JPRS ID: 8988 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/8988
20 March 1980
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West Europ'e Report =
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JPRS L/8988
20 March 1980
WEST EUROPE REPO RT
(FOUO 13/80)
CONTENTS PAGE
THEATER NUCLF,AR FORCES _
FRANCE
- Scenarios for U.S.-USSR European Theater Nuclear Conflict
(LE NOUVEI, OBSERVATEUR, va.rious dates) 1
East, West Nuclear Capabilities, by Francois
% Schlosser
Possible Sources of Conflict,
_ Fierre Hassner Interview
, East European, Soviet Instability,
- Christoph Bertram Interview
Soviet Aggression Against West Et.irope,
Pierre Gallois Interview
- L`uropean Defense Posture, by Georges Buis
TNF, U.S. Strategic Coupling, Francois de Rose
Interview
COUNTRY SECTION
- FRANCE
UoS., French Reactions to Aggression Contrasted
(Arthur Conte; PARIS MATGH, 15 Feb SO) 23
Jobert Views West's Reaction to Events in Iran, Afghanistan
(Michel Jobert; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 27 Feb 80) 29 -
. Raymond Aron Views Western Post-Afghanistan Policy
Decisions
(Raymond Aron; L'EXPRESS, 2-8 Feb 80) 32
Commentary on Factianalism Within PCF Leadership
(Thierry Pfister; LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR, 28 Jan-3 Feb 80) 35
- 'A - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
ESA's 1980 Budget Qutlined, Changes Noted
_ (Pierre Langereux; AIR & COSMOS, 9 Feb 80) 38
Cost of Ariane Versions 2 and 3 Now 560 Million Francs
(Pierre Langereux; AIft & COSMOS, 9 Feb 80) 45
Ground Forces' Use of Computer Technolog,y Assessed
(Guy Collognat; ARNIEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Jan-Feb 80).. 46
Briefs
Shock Brigade Headquarters 53
ITALY
Details on Nava1 Vessels To Be Supplied to Iraq
(CORRIEftE DELLA SERA, 5 Feb SO) oo 54
- b -
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES
SCENARIOS FOR U.S. - USSR EURdPEAN TIiFATER NUCLEAR CONFLICT
East, West Nuclear Capabilities
Paris LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR in French 10-16 Dec 79 pp 63-69
FRANCE
[Article by Francois Schlosser: "Scenarios for a Third World War"]
[Text] The most recent nuclear war lasted 10 minutes. It began Friday
- 9 November 1979 when the American military mistakenly initiated the first
ateps in the procedure leading to the nuclear holocaust.
At 1050 on that dayr countlesa small lfghts began flashing throughout
North America in all operations centers of the strategic forces. Computer terminals had reported--with a neutral and quiet murmur--an incoming sheaf
of nuclear missiles launched from a submarine somewhere in the northern
Pacific. Reconnaissance aircraft took off at a mfnute's notice from several
- air bases thousands of kilometers apart. From the Caribbean to Alaska, � -
from Greenland to the Philippines, in submarines scattered throughout the
oceans of the world, and in space communications relays circling the globe
- round the clock, the immense American military machine bristled with intenae
electronic buzzing. Complying with standing operating procedures, thousanda
of silent tachnicians initiated the big countdown with limited and precise
movements. From Montana to Arkansas, in the Dakotas and Wyoming, locking
devices were released on heavy, armored protective covers over the deep
underground silos housing the ICBM's. Operators were ready to broadcast
_ orders grounding all civil air traffic in North emerica. The time had come -
to notify the President of the United States that the country was under
nuclear attack. The 110 B-52 bombers, on continuous ground alert and with -
- some 1,500 megatons in their bomb bays, were scheduled to be airborne 4
minutes later. But everything was cancelled at the lOth minute after
preliminary chec'KS revealed that a Colorado Spriitgs computer had played thia
nasty trick on "the end-of-the-world headqua:ters" by inserting into warning
circuits a test tape intended solely for routine exercises.
Technically, the war had started by itself. And the men who had no intention
wnatever of starting i,t were at least able to stop it, this time.
,
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American public opinion attached no importance whatever to the incident, in
fact, nu more than did European opinion. Yet, for many months now, that -
- same public in its replies given to all po11s and surveys, has indicated, _
at times by an overwhelming majority, that it is once again afraid of war.
And more and more frequently, authoritative voices--politicians who are not
among the most excitable, or responsible leaders in important sectors of the _
economy--are expressing the same fear. What exactly is this fear?
One initial observation: it is not a fear of wars in which black or yellow
- people are dying. Such wars have been going cn too long, and the West's
anxiety is recent. At this very moment, there are fiVe open wars in Africa
and just as many latent conflicts. There are also four or five major wars _
and seven current massacres in Asia. Not to mention the refugees, whose =
number can no longer even be estimated to the nearest million. And not to _
- mention either those entire populations who are victims of deadly famine or
just simply dying of destitution. Sheltered behind its hoarded wealth, Europe
is not really affected by these upheavals, even when it is technically involved
in them. Travel agencies are rushing to the Cambodian border in Rosalynn ~
Carter's footsteps. They expect to send a flood of tourists to the very
gates of hell so that they can witness the mortal agony of human beings who _
have come there to die of disease, starvation, and exhaustion, lying in the ,
muddy puddles of the Thai monsoon season. Yet before such. acenes, filmed
with compassion, can also arouse apprehension, there must first be the fear- '
some noise of marching men inside China's borders.
The truth is that Westerners are fiCightened primarily by images of crisis.
Our history books explain that utiemployment and inflation produced Hitler.
They trace the war of 1939 back to the depression of 1929: recession,
trade war, and monetary collapses, are all so many words that bring bad
luck. The fear of being penniless, rumors of shortages, and uncertainty
about the future are what have recently revised latent anxieties.
There are 15 million unemployed in Western countries today compared with
5 million some 10 years abo. We no longer feel we can promise our children
a better world. Fear of the atom looms large. The price of gold has
reached record levels, and silver, that old forsaken metal, is now also
Joining the ranks of safe, sheltered investments. The alwayg pragmatic
Lloyd's of London has raised shipping insurance rates a peg or two: one
never knows in this topsy-turvey world where Third World countries, tired
of being exploited, are demanding better treatment in the international
distribution of work. And this at a time when the whole world recognizes
- that development models have failed: the gap between rich and poor countries
is widening after 20 years of aid, of speeches and theories on development.
The poor are more numerous and their poverty greater. The despair of billions
of human beings is "programmed" for several centuries to come. The World
Bank reports: Among the most rapidly growing developing countris, there are
seven that can hope to catch up to the industrial countries in a century,
- and about nine in 1,000 years."
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This is a terrifying verdict that destroys for good the mqth of the West's
civilizing role. Yet no other model has, up to now, convi-ncingly proved
itself to be any more effective. If the World Bank's economists are right,
the time has come for the rich to withdraw into their fortified towex and
~ hope that its foundations are not too quickly shaken by the convulaions of the
deprived continents.
Since the Vietnam War, followed by America's long decline, OPEC's hypocritical -
officials and the fanatic mobs in the streets of Iran have carried the
- impact of the same impassioned message into contemporary history. It is the
sudden revelation of a Third World chasing the policenen and shouting "stop
. thief." These developments are shaking the West in some c� Al-ts-o3-de-st-
convictions. The West is suddenly starting to fear for its oil, its
- phosphates, its uranium, and its privileges.
Is this a rich man's anxiety or is it fear of war? Everyone knows that the
onl.y possible war in Europe would be an East-West conflict, in other words,
world war. Consequently the Soviet ogre has rapidly regained the spotlight in
the past few months. To such a point that it has now become possible to
blame the USSR for all disturbing factors originating elsewhere and thus
create a monumental threat out of nothing. From this there has emerged real
fear which, at least for its part, is not lacking in proritability. The -
great strategic debate on the SALT agreement, heightened by the apgroach of a
presidential election, and the Pentagon's fixed desire to deploy a new genera-
tion of new weapons in Europe, are furnishing the media an ample supply of
irrefutable arguments, alarming assumptions, and catastrophic scenarios.
All of these prove wiCh force and conviction that military expenditures must _
be increased immensely, that it is an urgent necessity to produce the new
ground, air, and naval weapons invented and developed by the world's best
scientists. We are told that these new generations of missiles are the only
ones commensurate with the end-of-century pattern of the apocalypse. Is it
- really wrong if, in a good cause, fears are slightly manipulated by considerab.ly
juggling the figures? In any case, that is exactly what the most brilliant _
advocates of a return to the told war have been doj:ng in the United States
and Europe for months. Why?
~
We can, of course, no longer simply heap the blame for this on the "military- ,
industrial complex." Because that complex is now much more than military
and industrial (and the same can be said about all of those processes currently -
_ leading the world into irreversible militarization at a dizzy pace). This -
- complex is also an academic, administrative, bureaucratic, banking, and, in
certain aspects, transnationai complex. And as John Kenneth Galbrafth recently -
explained: "The greatest source of opposition to detente are the economic
interests. Huge sections of the American administrative bureaucracy literally
live on the proceeds of tension with the USSR. According to Galbraith, this
bureaucracy and this industry are once again attracting the best brains. In
addition, the arms race is good for employment, revenues, innovation, and the
gross national product. No one ever says this aloud, but it is what everyone
privately thinks. And Galbraith concluded: "It would be much more senaible
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if those who have an economic interest in the arms race stopped shielding
themselves behind words like peace, freedom, or national security" and openly
discussed these interests.
\
- The military-industrial complex ingenuously denounced by President Eisenhower
is really no longer what it once was. It is now much more extensive, varied,
and powerful than it ever was in the past. To get an idea of its tremendous =
power over people and their way of thinking, we need only look at what is -
happening in the United States at the present time.
- One of the best observers of the American scene wrote in THE GUARUTAN recently
that the debate in the United States on the _Eas_t-Weg_t._balance has now reached
an irrational level and that certain statements by senators or political
candidates border on hysteria: "Facts about the military balance are being =
distorted day after day." Discussions between experts or experienced _
- politicians very quickly shift from arguments supported by figures and from
assessmc:nts of the real capabilities of the United States and the USSR and
become bogged down in the most rudimentary psychological swamps of discussion
on levels of virility and differences between those who have some and those
who do not.
- Nobody disputes the military progress the USSR has made over the past 10 years.
Soviet generals have boasted about it enough in Red Army publications and to
- their allies--and clients--in the Third World. And there is no press in the
Soviet Union capable of denouncing the misdeeds of the local military-industrial
complex. The most visible result is that the USSR ia becoming economically
~ stagnant while continuing to give its military establishment abaolute priority
- over civilian sectors.
But is this being done to gain superiority over Western countries, or to
- remain even with them or just simply to try to catch up with them in a -
- constantly renewed effort th^t has thus far never been crowned with success?
The importance of the stakes involved demands that we focus on the figures
for a moment. This is necessary because the most widely-held opinion in the
Western media is the following: the USSR is constantly spending more money
on its military forces than the United States. It is acquiring the means
of destroying the American arsenal in an unanswerable fi.rst strike. Thanks
to this superiority, it will be able to exert any kind of political pressure
- on the West. In addition., it has Europe at its mercy, and thanks to its new
: naval pawer, it already surpasses the West in its capability to project its
power in all areas of the world.
- Wtzat is the real situation?
Since 1945, all innovations that have successively destabilized the world
military balance have first appeared in the inventories of the American
generals. At each turning point, the revival of the arms race has occurred
in the United States following secret reports released to the general publie
in small increments through deliberate leaks. In the early 1950's, it was
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- the alarm over the "bomber gap" which enabled the Strategic Air Command (SAC)
- to obtain a gigantic fleet of B-47's, and then the B-52's with an inter-
continental operating range. After this had been done, it was determined
- that the Soviets actually had no offensive capabi'-ity necessitating such a
response. In 1957, a secret report uncovered "the missile gap" by
announcing that the Soviet Union would pose a"critical danger" to the
United States by 1959 or 1960. Knowing nothing of the falseness of the
report, Kennedy rushed the United States into a"crash" program of inter-
~ continental ground-launched and submarine-launched missiles, a program General
Gallois called "Pharaonic." Now the "missile gap" did exist, but in favor of
the United States and to the detriment of the Soviets. What followed is well-
known: the Americans introduced the MIRV system to cope with an alleged
Soviet antimissile defense systeri that was soon acknowledged to be merely the
_ most conventional type of antiaircraft defense. -The USSR was stiil Iagging
behind when the United States, after the SALT I agreement, doubled its
number of nuclear warheads, the Pentagon having rejected any moratorium on
the deployment of multiple warheads.
And since 1976 it has been the big revival: a secret report prepared by a
group formed by President Ford developed all the arguments that have fueled
the new debate on Soviet "superiority" to this day. The report's leit-motif:
under cover of detente, the USSR is methodically preparing to wage and win a
nuclear war. The critical moment for Air-erica will come betweer. 1983 and 1986.
This is what is known as the "window of opportunity," namely the interval
during which the Soviets will have deployed enough heavry missiles capable
of destroying in one fell swoop the land-based component of the American
nuclear forces bef_ore it becomes mobile.
_ Yet it is impossible to unerringly destroy all American land-based missiles,
regardless of the intensity of the attack. The Soviets do not even know
how many of their missiles would leave their silos, or how many would remain
- wedged therein because of technical difficulties, or how many of the missiles
- actually launched would wander off course above the North Pole or lose
themselves somewl:ere along the way.
And even if sucn a blow were feasible, the U.S. president would still have
the major part of his forces after the first strike, namely several thousand
warheads in submerged submarines and on SAC aircraft that would have been
airborne after the initial alert. He could use these aircraft against
nonhardened Soviet military objectives: munitions plants, airports, key
road and rail junctions, oil refineries, communications facilities, ports,
etc. The United States could also retaliate for days on end by piecemeal
firing of its 3,000 submarine-launched warheads.
The obvious conclusion is that the "window of opportunity" scenario is a
farce. Especially since the "huge" SS-18 and SS-19 missiles expected--
according to the theorists of Soviet superiority--to do all the "work"
_ against American land-based missiles are much less powerful than had been
imagined. Here again, exaggeration had worked to the full. A report that
went almost unnoticed in the American press recently revealed that previous
estimates of the power of these Soviet "monsters" had to be reduced 50 percent.
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There had been claims of 1.2 megatons per reentry vehicle. The latest infor-
- mation is that this yield is no more than 600 kilotons. Given the higher
accuracy of American missiles, the warheads of the Soviet "super-rockets" are,
in the final analysis, no more formidable than the Mk. 12A reentry vehicle
currently being installed in American Minuteman missiles. Yet the immense
majority of Westerners continues to believe the Soviets have more dangerous
"super-rockets" than the Americans and that the USSR is capable of starting
- a nuclear war, if their bluff is called.
