JPRS ID: 8893 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040062-7
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 102
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 62
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L~/8893
29 January 1980
Sub-~al~aran Africa
R~e ort
p
FOUO No. 664
~ FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/8893 F
29 January 1980
SIJB-SAIIARAN AFRI CA REPORT
FOUO No. 664
I,ONTENTS PAGE
INTER-AFRICAN AF'FAIRS
Saharan Question May Split OAU
(Abdelaziz Dahmani; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 26 Dec 79) "1 -
France Urged T~ Give Up Indian Ocean Islands
~ (Elie Ramaro; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 2!~ Dec 79) 3
Zairia:~-Congolese Relations Strengthened
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 30 Nov 79) 7
Excerpt of Report on Italian Trade With Africa -
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 28 Dec 79) 9
Brief s
Cabral, Toure Visits to Brazil 15
Gabon-Angola Tension 15
ANNGOZA
Plans IJrawn for Benguela Railroad Renovation
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 28 Dec 79) 16
Briefs
MPLA Policies Qutlined 18
CAMEROON
Repercussions of Cabinet Shuffle of 8 November
(Jos-Blaise Alima; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 21 Nov 79) 19
First Stage of Expansion of Port of Douala Almost Completed
(Samuel Bea; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 21 Nov 79) 22
- a - [III - NE & A - 120 FOUO] _
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CONTENTS (Ccntinued) Page
CENTRAL AFRIC.MI REPUBLIC
FPO Leader Says ~ance Holds Real Power in Bangui
(San Fie; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 24 Dec ?9-6 Jan 80) 26
Balance of Pa~yments Deficit -
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 21 Dec 79) 29
New Presidential Tour in Provinces
, (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERR,ANEENS, 21 Dec 79) 30
Brief s
Vice President Affected by Hypertension 31
F`rench Company Withdraws 31
CHAD
GUNT's First Cabinet Meeting Held
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERkANEII~IS, 30 Nov 79) 32 .
- Brief s
Mini~ter Remains in FRG 33
French F~nergency Aid 33
French Mission's Visit 31~
CONGO
Brief s ~
GDR Gift to Militia 35
- 1980 Budget Adopted 35
EQUATORIAI~ GUINEA ~
Army Divided Into Pro-Spanish, Pro-Max~d st Factions ~
(CANIBIO 16, 30 Dec 79) 36 ;
Reportage on Current Economi.c, Political Situation ~
(CAI~IDIO 16, 23 Dec ?:i 39
- ~
- Prevailing Conditions
- Conditions Facing Spanish Businessmen ~
Ministerial Delegation in Paris Si~ns Agreements !
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEEi~iS, 30 Nov 79) 50 -
;
New Phase in Spanish-Guinean Relations Opening
(Jose Oneto; CANIBIO 16, 30 Dec 79) 51 ~
-b -
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
Brief s
Spanish Experts 53
OPEC Loan 53
GAMBIA
Bri ef s
Electric Powerplant Project 5~t
GUINEA
Briefs
~ Ftequest for FAD Funds 55
IVORY COAST
Briefs
Decline in French Influence 5li
KEPTYA _
President Pessimistic Regarding 1980 Economic Prospects ~
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER.RANEENS, 28 Dec 79) 57
Mungai Arrested in Nairobi
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 28 Dec 79) 58
Brief~
Articles Smuggled Here 60
r LIBERIA
Brief s
New ~pposition Party 61
- MALAWI
Bri ef s
I,ilongwe Airport Financing 62 _
FY~ench Trade Delegation 62
MALI .
Studen t Unrest May Have Serious Consequences
(Sennen Andriamirado; JEUNE AFRIQU~, 9 Jan 80) 63
-c-
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
~
PJ IGER
Briefs
BID Lc~an 6K
FtHODESIA -
Guerrillas Accept Cease-F`ire, Prepare for Elections
(JE'UNE AFRIQUE, 24 Dec 79) 66
Elections Are Ultimate Test, by Jos-Blaise Alima
Opposing Armies Analyzed, by Francois Soudan
Lancaster House Settlement Assessed
(~ancois Soudan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 19 De~ 79) 70
Details on Negotiations Given
(F`rancois Soudan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 19 Dec 79) 72
- RWANDA ,
.
International Airport at Kigali-Konombe
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 30 Nov 79) 75
Briefs
French Air Transport Aid 76
SENEGAL ~
PDS Secretary Discusses Economic Situation, Opposition's
Prospects ,
(Abdoulaye Wade Interview; AFRIQUE-ASIE, various dates) 77
Rice Supply, I7istribution Problems
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 30 Nov 79) 87
Data on New I,ands Company
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 30 Nov 79) 89
Bri ef s
Project Replacing Bud-Senegal 90
SIERRA I~EONE
Bri ef s
~ Amnesty International Report 91
FRG Forestry Experts 91
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CONTENTS (Continued) page -
TANZAIJIA
Brief s
P~tr~~l~um Pricns Increas~d 92
ZAIRE
Briefs
Zaire Delivers Hydrocarbons 93
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IN'TER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
SAHARAN QUESTION MAY SPLIT OAU _
Parsi JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 Dec 79 p 31
[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "Is the OAU in Danger of Breaking Up?"]
[Text] Is the OAU in danger of breaking up in 1980? There are indications
that it may. Many conflicts of opinion have comi~ined to make this split
possible, particularly those disagreements about the Western Sahara. The
SDAR (Saharan Democratic Arab Republic) has been recognized by 35 countries
of the world. It is now close to being recognized by the 25th African -
country. Such recognition would enable the SDAR to apply for admission
into the OAU as a full-fledged member. There is a precedent for such ad-
mission: Angola was admitted in 1976 with a simple ma~ority, i.e. the
votes of half the member states plus one.
Ever since its diplomatic successes at the summit conferences of the OAU
(July 1979) and the nonalined movement (September 1979), as well as in the
United Nations, the POLISARIO has, as part of a well-prepared plan, estab-
lished membership in the Organization of African Unity as its next goal.
Resolutions of the 16th OAU summit--adopted by 33 countries--and the ~
- Committee of Three ( Monrovia, 4-5 December 1979) recognized the right of
self-determination of the Saharans and thereby spurred the POLISARIO to
further intensify its efforts.
The OAU is thus liable to admit as one of its members a state which prac-
tically doe s not control 1 inch of its territory, or at least not one city
nor even one large village within that territory. Admittedly the POLISARIO
does frequently crisscross the former Spanish Sahara at will, creates many
problems for the Moroccan armed forces, and even moves in impressive con-
voys, but it does not occupy any clearly-defined site in the Sahara.
It is probably with a view to achieving its next goal, namely OAU recogni-
_ tion, that the POLISARIO has been conducting some highly daring operations
these past few months in hopes of "liberating" a few cities, such as Smara.
These attempts have all been unsuccessful. At the same time, Morocco has
also been conducting large-scsle campaigns, such as operation "Ohoud," in
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an effort to prevent the POLISARIO from firmly establishing itself in any
, part of the Sahara. This intensive military activity has produced some
~ bitter and bloody battles.
These clashes are being used to buttress the POLISARId'Scase before the
next OAU summit where it hopes to make "Morocco suffer its greatest and
ultimate defeat." Yet this scenario frightens som~ countries, including a
few that have recognized either the SDAR, or the POLISARIO as a liberation
movement. Countries who fear a direct confrontat~on :~ithin rhe OAU are
- currently maneuvering to "freeze" any new recognition so that the fateful
number of "25" is not reached.
Morocco has in fact, clearly stated that it would withdraw from the OAU
if the SDAR were ever admitted. Its example could be fol'lowed oy foiir or
f ive other countries determined not to get caught in the trap of what they F
call "the anti-Moroccan conspiracy" and "the destabilitzation of Africa for
the benefit of hardliners, of progressives." Upsetting the balance which
has thus far, thanks to African "prudence," saved Africa from fragmentation,
is liable to be greatly detrimental to unity. S3nce the ;iAU's establishment -
in 1963, Africa has weathered many storms. Will it do so again in 1980?
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAiRS
FRANCE URGED TO GIVE UP INDIAN OCE.~:N ISLANDS
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 24 Dec 79 pp 36-37
[Article by Elie Ramaro: "France and Its Small Diego Garcias"]
[Text] The nonalined countries, the UN, and the OAU have called upon France
to free its colonies in the southern Indian ~Jcean. France has not only
turned a deaf ear to these su~ons, it is ev~n building bases in the colonies
in question. -
On 7 December, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution, ap-
proved by 112 countries, which "reaffirms Comorian sovereignty over the
island of Mayotte and asks that Paris negotiate as soon as poasible with
the Moroni government so as to permit reunification of the archipelago." ~
_ There were some 23 abstentions on this resolution, mainly by Western coun- -
tries. Only one country voted against the resolution: France, of course.
_ In replyin~ to the charges leveled at France, the French delegate to the UN
merely said that this debate "should never have taken place" because it con-
stituted "unwarranted intervention in France's internal affairs."
In fact, at that very same moment, Gaullist and Giscardian members of the
French I3ational Assembly in Paris were passing a law extending for 5 more
years Mayotte's astounding status under French law, namely "a special col.- -
lectivity (community) within the Republic." The deputy from Mayotte, a
- certain Bamana, had the f ollowing sentence added to this law: "The island
- is part of the French Republic and cannot cease belonging thereto without
the consent of its population." And for good measure, former prime minister
Michel Debre, a deputy .from Saint-Denis [Reunion] and the leading spokes-
man ~or the French Indian Ocean "lobby," uttered his standard war cry in
defense of the Christian West, blaming the French Goverriment for remain~ng
on the defensive at a time when its is being regularly attacked in all of
the international forums about Mayotte, Reunion, and scattered small islands
in the vicinity of Madagascar.
The UN had, in fact, discussed the question of these small islands a few
days earlier, and French representatives had employed the same old subter-
fuges. In their view, "these sma.11 islands form an integral part of the
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Republic and any claim relative to them is, therefore, unfounded snd
gratuitous." The General Assembly of the United Nations did, neverthe-
less, invite the French Government "to open, without further delay, nego-
_ tiations with the Malagasy Government with a view to restoring to it the -
- Glorieuses, Juan de Nova, Europa, and Bassas da India islands arbitrarily
separated from Madagascar." A total of 97 countries voted for the resolu-
~ tion and seven against (France, of course, Belgium, the United States,
Italy, Great Britain, Germany, and, oddly enough, Senegal).
As in the case of Mayotte, these dispu ted islands had also been the sub~ect
of a multitude of statements made thes e past few year3 in the OAU, the
nonalined movement, not *_o mention the regional conferences on demilitari-
' zation of the Indian Ocean. But this was the first time the UN General
Assembly had ever considered the question. Upon thus seeing that its -
presence on these islands is so little "desired" by the international "
con~munity and nearby countries, will France decide to soften its position -
somewhat in the coming months?
For the moment, such is not the case. As far as Mayotte is concerned,
supporters of the "French presence" ore firml.y in the saddle. The May
1978 coup conducted against Ali Soilih by Bob Denard, a mercenary, with the
complicity of certain French circles, permitted restoring to power in
Moroni men who were most favorabl~ to France during the colonial era. The _
mercenaries have remained on the island and gone into the export-import
and hotel business while technical assistance personnel sent from Paris
have replaced them in the armed forces, palice, and various governm~ntal
departments and ~gencies. Suca a regime cannot, therefore, refuse any-
thing to France which helps pay the goverrunent`s bills and provides its
"elite" with relatively well-paying positions.
Furthermore, because of the archipelago's poverty and the inab ility of the
men in power to mar~age the affairs of state, France has total control of
communications and defense in the region. Tts warships move freely through-
out the archipelago, going from Mayotte to the other Comorian islands.
All air service between the islands of the Federal and Islamic Republic of
the Comoros is provided by a French airline, Reunion-Air Service, Air Comcros
having had to shut up shop. In this way, France may be said to be actually
proceeding to indirectly reunify the archipelago. It is doing this, how-
ever, in line with its own interests and from Saint-Denis, Reunion!
Under these conditions, Moroni's claims on the disloyal island have lost
some of their effec.tiveness. And Paris can ~ustifiably view UN condemna-
tions as "face-saving gestures" that are not likely to have any conse-
quences. Unless, of course,, President Abdailah is overthrown in the near
future, a possibility that is mentioned periodically.
Hence Mayotte is expected to remain, for a long time to come, that "French"
island which does not apeak French, easy prey to a handful of Creole fami-
lies of Reunion origin who dominate loeal business and the Mahori Movement
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(practically the sol:e political party), and a"cozy refuge" for officials
of the hardline "colonial" administration. In fac[, more than half of the
island's Europeans are Foreign Legionnaires. The very ones whom Madagas-
car expellt~d from their Diego-Suarez base in 1973 but who now remain en-
sconced oniy a few hundred kilometers away, as a possible threat.
~
Missiles Some Day?
The case of the small islands in the Mozambique Channel and northea~t of _
Madagascar is less complicated. They are supposedly "uninhabited." At
least that is what Paris claims in explaining wh,y no native population lays
claim to the islands. They are actually occupied by small detachments of
the 2d RPIMA (Overseas Infantry Paratroop Regimeht), periodically resup- _
~ plied by Transall transport aircraft from Air Base 181 at Gillot on the _
island of Reunion. These are also troops who were formerly stationed in ~
Madagaacar, at Ivato in the vicinity of Antananarivo. They continue to -
maintain surveillance of Madagascar, but from the outside because they can
no longer occupy the country directly as they did in the days of President
Tsiranana. -
The old justification for France's ownership ~f the Bassas da India~, Europa,
Juan de Nova, Glorieuses, and Tr~*nelin islands is no longer very convincing:
these islands serve as weather stations and track cyclones in cooperation
with the R~union ~~eather service. This reaso;~ is no longer convincing,
first because weather satFllites are increasingly replacing men and are
_ performing much more efficiently, and secondly because the military presence
- on those ielands has grsdually stifled the civilian presence.
Runways have been extended on most of the islands. This operation on _
Tromelin in 1978 required the presence of 400 legiannaires and paratroopers. -
And the s~nall 2d RPIMA detachments, when not performing guard duty--a some-
c~hat ridiculous taak on these small desolate islands covering an area of
only a few square kilometers--are primarily employed in building barracics
and installing modern telecommunications equipment. What nearby countries
fear, especially Madagascar, is that some day the French Ministry of Defense
may perhaps deploy missile systems on t~iese islands, under the pretext of _
deterring the West's adversaries from attacking the large tankers that ply
the "oil route" along a coastline which Paris considers too "red."
~ In any case, Antananarivo is making restitution of these islands a point of -
honor. In addressing the United Nations, Blaise Rabetafika argued: "There
definitely existed an independent and sovereign Malagasy state to which
these islands belonged. Consequently, they have always legally, historically, -
and geographically formed an integral part of Madagaecar. For that reason,
the Malagasy Government denounces France's unilateral and arbitrary action
placing these islands under its jurisdiction as overseas territories ef-
fective 1 April 1960."
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_ Nostalgia Still Exists
As a matter of fact, the Malagasy Government had raised the iseue of the
future status of these islands during the 1960 negotiations on the first
_ French Malagasy Cooperation agreements, after Madagascar had become fully
independent of France. But like Moroni's Comorian government today, Malagasy
off icials back then in 1960 could refuse Paris nothing because Paris imposed
its will on them. It taok the ma~or upheaval of May 1972 and Madagascar's
- gaining of what w~.s called its "second independence" to revive publicly the
issue of these islands. May 1972 was also the date when the 2d RPIMA
stationed its troops on these small islands, with tortoises and terns
for company: ridicule has never killed the French Army!
We would continue in this sarcastic vein if only the climate in which all
this petty intrigue is taking place were not so tense. If only France were
not maintaining 4,500 men in Djibouti--for the purpose of "defending" the ~
southern Indian Ocean--plus a naval force manned by 2,150 sailors, plus
some 3,000 army and air force personnel on Reunion. If only these French
Army troops were not conducting an increasing number of f ield exercises,
' amphibious landings, parades, and paradrops to such an extent that, for
example, the island of Reunion looks like a veritable base, a situation
compelling Paul Verges, secretary general of the Reunion Communist Party '
and member of the European Parliament in Strasbe+irg, to say: "The more
military intervention forces there are here, the more it will focus the
attention of African countries on the Reunion question." And only if ques-
tionable Frenchmen, even thpugh some are emple~yed by the French Ministry
of Cooperat~.on, wQre not interfering so much in ~~he internal affairs of
Mauritius, and especially of Seychelles. Such activity might possibly lead
people to believe that the part of ~'rance which is nostalgic for its hege-
mony over the southwestern Indian Ocean still definitely has the upper hand
= over that part of France which has forgotten the old colonial days.
COFYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
ZAIRIAN-CONGOLESE RELATIONS STRENGTHENED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3342
[Article: "Strengthening Relations With Zaire"]
a [Text] At the close of the visit to Brazzaville of Nguza Karl I Bond, the
7airian Government commissar of foreign affairs (MMT [MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENSJ of 23 November 1979, p 3279), the Congolese authorities
made public the content of a~oint communique marking the strengthening
. of relations between the two nefghbors.
In this communique th~ partners reaff irmed their attachment to the princi-
ples of neighborliness in Central Africa, a region the situation in which
was made the sub~ect of an in-depth investigation, dnd to "peace, which
the peoples of Africa need."
The communique also reaffirms the support of Zaire and the Congo for the
peoples of South Africa, who are struggling against the "illegal Salisbury
and racist Pretoria" regimes and recalls their co~nitment to spare no effort
to hasten the total and effective decolonization of the African continent
in compliance with the ideals and principles of the Charter of the Organi-
zation of Af rican Unity (OAU)."
The off icial talks between the two delegations particularly involved the
strengthening of bilateral relations in all fields and Af rican and inter-
:iational questions. Zaire and the Congo are engaged in conducting a
"fruitful" dialog and "brotherly concert within the African framework as
well as the international, bearing in mind the multiplication of tensions
in the countries of the Third World."
