, short moustache and restless dreams ~f a
childhood never his own emerged.
It was 13 days since the undisputed Caudillo, whom they owed so much and
who was so indebted to them, had finally passed away after a long battle
with death, which he tried to win on the same terms as he had won his
3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
battles, with patience, exhausting his opponent, humiliating and weighing
him down with the interminable waiting. But this time, if we can put it
thus, death had firmer intentions than the dictatorship, and on
20 November it carried him off.
_ Torcuato Fernandez Miranda paid respectful and challenging homage to him,
for everyone expected that the moment had come for the new president o.f
the Cortes to prevent his bill for the wrongs done him since December of
1973, when Admiral Carrero ascended to heaven, and Torcuato found himself
at the Local Credit Bank, a kind of situation very rewarding to those who
would refuse the future politician his bread and butter. Therefore
Torcuato recalled Franco and pronounced somewhat haughty or perhaps
grandiloquent words, spoken by a man who was feared and respected Uut
never loved as a professor, or as a leader, much less in this new post as
- president of the Cortes, to which His Majesty had appointed him. "I am an
honest man, and I am not bound by the past. But I am faithful to what the
past has taught me," he said in a perfect Germanic construction. And then
he also recalled, this time with sincerity, Admiral Carrero Blanco, "from
whom I learned great less~ns in patriotism and loyalty, and who with his
death taught the last lesson of his long ~nd brilliant life." -
Ministers, former ministers, governors, friends, enemies and candidates
were present, and also the so-called "table of the Cortes." After the
brief address in which he repeated the main theme with variations--I am
faithful to my past, but not bound by it--like a Bach fugue, Torcuato
approached his main adversary, Alejandro Rodriguez de Valcarcel, and
embraced him. The two men were separated by all the things whicli make up
the life of a politician: family, culture, party supporters, sponsors.
They were also separated by intelligence and luck. Alejandro had had the
misfortune of ending his term of office as president of the Cortes just at
the time of the Wagnerian death of Franco. Torcuato, for his part, was '
lucky in that the first d~.c:Ision of King Juan Carlos was to fill the
vacancy in the post of president of the Cortes.
The kirig suggested to iurcuato that he seek the presiding post iri the
Council of Ministers. If the necessity was to remove Carlos Arias, no one
could manage the situation better than he. He understood as did few others
the regime which had just died a natural death, and he knew how far it
would be necessary to go to avoid a political break with the old system.
They knew each other, king and vassal, from 20 years previo us. They began
as professor and student, and now they found themselves in a similar _
situation, although reversed. Torcuato rejected the offer with a gesture
which honored him more for his foresight than his modesty. It is reported
that he gave the king this answer: "I can render greater service to the
crown as head of the Cortes and the Council oz= the Realm." For the
two posts were joined like the heads of Siamese twins: in order for the
post-Franco operation to be successful, the two bodies had to be kept -
alive. The time would come for the inevitable surgical operation.
- 4
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9
I
FOP, OFFICIAL USE ONLY
r
Arias Navarro was fully aware that his main competitor was named
~ Fernandez Miranda, and for this reason he enthusiastically supported the
idea of putting him in the presidency of the Cortes, too mediatized by
the executive b ranch to pose an immediate threat. What did concern him
was presiding over the Council of the Realm, a musty body which resurrected
tLSelf every Lew years on liistoric occasions, buC witli wliicl~ on some oc-
casions he would have to deal, if only to discigline it. As no good is
~ achieved without risk, Arias took the risk, aware that it was the lesser
evil, which would give him several years' breathing space.
_ Arias became agitated when in an obvious gesture of challenge, and in 1.~:
gutteral voice which seemed to come more from his lower abdomen than his
throat, Torcuato ended his address with three cries which caugh t him un-
awares. "I express my feelings, I voice my sentiments," said _
Fernandez Miranda, with the redundancy of a former professor, "with the
three cries which come from my heart: Long live Spain! Long live the
king! Spain forever!" This was to be the last time the new president of
the Cortes would shout "Spain forever." And also the last time the state -
and government authorities gathered there would echo the cry.
7 December 1975
Early in the morning on that Sunday, Carlos Arias Navarro and his friend,
confidant and cabinet minister Jose Garcia Hernandez set out to go hunting.
They headed for the La Pinchares estate, near Toledo, in weather so cold
it could not be offset by the carafe of Carlos I with which they ended
their generous b realcfast. However. much they sought to forget their _
political worries, the smallest detail reminded them of the burning
reality. It was enough that they were alone. To be able to forget recent -
- events took too much of an effort. For Arias, hunting not only meant =
physical exercise, but the opportunity to think away from the offices, '
which in his experience always involved listeners, controls or unt:Lmely ~
calls. _
. Thirty hours had not elapsed since the king, stressing the authority and _
the tense relations linking him to President Arias, had telephoned, after ~
the Council of Ministers meeting was ended, asking for a public announce-
ment of the fact that "Mr Arias Navarro is confirmed as prime minister."
The call came at 1:15 in the afternoon and it was like a bucket of wat?r ~
which chilled the cabireet. The king let them know that the president was
confirmed. In other words, he was forcing them to present their resigna-
tions. In a calm week foretalling the exercise of power with mediatization, -
in the manner and fas!iion of which Arias dream~d, without haste and with
long pauses, the royal call echoed like pounding at the door.
Arias Navarro had achi~ved control of the royal will, subjugating it, as -
he liked to say in his postwar former military ~rosecutor's vocabulary. -
A few hours after the death of Franco, the Caudillo, a high-level political
5
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040240060031-9
~
Nuit ur~r'1c;iEU, u5~: ~aLY -
operaeion was lau:~ctied to remove him from the presidency. It was not even
necessary t~ keep the cards concealed. It sufficed, on approaching
E1 Pardo and greeting Juan Carlos, to note how ill-advised it would be to
reverse a decision by the General, who had given him everything and to whom
everyone owed all that they were, and it is to be presumed that this was -
reiterated several times by all. And it sufficed for a commission of the
medaled officers, their sashes impeccable, to visit La 'Larzuela to express
disapproval of the maneuvers seeking to remove this honest man and good
� friend, who had governed since the Caudillo graced him with his divine
favor in January of 19i4, to ensure that nothing could be done. It suf-
ficed, finally, for the men with ascendancy in ch~ new regime, such as
General Alfonso Armado, secretary to the king, to believe that to remove
Aria~ would be "an error, a great error," to transform Operation Lolita
= into grist f~r ti~e historians.