Galbraith believes "the Soviets are as aware as we are of the realities of
nuclear war. They have had much more horrible experiences with war than we
have had. All persons who have had occasion to discuss this subject with
Soviet officials have no doubts about the depth of their distress at the idea__
of a nuclear war. They know that after such a conflict the ashes of communism
would no longer be distinguishable from the ashes of capitalism."
- The most convinced believers in imminent danger will rebut: "Yes, but why then
- are they spending much'more money than we are in preparing for nuclear war?"
Actually it is assumed to be an established fact that the USSR spends at least
one third more than the U.S.A. on its armed forces. According to SIPRI*
[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute] experts, this issue has
been the subject of "a highly successful propaganda campaign" conducted in the
media of Western countries. How e1d the CIA and the Pentagon manage to get
everyone to accept "known facts" ti1at are either questionable or false? Here
is how the SIPRI Yearbook describes the procedure American experts follow in
making their calculationse they compile a list of all the components of
Soviet military strength--weapons, equipment, imports, personnel, etc.--and
simply estimate what these would cost in dollars. The United States has all-
volunteer armed forces, each member of which is paid. The USSR has armed
forces comprised of draftees that cost it almor:t nothing and which it uses
- superabundantly. Costing each Ukrainian, Russian, and Uzbek private the same
as an infantryman f rom Little Rock or Seattle already inflates the Soviet
defense budget like a balloon. For example, the United States has only some
75,000 men in its strategic capability whereas the USSR has at least five times
more than that for a barely equivalent capability. Consequently comparlson of
the sums spent produces some fanciful results.
Better still, the GIA recently suddenly increased its estimate of Moscow's
defense spending by more than one-third. The CIA's reasoning: it had
previously overestimated the military industrial sector's productivity in
comparison with the civilian sector's productivity. The new assumption is
that inefficiency, waste, and incompetency are just as great in the industrial
sector as in the civilian sector. Consequently the military industry's
products cost much more than had heretofore been imagined. This is merely a
change in costing procedure. It is more an indication of greater weakness on
the Soviet side, and has nothing to do with a real increase in the USSR's
military effort. Yet that is how most commentators have depicted it.
*"SIPRI Yearbook 1979: World Armament and Disarmament"
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Another idea generally accepted as an established fact reinforces the CIA's
analysis: for some 10 years now, the USSR has steadily increased its
strategic arsenal to a terrifying extent while the United States reportedly
has been practically at a standstill. This American "restraint" was not
reciprocated by any similar reserve on the part of the other side. On the
contrary, the Soviets are said to have taken advantage of it to gain a lead.
Congressman Lee Aspin, a former Pentagon analyst and an expert in East-West
comparisons, has furnished the following enlightening details on the aubject.
The number of Soviet missiles has risen from 1,514 to 2,504 since 1969, that
is true, while the United States has reduced its number of missiles from
2,270 to 2,058. But the number of American nuclear reentry vehicles capable
of striking the USSR has climbed from 3,950 to 9,200 during the same period
while the USSR still has only 5,100. In other words, the number of weapons
added to the American arsenal during this period is almost as great as the
entire existing Soviet arsenal. As seen ~~rom Moscow, the American "restraint"
is, therefore, not very convincing. The same is true about development of
new weapons. Admittedly, unlike the USSR, the United States did not develop
any new type of missile during this period. But thanks to its technological
lead, it did introduce such spectacular improvements in the accuracy and
miniaturization of its warheads that these have largely offset the quantitative
enhancement of the Soviet arsenal, and at a lower cost, approximately five times
lower, Lee Aspin's report submitted to the U.S. Congress on 7 July evoked no
echo in the press.
Then there are those favorite subjects for hyperbole when discussing the
~ East-West balance of forces, namely Admiral Gorchkov's navy and the USSR's
conventional and nuclear superiority in Europe.
First, the admiral's ships. Between 1955 and 1975, Gorchkov quickly built a
great many ships so as to give the USSR a navy, because it had none. The
trouble, however, is that in leaving.their shelters, these ships have to pass
within range of the guns or missiles of American and allied bases, whether it
be the Soviet Pacific Fleet, Black Sea and Mediterranean Fleet, or even the
Baltic Fleet. The only place Soviet ships can reach the ocean under non-
hazardous security conditions is the Arctic. Yet Soviet ports in that region
are icebound 6 months of the year. Is this the reason the Soviets never
dispatch more than 15 percent of their strategic nuclear submarines on patrol
- while the Americans maintain 55 percent of theirs on permanent alert in all
- the oceans? What is certain is that the Soviet Navy's situation is by no
means enviable. In fact, some Western experts even think that in rhe event of
war the first thing the USSR would have to do is, for example, withdraw all
its ships from the Mediterranean if it does not want to see them at the bottom
of the sea some 45 m;nutes after the, npening of hostilities. Because all
- experts nearly agree on one point, namely that Western naval forces have
- unquestionable superiority in almost every corner of the globe. But commenta-
tors generally keep this opinion to themselves.
Hence the following details are quite significant. They were compiled by Dieter
Lutz, assistant director of the Institute for Research on Peace and Security
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in Hamburg. One-sixth of the Soviet fleet is currently "obsolete," fit to
be scrapped. In 1976, half of Admiral Gorchkov's surface ships of over =
1,000 tons were already over 15 years old. The greater part of the Soviet -
- fleet is assigned to antisubmarine warfare (ASW) tasks. It is quantitatively
. and qualitatively declining, whereas NATO fleets are rapidly growing in size
and installing new generations of weapons--Harpoon and Tomahawk missiles, the
Aegis [air defense] system, etc.--based on microtechnology and surrounded by
electronic software the equivalent of which the Soviets do not yet have on their
- drawing boards.
Contrary to the most current apinion, the Soviet fleet has no offensive capa-
bility. It cannot possibly conduct long-range military operations in a hostile
environment, because it lacks air defense and amphibious forces and equip- -
ment. While Americdn aircraft carriers are gigantic assault platforms
transporting up to 90 fighter bombers and numerous helicopters, the Soviet
carriers have one-half the tonnage and transport mainly ASW helicopters and -
only some 15 small vertical take-off aircraft of the Yak-36 type. As in the
case of Admiral Gorchkov's "supernavy," there ie also another side to the -
' USSR's alleged conventional and nucl.ear supericrity in Europe. To be sure, the _
- USSR has considerably increased its forces in Europe. But why has the magni-
tude of this challenge been constantly exagger.ated? -
In a rarely quoted book--"Tactical Nuclear Weapons-European Perspectives,"
published by the SIPRI in 1978--we learn that in 1961 and 1962, the U. S.
Department of Defense, then headed by McNamara, made an exhaustive analysis
of NATO an,' Warsaw Pact conventional forces. This study concluded in favor not
of the Warsaw Pact's superiority, but of NATO's. This analysis and subsequent
others were never published. They were too contrary to official American
arguments aimed at cramming Europe with tactical nucZear weapons to offset
_ the Warsaw Pact's conventional "superiority," and at convincing European
countries to build up their own conventional forces.
It is impossible to summarize all the literature on the number of Soviet -
tanks, divisions, aircraft, and artillery pieces in Europe, so as to point
out the distortions caused by these analyses and estimates. For 15 years,
Europe was made to believe that the Warsaw Pact had a tremendous tactical
air superiority, whereas the opposite was true until recently. Public opinion
was likewise frightened with a breakdown of Soviet divisions that completely
distorted any estimate of the real ratio of forces.
The myth of the`superiority of Soviet tanks was largely debunked by the
- [Arab-Israeli] war of 1973. If the 1,200 tanks thrown by the Syrians into the
- attack on the Golsn Heights were often stopped less than 10 kilometers from =
their point of departure instead of reaching Haifa--only some 60 kilometers
- away--within a few hours, it was not because Israeli soldiers had imbibed
some magic potion. It was because they had not only the same tanks but also -
the same antitank missiles as NATO, which has invested mainly in this
weaponry, whereas the USSR continued to deploy thousands of armored vehicles
of increasingly greater vulnerability. Of course, the Soviets are also pro- -
ducing an ultramodern tank, the T-72. But it is inferior to the latest series
of Western tanks, such as the American XM-1 and the German Leopard.
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Most of the East's 40,000 armored vehicles are still old-timers, at best
T-60's that cannot hold out against modern antitank war�are methods. Among
these tanks there are a large number of old unserviceable vehicles still kept
i-i depots because inventories are so sacred to Soviet bureaucrats, and because
Western experts find it to their benefit to include them among the serviceable
items of Soviet equipment so as to make their estimates more impressive.
Even the London-based International Institute for Strategic Sutidies has now
abaridoned strict man for man and weapon for weapon comparison because such
comparisons no longer have any meaning in the light of technological develop- -
ment:. Besides, NATO as a whole has always had more men under arms than the _
Warsaw Pact �~:id Western defense budgets have always topped Eastern budgets,
even when compared with the inflated f igures attributed to the latter. And -
now for more than a year there have been new alarming reports of 2nother -
"missile gap" and of Soviet superiority in "theater nuclear weapons" in
Europe. '
We are even being told that NATO will be obliged to deploy new-generation
missiles in Europe to "catch up with the lead taken" by the Soviets and the
- Backfire bombers and SS-20 missiles.
= The SS-20 was quite recently added to the Soviet arsenal and the Americans
do not have, based in Europe, a missile corresponding exactly to its descrip-
tion. Just as they do not have the exact equivalent of the 400 to 500 old -
- intermediate-range missiles the USSR has had pointed in Europe's direction -
for the past two decades, and which are currently being replaced by SS-20's. _
Is this enough to constitute a dangerous "missile gap?"
For the past 20 years, NATO has had many more nuclear warheads in Europe
than it could possibly use in case of war. To strike at targets in Soviet _
~ territory, the Atlantic Alliance has medium-range F-111, F-4, A-6, and A-7 =
fighter-bombers based in Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Turkey, and on -
carriers in the Mediterranean. Above all, it has the Poseidon submarine assigned to NATO`s Allied Command Europe. The fact that the number of these -
submarines is arbitrarily set at three--though that number can be changed at
any time--permits getting people to believe the myth of NATO nuclear _
weapons "inferiority" in Europe. =
It would certainly be absurd to minimize the threat of the SS-20 missiles.
Hence any negotiations capable of obtaining a reduction in their number or `
even their withdrawal could not help but enhance European security. On the _
other hand, many experts doubt that the proper reaction is to deploy even
- more sophisticated land-based weapons in NATO countri.es that already have =
- ample nuclear forces. The real question raised at this juncture is that of
the American nuclear guarantee for Europe at the very moment that the two
+ superpowers have acknowledged, by the SALT II treaty, the parity of their
- central systems. This is a political question which is not answered by -
amassing in Europe new missiles under American control.
In any case, the big threat of the Soviet SS-20 seems to have come at just the
right moment to justify deploying in Europe two new fu11y developed American
systems, the cruise missile and the mobile Pershing 2 missile.
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Actually, this NATO moderi1ization process has been under discussion since
- 1973. According to Dieter Lutz of the University of Hamburg, it aas in late 1975 that Westerners first discovered, thanks to the Big Bird reconnaissance
satellite, that the Soviets were testing the SS-20 missile. American tests
of the Pershing 2 missile had begun 1 year earlier in 1974. As for the Toma-
hawk cruise missile, the second pillar of the NATO nuclear modernization
program, its conclusive tests were conducted as early as 1976. Considering
the necessary years of research and development, production of this cruise _
_ missile was planned much before and apart from any simil.ar development effort
- by the Soviets.
It is difficult, therefore, to speak of a Western "response" or "reaction" to -
a Soviet innovation, and even less of "catching up" with the Soviets. _
General M. Ellis, a furcner SAC commander, stated "that if the American F-111 _
- shoulci have to be exchanged for the Soviet Backfire, the United States would =
be making a bad deal. Speaking in more general terms, Marshall D. Shulmann,
~ one of Cyrus Vance's chief advisers, recently said that, given the United States'
military lead over the USSR, there is not a single American military of.ficial
' who would like to find himself in a Soviet general's shoes." Vadim Sagladin, _
- a member of the USSR's central committee, imp].icitly confirmed this viewpoint
in a recent interview granted the German weekly magazine DER SPIEGEL: "We
would not object if we were able to put ourselves in America's geographical
~ position and put the Americans in our place between China and NATO."
An uncomfortable position indeeds and one that explains to a great extent the
= continuous effort the Soviets are voluntarily making, to the detriment of their
economyr in an attempt to attain the highest possible level of military
readiness. For the past 3 decades, the USSR has been in a position of
- strategic inferiority. Since the early 1950's, it has been surrounded by an
~ unbroken chain of American bases. It is now faced with what it's leaders
- consider to be the greatest threat in their history, namely a quadruple
alliance of the United States Western Europe, China, and Japan.
Has the USSR moved too quickly and gone too far in its reaction to a threat
- it tends to exaggerate? In other words, by lining up its ICBM's on diplomatic -
- conference tables, with occasionally annoying gestures of self-satisfaction, _
- and by making a show of global military power in "friendly" Atrican and
Asiatic countries, a power that is still far from corresponding to r.eality,
hasn't the USSR largely contributed to the panic being spread in the West by
the apostles of excessive armament? That is what some high-level Soviet
officials seem to fear today.
What is certain is that the arms race of the year 2000 has largely begun. -
General George M. Seignious, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, recently stated with frank satisfaction: "The USSR does not have -
strategic superiority and will not obtain it in the future...On the contrary,
our military strength is increasing, and the SALT agreements Teave open to us
all options we may deem useful to our security: cruise missiles launched by ,
B-52 bombers, Trident submarines, Trident 1 and Trident 2 submarine-launched
ballistic missiles, the MX mobile missile, indeed even a new heavy bomber."
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When we realize:
1. That the new MX and Trident 2 missiles are by capability, if not by
intended purpose, "counterforce" weapons, in other words, weapons for an
_ offensive first strike and preventive war; -
- 2. That to cope solely with the threat of thousands of cruise missiles ]aunched
from B-52's, the USSR would have to build an air defense system costing it
more than 50 billion dollars;
3. That the United States has invested huge sums in militarizing the oceans
and is making rapid progress in developing a capability for the detection,
- tracking, and destruction of the Soviet nuclear submarine fleet;
4. That the two superpowers have extended the arms race to extraterrestrial -
space and are hard at work developing means of waging space warfare: laser -
beams, satellite-killer satellites, antisatellite-killer satellites, etc.;
- when we realize all this, the prospects for life on earth by the end of this
century appear dismal. -
As counterforce weapons become fully developed and are introduced into the
arsenals of both the USSR and the United States, strategic doctrines are
_ being modified and adapted. The idea of "waging a nuclear war to win it" -
tends to assert itself everywhere at the expense of old theories on
deterrence. This is the most incredible change that has taken place in the
past 20 years. This idea is slowly penetrating the most sophisticated circles
of military study and research. It is accompanied on the world level by
accelerated militarization of social and internati.onal life and by prolifera-
tion of nuclear and conventional weapons. A million dollars per minute are
- currently being spent for military purposes. Total world arms sales amount -
to 20-30 billion dollars. Some 75 to 80 million men and women, military and .