In the economic field, the two governments, af ter having "verified the
important possibilities opened up at the Grand Zaire-Congolese Joint
Commission," decided to t~ke "a certain nimmber of ineasures intended to
ensure the efficient realization of joint projects" and agreed to give
a"new impetus" to the~work of the Joint Commission to that end. �
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It should be pointed out that economic relations between the two neigh-
bors were strengthened recently. A mission of Zairian telecommunications
experts met in BraZZaville last July in order to study the realization
of telex-telephone communications via wireless beams between the Congo-
lese capital and Kinshasa. The liaison is to be realized soon by the
Telecommunications Joint-Stock Company (SAT), a French company.
In September it was a Congolese delegation that went to Zaire for the
Joint Commission meeting. At the close of the latter, it was decided that
Congolese off icer trainees would be trained by the Zairian merchant
- marine. The project of the Pool Fluvial Company as well as the possibil-
ity of Zairian merchandise being transported by ATC (The Trans-Congolese
Communications Agency) were also studied. A second meeting of the Joint
Cotmaission has been organized in Brazzaville in October.
, In order to provide electricity, talks were held between the two coun-
tries' national electrical energy companies. They had to do with the
strengthening of Zairian provision of electricity to Brazzaville and with
the establishment of an Inga (Zaire)-Pointe-Noire liaison. The increase
in the demand for electricity in this city is clear. The power planned
for 1983 is 18 megawatts, and the Congolese Government is presently study-
ing the possibility of realizing a La Bouenza-Pointe-Noire high-tension
line.
- COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979 ~
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' INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
" ,
EXCERPT OF AE.PORT t?N ITALIAN TRAIE NITH AFRICA
_ Parf$ MARCI~S TROPICAUX ET MEDI'IERRANEEHS in French 28 Dec ?9 pp 3666-67
~~x] Itsly's trade xith Africa~ xhich haa 3ust been examined in a brief
and ~eneral na~mer, i~ relatively eod~et repaeesenting less than 10 percent
of Itsly�s come~ercial operat~ona With the entire xorld. Moreover, thie
trade is of'speeial interest, flrom both the ioport and export aspe~t~ to
about 10 countries out of the 57 on ~hich etatistics are available (but of
Khich certsin c,nea, it is true, sra territorially, de~aphically and eco-
~ nonically insignificant~. ,
Five Ha3or Suppliera
The right hal.f of Table ITA-CE-1 shoWe Italy'e p~incipsl At'rican partners.
The txo half-"Caaneeberts" devoted to the "auppliera" and "eusto~sra" clearly
indicste the exceptianal position of five eountriea in the txo eategories~
Libya~ Al~eris~ South Africs. Egypt and N16eria, folloxed at aotne distance
by aerious-n+inded outsiders such aa Ivory Cosst~ Tunisia and Moroeco.
In~1978, txo countries, Libya and South At~ics~ accounted for s little more
than 50 percent of It,aly�s total i~eporta ~ros Africa (31.13 peroent eoaing
from Libya au~d 19.2 percent fro~ South Afriea)i and aia suppliere, Libya~
5outh Atrica~ E~ypt~ A].aeria, Ivory Cosat and Tuni~is, accounted for 80.6 ~
percent of overall Italisn purchaeea yeade by the dark eontinent, leaving
_ only 19.4 percent to their 51 neiahbora.
Table ITA-CE-C~ risht hal! ~ae publislwd]~ 61ves the 24 pacincipsl AtMcan
~zp~rt~ra to Itsly in 1978. The 1978 liat atope wfth Uganda xith 10.3 bil-
lian lire. To aive a total or 3o eountriee~ ~e need to add: IKos~bique
S9.2 ~ Togo (8.7), Sene6al (8.65)~ Central African Republic (7.2), Burundi
l3�5~ and Sxaziland (3.3). Beyond that point. suppliers account for very
little~ their e~].es~ for the ~oet psrt, atou~ting to only a fex hundred aiil-
lion lire.
Bet~een 19?7 and 1978 the chanse in the value of purchasea eade frow the 15
foresoat suppliera (in 1978) xaa the follo~rin6s Alserias +128.2 pereent=
Eaypt: +72.2= Ni~eria: +43= Kenyae +32.8~, 3outh Africa: +22.2~ Sudaas
, +9,6= Lib~ra: +A.6= Ca~eroans +8.4; Tuni4~a: +3.7s Morocco: �4.2t
9
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L:beria: -9.2i Ivory Coast: -13: Zaire: -19.8= Zambias -21.1i and Congos
-35�5� Among the outaiders one can note a substantial upeurge in purchaeea '
from Guinea 66.7 percent) and a decline in deliveries from Uganda (-41.1).
Table ITA-CE-C
Italy's Best Afric~sn Suppliers and Customers in 1977 and 1978 (Figui~es Given
Are in Billions of Lire)
Imports fro~n Africa Exports to Africa
1978 1977 1978 1977
Libya 1~45~.4 1~340.2 Libya 1,106.9 1~081.0
south Africa 902.~ 737.9 Algeris 804.2 579�2
EgyPt 635.6 369.0 Nigeria 556.8 52~4.2
- A2geria 394.4 172.8 Egypt 34S�6 300.2 ~
Ivory Coast 218.1 250.6 South Africa 265�2 233�2
Tunisia 172,6 166.5 Morocco 181.9 185�9 -
Nigeria ~33.0 93�o Tunisia 167.7 163.9
Zaire 113.2 141.2 Somalia ?9�6 ~+�7
Morocco 82.3 95�9 Ivory Coast 73�~ 49�9
Sudan 77�8 71.0 Kenya 68.1 48.3
Cameroon 64.6 59.b E thiopia 5t.6 43.4
Zambia 60.6 76.8 suc~an 50.7 63�8
Liberia 59,6 6~.6 Ghana 5~�2 33�8
Kenya 38�9 29�3 Tansania 48.1 28.0 -
Congo 3w�5 53�5 Z~re 46.7 5~�9
Guinea 3~?~.0 20.4 Canary Islands 38.0 31.7
Gaban 30.5 z4.o Cameroon 35.6 34�4
Tanzania 25.1 28.1 Senegal 31�6 35.2
Mauritania 22.9 23�9 Libe~ia 26.4 40.4
Ghana 20.5 23.8 Zambia 25.8 24.8
E thiopia 19.2 19.5 Angola 24,4 17.4
Somalia 12.6 16.6~ Benin 20.3 7.4
�Madagascar 11,1 9.4 Guinea 15�3 13�3 ~
Uganda 10,3 17.6 Reunion 14.3 10.3 ;
Six Principal Customers
with regarti to Italian exports to Africa~ six countries are prominent in
- 1978 (as shown in loxer half of Chat~t ITA-CE-1)~ Libya (26.1 percent of
Italian exports to the dark continent). Algeria (19.1 percent), Nigeria
(13.2)~ Egypt (8.2), South Africa (6.4) and Moroccu (4.2). These six coun-
tries therefore absorb 7?.2 percent of Italian goods delivered to Africa.
The 51 reeiaining states share in exports of 970 billion lire= but of thia
total the 18 customers listed betxeen numbers 7 and 24 in Ti~ble ITA-(~-C
10
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'
account for~8~4 billion. In fact~ only 96 billion lire remain for the 33
African coun~riea not liated.
Betxeen 197~ and 1978 there rras a sharp increase in Italian sales to AfYica
(27.3 percent). Of Italy's 25 principal African customers only 6 reduced
their pt~rchas~qs in 2978 compared xith 19?7. Appreciable increases can be
seen in purchasea mnde by the ma3or purchasers. The folloxing ahoxs the
- chanae in the ~esrket from 1977 to 1978 for the 15 foremost customers: Tan-
zanis: +71.8 percenta Ghana: +48.5: Ivory Coast: +47.9~ Kenya: +41=
Alaeria: +38.8i Ethiopia: +32.7i Somalias +23: Egypt~ +15.1i South At~i-
cas +13.7t ~igeria: + 6.2= Libya: +2.3; Tunisia: +2.3i Morocco: -2.2i
z a~re: -io.o= and suaa~: -20.5. ~
Among the countries listed betxeen numbers 16 and 25~ ane can aee the fol-
loxing substantial positive or negative spreadss Benin: +174.3 percent
(from 7.~+ to 20.3 million lire)= Angolas +40.2 percent= Reunion: + 38.8
percent= Liberias -3?+.7 percent= and Ugandas -47.9 percent.
Distribution of Itallan Purchases of At~3can Products -
In 1978~ Ttalian purchases from Africa xere canfined principally to rough or
semifinished products. Considering only imports close to a billian lire and
- equsl to or gre~?ter than that value~ xe co~e up xith a total of 4~585�7 bil-
lion~ representing 9?.8 percent of Italy's 1978 purchaaes from Africa. ife
may consider this total and percentage fLlly representative of the market.
The folloWing gives the distribution in billions of lires
l. Nonmetal ores~ 2,639.9, of Khich crude oil aaounted to 2~465 ~1~323�3
coming from Libya~ 578.0 from Egypt, 355�6 tYom Algeria, 85.7 t`ron Tunisia,
78.6 from Nigeria~ 23.7 from Congo and 20.1 fro~ Gabon)= coal ca~oe to 34.4
(all from South Africa)i and other orss amounted to 140.5 (84.1 from Libya~
28.0 from Morocco~ 22.5 from South Africa and 5.9 froa~ Togo).
- 2. Ordinary or precious-metal products: 840.0, of which precious metals
- (gold~ ailver and latinwe) amounted to 665.7~ all from South Africa~ cop-
per cane to 103.4 ~57.8 from Zaunbia, 34.0 from Zaire and 11.6 from South
Af~ica)= lead being 21.2 (10.6 fYom South Africa~ 4.8 fxom ~lorocco~ k.0
from Tunisia and 1.8 from Zsmbia)= iron and laninated steel totaled 14.5
(7.4 from Al~ria auid 7.1 from South Africa)i nickel xas 9.4 (all from
South Africa i metals in ingot form came to 5.3 (all t~om Algeria)i cin-
ders and slag amounted to 2 billion (coming from South At~ica)i and alwni- _
num caae to 1.4 (all from ~gypt). -
3. Ra~+ agricultural products: 442.6, b~oloen doxn as folloxs: coffees .
' 229.2 ~72.1 from Zaire~ 53�7 from Ivory Coast, 39.8 t5rom Cameroon~ 18.3 from
Tansania, 15.7 t~om Kenya, 6.4 Prom Central African Republic, 2.4 from Bu-
rundi, 1.4 tro~ Rxands, 1.3 ~rom conao sna i.0 from Togo)i cocoa~ 89�7
, (36.3 i~om N16eria~ 33�5 from Ivory Coaat~ 11.6 from Ghana~ 3.1 from Cameroon~
11
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2.7 from Gabon, 1.8 from Togo and 0.7 f~om Benin)i raw cotton (waste ex-
cluded): 6..5 (40.3 from Suds~tZ, 15.3 from Egypt, S.1 fY~om South Africa and
1.3 from Chad~= miscellaneoue fruits (except citrus): 25.1 (ll.s from
Ivory Coast, 10.2 from Somalia~ 1.2 from Cameroon~ 1.2 fYom Algeria and 1.0 -
_ � from Egypt) i oil sesds or fruitss 18.4 (12.5 ~om Sudan, 1.6 f`rom Senegal~
1.5 ~om Egypt~ 1.4 ~om Gambia and 1.4 from Nigeria) i fresh or dried vege-
tables: 8.2 (6.9 from Morocco and 1.3 from South Africa); medicinal plants: -
2.0 (1.2 from Egypt and 0.8 from Zaire)i citrus fruits~ 1.5 (all from South
Africa)i ve table fibers other than cottons 1.4 (all from Tanzania)i
wheats 1.4 ~from South Africa)i corn: l.l (from South Africa); and tea
and spices: 1.0 (all from Kenya).
4. Forest products: 127.5 distributed as follows: rough xood: 114.6
(90.1 from Ivory Coast, 7.7 from Congo~ 6.8 from Ghana~ 6.1 from Cameroon~
2.6 from Gabon and 1.3 from viberia)= rax latexs 11.6 (3.1 from Liberia~
2.9 f`rom Ivory Coast~ 2.6 from Zaire, 1.7 froa~ Cameroon and 1.3 from Nige-
- ria)i and other gwns and resins: 1.3 (all f~om Sudan).
5. Metallic ores and scrap irons 119.2 broken down as folloxs: iron ores
85�~ ~50.3 from Liberia~ 1'j.9 from Mauritania, 14.8 f~om South Africa and
2.8 frnm Algeria)i other metallic oresc 30.0 (12.5 ~om Guinea~ 8.3 from
South Africa~ 5.0 from Morocco and 4.2 from Gabon)i scrap metale 3.4 (2.4
from Algeria and 1.0 from Liberia).
- 6. Products for human consumption at least partiall processed: 83.2 dis-
tributed as folloKS: olive oil: 35.1 (from T~nisia~i other vegetable
oilss 3.2 (20.8 ~om Sudan, 6.5 from Ivory Coast~ 2.3 from Cameroon~ 1.4
from Senegal and 1.0 from Mali)i products derived from sugar (molasses)~
6.8 (3.9 from Ivory Coast and 2.9 from Cameroon)i preserves and fruit 3uic-
ess 5.0 (3.7 from Ivory Coast and 1.3 from Kenya); and canned fish: 4.3
(all from Morocco).
7. Chemical p~oducts: 80.4 broken doxn as follows: chemicals: 53.1 (21.4
from Guinea (alumina), 17.6 from Tunisia (phosphates), 10.9 from Morocco
(phos hates) and 3.2 from Libya)= organic products derived from petroleums
15�9 ~9�6 from Algeria and 6.3 from Libya); prepared fertilisers: 5.9 (all
f~om Tunisia); pickling or tanning products: 4.6 (from South Africa~~ and _
disinfecting and phytosanitary products: 0.9 (Kenya: pyrethrum).
8. Vegetable or animal products not intended for human consumption: 71.2
_ divided as follokss rough pelts: 69.5 (coming from 17 countries the main
ones being: South Africa xith 24.9~ E thiopia with 9.0, Nigeria xith 8.7~ -
Kenya with 5.0~ Mozambique with 3.7, Botsxana xith 2.8, Cameroon xith 2.3~
Somalia xith 1.9~ Upper Volta with 1v6, Sxaziland xith 1.6 and Rxanda xith
1.4)i and oil cakes: 1.7 (Egypt).
9. 011 and coal dsrivatives: 70.4 distributed as folloxs: light oilss
42.7 (23.7 from I,iby~, 16.2 from Egypt and 2.8 from Tunisia)= heating oils:
12
,
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,
14.~ (k.5 from-Kenya~ 3.9 from Alqeria~ 3.3 fYom Mo~ambique ~nd 3.0 f~om `
LRypt) ~ medium-?night o118: � 11.6 (Libya) = snd liquefiad ~a.e, 1.4 (Pgypt) . �
All oth~r purchsees are leas than 22 billion lire as a unit and xill not be _
list,~d. .
ITA-CE-D Diatribution of 1978 Italian Exporta to Africa (Billions of lire)
Product categories Yalue Principal customers
1. Machines and equipment 953�4 Ai~eria 208.9, Libya 202.9, Nigeria
176.8~ Egypt 84.6, South A~ica 64.0, -
Morocco 44.4, Tunisia 42.5, Ivory Coast;
17.8 and 5udan 13�3�
2. Transportatio~n equip-
ment 749.6 Libya 195.0~ Nigeria 132.0~ South At�ri-
ca 95.4~ Alg~esia 69.4~ Egypt 49.5~ so-
malia 36.9~ Ethiopia 29.9~ Morocco
29.4, Tunisia 21.8~ Kenya 21.4 and
Ghana 21.2.
3. Mechanical producta 385.2 Libya 153.0~ Algeria 95.4~ Nigeria
39�8, Egypt 21.7, Morocco 13.1~ Tuni-
sia 10.8~ Ethiopia 6.8, South Africa
6.z and Ivory coast 6.0.
4. 011 and coal derivstives 362.8 Algeria 120.0, Libya 68.5~ Egypt 33�5~
Nigreria 30.3~ Ttuiisia 16.6~ Morocco
15.6, Benin 15.5~ Liberia 12.3, Zaire
10.5~ Ivory Coast 10.1 and Can~eroan
7.8.
5. Metallurgiasl products 290.3 I,ibya 111.2, Algeria 71.9, Nigeria
32.1, Egypt 20.1~ Morncco 18.4, Tuni-
sia 14.2 and Kenya 7�5�
6. Che~ei.eal products z35�9 Egypt 53.8~ Algeria 52.4, Nigeria 24.9,
- Ll~aya 23.5~ South Africa 23.1~ Tunisia
1~.'~, Morocco 9.8~ Kenya 8.2 and Sudan
6.4.
7. Induatrial food products 156.8 Alaeria 77.7, Libya 26.1~ Nigeria 16.2~
L~~rpt 10.8 snd Ivory coast 3�5�
8. Liue, ce~eent~ glsaa and
the like 119.3 Liby~ 45.6, Nigeria 27.7, Algeria 16.2,
Egypt 12.8, South Africa 4.8 and Moroc-
co 4.6.
9. Miacellaneous indus-
trial products 106.4 Zibya 40.7, Nigeria 19.6~ Egypt 12.3,
Alaeris 11.0, South Africa 6.0~ Ttmisia '
. 5�5r S oma:lla 4.2 and Morocco 4.1.
13
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ITA-CE-D (continued)
Product categories alue Principal customers
10. Clothing 94.4 Libya 51.5~ Nigeria 20.9, Egypt 4.2~ ~
Ivory Coast 4.1~ Tunisia 3.7 and South
Africa 3.1.
11. K ood industries 89.9 Libya 70.5~ Nigeria 6.3~ Tunisia 5.2~
Egypt 3.6, Ivory Coast 2.5 and Senegal
1.8.
12. Textiles 89.0 Libya 27.4, Algeria 21.5, South Africa
12.5, Tunisia 10.0, Morocco 5.2~ Egypt
- 5.1~ Nigeria 2.Z, Kenya 1.7 and Ivory
Coast 1.6.
l~, Precision clocks and
Katches 48.2 Algeria 13.1, South Africa 11.4, Libya
10.8, Nigeria 5.~, Egypt 3.1 and Tuni-
sia 1.6.