In a proper liberal parliamentary interpretation, the death of Franco _
forced the prime minister to offer his resignation. There were two
_ reasons for not doing so, and Arias Navarro seized upon both without the _
slightest hint of a blush. First of all, reference to the liberal `
tradition or that of the parliament would be a solipsism. Arias, like
almost everyone from that same historical era, was neither a liberal, nor
much less still a parliamentarian. Recourse to this tradition would mean
considerable lack of conscience and a sense of humor, but neither con-
- science nor humor have anything to do with politics.
In addition, Arias was holding a joker for discard. It was an affair
- which had happened only a couple of months previous, and could now already
be considered old history. When the death of rranco seemed to be a
certainty--and it seems that for many this was only when he had already
been dead several weeks--King Juan Carlos decided to send General
Diaz Alegria, representing the armed forces, to convince his father,
Don Juan de Borbon, that he should not make any statement which would make
_ the reestablishment of the monarchy in the person of his son more diffi-
cult. This step was taken without any consultation at all by His Majesty,
and Arias Navarro, who could have dissembled and swallowed this had it
come from the Generalissimo, was not prepared to repeat the experience
with the inexperienced king. And he grew angry. This anger, strongly
felt, was then transformed into his resignation in writing, which, when he
~ saw that Juan Carlos was in a difficult position, became an "irrevocable -
decision." With Franco moribund, and the general political situation _
deteriorating, one did not have to be Winston Churchill to realize that _
Arias could not resign without causing a trauma and irrevers~.ble conse-
- quences for the crown. And so the t~arquis of Mondejar was sent along with ~
- detailed instructions to go as far as necessary to persuade Arias not to -
resign.
Arias had accumulated in himself enough private and public history to know
- how to be cruel, and it appears he was excessively so with the Marquess of
Mondejar. Not anly did he refuse for several days to reconsider his
6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R004200060031-9
FOR ~FFTCIAL US~ ONLY
~ resi~nation, ~_n order to "teach the Borbon a lesson," as it was said in
the waning days of the dictatorship, but forced him to apologize in such a
_ ~aay that it is unclear if this was political sadism or simple contempt.
- As of that day, which added a little more ~rey to the hair of the marqiiis
and a few centimeters more to the security and self-confidence of
' Arias Navarro, the president took the position that he had been appointed
by Franco in January of 1974, and would remain in office until he decided
ott~erwise, since the consitution provi~~ied for a five-year presidential
'term.
It had occurred to the ingenuous political minris present at La Zzrzuela
_ on th.: death of the dictator that Arias would submit his resignation, aiic
_ that the king rsight b~gin his political reign with a new president. They
even devised a substitute, Jose Maria Lopez de Letona y Nunez del Pino,
a roads, canals and ports engineer who had served as minister of industry
under the government formed during the October 1969 crisis, and of w~hom it
could be said, as his highest virtue, that he was never excess3vely any-
_ thing, although he was always everytvhere. Philosophical reflection
indicated, dispassionately, the most obvious conclusion: the advisers to
Juan Carlos preceding Fernandez Miranda were courtly council members, not
in the Goethian sense, but physically: they were members of the Court.
- Someone wittily dubbed the operation to make Lopez de Letona prime minister
' "O~eration Lolita," not, regrettably, in honor of Nabokov, who wrote an
excellent book with that happy title, which would have been a stroke of ~
genius, but in honor of a no less ingenious operation, with
- Gregorio Lopez Bravo, idiotically called Lola, as its protagonist.
It is almost certain that Torcuato regarded this operation as the work of
amateurs. If Arias was not prepared to offer his resignation formally,
_ at least those of his ministers must be offered. It would not be easy to
speak of the "confirmation of Arias as prime tninister" to the publj.c,
because the newspapers at the time seemed to have lost their direction,
some giving the date of confirmation as the third and others the fifth.
In brief, there was no such confirma.tion until the king forced matters and,
in the last half-hour of the Council of Ministers session, announced that
Arias would continue to preside, and that in pure logic, the ministers
= should offer their resignations.
Arias was locked into power because Franco appointed him for five years,
- and because the king, for his part, expected no change in the nature of
the system. Thus he would go off hunting self-confident, although
somewhat annoyed with the impertinent hangers-on who brought bad tidings.
Hunting on the La Pinchares estate is mediocre. Arias could not concen-
trate on the quarry, and in addition his companion did nothing but come
back to the same old subject. "The ministers have resigned and
Torcuato Fernandez Miranda has asked to see you tomorrow to talk." He
was not unaware that there was a relation between the two things. -
Garcia Hernandez was a cabinet minister and knew very well what steps
- Torcuato had been taking.
7 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE Oi?LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9
A'ux uri~ i~tEw u5r: UIVLY
It cannot be said that Arias was nervous in anticipating his meeting u:ith
Torcuato. It concerned him, that is all. It is not easy to understand
this new president of the Cortes, with his peasant's laugh from which one
cannot tell whether something has amused him or whether his interlocutor
merits guffaws. Arias has played mus, a current game, with the peasants
in Asturias, during tlie summer in Salinas, many times, hut Torcuat4's l,iu~li
is notable because it comes at unexpected times.
The two hunters returned early to Madrid. They had risen with the dawn and
Arias had to prepare for his meeting with the king the following morning,
; and his call upon Torcuato in the afternoon. He believed that the talk
_ would not be easy, and that it would affect the formation of the new gov-
- ernment. He was not prepared Co yield. On his own initiative and encouraged
by the king, he caanted to go far in incorporating men excluded in the past

- in the government. But to yield to pressure--never.
Arias' house in the outskirts of Pladrid seemed a~andoned when Torcuato
arrived. Night was beginning to fall, and it was not easy to distinguish -
tl:e sign reading "La Chiripa," which identiiied the house. December is not
the best month for paying visits in Castille. Arias believed that Torcuato -
would have in the pocket of his suit, of ~~uch an ancient cut that it
appeared to have been won in scme wager, the list of ministers the king and
he had drafted. If they think I will be like Santiago de Alba with
Alfonso XIII, he thought, they have a shock coming. But he was surprised
to see Torcuato seat himself and confirm each of his ministerial proposals,
one by one. Not until the end did Torcuato mumble, in a tone which sought
to be advisory but sounded authoritarian: "I want to make a suggestion to
you."