_ civilian, are either waging war or preparing to do so somewhere in the world. -
The SALT II agreement will in no way declerate the arms race which will attain
such a tempo and sophistication by the late 1980's that it will definitely be
impossible to determine the level of declared balances. Most researchers and
scientists throughout the world who, in different institutes, are engaged in
studying "the science of peace" and the problems of disarmament are becoming
more and more convinced that the dangers of a nuclear confrontation are
increasing much more rapidly than in the past. "Fear of the other side" is
a prime mover in this arms race and the military in all countries of the world
find themselves in a privileged position to win their case when competing for
public funds with other social groups. The most serious danger to peace is
this arms race per se, a race which is being imposed on modern societies by
bureaucratic, military, and industrial establishments that have means powerful
-0 enough to "jam" the channels of information and often to paralyze the judge-
ment of politicians.
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Possible Sources of Conflict
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 17-23 Dc:c 79 pp 56-57
[Interview with East-West relations specialist Pierre Hassner, Center for
International Studies and Research of the (French) National Political Science
Foundation, by Francois Schlosser; date and place not given]
- [Text] [Question] The international situation is marked by the oil crisis,
the accelerated East-West arms race, the West�s economic and financial difficul- _
- ties, and the unforeseeable outcome of the Iranian crisis. 1n your opinion,
does this situation justify fear of a new world war?
[Answer] Up to now, I had been rather inclined, instinctively, to believe the
opposite. Today, I am somewhat less certain. I have the impression that on all
sides there are new factors which no longer permit us to rule out the possi-
bility of a conflict. I do not mean a big, all-out war that would destroy
mankind. But there are signs that justify misgivings.
[Question] A"big, all-out war" has been avoi.ded for 30 years. What, there-
fore, are those signs?
[Answer] Since World War II, there have be2n many wars throughout the world
but there has been no "big, a11-out" war. Why? I see three reasons:
1. Nuclear weapons have created protected areas. Without going so far as to
support the simplistic view which holds that those parts of the world in which
there are nuclear weapons are deemed definitively protected while all other
parts are exposed to conflicts, we must, however, admit the fact that there
has been a war between the two Koreas, a war between the two Vietnams, but no
- war between the two Germanys. That is clearly because such a war would have
brought on the total destruction of Europe and a general nuclear conflict.
2. The primacy of economics: between highly developed countries, wars of
conquest to acquire territory are very destructive with modern weapons and,
therefore, no longer have any sense, especially for countries that are
centering their efforts mainly on enhancing their productivity, standare of
living, etc.
3. Mental and cultural attitudes which these days make the idea that France
and Germany could again fight over Alsace-Lorraine seem absurd. In certain
regions of the world, particularly in Europe and North America, there has been
a kind of historic change in what were formerly warlike attitudes. For
example--even though there are other reasons for the phenomenon--it must be
noted, nevertheless, that Hungary and especially Czechoslovakia offered
almost no resistance to the Soviet invasions of 1956 and 1968. Everything
- seems to be happening as if, in the world's urban, industrialized, and so-
called "embourgeoised" areas, there is a sort of reluctance to accept the idea
of going to war, a reluctance reflecting a change in cultural values. Even
direct East-West relations in nuclear matters seem to be in keeping with d kind
of geace in which both sides argue about SALT II or the SS-20's, but in which
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This serves to further heighten the distressing character of warlike develop-
ments throughout the Third World, and even between communist powers. Such
phenomena as the irruption of religion--in Iran, for example, but also in
other cauntries--alter the perception people have of international relations.
Some taboos are disappearing, and forms of reasoning are emerging that are
not those of the industrialized and developed regions, and these create n.ew
~ uncertainty about the possibility of war breaking out.
Wars between communist powers--China and Vietnam last March--have only added
to this confusion. We did not know what the rules of the game were for this
new type of conflict, or where these conflicts were going to stop. Between
the United States and the USSR, even when they fight each other through allied
countries, there are always certain taboos that are respected: they do not
attack each other, directly, they do not use nuclear weapons, etc. In the
end, the Chinese did not go very far and the Soviets did not intervene. It
seems, therefore, that, in that case too, there was a desire to be moderate
and not go beyond certain thresholds. Nevertheless, great uncertainty persists
about the rules of the game.
- [Question] Are there other perturbing signs that make you fear an increasingly
dangerous phase in international relations?
- [Answer] There is, first of all, the uncertainty about the reaction of the two
- superpowers--tightly linked as they are by extremely complex agreements like
- SALT--to a world that would be "Khomeynized" as it were, a world in which
certain leaders "break the rules of the game." Neither of the two suger-
powers can any longer know how the other will react in such a situation.
Despite a certain degree of anarchy, international relations had become
relatively "regularized" so that, for example, the "small powers" knew that
they had better not do certain things in the proximity of a superpower: that
is the explanation for a certain "Finlandization," and also the reason for
the conspicuous restraint displayed by the new leaders of Nicaragua. But
when a leader suddenly renounces these unwritten conventions and directly
' affronts a superpower, how can the latter be expected to react? And to what
extent will its response be influenced by the fear that the other superpow2r
may exploit the incident for its own benefit? As a result, we are reduced to
a"blow by blow" world in which coexistence has to be constantly reinvented,
a world in which we set something going and do not know what the outcome will
be.
[Question] Yet the two superpowers have acquired experience in exercising a
condominium and this ought- to enable them to avoid collisons, even in situations
as unforeseen as the one in Iran, for example.
[Answer] The two superpowers are each at a turning point, and this is also
a factor of uncertainty and increased danger. America is uneasy. It is
- nearly out of the post-Vietnam and post-Watergate period. There is public
pressure not to allow itself to be stepped upon" any longer. We are entering
- a period in which we are no longer sure whether America will move toward
neoisolationism, or neointerventionism, or a combination of both. After the
Iranian crisis--assuming that an armed clash is avoided in that situation--the
United States is perhaps likely to seek to make a show of force or reaffirm its
"virility" at the first opportunity.
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A turning point likewise in the USSR which is steadily increasing its military
power. Who will succeed Brezhnev? The gerontacracy can last another 10 years
with the old men currently in power. But there may possibly be a new genera-
tion of younger and tougher leaders. Sovietologists are 3ivided. Some are
of the opinion that Brezhnev's policy based on a desire for peace and detente--
but also on power and expansion supported by a most unmistakable position of
military force--will survive. Others believe there is polarization between
the "successors" who are 50 years old, between those who are basically managers
desiring to take into account the USSR's increasing economic interdependence
with the capitalist world, and those who are hardliners, neo-Stalinists, neo-
Slavs, neonationalists more disposed toward military adventure to compensate for
domestic failures. In short, as things now stand in the world, the occasions
of conflict are here, there, and everywhere.
[Question] What conflicts do you mean?
[Answer] A few years ago, it was still possible to designate, on a map of the
world, the "extreme regions" such as Europe and Africa where the risk of a
superpower confrontation appeared very small or excluded, and the "ambiguous
regions" like Southeast Asia and the Middle E1st where that risk was present.
Peace in Europe was assured by the nuclear threat. In Africa, after having
gotten their feet slightly "wet" in the Congo, the superpowers had assumed a
- very low profile. African wars and genocides had stopped worrying the world
because they no longer, for the moment, involved the risk of confrontation between
the two superpowers. On the other hand, this risk continued to exist in the
ambiguous areas of the Middle East and Southeast Asia where escalation was
never ruled out, even if, from time to time, the two superpowers did agree to
reestablish some rules for the game. But the risks were never completely
eliminated.
" Now, however, it seems to me that the present situation throughout the world
is getting to look more and mcre like the situation in these "ambiguous"
areas. This is especially true in Africa where the Soviets are making
extensive use of their new long-range military capabi]_ities. As a result, the
occasions of intervention in the Third World are becoming more numerous, along
with mounting risks of escalation.
[Question] In your view, can this new international configuration jeopardize
detente?
[Answer] I believe we are in a phase which, without resembling the old cold �
war, is not altogether a phase of detente. I will call it "hot peace."
Detente is still the basic principle, but there is a greater number of
external conflicts that can degenerate and bring us closer to hot war more
easily than during the cold war era.
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East European, Soviet Instability
Paris Lr NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 10-16 Dec 79 p 69
[Interview with Dr. Christoph Bertram, director of the International Institute
for Strategic Studies; date and place not given]
[Text] [Question] In your view, are the risks of war in Europe or of general
war greater at the present time, and for the next 5 or 10 years, than they
have been these past few years?
[Answer] It is difficult for me to imagine that a planned and intentional war
will break out in Europe in the next S or 10 years. Statements, like those
made by Henry Kissinger, indicating that doubts could be cast on deterrence,
are highly premature, in my view. According to all the information we have,
the USSR reraains convinced that if it were to start a war in Europe it would
have to reckon with retaliation by the strategic systems of the United States.
Besides, we can't see what benefit the USSR would derive from a war against
Western Europe. It already has enough problems in Earstern Europe with its
owm allies whose attitude and behavior are far from reliable. We must not
overlook the fact that the Red Army does not have the monopoly of arms
modernization. Extensive military efforts have been made or are underway on
the Western side. The modernization program established by NATO shows that
Soviet military progress, far from triggering a reflex of "Findlandization"
in Western Europe, has, on the contrary, stimulated increased defenae efforts.
[Question] In any case, you do rule out any risk of war for the moment. Is
that right?
[Answer] Yes, I do rule out the risk of a war started intentionally. But we
may be drawn into a situation, in Europe, that would get out of control in
the wake of local developments involving military actions.
[Question] Can vou describe the situation you have in mind?
[Answer] I am disturbed by developments in Eastern Europe. The present
regimes there and the USSR can no longer rely on either ideological belief
or economic successes. "Goulash communism's" days are numbered. Economic
difficulties will soon be such that the present governments will no longer be
able to "buy" the population's support through steady improvement in its
material welfare as they have been able to do these past 10 years. This
ultimately produces an explosive mixture. We must not forget that the USSR
- intervened militarily in these countries several times in the 1950's and 1960's.
Such interventions can happen again. These past few years, Brezhnev's
. government has displayed a sort of placidity and even a certain resignation
about internal developments in the satellite countries. Just imagine that
its successors are less placid, less disposed to live with a certain pluralism
inside the socialist camp, less experienced, more nervous about the ideological
softening of some of their partners, and consequently they clo decide upon another
military intervention someday.
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It is plausible that in such a case the USSR would meet sharper resistance
than during its previous interventions. There could be mass demonstrations
that would spread to neighboring countries. There could be large-scale
attempts to Flee the country, mass movements, with opposition and clashes at
the borders. Then the military machinery could begin "rulling" and the
situation get out of control. This is especially likely because changea in
- the conventional weaponry with which forces are being equipped, in the East
as well as the West, tends to reduce reaction time more and more and provide
an increasingly more rapid retaliation capability.
' Soviet Aggression Against West Europe
- Paris LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR in French 10 Dec 79 p 66
[Interview with General Pierre Gallois, French Air Force retired; date and
- place not given]
[Text] [Question] Do you believe war between the USSR and the United States
is a possibility?
[Answer] Such a conflict appears to be ruled out, and for a long time to come.
Before saying why, I would like to make an excursion into the realm of weapons
technology. Actually there is a twofold revolution in progress within that
field and it is adding to the dangers. First, the multiple warhead technique
is being brought into general use, thereby increasing the destructive power
of a single launcher as much as 10 or 15 times. For instance, these past
few years the United States has increased its number of warheads from 3,000
to 12,000, and the USSR is following the same pattern with a certain time lag.
Furthermore, and this is even more important, accuracy has been greatly im-
proved. Some 10 years ago, ballistic missiles could strike 3 or even 5
kilometers away from their ta:.get. This lack of accuracy was offset by using
high-yield warheads. Today, accuracies of some 200 meters are being obtained--
before 1985 they will have been refined to 100 meters--and the yield required
to destroy the same target is reduced accordingly. The radius of total
destruction around the target, which formerly was 5, 10, or even 15 kilometers,
can now be reduced to 1,500 or even 800 meters.
If this present pattern of improvement continues, both superpowers will each
have weapons capable of disarming each other at long range, a situation that
would obviously benefit the one striking first. The only way to avoid this
disarmament is to have mobile weapons permanently deployed, weapons whose
movements remain secret, thus making their simultaneous destruction impossible.
This is what the United States is preparing to do. With 5,400 warheads
carried by its bombers and 4,960 warheads on its submarine-launched missiles,
the United States already has the bulk of its arsenal on mobile launchers.
When the new MX missile was replaced most of the existing fixed missiles (1,054),
its arsenal will be 100 percent mobile. The USSR, on thE other hand, has only
a small part of its strategic weapons on mobile platforms. Even its new
generation SS-18 and SS-19 missiles are positioned in fixed silos. Only 1,000
of the some 5,000 Soviet warheads are on submarines.
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In the event of a first strike, the United States would, therefore, lose only
a small part--i.e. the static component--of its intercontinental force. It
would still have the bulk of its mobile arsenal available for retaliation.
That is why I view the conflict as impossible, despite all the technological
advances.
[Question] And what about war in Europe?
[Answer] In Europe, the situation is becoming delicate. To command respect
in Eurasia, from NATO and China, and to overtake the United States and make
itself respected by that country also, the Soviet Union has armed itself with
considerable military might. This intercontinental rivalry has placed the Old
World in a position of complete imbalance. A mili*ary giant now towers over
that Old Wor1d, a giant that worries both the East--China--and the West--
Europe.
- I do not believe in a Soviet armed aggression against Western Europe. The
- Soviets have a more prudent, a more discerning foreign policy. But if, for
reasons difficult to imagine at the present time, they were induced to go to
war against Europe, they would do so by making intelligent use of the weapons
in their possession. Now then, in Europe and for the NATO countries, one of
the types of action modern technology makes possible is the disarming of an
adversary from a distance, at long range, by destroying its conventional
military force whose wlnerability increases the more it is static. With
SS-20 missiles that can be armed with low-yield warheads because of their
very great accuracy, the selective destruction of critical targets can no
longer be excluded. It is conceivable, for example, that the; Soviets could
destroy at long range, and without inflicting too much danger on urban
centers, all military targets that constitute the Budeswehr's armament and
infrastructure--airfields, radars, tank parks, headquarters, etc.--and also
without hitting the American forces in Germany. The Soviets could then turn
- to the Americans and say: "We have disarmed your allies. What are you going
to do?" And in that case, what could the United States do? Start a war in
Europe, a war lost even before it starts? Risk its own survival by employ-
ing its strategic weapons? I do not think, I repeat, that the USSR would
initiate such action which would still be risky in spite of everything.