14. Rubber products 46.8 Nigeria 14.2~ Algeria 11.1, Libya 6.4,
Ivory Coast 3.0, Moracco 2.3, Kenya
2.2, South Africa 2.0, Pgypt 1.8 and
Tunisia 1.5.
15. Nonfood vegetable products 28.4 Libya 28.4.
16. Paper boxes 27.8 Libya 13.5, Algeria 7.4, Egypt 5�3~ -
South Africa 3.6 and Tunisia 3�3�
17. Polygraphic industry
products 10.8 Libya 7.5~ South Africa 2.0 and Nige-
ria 1.3.
18. Rax staple products 10.7 Libya 8.9 and E gypt 1.8.
_ 19. N onmetallic ore 6.0 Alg~eria 4.7 and Libya 1.3.
20. Leathers and furs 2.3 Nigeria 7.2 and South Africa 1.1.
COPYRIGHTi Rene Morewc et Cie., Paris, 1979
8568
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BRIEFS _
CABRAL, TOURE VISITS TO BRAZIL--The presidents of the republic of Guinea-
Bissau and Guinea, Messrs Luis Cabral and Sekou Toure, will make an official
visit to Brazil next year, the speaker for Brazil's Chancellery, Mr Bernardo
Pericas, announced on 18 December; the dates of these visits were not
indicated. [TextJ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in Fre~?ch
28 Dec 79 p 3677J 9294 "
GABON-ANGOLA TENSION--The presence in Gabon of Roberto Ho~den, head of the
puppet FNLA organization, has subjected the relations between Libreville
and Luanda to intense tension. The head of Angolan diplomacy, Paulo Jorge,
has just warned Gabonese authorities about the serious consequences that
, could derive from the presence of Holden in Libreville, after he was
expelled from Dakar and Abidjan. Gabon, which recognized Angola, has an
accredited ambassador in Luanda. However, the Angolan Government has no
diplomatic representation in Libreville. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in
French No 204, 7 Jan 80 p 21]
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ANGOLA
PLANS DRAWN FOR BENGUELA RAILROAD RENOVATION
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Dec 79 p 3695
[Article: "Bp.DEA to Take Part in Renovation of Largest Railroad in the
Country"]
[Text] The board of directc?rs of BADEA (Arab Ba:nk for Economic Development
in Africa), at its 15th meeting (1-2 December), has approved a 10 million
dollar~ ioan for the renovation of the country's largest railroad--the
Lobito road--which extends over 1,348 km from east to west.
- The economic importance of this railroad is all the greater as it is connected
to the railway systems of Zaire and Zambia and that, until 1975 when it
was shutdown following the Angolan liberation war, it was the regu3ar transit
route for ore exports from the Zairian Shaba province and from the Zambian
copper belt. -
The project will comprise two stages: first, the transportation capacity of
the railroad will be increased from 42,000 to 70,000 tons per month; in
the second stage, it will be increased to 96,000 tons per month. The
total projected investment is 82 million dollars. Of these, 55.3 million
will be used on the Angolan system proper (additional work on the Zairian
and Zambian systems being financed separately). The cost of the first
stage is estimated at 25.35 million dollars, of which 39.4 percent will be
financed by BADEA, with co-financing from OPEC special fund (2.99 million),
Belgium (.78 million), Sweden (1.30 million), the Netherlands (2.60 million),
UNDP (.39 million) and the government of RAP [expansion unknown] (7.15
million).
The BADEA loan, reimbursable over 15 years, including a 5 years' extension,
and bearing interest at an annual rate of 4 percent, will ~ointly finance
the following:
--technical assistance for hiring, training and upgrading the skills of
the personnel of the Angolan railroad company (Benguela Railways);
--purchase of rolling stock. i.e. 180 railroad cars during the first stage,
and 450 during the secs~nd, to meet projected requirements;
16
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--modernization of the hauling stock, i.e. purchase of 18 diesel locomotives,
which will lead to a progressive phasing-out of steam loco~totives and to
the general use of diesel locomotives (by the end of the second stage of the
project, the Angolan railroad will be 75 percent dieselized);
--repairing of the rails on the eastern portion of the railroad, and renovation
of several kilometers of railroad between Huambo and Cubal; for this purpose,
repair and maintenance material and equipment will be purchased;
--purchase of telecommunication and signalling equipment to improve the
operation of the system;
' --improvement and reinforcement of bridges; replenishment of spare part
stock, and modernization of maintenance and repair shops.
- The realization of this project will remove the economic obstacle which has
- heavily handicapped the international trade of Zaire and Zambia, as well as
that of Angola. By granting this loan, BADEA is therefore adopting for its
o~an one of the cardinal objectives of the African Railroad Union: "To
promote unification, development, coordination and improvement of the railroad
_ systems of Union members, in order to ensure connection of their systems to
o~:ze another and to other transportation systems which link Africa to the rest
oF the world."
- In addition, the re-opening of the Angolan railroad will contribute to -
r~ducing the dependence of Zaire and Zambia on the southern route which,
apart from its political implications, is longer and more expensive.
~ With the development of international trade, of regional transportation of -
persons and goods, and the expected rise in income, especially in foreign
currencies, it is estimated that the groject will create favorable conditions
for a regional economic integration.
On a purely national level, this project is expected to pxomote, in Angola,
the development of large, densely populated areas, the development of the
transportation sector, the creation of jobs, the improvement of job training
and the distribution of income. With respect to the latter point, activities
resulting from overall transportation (railroad and shipping) are expected to
create an annual inceme of close to 30 million dollars.
The project will be carried out under supervision from Companhia do Caminho
de Ferro de Benguela. The first stage will be completed by the end of 1981,
tlie second stage by the end of 1982.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreau et Cie., Paris, 1979
9294
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ANGOLA
BRIEFS
MPLA POLICIES OUTLINED--Angola does not have, at this time, a true plan
for economic development. This lack should be remedied in 1980 or 1981.
However, th e MPLA-La.bor Party has defined a certain number of general
policies: increase of cultivated areas; cadre training; rational use of
foreign technical assistance; increased prospecting for mineral resources;
selection of the most important state, mixed, and even private enterprises
in order to provide them with cadres and the means to conduct their activi-
ties; legislation on.problems of work discipline and fight against absente-
ism; rigid policy of austerity and financial controls; guarantees for
timely payment of monies due the state; compulsory registry of accounting
and statistical data; setting of prices according to rate of profit; im-
- provement of foreign trade infrastructures. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
- TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Jan 80 p 42]
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CAMEROON
REPERCUSSIONS OF CABINET SHUFFLE OF 8 NOVII~ER
_ Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 21 Nov 79 pp 21, 22
[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima]
[Text) True to himself, President Amadou Ahid~o surprised everyone on 8
November by totally unexpectedly reshuffling his government. The cabinet
which had been established on 30 June 1975 stood a good chance of breaking
the record for longest time in of`ice. Of course, twice during the legislative
~ session, two of its members had been removed. But that only involved
immediate adjustments, of a very limited scope. At the level of the populace,
however, a desire for change was being felt more and more. Yet everything
seemed to anticipate that the "great washing" would occur only after the -
prestdential elections set for May 1980. And none of the victims of the
latest reshuffling would have thought he would have to start packing before
next year.
The president's decis~_on thus had the effect of an explosion on the Cameroonian
political scene. Twelve ministers (out of 23) have had a change in post. _
Three departures stand out especially, turning this technical reshuffling--
mainly concerning the economic sector--into a political mini-event. Thus,
an influential member of the Political Bureau of the sole party, the UNC,
Francois Sengat Kuoh, spokesman for the party's progressive wing, is leaving
his position of charge to the president, which for many years made him one
of the head of state's top advisors. With him, two members of the party's
Central Committee also left the government: Henry EJ.angwe and Marcel Yondo.
Elangwe, from the former English-speaking Cameroon, was the director of the
Department of Mines and Energy, i.e. petroleum. And it is known that, by the
most accurate estimates, Cameroon is considered one of the great oil producers
of the future. This proapect, however, is not without its dark side. The
Yaounde authorities are afraid that the people living in the regions where
the pool; are located have some separatist notions. Indeed, haven't we
recently noticed an abundance of statements by opponents abroad, calling
for the pure and simple return to the federal system? It would obviously be
risky to connect Henry Elangwe's departures with these matters. But President
Ahidjo's intentions are so unfathomable that his decisions are sub3ect to all
, kinds of interpretations.
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Marcel Yondo's departure from the government came as a big surprise. An
elected member of the UNC Central Committee at the Congress o,� Douala in
1976, tne former minis~er of financea seemed destined for a fine future.
Tn any case, he was one of those overambitious young wolves who do not conceal
their political designs very we11. Was he a victim of that, or did he
remain apart from it? The fa~:t is that no one is accusing his competence.
Although his replac~ment as head of the Ministry of Finances, Gilbert Ntang,
former PDG [president-director-general] of the Cameroonian Railway Company,
is also a technical person. But the latter, as high functionary, must be
more concerned with technocracy than with politics. Perhaps the cabinet
reshuffling of 8 November indicates a desire on the part of President
Ahidjo to take matters into his own hands, reminding all that he is still
master of the game. -
A genuine malaise has pervaded the country for several montiis. Three months
away f rom the UNC Congress, to be held in February in Bafoussam, principal
city of the West Province, the Ca,neroonians appear to have discovered the
- jelights of the game of politics, which the sole party system and the
president's forceful personality had suppressed somewhat. Thus, certain
events, without being obviously connected, have caused a disturbance to a
- ;~olitical life which had for several months been immersed in monotony.
~resident Ahidjo's decision last June formally to govern his relief forces
launched again the political debate. Several public officials thought that
Erom then on the door to succession would be open. This e~ror in judgment
spawned numerous intrigues among those who had more or less declared their
~:andidacies.
[t was in this context that the Office of Security learned, in July, that
a group of non-commissioned officers was organizing a plot to overthrow the
regime. In fact, these four non-commissioned officers disclosed themselves
_ r_o their superiors, to let them know of the discontent which was growing
_ within the army. They ~*ill subsequently confess that they tried to remove
]'resident Ahidjo on the day of the ceremony at which the officer trainees
of the EMIAC [Cameroonian Military Inter-Service School] receive their
commissions. .
i'he conspirators' arrest should have closed the case. But in a country
where rumors are the authority, the most unlikely reports, based on an
i_nsinuation of some o�ficer or another, have been circulating ever since.
1`Io off icial statement will be released concerning this abortive attempt. It
i.s still true thatthe matter raises certain questions. The ethnic backgrounds
c~f the four non-commissioned off icers is one of them. They are all from
~ the south central part, the region of wliich former Prime Minister Paul Biya
i.s also a native. Some peopJ_e soon made the connection, and saw the arrest
cf the non-commissioned officers as a plan to harm the prime minister. Others
maintain, without any proof supporting it, that the arrested non-commissioned
cfficers wanted to beat another group of soldiers who were preparing a coup
d'etat that would have been advantageous for Bamileke.
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A fanciful hypothesis? Of course. Nevertheless, like many others which
are currenCly spreading in Cameroon, it indicates a certain state of mind.
`I'hc~ ~fficf~tl Fiilenc~ help9 to encourage apecul.atton, A1.1 the more si.nce
- c?llicr In~~lclentN r.nl.se n~w q~~estione.
Thus, everyone has interpr~ted in his own way the violent confrontations
in Dolle, in the northern part of the country, which left about 30 dead,
including 14 police, at the end of Oc~ober. If it is true that an intense
animosity exists among some tribes of the region, especially between the
Choa and Kotobo Arabs, the fires were fanned by a holy man imposter who
tried to expYoit the situation. Spreading his opium among the peoples, he
convinced them of their invulnerability and incited them to more hostility
toward other groups of people. Members of the police force who were sent
onto the scene were put to death, while trying to put an end to that
situation, by the agitated populations. Whatever its real significance, the
event shows how difficult it is, 20 years after independence, for the
Cameroonian ethnic groups to live together.
In a central Africa overcome by uph~:avals, Cameroon had up to now remained
an island of stability. Likewise, the present stirr~tngs appear, in the
final analysis, as the sign of a crisis of growth. "Our country," says a ~
Douala militant, "is like a car. The motor, i.e. Ahid3o, is still in good
condition. But the other parta must be changed to prevent a breakdown."
Which translates: the cabinet reshuffling of 8 November would b~~ followed
next year by a more deeply rooted change both in men and in syst~am of
governing. _
, COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
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CAMEROON
FIRST STAGE OF EXPANSION OF PORT OF DOUALA ALMOST COMPLETED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 21 Nov 79 pp 103, 105-107
[Article by Samuel Bea]
[TextJ Tn the first months of next year, work on the first segment of the
port of Douala`s expansion, begun 3 years ago, will be completed. Its
purpose has been to provide Cameroon's economic capital with a harbor facility
adapted to the country's ever-increasing needs. The operation had gotten
underway after several delays. After that, it appeared to be having success:
- its creditors, who were hesitant at first, long since became reassured as -
Co the economic and financial profitability of the operation; Cameroon's
two neighbors, Chad and the Central African Republic,who have the misforr.une
- ~f being landlocked, wi11 be partially relieved. As for Cameroon, it goes
~aithout saying that it will profit greatly from the praject. Within a short
time, a slowing in export cost hikes wi11 result, and perhaps even in some
cases a reduction of those costs, allowing exports to become more competitive.
ciandling a larger amount of inerchandise will contribute, at least it is
noped, to a notable increase in duty revenues. Finally, and most importantly,
:Lt is hoped that the new harbor installations, for which future developments
are foreseen, will boost the economy of Douala and the region along the
coastline. Set up at the end of the 15th century as a trading post for
the Portuguese and the Wouri river peoples who bartered for trinkets with
palm oil and ivory, the port of Douala-Bonaberi is 25 km from the sea, in
the Wouri estuary. Poorly devel~ped until 1914, it fell to the French right
after the Treaty of Versailles, at the same time as all of eastern Cameroon.
l3etween the two wars, and after World War II, the authorities of the
protectorate attempted some remode].ling. But that was of a limited na.ture:
L-he port's location, in the middle of an estuary, and an access made difficult
by a shallow ch~nnel, were some other factors discouraging much interest.
~he securing of the country's independence in 1960, and its subsequent
clevelopment of trade, radically ~ltered the situation. Overall traffic at
Che port of Douala, representing 90 percent of total port traffic, increased
rapidly, from 767,000 tons (imports and exports~ in 1960 to 1,536,000 tons
i.n 1968. After a downward trend, beginning in 1971 and intensifying in -
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_ 1975 (the year when the effects were being felt of the crises involving oil
and wood, la'r' e Cameroonian exports), the growth resumed and continued
uninterrupted~}r, in spite of slight fluctuations once in awhile. Especially
regarding imports, whose volume increased from 411,000 to 2,026,000 tons
between 1960 and 1978 (or five times), while exports for the same period
rose from 356t000 to 811,000 tons (a little more than double). (See table
on port traf~ic).
Vis-a-vis this increase in traffic, the harbor installations have, since
1969, been showing the first signs of collapse: dock occupancy has reached
the saturation point--90 percent, with 75 per~ent considered normal. The
result was that ships' waiting times have increased, and penalties have
multiplied. Meanwhile, there was something even more serious: insufficient
means of storage. That required all kinds of maneuvering. To top it all
off, the canal of access was not deep enough, with a water level of five
meters, preventing ships with heavy cargo from approaching. At best, during
high tide, the port could accommodate vessles with a draught of 6.5 to 6.8
meters, and 6,000 to 7,000 tons of cargo. In other words, at a time of
hugh vessels, when more specialized types of ships are being used (barge-
carriers, container ships, roll-on/roll-off ships), it could he said that -
the ~ort's future was seriously tl-.reatened. Unless the whole operation
were reviewed. That was the decision that was made. It required a series -
of preliminary studies: ,
--technical: topographic and hydrographic surveys; study of tidea, currents,
swells, sedimentation;
--economic: traffic pred'ictions; technological development of maritime
transport; evolution of ship size; instances of container ships and paddle
wheels; economic profitability studies;
--financial: determination of estimated implementation costs; definition
of the indebtedness capacity of the organization managing the port, in terms
of gross margin of self-financing; establishment of a tariff policy, etc. -
--organization and managerial: definition of features and structure of the
organizatian managing the gort; definition of inethods of operation.
- These studies resulted in the two basic options: on one hand, the port of -
Douala had to be equipped and expanded, preserving, however, its function
- as a varied merchandise port; on the other hand, a deep water port for heavy
traffic (petroleum and possibly ore) had to be built at Cape Limboh, west
of Victoria.
The characteristics of thP: pro~ect under completion depend both on the desire
to develop other installations later on, as well as on the geographic
location itself of the port of Douala, which is limited upstream by 'the bridge
over the Wouri and, in the middle, wedged between the water surface and
the cliffs.
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Overall Traffic of the Port of Douala
(1960-1978)
(in thousands of tons)
1960 1965 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Imports 411 658 1115 1163 1148 1167 1225 1331 1380 1714 2026
:Exports 356 515 727 732 742 891 966 717 848 802 8i1
'TOTAL 767 1173 1842 1895 1891 2058 2121 2048 2228 2516 2837
Traffic Evolution Prospects
Year 1975 1980 1990 2000
'Pons unloaded 1,229,372 1,585,939 2,614,745 2,610,691 tons/yr
Tons loaded 1,619,265 1,392,206 2,196,909 3,004,862
Ship Movement 977 955 1210 1500 no/yr
Ship Anchorage 3022 2350 3404 2925 da/yr
Average Waiting Time 5.28 1.60 1.57 0.8 hrs
Source: ONPC [expansion unknown]
Two types of work have been initiated: that which can be called the
"functional components," constituting the major part of the program, and
that which is simply the "accessory components." The former include a roll-
on/roll-off container ship terminal, a wooden park, a fishing port, and a
section for light ship repair. The "accessory components" are the dredging
of the canal; the construction of a railway and road service; the improvement
uf traffic, surfaces, and various existing networks; the insuring of the
~aorkability of durable storage areas; and the expansion of the internal
harbor service.