= And the suggestion was that this young man heading the Union of the Spanish
People (UDPE) should be minister of the movement. His name was -
Adolfo Suarez. Arias had no better argument to reject this than to say:
- "Impossible! Franco askec':ne specifically to see that Solis held this'post
when Herrero Tejedor died, and to remove him would be to against his last
~ political instructions." Arias could not have been wholly persuaded,
because when Torcuato told him that he need not be dismissed as a minister,
he agreed. "Why not put him in the labor post?"
Truly, Arias had not expected this. That Torcuato proposed Solis as
minister of labor pleased him: the post was occupied by Fernande Suarez,
one of Torcuato's disciples at the University of Oviedo, and Arias had
felt no great sympathy with him in those months, in view of his impertinent
nature, which had led him on some occasions to go so far as to interrupt
his address in the Council of Ministers because somE inattentive person _
was talking of something else. "Either you stop talking or l do." It was
_ already known that these things displeased everyone, particularly the man
_ presiding over the council, who in the final analysis has the last word. :
In addition, Fernando was well established with the king, because he was
credited with a statement, in connection with Juan Carlos, when Arias
8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY '
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9
FOR OFrICIAL USE ONLY
~
. threater.ed to resign because of ttie royal decision to send Diaz Alegria
to talk with his father: "This lad," Fernando said, "will have to be
taught a lesson."
Everyone was happy. Ousting Fernando Suarez won unanimous approval. When
Torcuato left La Chiripa, Adolfo was confirmed as minister and secretary
general of the movement. Fernando, accused by students of the Franco era ~
of exploiting his own achievements excessively, found his career up a
blind alley. A few months later, Juan Carlos, by royal decree, appointed
him procurator. An attempt at amends, while the sea was flat as a plate,
~ such that no one could progress in the dead calm. Here lay the end for cl
man who, like Adolfo, bore the name Suarez Gonzalez.
- 13 December 1975
The hour of the Angelus had not yet struck, but former Minister
Garcia Hernandez had already pronounced his words of farewell on behalf of
the outgoing cabinet. His sentences rang cold and formal, as was inevitably
the case when so~e were leaving and others settling in. It was Saturday
and it was raining.
One by one the ministers took their oaths before the king, a little stiff
because at that moment they were going down in history as the first govern-
ment under the monarchy. They proceeded in strict hierarchic order, as was
proper, although there was one, Arias Navarro, who did not feel obliged to
repeat his oath, and who watched the scene being played abstractly, with a
mild suspicion that he was destined to surrender the leading actor's role.
~The prima donnas in the new government bore names oft repeated in recent -
months: Manuel Fraga and Jose Maria de Areilza. Fraga, in the interior -
post, ranking as second deputy prime minister in the cabinet, was thought
to be in the ideal political position, followi~,g his experience at the
head of two corporations--the Federation of Independent Study, Inc.
(FEDISA), and the Documentation and Orientation Office, Inc. (GODSA),
established to distribute political dividends. He was a little out of
_ touch with the administrative machinery, for after his resignation as
minister in October 1969, his greatest concern had been travel and study.
Areilza, the new minister of foreign affairs, had for his part achieved a
dream which came to him rather late. At the age of 76 it is not easy to
_ sustain an illusion which may become reality. Count of Motrico by virtue
of his marriage to Mercedes Churruca, he constituted the prototype of the
- political animal of the Spanish right wing. His past was unmistakably tied
to Franco, because he was Mola's liaison in the early days of ~the war, and
also because of his proclamations as the first post-republican mayor of
Bilbao. At a splendid moment in his career as ambassador in Paris, he _
resigned and went to Estoril to devote himself to advising
Don Juan de Borbon. As of that moment, the Spanish right wing hated him,
feared him or scoffed at him, but never regarded him as its genuine
representative. He ~vas closer, in terms of culture and manner of acting, -
9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9
FOR OFFICIAL U~E ONLY '
to the politicians of the 19th century than to the businessmen of the
20th century.
- At some distance .from the two figures who were the focus of all eyes were
the second rank with a future: Minister of the Office of Prime rtinister
Alfonso Osorio, Minister of Finance Jua~l Miguel Villar rli r, Minister ot
Commerce Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, Minister of Agriculture Virgilio Onate,
riinister of Syndica~ Relations Rodolf~ Tiartin Villa, Minister of Housing
Francisco Lozano, Piinister of Public Works Antoni~ Valdes, and Minister
- of the Movement Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez. Although the path toward the
future would not be easy for them, five of them had the advantage of being
highway engineers (Villar Mir, Calvo Sotelo, Onate, Lozano and Valdes) au,~ -
the other three did not need it. Osorio had been seeking a ministry since
1965, when General Munoz Grandes, then deputy prime ~n.inister, talkecl aJong
these lines with Minister of Labor Jesus Romeo Gorria, stressing the
respect commanded by the young State Attorney Osorio Garcia from his
. father-in-law, former Minister of Commerce Arburua, and Franco himself.
Neither Rodolfo nor Suarez needed any introduction, their political im-
portance being beyond question.
Then came the institutional men: Antonio Garrigues and Minister of
Justice Diaz Canabate, who at 71 represented the right wing by family
tradition, and the diplomatic corps, in addition to his service in
~ Washington and at the Holv See, by his care�ully maintained silences.
Lieutenant Generals De Sa~.tiago and Diez de Mendivil, Alvarez Arer~as and _
Franco Iribarneqaray, along ~�~th Admiral Pita da Veiga, were the in-
, carnation of the army, and tt.~ir appointments, as always happens, were
dictated by leaders of a military sort which could not be measured by the _
same criteria as the civilian ones. It could however be said that they -
retlected continuity in command and little more. Jose Solis, f~r his part,
was a relic of the past, who was not devoid of experience and the capacity
to maneuver.
Others were considered as hono~able supplementary figures: Minister of -
Education Carlos Roble~ Piquer, a Fraga supporter by fa~nily tradition and '
conviction, Minister of Information and Tourism Adolfo Martin Gamero, -
_ a career diplomat since 1945, and Carlos Perez de Bricio, a discreet
figure in the customs administration, who in time would aspire, without -
much success, to become a Politician with a capital letter.
