JPRS ID: 8952 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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1980
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JPRS L/8952
- 27 February 1980 `
- West Europe Report
~ (FOUO 10/80)
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JPRS L/8952
27 February 1980
WEST EUROPE REPO RT
(FOUO 10/80)
CONTENTS
COLTTTRY SECTION
INTERNATIONAL AF:FAIRS
PAGE
Technological Sanctions Would Have Worldwide Repercussions
(Editorial, Bruno Ciborra; CORR?ERE DELLA SERA,
26 Jan 80) 1
FINLAND ,
: Commentator Describes UKK's Handling of Ustinov Proposal
(Frane Barbieri; LA STAMPA, 23 Dec 79).................. 3
FRANCE
USSR's Attack on Islam Viewed
(Arthur Conte; PARIS MATCH, 18 Jan 80) 7
Soviet Goals in Middle East Examined
(Raymond Bourgine; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 7 Jan 80)......... 16
Ef fec t of PCF ' Liberals' of Afghanis tan Invas ion
(Andre Lesueur; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 21 Jan 80)........... 20
Educational Goals of Auguste Comte Institute Outlined
(M=che1 Lafon; L'EXPRESS, 15 Jan 80) 22
Briefs
CFDT's Anticommunism 25
Civi.l Defense Investigation 25
PCF Offensive 25
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[III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
. ITALY
Public Opinion Poll on Nation's Situa.tion
_ (PANORAMA, 31 Dec 79)
26 -
Labor Minister Interviewed on Political, Economic
Situation
(Vincenzo Scotti Interview; PANORAMA, 31 Dec 79)......
32
Confindustria Proposal to Unions for Review of Wage
- Indexation
(Alberto Mucci; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 16 Jan 80).......
37
New Offices of PCI Foreign Affairs Exparts
(L'EUROPEO, 10 Jan 80)...........
40
Decree Law 684 on Sites for Electric Power Plants
(IL SOLE-24 ORE, 10 Jan 80) .......................v...
41
Electricity Demand Continues To Increase
(CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 22 Jan 80)
45
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COUNTRY SECTION
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
TECHNOLOGICAL SANCTIONS WOULD HAVE WORLDWIDE REPERCUSSIONS
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 26 Jan 80 P 21
[Editorial by Bruno Ciborra: "The Withholding of Technology Will Hurt the
_ USSR and the U.S.A."]
[Text] Among the various commercial measures resulting from the state
_ of tension between Russia and the U.S., we should like to indicate one
that, if applied completely, will have crushing negative effects on the
energy market azd thus on European economy, much more so than other
- measures that are perhaps more apparent, such as the deployment of troops,
_ the withholding of food supplies, etc.
We refer to the decreed blocking of any supply of technology (machinery,
engineering), especially in the field of energy, to the USSR. The first
obvious result of this action will be a conCUrrent blocking of USSR
energy supplies to West Europe. This might occur not only in terms of
energy raw material, like natural gas for Italy and the Federal Republic
of Germany [FRG], but also in terms of refined energy technology.
Let us speak of Russian enriched uranium supplies to the various countries
of th.e EEC [European Economic CouQnunity], especially the FRG. This sup-
ply of qualified energy has assumed an essential iole with respect to
European provisions follawing known events: the U.S.A. refusal to
easily supply enriched uraniinn to European countries (Carter`s statement
on nuclear nonproliferation) and the development of nuclear energy that
requires enriched urani_;im (for fast reactors) in pilot European countries,
such as France and the Federal Republic of Germany.
But the most negative result of the measure might boomerang on the U.S.A.,
_ itself. The withholding of energy technology from the USSR, particularly
in the field of oil, where there already has been advantageous cooperation,
vill delay the exploitation of Soviet oil resaurces (for example, Siberia),
which will oblige the USSR to supply itself on the open market. We do
not believe that there will be any great difficultyy, in view of the number
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of crumbling import-export companies (the case of the useless economic
_ blockade of Rhodesia that was violated many ti.mes is proof of this).