'~he work assigned to the French Dredgi.ng and Public Works Contracting
Company (SFEDTP) for engineering, and to the Dutch company Bos and Kalis
for dredging, were made known to the contractors in October, and work was
l~egun two months later. Some 600 people were to be permanently employed,
~ind 150 different engines would be required. Since mid-1978, more than 50
percent of this work has already been completed, and some was finished ahead
of plan. The wooden wet-dock (for anchoring grumiers [translation unknown]),
and the floating wood park have been finished, as well as the line of
approach for the fishing port. The construction of the superstructures
(cold storages, fresh fish markets, ice works) was started in October 1978
and would be completed a year later. As of right now, in its first~stages,
the dredging of the canal raised the water level to 6.50 meters. It will
c:ontinue until it reaches 7.50. ~
jdhen the work's first phase is completed in 1980, the capacity of the port
will be increased from two to more than 5 million tons per year. Moreover,
as stated by Juhn Monie Nkengong, Minister of Transport, when the work was
inaugurated, "With the enormous possibilities for future expansion that the
master plan adopted offers, this capacity can be increased to 7.5 million
- tons in 1985 and to more than 10 million tons in 1990, requiring limited
investments." But estimates for 1990 are half as low (see table on prospects).
Average waiting time will be reduced from 8~hours and 50 minutes to 45
minutes.
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From the financial standpoint, the first stage of the expansion under
completion will have cost 25 billion francs CFA. If the financiers seemed
to have some reservations about the pro~ect, those were soon dispelled.
First of all, financial and economic studies revealed a solid rate of
profit: 21 percent. This figure, according to the same analyais, will not
fall below 11 percent, even if costs increase by 50 percent and if profits -
are 35 percent lower than what is anticipated. However, costs have not
greatly exceeded the ~nitial estimates and, if it has been necessary to
make some adjustments, it was because a traffic increase predicted for the
- CAR and Chad was taken. into account.
Moreover, the guarantee made by the state to the investors played a part.
The eight financiers of the project are:
--The Canadian Agency for International Development (ACDI), with a loan of
7.5 billion francs CFA.
--The group from the World Bank (BIRD + IDA): 6.25 billion francs CFA.
--The African Development Bank (ADB): 2.8 billior~ francs CFA.
--The Arab Bank for African Economic Development (BADEA): 2.5 billion francs
CFA.
--The Reconstruction Credit Bank: 2 billion francs CFA. -
--The European Development Fund (EDF): 1.1 billion francs CFA.
--The Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (France): 750 million francs
CFA.
--The Aid and Cooperation Fund (France): 750 million francs CFA. -
to which must be added the State of Cameroon and the Cameroon National
Port Office (see insert).
The effects of the port's expansion are manifold. Of course, the most direct
one will be the certain advancement of the natiorcal economy: with the
establishment of an industrial sector, whose nucleus will be the brick-
crushing factory of the CIMENCAM [Cameroon Cemen*_ P1ant] and the fertilize.r
factory of the SOCAME [expansion unknown]; the creation of jobs in the sea-
board region which has suffered serious unemployment problems; and the
development of activities surrounding the fishing port. On a larger scale,
the improvement of the harbor installations can and must contribute to the
reduction of inerchandise costs, or at least to maintaining them. That goes
for imports and exports alike. Finally, the newly remodelled port of Douala
will doubtless be in a better position to compete with the other ports along
the west African coastline. Which has not been the case up to now.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
~
FPO LEADER SAYS FRANC~ HOLDS REAL POWER IN BANGUI
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 24 Dec 79-6 Jan 80 p 27
[Article by San Fie: "Deadlock at Bangui"]
[Text] Dr Abel Goumba: "It is France who really
holds power in this country."
Just 3 months after the overthrow of "emperor" Bokassa, under condi-
tions we are only too familiar ~rith, the "debokassization" of the
� Central African Republic is confined to just a few changes in the
names of streets or establishments: Jean-Bedel=Bokassa avenue has now
become Avenue of the Martyrs, the Jean-Bedel-Bokassa highschool has
become the Highschool of the Martyrs, and President-Idi-Amin-Dada
avenue has become the Avenue 18 January 1979 (the date of the firat
massacre of children). As for 1 January 1966 Avenue (the date of
Bokassa's coup d'etat), it again becomes David-Dacko avenue while
Empress Catherine avenue becomes the Avenue of France! In other words,
the combination farce and tragedy ooes on. To get the population--who
still does not understand why "certain heads have not yet rolled"--to
be patient, a"national investigating commission," charged with
" purging those persons who were compromised under the regime of the
former emperor, has been set up. According to justice minister
Francois Gueret--who heads that commission--it should lead to the
- arrest, "for crimes of blood," of 28 persons, including a certain -
number of military personnel implicated in the murder of children, as
well as Catherine Gbagalama, Bokassa's sister. But all of this is
nothing but an appetizer for the big feast and the profound change
expected by the people of this country.
The fact is that, by denying the nation's active forces, the labor
unionists, the college and high school students in particular, any
right to participate in the country's political life and by breaking
off conversations with other opposition groups, 3ust after they had
been started, David Dacko and his French advisers closed the door to
any prospects for real change. Although the jerry-built throne has
been smashed, Bokassa's shadow is still hovering over the country.
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_ Giscardian France bears the heaviest responsibility for this tragedy
where a people is denied hope and speech. This was emphasized in a
statement published in E. ZINGO, the information organ of the fighting
Central Africans~by Dr Abel Goumba, president of the FPO (Ubangi
Patriotic Front), the oldest opposition movement, without which nothing
new can be done in Bangui.
"The die is cast in Central Africa," says Dr Goumba. "After having,
for an instant, given the people of Central Africa and the world the
illusion of a pretended restoration of democratic freedoms taken away
by him even before Bokassa, with Bokassa, and after Bokassa, David
Dacko has just dropped his mask: he has once again gagged the Central
African people in order better than in the past to subjugate them to
exploitation and misery--this time with the blessing of France whose
paratroopers are currently holding the road to Bangui. To conceal his
unannounced intentions--rapidly to put an end to the round-table con-
ference which was agreed to in spite of him amid the euphoria of the
initial success of the French coup d'etat--Dacko claimed the pre-
text of the, by the way isolated, case of Patasse in an attempt to
reduce to silence the entire Central A~frican opposition whose solid
roots among the people bother his antinational undertakings. The fact
is that the FPO did not entertain many illusions as to the chances of
success of these negotiations which were imposed by the popular will.
"We now witness the same scenario: Bokassa's personal political ad-
viser, like a Sisyphos, resumes the antipopular methods which had
brought about his downfall to the benefit of that same Bokassa and once
again moves against the nation's active forces. As during the time of
the Bokassa-Dacko two-man team, France is already embarking upon the
road of massacre of young Central Africans as witnessed by the events
of 29 October 1979."
The Last Word
"It is France that restored Bokassa's personal political adviser to
power against the will of the Central African people. It is France
which, by supporting Dacko, hopes to give him time enough to create a
politiral base which he dces not have in the country; in doing so, it
is in the process of introducing tribalism and division into Central
Africa. It is France who really holds power at Bangui. It is France
who, by protecting Dacko, gave him and sti11 gives him the kind of
audacity with which he takes all of the provocative and irresponsible
' measures he took in recent days, assured that he can count on the sup- -
port of the ~rench army as confirmed by his paradoxical conclusion to
call for calm during the antigovernment demonstrations on 29 October
1979, organized by college and high school students: "If you want war,
you shall have it." It is France which definitely and indirectly
contributed to the accentuation of the misery of the Central African
people by imposing leaders chosen by France.
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"But let.no one be mistaken: in this kind of struggle, the peoples
always haue the last word. French bayonets and arbitrary imprisonment
cannot aceomplish anything. The FPO continues to work as always to-
ward national unity in the interest of the Central African people whom
it wishes to spare the bitter experience of endless suffering. The
FPO will continue to fight, regardless of what happens, for the
defense of the right of the C:entral Africans freely to choose their
Zeaders, to make the instruments for their own development, themselves,
amid dignity and respect for the rights of other peoples: that is the
meaning behind our battle."
FPO Demands
The FPO essentially demands two things:
(1) The immediate withdrawal of FYench troops; the Central African
armed forces are the only legal forces to assure the security of the
Central African people and of foreigners settled in the Central
African Republic;
(2) The formation of a proviGional government of national union,
� charged with preparing and establishing democratic institutions; to
attain this objective, the FPO demands the resumption of negotiations
in order to find a political solution to the failure of the old
regime in Central Africa.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afxique Asie
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C~NTRAI, ArRT(;AN RI:PUAI.IC
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Dec 79 p 3628
[Text] According to an announcement by the National Committee for the
Balance of Payments of RCA [Central African Regublic], the 1978 budget
reveals that the trade volume increased slightly (up 10 percent) and
that the overall deficit increased somewhat from 0.8 billion CFA
[African Financial Community] in 1977 to 1.6 billion in 1978.
This development can be blamed on the stagnation in export revenues
which in turn is tied to the stability or even decline of certain
prices and products, whereas expenditures for imports and services in-
creased slightly, thus creating a greater deficit in the balance of
goods and services (down 15.8 billion CFA as against 13.1 billions in
1977). On the other hand, free services, made up almost essentially of
fareign development aid, continued to show a considerable surplus,
whereas capital transactions (investments and foreign loans) showed a
positive balance," although a very modest one at that," the committee
stated.
The deficit in the balance of payments was financed by an increase in
the commitments of the public sector with respect to the IMF and by a
decline in the assets of the Central African Republic in the operating
account whose balance nevertheless largely showed a credit as of the
end of 1978 (about 4 billion CFA).
For 1979, the cammittee noted that the prospects for the development
of the balan~ce of payments will reveal only minor structural changes
compared to 1978; an improvement was nevertheless registered after the
fourth quarter due to the increase in foreign financial aid following
the return to the republican system of government and, overall, the
balance of payments for the year should be close to equilibrium.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
NEW FRESIDENTIAL TOUR IN PROVINCES
PariG MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Dec 79 p 3628
[TextJ President David Dacko made a trip to the eastern part of the
Central African Republic in mid-December, going to the province of -
N['Bamou, whose prefecture is at Bangassou. This region is one of the
country's poorest and has a serious shortage of lines of communica-
tion, poor agricultural resources, and a chronic population decline.
~ Discussing the potential of the region (uranium at Bakouma, agricul-
ture), the president commented that it could become very rich but that
big sacrifices would be necessary befor~ that.
Since the 20 December coup d'etat, this is the third trip made to the
provinces by the (',entral African president who intends to break with a
tradition of extensively centralized government, to explain the
reasons for the government`s complete destitution, and give the
peasants and the local communities back their confidence.
It is noted that, in the course of one of his trips, the chief of st~te
announced his intention to replace the MESAI3 (Movement for Social Evolu-
tion in Black Africa), the party founded by Barthelemy Boganda in 1949
but which was also the only party of the imperial regime, with the UDC
(Central African Uemocratic Union) . -
It seemed that Mr. Dacko was personally in favor of a multiparty system
but that contacts with the rural population showed him that it was =
devoted to the single-party system.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
BRIEFS
VICE PRESIDENT AFFECTED BY HYPERTENSION--Mr Henri Maidou, vice-
president of the Central African Republic, left Bangui on 19
December for a private stay of about one month in Egypt and France.
_ He told AFP [FRENCH PRESS AGENCY] shortly before his departure that
reasons of health (especially hypertension) forced him to take a
rest for 3 weeks. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX.ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 28 Dec 79 p 3683) 5058
FRENCH COMPANY WITHDRAWS--One of the three french companies stationed
at Bangui (the 3rd Company, 8th RPIMA [Marine Parachute Infantry
Regiment]) returned to France on 12 December according to an announce-
ment by the Erench defense ministry. [TextJ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Dec 79 p. 368~ 5058
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CHAD
GUNT'S FIRST CABINET MEETING HELD
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3340
[Article: "First Council of Minist ers of Transition Government"]
[Text] The Goverrunent of the National Union of Transition of Chad [GUNT],
presided ov er by Goukouni Oueddei held its first council 24 November in
Nd~amena, 2 weeks after its organization.
' According to the government spokesman, this council specially examined
the problan of prisoners of war, for wham the principle of liberation has
been "estab lished." Ttie practical methods for this liberat~on are to be
studied by the next council, the date of which~has not been set.
The Lagos accords of 21 August last on Chadian reconciliation in fact
provide that all.prisoners of war should be liberated 15 days after the
formation of the government. According to AFP, 1,700 soldiers of the
Chadian Armed Forces (CAF) are still in prison in the north and east of
the country.
In addition, the council is at work on the problem of the installation of
the ministerial cabinets in order to make possible the "immediate" func-
tioning of the administration.
Finally the council studied the way to avail itself of the diverse emergency
aid granted to Chad in order to make relaunching of the country possible.
Numerous ~riendly countries have promised to participate in the construc- .
tion of Chad, on the sole condition that the govenunent be formed. Yet, -
except for France, no country has yet acted concretely.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreaux et Cie, Paris, 1979
9380
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CHAD
,
BRIEFS
MINISTER REMAINS IN FRG--Ahmed Acyl, Chad's minister of foreign affairs,
has not yet returned to Nd~amena, following the formation of the new
nationaJ. union government, on 10 November, and his nomination by the
- Goukou:~i Oueddei government. Acyl is being treated in Germany after having
cam,r,aigned in France to correct his image as the "man of the Libyans."
[TextJ [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 Dec 79 p 60] 5157
FRENCH EMERGENCY AID--France has decided to give Chad emergency
financial aid in the amount of F49.5 million, AFP [FRENCH PRESS
AGENCYJ announced at Ndjamena on 22 December. This emergency aid,
intended for a period of transition extending until 31 March, will be
devoted primarily to the restoration of t-he Chadian administration
and the resumption of cooperation with France. France in particular
will contribute to the payment of civil servants with F20 million.
Funds have also been allocated for the renovation of certain
ministries that were damaged or sacked during the fighting in
_ February, March and June, as well as the purchase of office equipment.
Several other operations were included in this emergency program, to
- wit: maintenance and repair of the Shari ferry between Ndjamena and
Cameroon; operation of the electric power plant in the capital on a
permanent basis; supply of school equipment, and dispatch of inedica-
tions. On the other hand, some of the funds will be used to demili-
tarize the capital and to beef up the military police who have been
handling security in the capital since the start of November. [Text]
[ParisMARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Dec 79 p 3683] -
5058
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FRENCH MISSION'S VISIT--A mission of technicians from the Fren~h Ministry
of Cooperation has been in Ndjamena since 25 November ~n order to evaluate
t}~e assistance which the Chadian economy requires in order to be relaunchE~d.
According to AFP, in anticipation of the reinstatement of the Chadian =
administration, France is contemplating initially reactivating pro~ects
= already planned in 1978 but interrupted during the crisis of February 1979
- before launching out into new activities. The Chadian leaders expect a
great deal from the assistance which Paris could grant them, because apart
fram the GDR and Egypt, which have made symbolic gifts of inedicine chESt:~ ~
and various implements, no other country has come forward to participate
in the reconstruction of the country. 'Itao thousand tons of wheat are to
be supplied to Chad within the framework of food assistance from France.
The distribution of these.2,000 tons will be carried out by the Government
of the National Union of Transition depending on local requirernents. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3340]
9380
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(:ONGO
BRIEFS
GDR GIFT TO MILITIA--The German Democratic Republic has made a gift of -
matpriel consisting of vehicles, motorcycles, spareparts and blankets
to the People's Republic of the Congo. In giving this gif t, intended
for the Congolese People's Militia, Horst Khol, the GDR ambassador to the
Congo emphasized that this gesture translates the principle of his coun-
try's foreign policy which is international solidarity with all its
friends everywhere in the world. The GDR will insure the training of
militia officers for 3 years, starting next year. [Text] [Paris MARCHE~
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3342] 9380
1980 BUDGET ADOPTED--The budget session of the Congolese National
People's Assembly ended at Brazza~~ille on 23 December, after 48 days
of activity. The 1980 Congolese government budg~t was adopted during
that meeting. It comes to 86.02 billion frar.cs CFA [t~frican Financial
- ~ommunity]. Presiding over the closing ceremony of this session, the
chief of state, Col Sassou-Nguesso, in particular declared that "The
year 1979 was a year of struggle and victories for the C ongolese
people." In his opinion, the "political confrontation," which
failed "to upset the party's correct line," had several results: "The
_ rehabilitation of the party as a leading authority, the democratic
functioning of the institutions, the permanent consultation and mobili-
zation of the masses, and better management of the affairs of state."
National People's Assembly president Jean Ganga-Zanzou thought that
this parliamentary session permitted the assembly first of all to take
up all of the problems touching upon the country's economic and social
life. Mr Ganga-Zanzou added that the work of the budget session
particularly dealt with the bill determining the number of days of
vacations, leave, and paid work in the People's Republic of the Congo,
the agreement of SONEL (National Livestock Company), the "Kayes"
agreement dealing with the permits for petroleum prospecting, and the
_ bill on youth as well as the finance bill. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Dec 79 p 368~] 5U58
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1?I~UA'1'(11t I AL (~lll NI?A
ARMY DIVIDED INTO PRO-SPANISH, PRO-MARXIST FACTIONS
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 30 Dec 79 pp 27,29 -
[Text] King Juan Carlos is again risking his personal pres-
tige by supporting the fragile regime of Equatorial Guinea
which has begun a fascinating policy of national reconstruc-
tion with the vital collaboration of Spain.
In a country isolated from the res*_ of the world and that has lived for 11
� years horror stricken by one of the bloodiest dictatorships in the world, under
unfavorable diplomatic conditions and in a difficult internal political sit-
uation, the King and Queen of Spain took the risk last week of visiting
Equatorial Guinea, a former Spanish colony, so as to give a"big push" to
Spain's actions for the reconstruction of a totally destroyed country.
With the official visit to Malabo and Bata, the capitals of the island and of
the continent, which is also the first visit by a chi.ef nf state to thP former
tyranny of dictator Franciso Macie Nguema, the interest that the Spanish state
has taken in the relations which since August have governed the collaboration
- between two countries separated for 10 years, is also confirmed.