The cabinet was closer to the king th.an its own president, and its most
notable characteristic was that it carried within itself the seed of its ~
- destruction, each individual being there for different reasons. Before !
the installation of the cabinet had ended, the least perspicacious guest
had realized that with it the interim Arias period had begun, and the
shots which would launch the minister-athletes on the race to replace him !
had been fired.
10
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE OLVLY
Most notable for his absence from this conclave was the Christian democrat -
Federico Silva Munoz, too confident of his luck in the future when the
trump suit would change to want to become embroiled. The conditions he ~
set for participating in the government were so burdensome as to make it -
impossible. Arias, fully familiar with the case of the politicn], clns:~
of the Franco era, feared him more than anyone else, and he was not mis-
taken, as he was the strongest contender when the time for substitution
came.
The commentators on that 13th of DecemL;:r failed to remark the visit paid
by the ambassador of the United States, Wells Stabler, to President Aria:.;
some hours before the cabinet appointments were announced. Presumab ly -
Stabler, who traveled to London to meet with Kissinger and the American
ambassadors in Europe, wanted to obtain an accurate picture of the upcoming
- Spanish cabinet. -
Two high-level military moves, one of which was to enjoy success, the other
suffering a delay, also went unnoticed. Gen.eral Sabino Fernandez Campo,
from Asturias like Torcuato Fernandez Miranda, a mi.litary interventor,
- with a degree in the economics of war and an alumnus of the United States
Industrial College, was appointed to the undersecretariat of the office of
the prime minister, just a short distance f;:om the office occupied by
Arias Navarro, and next door to Alfonso Osorio. When Suarez became prime
minister and General Alfonso Armada won the right to replace him in the
secretariat of the king, Sabino took his place, where he remains to the
present. The maneuver which could not be completed, although it was
deferred to await subsequent events, was the appointment of the commanding _
general in Ceuta, General Gutierrez Mellado, as military minister.
In the second week of December, which was stormy in terms and weather, one
needed to keep an ear to the ground to comment on and study the political _
situation. Accustomed to keeping their ears open under the preceding
regime, commentators were unaware that things had changed somewhat. _
History had become more sophisticated and interpretations had to be made
as the events occurred. The reality had become a deception: some politi-
cal sorcerer was trying to confuse the path of our intelligence with a red
_ herring.
27 December 1975 -
The officials who presented themselves in impeccable fashion for the
launching of the Adolfo Suarez team in the secretariat general were
angered by the way things were set up, It would have occurred to no one
to schedule the investiture between Christmas Eve and New Year's, at the -
risk of great haste and contempt for the sacrosanct family tradition.
Finally there was nothing for it but to attend, and they stopped grumbling
when all at once they recalled that the mi.nister had just lost his mother-
in-law and gave no sign of b~-:ng aware of it. -
11
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The minister of rhe movement was in a hurry: }~e wanted his team to take
ofEice and begin to move. lIe had appointed Ignacio Garcia Lopez as i~is
deputy secreCary, while the experts thought that the minister's number-two
man would be ~duardo Navarro. In 1963 Adolfo had served as liead of tl~e
legal advisory department in the office for youth, among many other things,
- and he had met Ignacio, who wa~ secretary general to the representative,
- ~ugenio Lopez y Lopez, there. Iie was impressed by his discretion, modesty
and the fact that he owed everything to the movement, even the political -
course of study he had pursued. The last to depart, those who turn out the
- lights and leave the empty building behind them, do not usually go down in
- history. It would always be the fate of Ignacio Garcia Lopez to bring up
the rear. The last head of the Youth Front, the last SEU [Spanish
University Unica] commissioner, the last minister and secretary gen~ral of ~
the movement. Ai:d he was to be known as the "royal senator of the 40," the "
last senators to be desi~;nated.
The rest of the team was made up of the technical secretary general, -
Eduardo Navarro, the service administrator, Jose Luis Graullera Mico, and
two women, the national culture delegate, Carmen Llorca, and
Carmen Diez de Rivera, who was not to last long as the personal secretary
of Adolfo. She stayed only a few weeks, long enough however to provide
the minister with documentary background which in the course of time was
- to be indispensable to him, concerning what the illegal political parties,
i.e. all of them, were, and what they thought. A month later the team was
to be completed with the addition of Manuel Ortiz in the department of the
provinces.
The only unknown person in Adolfo's new team, if we except Carmen Llorca,
- a transitional figure in this tale, was Eduardo Navarro. He had been one
of the leading minds in the Twentieth Century in the SEU years, and he was
regarded as a young man with a great future if his education and political -
talent overcame his timidity to qualify him in politics. During the months
he served as technical secretary general he provided the "grey matter" for
the reform operations, and repeatedly wrote the speeches of the minister. _
When Adolfo became pr~me minister, this man, whom everyone suspected of
~ being sought out b~ major business enterprises and who had served on
various levels of the regime, was set aside, perhaps because he lacked '
- faith in Adolfo Suarez. It is known that no one likes to be reminded,
even by his presence alone, of the medals he won on the merit of others.
19 January 19 76
Adolfo recalled nostalgically how the National Council of the Movement
- elected Antonio Jose Rodriguez Acosta to fill the vacancy left by
Herrero Tejedor, on his tragic death, in the gro�ap of "the 40," a nucleus
of venerable figures or Buddhas, so known because they were the vestige
of the direct appointments by Franco. By the time of the death of the
dictator the routine procedure had developed in a very curious fashion.
- When a vacancy occurred due to death, since these were council inembers ;
12
FOR OFFICTAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
who only resigned by reason of age, at 75, the remaining 39 met and chose
3 names, from which the national council in plenary session would subse-
- quently choose 1 r,o occupy the post.
T}~e simple listing of some of the names of the members of tiie council of
"tl~e 40" will provide some idea of the importance and cliarac.teristics oC
. the group: Antonio Iturmendi, Jose Luis Arrese, Alfonso Perez Vineta,
Mariano Calvino de Sabucedo y Gras, Jesus Suevos, Torcuato Fernandez Miranda,
Jesus Fueyo, Jose Antonio Giron de Velasco, Laureano Lopez Rodo,
- Antonio Maria de Oriol y Urquijo, Gabriel Pita da Veiga,
the Primo de Riveras, and even the prime minister himself,
Carlos Arias Navarro. Belonging to this great family was among the dreams
of every young politician in the system: acceptance in it was re~arded as _
living political canoni.zation. Every individual free of dust and straw
- and dubious affiliations aspired to become one of "the 40." It was, in -
the end, the certification of a Franco era pedigree.
