JPRS ID: 8987 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060028-3
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 28
• Content Type: REPORTS

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- JPRS ~/8987 -
20 March 1980
~lear Ea t/ t fr' a Re ort ~
s Nor h A ~c
p
- CFOUO 9/80)
FBIS FOREIG~J BROADCAST INFORIi/IATION SERVICE .
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY � ~
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NOTE
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transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
enurces are translated; tinose from English-language sources
V are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasi~g and
other characteristics retained.
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Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are _
enclosed in parentheses. Word,^ or names preceded by a ques-
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Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
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The contet~ts of this publication in no way represent the poli-
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JPRS L/8987
= 20 March 1980
- NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT ~ -
(FOUO 9/80)
CONTENTS -PAGE
, INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Briefs
Attempted Deportation 1
- AF'GHANISTAN
Eyewitness Report From Kabul
, (Jacques Buob; L'EXPRESS, 5 Jan 80) .................o. 2
ALGFRIA -
Internal Problems, Differences in Algeria Reviewed
(AL-WATA~I AL-'ARABI, various dates) ,.o .............o.. 7
War of Dossier~ Within FI,N
Housing, Agr~culture Problems
FLN 'Treasure' Scandal -
= EGYPT
Forced Retirement of Field Grade Officers -
(AL-WATAN AL-4ARABI, 18-24 Jan 80) 20
PEftSIAN GULF AREA
Briefs ~
Joint Armaments Industry 22
SAUDI ARABIA _
Briefs -
PRC Seeks Diplomatic Relations ~3 `
- -a- [ISI -NE &A- 121FOU0]
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CONTENrS (Continued) ~ge
WESTERN SA~iARA
Mi ~l.~i~:ary, Di~lomat ic Ffforts To Fnd ~iaharn,n Wt~r~ NoLed
( MARGHES TRO PICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 15 Feb 80 24
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
- BRIEFS
ATTEMPTED DEPORTATION--A Palestinian delegation camposed of 'Abd-al-Rahini
Ahmad, Muhammad Zahdi al-Nashashibi, and Khalid al-Hasan made an unannounced
visit to Kuwait to prevent implementation of the decision Kuwait had made `
to depor.t Arab Liberation Front representative Dr Ahmad al-'Akkah. The
Palestinian delegation succeeded in its mission. [Text] [Paris AL-WATAN
AL-'ARABI in Arabic 11-17 Jan 80 p 18] '
C~O: 4802 ' -
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AFGHANISTAN
EYEWITNESS REPORT FROM KABUL -
- Paris L'EXPRESS in French 5 Jan 80 pp 69, 70, 71 _
[Article by Jacques Buob: "What I Saw in Kabul"]
- [Text] After an initial landing in Kabul was refused and
an unexpected stopover in Delhi before being turned back
the next day, Jacques Buob was one of the very few French
newsmen to see the Soviet tanks patrolling the streets of
the Afghan capital. He told about it.
Christmas does not mean very much to the Afghans. That evening, the city -
was calm as it usually was. Curfew was about to begin at 2300 hours as it
i?ad every night, lasting until dawn for nearly 2 years now since Taraki over-
_ threw Daoud. Already there were very few people ~till out in the streets.
Europeans were at the homes of friends or in their own homes. At the Kabul
Intercontinental, in spite of everythin~, a few Germans were having a mid- _
night [Christmas] feast at *_he discotheque dn the top floor of the building.
The 200-room hotel was getting very few clients. Outside, the cold was very
dry as it is in winter here. The sky was very clear. The moon entering upon
its second quarter shone upon the high plateu (1,800 meters) on which the
~ city is built completely surrounded by high mountains forming a perfect basin -
around the city.
At 2100 1lours the first buzzing sound broke the silence. SofC at first, then
louder and louder. Odd. Planes do not come into Kabul at night. The air- -
port is not equipped for landi.ngs without visibility. Furthermore, it is sur- -
rounded by 4,000 meter peaks. Another sound, that of turboprops. Then yet -
another. In the sky the green and red specks of wingtip lights brightened ~
bhe night. It was Christmas. The Soviet ballet had begun. It was not to
_ stop until dawn with the lifting of the curfew.
Even Field Kitchens...
The following day, 25 December. In Chicken Street, the street for the ~azaar
tourists where samovars and lapis lazuli are sold, curious tourists were walk-
ing about. Soviets were here, people have been accustomed to seeing some -
~ since 5s000 military advisers landed. Some merchants have even learned to
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give prices in Russian. But th~se tourists have nothing in common with the
now customary silhouette of the Soviet adviser accompanied by his massive
spouse, market basket in hand. No. Those were very young people in civilian
clothes. It was not yet realized that they were the first soldiers to liave
come by the airlift which the Soviets launched from Tashkent to Kabul.
During the night of Tuesday, the 25th to Wednesday, the 26th, the rate of -
- landings and take-offs reached its height. One witness calculated that these
were occurring at 30 second intervals. Under cover of the night curfew, the
Soviets were landing tons of materiel, hundreds of combat vehicles, fast ~un
carriers, heavy tanks, trucks brought out from the bellies of the Antonov
12's and 22's. Thousands of inen and even field kitchens. -
What was going on? President Hafizullah Amin had left the People's Palace,
the former royal palace, a veritable city in the heart of the city, sheltered
behind kilometers of walls. He preferred to take up his residence some 12
kilometers away in Darulaman's palace, also a former royal palace recently
redone and in which the French Otis firm installed.the elevators. ~e palace
- is also flanked by a small fortress. Hafizullah Amin chose this place shel-
tered from the frenzies of the city. Did he already suspect something? In -
any event he was still fulfilling the tasks of his position in the midst of
tlie hullabaloo of the turboprops. He was seen in the Kabul TIMES receiving '
a bouquet of flowers from a little girl. But he felt the net tightening
about him.
~ That Wednesday when from then on the Soviets were landing at the airport in
broad daylight and blocking the road from the curious, Amin seemed to be
attempting a final effort to escape from the Soviet pincers that were already
_ crushing him. That day, in fact, he signed a decree condemning to ~eath no _
less than 1,300 members of the Parcham (Flag), the other wing of the PPD -
[Afghan Democratic People's Party], which he knows to be Moscow's favorites.
That order, of course, would never be carried out.
The Swiss Cook...
But in habul, as in the entire country, nothing indicated that Amin was soon -
to die. On the contrary, it was thought that it was he who sought Russian ~
support to put an end to the Islamic rebellion then holding a large share of
the country. The ambiguity was to be maintained for another 24 hours. L'ntil _
Thursday, the 27th, at 1915 hours, the time at which all telephone and Telex
- communication were suddenly cut off. In the heart of the city a bomb went -
off. It was the signal for action. Endless lines of gun carriers with the _
red star were starting up. Violent fighting ~roke out in the vicinity of the -
People's Palace, the radio and television buildings, on the road to the air- '
port, at the Ministry of Interior, and especially near Amin's residence.
_ Fi~hting ceased during the night. At dawn a column of smoke was rising from
Darulam3n Palace the approaches to which were closed from then on. It was
officially announced that Amin had been judged and executed. But in ~veryone's -
view in Kabul, Amin died at the end of the fighting. Along with him a certain _
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number of inembers of his family i~ accordancP with a vendetta tradition
well established here, not to mention his close collaborators, the "Aminis,"
as they are called here. Some ministers, it appeared, were held as prieoners,
doubtless in the radio building to which the Interr.ontinental's Swiss cook
_ was delivering about 200 meals on a daily basis.