African Offensive
This royal visit which, according to diplomatic observErs, has to be placed
within the context of the "African offensive" initi.ated in May with the visits
to the Ivory Coast, Conakry Guinea and Senegal, also opens up a period of
serious reservations not only with respect to France,.which is playing an .
important role in the area, but also the Soviet Union which is seeing with
concern how it is losing influence in a strategically situated country, the
center of all the petroleum traffic traveling across the Atlantic and a key
observation point for all maritime traffic from Latin America to the European
continent. '
The ~erious faces of the Soviet Union's and Cuba's representatives at the of-
ficial dinner offered by Lieutenant Colonel Teodoro Obiang for the king and
queen and at which the new president pronounced himself against those countries
seeking ~o "import" ideologies alien to African views, the attacks upon the
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Russians (in the midst of tl-~e popular clamor in the Malabo stadium on the oc-
casion of the national day) and the disinterested assistance which Spain has
- begun to give the new regime, aroused every sort of suspicion in Moscow.
Virtually coinciding ~~ith the royal visi~, the new military authorities of
Equatorial Guinea let the Soviets know that they must giv~ up the Luba base
- located in the southwest of the island and which more than a supply point
for the Russian fishin~ fleet is a strategic observation and communications
center. In fact, when CAMBIO 16's special correspondent who was traveling
with the king and queen tried to photograph the Soviet installations at the
Luba port, a small incident occur,red which a Guinean official settled by ar-
guing that since Macie's death, the port has been "Guinean territory" and "we
are the only ones in command."
For the new Guinean regime the visit of Don Juan Carlos and Dona Sofia has
mP~nt political consolidation. Lieutenant Colonel Obiang, accompanied by Don
.Juan Carlos, visited the continent (he had not visited it since the military
c~up) and received the support of his people who, fearful and superstitious,
thought that the new ruler was not capable of going to Bata, the fief of
Macie, or live in the Palace of Africa vrhere, according to popular legend, the
spirit of dictator Placie shot in September by the new regime still lives.
More than that, the tribal leaders told him his power would not be secure
until he went to Bata accompanied by the king and queen.
For Spain the royal visit means the "great thrust" in rebuilding a country
d~~vasted by misery, hunger, disease and poverty.
A.lthough during the Hispano-Guinean talks and in the public addresses there
_ w:~s a major surrender to the point that President Obiang even proposed that
Spain draw up and implement the budget for the next 5 years (which would mean
Spain even taking over tax-collecting), Spanish reaction has been moderate
and cautious because it does not wish to fall into a neocolonialism which
m:ight create insuY~cnountable problems in the future.
Pj-inciples of Equality ~
During his addresses Don Juan Carlos took upon himself to reiterate that co-
operation between the two countries has to be founded on principles of equality
bc~tween sovereign nations, that his objective has to be freedom and justice
ac?d that the community of culture and especially of languages, is the key -
f~ictor of that cooperation.
Passing over all of the difficulties, living under tough conditions, risking
even the prpstige of the crown by a trip which, because of the country's dis-
o2�ganization could have ended in a resounding failure, Don Juan Carlos wanted
_ tc~ take the first step in supporting the new Guinean regime and place his
international prestige at the service of a n~w policy of cooperation with
tr~e former colony.
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The royal action at a time such as the one the country is experiencing, in
which the tendency among politicans is not " to face up to things," for the
time being, according to the comments of Guineans themselves, has served to
give Pr^sident Obian political security. The new regime has encountered an
a11y which, as Lieutenant Colonel Obiang pointed out, may serve as an inter-
mt~dLary with Larin America: and with Europe.
In any event, the path Spain has to follow and which has been opened up oy
the king and queen, is not without difficulties especially because of the
interaction of the great powers' interests. The country's internal political
situation itself as yet is not stable. In the meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel
Obiang who is protected by Moroccan forces because he does not trust his own
army, has declared that the country will not have any political parties and
that the military will remain in power as long as the country's reconstruc-
tion has not been achieved.
So the answer rests with the army. An army which was decimated by dictator
Macie through successive purges and executions and which is divided into
two different factions: One clearly pro-Spanish because its members studied
at Spanish military academies (from the rank of captain on up), and the other
trained in the countries of Eastern Europe, educated in Marxism-Leninism and
taught Macie's hatred of everything Spanish and of the whole West.
And, in the middle, a whole bureaucracy of the old regime. A scanty and tiny
bureaucracy which sees how the former assassins, the torturers, those who used
dogs to eliminate the prisoners in the tens of concentration camps, remain
clinging to power waiting for any opportunity.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Informacion y Publicaciones, S.A.
8094 _
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
REPORTAGE ON CUR.~ENT ECONOMIC, POLITICAL SITUATION
Prevailing Conditions
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 23 Dec 79 pp 57-58, 61, 63
[Text] As if it had suffered through a long war, Equatorial
Guinea is almost at the brink of survival, beset by hunger, diaease
~and the apecter of the former regime, which has not yet been
decisively defeated.
Mambo, a lean man in his sixties, is perhaps the most famous sculptor
in Equatorial Guinea. He is misaing his left leg up to the knee,
but he hae hands of silver that can do fine, delicate work with
ivory.
He livea in an isolated little house, surrounded by the jungle,
near Ntobo, 6 kilometers from Bata, and attached to it he has his _
ahop. Commissioned by the govermnent of Equatorial Guinea, Mambo
is now working on the shield of Spain on two elephant tuska measuring
1 meter in length and 7 kilos in weight. They will be the gifte of
the Supreme Military Council to King Juan Carlos during hia visit
to the African republic on 13, 14 and 15 December.
For Queen Sofia Membo is preparing a aet of braceleta and a pink
ivory necklace with typical motifa. "But I've sort of put this
aside while I wait for them to tell me the dimensions of the Queen's
wrists," he explained to Pedra Paramo, CAMBIO 16's apecial correa-
pondent. -
This is all that Mambo is doing at the moment. Diplomata, buainess-
men and hia traditional customera will have to wait until he
finishes the royal gifts. It is not a question of price, and the
people who know him realize this.
- Moreover, Mambo ia an inexpensive sculptor, despite hia mastery.
"Bring him the ivory and a bottle of Spanish cognac, and that's
enough," people in Bata comment.
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- Mambo, the man with the delicate hande, the magician with ivory, ia
a good symBol of thie country, tortured by Maeie'e 10-year
dictatorahip, which brought it to moral and material ruin, and now
. in the midst of a chaotic hangover in returning to normalcy.
Mambo, Equatorial Guinea's most famed aculptor, livee in a hovel.
His house, with two roome and a kitchen, ie made of wood, with a
zinc roof, a veritable oven under the hot equatorial sua. The red
African earth is the floor, and there is no running water. Mambo
has to rise at dawn and retire at nightfall becauae he hae no
electricity. His only furniture is two cots and two small tables,
one of which he usea as a work bench on the porch at the entrance
to hia ahop.
When you close your eyes snd listen to him speak of his trc~ubles
in finding medicine to combat the arthroaie that ia eating away at
his only knee, you think of a man poor by necessity. But when you
open your eyes and obaerve his skinny black body draped over
crutchea, in the light of an oil lamp, you feel a�violent desire
to shout for the WHO, the FAO, heaven itaelf.
In any case, Mambo is lucky, becauae men of hie age are nat easy to
come by in Equatorial Guinea. He has lived almost 20 years longer
~ than the average Guinean, who according to the current estimates
of the Health Department, can expect to live only 40 or 45 yeara at
birth.
Eleven years ago, when Spain hastily took down ita flag in the area,
the life expectancy of a new-born ~uinean was 10 yeara greater.
At the time, Equatorial Guinea was one of the richest and healthieat
- countries in black Africa. Malaria had been practically eradicated;
leprosy barely existed, and you could count on one hand the number
of cases of sleeping sickneas, caused by the tsetse fly.
All of this was thanks to a health care network that was a model for
- the African continent. In the 1950's, when the Bata hospital was
inaugurated, the colony paradoxically had a more modern hospital
facility than the mother country. In that part of the world it was
surpassed only by South African hospitals, where years later Dr Bernard
~ was to do heart transplants.
At that time, the country, with its 310,000 inhabitanta, was a pearl
nestled in the armpit of Africa called the Gulf of Guinea. On the
island of Fernando Poo, called Bioko today, the ocher soil, which
never manages to dry out under the torrid year-round humidity of the
enviromnent, produced 45,000 tona of cocoa, 7,000 of coffee and
5,000 of the reddiah palm oil.
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The 40,000 echool-age children had 567 educational units at their
disposal, in addition to almoat 500 primary school teachere. Per
capita income was among the higheat in Africa.
But the 11 years of Masie's tyranny were like a tc=nado, an earth-
quake or a civil war, or all three.
Health Care Breakdown
Bata Hoapital now lies in ruins. "Although its structure is atill
standing, we would have to spez?d, at first glance, some 150 million
pesetas to get it back in shape," say Franciaco Fuater and Salvador
Cerda, the architect and foreman builder, respectively, from the
Spanish Health Ministry who inspected 6 hoapitals and 14 clinica
on the island and the mainland during the last week of 1Vovember.
The most aerious development has been that the breakdown in the
health care network has rekindled old diseases. Malaria now affecta
95 percent ~r the population, and although no studies have been
conducted, the incidence of veneral diaease and sleeping sickneas is
alarming enough to constitute a aerious concern of the new
govercm~ent of Lt Col Teodoro Obiang. There are 2,000 known casea of
leprosy, and the Health Department eatimates that another 2,000 are
unreported.
The purges of the Masie regime and the departu�re of almoat 40,000
Nigerians who worked the cocoa and coffee plantations have reduced
the harvests by nine-tentha. According to the latest estimatea, -
only 4,000 tons of cocoa will be harveated this year.
Since Masie vented his wrath at teachers in particular, ~nf whom he
executed a good number, and supplanted classes with teachings from
his book "Supreme Decision" and with group gymnastica that he brought
over from a trip to Mao's China, there is now a lost, illiterate
generation of Guineans who barely know Spanish.
The degradation has pervaded society. Ritual cannibalism ia known
to have returned to Rio Muni. "Bokuku," a coarse, quick-acting
poison that causes gross swelling in victims, has reappeared in
tribal vendettas. Spanish-educated natives, even those who have
been in higher education, are reverting with conviction to witch
doctors to a~k for traditional medicines.
- "If Masie has planned the destruction of hia country and made every
effort to do so, he certainly would have never achieved such
devastating results," was the co~ent made at the Bantu Hotel in
Malabo by Owen J. Lustig, an American official who has spent 15 days
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touring the country and interviewing all ita authoritiea for the
purpoae of drafting the report that will channel U.S. aid to the
n~w rcgime. -
~ Luatig, who has known aeveral Third World countries in critical
situatione,' confesaes that he has never seen anything like the
current aituation in Guinea, except after a war.
He acknowledges that the city of Malabo, which now has 15,000
residenta and which has been given an advanced layout and buildings
- of considerable architectural beauty, must have been lovely during
the good timea. Nevertheless, from his crumbling room in the state
hotel, furniahed with a pillowless, sheetlesa cot and a table
discolored with 10 years o.f filth, he cannot picture it in his imaginati~n
withoutthe cracks in the asphalt, mold on the walls of houaea and dirt
_ in the streets, and smelling of jasmine instead o� the stench isauing
from the garbage piled up at corners.
' No Food
The hotels have no food, but neither do the atate-run stores, which _
only from time to time put some rice and Chinese beer and mineral
water on sale.
- The ~eat and fish markets cloaed their doors years ago. If you want
meat, you have to go into the jungle and hunt a porcupine or
squirrel, and with traps because the military have practically all
the firearms.
There are no cows left. Masie banned bread and milk as fooda
befitting "Western capitalism," and the large herda that grazed
in Moka, a sort of Asturias that lies at an altitude of 2,000 meters
in the foothills of the volcano that dominates the island, were
slaughtered. Cuf into fillets, the meat was consumed in a few
months.
And if you want fish, you ask the Russians. Masie sank the -
people's fishing vessels, even the coastal canoes, to prevent them
from fleeing, but to offset this he signed an agreement with the
Soviets whereby they would fish the rich Guinean banks, with a
pledge to supply the natives.
For years the hake, tuna and sea bream wound up in the freezing
vaults of the Soviet fleet based in Luba, while the starving
populace was given the pork rinds that siz2led for days under the
tropical sun.
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In Guinea today, the word "Soviet" is synonymous with exploitation,
and the people cannot forgive them for the rotten fiah and their other
thefts. For example, there was the weather atation that the Spanieh
left in Moka and that, eo goea the account in Malabo, the Ruseiane
diamantled and took to the mainland as a fraternal gift of the
Soviet people to the people of Angola!
The new regime terminated the fishing agreement last month, and
now the Soviets enjoy no privileges. Just in case they might drr~g
their feet in leaving their base, President Teodoro Obiang force-
fully warned them in statements to the French press: "We do not
like violence, but..."
Without meat or milk and short on fish, the Guineans are limited to
a diet consisting of bananas, pineapples, coconuts, mangos and
roots and tubers, such as yucca or malanga, which nature providea
in abundance.
Black Market '
And if mother nature should fail them, not all is lost. That ia
_ what the black market is for, and it offera almoat everything. All
you need is enough money to afford what you want.
Today, Eq,uatorial Guinea is an immense, unconcealed black market.
Ekueles, the national currency, move at an incredible pace on it,
as if they were bottlecaps. An ekuele is equal to 1 peseta on the
official market and 25 cents at the black market exchange rate. A
peon earns from 6,000 to 7,000 ekueles a month, as does a teacher.
A specialized worker, a tractor operator for example, earns no more
than 15,000 ekueles a month.
A small loaf of bread weighing less than 50 grams costs 50 ekueles;
a amall container of condensed milk, 300; a liter of palm oil,
which could be bought for 30 ekueles 6 years ago, now costs 800; an
egg, 100; a small goat or pygmy deer (no more than 3 kilos of ineat),
7,000 ekuelea, when available.
The shortages have given rise to a market of miniature portiona at
~ out-of-this-world prices: a slice of onion costs 25 ekueles; a
teaspoon of fried tomato, 25 ekueles; one macaroni, 25 ekueles.
Inexplicably, Scotch whisky is not in short supply and is readily
available at 4,000 ekueles a bottle; nor is beer (Chineae on the
- island, Gabonese or Cameroonian on the mainland), at 600 ekuelea
a half-liter bottle. A bottle of Spaniah brandy, for which they say
Mambo will carve an ivory bracelet, could cost 6,000 ekueles.
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As we can see, Guinea now has an insane economy, in which a cigaret
(25 ekueles) costa just a little less than a liter of gasoline (30
ekueles). Of courae it would not be much different even if gas were
free, because there are barely 300 cara that work in the entire
country, not counting military vehiclea and the preeidential eacort.
The lack of spare parte has paralyzed the fleet, and the cara that ~
do run have to be push-started because their batteries discharged
months ago.
No News
Little remains of its former splendor. Malabo hae intermittent
electric power, in exchange for the din with which the eix
generators recently donated by Gabon break the ateaming nighttime
peace. The stores without aigns and the display windows that have
been empty for yeara give the streets the death-like ~ir of ghoat
towns during the hottest part of the day.
A single public telephone links the island with the reat of the world,
and only official business can ~e conducted over telephone linea
to the mainland.
There are neither bookstores nor books, news nor newepapera. The
Sata and Malabo radio stationa interrupt t?~e records of the Dynami`
Duo and African "salsa" with three news prog.rams a day. The TV
antennas on the roofs are waiting to pick up who knows what sirwaves,
because the country has no television station. A TV crew has been
working for a month now to reactivate the atation that Spain left
in working order when it left the colony. Old sets are being duated
- off in homes in the hope that the visit by the king and queen will
bring back the picture that was lost a decade ago.
There are two movie theaters in Malaba that show Chinese and Soviet
films, most of the time without Spaniah dubbing or aubtitles; they
are not very successful. The movie theater in Bata, which is more
in keeping with the times, now shows Western films. On Sunday,
25 November, it played an action film with chracters from the old
_ TV series "The Man From tJNCLE," but without sound because the
projector has no audio. The theater was filled, at 75 ekueles a head.
Four montha after the military coup, there is something of a
pathetic surrealism about the chaos in which Guinean society is -
operating, a society which Che new authorities have not yet been
able to get a handle on.
African Surrealism
For example, it cries out to heaven that people are starving while
- ' the Spanish vessel Ciudad de Pamplona, which docked in Malabo last
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28 November with all-terrain vehicles and foodatuffe, was forced to
seek warehouse space at the higher elevations of the city becauae
the port warehouses were filled to the brim with food from China.
There are also complaints that there is a lack of serum at the
hospital in Malabo, while on the mainland, at the hospital in
Mongomo, Masie's town, which was never inaugurated, Spaniah
technicians found more than 200 boxes filled with serum bottlea 2
weeks ago.
The new government is doing what it can to get things moving, whether
with good or bad luck. The Foreign Investment Law, which
authorizes the repatriation of inveated capital and the transfer
overseas of foreign exchange profits, has been applauded by all,
but it contrasts with the plan to bring in 40,000 immigranta from
the continent to do the hardest farm work. The laborers would
apparently be recruited in Angola, Nigeria and Rwanda, but the plan
has a number of experts working with the Guinean Government
knitting their brows.
"If they bring in more people, with this disorder and this pervasive
indifference, it's going to take them many long years to recover,
even if there are places here where the soil produces a potato
crop every 45 days," opined a Spanish economist and businessman who
is looking for new horizons for his products in Malabo.
But the disorder that is to be expected in the aftermath of the
coup or the country's neglect is not the only problem. Last
27 November, a me.re Guinean Army corporal was on the verge of
triggering a diplomatic conflict by attempting to search tc?~
Hercules aircraft from the Spanish Air Force that were bringing ir..
- medicine, food and furniture, the latter for the presidential palace
that will house the king and queen of Spain.
The Spanish ambassador and the head of the mission argued heatedly
- for an hour with the corporal, while the crews, confined to their
planes, awaited the potential order to fly back to Spain with their
cargo.
"Those are Masie people who are determined to boycott the new
goverrnnent," explained a high-level Guinean official who had recently
returned from Spain to join the new adminiatration and~.w~o had
witnessed the embarrassing scene. "Until a thorough housecleaning
is done, the people who prospered under Masie are going to keep -
taking advantage of their privileged status io benefit as much as
possible."
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Corruption
The corruption fueled by the dictator's regime ia atill around.