Adolfo made it known he would like to be included among the three, and
those in a position to do so advised him that his time had not come, that
- he should wait, and that it would come. The battle between former
Interior Minister Jose Garcia Hernandez and the young Rodriguez Acosta
- was to be a harsh one. The other candidate, Emilio Lamo de Espinosa,
was not so well favored. _
- Those who advised Adolfo knew very well what was happening.
- ~ Garcia Hernandez, a friend and confidant of the prime minister, believed
that he was more than well enough qualified to win and he was defeated by
Rodriguez Acosta. The lesson was clear: in the national council, the
_ cabinet had a midwife attentive to its every step and ready at any moment
= to validate its historical rights and its old medals.
28 January 1976
The alliancz between Minister of the Office of Prime Minister -
~ Alfonso Osorio and Minister of the Movement Adolfo Suarez was formalized
_ by a decree. No one could deal with the matters pertaining to Osorio's
post better than Adolfo. The trip Osorio was to make to the United States
forced them to reach agreement, and the BOLETIN OFICIAL published the order
announcing that Adolfo Suarez would serve as minister of the office of
prime minister in the absence of the incumbent.
11 Feb ruary 19 76
The notice was carried in the pages of the newspapers for 10 days, and
yet it went unnoticed. A mixed commission of representatives of the
government and the national council was established to organize
"political reform." The idea came from Adolfo, as a gesture honoring the
irresistible figure ot Fernandez Miranda, who had already attempted it ~
13
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
unsuccessfully during the period he served as minister of Che movement
(1969-1973). Now the man who aspired to be his dauphin extracted it from
' his bag of souvenirs to show that he was prepared to follow in his foot-
steps exactly.
'I'I~e ~overnmeut was represented by Carlos ~rias, Adolfo Su~rez,
Fraga Iribarne, Villar Mir, Areilza, Garriguess Martin Villa, Solis,
Osorio and General De Santiago, and the council by Giron, Fueyo, -
- Primo de Rivera, Garcia Hernandez, Orti Bordas, Sanchez de Leon, and
Torcuato, serving as master of ceremonies, with his ironic gaze. Eighteen =
appointees for reform, as the newspapers liked to write. The news had
been released on the first, but no one on the streets lost a minute in
commenting on i*_. Another event which was more human and direct and more
laden with significance had caught everyone's attention:
Carmen Polo de Franco left the E1 Pardo Palace that day. Those with a
movie-oriented imagination thought that this was the end of an historic
era.
It was necessary to await 11 February before the meeting of the mixed
commission was the focus of attention. The tasks of the commission were
oriented toward the drafting and discussion of three laws: the Constitu-
tion of the Cortes, the Succession Law and the Political Affiliation Law.
But from the very first, Arias Navarro made his future plans very clear.
"What I desire is to continue the Franco policy. And while I am here or
active in public life I wi11 do nothing but strictly pursue that policy
in all its aspects, and I will fight the enemies of Spain who are beginning
to show their heads." These words, recorded accurately by Areilza in his
"Diary of a Minister Under the Monarchy," seemed credible and even rather
polished, in the light of later events. Arias, who in the final analysis
- would be the traffic policeman who would give the green or red light, was
accustomed to stating his political thoughts publicly with coricise
clarity: "Constitutional reforms will be needed and timely." In other
words, those on which he would decide. The mixed commission appeared to
be a luxury v~hicle, but one plagued by breakdowns, which Arrias was not
prepared to repair.
13 February 1976
The United States ambassador, Welles Stabler, visited P4inister of the
Movement Adolfo Suarez early in the morning. With the sensitive nose
characteristic of American ambassadors, Stabler was interested in knowing -
the man who so regularly associated with King Juan Carlos.
� Stabler, who en~oys the keenest sense of hearing, knew that on the second
of the month Adolfo Suarez had taken two steps of great interest: he
visited the king and suggested to him that the ideal man to replace _
Arias Navarro was Torcuato Fernandez Miranda, and he dismissed the press
_ officer of the Movement, Emilio Romero, the same man who in a panegyric
- 14
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
of welcome to the president of the Cortes had used some prophetic phrases:
"Another thing which can be sensed nowadays is the desire for new men.
Naturally, this is said from rostrums for criticism, aspiration or opposi- -
tion. And the most reasonable thing would be also to ask for new men in -
these same fraternities of criticism, aspiration and opposition, so full of
old faces and men who have waited too long." Probably the two decisions
were only sequential in time, but ambassadors are people who waste no
opportunity to demonstrate what they know.
_ 20 February 1976
The Council of Ministers met. Arias was beginning to feel importuned. Hc
- was not unjustified in thinking so, nor did his ministers cease to provide
that justification. There were many aspects to the battle front, and the
~ president, accustomed to using firmness in blocking initiatives, wanted to
build a wall of containment around the mixed commission. Making use of
the Official Secrets Law dated 5 April 196$, which had happened to Fraga
when he was minister of information and tourism, everything pertaining to
the mixed commission was declared "classified material."
From that moment on, the press could no longer carry anything but govern-
ment releases. The "political reform" was rendered secret by the
government itself. Two days before the decree, the secretary of the
National Council, Baldomero Palomares, indicated that the discussions
concerning reform were so open and frank that it did not seem possible
tc~ declare them secret."
1 rtarch 1y76
As if the world turned according to Galileo's concept and life, when all
is said and done, had no sense beyond jumbled impressions of the time
elapsed, the highest body in Spanish politics, the Council of the Realm,
met once again. After Torcuato Fernandez Miranda took office to preside,
things had changed. Using the text of the constitution as his recourse,
Torcuato managed to sell the counc3.1 members succes~fully on the fact that
that body should have life and serve as the permanent guide of the politi-
cal situation. The time had come to put meetings held to alleviate
~ critical situations in the past; in the future, the council would meet
every 15 days and follow the political situation closely.
It was not easy for Torcuato to supply the Council of the Realm with
= political material to avoid a pejorative interpretation of its meetings
- eve�ry 15 day~. All kinds o� documents, in greater or lesser quantity,
- were dissected by the illustrious and upright council members. The compo-
sition of the council facilitated discussion and things moved along with
a certain ease. The most important personages in the old regime were there.