Un Frid~y, 28 Uccemher, Amin's regime was finisli~d. Thr Ruseinne got litm.
Kabul awoke that mornfng with a third president riead of a violent death in 20
months and a fourth leader whose name is Babrak Karmal. But if the shops opened -
their doors as usual, nothing in Kabul was the same: The Soviets had invested
the city.
At the traffic circle of the major avenue leading from the People's Palace
to the airport passing in front of the radio building and that of the United
States Embassy, they had set up cannons. They occupied the president's house,
the People's Palace, the radio and television [buildings], the main post office,
the Ministry of Defense no doubt and certainly that of Interior where they -
_ them~elves took the files in hand. The country closed its doors to newsmen -
who are systematically turned back. In Kabul snow began to fall on 30 Decem-
= ber, The cold season, which will last 2 more months with temperatures goin~
down to -20� below zero Celsius, was beginning. In khaki uniforms and fur
caps, the Soviets with impassive faces were completing their settling in.
They were mounting guard in the capital's strategic points. In front of the
- government buildings it was Afghan soldiers dressed in the sttyle of a"people's
democracy" like Tintin's Syldaves who were on guard duty; the Soviets behind
_ tlie iron gates on the inside were overseeing the Afghans. In Kabul's basin
there was a continuing shuttling back and forth of large and small cargo
planes and Antonovs. Uccasionally, MiG 19's, 21's and 23's briefly pierced
the sky, Jet pursuit planes were based not far from the capital, at Bagram.
At ttie foot of the mountain transport vehicles and tanks were jostling each
other. The gun carriers were moving at top speed through the city's streets.
A Smell of Gasoline
In Kabul-Hotel, a yellow and decrepit building near the main post office
bearing black traces of the explosion which set off the fighting on Thursday
evening, Soviet civilians were bustling about. It is the KGB's general
lieadquarters, mischief makers say. In any event, it is doubtless a question _
of a certain number of civilian experts who have partly taken over the Afghan
- people's destiny. At nightfall, long before curfew, Kabul becomes empty.
Only the Russian gun carriers go by at an amazing speed given their massive
size amidst the smell of gasoline which infects the whole city. Very low
octane Soviet gasoline. The drivers closed the air locks on their gun car- .
riers to protect themselves. For the Russian did not come here as Messiahs.
- Strolling in the bazaar has long since become very dangerous for them (as for -
any European of the more or less Slavic type. Just a few days ago, two mili-
t3ry advisers and a woman were gunned down. In this country very faithful
to Islam, Moscow is the archfiend. The Afghan garrisons of the Kargha,
~ Richkor and Bala Hissar fort barracks rebelled last summer against the auth- -
_ ority of the Soviet military advisers. Many soldiers took to the maquis and
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joined the rebellion. Recently, violent fighting took place in Kabul. It
~aas on the night of Sunday, 30 Decembe~r, to P4onday, the 31st. Just after -
curfew at 2300 hours, violent gunfire broke out around the radio and People's
- Palace buildings. It ceased at about 0100 liours. For 2 hours, Kabul's inhab-
- itants saw tracer bullets liglit up ttie city. iJho takes up arms against the _
- Russians? Troops that I~ave remained loyal to Amin, deserters, rebels W110 '
liave infiltrated? It is hard to know. Furttiermore, more than anywhere else,
- the Russian Army is the army here. In the meanwhile, it does seem that the
Afghan Army has now been disarmed so as to prevent such incidents ~xom re-
curring in Rabul. ' ' ~
Service in East Germany
Some of the Red Army soldiers, however, do confide in the people, some of whom
are seen peacefully surrounding patrols. This was how it was learned that
these men (at least some of them) served until recently in East Germany.
Would they be the ones Brezhnev decided, as a big peace gesture, to withdraw
from the GDR a short time ago?
On Wednesday morning the Soviet presence in the streets of Kabul, according
to witnesses, was less visible than on preceding days. The antitank gun at the
traffic circle on the road to the airport had disappeared. The city showed
hardly any trace of the fighting that took p1acQ in it. But one could not '
go to Darulaman, there where Amin was killed and where the fighting was
doubtless the most violent. The night of Tue~day to Wednesday was calm for -
the first time in ages. It is hard to imagine who would attempt anything
against that powerfully equipped and superorganized army which landed tiere
and which is spreading very rapidly throughout the country. A Soviet colonel
has apparently already taken up his duties at Jelalabad, east of Kabul, where
regular Afghan forces reportedly rallied to the rebels to fight a~ainst the
Red Army . ~
The Russians' man brought in ~n Antonov luggage compartment, like David Dacko
in that of the French Transall to Bangui, made l:is first semi-public appearance
on Afghan television on T~~esday eve.ning. Until then there were doubts as ro
his physical presence in Kabul. Actually, he had very likely arrived just
shortly before (the sophisticated electronic equipment of the American Em-
bassy had in fact made it possible to learn that his first appeal, presumed
_ to have been broadcast by Radio Kab ul, had really been broadcast by a Soviet
station, Radio Tashkent). Bab rak Karmal suddenly appeared on the small
- screen surrounded by the members of the Revolutionary Council and of the
government. An astonishing resemblance to the Romanian Ceausescu. His right
index finger raised in a professorial manner. He who only wore shirts with
the collar democratically open, that day put. on a white shirt and a tie. He
asserted that if it were necessary he would request even more help from Mos-
cow. He attacked Carter whom he accused of supporting the Afghan rebellion.
Along with him was the one considered to be his mistress Anahita Ratebzad, for-
mer minster of socia~ affairs in the first Taraki government and now minister
of education, with a Soviet style lace collar, appeared on the platform and
hammered out her words to the beat of iier hatred for the old regime. They
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are the strong pair today in I~abul to whom must be added the minister of
planning, a personal fiiend of Karmal, Ali Kishtmand, who only just came
out of Amin's prisons.
"In the Name of Merciful God"
But the nost astonishing part of that ceremony, cold as that of a people's
democracy, was the reappearance of Taraki's portrait on the speakers' right
and tile complete rehabilitation of the former president. Here we have the
former leader of the Khalq (People) wing promoted to the rank of father of �
tlie revolution. Anahita (that is how she is called here) requested a min-
ute's silence in his memGry and, better yet, a mullah prayed for his soul's
eternal rest.
It was the hour of the great reconciliation. Karmal promised that all prisoners
(it is said that there are 25,000 of them in the sinister Poule-Tchakri prison)
would be released. Including,the very reactionary Moslem Brothers. "It does
appear," a UN official confided, "that repression is not very severe, The
IChalqis whom I know~are still where they were." Karmal did say that only
_ Amin's officious policemen� would be chastized. '
Actually the Russians have every reason to see the various tendencies of th.e
party stop tearing each other to pieces. The mullah's presence at the tele-
vised cere~nony was itself intended to prove that the new regime was thoroughly
religious (which makes observers here smile commenting that Karmal has al-
ways been a militant atheist). FurtherMOre, don't his comr~uniques begin more
or less like those of Ayatollah Khomeyni with these words: "In the name of -
gentl~ and me rciful God"?