But doesn't the mere fact that it has the means to do this,,change the whole
equation of the political and diplomatic balance in Europe?
European Defense Posture
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 17 Dec 79 pp 54-55
[Article by General Georges Buis: "The Status Quo's Chances"]
[Text] A poll conducted in 1974 by the [French] Foundation for National Defense
Studies showed that Frenchmen perceived the main threats at that time to be
terrorism first of all, followed by highway accidents, delinquency, declining
moral values, etc. The military threat ranked ninth, reflecting the almost
zero probability of war and the mild public interest in such matters.
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In 1977, a lean year, anxiety--that other luxury of modern times--made its
appearance. Suddenly, Frenchmen began talking about what they had wanted to .
ignore. Along with zero growth, nuclear firepower made its majestic entrance
into the public consciousness. Such mysterious acronyms as SALT, ICBM, and
MAD [Mutual Assured Destruction] became household words. Into this new
climate, there erupted, dramatized to perfection, the isaue of Soviet -
"Eurostrategic" weapons. Europeans discovered they were liable to receive _
blows they could not return. What then had become of the American "parasol" _
under which we had so comfortably siestaed? Were we going to have war?
This was a belated awakening. Yet there has been no lack of bloodshed in the
four corners of the world since 1945, even streams of blood. But since it
was not their blood: Europeans refused to see it. Nuclear firepower
temporarily proli.tbited the "big war," so major powers fought each other
through poor Uenighted third parties. War had become crisis management.
Then suddenly these crises began blowing up in your hands: "Ah, how easy it
was to settle the Cuban crisis," Kissinger sighed some 15 years later when
faced with other far more complicated crises which have steadily become worse
since then. Such perhaps "unmanageable" crises leading, therefore, to the
apocalypse, are what the French public dimly sees coming. How fearful should
we be of Brezhnev's succession and of the grcwing importance, in the USSR, of
the self-confident generation of young generals and admirals? What can be
expected from post-Tito Yugoslavia and from the temptation of access to
"warm waters" for the Soviet Navy, in the Adratic, of course, but elsewhere,
too, in the Gulf of Thailand, for example, via a Vietnamized Cambodia, and in
the Persian Gulf via a Sovietized �akistan and a torn Baluchistan? What
_ would Moscow's reaction be if the August 1978 Sino-Japanese treaty were to
create an intolerable imbalance of forces in eastern Asia? What chain
reaction would be produced by an American, indeed even Western, expedition
into the oil-producting countries of the Persian Gulf in the event of a
- disruption of oil supplies?
Frenchmen know that if there is a war, they will not win "because they are the
strongest," for they realize there is no--I emphasize "no"--real solidarity
in the Western camp betwee^ large-size and medium-size powers. Who still
believes in the "American nuclear umbrella?" Henry Kissinger, in Brussels
in early September, and then General Haig, in Paris on 17 November, opened
the eyes of the last of the blind. As for Europe, it was recently dealt a
severe blow when the British and Norwegians delivered a resounding "no" to
recognition of a"European continental shelf" despite the fact that such a
shelf does indeed exist. In that case, its defense...
In the little that is left of this year 1979--a year that will have given
up SALT II ratification as lost--Europeans still have to decide whether to
accept or refuse America's "modernization" of NATO "theater nuclear forces."
- In plain language this means deployment in Europe of weapons capable of
striking Soviet territory. Europeans are apprehensive about entering,
directly involved, into a decade that will no doubt become a historical
benchmark. Because of a military disaster? But where? When? How?
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Where? For Europeans, there is absolutely no doubt that the danger lies to
the East. For a rather considerable number of Frenchmen--many of them
unwavering supporters of NATO and very close to the government--the Rhine
- as a symbol has been replaced by the Teutonic Knights standing guard in the
East. This imagery of a defensive wall of armor bristling with spiked maces
and swords, must have, after the armored divisions' brief--5 years, 1940-
1945--hour of triumph, filled the eyes of our fathers who designed the Atlantic
Alliance's military organization, NATO. The problem is that this image still
fills the minds of their sons and grandsons.
That is why, some 30 years later, NATO's immutable organizational structures
remind one of an attractive Edwardian era mantelpiece. In the center,
instead of the Second Empire clock, there majestically sits CINCENT, Comman-
der-in Chief Allied Forces Central Europe, who has been assigned more than the
main part of the forces, namely the Central, Northern, and Southern Army
Groups (CENTAG, NORTHAG, SOUTHAG). To the north and south--like Dresden
china figurines left and right of the "Allegory of Time" which, for NATO,
does not pass--there are two fragile secondary commands: CINCNORTH and
CINCSOUTH. They really ought to be called "flankers" because at least that
name candidly means nothing. They are so little motivated, the men of the
north by the famous "Hoffgap" so dear to Napolean's light cavalry, and the
men of the south by the Otranto Canal, that they are already discouraged.
In the north, Denmark is a"pushover," Norway stands aloof, and Sweden is
neutral. In the south: Italy, Greece, and Turkey. Italy's contribution to
NATO is minimal, and the other two countries are more inclined to fight each
other than to unite. This puts both of them in a strong position to negotiate
their Atlantic contribution with the Americans who are stil shamefaced about
the Cypriot crisis.
As a matter of fact, in his so highly su cessful book "The Third World War"
(published by Ed. Pierre Belfond), John ~ackett, a British general, cannot
avoid sealing Italy's fate in 48 hours and that of the Nordic countries in
4 or S days. Now Sir John Hackett is a remarkable man and a priori credible.
He was a very high-level commander in NATO. Nevertheless, he draws the
arrows indicating the enemy's movement across the northern plain and over
Franconia's "gently rolling hills" the same way Moltke or Schlieffen would
have drawn them, in their bygone days, had they been obliged to study this
proglem in 1870 and 1914 respectively.
- This conventional battle--which General Hackett does not tell us is fought in
an area teeming with contiguous cities--is, mirable dictu, not lost by NATO
against forces the author complacently depicts as being three to five times
superior to NATO's! As if it can be assumed that this enemy would have
launched into a war by accepting, at the start, the idea that it could possibly
lose that war! At the same time, it is taken for granted that the enemy
could wage that war without using all of its capabilities, without nailing
- NATO's small Europe to the cross with the atom at the very outset. Yet this
is almost the exact military strategy which NATO attributes to the USSR. This
is distinctly acknowledged by Pau1-Marie de La Gorce in his dazzling tightrope-
walker performance in his postscript to General Hackett's book.
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= Another best seller, "L'Europe sans defense?" [Is Europe Defenseless?] (pub-
lished by Ed. Gamma), by General Close, a Belgian, is also a most remarkable
survey of European defense organization from the Treaty of Dunkerque up to
NATO. For maximum dramatic effect, General Close not only employes a possible
massive attack by the Warsaw Pact but also gives Pact foreces the invaluable
advantage of total surprise. Helicopters land in NATO barracks areas and
neutralize the troops therein. Conventional forces follow and reach the
Rhine within 48 hours. Chancellor Schmidt is reported to have asked: "Wetl
then, what good is the Budeswehr?"
Noteworthy is the fact that even though he is an unwavering Atlanticist,
General Close lets the President of the United States scratch'his head"
over possible use or nuclear weapons and make no decision thraughout this
entire blitzkrieg. Equally noteworthy is the fact that General Hackett, in
- his book, expresses satisfaction at the American president's refusal to
authorize the employment of tactical nuclear weapons. Lastly, it is no less
remarkable that the Soviets do likewise and allow "France reflect," the latter
being "sanctuarized" by its nuclear capability. Taking everything into
account, the author believes the best defense is one conducted by the people
and based on a tight network of forces and antitank weapons.
While, like Generals Hackett and Close, I too believe in "surprise" (there
is always surprise), it is not on the tactical, operative level that I fear
it. On the one hand, I see a direct strategy implemented indirectly by the
Soviets in the Far East or, if the West blunders, in the Near or Middle
East.
On the other hand, I fear a"creeping" strategy that would espouse the slow
_ eveolution of the FRG's Ostpolitik and be accompanied by disarmament measures
_ in Central Europe. NATO's very essence would thus be threatened. By with-
drawing from NATO arid nuclearizing itself, France has given Europe a
tremendous deterrent trump ca:-a. But if the nonnuclear FRG were to become
merely somewhat cool toward NATO, without, however, separating itself com-
pletely therefrom, it would deal NATO a fatal blow.
Having, said this, I do believe that where Europe is concerned, the Americans
and Soviets are fully partners and firmly determined to retain the status quo.
And Europeans, who no longer want to be the ones to die, are quite content
with the status quo.
TNF, U. S. Strategic Coupling
_ Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 17 Dec 79 p 56
[Interview with Ambassador Francois de Rose, former French NATO permanent
representative; date and place not given]
- [Text] [Question] There are some who believe W.esterners are now tempted to
abandon the doctrine of deterrence and are steeling themselves--like the Soviets--
- with the idea that it is possible to wage a nuclear war to win.
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[Answer] It is incorrect to say that the idea of "waging a nuclear war
to win" is gaining acceptance to the detriment of deterrence. NATO concepts
have never aimed at victory per se but solely at stopping the enemy by means
of a flexible response with employment of tactical nuclear weapons at a level
of power posing a constant threat of escalation. This is clearly a strategy
of deterrence. Soviet writers are the ones who claim a nuclear victory is
possible.
It would be paradoxical if Westerners, who did not believe in the possibility
of such a victory when they had undisputed superiority in theater nuclear
weapons, should take the oppesite view now that the qualitative and quantita-
tiva balance of forces had shifted in favor of the USSR.
This mistaken conception undoubtedly comes from the fact that in Europe, and
_ particularly in France, people confuse deterrence and an anticities attack.
- But it was some 20 years ago that the strategy of massive retaliation lost
its credibility. Since then, deterrence has been based on a full range of
forces with a coupling of conventional and tactical nuclear weapons and a
coupling of the latter with strategic weapons.
_ [Question] From that standpoint, do you consider it now necessary tu deploy
- in Europe missiles capable of striking targets in Soviet territory?
[Answer] Even if we do not believe SS-20 missiles can perform a"surgical
operation" that would almost impeccably disarm the Atlantic Alliance--each
SS-20 carries three 150-KT warheads and the firepower of 100 SS-20's would
be the equivalent of more than 2,500 Hiroshimas--it is certain that NATO
does not have an equivalent capacity because the penetration capability of
its land-based and 6th Fleet aircraft is very reduced against Soviet
antiaircraft defenses.
This situation poses a dual problem. First, NATO must have mobile missiles
so that they cannot be destroyed by a first counterforce strike. Secondly,
and perhaps more than anything else, the coupling must be restored between
theater nuclear weapons and the American central (strategic) system.
But the assignment of a certain number of ballistic missiles from Poseidon
submarines to the Supreme Allied Comnander Europe does not fully meet this
requirement. In fact, the employment in the defense of Europe of weapons
based in Europe will always be more probable than the employment of weapons
deployed in the United States or the Atlantic Ocean. It is not facetious to
- say that while a 10 percent credibility is enough to deter an adversary,
such credibility undoubtedly has to be as high as 80 to 90 percent to
reassure one's allies. The important point is that American weapons fired
from Europe, in a battle for Europe, must be able to strike the enemy's
territory. Because as far as that enemy is concerned, the place from which
weapons striking its territory are fired makes no difference. Once its
terriGory is hit, it will have to retaliate against American territory, unless
it acknowle3ges that territory's "sanctuarization" without reciprocal acknowledge-
ment of a similar status for its own territory. But by that time, violence
would have escalated close to its highest possible level.
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By increasing the probability of coupling (or recoupling) theater nuclear
forces and the American central system, the basing of these missiles in
Europe--provided they meet the two requirements I mentioned earlier--thus
constitutes a measure meant to bolster deterrence and not to prepare any
strategy for nuclear victory.
Having said this, is war now more probable than at any time in the past 30
years? That is a very big question which involves more than simple military
ronsiderations. It does seem, however, that the change in the balance of
forces does not necessarily and per se lead to an affirmative answer. What
= is at issue is the perception the antagonists have of that 3alance of forces
in a serious crisis. The important thing is not to be the first one to
blink in an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation. During the Cuban missile
crisis, the men in the Kremlin were the first to blink. Soviet programs
could cause the West to be the first some day. The deployment of mobile
medium-range missiles is meant to preclude that from happening.
' COPYRIGHT: 1979 "Le Nouvel Observateur"
8041
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
U.S., FRENCH REACTIONS TO AGGRESSION CONTRASTED
= Paris PARIS MATCH in French 15 Feb 80 pp 52-53
[Article by Arthur Conte: "A New Yalta in 1980"]
-
[Text] Immediately Following His Re-Election, Carter Will Pick Up the Red -
Telephone . . . .
"Should Yugoslavia be attacked the United States would not entervene,"
Jimmy Carter proclaimed only a few months ago. Afghanistan may be in the -
_ process of paying the price of such a lightly made statement. In any case, -
_ no better statement could have been made to encourage the last big
imperialists to take over other Angolas.
No free man in the world, therefore, would be sorry to see today the
American people asked by their president to assume a more reasonable and
- realistic v iew of�people and things. In both the Iranian crisis and the
Afghan drama they would have at least lost some of their guilelessness or
- sleepwalking. This is relatively good news.
Yet, considering all current major events, must we absolutely and system-
atically accept Jimmy Carter's theses, assuming that he would have become
firmly aware of the need for a crusade for freedom, and therefore become
firmly resolved to insure by all means, facing the tanks of Soviet
_ imperialism, the protection of the Persian Gulf?
At least five elements would advise the people of the European West to be
very cautious and reserved in this regard.
The first has to do with the nature of the man who is in charge, presently
and, perhaps, for yet another four years, of the American destiny. He is
evidently not only an opportunist without real strategy, navigating without
instruments, letting himself be pushed around by circumstances, surprising
- in terms af most of his analyses and thoughts, as multiple signs have -
confirmed ever since his advent, but he is also weak, as capable of
committing fatal acts of rashness as excessive starts. Everything occurs
- as though he would begin by being afraid of himself or would suddenly lose
~ his mind at the idea of being abandoned by his guiding star.
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This represents an incredible change fxom �oursquare presidents such as
Truman or effective strategists in the Nixon style. Yet it is a fact:
- Carter is not one of those on whom once could bet w3th a minimum of confi-
- dence.
The second element stems from the fact that America is in the midst of an
electoral campaign. Therefore, all political tricks are to be unp4. This
- applies even more so to such an extraordinary demagog, who at least knows
how to manage an electoral campaign. Sad though it may be, we must be
- aware of the following: Tfe affairs of the hostages and of Afghanistan
were right on time to reheat the mood which the incumbent president needed.
He is not about to let the climate cool off or allow the excessive re-
= appearance of faintheartedness with which he is charged by his competitors
and which is deplored by his entourage.