Members as a function of ~tt~ir posts included Manuel Lora Tamayo,
president of the Institute of Spain; veteran churchman Pedro Cantero
- Cuadrado and military officers Carlos Fernandez Vallespin and
15 =
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
_ Angel Salas Larrazabal; the president of the Supreme Court,
Valentin Silva Melero, and the president of the Council of State,
Antonio Maria de Oriol y Urquijo.
The Council of the Realm had heen envisaged hy Fr~nco as the hi~;hest ~
expression oi rl~e concentration of power, and it had to ~ive its consent
for all historic decisions, including the choice of the three possibili- _
ties for the highest representative posts, and it had "to be heard" in
- order to remove the prime minister. It also had preceptive rights to
draft the list of three candidates to succeed him. It was the cornerstone
of the regime, unimportant in itself, but basic if what was sought was to
avoid a break.
In addition to the council members who served as a function of their
appointed posts, there were the representatives. Those elected by the
National Council were Giron de Velasco and Miguel Primo de Rivera; those
_ elected by the trade unions were Dionisio Martin Sanz and
Luis Alvarez Molina. The local administrations elected Araluce Villar,
and the popular representatives, the euphemism for the members of the
Cortes, were Joac~uin Viola Sauret and Enrique de la Mata Gorostizaga. -
And, finally, there were the representatives of the government chambers,
Inig~ Oriol, and the university, Angel Gonzalez Alvarez. In all, there -
were 16 men on whom the destiny of the country weighed, not so much
_ because they felt it as because their opinion was indispensable to any
adrance along the path the "pro~rammers" had laid out.
_ With strict punctuality, they met twice a month. No one can imagine the
- contentment of the members of the Council of the Realm, aware of their
importance, when they met every 15 days to scrutinize the advance of
history in Spain. Torcuato had convinced them of their weight and dis-
covered what Franco had denied them: everything could be done with them,
and nothing without.
3 March 1976
Vitoria, a city which ceased to play a role in history after the battle
- against the French on 23 June 1813, and which was anti-republican on
18 July 1938, again assumed a place in the internal history of Spain.
The general strike had been called. The attitude of the police resulted
in two dead and more than a hundred wounded.
The news arrived while the Mixed Government-National Council Commission
was meeting. The absence of three ministers (Fraga, Solis and Areilza)
away on trips or indisposed, and the absence of Giron on a matter of
principle, did not prevent discussion of the decisions to be made.
Lopez Bravo had just spoken against the authorization of the Marxists,
and the men with a Falange background were incensed because they were not
prepared to surrender the symbols of the Falange to any unscrupulous
group, since their electoral credibility would be enormous.
16
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY '
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
While Fraga traveled to Germany and Arielza spent two days "enmeshed in
th e hazy bonds of influenza, which clouds the understanding and jeopar-
dizes the will," as h~ wrote in his diary, Adolfo Suarez left the meeting -
and proposed to test his ability as a man of government. He directed the
_ operations of the forces of public order following the massacre from a
distance, with no goal other than to prevent further conflict and more
bloodshed. The outcome was positive, perhaps much more for his particular
purposes than for those of the citizens of Vitoria. From that time on he
never tired of telling the king, the ministers, and all his colleagues of =
- the effective steps he took to offset the crowded funeral of the victims.
_ The king, for his part, was vividly impressed by the minute detail and
expository talent of which Adolfo Suarez, future minister of the interior, _
boasted, and he had to repeat the story in some private interviews in
that era. It was a precept that the interior post would automatically go -
to the official responsible for the Movement, in the absence of its head.
29 March 1976 -
Torcuato Fernandez riiranda met with the minister of the movement in the
office of the president of the Cortes. First of all he congratulated him
for his action with re;ard to the events in Vitoria, particularly not
having supported a declaration of a state of emergency. In a rather more
difficult situation, Torcuato had also refrained from this step, although
pressed to do so, and he was able to avoid it. The death of
Admiral Carrero Blanco could not be compared with the incidents in
Vitoria, but he congratulated him.
Torcuato was aware of Adolfo's suggestion to the king that he was the
candidate best suited to replacing Arias, and he hoped that Adolfo would
repeat it. When he did so he shot back at him: "And why not you?" And
Adolfo continued to talk as if he had not heard the words spoken bp the
president of the Cortes. Nothing more was necessary, for these things are -
not forgotten. He had already noted certain obvious indications that he
- was beginning to be regarded as a candidate, but this time Torcuato,
without promising too much, had tempted him with the prospect of the
prime ministry in the future.
Adolfo's colleagues commented later that on that occasion Tor~uato
expanded on the reform project without subterfuge. He did not show all
his cards, because this would be equivalent to a break with his style of
political work, but he tempered it somewhat concerning the viability of
expecting the mixed commission--in which Adolfo placed great hope--to
serve as something more than an illusion for the naive, and to make the
- gullible believe that reform would advance there. Nor did he reveal any-
thing about the final significance of the bimonthly meetings of the Council ~
of the Realm, but he did reveal the key "urgent procedure" decision. The -
majority of the Cortes members were reformists, and if not, the executive
17
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
' branch was in a position to convert them, hut the same was not tlle c.zse L11
' tlie vazious commissions, controlled by the traditionalists devoted to tlie
study of reform. To prevent the parliament from torpedoing these com-
~
missions with its delays and interminable discussions, Torcuato had -
conceived the "urgent procedure," according to which a law could go
directly to the plenum of the Cortes, bypassing the obstacle represented
by the commissions. This would be used for the first time, with great
success, in May, in connection with the law regulating the right of
assembly.
Of the whole complex of laws the secretary general of the Movement was
drafting to get reform started, only one had interested Torcuato. It was
the law on pol~tical affiliation, sometimes improperly called the political
reform law. The others, which Eduardo Navarro and Juan Santamaria had
drafted--the law on assembly, the amendment to the Penal Code, and the
draft constitution in the two aspects pertaining to amendment of the suc-
cession 1aw and the organic law, appeared to Torcuato to be like
celestial music, perhaps convenient for deceiving opponents, but dangerous
if one believed that this path led anywhere.