Entrenched behind the powerful Soviet buckler, Karmal may still hang on for
a long time. In the arid mountains the rebels are waiting. The snow will
soon fall and close the 3,000-meter high Salang col which opens the road to
the USSR. Perhaps the snow will ~make the delivery of supplies difficult -
for the Sovie ts. But no one here dares bet one Afghani on the rebels' chances,
at least for the moment, so impressive is the Red Army, seen on the job, be-
cause of its organization and the weight of its boot.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 S.A. Groupe Express
8094
CSO: 4900
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ALGERIA
INTERNAL PROBLEMS, DIFFERENCES IN ALGERIA REVIEWED .
War of Dossiers Within FLN
" Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 4-10 Jan 80 pp 34, 35 "
[Article: "War of Posters Followed by War of Secret Dossiers in Back
Rooms of FLN"7 .
[TextJ The Central Committee of the National Liberation Front (FLN), ;
Algeria's highest party authority, holds its second session in delicate
circumstances which denote that the regime is going through an important
transitional period. It is a period punctuated by student disturbances
which have been characterized by an intensification in the war of pro-
test wall posters which dernand an affirmation of Algeria's Arab character
through complete Arabization. It is also a period c}~aracterized in part _
by a war of "doissers" among some of the power centecs on the eve of the
Central Committee's meetings.
The session coincides with the first anniversary of the death of Presi-
dent Houari Boumediene on 27 December. The cel2brations marking this
occasion am~unted to a reaff irmation of the slogan of continuity.
" It is known that the meetings of the second session of the FLN's Central '
Committee are officially held under the slogan of reaffirming loyalty to
PrPSident Boumedienzie and renewing the adherence to the National Charter. ;
They are also guided by the resolutions of the fourth congress which has ,
produced the "new leadership organs" embodied in 199 members representing
the central committee and the political command which holds responsibility
because it directs the country's general policy, oversees the application
of the principles prescribed in the National Charter, defines the major
tasks to be accomplished in all fields and elects from among its members
- the party secretary general--also the president of the republic--whose _
election should be endorsed by the congress.
Thus, the "literature" of the party's bylaws def ines the role and powers
of the Central Committee. The question is: Who makes up the committee?
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Ys it made up of productive forces or consumer, bureaucratic forces?
What are the social strata from which the committee members derive?
- Briefly, the forces within the Cer_tral Committee are almoat a"realis-
tic specimen of the dynamism of the Algerian society." Army pereonnel--
both on active duty or retired--make up the majority of its membership,
or 41 percent. About 23 percent of the members are from the bureaucracy
and intelligentsia and some 26 percent from the various masa org~nizations
which have merged into the party mainstream. Two conditiona which are
vital in Algerian political life have been observed in this makeup:
One--Attention has been paid to the "extreme sensitivity"of the power ~
centers represented by the members af the former revolutionary council
and the pillars of the economic and administrative bureaucracy who tiave
eventually become members of the political bureau--the higheat authority
in the country. It was thus necessary to have representatives of this
sphere of influence included in the Central Committee. -
Two--The establishment of an FLN balance which is satisfactory to the
various groups in Algeria as well as to the Algerian public opinion ir.
general. For this very reason, the members of the political bureau ig- _
nore many of the studies and reports submitted by the various committees
set up by the Central Committee. This leaves the committee at a loss
between its political responsibilities and its relationships with the
various spheres of power and influence which safely hold the reins of
government. This is one of the difficulties encountered by the Central _
Cammittee in pavi*~g the way for the extraordinary congress of the party
wh~ch will determine the political and econonic lines for the next
J 5 years.
The political bureau feels that new vistas are opening up and new blood
- is running in the Algerian scciety. A standstill situation under khe
name of "continuity" might exhaust the people and feed the wave of pro -
test, which would in turn bring on the frightening wave of strikes which
- is close to eruption nowadays. The strikes and violent quarrels which
have taken--and are still taking--place in universities and high echoole,
and even some elementary schools, across the country from east to west
- up to the town of Biskra, at tY~e feet of the Aures mountains, have had a
potent impact on the Algerian masses.
The heat of argument pervaded the Palace of Nations where the second
session was being held. According to informed sources, the energy minie-
ter Nabi Belkacem raised before the conferees the question of Algerian-
American relations and severely criticized the Belaid Abdessalam group -
which had pawned Algeria's economic and political future for unfair
contracts with a number of monopolistic American f irms. The same source
adds: The Algerian minister demanded an investigatinn of the era in
- which Belaid Abdessalam and Ahmed Ghozali presided over the m~nistries -
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of industry and energy. The minister hinted to handsome commissions -
received by senior officials in return for inequitable deals.
- Belkacem Nabi has previously spoken about this subject in statements he
made to the Algerian Radio and Television Service, but those statements
were more tempered and less candid. The statements at the time rankled
- Belaid Abdessalam and his successor as energy minister Ahmed Ghazali, so ~
' they wrote report signed by Ghazali and waited for an audience with
- President Chadli Bend~edid to give him the report. Ghazali's patience,
- however, gave out as his adversary continued to "gossip" about him, so he
distributed his secret report among some members of the Central Committee. -
In the report, he accuses his successor in the ministry of energy Belkacem
Nabi of hav~ng "...cooperated with France at the expense of Algerian _
interests..." when he was a department head at SONATRACH, before he ber..ame
_ governor of Tlemcen. The report provides a lot of evidence about the
excesses that had been committed and important information about that
- period.
President Bendje~id equated the distribution of that report with the
: distribution of leaflets and rebuked his minister who was relieved of -
_ his post a few days later. The pLime Minister speeded up the decision
to relieve Ghazali. From that day on, Belaid Abdessalam considered that
he was meant by those measures, and the disagreement between him and -
prime minister Abdelghani deepened when the latter, at a meeting of the
political bureau, asked the members of the economic committee to devote
- their time to party work and leave the responsibilities for heavy and
. light industries, petrochemicals and other industries to other cadres
so ttiat the responsibilities of planning, implementation and control
are not jumbled together. However, Belaid Abdessalam, chairman of the -
FLN's economic committee, rejected this view, and the prime minister
retorted: we have files against you. Belaid answered: And we too have
files against you. And the "war of the dossiers," as the Algerians
call it, is now in full swing. The spillover of this war has; involved
Rabah Bitat, president of the People's National Assembly wha is accused -
- by adversaries of having pocketed tens of millions from the "treasure"
- of the FLN. The same charge involves Mohamed Boudiaf, an opponent of the
Algerian regime who lives in exile. -
In connection with the irrigation dossier, various charges were made
against several senior Algerian off icials including two members of the _
- political bureau.