In a State of Alarm Until 4 November 1980
Until 4 November 1980 Carter must cultivate in the United States an -
atmosphere of alarm: we can be sure of remaining in this state of alarm -
until that date. However, a re-elected Carter could turn out to be entire- '
ly different from Carter the candidate. Today's warmonger could become the
_ mildest pacifist, the most eager to accomodate himself to living in the _
- neighborhood of the wolf or the bear. Naturally, I could b2 wrong. Never-
theless, it remains equally true that we would be rather i:ncautious and
daring to make a bet too soon. In this respect as well the greatest '
reservation becomes necessary. Consider the political sawy with which
Mohammed Ali was chosen to explain the "New America" to Africa. No one
should misjudge the real reasons for a choice which essentially reveals a
courtesan of nations.
The third element is known as Yalta. Since 1945 the spirit of Yalta, with
a Russian-American condominium, has survived all crises, even the most .
- severe ones, even-th-L-cold war, and even the battle of the-lYerlin blockade.
Let us rest assured that, this time again, sooner or later, the same will
prevail. The two superpnwers may appear on occasion to be on the verge of
a violent clash: in truth, all they are waiting for, as of now, is for the ~
proper time to find themselves in agreement and with agreements. Above all
let us refuse. to play the role of Candide and be carried away by the
generosity of our most justifiable passions. At one point or another,
- following the American electi.ons, nothing will prevent Washington and
Moscow--the Western empire and the Eastern empire--from finding each other I
again and redefine the terms of a coexistence and of a gigantic complicity.
Even before this year has ended, the "precious" red telephone; whose pur-
pose is to secure contacts better, will have done its job. Too bad the -
_ Olympic Games have not taken place in fu11 or have not taken place at all. _
Too bad for that unfortunate Iran if it is to be the main item in the great ,
bargaining. Also too bad for sufferirig Afghanistan, should tihe bear keep
- it in its clutches. Once again "Yalta" will speak out, the America-Russia
axis will be firmly restored; at a given time and place Russians and
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Americans will be able to find for the Middle East the same dividing
formulas as for the Mediterranean, Europe and the Suez Canal. Too bad for
- the Europeans, who once again will have been unable to realize this. For
at least 20 years I will never believe that Yalta has been renounced either
- by the Rusaians, whoever they may be, or by the Americana, whatever they
- may say or let others say. The fourth, on a major hiatorical level, et&ms
from the fact that, henceforth, the United States should be considered a
country whose friendships are too uncertain. This is a cruel statement.
- However, truth, even though harsh, is better than the worst blindness or
the hypocrisy of a false friend who knows only how to flatter you.
_ Actually, many Americans themselves agree with this. Whereas the American -
= people remain a magnificent people, prompt to do justice, generous, proud
of all its liberties, and forever blessed by Lincoln's messages, we are all
, too forced to recognize that for the past 35 years it has hardly helped its
friends in an exemplary fashion. In terms of friendship, the United States
has been as unsteady as was France between the two world wars. We saw it
abandon, in turn, Chiang Kai-shek in China, Diem and his successors in Vietnam, or their friends and allies in Cambodia, Lebanon, Angola, ~ Ethiopia, Zaire, Somali or Iran. This is impressive. Gforse: it applies
such zeal and obstinacy, this time, actually, fully in agreement with the
Soviet Union, in bringing down the old colonial empires of Western European _
nations, that it bears a heavy part of the responsibility for the clumsy
and precipitous way in which decolonization was carried out. With terrible
efficiency it contributed to pushes, to force us to leave alone countries -
too poorly equipped to administer themselves normally and immediately, thus
left to the worse devils, anarchiets or worse temptations provided by _
the only imperialism spared, Soviet imperialism. To this day no serious
and honest European would bet that should Western Europe be attacked from -
the Ea3t, free America would come to its aid. -
= In many ways, rather than rely on a dream shield, it would serve us better
to cement, organize and arm, while there is still time, a firm Europe.
This is the only certaizrt Y.
-
No Need to Wo rry the "Monster"
The fifth element is based on the reaction itself which the event triggered
in Jimmy Carter. When we ourselves have to react, and when we have the
- means to do so, we react dryly, clearly and locally. Thus, in Kolwezi, we
were able to prevent Zaire and the huge mining installation of Katanga from
tumbling into the Soviet world through Angola. Several days ago, neither =
Bourguiba nor Nouira lacked our help in preventing a severe destabilization
- nf eastern Maghreb. We avoid any action or reaction which could trigger a =
gEneral crisis or destablization. Conversely, Carter's error on Afghani-
_ stan was to react both globally and blunderingly. He immediately exposed
_ himself to three disadvantages. On the one hand, he does not save Afghani- =
- stan. On the other, he assumes the risk of destabilizing areas such as
- Europe whose equilibrium has not as yet been threatened. Finally, since
, his allies proved unwilling to follow him or to support his reactions which
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- they have judged either ridiculous, unsuitable or undurable, he even courts
the danger of introducing sourness, mistrust and resentment in his rela- -
tions with them: it is already clear that the Afghan crisis has led to
- "misunderstandings" between Carter and the French and the Germans. In a
way, he excites himself or becomes uptight wittiout really acting. He does
not adequately look out f.or the protection of areae and friendships which _
he had no reason whatever to drag into this sandetor�m. The man neither
properly gaged nor "thought out" his reaction or long-term trumps.
Obviously, the purpose of saying all this is not to ascribe some kind of
Machiavellian plan to the Afghanistan coup. Morally, politically and
strategically, the occupation of Kabul by Soviet troops is highly condem-
nable. No free man in Western Europe could find it acceptable. It would
be also highl}- des{.rable for the Russian Army to leave Afghan territory as
soon as possible.
Yet let us note in passing that many people, some of them tamous, who are ~
- currently sounding the alarm on the subject of Afghanistan would have had
their indignation far more justified had they, with the same spirit and .
_ sense of justice, denounced at other times other horrors, such as the ;
genocide of the Armenian people, the enslavement of the Georgian people, ,
the servitude of all the Eastern European satellites, or, among others, the
Gulags. There is a strong quixotic element in all this current uproar. Let us not ;
_ go so far as to say that the sanctions aimed at punishing Moscow could be _
_ totally inoperative. This would be as inaccurate as to ascribe them a _
total magic property. It is a11 too true that the Russian people would
deeply resent the snub aimed at their leader for their failure to organize
the Olympic Games and would find in this fact even better reasons to
criticize them. The lack of grain may increase the concern of the managers .
of the Soviet economy even though they are no longer worried by yet one _
more failure. Above all, ti.a embargo emposed on all highly specialized
electronic equipment, providing that it is not temporary, could quite _
- saverely handicap some re;,earch projects or leiading inciustries. Yet, let
us be honest, there is no reason greatly to worry the monster. What? Are -
you saying that this bear is mad? Are you pointing out that it is killing
and devouring your brother? You are calling for a mobilization of all
- available forces against it, yet all you find to neutr2::tze or intimidate _
it is to deprive it of a toy, to reduce a little bit its ration, and to -
deprive it of its lollipop? Let us do something, for we should not be left
without any reaction whatever but, for pity`s sake, let us be serious and, _
above all, having done so little, 1et us avoid an epic posture which would
_ quickly become comical.
"The Empire Which Must Not Blow Up"
In truth, this Af ghan matter does not present any direct reason for
excessive concern, even were we to really pity a population in its hour of
trial and, in fact, pathetically abandoned to its own devices.
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What is the most worrisome remaining fact is the internal development of
Russia and the trouble which it may incur, even though it may be too soon
- to gage it properly. That is the main thing. For there are three ma3or -
_ reasons for explaining the military infiervention of the Soviet Army in
Kabul:: defeat, precautionary measure, and confirmation.
The defeat is that of the Afghan communists. It was because the communists
proved to be incapable of estab:lishing a Marxist order that the Red Army
had to be called on. It would not have had to intervene had the Afghan
communists had a brilliant success. By this token the military interven- -
tion expresses and proves a severe political defeat. _
The precaution has to do with the Muslim republics which the Kremlin is
keeping under its thumb within the Soviet Union itself. It is all too -
- evident that the storm which leads all Islam to a confrontation with the
- atheistic empire would inflame the Russian Muslim populations the moment
Afghanistan would be lost. This is the entire problem of the "empire which
must not blow up." Had Moscow displayed any weakness a commotion could
have been felt throughout all subjugated countries, including Eastern
Europe. This is confirmed by the tremendous importance acquired by the
armed forces in Russia. The Red Army has indeed become a primary, if not
major, element of global life for the rest of the century. It may have -
become, perhaps, the great czarina. As to Afghanistan, an overall analysis _
_ shows that the Kremlin was more condemned to carry out this operation than
it wished. This.is more a sign of ma3or troubles at the top of the empire
than proof of aggressiveness. Let us above all not confuse the effect with -
the cause. Let us, therefore, avoid all definitive and categorical judg-
ments, since nothing happening in Moscuw is simple.
All we have to do is look at the conflicting theses of the witnesses. We
are told that Russia would like, essentially, to "keep" China within the
limits of a solid waistbelt with tough mail.and Afghanistan, together with
Vietnam, Vietnamized Ca�bedl-a-, and Vietnamized I,aos and the Indian army _
would be one such link. We are also assured that Afghanistan is merely the
_ first stage of the "march to the south," of a march toward petroleum
deposits and warms seas, and that the Russian military leaders must have
programmed a general offensive against the Near East. This is Hitler all
over again, some claim. No, others say, it is rather the Russians who are
- taking pledges and important strategic positions for the time when they
will become involved in the inevitable division of Iran and, subsequently,
"the division of the oil." Actually, all this may be true. It could even be possible for all these explanations to be more-or-less valid at the same -
time. Other questions, however, remain even more important. Henceforth, '
- what men, what forces will be commanding in Moscow? What kind of troubles
- do they have and have they already made major political decisions? Does -
the golden rule according to which "all convulsions of all kinds, social,
economic, financial, military, religious, nationalistic and racial, which
could weaken the capitalist world" are to be exploited remain the first law _
of Leninism? Providing, of course, that any one such convulsion would not _
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worsen to the point of triggering a risk of general warfare and, theretore,
directly threaten "the first socialist country in the world"? Or else, is -
the army demanding entirely different calculations and entirely different
ambitions? What is precisely the situation with the relations between the ~
army and the party? That is the essential factor. Yet all we have are -
bits of answers. We are barely capable of asking the pertinent questions.
_ Which means, in this case as well, we, the French, must adVance very _
cautiously. The fog is too thick in the East. Plunging too impulaively _
along one or another track, let us take care not to fall into most un- -
pleasant shifting sands, into the most severe errors of interpretation.
For example: participating in the boycott of the Olympic Games and con-
vincing ourselves that this would embarrass the entire Soviet Government,
we could, conversely, become part of the calculations of the clan which,
in the Kremlin; can only think of how to abolish the games and which, for a
number of years, has worried about all the problems they involve. Obvious-
- ly, as an initial reflex it would be tempting tQ give them such a lesson.
It would even be easy and would entail-no immediate risks. After giving it -
a second thought, our reaction may finally be such as to meet our ojbec-
_ tives. Let us learn how to be patient and to wait.
France's Arbitration Opportunities
To top it all, it so happens that we hold an ideal moral position between
East and West. Neither side could accuse us of sectarianism, sordid
ulterior motives or Machiavellian calculations. The entire universe knows
that, while knowing how to insure its security, the new France has as its
,nain ambition to serve the balance of the peace. It is of capital impor-
tance to retain this position. France is just about the only country in
this all too nervous world to retain full self-control and retain great
arbitration possibilities. In truth, the general situation is far less
alarming than some actors or observers claim. There is nc reason whatever
for panicking. Let France, even though sailing against the tide, preserve
its full serenity and clari,j of-view, firm objectivity. The truth
will belong to those remain the most calm. For, alas, those who, today,
are most on edge will not necessarily be the most firm tomorrow.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 par Cogedipresse S.S
5157
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JOBERT VIEWS WEST'S REACTION TO EVENTS IN IRAN, AFGHANISTAN
LD101437 Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 Feb 80 pp 26, 27 LD
FRANCE
[Commentary by Michel Jobert: "Wicked Arabs: Frightful Soviets!"--passages
between slantlines printed in italics]
[Text] The period 1945-1980 bears witness to an unchanged world of Russo-
American rivalry and its spirit of partition. However, Western and espec-
ially European public opinion, far from fleeing the double propaganda to
whic~, it is subjected, remains just as vain an d blind.
For years the Arabs and Islam have been a sub,ject of irritation and worry to _ Western public opinion. Without going back to far, Nasser, from his starv-
ing country in 1956, sowed anxiety by nationalizing the Suez Canal. Several
Moslem countries are emerging from colonial struggles'into rightful indepen-
dence. This immense effort, and this transformation, place in question, at
least externally, the West's positions, and spark off bitterneas the;ce rather
- than sympathy. Israel's struggles to protect and increase it territory in
the Middle East give this trend a boost by providing it with a cause, a lo-
_ cation, some champions. In the old land of the Philistines the pyres of
- -passion catch light again easily, and from Los Angeles to Djakarta thE clans
mobilize. Undoubted anti-Semites become pro-Israel to reveal themselves as
- anti-Arab.
The oil "war," astutely spread across the front page by the U.S. media during
U.S. negotiations since 1971 on a price increase with the main Arab producers, -
adds to the emotion of the Western communities: it questions habits of
price, consumption, industrial development and trading channels. It intro-
duces worry, if not scarcity into everyone's daily life. It will take time
- for reality to emerge from behind propaganda's thick curtaira: most regimes
of the oil-producing countries are bound up with the West, since the latter
is the market for production, a bank to invest the profits, a guarantee
against communist subversion. This objective complicity is ultimately trans-
lated very simply in politics. Has public opinion, which is hardly refined
either in its reflections or its motivations, at last noticed that? When, `
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in 1973, Georges Pompidou's finance minister spoke in favor of a plan, at-
tributed to the Americans, to bomb the Middle East oil wells, Pompidou re-
plied with a curt, cutting irony: "Xou do not bomb yoursel.f!"
Western fury reached its peak with the fall of the shah of Iran wh3ch was
due as much to his mistakes as to doggedness of an archaic religious leader
who responded better to Iran's concept of liberty which hxd been captive for
so long. What! This country wanted to be free. What! It refused to pro-
duce oil to nourish an evolution at home in which it could not get its bear-
ings. What! It used methods long since rejected by the international com-
munity. What! Without force and feeding only on disorder it provoked every-
one with a singular thoughtlessness! But this public fury hid the main point:
Jimmy Carter and Khomeyni were "objective allies"--as the Marxists say.
Thanks to the Iranian, this colorless, uncertain American became a resolute
dispassionate statesman. Gallup po11s turned in his favor. His rival, Ken-
nedy, formerly so threatening, was collapsing. Khomeyni was promoted to the
not inconsiderable role of Carter's "stooge."