Several Sganish buainesamen have been urged to pay money to
streamline the adminiatrative procedurea required for them to do
busineas in Guinea. Manuel Fernandez Tarin, a brave ATS [expaneion ~
unknown] wtio has spent 10 days in the jungle on the mainland
vaccinating some 1,000 children in the moat foresaken towna, has
learned that the first shipments of vaccine that 8pain and the
United States sent in immediately after t~he military coup are
being sold in neighboring Gabon.
- To many observers, as long as powerful men from the former regime
continue in leaderahip posta, Che spirit that apurred Col Teodoro
Obiang will not be consolidated. The preaident himaelf aeems to
realize this, surrounded by same 100 Moroccan bodyguards, who
are the ones maintaining order in the country.
The purge, which the populace is demanding as a necessary move,
, could come in the next few weeks, at the start of the new year,
' sources close to the Supreme Military Council note.
While the situation is returning to normal, Spain is carefully
doling out its contributiona to make stire that they wind up among
the Guinean people, not in the pocket of some loafer. "The Malabo
Hospital needs mattresses," explains one of the people in charge of
Spanish aid to Guinea, "but we know that if we do not supervise the
deliveries, they will never get to the hospital, and tomorrow they
will be selling for 5,000 ekueles on the black market."
The Spanish authorities plan to distribute the foodstuffs, clothing
and medicine directly, but in no case will they be free of charge.
They will be pr~ced low, but high enough to discourage callous
hoarders, and the money that is collected will then be handed over
to the Supreme Mil~tary Council.
Thus, the hope is that all Guineans will benefit, the current
psychosis of need will disappear, the black market will become part
of the history books, the country will rise up from the depths and
Guineans will recover their pride.
Conditions Facing Spanish Businpssmen
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Sp~nish 23 Dec 79 pp 63, 64
[Text] Drawn by the new situation, dozens of Spanish businesamen
are descending on Equatorial Guinea. In addition to anti-~malarial
quinine and the appropriate vaccinations, they have to have a good
dose of patience. ~6
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On the night of 28 November in the banquet room of the Bantu Hotel
in Malabo, a dozen Spanish businessmen gathered to dine on roast
goat seasoned with epicy sauces in West African style.
That same morning, the OFFICIAL BULLETIN of Equatorial Guinea
published the Foreign Investment Law, which opened up the country
to foreign capital under extraordinarily favorable conditiona and
which Spanish financiers were awaiting like rain in May. But this
was not the reason for the banquet. The industrioua businesamen _
had a more important job to do: to finiah off the young goat that
was bought on the black market and slaughtered by one of their
fellow diners with his own hands.
Those were the first slices of fresh meat that they had bolted down
after 6 days of a forced diet in a country in which there is hardly
any food and in which the search for nourishment is the populace's
nain concern.
Farewell and Sorrow
The di.nner had a certain air of a sorrowful farewell. Moat of them
_ would be leaving the next day for Spain on Iberia's weekly flight, .
the only regular service linking the island with the rest of the
world, after a week's stay in search of new markets for their
businesses, in light of the new political situation in the former
Spanish colony.
Most of them were returning with empty hands; others, with a series
of vague promises. In any case, behind them was a week of
negotiations left pending, of kind words, of administrative silencea
- and of bureaucratic delays in starting talks that on occasinn
required bribes of a few thousand pesetas or a wristwatch.
Very few were leaving with the consolation of a signed and sealsd
contract or the green light for their activities in Guinea.
"Someone should have told us what we were getting into and what kind
of people we were going to deal with," complained an industrialist
who preferred to remain nameless in case his businesa eventually
works out. "This is chaos; the administration doesn't work; there
are no clear-cut norms...I came here thinking that the Spanish
Government had gotten really involved with all of the aid that the
_ papers are talking about, but it turns out that absolutely nothing
has made it through, and we're more alone than a solitaire player."
Until the Tranamediterranea's "Ciudad de Pamplona" docked that
morning at Malabo with all-terrain vehicles and foodatuffs, official
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Spanish aid had, in fact, been more symbolic than anything else. In
reality, it was limited to shipments of vaccines and to ti~e preaence
of the Aviocars of the Air Force, which linked the island with the
mainland twice a day in tranaporting persone and gooda free of charge.
Accustomed to air conditioning and fine cuieine, the induatrialiata
and merchan;:s suddenly found themaelvea in a ruined, poverty-stricken
country in which the hotels have no food to offer, in wfiicY~ the
rooms are unfurniahed and the beds without sheete and in which dirt
and grime are everywhere, as if there had just been a war.
Instea3 of doing business in the five-star establishments that they
are familiar with, they were forced to walk, sweat-drenched, through
_ the streets of Malabo, ever in search of something to eat or a cold
beer, while awaiting the meeting with the ranking official who was to
give their business the OK.
More Patience Than Job
They were the pioneers. But after them came the French, the
_ Italians and the Gabonese, and there would be no favored treatment
for the first Spaniards. _
"You have to have more patience than Job here," says a reaigned
Manuel Diaz de Teran, a farm machinery manufacturer with houaes in
- Madrid and Valencia, who was the first to arrive, as Masie was being
tried. "It does no good to be the first."
Diaz de Teran wants to set up an import-export enterprise, and his
request, submitted in late September, has not yet been acted on one
wa}~ or the other.
Julio Chiilida, from Sogeha, Alicante, was the first Spaniard who
succeeded in placing merchandise in the new Equatorial Guinea. As
soon as he learned of the coup, he loaded two Aviaco DC-8's with 60
tons of food, beverages, clothing and footwear and flew to Malabo
with them, without an import license and with the n~w government's
word as guarantee that they~ would authorize the remittance of -
profits to him.
No Foreign Exchange
Two months later, Julio was still waiting for authorization, because
"for the time being therE is no foreign exchange," Guinean officials
tell him. Nonetheless, Chillida, who met with President Teodoro
Obiang, had so much faith in the Supreme Mi_litary Council that on
2 December he was waiting in Malabc~ for a ship transporting 1,500 tons
of general cargo for him.
L~~~
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It took Marciano Martin, a hotel owner from Saldana (Palencia),
2 months and 4 trips to Malabo to secure the use concession for the
Bahia Hotel, which the state had run until then. The concession '
_ had been autherized since the end of October but because of
bureaucratic red tape did not take effect until 29 November, the
day of the goat dinner.
Marciano was one of the few happy men at the banquet. Like
Chillida and Diaz de Teran, he has faith in the new country and
is confident about starting a hotel management school that will lay ~
the groundwork for tourism to become one of the country's major
sources of income. But the delays and procrastination do not
always have a happy ending. "There's no way you can come to an _
understanding with these people," complained a textile dealer who
was returning to Spain with empty hands. "You never know whether -
they want money or whether no one knows what to expect."
"Of course they know; the technical secretaries know perfectly well,"
asserted an Andalusian manufacturer. "Those are the ones who have
the upper hand and want companies worth 200 million and up to come
in and give them 10 percent of the action."
COPYRIGHT: INFORMACION Y PUBLICACIONES, 1980
8743
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
MINISTERIAL DELEGATION IN PARIS SIGNS AGP.EEMENTS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 33/~0 _
- [Ar[icle: "Equatorial Guinean Delegation to Paris"J
[Text] On 28 November a six-member Equatorial Guinean ministerial dele-
gation headed by Capt Salvador Ela Nseng, the military commissar (minister)
of the economy, finance and co~nerce, signed cooperation agreements with
France. The Equatorial Guinean ministers were returning the visit made
~ last October by the French minister of cooperation, Robert Galley.
- During the visit to France the delegation met E1f-Aquitaine and BRGM
[Bureau of Geological and Mining Exploration] representatives. It was
also to meet off icials of the French Petroleum In~titute and the CFP
(French Oil Company).
The Elf-Aquitaine and CFP campanies have already participated with other
companies in boring off the Equatorial Guinean seacoast(particularly off
Fernando Poo), which would have given "positive" results. _
. In terms of mining, Equatorial Guinea has manganese, titanium, uranium and
gold.
In 1978 trade between the two countries was balanced: F 4 million for
exports and imports. France exports textiles, industrial products and
vehicles and imports essentially wood. Spain remains Equatorial Guinea's
principal partner.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979
9380
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L:QIIATORIAi. GUINEA
NEW PHASE IN SPANISH-GUINEAN RELATIONS OPENING
I
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 30 Dec 79 p 15
[Article by Jose Oneto: "The Guinean Challenge"J
_ [T'extJ Through the royal visit to Equatorial Guinea Spain has launched the
most ambitious and stimulating project that a European country has implemented
in recent years.
Guinea, a Spanish colony until 1969, an exam~?Q of one of the worst decoloni-
zations in Afrir.a, if one goes by public opinion and all of the political
forces, can now be turned into one of thQ principal goals of Madrid's foreign
policy and into a valid model of what caoperation between developed and under-
developed countries means. Spain, as Pr:me Minister Adolfo Suarez has been
_ saying, is a medium-sized power which has Eui~pe as its goal and which finds
its entire historical justification in Spanish America, now has the great
"historic opportunity" of getting a country started that was destroyed by the
paranoid tyranny of dictator Francisco Masie, another of colonialism's by-
products brought forth in the final stage nf the Franco era. The case of
Guinea, a country of somewhat over 28,000 square kilometers and a population
of 350,000 inhabitants, should be a great "challenge," a challenge suited to
Spanish dimensions and aspirations for a policy of cuoperation that may turn
_ into an example for other powers.
It is not a matter of impovising cooperation like France, which is devoting
$2,689,000,000; nor like Germany which is dedicating $1,984,000,000; it is
almost a matter of carrying out a laboratory test which may transform this old
country into an international model. -
_ Since August, when a military coup ended Macie's dictatorship, the Spanish
Government has spent over a billion pesetas in aid to Guinea in the form of
food, medicine, basic assistance, transport and plans for an infrastructure
which have come out of the various ministries.
After this initial state, serious reflection is essential in which all of the
political parties with parliamentary representation must participate and pass
in Parliament an entire aid plan which has to be approved by and fulfill the
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dreams of all social sectors. Without these collective dreams, without tl~is
ambitious planning everyttiing done in Guinea will be futile and will lack
that spirit which all great historic collective undertakings possess.
Now, wl~en one starts from zero and endeavors to reconstruct a whole country Erom
nothing, one must build on solid and stable foundations. One must flee from,
one must avoid "economic self-seeking" which in the end was one of the factors
in the collapse of a country. And one must manage not to fall into a neocolon-
ialism which would again create tensions and frustration. -
Those who made fortunes for themselves in the colony cannot return there nor
those who profiting~by_the opposiEion to~Franco contributed (e.g., Antonio
Garcia Trevijano) to the consolidation of Macie's tyranny.
- The stage that has just begun is completely new and there will be a bit of
everything in it. There will be inevitable tension, attempts at corruption '
and, above all, international pressures which will have a consequent impact
on Spain.
Guinea is ;~he sole little Spanish-speaking "island" in an area under French
influence. The first differences will arise with Paris because of the dis-
_ pute setting Guinea against Gaboi. over the jurisdiction of waters where pet-
roleum may lie.
But the big struggle, the big concealed struggle will occur with the Soviet
" Union, one of the major powers in Africa which has seen with concern how its
influence over a territory, which served it as a strategic cover for other
areas of Africa, evanesced in hours. The Soviets who supported Macie to the
end despite the denunciations throughout the world of his regime's crimes,
will attempt to ~hange the situation by every means. And for that it is re-
lying on a group of young officials, educated in Eastern Europe, lightly
"glazed" with Marxism-Leninism and brought in at all levels. Because of
that, in the grand "Operation Guinea" one must rely on public opinion in its
entirety. _
- In the meanwhile, the nomination of Jose Luis Graullera, who is close to Prime
Minister Adolfo Suarez, is a guarantee that Moncloa is interested in the
operation and that there will be direct ties between rialabo and Piadrid. But
somethi:~g else is lacking. Above all a state policy, and not one of the UCD
[Democratic Center UnionJ, is missing.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Informacion y Publicaciones, S.A.
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
BRIEFS
SPANISH EXPERTS--Approximately 500 physicians, armed forces and police
instructors, agricultural experts and various other technicians will
meet soon in Equatorial Guinea within the framework of a plan for emer-
gency aid from Spain, if one believes the Madrid weekly newspaper CAMBIO
16, which adds that Spain has granted a loan of $19 million to Malabo in
order to finance the most urgent work. According to CAI~IO 16, the -
Spanish economic experts at Malabo are optimistic as far as the economic
future of Equatorial Guinea is concerned because the country possesses
reserves on the order of $20 million, and it is all the more able to re-
quest large loans because it has no external debt. Finally, according
to these experts, the emergency plan submitted by the Spanish economists
to the Equatorial Guinea authorities provides for rapid retu~n to the
production levels of the 1960's, a fact which will mean an increase of
_ exports which may be as much as $250 million. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3340] 9380
OPEC LOAN--On 22 November the OPEC Special Fund granted a$1 million loan
_ to the Republic of Equatorial Guinea in order to help it reestablish the
equilibrium of the balance of payments. This loan ~ras granted without
interest for a term of 15 years with 5 years' moratory interest. [Text] `
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3340]
9380
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~ GAMBIA
BRIEFS
ELECTRIC POWERPLANT PROJECT--The Gambian minister of transportation and
telecommunications, Bakary Sanyang, has announced the construction of a
$6 million hydroelectric powerplant near Koter, at the mouth of the river,
thanks to a loan fran the Afr3can Development Bank (ADB). Intended to
remedy the frequent electricity cuts which Banjul and its suburbs have
b een experiencing since September, this electric powerplant should go ~
into operation in 1981. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 30 Nov 79 p 3330] 9380
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GUINEA..
BRIEFS
REQUEST FOR FAD FUNDS--The Guinean ministers of Oil and Economy, Messrs
Navamra Kitta and Mars Crousse, paid a visit to the United Arab Emirates
on 16-18 December; during this visit, they met with high officials of
the Abu Dhabi Arab Development Fund. Guinea submitted a request for the
financing of a dam to be built at Conakry, which was approved. A delegatian
from the Arab Development Fund will go to Guinea after it has examined the
studies and blueprints for the dam. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
rIEDITERRANE.ENS in French 28 Dec 79 p 3677] 9394
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s~
IVORY COAST
BRIEFS
DECLINE IN FRENCH INFLUENCE--France is losing ground in relation to the Ivory
Coast's other Western friends. President Houphouet-Boigny has report~dly
reproached Giscard d'Estaing for treating him in cavalier fashion, as op-
posed to the French president's predecessors who never failed to consult him
on all major African issues. This development is more than the Belgians,
. British, and Spaniards needed and expected in order to take st~ps to sup-
plant the French in certain investment fields. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE
in French 26 Dec 79 p 59] 8041
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KENYA
PRESIDENT PESSIMISTIC REGARDING 198Q ECONOMIC PROSPECTS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Dec 79 p 3687
[Text] In the coursP of his public address on 12 December on the
occasion of the day marking the 16th anniversary of the country's
achieving independence, president Daniel arap Moi surrounded by his
- vice-president, Mr Mwai Kibaki, and members of his new administra-
tion, presented a rather somber picture of Kenya's economic prospects
for the eighttes. "We are going to have a very difficult time," he
said, "i~? pursuing our develo~,ment at the same rate as during earlier
~ years and we are certainly going to have to modify our programs."
The chief of state also mentioned the current food shortages among -
the population but he said that the country has sufficient reserves.
He blamed tne shortages on dishonest merchants and fraudulent ex-
ports. On that subject, he promised "firm measures" and announced
a certain number of confiscations, both in Nairobi and in the pro-
vince.
During the first meeting of the new parliament eanerging from the 8
November elections, on 4 December, the chief of state had already ex-
pressed his worries about the future. "Looking at the challenges
, which our nation will have to face during the eighties, I have
arrived at the conclusion that the government machine requires a sub-
stantial reorganization. I do not want to alarm you but the eighties
- will be difficult, especially because of outside forces. We must
thus assure maximum efficiency in government," he emphasized.
Mr arap Moi also remarked that the responsibilities of the presi-
dential office had been increased considerably since independence and
he explained that three ministries of state were created in order to
~ guarantee better coordination on that level and that defense was
attached directly to his office.
Finally, since Kenya is not a petroleum produc~r,which is why there is
- reasor~ to worry about the future, Mr Moi stressed the importance
which he assigned to the prospecting and operation of new energy
sources, such as wind and sun, within the new ministry of energy under
Mr Munuya Waiyaki.
. ,
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
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KENYA ~ -
~
t
i
MUNGAI ARRESTED IN NAIROBI ~
I
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Dec 79 p 3687 ;
[Text] Mr James Mungai, the high official in charge of the Kenyan
police for the provinoe of Rift Valley--who had disappeared from the ~
country following the announcement, early in November 1978, of an ~
attempted plot during the month of August of that same year (MTM ,
[MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS] 10 November 1978, p 2976),
which was discovered after he had fled to the Sudan and then to
Switzerland (MTM, 12 January 1979, p 92)--was apprehended on 19 ~
December at the Jomo Kenyatta international airport at Nairobi as he
left the aircraft that had brought him from Geneva: He was taken in
a station wagon, with a big escort, to an unknown destination. This
event caused a certain sensation in Kenya where Mr James Mungai--who, ~
it was said, upon his return, was accompanied by four members of
Interpol--was considered by the authorities to be a particularly '
dangerous personality. �
Mr Mungai had been principal vice-commissionaire of police who for
10 years was in charge of security in the Rift Valley, a region !
which includes almost the entire western portion of the country, from
the Tanzanian border to the Sudan; Mr Mungai was also in command of
- the cattle-rustling combat unit, a special police section, some of :
whose members had gotten special training and were to carry out a ;
certain number of assassinations following the death of president
Kenyatta. These assassinations, first disclosed to parliament by
justice minister Charles Njonjo, who stated that he was to be one of
the victims, supposedly were intended to prevent the current president,
])aniel arap Moi, from coming to power. ,
Nobody knows the reasons that persuaded Mr Mungai to return to Kenya,
_ ~specially without being assured of sufficient guarantees. His
~
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,
immediate arrest in any case shows that the climate of uncertainty,
wlilrli cleterit~ra[e~d furtlicr prtor to the recent e�le~ctian~; (MTM, 2
November, p 2965) has not been completely dispelled as yet, even after
the organization of a new cabinet.
COFYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
5058
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KENYA
BRIEFS
ARTICLES SMUGGLED HERE--The smuggling of various articles, especially
Chinese, coming from Tanzania, is currently worrying the Kenyan police.
This smuggling, it was said, is encouraged by the strength of the Kenyan
shilling which is quoted twice as high in Tanzania. [Text] Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Dec 79 p 3687] 5058
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LIBERIA -
BRIEFS
NEW OPPOSITION PARTY--Monrovia. Officials of the Progressive Alliance of
Liberia (PAL) requested the recognition of the Progressive People Party
(PPP) as an opposition party. We may recall that the PAL had organized,
last April, a demonstration to protest a plan for raising the price of
rice, a demonstration which degenerated into a riot and caused the death
of over 70 people. Since that request no other reference has been made
to socialism which the PAL is said to support. The ideological line of -
the PPP will be determined at a congress during which the leaders of the
new party will be elected, stated Gabriel Bacchus Matthiews, PAL president.
For the time being, the representatives of the future PPP state their
_ willingness Co "obey, protect and defe*id the constitution of the Republic
of Liberia." According to Liberian law, such a request for confirmation, `
accompanied by 5,000 signatures, will be publicized for three days, to
enable those who oppose it to speak out in front of the Monrovian Probate
Court which will have final say on the request. The party currently in
power in Liberia, the True Whig Party (TWP) is de facto the only party,
even though nothing in the Liberian constitution bans the formation of �
different par.ties. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 24 Dec 79-
6 Jan 80 p 12] 5157
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MALAWI
BRIEFS
LILONGWE AIRPORT FINANCING--Malawi received a loan of US$40 million from an
international consortiLm of banks, designed in. pa_�t to finance construction
of an international airport at Lilongwe, according to a statement made by
Malawi's finance minister, M. Edward Bwanali, before parliament, on
23 November last. Another portion of the loan will be applied to financ-
- ing a number of agricultural development projects, the minister added. The
new airport, which it has been estimated will co5t US$60 million, is to _
replace one at Chileka. The first stage of the work--programmed to be con- -
cluded by next year--was financed by loans from the African Development
Bank, the Japanese Government and an international consortium of banks,
led by the Chase Manhattan Bank. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3347] 7129
FRENCH TRADE DELEGATION--A 10-member French trade delegation arrived in
Blantyre on 24 November to hold discussions with the Malawi Government on
the development of trade relations between the two countries. The head of
_ the delegation, Gerard Dorle, of the French Foreign Trade Center, stressed -
_ right from the start that the field for trade between France and Malawi was
quite limited und that the target of his visit was to study the sectors
where development was possible. The delegation has already visited Tanz:ania
and PZozambique. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French 30 Nov 79 p 3347] 7129
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I -
MALI
STUDENT UNREST MAY HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 992, 9 Jan 80 p 23
[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "Mali: An Alarm BelJ."]
[Text] The year 1979 has ended on a note of uncertainty, and 19f30 is
b~ginning with concern. Today's protagonists are the same as yesterday:
the students on one side, the forces of order on the othar.
At the basis o~ the conflict is ,:he strike launched on 16 November 1979 by
- high school and university students and by some teachers. The motives:
a protest against the continued use of the "common stream" in high schools
and against the examinations which, following the baccalaureate degree,
decide on who will have access to the university and who will enter the -
professional field--or the field of unemployment. Since that time, action
= has escalated, with the fatal spira? of strike-sanctions-manifestations- -
- repression. The balance sheet: new arrests (almost 300 at the end of
December), 5 dead according to some sources, 15 according to others. In
Bamako, mothers are taking to th~ streets. In Paris, students occupy the
Malian Embassy. -
These December 1979 explosions are the worst inc:idents which have taken
place in Mali since May-June 1977. At the time, young people had again
taken to the streets, and for the sam~e reasons as today's.
In truth, the economy cannot absorb a plethora of diplomas awarded by an
obsolete and monolithic system, iust as establishments of higher learning
cannot accommodate all those with baccalaureate degree. In other words, ,
Mali has too many of these for the positions it can offer them: the ideal
conditions to nurture a revolt.
The authorities let it be known that the young people had been induced into
- error and manipulated by subversive troublemakers. Nevertheless, if it is -
true that spontaneous m~vements are rare, the fact hs that they do grow out
of a genuine malaise. Youth organizations are regularly sounding the alarm
bell. It would be suicidal not to listen to them. Keeping the proper
- proportions in mind, it must be noted that other revolts elsewhere have
upset regimes stronger than Mali's. In France, the month of May 1968 will
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I
mark the turning point for this second half of the century in the annals of
hivc~ry. In Sene~al, May 1968 (as wetl) made authoritie5 m~re circumapc~~r.
I u Mii~lri}~,iit?~~i1 i~ , Mny I'17: I I n~i I I y I~ r'uii}{li t ~ut t�Ittl l n ti I'i~}; I nu~ wli I~'li ~'nnti I~I~~ 1'~~~I
- Il4~~ll vc~ry ylrun~; nncl vrry Kl~tblc~: Prc~yld~~nl I'It! I lb~~rl 'I'ylrnn;inn tincl
been reelected with more tt~an 98 percent of the vote in January; in October,
he was swept away by a referendum in which the tally was approximately
the same.
In Mali, it would be a gross error to believe in a similar arithmetical
stability. Admittedly, Moussa Traore was elected in June by 100 percent
of the vote less eight [sic]. In Africa, however, we have always been
taught to vote for the strongest candidates. Until such day when the cup
overflows: more often than not, a simple revolt of the youth. Bokassa can
testify to that. His dictatorship was not unmasked suddenly in 1979. But
i: is in 1979 that the young peopl2 of the Central African Republic decided
to s~~y no to him.
What to do in Mali? Admit that a malaise is not necessarily provoked by
third�-party forces. And do everything to prevent baccalaureate-degree
holders from having to choose only between unemployment and revolt.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
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NIGER
BRIEFS
BID LOAN--On 11 November the Islamic Development Bank (IBD) granted a tech-
nical assistance loan of 780,000 Islamic dinars (approximately $1 million)
to the Government of Niger. This loan will finance the final studies on the
Niamey-Balayera-Filingue highway (lE5 1~). The realization of this highway
will make it possible to reduce the distance by road between Niamey and
Tahoua via Birni N'konni from 550 to 430 lan. The project will be launched
early in 1980, and the studies will require a year to a year and a half.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79
p 3334] 9380
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RHOU~~IA
GUERRILLAS ACCEPT CEASE-FIRE, PREPARE FOR ELECTIONS
Elections Are Ultimate Test
- Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 24 Dec 79 pp 63-64
[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima:"Zimbabwe Between War and Peace"]
[Text] A few months ago, nobody foresaw that Zimbabwe would be knocking at
freedom's gate as this year drew to an end. The country's future independ-
ence is still highly fragile, hcwever, becaus~e of the extreme divisions
among the varioua forces that are to vie for voter support in the coming
elections. Rarely has there even been such a narrow distance between mir-
acle and mirage.
In one of history's turnarounds, the British Union Jack was once again
hoisted above public buildings in Salisbur,y on 11 December. A few minutes
earlier, the aircraft carrying Lord Soames,~repreaentative of Her Ma3esty
the Queen, landed at the Rhodesian capital's airport. Through a governor,
Great Britain had now reassumed responsibility for the administration of its
colony. The official cease-fire agreemenL was finally signed in London on
- Monday night, 17 December. The Zimbabwe people tiad been waiting 14 years
for this moment. In the space of just a few months, the "rebel" colony re-
si.mmedthe status it had had prior to 1965 when Ian Smith, defying the whole
world, proclaimed the country's "independence." In several weeks, Lord
Soames will have to return to London permanently after having handed over
power to the new leaders chosen to govern the af~airs of an independent
Zimbabwe. _
Zimbabwe has certainly come a long way, that's the least that can be said.
Everything had been tried to bring the deacendants of the first British
settlers to their senses. Admittedly, however, the succession of govern-
ments in London after Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independen~ehad
all displayed an extreme degree of complacency toward the "rebels." It is
also true that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) itself never took
any concrete action to take up Ian Smith's challenge. Lastly, it is true
that the economic sanctions ordered by the OAU, as well as the United Na-
tions, were unevenly enforced by the ma~or powers.
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A.ctually, its was the determinationof the people of Zimbabwe that influenced
the course of events. It was the people's will and the sacrifices of the
masses that compelled the white minority and its last minute allies to
negotiate.
It was the Patriotic Front's real representativ?ness that finally compelled
Great Britain to assume its responsibilities.
Has total victory been achieved? The procedural questions having been set-
t~ed in the Lancaster House Peace Conference, Zimbabwe's futuMe will now
be determined in the field. There are several oppoeing forces and the
elections will be a crucial test. The "men of the interior"--particularly
Abel Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole--are opposed by representatives of
the Patriotic Front. But the actual election picture is much more com-
plicated, given the disagreements and alliancesresulting from the long war
of liberation. Dissidents from Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's
Union (ZAPU) were the ones who in 1963 formed the Zimbabwe African Nation-
al Union (ZANU) that is headed today by Robert Mugabe, the other co-leader
of the Patriotic Front. The 1973 meeting of the two "separated brothers"
within the Front has not been enough to dispel all suspicion and mis-
trust. As a consequence, the alliance between the two men is very pre-
carious. There are fears that the lust for power may trigger a split in
the Patriotic Front. ZANU's internal leadership has already let it be known
that they want the Front's two wings to run separate candidates, and then
form a caalition after the elections.
This view is shared by conservative elements within the ZAPU who have al-
~ ways advised Joshua Nkomo to keep his distance from Robert Mugabe who is
considered to be more radical. Each of the two branches of the Front
actually hopea to be in the better position at that decisive moment when
_ governmental responsibilities are apportioned between them. This sysr~ltic -
power struggle between its two leaders does not help the Patriotic Fror:t
which, even now, will enter~ the electoral campaign with many handicaps.
Its in-country following has yet to be determined and there is reasonable
doubt as to whether a few weeks of campaigning will be enough for the Front
to gain the required support. Especially since the local gress is controlled
by local Muzorewa supporters. In addition, votes are liable to be scattered
among the 11 political groups vying for the support of 7 million Africans. .
~ In any case, the only foreseeable solution, once the election is over, seems
to be a coalition government~. The situation remains totally uncertain,
and anything can happen, including an alliance between former enemies.
_ T'ne main thing is that the politicians must display enough clear-sightedness
to avoid any repetition of the Angolan experience.
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Opposing Armies Analyzed
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 24 Dec 79 pp 64-66
[Article by Francois Soudan: "Seven Years of Buah Warfare")
[Text] Some 22,000 persons killed. That is the overall price in human
lives of l years of war in Zimbabwe. The most reliable sources place the
number of national guerrillas killed at 7,700 and the number of civilian
victims among the black population at 15,OG0. On the Rhodesian side,
some 1,500 soldiers--950 of them black--and 800 white civilians have per-
ished since 1972, the date real military operationa hagan. All things con-
sidered, this is a moderate toll when one recalls that another war of de-
colonization, the Algerian War, resulted in nearly 500,000 civilian and
military victims in slightly more than 7 years of fighting.
There are two reasons for the relatively moderate toll in Zimbabwe. First,
the very nature of the fightin$: a guerrilla war consisting of hit-and-run
attacks and lightning raids with no large-scale offensives or deadly sweep-
ing area-wide hunt-and-kill operations. Secondly, the relative weakness of
the forces and equipment employed by both sides: the Rhodesian Air Force
began its systematic heavy bumbin~, of guerrilla camps only in 1977, and
national troops practically never attacked urban targets. It is true that
, the nationalists have never been very popular among the black urban popula-
tion. -
By late 1979, a combined total of 100,000 armed men were fighting over
Zimbabwe's future.
The Patriotic Front has 45,000 men. Throughout the entire conflict, they
operated on two fr4nta and as two separate armies. The ZIPRA (Zimbabwe
People's Revolutionary Army)--the military arm of Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU--
is based in Zambia and stationed in some 20 camps around the capital city
of Lusaka and throughout the southeastern part of the country. ZIPRA's _
23,000 men are armed with Soviet weapons and trained by Angolan, Cuban,
and East German instructors.
The ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army)--the military arm of
Robert Mugabe's ZANU--is based in Mozambtque along the Rhodesian border.
The Rhodesian Army raided and destroyed its headquarters at Chimoio in
= September 1979. ZANLA's 22,000 men have Soviet and Chinese weapons and are
trained by Mozambican, Ethiopian, Tanzanian, Soviet, and East German in-
structors.
Theoretically united since June 1979--Addis Ababa agreements--under a joint
co~and led by General Josiah Tongogara, the Front's two armies have never
actually operated in a coordinated manner. Mugabe's ZANLA was the only
army to actually fight inside Zimbabwe where it succeeded in gaining
control of a few "liberated areas" in the north. Nkomo's ZIPRA infiltrated
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only 4,000 men into Zimbabwe (in comparison with ZANLA's 12,000). They
~~lways avoided any contact with the Rhodesian Army, limiting their activity
to conducting propaganda meetings in the villages. Admittedly the terrain �
in the western part of the country where Nkomo's men operate (a flat and
barren area) differs from the terrain in the east where Mugabe's troopa
fight (mountainous and wooded region, and thus easier to infiltrate).
F'urthermore, ZIPRA is definitely more of an army organized to seize power
t:han an army org3nizcl to wage guerrilla warfare. Concentrated in vast
camps along tlie Zambezi River, it became one of the favorite targets of the
Rhodesian Air Force pilots who bomb it almost as if were a bombing exercise
target. We must add that there hawe been occasional violent clashes be-
tween "brother" units of the ZANLA and ZIPRA.
T'he Rhodesian Army, under the command of Lieutenant General Peter Walls,
has 16,000 men (plus 8,000 police). The majority of the troops are black
and the officers are white. Approximately 2,000 mercenaries have swelled
the army's ranks in the past 3 years. Taking everything into consideration,
this army is one of the world's most efficient and well-trained military
forces. Through a multiplicity of collusive arrangements it has been able
to equip itself with relatively modern materiel suitable for antiguerrilla
warfare, such as Mirage 3 aircraft, "Huey" helicopters, etc. It controlled
90 percent of the territory by day and 60 percent by night. Its crack
units, the unfortunately famous Selous Scouts excelled 3n fomenting discord
between the Patriotic Front's two armies. The Rhodesian Army was deployed
in seven "war zones": Ranger, Grapple, Flasher, Hurricane,Tangent, Splinter,
and Thrasher.
Private militia units form the "Praetorian" guard of the two moderate black
leaders who signed the transition agreement of March 1978: Ndabaningi
Sithole and Jeremiah Chirau. Composed primarily of deserters from the
Rhodesian Army ~nd the Patriotic Front, these militia units total 5,000
men. T6ey live almost exclusively on pillage and rapine, but authorities in
S3lisbury have used them to "hold" certain Tribal Trust Lands highly in-
filtrated by national guerrillas.
The problem raised by the unification and partial disarmament of these three
armies was at the core of the London negotiations on Zimbabwe's future.
Tlie task of resolving this problem in the field is now the responsibility
oY the British Governor, Lord Soames, and his military deputy, Ma~or General
J~hn Acland, who commands the Commonwealth truce-monitoring force. Lord
Carver, whom the British Government had assigned in 1977 to an "exploratory
m:tssion" in Zimbabwe, recently said that "the real power is the army. Any
- peace initiative must take it into account." It remains to be seen how the
peasants fee1. They constitute the great majority (90 percent) of Zimbabwe's
b::ack population. As in any conflic.t of this type, there is every indica-
tzon that their sympathies lie with neither one side nor the other: neither
wi.th the Front's guerrillas who suddenly appear in the middle of the night
atid demand food, nor, of course, with the government ftirces who burn down the
hc~uses and kill the livestock of villagers suspected of having "helped('the
Freedom Fighters.
CC?PYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
8Q41 (9
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KklUUL51A
LANCASTER HOUSE SETTLII~IENT ASSESSED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 19 Dec 79 p 20
[Article by Francois Soudan: "The Peace of the Greats"]
[Text] Will this twelfth month of the year 1979 mark the dawn of a new epoch
in the history of southern Africa? On the same day, Wednesday, 5 December,
almost at the same hour, two events suddenly changed the future of the
southern end of the continent. Ir London, after 3 months of tedious
. negotiations, an agreement in principle on a cease-fire in Zimbabwe was
- reached between the nationalists of the Patriotic Front, the British
colonial authorities and the government of Bishop Abel Muzorewa. In
Pretoria, the South African prime minister, Pieter Botha, announced that
- his country was accepting the main points of the Western plan on Namibia, .
to which the Afr~can states in the region and the Namibian guerrillas had
already agreed. .
A sudden reversal in the history of what, ~ust a short time ago, was one of
- the hot spots of the planet? _
Certainly, it seems possible now that 1980 will see the appearance of two
new independent states on the map of Africa. But the important thing is
to know to whom .Africa will owe this "victory." During the entirety of the
London conference on the future of the "rebel colony," it was outside inter-
ventions, more or less direct, coming from the United States or the So~iet
Union, that provided the necessary prodding so that everything did not fall
apart. And this pervading presence of the great powers is hardly surprising
given the fact that one can scarcely fail to notice the absence of any clear
political plan among the African protagonists with respect to Zimbabwe.
Abel Muzorewa, resigning prime minister, is playing by ear with a single
objective which seems to be nothing more than to regain power, even if that ~
- has to be done with the massive financial support of South Africa. The
Patriotic Front, which, by its fight, has acquired a certain moral and
historical legitimacy, is divided and has not formulated any concrete proposal
on the society and the state which it wishes to build. Independent Africa,
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and more particularly the OAU, excluded from negotiations in London, has
always acted as if the problem of Zimbabwe was a classic case of decolonial-
ization which was up to Great Britain to solve. The frontline, finally,
is torn between its "modexates" and its "hardliners." So there is nothing
surprising in the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have
their own plans. For the moment, it is a discrete consensus: Washington,
which fears an internationalization of the conflict if the war continues
and believes to have found in Abel Muzorewa and Joshua Nkomo two "moderate"
cards, is playing for the fastest peace possible. Moscow, for its part, has
neiti~er the desire nor the means to support forever the war economy of its
Atozambique, Angolan and perhaps, if the conflict continues, Zambian allies.