The second major topic at the meeting, beside the housing dossier, was
the dossier on education, upbringing and the question of Arab ization '
presented by (Bouallam Ben Hammouda), member of the political bureau
g and the secretary general of the presidency. The heated debate revealed
~ that there was an opinion calling f ~r a dual lai:guagP system, whereby
French would remain the medium of administration anc: economics. This
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position is repr~sented by Col Ahmed Bencherif, Kasdi Merb~h, Belaid
_ Abdessalam, Rabah Bitat, Ahmed Abdelghani, Liasaine and a numbez of
technocrats. The alternative to this line of thinking ~lA represented
by the Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui group, which hae declared tti~t "its view- -
- point coincides with the recent atatemenks by the aecretary g~neral ot
the FLN, the Preaident, at his recent meeting with deputies of the Peo-
ple's National Assembly, and supports legitimate demands in favor of
complete and immediate Arabization and of apeeding up the application
of Arabization in the adminiatrative, social, economic and cultural
f ields." -
The group, which appeared cohesive at the meeting, depends on th~ un~.~n-
ist forces and the mass organizations repreaented in the parCy, Uut it
ia aplit into two winga--one which ie progresaive and Marxiet and one
which is nationalist and conservative. Both sides aee in the exscutive
_ coordinator of tha party machinery the man who is in control of the tac- _
tical phase which will eventually lead to the haven of strategic clarity.
Col Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui is supposed by Mohamed Cherif Kharroubi,
minister of elementary and secondary education, Abdelhamid Mehri, minis-
- ter of information and culture, Saleh Goud~il, minister of traneporta-
tion, Lahcene Soufi, minister of ~ustice, and the ambitious young minis-
ter of higher education and scientific research Abdelhak Bererhi whose
main concern now is to "contain the circle of strikea and cordon off tlie
conflict" which is taking place between studenta affiliated with the
National Federation of Algerian Youth and the "Muslim Students," as they
are called, who naw control a large portion of the atudents in Algeria's
- universities, secondary schools and even preparatory schools.
~ Last week, violent clashes took place and several studen~s were wounded.
Reports circulating among students of the University of Algiers eay that
two students fell during clashes in Constantine.
In the meantime, the war of leaflete and wallpoeters goes on in Algeris~n
universitiea and collegea. The leafleCs and wallpoatera, however~ carry
conflicting information. Some warn againat the idea of Arabization and -
accuse advocates of Arabization of being reactionary. Most of the~t~ how-
ever, aupport full Arabizatien and declare: "We ehould either be A~ab or
- not be."
It is clear that student circlea are determined to continue the atrike
- movement unCil demands are met, since no one has forgotten how the reeo-
lutiona and pro~ects of the 1975 Arabization conference were ignoxed.
That conference had called for the "application of the Arabization proceee
- in all adminiatrations and establishmente..." and insieted on "complete ~
and immediate Arabization." The late President Houari Boumedienne wae in
charge of that conf erence, p.esponae to the de~ire of the conference came
only from the party machinery, which Arabized moat of its administration~ _
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the fully-Arabized justice ministry and a part of the Presidential Office.
The other ministries maintalned the dual system--that is, they remained a
French hammer hanging over the people's head. The language used by the _
Algerian national companies for administrative and "human" purposes is
still purely French.
_ The position of the Algerian bureaucratic machine is clear. Seventeen
years aftex independence, the man in the street is still a stranger in
his own national language and would need an interpreter e;hen he calls on
_ financial and industrial establishments--even when he vists the munici-
_ pality of his town.
Some Algerian companies have already outgrown French and are now dealing
in English, after the number of American cooperators has reached 5,000
experts over the last 5 years, which means that they have exceeded the
number of French cooperators in Algeria. In the meantime, large numbers
of Algerian cadres were graduatirig in Arabic but were being unable to find
_ placement because the system of administrative guidance is based on foun-
dations and interests that are against the use of Arabic.
Commenting on this situation, which requires the political leadership to
assume its historical responsib ility and take decisive stands, a senior I
aide to the Algerian president tnld AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI: "We are fully
- aware that decisions by the central committee will not change the nature ~
of the existing problem. What is needed is a true intention to change -
in favor of Arabic. Without Arabic, we cannot maintain our cultural
personality and Arab character. As scientific studies show, French is
in decline, and those who want French to remain spaken in Algeria are
deluded and blinded by transient interests." -
In fact, the question of Arabization is of extreme importance to Algerians.
Either French continues t^ prevail for some more years, and this would .
continue to hitch the Algerian society and Algerian interests to the West--
linguistically, culturally and economically--for a long period of time.
Or Algeria would become independent of the language, culture and economy ;
of the West and would build an Arab Algerian personality and develop the
structure of an alternative society imbued with distinct and intrinsic '
values, supporting an industry which would be the real springboard towar.d ;
independence and the future. But can one perceive the prospects and
possib ilities of the new phase in the light of the conflicts and over-
lapptng interests of the political forces in Algeria? Many knowing ob-
servers behind the scenes in Algeria say that a powerful storm is now
assailing the political leadership and undermining its dynamism, namely, _
"the scan3als of the dossiers." President Chadli Bendjedid now has a
propitious opportunity to determine several basic issues, including the
questions of Arabization, industrialization and replacing the economic
_ team which is not in tune with the new phase. If decisive action is not
taken, compromise will prevail, but it will entail various crises. It ,
will again refer the Arabization question to the extraordinary congress ;
of the FLN which is scheduled for March-April 1980.
i_
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Housing, Agriculture Problem~
. Parie AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 11-17 Jan 80 pp 28, 29 -
~ [Article: "At Conclusion of Meetinga of Central Cammittee of FLN,
Tranquilizing Pills To Deal with Agoniea of Houeing, A~riculture and
_ Arabization; Algerians Forsake Virtue of Patience"]
[Text] By ita continuous dissection of the aituation in Algiexa, AL-
WATAN AL-'ARABI does not seek to discredit the members of the regime. ,
It acts only out of a concern to place all the facte before the Arab
citizen and to perform its,informational misaion of urging the Algerian
government and people to open up fully to the greater homeland, r~nd riee
up to the level of hopes and aspirationa which the Arab naCion had pinned
on the Algerians in the years of their bitter, heroic struggle.
For the first time, the meetings of the Central Committee of the ruling
FLN end amid a climate of off icial and popular upheaval never befare
experienced in the country aince the early day8 of independence. This
climate has actuated the Central Committee to adopt a aeries of quick
decisione to defuse the exploeive situation which ie being stoked by
current developments in the Middle East and central Asia which leave a
- clear impact on the Algerian man in the street. _
The pacifying decisions, so to speak, basically involved three areas~of ~
life which directly affect the ordinary citizen: houeing, agriculture and
Arabization.
WiCh regard to housing, which constitutes a severe problem of serious -
social implications in Algeria, the Central Committee has adnpCed a -
"housing charter" which reaffirms the atate's control over the varioue _
real estate sectors and at the same time encouragea familiee to owa their
houses. It has been decided to sell state-owned "old snd future" housea
to individual citizens; including houses which have been deaerted or -
nationalized after the departure of their previoue owners. Thie deci- -
sion involves some 300,000 houaee, half of them in the Algiere area. _
The "housing charter" "contains a long-term atrategy dealing with the -
question of how to build and expand towna through epecialized agencies
in which local organizations in a particular region would play a baeic
role.
Thoae organizatione, such as municipalities and so forth, would ehare ia
planning, funding and mar?aging housing complexee.