The obvious and immediate consequence will be that later on there will be
- pressure from the oil market, both in the matter of prices and availability.
Thus this would react dangerously on world energy and economic policy.
A counterbalance to this situation might be obtained through greater
American technological assistance to China, with particular reference to
energy resources. However, it seems obvious that, given the physical
_ distance of said country from the European context, and the temporary
inertia connected with these eventual supplies for energy elaboration and
production by the Chinese, this will not make possible a quick remedy to
the deterioration in the situation that would result from an interruption
in technological exchanges with the USSR.
Within the EEC sphere in particular, Italy is in a situation of ratural and
advantageous use of energy and technological exchanges with the USSR, in
that Italy does not possess energy raw material, but has instead at its
disposal suitable and sufficiently good technology for exportation (for
example, engineering for oil drilling, thexmoelectric and electromechani-
= cal machinery for conventional and nuclear thermal plants.
These of course are not the only extremely harmful results of an unfor-
tunate growing tension between the East and the West, but certainly
reflection on all of this should induce one to strive for an agreement.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
8255
CSO: 3104
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COUNTRY SECTZON
_ COMMENTATOR DESCRIBES UKK'S FiANllLING OF USTINOV PROFOSAL
Turin LA STAMPA in Ital-i-an 23 Dec 79 p 3
[Article by Frane Barbieri: "Helsinki, RuSSia's Shortcut"]
FINLAND
[Text] Helsinki--The treaty which gave birth to the phenomenon which today
_ is being called "Finlandization" bears Molotov's signature. Arranged in
Moscow back in 1948, the agreement established the ouLlines of the special
kind of Finnish neutrality. In the articles of its two scant pages, it is
implied that the USSR's strategic interest is tied to the independence of
- its neighbor, affecting it and giving it a unilateral stamp.
The first point is the most signifi~-ant one. We read: "In the eventuality
that Finland, or the USSR through Finnish territory, should become the
object of an armed attack by Germany or any state allied to it, Finland,
this being its obligation as an independent state, will fight to repel the
attack...if necessary, with the assistance of, ox jointly with, the Soviet
Unian." An arrangement in the genuine Molotov manner which, born of the
anti-German obsession, with the passing of time has offered Moscow the
pretext to add to the binding sentences of the treaty continually new and
more binding interpretations.
No sooner does an international crisis appear than the Finnish president
receives an urgent invitation for consultations on how to face together a
_ gossible attack. Particularly dramatic were the Soviet demands during the
two Berlin crises (1958 and 1961). Even the current confrontation on the
- Euromissiles has been taken by Gromyko as a pretext to ask for urgent
consultations and to obtain a pledge from Helsinki on the Soviet campaign.
Maneuvers
The hesitations of the Nordic governments are being attributed in good part
also to the remonstrances presented by the envoys of Kekkonen who has
warned against a presumed d3nger, shown to him by Brezhnev, according to
whom a strenbthened commitment in the area would cause the collapse of the
special Nordico-Scandanavian equilibrium, articnlated on an intermingling of
alliances and nAutralities, or, more properly, on semialliances and semi-
neutralities. The most extreme application of that phrase of Molotov was
attempted this summer by Marshal Ustinov.
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On a visit to Kekkonen, it seems always in the famous government producing
- sauna, the Soviet minister of defense attempted to force an agreement on
holding joint maneuvers of the two armies in the Nordic zone, siace they are
pledged by virtue of the treaty to mutual defense.
The Finnish president was able to avoid this by resorting to quibbling over
the term inserted in the main sentence of the treaty, according to which
Finland is obliged to defend itself "as an independent state." Ustinov's
plan would have cast a shadow both on the independence and on the neutrality -
of Finland. The marshal was defeated, which does not mean that he will not
make another attempt at the opportune moment.