At this point and "for better or for worse," the Soviets out of alarm at the
Islamic unrest of their south-east border--an unrest so contagious for their
own Moslem republics--out of a conviction *_hat, in any case, the U.S. Senate
would not ratify the SALT II treaty in tlie election year of 1980, and finally
having becom2 imbued with a precept of Frederick II---despite his being a
Prussian!--"Take first, negotiate after," hurl themselves against Afghanistan.
"Enough is enough," U.S. citizens rage. They fly to the aid of Pakistan, only recently blacklisted for wanting to manufacture "the first Islamic
atomic bomb," which justifiably worried Israel, among others. They trumpet _
about human rights in Afghanistan, having cared little for European rights _
at the Helsinki conference. Here they are discovering the virtues of Islam,
- that social and religious principle which has always been resistant to Soviet-
ization. Now they wanted to become 3ts prime defenders. And even Ayatollah
Khomeyni, formerly destined to be excommunicated by honest people, is on the
road to atonement, he who so haughtily rejected Brezhnev's self-interested
advice and offers of support: "Carter-Khomeyni, the same fight!" for awhile
this apFeared on the placards of the delegations in front of the White House.
The U.S. Tehran Embassy hostages have been somewhat forgotten, have they not? Like the snubs to iTN Secretary General Waldheim. A1so forgotten, -
- those "wicked Arabs" who for so long fuelled popular imagery, as soon as the _
"frightful Soviets" stired up mobilization! After all, the Iranian are mere-
ly Moslem.... .
This is how propaganda runs to suit interests. Here, in France, an under-
employed politician (Note--Mr Poniatowski) who without office gives voice to
presidential thought, does not want to miss out on the future: "If, in this
affairs, France officially seems to be deal3ng tactfully with the Russians,"
he more or less explains, "this is because the real danger is the Yellow
Peril and because Russia is the bsst bulwark against it!" This brings to
mind the line put forward by French rightists during 1936-1939, who pre-
ferred to make appeasing noises to Hitler who, it was believed, would pro-
tect them from communist. Oh, what thoughtlessnes! "Wicked Arabs!"
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"Frightful Soviets!" do we have to add "Distur.bing Yellow Peril" to the con-
temporary litany of popular whims?
Rather than wandering off searching in the sky of daily news for who is to
play the role of the "Black Angel" of their misfortunes, the Weat, given
that these misfortunes exist, would do better to "turn an inward eye" on
itself, as the English poet said. It would notice fewer blank spaces than
it thinks; it would realize the short-term relentlessness with which it
clung, despite all reason, to positions of dominance, even when they threat-
ened it with ruin; the egoism which finally paralyzed its adapting to a more
populated, better informed and more susceptible world; the materialism which
stripped it of the very sense of happiness; the terrifying weapons which it
manufactured either to utilize or protect itself from the poverty of the
others: the nuclear weapon and the so-called interhational monetary system;
its inability to imagine a collective development which does not stem first-
ly from the abuse of positions of strength.
Above all Europe, which has been the cradle of so many brilliant if cruel
civilizations, based on living languages and cultures Europe today, lacking
- imagination and will among each of its peoples, is failing /to be/. The
Soviet aggression against Afghanistan aroused in it nothing but short-term
tricks, timorous acquiesence to the Americans, compensated by counterassurances
of comprehensive indulgence toward the Russians. Poor Europe! If the Soviets
worry it at this point, may it loudly espouse the mometnary U.S. crusade
- against its favorite Russian partner. But may it put forward its conditions
in return: /The reform/ of a monetary system which is going to lead us all
to disaster; /its freedom/ to be a partner for the whole world and no longer
just a docile shadow; /its vocation/ to practice a real detente which will
stem from its /nonalinement/ with either bloc. The defense of /human rights/
includes Afghanistan, naturally. But its success would be better assured if
Europe took the trouble first to defend its own rights as free men instead
of pretending to worry about those of others.
- COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
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RAYMOND ARON VIEWS WESTERN POST-AFGHANISTAN POLICY DECISIONS
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 2-8 Feb 80 p 68
- [Article by Raymond Aron)
FRANCE
[Text] In several statements and interviews, Indira Gandhi has reiterated
- Leonid Brezhnev's version of the events in Afghanistan: The Soviet troops
responded to the appeal of Hafizullah Amin. Sympathetic to Valery Giscard
d'Estaing's arguments, she signed a joint French-Indian communique in which
the occupation of Afghanistan, without being mentioned, is implicitly con-
demned. The Indian premier and the French president both consider it unac-
ceptable.
On the other hand, the entire communique itself was inspired by the sc-
called doctrine of nonalinement, a doctrine that is not very compatible
with French participation in the Atlantic Alliance. Giscard d'Estaing ob-
tained from his counterpart a moral condemnation of the Soviet Union, pro-
vided that tension could be diffused as quickly as possible, in short to
accept the unacceptable.
With the exception of Georges Marchais and communist leaders, French poli-
ticians have also condemned the entry of Soviet divisions into Afghanistan
with more or less force. They have all added that the retaliatory measures
taken by President Carter were ineffective, but none of them, not even
Francois Mitterrand, has advised the press, radio or television of which
other retaliatory measures the United States should take.
One of my friends, who also compares current French diplomacy to that of
the thirties, does not approve of the boycott of the Olympic games. "A
political act must be met," he wrote me, "with a strictly political act."
Politics has become all-encompassing and the politicization of sport did
- not occur yesterday. What remains of the spirit of the Olympic games and
Coubertin's ideal when the host countzy's government steps up repression
before the arrival of foreigners and tries to separate its people from
visitors who have come from all over the world?
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The partial embargo of grain sales has also not been spared by the critics.
Either the shortage of cattle fodder will punish the people, who had no
hand in the affair, or the Soviet Union will purchase elsewhere the equiva-
lent of what the United States refuses to sell it. No one in Washington
has any illusions about the short-term effectiveness of the so-called agri-
cultural or green weapon. The President has nevertheless demonstrated that
he would not hesitate, even during an election period, to estrange himself
from voters in the name of the national interest.
More generally, what could the retaliatory measures affect, if not the
various trade, scientific and technical relations with the Soviet Union?
Is trade a weapon of peace or a market of fools? Western countries have
granted the Soviet Union favorable credit conditions, have sold it high-
technology products, including turnkey plants (and the products from those
plants sometimes compete with Western products). They have facilitated
the Soviet program of excessive anas buildup. Commentators also point out
that during a period of recession, Western businesses do not turn down con-
tracts with Eastern Europe. France in particular, in return for the capi-
tal goods which it exports to the USSR, receives about 8 million tons of
petroleum.
A break in trade between Western and Soviet countries is not conceivable,
since it would affect the Soviet Union as well as Western countries. The
Soviet world owes several tens of millions of dollars (about 50). If we
refuse to honor the contracts, the Soviets will do likewise.
Thus we have not yet reached the point of all or nothing. Let us first
dispel the illusion that Soviet diplomacy or society will change because
the French have built a hotel in Moscow (providing all the materials and
even workers). Let's also rule cut the plan, neither feasible nor desir-
able, of a general embarqo agains t the Soviet Union and Soviet countries.
On the other hand, what would be desirable_.and_perhaps feasible is an
agreement between the Europeans and Americans on trading procedures with
the Soviet Union. Rivalry between Europeans to grab Eastern contracts ul-
timately convinces the men in the Kremlin of the suicidal inclination of
the capitalist system, thus confirming the old Leninist view.
Beyond the uncertainties concerning procedures lies the real question:
What is the purpose? According to the president of the republic, above
all it is a question of preserving detente and preventing war. These two
goals are not the same. Of course, preventing total war between the two
blocs or between the two great powers remains the most important require-
ment. But detente does not reduce the risks, no more than tension aggra-
vates them. Further expansion of Soviet power toward the oil-producing
areas, tolerated without anything more than verbal protest, would create
a situation in which an arme d confrontation would become more likely.
Perhaps the Europeans and Americans do not interpret the Afghan crisis in
the same way: a single inci3ent in the eyes of some, a stage of a
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large-scale plan for others. Whatever the interpretation, the USS R was not
satisfied with the coup d'etat in Kabul and sent in a large army. Presi-
dent Carter was aware that Soviet troops were concentrated at the borders:
did he advise Leonid Brezhnev of the extent to which he considered "unac-
ceptable" the possible occupation of an independent country, a buffer be-
tween empires? Even if he didn't, he could not limit himself to protests.
If Soviet troops occupy an independent country without the White House re-
sponding to the challenge and retaliating against the attack, the psycho-
logical balance between the two great powers, which is essential for peace,
is seriously compromised.
What amazes me is the refusal to understand the stakes in this crisis, com-
_ parable to the Cuban crisis of 1962. The material stake, Afghanistan, is
no less than the i.nstallation of Soviet missiles off the American coast.
r As for the moral stake, if it is not of the same scope, its nature is no
different from that of 1962.
Does the United States have the will and the ability to protect its vital
interests? After the Vienna conference and the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Nikita
Khrushchev tested the courage of the young American president, so to speak.
This time, the Soviets no longer take seriously an American president who
did not react to any of the Soviet or Cuban operations in Africa or Asia.
- But Carter's job of restoring credibility is more difficult than Kennedy's
_ was in 1962. The latter had the means to send an ultimatum; Carter does
not. In terms of nuclear weapons, the United States has lost its superior-
ity. In the area of conflict, the Soviet Union enjoys every geostrategic
advantage.
Although the retaliatory measures may not be enough to lead to the birth
of a different Carter in the eyes of the world, they are better than the
"concerns" of the French Government.
- COPYRIGHT: 1980 s.a. Groupa Express
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COMMENTARY ON FACTIONALISM WITHIN PCF LEADERSHIP
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 28 Jan-3 Feb 80 p 29
FRANCE
CArticle by Thierry Pfister: "A Party of Petitioners--While It Is Clear
That Georges Marchais Has Understood Leonid Brejnev's Arguments, the
Opposite Is Obviously Not True"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed
_ in italics7
- CText7 The PCF leaders have just silently completed a minor moral revolution
which has legitimized the mode of expression used since the spring of 1978
by the communists contesting some of the party's orientations. First, the
leaders themselves are now using petitions signed by intellectuals and they
- are also publishing one such petition as a full-page ad in LE MONDE. Just as
each member of the socialist party is defined by his adhering to one trend
or another, the communists are now achieving a comparable results. Subtle
categories are being created, depending on whether one has signed this or
that petition or even--the ultimate nuance--whether one belongs to those
who do not associate themselves with the avowed dissidents without, however,
putting their signatures on those petitions written by the leaders.
The case of the five authors of "L'URSS et Nous" ["The USSR and Us"], a book
which had been officially endorsed by the political bureau at the time of
its publication, is characteristic of this situation. Francis Cohen and
Maurice Decaillot, both official associates of the PCF, have signed the
petition initiated by the party's leaders to denounce the anticommunist
campaign. Leon Robel and Claude Frioux, professors of Russian, have refused
to follow suit without, however, going as far as historian Alexandre Adler
who did not hesizate to initial the declaration in which dissidents demanded
the withdrawal of Soviet troups from Afghanistan.
Claude Frioux, however, has taken advantage of the forum offered by L`HUMA-
NITE in preparation for the national council of 9-10 February to exnress
- his concern in view of the upsurge of trade unionism which has become appar-
ent within the PCF and which had already been called to attention by Henri
Fiszbin, former first secretary of the Paris federation, and Francois
Fiincker, assistant editor of the future weekly REVOLUTION. As for Maurice
Moissonnier who has been a member of the Rhone federation committee, he
. has chosen to warn his comrades against the resurgence of sectarism.
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The Leader
Trade unionism and sectarism, the traditional deviations during periods when
the PCF falls back, have been illustrated, among others, by Georges Marchais'
performance on the Channel 2 program "Cartes sur Table" ["Put Your Cards on
- the Table"]. /"To you, I may be only a worker,"/ exclaimed the general sec-
retary of the PCF whose abrupt formulations have always resulted in blurring
the nuances or the dialectic character of his party's positions. Who still
remembers that in June 1974 the same Georges Marchais explained peremptorily
to his party's central committee that socialism was not the question of the
day and that they should not flinch, but play with confidence the card of
alliance? Last Iear, Henri Fiszbin was accused of opportunism for much less
than that. Wishing to show that he is the leader, Georges Marchais always
rushes ahead of his troops, at the risk of sacri=icing the coherence of his
successive analyses. The general secretary, for instance, has stated on
- television that in 1939 the PCF, alone against all others, had been right.
Thus, the German-Soviet alliance has been justified once more, and Nizan,
who had been discreetly rehqbilitated through cultural columns, is by the
same token relegated to the limbos with the excluded.
Until now, Georges Marchais' style had the advantage of catching attention,
of forcing curiosity. This is no longer true today. Too much is at stake
_ for his performance as an actor to invite smiles. LIBERATION summarized
this feeling quite well in its first page headline on the next morning:
"Hey, Marchais, you are going too far!" A Louis-Harris-France poll publish-
ed by LE MATIN has confirmed *he lack of understanding between communists
and the country which is again becoming apparent. Only 9 percent of those
polled still believe that the PCF has changed a lot since the Stalin era,
while 20 percent thought so in September 1977.
In addition, the time of fellow travelers is now gone for good. Only
Pierre Bourgeade remains to explain in L'HUMANITE that %"wit-hout the commu-
_ nists, there is no nation; without the friendship of the USSR there is no
security for France."/ i.ven the national bureau of the extremely under-
standing riovement for Peace has felt the necessity of taking its distances
and of demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, in spite
of the objurgations of its communist leaders.
On the other hand, the majority of communist voters do not stir. In this
respect, the Louis-Harris-France poll published in LE MATIN is a revelation.
And many party members breathed a sigh of relief when they read the report
presented to the central committee by Maxime Gremetz on 21 January. A
stable core of party members is pleased to find again its traditional view
of a manichean world where strenghth on the socialist side is tne only
reliable means of escaping the intrigues of imperialism. This view is
essentially in keeping with "third worldist" analyses a la Regis Debray
which are not wi-thout influence on the youngest among party members, espe-
cially students. The PCF leaders, therefore, can align themselves on Soviet
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diplomacy. At most, cadre meetings will stress the fact that, for the first
_ time, in the communique signed jointly with the PCF, the Soviets have acknow-
ledged the existence of a right to disagree.