Retrogression in the Agricultural Sector
With regard to the agricultural sector, it undoubtedly receives epecial
attention by the administration of President Chadli Bend~edid, not only
_ because it affects the vast ma~ority of the Algerian population, but be-
cause it has demonstrated an alarndng retrogreasion too. Algeria, once
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agriculturally self-suff icient and still capable of securing such self - :
sufficiency, today buy s from abroad one third of the food materials that
it needs to the tune of 5.5 billion French francs or one fifth of it5
oil revenue. For example, wheat production fell by half over th~ past
few years, from 30 to 17 million kantars.
This ~gricultural deterioration entails a series of serious repercus-
sions in a developing country with one of the world's highest raCes of
population growth. Young Algerians are migrating from the countryside -
to the cities, adding to unemp].oyment, overcrowdedness and social prob- -
lems, in addition to problems created by emigration to foreign countries,
especially France. To deal with this situation, Salim Saadi, minister
of agricult~ire and agricultural revolution, announced the formation of
new cadres for the municipal establishments involved in following up t:le
various phases of the agricultural revolution. The new goal of this -
operation is "to make the agricultural sector develop through constant
_ - contact with the peasants."
From now on, the newly created organs will b e responsible for all prob- ~
lems related to agriculture in all the s!ages of production. The steps _
taken in this regard fall within the context of the principles pre-
scribed in the national charter which recommend decentralization, the
independence of management and production and the reorganization of
agricultural activities. '
In,Algeria today, there are about 1,250 engineers and technicians
distributed among 704 municipalities to oversee the implementation of
the new plan and participate in improving conditions in the countryside.
~ Arabization: The Biggest Problem
= There is then the third r'~orny problem--Arabization. It is known that
this problem touched off the tension which has been gripping Algeria
for the past 2 months. The Arabized university sCudents have been boy-
cotting classes for several weeks, and their movement is receiving
growing support from various sectors of the people. The movement is also i
spreading to embrace most of the educational establishments in the various
parts of the country, despite the negative attitude taken by President i
Chadli toward this mo~~ement. ;
The statement issued by the Central Comie~ttee on 3 January in connection
with the questions of Arabization and education includes a number of con-
cessions which are supposed to satisfy the striking students, even if in
- principle. The statement, for example, dwells at length at the weak
spots in the educational syster,; such as the existence of two educational
sectors, one in Arabic, the other in French, in the various branches of
knowledge, especially the sci.entif ic fields.
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It is quite clear that this linguistic differentiation in turn creates
_ a class differentiation, which is the fact of the matter in Algeria.
The CenCral Committee noted thaC "foreign languages"--of course, this
means French--occupy all "th~ strategic positions in the state machinery
and in society at the expense of the national and off icial language of
the country." _
As a way out of this predicament, the committee recommended that Arabic -
be made a basic language in order "to train instructors in all branches -
- and on all levels." At a f irst transitional phase, an Arabic technical
dictionary with all the basic terms will be used in higher technical
education as well as in technical and university and secondary education _
levels.
The Central Committee also called for the use of various modern audio-
visual means to facilitate the learning of Arabic by the new generations. _
More importantly, the Central Committee adopted the demands of the striking
students in a number of points. It asked the competent authorities to
speed up the complete Arabization of the educational 3gencies, both on -
the secondary and university levels, as well as in the rest of the sec-
tors which are closely or remotely related to education and upbringing.
On the level of higher education especially, Arabic will be introduced
- into the curriculum as a basic subject. On the other hand, instruction
in Arabic will be supported in the schools of the children of expatriate
workers in France. ~
Islam a Compulsory Subject
The more important concession contained in the statement issued by the
Central Committee--a concession which implies a political significance--
is the introduction of religious instruction as a compulsory and basic ~
_ subject on all levels of education and in all tests and examinations. It
has also been announced that new classes called "Islamic studies" have
been instituted in some secondary schools. It has been decided too to
open Islamic institutes which would provide the ministry of religious
_ affairs with cadres. One of the decisions too is the teaching of the
Koran to young men in mosques and Koranic schools which will receive
special support from now on. ~
The question which political circles in Algeria are now asking: can those
fast decisions taken by the Central Committee control the situation and
return things to normal? The answer most observers offer is no. Why?
Firstly, all the decisions taken, whether pertaining to housing, agri- -
culture, Arabization or any of the other sensitive matters, are decisions
whose effect will appear only in the long run. Things in Algeria a year
after the death of Presidert Houari Boumedienne cannot brook delay or
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- postponement. The striking students, for example, recall that similar,
and probably more radical, decisions have been taken several times since
independence. Instead of gaining ascendency, Arabic has been diminishing
- steadily to th e point that all the Arabized students wtx~have graduated
from universities within the past 10 years today find themselves completely _
discarded by the state agencies and economic establishments. Because of
this, it is very unlikely that the striking students will accept the
- hackneyed decisions taken by the extraordinary meeting of the Central
Co~nittee.
Struggles Within and Outside the Regime
The second reason which makes observers doubt that the situation will be
stabilized is that the struggles among individuals and centers of power
have become more public than ever before and now constitute the daily -
~ talk of citizens. It is no longer possible to indefinitely maintain the -
contradictions with which people have coexisted thus far.
Most of those conflicts are occurring within the regime, but some are
taking place outside the regime. For example, the advisers of the presi-
dent, Abdelaziz Bouteflika and Ahmed T~leb Ibrahimi, are at loggerheads.
The former is trying hard to regain his lost glory by means of rearrang-
ing the ranks of his supporters (Draya, Taibi, Elarabi...), while the
latter is trying to become the second man in the country with the support
of the president himself. Although Ibrahimi depends on his family con- '
nections since he is the adopted son of a founder of the Moslem ulema
movement in Algeria, he lacks, however, any popular base. '
Within the regime, too, the struggle grows among the ministers in charge
of oil and economic affairs. The way in which the former irrigation
minister Ahmed Ghazali, a supporter of Belaid Abdessalam, was relieved
of his post is still reve-herating in the ruling circles. Ghazali _
learned about his removal from off ice from the doorman of the council of
~ ministers when he came to attend a cabinet meeting.
The new energy minister Belkacem Nabi spares no opportunity to denigrate _
. the oil policy of his two predecessors (Belaid and Ghazali). In so doing,
he gets implicit support from Premier Abdelghani and President Chadli -
himself.
The most intense struggles, however, are those occurring outside the pale
- of the regime. There is first the Islamic current which is growing
quickly as a reaction to the "westernization" of the country and to what
- is called "the ruling political and economic class which is dissociated _
� from the language and needs of the people." Language in Algeria today
plays the same role religion has played in Iran.
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Cardboard Organizations, Scandals and Accusations
- There is also a wave of opposition to the "mass" organizations of the ~
, regime: UGTA, UNPA, UNFA and UNJA. This latter organization, for example,
is controlled by groups whose primary language is French wrapped in the
disguise of progressive slogans. Subsequently, this federation has
failed to pay any serious attention to the question of Arabization, which ~
is the main reason behind the Arabized students' withdrawal from and oppo-
_ sition to the federation. The federation is now going through an acute -
crisis because it has proved to be unrepresentative of the interests of
- the ma~ority of students.
The same applies to the peasants federation, which has completely failed
in defending the interests of its members etc. In addition to all that,
_ there is the wave of scandals involving senior and low-level officials.