A politician told me: "The Soviets surpass everyone in patience. They keep
repeating a proposal until the other side gets tired rejecting it." `
Based on the eight terse articles of the treaty, there has since been built
_ what Minister Vayrynen defines as "an extensive network of agreements
concerning various sectors which serve as a basis for the practical
cooperation between the two countries." Most concern the economy. A look
- at the list gives a f irst impression that Finlandization in this area has
= worked to the complete advantage of the Finns. For 10 years, Finland
already was assured in advance of $70 billion of business. In the two most
critical sectors of exports and imports (critical on a world scale), the
USSR offered its neighbor all the guarantees: the only naval shipyards in
the world which are not in trouble are the Finnish yards, since Russian
= orders cover almost their entire production (and we are talking about the
, country's most important industry); aad furthermore, the only economy which
- does not run the risk of shutting down for lack of energy is again the
Finnish, since stable Soviet supplies of petroleum, gas and electricity
. cover more than three-quarters of the country's needs.
_ Under the heading "imports" of raw materials and energy one finds almost
exclusively the USSR and under that of exports of highly finished industrial
products, plants and machinery, one finds the same information. Everything
- has been paid "in clearing," without any financial worries. -
It is no problem, they assure us, that such intense cooperation is being
carried out between a state zconomy which is jealously private. In its
_ commercial embrace with the Soviets, Finland has been barely touched by the .
world crisis.
The Soviets often object: "Although we are a great power, in these exchanges
we seem like an underdeveloped and exploited counCry." They are referring
to the fact that the USSR supplies mainly raw materials and takes in exchange
industrial products. However, the Soviets do not seem to be losing out,
either economically or politically. Instead of just a loss, it is a
- calculated loss. Economically, they obtain from the Finns machines which
alone they are not able to build. Then, through Finland, they obtain
Western technologies which are still inaccessible to the USSR.
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However, the superior advantage is without doubt political. The safety
margin so as not to fall into a dishonorable situation in exchanges with a
stronger economy is usually set by economists at 20 percent of total trade.
Under the pressure of the crisis in the world markets, Finland has had to
exceed the safety limits, going as far as 25 percent in its dealings with
- the USSR.
Beyond its quantity, the mortgage becomes heavier through its quality: the
- USSR holds Finland's energy sources (even the two projected nuclear power
plants are Soviet) and it supplies work to the country's key industries.
- With one blow, it could doubly paralyze the Finnish economy. A circumstance ,
which cannot fail to influence thinking and policy formation in Helsinki.
. Not only at high levels of responsibility. The common people, although
they still say their "historic enemies are the Russians, the Swedes and
winter," are already becoming convinced that the "K line" is the only way
to live and survi.ve: Finlandization thus becomes even psychological.
_ Here we come to the key dilemma, to the moment of truth, which we have post-
poned until this point in our study so as not to come to a conclusion too
early. Why did the Soviets not occupy or annex Finland, after having won _
the war? Why did they not absorb it afterward, perhaps through an internal
coup, considering that the West would not have lifted a finger? Finally,
= why do they not now break the internal system to impose one which is more
consonant with the Soviet one? As we looked for the answers, we thought
of the epic Finnish resistance, which perhaps rioscow prefers not to face
again. We thought also of a Soviet plan aimed at having Finland serve as a -
model show�case to charm all of Europe at a distance, pointing it in the
_ direction of Finlandization.
I hear the most consistent response to all these questions coming from the _
- soldier-politician Wolf Halsti, an observer strategy, a great friend of
the presidenr, an active politican, the former head of the Paasikivi Associa-
tion which aims at broadening cooperation with the USSR. With Cartesian
coolness, as if it were not a matter of his own skin, he told me: "Your
hypotheses are too sophisticated. There is no room for illusions on Fin-
land`s position. The fact that the USSR did not occupy us was not due to
_ friendship. It was only a preci.se calculation. If they had tried to -
' occupy it, Sweden would have given up its position of neutrality and it
would have joined in the Western alliance. NATO would have become active -
in the Gulf of Bothnia, facing Russianized Finland and facing Leningrad. -
Scandanavia would have become an enormous aircraft carrier close to the
_ USSR. The status quo is more favorable to the Soviets: now the entire gulf -
= is pratically a Russian sea. If Sweden were to become allied with the West,
- Soviez policy on its relationship with Finland would change overnight. I
do not believe the Soviets would refrain from occupation for fear of our
, resistance. What the Finns and the Europeans thought would be irrelevant.