From that time on, Adolfo knew that Torcuato had become his sponsor, and _
that he should call him every day to be guided in the risky world of
reform, not only because he needed this aid but because he had realized
that Torcuato's pride and intellectual vanity required that he behave
like an industrious disciple. Torcuato would give him a bonus if he ~
promptly adopted the teachings and suggestions of the master. It was also
Adolfo's intuition that one of Torcuato's concerns was to follow the steps
of Arias. And if he wanted to control him, to know what he feared and to
provide Fraga and Areilza with false clues to confuse him.
Adolfo's experience as the government representative in the telephone
company in 1975 helped him to deal with the technical difficulties. In
addition, he could rely on .Tuan de la Cierva, a businessman in electronics
for whom there was a solution to every problem if there was money to pay -
for it. He was a nat~ve of Murcia, the brother of the writer -
Ricardo de la Cierva, who had free access to Zarzuela and who enjoyed
substantial technical prestige. Also he had visited the Mecca of applied
electronics, the United States.
~ At the very beginning Adolfo had installed a private telephone line from
his home in Puerta de Hierro and the headquarters of the rlovement at
No 44 Alcala. No one made more circumspect use of the number 13, the
direct line to the king, than he. For Adolfo this was more a lucky number
than a symbol of misfortune. The truth is he had become accustomed to -
dialing it without smiling, as he did at the beginning. He had always
wanted to ask Juan Carlos why he had chosen 13 as his private number.
r. -
Torcuato, for his part, was already sounding out Areilza about the possi-
bility of replacing Arias Navarro, and had found him very receptive. A
_ 18
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9
F'OP. OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
week liad passed, and he tiad the feeling that his talk wou7.d produce
effects. Areilza wrote tt~e following in Eiis diary: "I saw Fernandez Mir.anda
in l?is off~Ice. `May I ask you some entirely indiscreet questions?' he
inquired. 'Naturally.' He took up the subject of the prime minister wiCl.~
me directly, saying that it could not continue thus. That the individual
mi~st be changed, leaving the cabinet or at least its atithority intact. That
tiie Council of the Realm would approve the necessary list of three can- ~
didates." The Count of Motrico favored change and Torcuato's ~aords filled
him witll satisfaction. A neca front had just been created for Arias.
Areilza deemed his position auspicious for the immediate f-uture. He did
not realize that he had just been deceived. Torcuato warned him that tlic
key thing was to remove Arias and then seek a substitute, rather than tt~e
reverse. In effect he was saying that he should help him first against
the prime minister and then "we will see." _
On 29 March history pursued iLS train and the system continued as if
nothing had happened. Late in the morning 39 National Council members _
drafted the list of three candidates for "the 40" to fill ar_other vacancy
resulting f rom the death of Iturmendi. The three nominees were
Gonzalo Fernandez de la Mora, General Iniesta Cano, and the veteran
Jimenez rlillas. It could have been a news item in ARRIBA dated 1956.
~ 10 April 1976
The cabinet members serving on the mixed commission met. It resembled a
session of the Italian High Council before Mussolini was ousted. Seven
days earlier the Seville cabinet had met, sinking close to personal insults.
The atmospliere was characterized by the Prussian attitude oL- tirias, wtio
was greatly pleased because Gonzalo Fernandez de la Mora had been named
the council memb er for the group of "the 40."
The purpose of the meeting was to unify the government criteria in the
mixed commission. Fraga spoke out, causing surprise by his excesses, as
if he had adopted the slogan "No one to my right." Without forgetting that
"the family, the municipality and the trade union" represented the basis
of his two draft reforms, his words implied the certainty that "with this
formula we can guarantee that the left will never win." The motives for
reflection with Fraga were well and publicl.y known and drafted: when he
took up the galloping crisis situation in the Basque country with his
cabinet colleagues, he launched into a prolooue filled with rhetorical
' questions. Are we then to allow them their 1936 statutes? Will they then
, be permitted to have their own law again? Shall we return their economic
agreements to them? (At which moment Minister of Industry Villar riir made
- a"thumbs down" gesture.) In view of the high level of political aware-
- ness, Fraga added, it wo~sld be well for the Basques to have at least some
of their own dep uties ir~ the future, although "regional immigrants' bodies"
would be promoted to offset nationalism. He ended his address with the
hope that within a few years, the immigrants would outweigh the native
19
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Basques. This whole plan for reform was drafted in the Fraga style in _
order to keep everything bound up and under control.
Then someone mentioned the "inviolability of the principles of the Move-
ment," and Jose rlaria de Areilza took the floor, speaking for.~he'first
and only time for half.an hour. Iie recalled what democracy is, quoting
_ ti~e classics from fiemory and giving the impression of a feminist in'a den
of pimps. When he concluded, General de Santiago reproached him with a -
'certain respect.and-a touch of.l~arshness, because~lie is a gentleman and _
not much aeeust�omed td circum~ocution. In the confusion, Adolfo Suarez
mumbled some words to the Count of Motrico, heard only by those nearest:
"To win the respect of the left, you don't have to define yourself."
As of that moment, Areilza not only did not give up, Uut continued Iaith-
fully to attend all the meetings, in a gesture worthy of a patient man,
b ut one which diminished him as a statesman. In his diary he wrote of
one of those meetings, with a postscript saying that "I was on the point
~ of getting up and walking out," which has come to be one of those state-
ments whir_h out of personal modesty, no politician in office should ever
write down. A professionai is not on the point of doing things; he -
simply does them.
The discussion by the ministers ended on the subject of the royal com-
mission, an Anglophile invention of Fraga and Areilza. It involved
proposing to the king that a commission of notables be appointed to head
reform. In the machinations of its sponsors, the ideal man to head it -
- would be no other than Pio Cabanillas Gallas, former minister of informa-
tion. Surprisingly, the royal commission met with the opposition of
Adolfo Suarez, Osorio and Nfartin Villa, winning the approval, according _
- to its sponsors, of Tierno Galvan and the immutable Gil Robles. -
24 April 1976 -
_ The International Cup playoffs between Spain and the FRG were underway at
the Vicente Calderon Stadium. His majesty the king was there, accompanied
- by Adolfo Suarez. The match was a boring one except for its final moments,
and the outcome was a tie at one goal each. Don Juan Carlos was entertained
not so much by the game as by the conversation of his companions. Adolfo
wa.s excellent company in the royal box, as the king had already had
_ occasion to discover a month earlier, when they attended the tie match
between Real Madrid and Borusia de Moenchenglandbach in Santiago Bernabeu
together.