The latest scandal involves information provided by the widow of Mohamed
Khider claiming that funds from the "FLN treasure" have found their way -
_ to the pocket of Rabah Bitat. The "treasure," which had been deposited
_ in a Swiss bank under the name of Khider, has been recently returned to
Algeria.
The fact is that those scandals have become innumerable. This seems
natural and understandable to all those who witness the boundless luxury
in which the class of senior officials and off icers l~ves. Luxury g~ods,
which no longer are luxury goods such as refrigerators, washers and
television sets which an Algerian citizen dreams of owning even after
years, are pouring in, in quantities on members of the ruling class.
But if you wanted to buy a car, you hav e to register your name, pay in
advance, have a savings account in a bank and then wait for 5 or 6 years.
Finally, you do not get the car which you wanted, but a car which the _
state has selected for you. Yet, American cars of the latest models -
roam the streets of Algeria. Their owners are all members of "the lucky -
elite." In the face of such conditions, can "palliative" decisions be
adequate?
FLN 'Treasure' Scandal
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 18-24 Jati 80 p 27
[Ariticle: "Every Millionaire in a Socialist Country is a Scandal";
FLN Treasure Disastrous for Khider and Auspicious for Bitat and Boudiaf]
[Text] The question of the FLN treasure is bubbling following the big
- scandal touched off by the widow of Mohamed Khider, one of the heroes of
independence, who is believed to have paid in life for having opposed
the return of the treasure to Algeria. His widow is today asking the ,
new regime: Why was the treasure a disaster for my husband and milk and
honey for some senior officials?
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"Every millionaire in a socialist country is a sc~ndal." This is how a ~
senior Algerian official commented on the wave of scandals which is
sweeping the country since the death of President Boumedienne. To know
that a class of more than 5,000 millionaires has emerged in Algeria within
a record period of no more than 18 years--the age of independent Algeria,
_ is to realize the number of scandals which are still under the surface
_ waiting to ~urst out.
If Messaoud Zeghar, doyen of this new class, had not kidnapped his sister _
Delilah from Canada about a year ago to make sur~:, she does not divulge
his secrets, the Algerian citizen who is deprived of several consumer
commodities, would not have known that Zeghar owns a wealth of more than
$1 billion, in addition to properties and possessions in several European
countries, but especially in the United States and Canada.
_ 'The story, however, which is the paramount concern of the Algerian
public opinion relates to what has come to be known as the "treasure
of the FLN." What is then the story of the treasure, and what's behind
, it?
The story recaptured headlines in the Algerian press on 26 November when
the Algerian Government signed an agreement with the Geneva-based Arab
Commercial Bank under which i~ acquired ownersh~p of the bank. On
11 December, t~he Algerian Government off icially repossessed the "FLN
treasure" after about 15 years of give and take.
Story of the Treasure
The treasure was deposited in the Arab Commercial Bank by the then FLN
treasurer Mohamed Khider who was assassinated in Madrid on 3 January 1967
in circumstances which remain mysterious to this day.
Khider's widow took the opportunity of the 13th anniversary of her hus- _
band's death to demand of the Algerian Government to rehabilitate him now
that the money has been returned to the government. Mrs Khider takes ~
the main credit for the return of the money. Without the documents and ~
papers provided by Mrs Khider, the government would not have been able to _
back its case and regain the treasure from the Swiss bank.
In July 1964, the government of President Ben Bella had accused Mohamed I
Khider of having diverted the FLN treasure from the purposes for which ~
= it had been raised in the first place, especially since Khider was en-
trusted with the treasure. When Houari Boumedienne took over power
on 19 June 1965, he kept the charges against Khider standing. Khider
had joined the opposition in July 1964, declaring that in his capacity
as FLN secretary general and treasurer he places the money he controls "at
the disposal of the anti-Ben Bella FLN." He had chosen the Geneva-based
"Arab Commercial Bank" to deposit the funds. The bank manager at the time
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was a leading Syrian businessman called Zuhayr Mardam. Khider had bou~ht
= the majority of shares in the bank's capital in 1963. First the Ben
Bella govercmient, then the Boumedienne government filed a complaint against
the bank in an attempt to regain control of the money, but many legal pro-
visions prevented Swiss ~ustice from taking any action against Mr Mardam.
Khider's Widow Sides with the Government _
In 1974, Mrs Khider sided with the Algerian Government and legally supported _
its case. She has recer~tly described the motives which had led her to
take this position. She said: "What concerns me more than anything else
_ is the honor and memory of my husband. They have promised me that if I
were to hand over all the relevant documents in my possession, the Algerian
Government would make a public announcement recognizing my husband's
integrity and admitting that the funds in question have been honorably
managed by him." Mrs Khider added: "In 1970, I met with Boumedienne and
personnally handed him all of my husband's documents and accounts, includ-
ing those which were kept in the bank. From that time on, Boumedienne
became certain that the bank's ownership is actually Algerian..." She
pauses and adds with regret: "The most serious thing is that Boumedienne
has not kept his promise despite my full assistance in the search for truth...
The Algerian Government's recourse and pleas to Swiss justice failed com- -
pletely. It was I who pushed the challenge forward and personally inter-
- vened in this matter to clarify the truth." -
Mrs Khider believes that her efforts to clear her husband's name of any
blemish have enabled the Algerian Government to repossess the S~aiss bank -
and the huge amounts of money deposited in it. She feels that it is
natural for her today to demand "a clear and open recognition" of her
husband's integrity.
The Widow Explodes the Scandal ~
Things soon grew complicated, however, and eventually turned into a new
scandal preoccupying the Algerian public opinion when Mrs Khider declared
that "all Ben Bella opponents who have obtained money from her husband,
most particularly Mohamed Boudiaf and Rabah Bitat, the current president
of the Algerian National Assembly, to di~close what they have done with
those sums of money."
The Algerian Government strongly responded to those charges in a state-
_ ment publi~hed by the Algerian news agency on 24 December. Said the
statement: "The method in which this issue has been reopened at the
press level, and particularly the insinuations involving an important -
Algerian personality, carries the mark of a well-planned political offen-
sive designed by circles which are traditionally hostile to Algeria."
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In the face of this sudden attack which did not have a convincing answer
to the charges made by Mrs hhider, she renewed her assertions that the
Algerian Government had not kept its word: "In the statement I gave the
newspaper, LA SUISSE, I brought back to mind the pledge made by the A1gerlfin
Government. If I had mentioned the names of two opposition personalities
= at the time, including Rabah Bitat, the current president of the National
Assembly, its because I expected him to intercede in defense of my hus-
band's reputation, since he was a friend of my husband. My concern today
is to defend my husband's memory and clear up the circumstances which led
to his death. At no time did I consider participating in an anti-Algeria
campaign. No one can impugn my truthf ulness because had it not been for
my role, Algeria would not have regained its right to thP Arab Commercial
Bank."
Those are the outlines of the new scandal which is now rocking Algeria
- with spillover effects involving some senior off icials and personalities.
Will the comrades in arms continue to open old books in this fashion?