With the current state of affairs in Moscow, the prosper..t of extending the
- neutralist spirit in Scandanavia and then through the entire continent,
remains open." -
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At this point the colonel took out a book of his just published entitled
"European Crisis." He describes it as "fictional reporting," since it
takes place in 1988. That would be the year in which Halsti, basing himself
- on his studies of Soviet strategy, foresees great changes in Europe. This ~
is not fantasy. These are predictions.
!
This is the plot of the book as told to us by the author: the USSR, after
the insertion of the Chinese card into the planetary game, finds itself
besieged on all sides. To break out of the encirclement, the Moscow
_ goverruuent takES countermeasures and decides to break the circle at its weakest point: Europe. An important Soviet minister visits the Belgian
and Danish leaders to explain the need for the Soviets to extend their -
securiCy zone to Curope. '1'he U5SR dozs not want any otlier power to use _
Europe to put pressure on the Soviet Union while the latter finds itself -
involved in Asia. Its aims would not be imperialistic, but defensive. Europe, again according to the book`s hypothesis, can remain capitalistic _
or whatever it wants, but without the military bases of another superpower. -
- rioscow demands the withdrawal of the United States from the continent and
offers in exchange all milita.ry, political and economic guarantees. NATO
is informed and its council, at the suggestion of the Germans and the Ameri-
cans, rejects any possibility of negotiation. The Soviet persist with
individual governments. The French government discovers that, after all,
rioscow's arguments are not far from those of Paris. The USSR proposes an
international conference in Stockholm. Washington manages to block it at
Cirst. Aioscow then resumes its close bilateral negotiations with the -
Europeans. Holland, Denmark and Belgium begin to vacillate.
Ultimatum
France and Germany, at this point (this is still from Hasti's book) express "
the fear that a conflict could explode if the Soviet demands are not taken
into consideration. In fact, Moscow in a series of notes intimates an
"ultimatum" of 2 months, to open the negotiations and obCain a compromise. -
The European governments consult each other anxiously. Consequently, even
in America the idea of the need for a new balance is making headway. it is
_ felt that is would not be possible to wage a limited war in Europe without
causing a nuclear and planetary war, which reinforces the Soviet thesis.
_ Ther.e occurs a sort of referendum within the framework of the European
Community: the majority decides to approve the security needs ?a.anced by
Moscow. The United States withdraws and 14oscow pledges to observe, aJ.ong
with Washington, the neutrality of Europe. There are still 9 years before
i-Ialsti's predictions are to come true. If events follow rhis "fictional
report," the I'innish experience "might become useful, positive and worthy
oF being studied" in order to establish a new order on the continent. -
_ As I left, I had the suspicion that the Finns are wishing for the Finlandiza-
� tion of Europe, hoping that cvithin a changed framework of forces, Finalandiza-
tion would be translated into a sort of Europeanization of Finland. At this
point, we must inquire of the Europeatis: how much do they see themselves
reLlected in the fate of the country of a thousand lakes.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 LA STAMPA S. p. A.
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COUNTRY SECTION
FRANCE
USSR'S ATTACK ON ISLAM VIEWED -
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 18 Jan 80 pp 40-41, 68
[Article by Arthur Conte]
- [Text] The conflict between Iran and America is a false problem; the
_ Afghanistan drama, which is a major problem, may be the first phase of a -
J conf rontation between Islam and Marxism which is going to dominate the end
" of this century, and Pakistan, as the first Muslim "thermonuclear" power,
will pose serious problems in the next decade. These are the main lessons
= to b e learned from a calm and objeciive analysis of the serious elements
tormenting, from Kabul to Tripoli, this key sector of the world. The take-
over of the American Embassy in Tehran by more or less controlled crowds
is important only at the human level. It is obviously normal that almost
everybody in the world should be moved by the plight inflicted on the 50
hostages, in defiance of the most sacred international regulations. One -
may trEmble for their life, one imagines what moral tortures they must be
suffering: this is what makes a deep impression on world opinion.