Net ResuJ.t Nothing to Brag About _
This is the "victory" which Georges Marchais was celebrating in Moscow when
h2 waved in front of TF1 cameras the PRAVDA issue in which the communique
was published. It was a Pyrrhic victory, though, since the PCF delegation -
not only accepted in counterpart to leave out any mention of the intervention
in Afghanistan, but also omitted in the communique any mention of its dis- -
agreement with the Soviets on the subject of democracy. However, if we are
to believe Maxime Gremetz, Georges Marchais had been quite clear on this
point in front of Leonid Brejnev, and had gone so far as to insist on the
- /"caricatural"/ character of socialism as it is interpreted in Czechoslovakia
by the Husak team. Which prompted Guy Konopnicki, former secretary of the
communist students to make the bitterly 1-ronic comment: /"Back then, the -
= great rabbi of France should have thought of complaining to Hitler about
Petain!"/
- Another reason why the net result of the reconciliation with the CPSU is
nothing to brag about is that, while it is clear that Georges Marchais has -
understood Leonid Brejnev's arguments, the opposite is obviously not true.
The measures taken against Andrei Sakharov have placed the PCF leaders in
a particularly unconfortable position. L'HUMANITE's disapproval and the
_ respectful letter of protest addressed to Brejnev by a few "official" party
intellectuals, from Rene Andrieu to Andre Wurmser, will not bother the
Soviets much and hardly suffices to salvage the PCF's stakes.
After all, when Jeannette Thorez-Vermeersch congratulates Georges Marchais _
on his /"two positive actions: an internationalist attitude in the Afghan
- affair and a renewal of relations with iche CPSU which is the greatest force
at work for peace in the world,"/ one may wonder. Which of the two has
reconciled himself with the other? There is no indication that the widow
- of the former general secretary of the PCF has given up her (frozeli) part
- as "statue of the Commander." -
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Observateur"
9 9294
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ESA'S 1980 B(JDGET OUTLINED, CHANGES NOTED
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 9 Feb 80 pp 50-51
FRANCS
FArticle by Pierre Langereux]
EText] The ESA [European Space Agency] is off to a gcod start in 1980. Its
- 37th Council, which met in Paris 23-24 January, made several decisions of
importance to the future of the Agency and of European space activities, _
especially in regard to the 1980 budget, the Earthnet program, the Spacelab -
program, and the �uture of the ARIANESPACE company.
For the first time in some years, the 11 member countries of the ESA agreed
unanimously on the 1980 budget �ot mandatory European space activitiesl
- Thus, the entire ESA 1980 budget (mandatory and optional activities) is now -
_ approved. It totals 629.6 million Units o� Account [UCJ*, or 3,676.5 mil- _
lion francs (see chart).
This is the first time in about 3 years the annual mandatory activi-
ties budget has been approved at the beginning of the year, as, normally,
it should be. This is also the first year the annual mandatory
activities budget has had the unanimous approval that is required but that -
has not been achieved heretofore, owing to Italy's attitude of complaining
that it is being per.alized by the European monetary regulations (in view
of Italy's high rat:e of inflation) and by application ot the rules of '
"fair industrial re:urns," especiall.y in the case of the Spacelab program.
Major Concessions to Italy
The situation is now completely changed. The "Italian matter" has been
resolved through the efforts of the Agency, which has agreed to several
major concessions to Italy from afinancial standpoint. These have to do
with Italy's contributions to the ESA and with the compensations to be paid ~
to Italy to.palliate the monetary policy's effects.
G
* 1 UC (1980) = 5.83943 francs.
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= Comparison of ESA 1980 and 1979 Budgets (in million
UC's*)
Activities
1979
1960
Total annual.budget
591.9
629.6
Mandatory activities:
General budget:
73.1
75.7
Basic activities
- Support to centers (ESTEC [European Space Technology
Center], E50C**, ESRIN**)
- Support to CSG [Guyana Space Center] (Kourou)
= Scientific program
79.4
88.9
Earthnet program
6.3
4.6
Programs in support'of mandatory activities:
34.4
10.4
Extended operation of COS B
~ Support to Ariane users
Support to Exosat (rocket) program
Total mandatory activities
193.2
179.6
Optional programs:
Earth observation:
34.0
36.4
Meteosat 1 satellite
11.6
6.0
_ Meteosat 1 operation
8.7
7.7
Meteosat 2 satellite
4.0
7.0
Sirio 2 satellite
6.6
10.9
Remote -sens ing preparatary program
3.1
4.8
Telecommunications:
89.55
125.3
Phase 2(end of OTS operations)
14.6
10.8
ECS 1 and 2 satellites
36.0
43.7
Phase 3 of above (ECS 3, 4 and 5)

16.3
= MARECS 1 satellite
17.8
9.3
MARECS 2 satellite
10.7
28.0
Technological program (ASTP)
7.8
6,7
- Aerosat project (abandoned)
0.1
0.1
H-SAT project (Phase B)
2.1

L-SAT project (Phase B)
0.4
9.5
SPINE trial
0.05
0.9
[Optional programs continued next page]
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Comparison of ESA 1980 and 1979 Budgets (in million UC's*) Econt'd]
Activities 1979 1980
Optional programs:-Icont'd]
Space transport: 274.25 288.3
Spacelab program 118.4 119.8
First Spacelab trials (FSLP) 8.2 6.5
Ariane program 146.25 159.7
Supplemental Ariane development (FOD) 1.4 2.3
Total optional programs 404.1 450.0
* 1 UC 1980 = 5.83943 francs.
**[expansion unknown]
Contributions by Countries to E5A Activities (in percentages)
_ 1979 - 1980
Germany 25.57
France 21.07
- Uni'-Ad Kingdom 15.35
Italy 12.19
Low Countries 5.60
Spain 4.73
Sweden 4.41
Belgium 4.29 '
- Switzerland 3.96 ,
Denmark 2.29
Ireland 0.54 - 40
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Italy's outstandinq contributions (including its 1976-1978 arrears and the
adjustments to its 1978 and 1979 contributions), which total 4.2 million
UC's, are to be settled in three payments: 1 million UC's in 1981, 1.5 mil-
lion UC's in 1982, and 1.7 million UC's in 1983.
41 As regarda 1980 contributions, Italy will be �avored as follows: Its con- -
tributions will not be increased (as, normall.y, they should be) if, at the
time of payment, the rise in costs owing to inflation and to changes in -
monetary parities does not exceed 6 percent; otherwise, Italy will pay the
difference. Furthermore, Italy will receive significant financial compensations as
follows:
_ --the participating countries in the Spar,elab program have agreee, to permit
Italy to reduce from 18 percent to 1 percent its contribution to any cost-
- overruns to completion of the Spacelab development program (see AIR & COS-
MOS No 797);
--Italian industry will also receive additional contracts (totaling 8 =
million UC's) under the Spacelab development aiid production (FaP)
programs; .
--the ESA has agreed to reduce by 12 million i7C's (2 million UC's in 1980 -
and 10 million UC's in 1961-1983) Italy's contribution to the Agency's
general budget. _
The latter measure is all the more siqnificant in that it entails a real
- drop in the Agency's general budget resources, since the 12-million UC
"rebate" granted to Italy will not be made up by raising the contributions
of the other countries to these mandatory expenses.
This decision is being accompanied by reductions as well--minimum, of
course--in the contributions of Sweden and ireland, who do not want to bear
the effects of the Italian position.
Thus, the ESA will have to reduce substantially its "manner of living" to
absorb the effects of these measures on the general budget. It has just
cancelled its participation in the Hanover Exposition.
Earthnet, a Mandatory Program
The ESA Council approved unanimously, subject to further consideration by
Spain, the inclusion of the Earthnet program--to receive data from American
remote-sensing satellites--among ESA's mandatory programs, effective 1 Jan-
uary 1980. This program, undertaken in February 1977, has until now been
one of the Agency's optional programs; from now on, all member countries
are required to participate (with aontributions proportional to their
respective GNP's).
41
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The aspects of the program approved--to the end of 1982--represent a'cost
of 18.05 million UC's (mid-1977 prices), of which 4.05 million UC's will be
for program management by the Earthnet staff (installed at Frascati), in-
cludinq the development and operation of an automated satellite-data cata-
log using the RECON system, and 0.95 million UC's will be for processing of
_ SAR [Synthetic-Aperture Radar] data from the Seasat 1 satellite (to Decem-
ber 1980). It is recalled that this satellite has operated only 90 days.
The remaining credits will cover receiving station operating and data pre-
processing costs at: Fucino, Italy (for the Landsat 1, 2 and 3 satellites),
= Kiruna, Sweden (Landsat 2 and 3), Oakhanger, Great Britain (Seasat 1),
Lannion, France (HCMM, Nimbus G) and Maspalomas, Canary Islands (Seasat 1
and Nimbus G).
Arianespace Resolution
The member countries, except Germany, also passed a resolution to create
the future Arianespace Company for the production, marketing and launching
of European rockets. This four-point resolution covers: participation by
the countries, negotiations to be conducted by the ESA, the placing of the
ESA's Ariane installations at the disposal of Arianespace (including owner-
ship rights to acquired know-how), and conditions pertaining to the use of ~
Ariane for Agency programs. '
This now makes it possible for the interested member countries to subscribe
to the disclosure filed by France concerning the rights and obligations
of tlie Arianespace Company toward the participating countries; the produc-
tion and use of Ariane, and the schedule of rates to member countries for
Ariane launchings: 175 million francs for the single launching of a satel-
lite of the Ariane class; 150 million francs for the single launching of
a satellite of the "half-Ariane" (or Delta) class; and 95 million francs
for the double launching of satellites of the Delta class.
The countries have 3 months from the disclosure filing date (14 January
- 1980), that is, until mid-April, to sign the document attesting their par- _
ticipation in Arianespac~:.
One member country, however, requested the ESA to hold another informative
meeting on Arianespace on 6 February.
The question of Germany's participation must also be settled. In view of
this, France has meanwhile withheld its participation in the financing .
of the Spacelab cost overrun. . Interest in Supplemental Spacelab Development Program
_ The ESA Council has therefore not voted on the resolution concerning parti-
cipation by the member states in the Spacelab developmental program cost
overrun (140 percent). Nine of the 10 participating countries, however,
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are in favor of the resolution. France alone has withheld its vote, in
view of the magnitude o� pendinC financial commitments. It is, in fact,
linking its positions on the two major ESA programs, Ariane and Spacelab,
and awaits an equivalent commitment from Germany on Arianespace.
The definitive participation of all member countriea in the Spacelab coet
overrun is expected to be obtained at a special meeting of the Spacelab
program's management committee on 19 February.
On the other hand, the member countries pasaed unanimously two other reso-
; lutions concerning production of the second Spacelab and further develop-
mental work on the orbital laboratory (see AIR ET COSMOS No 797).
One of these resolutions authorizes the director general of the ESA to take
immediate steps providing for "carry-forward funciing" to October 1980 of
the construction program on the second Spacelab, which is beinq built for
NASA.
The order for the second Spacelab was signed by NASA on 28 January 1980.
But since the American space agency does not have the necessary credits
available this year, the ESA will advance the reqtAired funds through a bank
loan (interest charges on which will of course be billed to NASA). This
enabled the ESA to sign with ERNO Eexpansion unknown], on 30 January 1980,
the contract to build the second Spacelab.
The other resoluti.on--passed by all the member countries except Sweden, ab-
sent--marks "the interest of the member countries in a further supplemental
Spacelab development program" (FOD), the "initial phase" of which will be
implemented within the framework of the ESA. The Council then asked the
interested countries to define in writing their proposed cosnmitments to -
this initial phase of the supplemental Spacelab development program, which
consists of a"program of studies and support," the cost of which is esti- _
mated at 1.6 million UC's (1978 prices) for 1980. The definitive contribu-
tions of the member countries have not yet been established; the proposed
schedule is: Germany 32.5 percent, United Kingdom 21 percent, France 20
percent, Italy 14 percent, and other countries 12.5 percent. -
The decision to undertake this initial phase of the supplemental Spacelab
development program must be taken by 1 July 1980 at the latest to enable
work to actually start by the end of 1980.
Preliminary work (1.6 million UC's) is to consist of studies on the initial
phase (detailed definition, preliminary design, cost analysis, evaluation
of Spacelab resources, and study on a small aiming medium) and preliminary
studies on successive medium- and long-term phases. The latter are to be
the object of decisions to be taken during the seoond half of 1982, that
is, after the first Spacelab flight (April 1982).
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The object of the initial phase of the supplemental Spacel.ab development
program (FOD) is first of all to increase the duration of its miasions (to
30 days), its electric power and heat dissipation (to 4 kW),.its opera-
tional flexibility (remote control, data management, short pallets, etc.),
and the services that can be performed by its payload. The total cost of
this initial phase, which will be completed toward the end of 1982, is'
estimated by the ESA to be 23.5 million UC's (1978 prices).
Its medium-term objective will be to achieve full compatibility with Ameri-
can means of increasing its power--PEP [Power Extension Package] and 25-kW
- Power Module--as well as greater endurance of Spacelab, leaving its equip-
ment pallets in orbit, together with its power module, over longer periods.
The long-term intent is to achieve total independence of Spacelab (with
respect to Shuttle), at that point leaving Spacelab's pressurized and
manned module in orbit with its power module, thus achieving a true small
orbital station.
COPYRIGHT: Air & Cosmos, Paris, 1980
- 9399
CSO: 3100
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- COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
COST OF ARIANE VERSIONS 2 AND 3 NOW 560 MILLION FRANCS.
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 9 Feb 80 p 53
[Article by Pierre Langereux]
[Text] New estimated cost studies for the first supplemental development
phases of the European Ariane launcher were presented by the CNES [Nation-
al Center for Space Studies] to the Ariane program executive committee,
which met in Paris 29-30 January.
The new CNES proposal puts the cost of developing new Ariane 2 and 3 vers-
ions, that could place, respectively, 2 and 2.4 tons of payload (instead of
1.75 tons with Ariane 1) in geostationary transfer orbit toward mid-1983,
_ at 96.018 milZion units o� account CUC], that is, around 560.7 million
francs.
This includes the development ot powdered-fuel boosters, improvement.of
the three stages and of reliability, propellant ingredients, ground facili-
ties, etc. (see AIR ET COSMQS No 795). This new estimate of 560 million
francs greatly exceeds the previous estimate (360 million francs).
Development costs on recovery of the Ariane launcher's first stage will
total 16.2 million UC's, or around 94.6 million francs, according to the
new Cr1ES proposal. This includes the feasibility and design studies (2.43
million UC's),-and development of the recovery systems (13.357 million
~ UC's).
COPYRIGHT: Air & Cosmos, Paris, 1980
9399
CSO: 3100
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- COUNTRY SEC`rION
GROUND FORCES' USE OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY ASSESSED
Peris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Jan-Feb 60 pp 24-25
[Article by Col Guy Collognat]
FRANCE
[Text] Col Colognat graduated from Saint-Cyr with the 1945-1947 "New
School" graduating class, aiid was assigned to the metropolitan artillery.
After a stay in the Far East, he obtained a technical diploma in opera-
tions research. A battery commander in Algeria, he then served with the
Inter-Service Operational Research Center (CIRD), then commanded the Army
Operational Research Section (SROA?). After completing his cortxnand
assignment with the 16th R.A., he became heed of the Action Methods end
Techniques Section of the War College. Assigned to EMAT [expansion un-
known] in 1976, he is presently head of the Organization-Methods-
Automation Bureau.