Observers in Algiers are worried about the consequences of casting
� aspersions on those who have led the country over the past years, at a
time when student disturbances are escalating and social crises are
deteriorating.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "AL-WATAN AL-ARABI" ~
9254
CSO: 4402
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= EGY~T
FORCED RETIREMENT OF FIELD GRAI)E OFFICERS
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 18-24 Jan 80 p 16 _
[Article: "Egypt: Retirement of 172 Officers of Major and Brigadier
General Rank on the Charge of Disloyalty to the Head of the Family"]
[Text) Before the end of 1979, the largest removal of senior officers in
_ the history of the Fgyptian army took place. President al-Sadat's orders
were issued in accordance with lists provided by Vice President Husni Mubarak,
who is in charge of the secret organization for security in the armed forces,
and Minieter of Defense General Kamal Hasan 'Ali, retiring 172 officers with
the rank of major and brigadier general. Thia unprecedented step came as
such a total surprise that personnel of the armed forces are now referring
to it as "the officers' massacre." -
Well informed sources say that there was not one reason for chopping off
the heads of these officers except for "lack of total loyalty to the person
of President al-Sadat." However, according ta the lists of the massacre,
disloyalty fell into various categories.
The first category, comprising about 50 percent of the names, involved all -
officers who, after having been placed under close surveillance of the
secret organization, made stat~ments or engaged in actions indicating that
they opposed the Camp David agreements, the peace treaty with Israel and
the normalization of relations.
The second category involves off icers who had opposed the selection of
General Kamal Hasan 'Ali, the commander in chief of the arnry and the
minister of defense, for membership in the political bureau of the National
Democratic Party which al-Sadat heads. The officers viewed this as an
unconstitutional act that would drag the armed forces into the battleground
of political quarrela on the side of the government party ag~ainst the oCher
opposition parties and forces. _
_ The third category, includes a number of officers who abstained from partici-
pating in the su-called military prosecution decree againsfi General Sa'd-al-
- Din al-Shadhili, chief of staff of the armed forcea during the October 1973
war. Their abstention was based on the inadequacy of the evidence, and the
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fact that what General al-Shadhili had published revealed no military
secrets but only responded to charges directed against him publicly by
the "supreme comm~ander." -
The fourth category includes a number of officers who, during the viait -
of Israeli Minister of War Ezer Weizman, refused to receive him in their =
units, although orders to that effect had been issued by President al-Sadat =
and the Egyptian minister of defense. -
COPYRIGHT: Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 18-24 Jan 80
8389 ~
CSO: 4802
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PERSIAN ~ULF AREA
BRIEFS
:
JOINT ARMAMEiVTS INDUSTRY--Several countries on the Persian Gulf plan to ~
establish, with the help of France, a,i,oint armaments industry enabling the
installation of an antiaircraft defense system. It is estimated that it
will cost 8 billion dollars and will involve local construction of Mirage
aircraft and Crotale surface-to-air missiles. The plan will be submitted
to President Giscard d'Estaing during his forthcoming visit to the Arab
- Emirates. Iraq will participate in financing the project. [Text] [Paris
VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 25 Feb 80 p 16]
CSO: 4800 .
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SAUDI ARA.BIA
- BRIEFS
PRC SEEKS DTPLOMATIC RELATIONS--Diplomatic reports from Jiddah "indicate that _
in light of developments in Iran, the People's Republic of China [PRC] has
renewed its efforts to exchange diplomatic representation with the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, which only recognizes Nationalist China (Taiwan). It
appears that the Sultanate of Oman is acting as an intermediary in this .
regard. It is well known that the PRC has established full and official
- diplomatic relations with Oman. Oman had a parC in ar�rang~ng Foreign
Minister Huang [Hua]'s tour of some Persian Gulf nations last year. AL-
WATAN AL-'ARABI's information indicates that real mediation could come from
Pakistan's Gen Zia ul-Haq, since the Pakistan-PRC discussions resulted in
measures focused on strategic cooper.ation tn stop Soviet expansion toward _
the Indian Ocean and the Gulf. Among the factors which led to the failure
of the first Chinese attempt to engage in a dialogue with the Saudis was
the PRC's position with regard to Sadat's negotiations [with Israel] and
its support of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The PRC's shipments of
spare parts and aircraft engines to Egypt are among various indications of _
~ this position. [Text] [Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 25-31 Jan 80
= p 17]
CSO: 4802 "
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- WESTERN SAHARA -
MILITARY, DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO END SAHARAN WAR NOTED -
Paris MARCHES TROPI::AUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Feb 80 pp 356-357
[Article: "Western Sahara Issue. War and Diplomacy"]
[Text] One year after the launching of the "Houari Boumediene offensive,"
Mohammed Abdelaziz, secretary of the Polisario Front, has released a report
_ summarizing the successes he attributes to the Front's combat units: 700
- operations and combat actions; 6,800 Moroccan troops killed or wounded and =
1,500 taken prisoner; 400 artillery pieces, mortars and other heavy
weapons, plus 550 armored and combat vehicles captured; 750 transport veh{-
cles destroyed; and 10 aircraft shot down. The various exhibitions of
military booty held for the benefit of the international press during the
_ past year corroborate these figures to a large extent.
Furthermore, *_he Polisario's successes in 1979 were, for the first time,
clearly scored in the field. There is no locality in southern Morocco
and the former Spanish Sahara, with the exception of Tarfaya, that has
not been shelled by Saharan heavy weapons several times. Saharan troops nave
temporarily seized several urban centers and military p , nd--
devastated their military installations. This has happened twice to Tan-
Tan, once to Lebouirat, and part~ally to Smara, Lastly, Polisario forces
have liberated and now permanently hold seme 15 localities and poets in
Saguia el Hamra, the northern portion of the former Spanish territory.
Among these are: Mahbes, Jdiria, Tifariti, Bir Lahlou, and Amgala. The
Saharan Arab Republic's "battle map" has thus considerably improved in
the past 12 months. -
Yet the Polisario's operations do appear to have declined in both number
and intensity during the final quarter of 1979, and the losses sustained
by its units seem, on the contrary, to be heavier and heavier. There is
a distinct possibility, therefore, that the Saharans may soon face a man-
- power problem, even though they are drafting almost all young men as soon
as they reach draft age. A low-key campaign to recruit volunteers already
appears to be under way among the ethnic Saharan populations of Algeria,
- Libya, Niger, and Chad.
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In addition, the replacement of equipment and arms by those more or less
weli-equipped friendly countries necessitates lengthy transit and is plagued
- by man~ delays and difficulties.
"War of Attrition" Strategy
Moroccan military leaders no longer boast about breaking their adversary's
will. ~hey do hope, however, to wear him out and thus eventually have him _
at their mercy. They are organizing themselves for a long and costly "war
of attrition,"but are absolutely confident that its outcome will be favorable.
The Royal Armed F~rces currently in the field in the Sahara are now organized
into seven militar}� sectors: Zak, Tan-Tan, and Tarfaya in southern Morocco;
Aaiun, Smara, Bu Craa, and Dakhla in the new "Saharan provinces," that is to
say in the former Spanish territory claimed as its territorial base by the
Saharan Arab Republic. The chief town of each sector has a garrison force ~
of at least two regiments and serves as base of operations for light, -
motorized and armored columns supported by combat aircraft and reinforced
by helicopter-borne troops. Sector commanders seem to receive certain
orders directly from King Hassan, although Gen~:ral Dlimi coordinates the -
_ services and their operations in the field and exercises disciplinary authority. '
This new deployment of the Royal Armed Forces into powerful bases and,flying ~
columns and the very substantial increase in the number of troops operating ~
in the Saharan enabled the Moroccan forces to conduct a series of local
search-and-destroy campaigns,, the first of which, "Ohoud," was very highly
' publicized. Admittedly, contrary to announced expectations, no decisive
or striking results were obtained right away, but these new tacCics were _
undoubtedly responsible for the reduced scope of Polisario operations last
fall and the probable increase in Polisario losses. ,
Yet for this "war of attrition" to be really effective, Morocco-must be
able to sustain it for a long time. According to Moroccan officials, the
nation's high morale in~icates that a~rolonged effort can be expected.