The Americans Never Colonized Iran
On the other hand, viewed attentively, the matter is far from assuming
_ primordial significance on a strictly political level, except that of the
- American presidential elections, in which according to the final destiny
in store for the hostages, Jimmy Carter stands more or less high chances -
for reelection. The simple r.eason is that tH.ere is no serious political
reason to justify a conf lict between Iran and the United States. The lat-
ter purchase from the Iranians only a tiny fraction of their oil imports,
barely 1 percent of their needs. Unlike Russia or Great Britain, they
never colonized Iran, directly or indirectly. They only provided powerful
- equipment for the shah's army at the express and free requ2st of the
Persian sovereign, naturally anxious to protect his people from the
_ cupidity of too ambitious or voracious neighbors. They had established
.on the northern Iran frontier, along the Soviet border, a surveillance
and protection network with the total agreement of an Iranian Government
- which had never had to be oressured into consenting to i.t. Although they
_ occasionally played a fairly decisive role in the int2rnal life of Iran, _
it is only when Carter refused to support the shah facing the religious
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heads and thus c3used deliberately the fall of the Pahlavi regime, in the -
hope, so natural in this very religioas minded man that in a regency
formula and for example, after the coronation of the Crown Prince, a mystic
religious regime could be installed, whic'r would establish relationships of
confidence with the great believer in prayer of the White House. It had
never been the intention of the American President, who for the rest, is -
known to resemble Roosevelt in his principles, to colonize Iran ~hrough
puppet ayatollahs, but rather to seek with them bonds of simple friendship.
It may be said that his fault lay in naiveness, and not cynicism or greed.
Once the Imperial family was exiled,Carter sought again relationships on
an eqaality basis between Washington and Tehran. It is even certain that
after any peaceful settlement of the specific problems relating to the
hostages, the Americans will only seek to coexist normally witn any. Iranian
Government or sovereign, whoever he may be. Cor.sequently, there can be
absolutely no political reason strong enough to start a conflict, and all
the more, a bloody conflict.
A New Convulsion in the Capitalist World
For the rest, to understand even better the futility of the irritating dis-
put in progress, you need only ask yourself who are the men or forces who
have gained or may gain by provoking it and causing it to last.
The first one is surely Ayatollah Khomeyni, a very effective manipulator,
_ who found in it an unexpected opportunity of crystallizing all the fury of
his public opinioz and to induce people more easily to forget the deficien- -
cies in his goSitical and economic management: While his crowds are demon- -
strating against the American "spies," they will not be thinking of orga-
nizing marches, parades and demonstrations against any particular ineffi-
cient ministers, or take part in mortal riots between ayatollah clans.
The American scarecrow acts as an obsessional red cape in the eyes of the
nervous and aggressive bull, totally panic-stricken in the present turmoil.
The second beneficiary is obviously the Soviet Union. First of all., the
event provides it witln the opportunity of st.irring up a new "convulsion"
in the "capitalist" world. The it helps unexpectedly to concentrate the
indignation of the Iranian people against the Americans alone, thus pre-
venting this indignation from rising against itself. Finally, it even
manages, at least for some time, to prevent prominence being given to its
- own disagreements with Iran and Islam, in spite of the seriousness of the
latter. The situation is worth exploiting to the hilt. It is not sur-
prising by the way, that shrewd witnesses were able to observe a number ef _
elements of the Iranian Tudeh Communist Party among the students who seized
- the American Embassy and are holding there the hostages with stony intran-
sigence.
The only ones who benefit by taking the heat out of the debate, then
defusing and erasing it are the Americans. And this is what leads us to
_ believe that the present conflict between Tehran and the White House is
a false problem.
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- Our analysis would only change completely if suddenly because of who knows '
- what madness o� crowd or crank, the hostages were to be massacred.
This is so true thai: certain men might plan to create "the irremediable"
- situation by proceeding to cold blooded massacres. But how can or_e even
think of this.