However, Juan Carlos was uninclined toward confidence, since the article
by Arnauld de Brochgrave in the American magazine NEWSWEEK had just come
out, saying, on the basis of an interview at the Zarzuela Palace on
S April, that his majesty had freely voiced his complaints against Prime
Minister Arias. Officially, following the Franco tradition, a denial was
issued but the effects were undezway. For Arias, the countdown had
begun. -
20
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R004200060031-9
= FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
In the morning of that same day, Adolfo was concerned about a series of
- articles publ~shed in the periodical DOBLON, accusing him of economic
irregularities during his term as president of the YMCA. His concern led
him to r.ecall other political careers cut short dtie to unsavor.y busIneS~
transactions--those of Rincon de Arellano, Martin Esperanza or
Nicolas Franco himself.
28 April 1976
Arias took up the ct~allenge thrown down by the king in his NEWSWEEK inter-
view, and instead o~ resigning, he took a giant step forward, addressii~g
himself to the entire country. He explained the proposed amendments tl~c
drafting of which, he said, was well along, and which were exactly the
things which had been sought for some months.in the mixed coimnission, and
he plunged further forward, proposing a referendum for the month of
October and general parliamentary elections by the end of the year. _
Four months earlier there might have been those who thought that Arias
believed in what he was saying. On 28 April, the ministers themselves
were saying to anyone who would listen that this plan, in the best of
cases, was intended for the prime mini~ter's successor. What no one knew,
except for the close colleagues of Arias Navarro, was thzt he was confi-
dent of reaching the year's end at the head of the government.
10 May 19 76
E`very time Fraga planned a trip something began to happen. On this date
- he was in Venezuela when the neo-Nazi group of Don Sixto's partisans
left one dead and three seriously wounded on the upper slopes of Mount
Irache, on the anniversarv commemorating the Montejurra battle. The
C2.rl.ist celebration was bloodied by a dark episode in which various state
intelligence se-~vices played a role, working with extreme right-wing _
terrorists.
Again ndolfo took over the Ministry of Interior in the absence of its head.
If it had been Areilza instead of Suarez, it is certain that Fraga would
have taken precautions, but the minister of the movement did not seem to -
him importanr enough to be a leading adversary. Fraga was then in his
authoriearian cycle phase, and he thought of Adolfo only when he had to
distribute civilian governors' appointments or when they alternated at
the installation ceremonies.
_ The only one in the mixed commission who could block his path was
Torcuato and he considered the others to be weak politicians. However,
he began to pay some attention to Adolfo at the time of the incident of
: the political affiliation law. Suarez had given the draft to him, and
Fraga passed it on to his colleagues without even glancing at it. At
that moment he was preoccupied with other things. It goes without saying
that these same colleagues ez~iscerated the draft and made comments on it,
rather contemptuous, in zhe margins of the pages. When it was returned -
21
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
to Fraga for his opinion, he put it in the envelope and sent it to Suarez.
The various impertinences written on the margins and the contempt shown
for the interior minister forced Suarez to send Fraga a letter consistent
with t11e offense taken. For two days i'raga triPd fruitlessly to reacli
the offended minister, who refused to answer his calls. Finally, he ate
humble pie, as they say, going to Adolfo's home to beg his forgiveness.
This incident held Fraga's attention for perhaps a day or tc but he then
Eorgot it. He had, as he frequently said, other things on his mind.
15 May 1976 (conventional date)
Since the higher levels of the government had endorsed Adolfo Suarez in
P4arch as the candidate to succeed Arias Navarro, one citizen with a twangy
way of speaking and considerable drawing power had been holdin~ a seri.es
of regular dinner parties, with a discretion with which few credited him,
which had go~}e unnoticed:by the commentators. Their basic characteristic
was secrecy,'which:placed them on a par with the method of operation of
the closest Zarzuela Palace collaborator, Torcuato Fernandez Miranda.
The name of the host was Luis Maria Anson, and the carefully selected
~uests made up the four pillars supporting the Spanish right wing.
Representing the technocrats, affiliated to a greater or lesser extent
with Opus Dei were Meilan Gil, Alvarez Rendueles and Rafael Orbe Cano.
The Christian Democrats spoke through Eduardo Carriles and
Fernando Bau. Inevitably, there were the monarchists, the bearers of
illtistrious names--Alvaro Domecq and Jose Joaquin Puig de la Bellacasa.
And, finally, f.or the movement, there were two former Spanish Universlty
Unionists, Jose Miguel Orti Bordas and Eduardo Navarro. The faur pillars,
as Anson termed them, would be the support for the new phase which he
called "Juan Carlist."
This group had some characteristics in common. They were of the younger
- generation, if some of their ages were viewed tolerantly. Also, but
for the exceptions for reasons of private economic interests, all held ~
key government posts. Logically, the political situation was discussed
at these dinnera and it can be said without exaggeration that with the -
- various vantage points they had in the administration, they made up an
ideal observation team for following the internal pulse of the state.
They met approximately twice a month, and neither used nor abused the _
telephone. They were simply invited to a dinner party by someone else, -
always in private homes and with no ladies present. From time to time
there were some absences and also some specially invited guests, such as
Alfonso Osorio. These special guests rarely came more than once. It was
at these dinners that the name of Adolfo Suarez was first mentioned, that
is this is likely in my modest opinion, as a likely candidate to replace
- Arias Navarro. One such dinner was the scene of a reading of the speech -
which was to be delivered a few days later to the Cortes by the minister
of the movement in support of the political affiliation law, and it was
22.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY =
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060031-9
FOR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY
at one such dinner too that the advautages which might resuJ.t if
Minister of the Office of the Prime ~tinister Alfonso Osorio were to y~Leld
the foreground for the address to the Cortes on political affiliation to
Adolfo Suarez were discussed.
These dinners continued, discreetly and tactfully, until the eve of the ~
emergence of the Democratic Center Union. It was then that one of the
dinner guests, displeased with the development of events, was to criticize
the work of Prime Minister Suarez, and there would be tugging of ears and
an interruption of the gourmet sessions. Btit before that point was reached,
;nany changes would intervene and one host followed another, ~raciously
offering his home, such as Prado y Colon de Carvajal, or intimates of ti