Lawful opposition parties continue to strongly support the king's Saharan _
policy, and the clandestine opposition is, rightly or wr~ngly, said to be ,
- negligible.
Morocco's population is large enough to readily compen,sate numerically for -
the loss of life. Nevertheless, the best combat troop::, traditionally ~
drawn from Berber mountain tribesmen, have difficulty co~ing with combat ,
conditions in the Sahara. They find them disconcerting. Araftees from -
_ Morocco's Saharan regions, and especially from the former Spanish
Sahara, would be much better adapted to these operat~ons, but they are
apparently not very reliable. Generalty speaking, the rank ,and file appear -
to have relatively little motivation, and the officers and noncommissioned -
officers are said to have become openly discouraged and passive on various
~ occasions. But the aug~cantation of troops in the field is expected to allow -
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_ units to be relieved more frequently and individuals to be granted more
home leaves. Until a short time ago, such leaves were very few because
of the illusive hope of a short war.
The unusual military equipment expenditures are placing a heavy burden
on the Moroccan economy and finances. Furthermore, military leaders still _
consider the equipment and arms furnished them to be insufficient. President
Carter had long refused Morocco's request for the sale to it of 24 Cobra
= helicopter gunships, 24 F-5 fighter bombers~ and 6 OV-10 Bronco reconnais-
sance aircraft. But Congress was finally asked to approve this sale on
- 24 January when Harold Saunders, assistant secretary of state for Near East
affairs, indicated that such arms would enable King Hassan to negotiate
from a position of strength. General Graves, speaking for the Department
of Defense, added that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would be prepared to ~
finance this Moroccan procurement for a total sum of 235 million dollars.
Saharan Arab Republic Recognized by 35 Countries.
In any case, Saharan troops took the offensive once again on 1 January
1980 by shelling the Moroccan military post at Bir Enzaran for 20 minutes.
On 2 January, they penetrated northeast of Aaiun and attached Haggounia.
After a 2-1/2 hour battle, the Saharans withdrew, taking 10 prisoners
and booty with them. Saharan military officials claim to have destroyed
considerable equipment and killed more than 200 Moroccans. On 4 January,
_ a 1,000-man column dispatched to reinforce the Haggounia garrison was
ambushed. Saharans announced they had taken 24 prisoners, including a
wounded officer, and captured 16 vehicles and 12 heavy weapons. Six
Saharans, reported to have been forcibly enlisted in the Moroccan army,
were able to join the Polisario on this occasion. ~
These strikes at opposite ends of the theat.er of operations illustrate the
Polisario's ability to maneuver and take effective action. These *~n-s-
- were not as large or long-lasting as the major combat operations conducted -
in 1979. The largc urban centers held by riforoccan garrisons no longer
seem to be seriously harassed. The sector deployme;.it of reinforced Moroccan
troops does appear, therefore, to have produced some ~`avorable results.
January 1970 was also marked by an impQrtant diplomatic success achieved
by the Saharan Arab Republic. The latter was recognized by Cuba. Admittedly,
the fact that this recognition was so long in coming, may be somewhat sur-
prising. Cuba had long maintained a large medical mission in the Saharan
refugee camps. Back in 1977, it had sent an official delegation, led by
a member of the Central Committee, to ceremonies celebrating the fourth
anniversary of the outbreak of the Polisario's armed struggle. In addition,
at the sixth suuunit conference of the movement of nonalined countries held
in Havana in 1979, Fidel ~astro had officially endorsed the Saharan people's
. right of self-determination and had had a paragraph inserted in the Fina1
Declaration deploring t.he fact that this region had not been decolonized in
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conformity with resolutions of the United Nations and the Organization of
African Unity. But it is said that the Cuban Government hesitated a long
_ while because it did not wish to ;eopardize its favorable trade relationa
with Morocco.
As 1980 began, 35 countries, 20 of them African, had recognized the Saharan
Arab Republic in the following chronological order: Madagascar, Bur~sndi, _
Algeria, Benin, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Togo, North Korea,
Rwanda, Seychelles, South Yemen, Congo, Panama, Sao Tome, Equatorial Guinea,
- Tanzania, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Af ghanistan, Cape.Verde, Grenada,
Ghana, Guyana, Dominica, Saint Lucia, Jamaica, Uganda, Nicaragua, Mexico, -
- Lesotho, Zambia, 3nd Cuba.
Morocco Launches Diplomatic Offensive in Africa
Morocco thoroughly discerned the gravity of this situation. When it
launched operation "Ohoud" last fall, the logical assumption was that this
military effort was meant in large part to obtain a favorable territorial
position from which the kingdom could launch a diplomatic offensive. Thus
all that would remain to be done would be for the Royal Armed Forces to
regain control of the "Saharan quadrilateral" of eastern Saguia el Hamra. '
But without waiting to be in possession of this additional trumg card, King -
Hassan's government decided to wage a ma~or diplomatic effort in the direc- -
tion of Africa. On 14-15 January, four ministers were sent to 27 capitals
of Africa and the islands of the Indian Ocean. These emissaries endeavored ~
to regain for Morocco support and sympathy that had been given to the Saharans,
and also confirm established friendships and make them more actively support-
ive of the Moroccan cause.
, Ahmed Remzi, the minister of Islamic Affairs, visited Niger, Mali, Cameroon,
- Togo, Upper Volta, Congo, and Gabon. Abbes el Fassi, the minister
went to Senegal, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Ghana, and
Nigeria. Haddou Chigue~r, the minister in charge of relations with Parlia- -
ment, has been to Djibouti, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Malawi, and Zambia. _
Abderrahmane Saddou, the secretary of state for foreign affairs, visited
Botswana, Swaziland, Mozambique, Lesotho, Madagasc~, Mauritius, and the
Comoros. As can be seen, Morocco did not hesitate to contact nine countries
having already recognized the Saharan Arab Republic. It deemed it futile,
however, to approach the most hardened governments, such as those of Benin ,
_ or Tanzania, and probably useless to press the bovernments of Uganda and
Equatorial Guinea which have radically changed since the day those countries
recognized the Saharan Arab Republic.
If these diplomatic moves have some success, the OAU's next summit meeting
could be less unfavorable to Morocco than the previous meeting. Yet the
Saharan Arab Republic will not fail to counterattac~C. Should we, therefore,
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expect to see formulation of a compromise solution? Up to now, however,
the opposing views--the intangibility of the currently attained Moroccan '
borders versus the exercise, under neutral supervision, of the Saharan
people's right of self-determination--do not seem to lend themselves to a
possible happy-medium arrangement.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980
8041
_ CSO: 4400 END
~
,
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