As for the Afghanistan drama, this is a top priority problem. That is
because it is the first to raise, in tertns of bloody conflict, in all its
vastness, the grea*_est confrontation of them all: the one opposing Islam
- and the "Godless empire," the believers in the most impassioned faith in
_ the world and the Ma.rxist universe. The more so since it reverberates in
= shock waves on the fundamental choices and the destinies of Russia itself.
LTnion of Men Considered Unreconcilable
It may be noted by the way, that very strangely, many of our newspapers or =
- observers seem to discover the Afghan drama as though it were something
' new. That is not at all true. It began at least 6 years ago when, with -
; full official approval from the Kremlin, a"communist" coup d-etat over-
threw the royal dynasty in the person of Zahir Chah, precisely on 18 July,
1973.
The well organized Afghan communists immediately undertook to make the
country Marxist, with the help of Soviet "advisers," whose discretion was
not their greatest virtue. They would never have expected a f irm opposi-
tion, the more so as there is not a single Islamic country in the wor].d
~ where tribes and trends, Shi'ites and Sunnites, Subshi'ites and S;ubsunnites
_ oppose each other with more bitter hatred. The dialectic of our "historic
_ materialists" was imprudent; they believed they had grounds for their con- _
viction that such tribes would never he able to constitute a united front.
We11 that was what happened. The unimaginable situation became concrete: -
- the union of inen assured forevermore unreconcilable. A few blunders on
_ the part of the "inf idels" only precipitated the phenomenon. Soon shots
were fired. By 1975, the drama had come to a head in all its intensity.
In vain did the Soviets reinforce their personnel every year. Just as
- futile were the severe purges of communists on the pretext of treason, -
deviationism or incompetence; they even proceeded to change one government
after the other, one "archduke" after the other. The more they realized =
they had been proceeding on a wrong initial analysis, the more they got -
worked up, and the more they contributed to aggravating the problem, the
more friends they 1ost, to the point that they could only rely on the sup-
port of a few creatures. The worst happened: the Afghan army defected -
. in its turn, and rallied to the side of Islam, whole units at a time, a
party from year to year increasingly cemented, bolder and more obviously
uncom.prising. Now, 5 years later, Moscow had to send three elite divisions
and engage about 50,000 men in unif orm or as civilians. Suddenly then the
drama unfolds its full effect, the more so as now the entire Afghan people
has been termed rebellious.
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_ Some people, reasoning with an apparently impeccable logic, explain that _
we see in Afghanistan a phase of "worldwide decolonization." The great
European colonial empires fell in about 20 years, in the early sixties.
- The only remaining empire is the Russian one. The advantage enjoyed by
= the Russian colonial. empire was that it was "grouped" and not "scattered -
= to the four corners of the world. The Russians were therefore able to
safeguard their property. Well, these demonstrators now say, even if the
line is held rigorously from the Baltic to Vladivostok, decolonization is =
, now striking in its turn the Soviet Empire. The other Muslims colonized -
_ inside the Soviet Union itself, in Kazakhestan, Girgiestan or Azarbaijan
_ will not fail to follow. One has to admit this idea is attractive. But
is is actually just the opposite that is taking place: far from watching
_ a"decolonization drama," we would be more correct in identifying it as
a proress of "recolonization." Russia had to make that terrible choice:
not intervene iri Afghanistan and abandon the latter to itself, but at the
risk of a loss of face, and accept historically a def eat in the face of an
Islamic army, and have the "Islamic evil" flare up on its own territory.
In their present offensive, the Rusc'.ans have been attentive to the memory
- of the "water-carrier's son," the visionary Islamic wise man, the desert
preacher who in the twenties, preached to Kaul about Islamic purity and
caused in the Musli.m provinces of the USSR, disturbances which must have
been cruelly repressed.