"In short, we have to forge it into an instrument, a tool. Not the
chiselled stone which is an extension of the arm, but the minute sparkle
of components which complements the mind's efforts..." (Address by the
President to the International Colloquium on Information Processing and
Society, 28 September 1979). Two years ago at this time, the CEMAT [expansion unknown] general inaugu-
rated the Mont-Valerien National Information Processing Center. On this
occasion, it was point2d out that the modernization effort oF the army,
~ already being applied to weapons and equipment systems, was now being di-
~ rected toward the development of modern methods of decision-making, and
in particular toward information Processing. Emphasis wae placed on the
role of this indispensable means of analysis and action at all levels; on
the need to put it into effect "to manege the immense peacetime enterprise
which the army represents"; on its potential for providing efficient
command assistance ir wartime; and on the contribution to the enrichment
of human heings who thus become more available for ther pursuits.
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~ LES INFORMATIOUES
1MATERIEL f
. ~i T 7m
YOBILEi YSTEIIES d'ARMES 6
ltMIPl01
7
we
7
t,
AUt01+1A19A1k1N
1
V
t
6 PNOCEOURES
AIDE a b !i
kU
19Atl(1N
L
A
do pNOtE95US $
1
ADMIMSTRAINES
DECISIqI
IIDUSTRIELS
i3 EM~
OB, TED
'
VEGA
~A I
pT1LA,PlUTON,
PROPMYFl
PAMINI
RrTA , ELOOEe,
14sIrunna,
wAnc 15
crdSE a. �,ERrtE ib
Information Processing
Key: 1.
Equipment
9.
Command
2.
Generel
10.
Automation of administrative procedures
3.
Specific
11.
Deci9ion-making aid
4.
Fixed
12.
Automation of industrial processes
5.
Mobile
13.
Example
6.
Weapons systems
14.
Situation
7.
Utilizetion
15.
Peace
8.
Management
16.
Crisis or war
ILE TELETRAITEMENT
[VOLUiIOM ' DU MOMlII[ DCS
~p1
.b.
N
~~~0 � ~~17 1 t h~~ I t~~1 1 7n 1 N~~ 1~Mp I 1N1 1 ~~i �
~TCANIMAI lOUIVO - Q ~ T[IIMiMAI ICGCII Q ~
;
1
i

I ~ f
; I I
11/
ll
I I
N
A
~
Remote Processing
Key: 1. Number c;f terminals (national and regional levels)
2. Heavy terminal
3. Light terminal
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Twenty-Year Balance: Irreversibility
Uriginally (1), the computer quite naturally took over fram mechanical
devices which were already easing the burden of repetitive functions, so
conducive to human error.
With the help of technical development, computers are becoming increasing-
ly effective and fast in handling and storing increasingly large amounts
of data. New possibilities are emerging: as a help to management and
supervision, and as a way to inform decision-makers.
The pioneers of that period then became fully engaged in the design and
implementation of management applications, which were more or less well
adapted to ill-dPfined needs of users, who were still reticent or un-
convinced.
With the passing years, resistance diminished, needs became better de-
fined, and requirements became more specific. The central administration
- gradually acquired a large selection f "products" in various areas:
organization, personnel, eq-jipment, infrastructures, and more recently,
financing.
The system's designers soon felt the need to coherently organize the over-
all information system. But they encountered various difficulties: there
were long-range Groblems whose cnordination proved to be tricky; equip-
ment was heterogeneous; and programs did not perform well enough. The
army found itself penalized because it was using untried equipment.
In another context, it appears that this system, which at the beginning
was leqitimately instated for the benefit of the central hierarchy but t
the exclusion of any other levels, was fed data origina+ing at the base:
the latter felt uninvolved, carried the burden, and derived no benefits
whatsoever.
Information processinn has been developing with renewed impetus in the
last 5 years. First of all, there is a need for corrxnand to assess the
foreseeable consequences of its decisions, particularly as regards fi-
nancial resource allocations which are always inadequate and this need
has led commend to set a new objective: aid to planning and intermediate
term decision-making.
At the same time, new technical possibilities of remote and distributed
processing enable more users to heve access to the information system, and
make it possible to set up specialized systems for department managers;
this makes it easier to retrieve information which is more up-to-date and
= more reliable, thus improving local management.
(1) Ground forces installed their first computer in 1960.
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LES SYSTEMES INFRA REGIONAUX
EVOIUTION DU NOMBRE DES MINt_ORDINATEURS
200 33
~so
OCG,
129 96
� DCMAT
100
~ .
~
ts I !C~ GLlS ~
i. .
so
, , ae F: .
15 .
zs
i - - - - - 28
. f. :r,~, :a,.�,,,y ~ i
1075 �1 1978 I 7977 I 1978 1 :979 I 1990 I 19E1 I 1982 I 1983 1
Infra-Regional Systems
Number of Minicomputers
Key: 1. Schools

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At the beginning of the 1980's, the army has an information system which
has qone much beyond the point of no return. The system can handle prob- _
lems which are more complex each day, and whose solution cannot be post-
poned (facilities given to drafted personnel to indicate their choice as
late as possible beFore induction, among ether examples). The system has
a large equipment pool which is being made compatible, and is interconnec-
ted by the beqinnings of a data transmission network.
The recent establishitient of an Action Methods and Techniques Division at
EMAT should make it possible to incorporate modern methods to assist oper-
ations, f acilitate control of technical development, and contribute to
- clearing imperfections in the present system, particularly difficulties
encountered in oersonnel matters. (2)
Twenty-Year Perspective What is Fated to 8e
The Nora Mine report on society's trend toward computerizatibn, and the -
' President's recent statement, have amply described the information pra- �
cessing phenomenon in terms of the future, commenting on the foreseeable consequences. Circulation of information, decentralization of decision-
~ makinq, and participation at all levels will benefit from widely and pub-
licly available data banks using telephones or scrrens, from extension of
services to even the most modest small and medium size businesses, and from
planned "electronic mail" service. Starting in school, new generations
~ will soon be familiar if not experienced in the use of information (as _
present generations are with the use af the telephone or the automnbile.)
Transposition of this "information explosian" to the ground forces makes
it possible to spell out new needs, and current studies contribute ta the
satisfaction oF these needs in one way or another.
Decision-makers now have only a very limited time to react appropriately
to events whose ccurrencr: is learned almost instantaneously (the death of
a recent Pope was known throughout the earth within the hour.) Military
commanders must therefore have access to data summaries which are reliahle,
up-to-date, and permanently available in peacetime, and which withstand no
discontinuity during wartime. �The SACRA (Automated Frontline Command and
Inf ormation System) project and the SINEMAT (EMAT'Information system)
study, made possible by the new high-performance computer programs, are
= designed to meet this type af need. ,
Aid to planning and scheduling must be extended to aid in decision-making.
Operational logistics studies (automation of movement plans, automatic in-
_ ventory of resources) constitute in this respect, privileged fields af ac-
tivity. They reveal dangers to overcome, as well as the need to be able
- t revert to manual operation in case of systems f ailure.
(2) Grounci forces use about 1500 operators for their informatior system
- (one-sixth officers, two-sixths non-commissioned officers, one-sixth rank
and file, two-sixths civilian personnel, the majority of whom are of 8 and
C grades.) One-third of them are perators and two-thirds are users.
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LE RESEAU DE TRANSMISSIONS
DE DONNEES ACTUEL
~
~ �sm s
+
n. "
i
41^, y 
�'T:1
.J" �
I
~ cTi tr-a-w-..'�...u�..~
~ C-1Nwi.. IIITTEA
Lwi.�.rar
l-lllTiGll I~~reu.~~iemwwi~Nl
Present Data Transmission Network
15ey: 1. CTI (Information Processing Center)
2. RITTER switching stations
= 3. Deta transmission terminal9
4. P 8 T connection
5. RITTER connection (switched circuits)
Decentralization of the decision-making process, often indispensable in
- the complex environment of the army, implies the caherence of the process,
itself sub ordinate to information autonomy, which should be adequate at
_ each decision level under consideration. In addition, development of data
transmission facilities based on the P,ITTER network, which interlinks the
cmnputers of data processing centers and also connects the minicomputers
~ of department managers, will ensure satisfactory operational reliability.
Information processing must help perf ect the military resource in peace-
time. -
In particular, pursuit of automation to the level of the troops "an
enterprise involving thousands" will increase the availability of
personnel and benefit their training, thanks to a genuine easing of manage-
ment responsibilities. At the same time, support aid provided by depart-
ment manag^ment systems will be extended by help in instructian and ~
training. -
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1' Vl\ VL' 1' 1~.1ciL VUL V1V.u1
Widespread application of information processing to all military
sectors as in all areas of public or private life therefore calls
- for active cadres to know its potential and its limitations. It is fran
the renks of users af every kind that operators will first heve to be re-
cruited before being trained and assigned. The emergence of generetions
experienced or at least familiar with the use of this tool will f ac?litate
the large effort which the ground forces must inevitably make.
_ The computerization of the army as well as of society will enteil
deep changes not only in its organization, operation, and methods, but
also in its mental outlook. Even now, the availabil:ty of all sorts of
data to increasing numbers of people, in at least apparent conflict with
the "right to !crow", is raising delicate information security problems
which are not yet well controlled, as well as problems with the indivi-
dual right Lo Privacy, protected by the Information and Freedom Law. -
The army, as well as society, will have to devote itself to the
- elaboration of an "information processing deontology."
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Revue des Forces Armees Francaises "Rrmees d'Aujourd'hui"
11,023
CSO: 3100
,
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- COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
BRIEFS
SHOCK BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS--A shock brigade headquarters will be set up
at Marseilles for the 31st demibrigade, to be formed this summer and
' trained for overseas missions. The demibrigade will be made up of three
units provided with armored cars and vehicles: the 21st marine regiment,
based at Frejus; the first Foreign Legion cavalry regiment at Orange;
and the 2nd Foreign Legion infantry regiment in Corsica. This 31st demi-
_ brigade will have the same landing capability as the 9th marine division
- at Saint-Malo. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 25 Feb 80 p 161
CSO: 3100
- '
I
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~
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COUNTRY SECTION
DETAILS ON NAVAL VESSELS TO BE SUPPLIED TO IRAQ
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 5 Feb 80 p 9
ITALY
[Article by G.F.B.: "A New Advantageous Contract for the Shipbuilding In- �
dustry--1,500 Billion Lire Worth of Naval Vessels Sold by Italy to Iraq"] -
[Text] The conclusion of the agreement, which provides for
- the supplying of four missile-launching frigates, six cor-
' vettes and one squadron fueling :stiip, was announced upon the
return of the "Ardito" and the "Lupo" from a round-the-world
cruise.
Naples--Italian naval vessels are selling like hotcakes. Despite the sea-
soned competition from the French, the English and the Germans, the Italian
- shipbuilding industry has succeeding in obtaining construction of 11 ships
for Iraq. This big order (a deal worth something like 1,500 billion lire)
will, according to the specialists, ensure 3 to 4 years of work for the
yards of Muggiano (La Spezia) and Riva Trigoso, both belonging to the Can-
tieri Navali Riuniti (IRI [Industrial Reconstruction Institute] group),
which now specialize,in building naval vessels.
The conclusion of the agreement (which has already been signed) was an- -
nounced in the course of an official ceremony organized to celebrate the
return of two of our fleet's most modern units (the "Ardito" and the "Lu-
po"), which have just made a round-the-world cruise. Having sailed from
Livorno on 18 July, the two ships visited 19 countries (including Japan, In-
dia, China, and many nations of Latin America), traveling a total of more
than 37,000 kilometers.
In the course of a stimulating press conference held on board the "Ardito," with the minister of defense and top military personnel present (honor -
_ guard, trumpet fanfares, squeals from the boatswain's whistle), it was ex-
. plained that the cruise had three purposes: to train the sailors, to "show
the flag" around the world, and to let it be seen what we can do in the
naval-technology sector. One of the aims of the cruise was, in a wor.d,
promotional: we Italians do not know only how to make shoes, sweaters, _
household appliances, but also those very sophisticated contrivances that
are the naval vessels of the latest "generation."
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The cruise itinerary was decided on in collaboration with the Ministry of
- Foreign Trade, to enable the two ships to call at those countries most in-
terested in Italian naval vessels. And at various ports touched by the
two units, the representatives of the shipbuilding firms (joined in a kind
- of consortium, the so-called "Melara Club") were present to illustrate to
potential customers the characteristics of "Made in Italy" ships. And in-
terest was veiy lively, even in China. -
According to the new defense chief of staff, Admiral Giuseppe Torrisi, the
agreement with Iraq "confirms the good quality of Italian ships, conceived
and designed by the Italian Navy." And Minister of Defense Adolfo Sarti
says: "The round-the-world cruise by the two ships must have had a consid- -
erable influence cn the conclusion of this deal with Iraq. From this point -
of view also, therefore, this mission by the Italian Navy had a strong pro--
- motional effect."
At the Cantieri Navali Riuniti (Genoa), there was absolute reticence: "As
far as we know, the deal has not been finalized yet," a director said dri-
- ly. But the golden rule of the international armaments market is, as is
known, silence.
- The contract with Iraq is reported to be for the construction of four
- 2,500-ton missile-launching frigates of the "Lup:," class ("ready to sail"
cost: 100 billion lire each), six 650-ton cosvettes (30 to 40 billion lire
each), and a"Stromboli"-type squadron fueling ship (30 to 35 billion lire.)
The contract is also said to provide for training of personnel and con-
struction of several infrastructures on land. The units for Iraq will be _ built in the shipyards of Riva Trigoso (2,000 employees) and Muggiano (La
_ Spezia, 1,500 employees). The latest big orders obtained by the Cantieri
Riuniti are the following: four "Lupo"-class frigates for the Italian Navy, six "Lupo" frigates for Venezaela, six "Maestrale"-type frigates for our �
Navy, two "Lupo" frigates for Peru, four corvettes for Libya, six corvettes
for Ecuador.
, The ships sold to Iraq w=11 mount cannons from Oto Melara (of La Spezia)
and will have electronic equipment from Selenia, Elsag, Elettronica and
Elmer and propulsion systems from Grandi Motori (Trieste) and FIAT.
With this contract, Italy consolidates its position in the international ~
armaments market, in which, according to reliable estimates, our country is .
� in fourth place, coming right after the two superpowers and France, and is
on a par with the FRG and Great Britain. In the latest issue of RIVISTA _
- MILITARE, Col Luigi Trinchieri, chief of the research and studies office of
the Army General Staff, writes that for the Italian arms industry, "the
future is promising." And the big order from Iraq shows that he is right.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
11267
GSO: 3104 END
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060029-2