It all happens as though Moscow had become Byzantium. It was built long -
ago as a daughter of Constantinople: you have only to contemplate its -
_ Kremlin, its churches with pointed domes and its icons to be convinced of -
it. It even owes to Byzantium i_ts alphabet, its Orthodox religion and its
passion for vast ceremonies. Now it has taken over completely from where
Byzantium stopped, to the point of replacing it. For centuries the
"Byzantine empire," or as it was also kncwn, the "Eastern empire" (which
had separated from the "Western empire," whose capital was Rome), held _ under its dominion vast Eastern and African regions. Now Moscow is estab-
lishing itself as the capital of the new "white" Eastern empire, served by
- generals already as bedecked, decorated and superb as were the gaudily
_ appareled Byzantine dionitaries and satraps. It is quite natural, ac-
cording to the laws of a very ancient history, for the soldiers of the
Eastern empire to go off to Afghanistan to impose the imperial law in the
territories and over the most turbulent tribes. The indignation of the
West must be astonisfiing the Muscovites. ~
- The Yalta Spirit Can Survive the Crisis
They can do caithout our fine scruples. For them there were only two op-
- tions: leave or remain. They are incapable of imagining any middle way.
_ Thus, seeing that in their eyes, leaving was impossible, they gathered all
their military trwnps to win. They are sparing no expense. How ingenuous =
many of our intellectuals must be to have so often imagined in the past -
that the Soviet heads could act occasionally as tender doves and to be
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~
= surprised to see them now engaging in total *.�.*ar! At least one thing is
sure: The Russian.s wil]. cnly start discussions with the AmericAns on a
- general Middle East arrangement when they have attained their total objec-
tive in Afghanistan with the most dz-astic will and forces.
' For one day or the other, like it or not, whether or not it sounds sur-
prising today, the Eastern empire will necessarily come to terms with the
new Western empire, that is Moscow and Washington. Let us West Europeans
not be deceived by the vociferation and threats being exchanged on a
homeric and temporary basis from one great rampart to the other. The _
- spirit of Yalta is not broken at all. It should even survive this crisis _
stronger than ever. Naturally tha regulations and establishment of a
Russian-American condominium are not and wi].1 not be simple. On one hand,
revolutionary Leninism remains Moscow's official doctrine: the communist
- Internationale, more or less camouflaged or disguised, r_emains a formidable
_ force (and we can see the greatest proof of this in the openly pro-Soviet
. position of the French Communist Party). On the other hand, the worries
- about the campaign for the presidential elections are disturbing excessive- -
ly the American policy: nothing is pure in Washington any more; Carter `
does not want to be accused of a spirit of abdication shown on another oc-
casion, by a certain Neville Chamberlain and a certain Edouard Daladier at
the Munich Conference in 1938; he can allow himself to seem to be a toy in
the hands of Russian machiavelism; he cannot go too far publicly in his
deep complicity and "objective" alliance with Moscow; moreover, as long as
the American hostages in Tehran remain in danger, he could not adopt an
attitude of too much compromise: for some time, he is compelled to show
a certain stiffness, or even bravado. It is nonetheless glaringly apparent
that the Middle East can remain stabilized only if the two Superpowers
supervise or impose a balance. Apart from them and their agreement, no
- real peace is possible there. We will therefore inevitably see them
_ reaching an agreement. The only alternative solution is world war, or a
terrible risk of world war which neither the Americans nor the Russians
are panic-stricken enough to adopt now. The Middle East will be di.vided _
into areas of influence just as Europe was divided in 1945, and just as
later the Mediterranean and the control of the Suez Canal was shared.
On condition of being ackriowledged de facto in Afghanistan, the Russians -
_ will be willing to make all the necessary engagements to respect and have
respected the oil bearing areas which are vital to the Western world. On
- condition of not having the Russians exerting a more or less direct control
of the black gold of the Middle East, the Americans will do nothing in the -
final run to prevent the Russians from fortifying their "safety positions"
on their southern border. The only great victim in the entire bargaining
= after Afghanistan, will be Iran itself, which will not only be ruined and
have even its independence threatened, but will its southern oilfields =
- mortgaged, and its northern area closely watched by the Russians and
;.egions suffering from storms of separatism.
- On the other hand, now Russia is in open conflict with Islam. This is the -
event, the great dramatic event, and not just at the level of who knows
what Russian-American rivalry. This is the irremediable part
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