The probable independence of ZimbabH�e and Namibia should not, therefc,re, be
celebrated too triumphally by the Africans. They are much more the result
of a desire for consensus among outside powers than of action by the govern-
ments of the OAU.
Will it be the same for the last stronghold of white domination on the
continent, i.e. South Africa? Already, since the beginning of the year
[1979], the South African authorities have, with remarkable intelligence,
begun to cleanse apartheld of its least presentable features while favoring
the creation of a black lower middle class capable of assuming certain ,jobs
reserved heretofore to the whites. This internal "updating," which it would
be dishonest to deny the reality of, runs a strong risk of ultimately
making the fundamental racial inequality of the Pretoria regime acceptable
in Western eyes. It is thus necessary for the Africans to dump some well
established scenarios: the theoretical resorting to armed conflict or to
the development of a suicidal guerrilla war are now not on the agenda, and
the "liberation" of South Africa is still only a distant perspective. For
"free" southern Africa, the most urgent task seems then to be concretely
detach itself economically from Pretoria. Given this, the month of December.
1979, will merit inclusion in the history books.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
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RHODESIA
DETAILS ON ,]EGOTIATIONS GIVII1
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 19 Dec 79 pp 21-22
` [Article by Francois Sou3ar~: "Miracle at Lancaster House"]
[Text] In the triumphal decor of the Victorian rooms of Lancaster House, a
historic residence in the middle of London where numerous decolonization
agreements were signed in the sixties, Great Britain has succeeded in
undoing the la~t link in its Af:ican empire: Zimbabwe. After more than -
� 3 months of haggling, shouting and handshaking;3 months after negotiations
between the government of Prime Minister Abel Muzorewa and the exiled leaders
of the Patriotic Front, Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, sheltered--iron
fist in a velvet glove--by the British Foreign Off ice Secretary Lord Peter
- Carrington....
~Nobodg, on Monday, 10 September, opening date of the tripartite conference
on the future of Zimbabwe, would have bet a penny on its chances for success.
On the contrary, everybody remembered that on 5 December 1960, 19 years ago,
also in Lancaster House and already with Joshua Nkomo present, the first -
constitutional conference on Rhodesia had collapsed in general indifference.
Passing through the heavy wood door at 1000, the huge 3oshua, 64 years of
age, muttered to one of his aides, "I don't much like this place; it's
- haunted." However, the results which came out of the conference can
henceforth be called historic.
On Wednesday morning, 12 December, a VC 10 of the Royal Air Force landed
at Salisbury airport with Lord Christopher Soames aboard, the British governor
assigned to organize the general elections ar~d lead the nation to inde- ~
pendence. A Rhodesian police orchestra was playing God Save the Queen on
the runway, wet with the first downpours of the rainy season, and a black
Daimler took Lord Soames to "Government House" to see, raised for the first
time in 13 years, the Union Jack waving in the sky of Zimbabwe. Three months
ago, who could have fureseen that?
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As frequently happens in this type of conference, everything started off
badly. The four major participants, Abel Muzorewa and Ian Smith, the rebel
exprime minister on one side; Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo on the other,
each surrounded for all their movements between their hotel and Lancaster
House by some ten bodyguards, refused during the first week to say a word
to each other and carefully avoided looking at one another. "We have come
for talks with the British, not with the terrorists of the Front," declared
Muzorewa upon his arrival at Heathrow airport. "In our eyes, only Lord
Carrington is worth talking to. The bunch of bandits seated around Muzorewa ~
do not interest us," replied Joshua Nkomo to him the next day. But very
fortunately, these statements for external consumption did not prevent the
British, Tanzanian, Zambian and Mozambican "mediators" from working in the
wings for a softening of the positions of each. (See JEUNE AFRIQUE NO 985)
It was thus that each step of the "Carrington tactics," which consisted of -
getting a partial agreement with the Muzorewa delegation and then giving
the Patriotic Front an ultimatum of 3 or 4 days to answer yes or no, was
preceded by intense consultations with the "sponsors" of the front, notably
the Tanzanians. And in fact this reduced the risk of it appearing to be
the blunt act of the British Foreign Office secretary. The conference thus
took on the character of a succession of crises quickly resolved after
exhausting night sessions where strong tea flowed by the gallon in the cups _
of the participants.
On 24 September, after 20 hours of tension, the front accepted the draft
constitution which stipulated that the white minority of Zimbabwe (4 percent
of the population) would hold 20 percent of the seats in Parliament. On 18
October at 2300 hours, Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe decided to agree to
British proposals for indemnification to be paid in case of expropriation
to the white colonists. T~ao hours later, everyone believed a breakdown was
. imminent. Finally, on Wednesday, 5 December, the front delegation accepted
the decisions of Lord Carrington on the major aspects of a cease-fire in
Zimbabwe, after the observers had once again been talking about the
- conference collapsing.
Drawn in filigree behind the success of the talks and the incontestable
diplomatic talents of Lord Carrington are the interventions at each critical
moment of the two great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. In
fact, outside Lancaster House much note was taken of the discrete acticns of -
Nikolai Lunkov, ambassador of the Soviet Union in London, with whom Lor~i
Carrington had two crucial meetings which each time we~e followed by a
softening of positions of the Patriotic Front and its Mozambican and Angolan
allies.
Likewise, it was after a secret meeting held Tuesday, 16 October, with
Kingman Brewster, representative of the United States and its African affairs
:idvisor, thatthe head of British diplomacy was able to present on the
following day to Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe "acceptable" proposals on
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the problem of lands. It was likewise the Americans who seem to have
required that Ian Smith be ranked only in the eleventh spot in the delegation
of Bishop Muzorewa. The white exprime minister was moreover treated like
the plague by his South. APrican friends, who accused him, 3ue to his
- intransigence, of "playing the Marxists' game." Muzorewa himself referred
to him as a"museu~ piece."
The military offensives conducted in the field by the men of Abel Muzorewa
and Lt Gen Peter Walls, commander in chief of the Rhodesian army, during
the entire conf erence likewise played an important role. For the biracial
government in Salisbury, the primary thing was to force the Patriotic Front
to break off the negotiations. In fact, the co~ando raids produced exactly
the opposite effect.
Eight aerial and airborne attacks and three spectacular sabotage actions
took place in Zambia and Mozambique between 15 September and 20 November.
Held by the throat and with little assurance of much Soviet support, the -
Zambian president, Kaunda, and Mozambican president, Samora Machel, multiplied
the pressure on the two leaders of the Front to get them to come to terms.
The great skill of Lord Carringtor~ must lie in his knowing how to play all
the cards, contradictory ones, which he held in his hand. Don't they say
_ in London, among the "higher society" that Lord Carrington is a great fan
of bridge?
Next week, JEUNE AFRIQUE will publish a complete file on Zimbabwe: the
present situation on the country, the balance sheet of l years of war and
the new perspectives which appear to be open to it.
_ COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUP.TIA 1979
9550
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RWANUA
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AT KIGALI-KONOMBE
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3347
[Text] The Government of Rwanda proposes to undertake the sctting up of
equipment of the international airport at Kigali-Kanombe, and to do so
with the assist~nce of the Central Economic Cooperation Fund. In this
- connection, th: government is desirous of contacting enterprise interested
in the execution of the program, the total cost of which will be approxi-
mately 1 billion Rwandan francs, and which will include the following:
' --Earthwork: 100,000 cubic meters; strengthening of the airport aprons
and their coating: 60,000 tons; paving of hignways: 35,000 square meters;
sanitation (dr:.inage?) works;
--Construction of housing for a power station, with an area of 400 sq.m.;
construction of a shed to store equipment, with an area of 400 sq.m.; relo-
- cation of an aeroplane hangar with an area of 1,000 sq.m.
This inquiry is addressed solely to French or Rwandan enterprise, or those
in the Economic Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes (CEPGL). The
allocation of the contracts will be made on the basis of a call for tenders
by the prequalified enterprise. All those interested should submit an
application, with qualifications, to the Minister of Post & Communications, _
BP 720, Kigali, Rwanda, with a copy for Sofreavia, 75, Rue de la Boetie,
75008, Paris, France.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979.
7129
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RWANDA
BRIEFS
FRENCH AIR TRANSPORT AID--The fact that Rwanda is landlocked makes it
essential to insure adequate equipping of the international airport at
. Kigali, in order to facilitate landing of large-scale freight planes. -
The French aid and cooperation resources and the Central Economic Co-
operation Fund will assist in financing ttie infrastructure, a project to
_ be executed in accordance with the program studied by Sofreavia, and
budgeted for 60 million French francs. The Central Fund on 16 October, _
agreed, on its part, to lend 50 million French francs for the purpose.
[Text] [^aris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Oct 79
p 2905) 7129
- CSO: 4400
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I~OR ~Fi~ IC i~l, 1151: ONL,Y
SENEGAL _
PDS SECRETARY DISCUSSES ECONOMIC SITUATION, OPPOSITION'S PROSPECTS
- Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 10-23 Dec 79 pp 33-35; 24 Dec 79-6 Jan 80 pp 25-26
~ [Interview of Abdaalaye Wade, secretary general of the Senegalese
Democratic Party, conducted by Simon Ma11ey and Ginette C~:. "No
Senegzlese Will Ever Go To Battle For King Hassan II Agai.~st the.Sahraoui
People. . .
[Text] We are against using Senegal as a base for anti-Angola agression
, forces. In general, the Senegalese people support the str.uggle of the -
i
Palestinian, Sahraoui, and Sour.hern African peoples for their independence.
We do nc�: appreciate rhe method of taking Dacko to Bangui under milirary
prc,tec:rion ior the sake of imposing him on the Central Africans. Thc
] Novc~mbcr Algerian milirary parade was of a peaceful naturc while _
proving that Algeria can defend itself.
AFRIQUE-ASIE: Mr Wade, on 1 November you attended in Algiers the cere-
monies in honor of the ~Sth anniversary of the Algerian revolution. Un-
questionably, you must have had interesting talks with political per- ~
sonalities of several parties and diplomatic representatives.
Abdoulaye Wade: I had contacts with [he Algerian FLN [National Liberation
Fro~t] in it.s role as a party and, more especially, with the people in
charge of the party's foreign relations, even though I did not conduct
talks with the Algerian government proper. Conve:sely, I used the
occasion to talk with party leaders from Africa, Europe, the M'd~le Ea~t,
and elsewhere, as well as with r.epresentatitv~s of liberation movements in
- Southern Africa with whom I exchanged a number of viewpoints. Even though
the problems o� Senegal did not dominate such talks, for it was a cele-
bration of the Algerian revolution, we were able to assess the distance
covered by Algeria since 1954 thanks, on the one hand, to the efforts
made in the building of socialism and, on the other, the struggle waged
by Algeria, leaving Third World countries in t'te defense of their
interests.
What impressed me greatly in the course of the 1 November ceremonies in
_ Algiers was tl~e serious, aeaceful., and constructive nature of this
R
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_ demonstration. Unquestionably, we saca a parade of sophist:cated modern
weapons, proving that Algeria can defend itself. However, I particularly
~pprt~ci~~ted the features of Chis demonstration which showed the progress
achieved in the field of economic development, the struggle against the
deserr, and the efforts to strengthen education, and everything else
which was accomplished for the benefi[ of the Algerian masses. I also ~
greatly appreciated President Chadli's speech, his moderation, his firm-
ness and, above all, his orientation toward the future. Naturally, my
associate in charge of foreign relations, Alioune Badara Niang and my~elf
had talks with political personalities of the Third World and the
developed countries such as, for example, officials from the Spanish
Socialist Party or the French trade unions. However, we spent more time
in talking with delegates from the African parties with ~Jhom we exchdnged
information as to our respective orientations and the means we are using.
All in all, this stay in Algiers was quite beneficial to the PDS.
AFRIQUE-ASIE: Unquestionably, the question of the Polisario was raised
in the course of suc:h conversations. You also talked with Polisario Front
comrades. What are your impressions on the future of the struggle waged
by the Sahraoui people?
Abdoulaye Wade: As to the FLN and the PDS, a real convergence has been
achieved on this matter. I would like to point out that the Senegalese
Democratic Party is second to the FLN as an African political party to
have given its official support to Polisario. We know that in the course
of his trip around Africa, at the time of the founding of the Polisario
Front, its f.ormer secretary general Sayed el Ouali, had visited Senegal
first, where we welcomed him as proved by the joint communique published
in LE DEMOCRATE (journal of the PDS) in 1975.
Therefore, we have quite freely always supported the Polisario Front on
- the basis of one of the principles of the basic constituent charter of
our party. Therefore, the question discussed with the FLN dealt mainly -
on the dangers threatening this subarea. Bearing in mind the fact that
= Senegal's prime minister went to Morocco to offer Senegal's support to
, King Hassan II, I insisted on changing targets. Specifically, I pointed
out, once again, the stand of the PDS, already stated in Senegal, accord-
ing to which in no case would Hassan II rely on the support of the
Senegalese people in the unfair war he is waging against the Sahraouis.
Consequently, I specified that the PDS totally disapproves of this step
taken by the prime minister in Dakar and that no Senegalese soldier would
ever go into battle and die for Hassan II.
- The king of Morocco should abandon his illusions on this subject, whatever
~:romises may have been made to him. Such being the case, we held dis-
cussions with Sahraouis officials, specifically with Mohamed Lamine,
prime minister of the SDAR. I used the occasion to reassert our position
_ and ask about the development of the situation. We noted with satisfaction
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nc~~ suc.cc~5s achicved by Pc~l isario ~nd thc SDAR in b~rh mi l i t ary ;~nd
diplomatic are~~s, speciEically in the United Nations, the Organization of
African Unity, and the nonalined countries.
AFRI(2UG-ASIE: S~~~rikin~ c~f n~~c ion.~l 1 iberntion m~vem~nt ti, it iti nls~~
knuwn ~ I~,i t t h~~ I'U5 ha ti;i I w,iys I av~recl t hc~ st ru~;g I c wa~;ccl by l hc MPL~
~Popular Movement tor the Liber.ation of Angola] in Angola. If I am not
mistaken, you were among the first to recognize the people's republic
proclaimed by the now mourned President Neto. Y~t, as you undoubtedly
know, the leader of the FNLA [National Front for the Liberation of Ango}a] _
shadow muvement has ~eft Zaire for Dakar where he would like to settle.
On the other hand, you are equally aware of the relatio,. existing between
Savimbi, the leader of UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence
of Angola] shadow movement and Dakar. How do ~ou explain such relations
with movements which are in ef.fect fighting against the independence and
- sovereignty of their government with Pretoria's blessing~7
Abdoulaye Wade: In this case the answer could be very simple. As you
poin[ed out quite accurately, we have always supported the MPLA, and it
is proper to emphasize that our support given to this movement far pre-
cedes Angola's independence. E~en when Portugal was still very powerful
~ in the area, we, in Dakar, were the correspondents of the MPLA and the
Frel.imo, whereas, as one may remember, the Senegalese go~~~rnment was not
wclcomin~ Angolan nationalists. This is a question of implemenring one
of our steady principles. The Senegalese Democratic Party, as such, has
always f.ought, since its founding, on the side of the MPLA. On the
Senegalese level our action has always tried to make Savimbi and his gang
lose the use of our country as his base.
Recently, in the nakar National Assembly, we objected to the decision of
the Senegalese government to issue diplomatic passports to Savimbi and
his accomplices and to appoint Kakumba (its representative in Paris)
Senegal's honorary council in Liechtenstein for the only purpose of
_ allowing him to reside iri France. We opposed this and we have not given
up the Eight. We have ~quaLly opposed Savimbi's stay in Senegal and we
~rould do so a f.ortiori in the case of Holden, should the latter work to
stay in our country. After all, what a paradox! Whatever the feelings
~f President Senghor may be concerning the Angolan regime (f.or, unless I
ar: mistaken, at least officially, Mr Senghor has raised the question of
the Cuban presence in Africa and of what is described as the "Soviet
penetration" in the continent, as a reason for withholding recognition
from the Angolan government), this support g:.ven to governments which are
openly supported by South Africa seems incomprehensible. That is why, as
Ear as we are concerned, we shall continue our struggle on the side of -
the MPLA and oppose allowing Senegal to be used as a base for such
aggressive forces. In fact, this would constitute Senegal's interfer.ence -
_ in Angolan domestic affairs. For example, imagine that a movement for -
, 1. Something he was Eirst refused by the Senegalese government.
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the liberation of Senegal would be set up in Luanda! Would Mr Senghor not
_ be the first to consider this an abnormal situation'? One can hardly see
how a member of the Organization of AErican Unity could shelter a move-
ment which is conducting an armed insurrection against its own government,
,~15~ a member of [he Or~~nization of the African Unity!
AFRIQUE-ASIE: The third problem which, obviously, is of great importance
ro the peoplcs of the Third World is that of Palestine and the PLO. Here
~gain, your party has taken avant-garde positions opposing the conclusion
of. a separ.ate peace treaty between Israel and Egypt and against the Camp
David agreements. Could you give us an idea of the feelings of the
Senegalese people and, naturally, of your party, on the question of the
cause of the Palestinian people?
Abdoulaye Wade: Our party, as we know, supports as a matter of principle
all liberation movements, unconditionally. In other words, we let such -
movements define their own positions, for they are more familiar with -
the problems concerning them, while we give them dynamic support. That
is what we have done with the PLO. Furthermore, it is worth noting that
we have always attended all conferences and meetings of. support of the
PLO. As far as the Senegalese are concerned, let me recall the fact that
the break of diplomatic relations between Dakar and Tel Aviv was largely
caused by the reaction of the Senegalese people. It is well known thar
this popular pressure was manifested in [he mosques where, in the caurse
~F their prayers, the people cursed Israel and asked the governmenr r.o
hrcak relati~ns with thar state. This means that the Senegalese peopl.e
are far from being indiEfcrent ro such problems. The average Senegalesc
considers it scandalous for a people to be expelled from their fatherland.
That is why we can state that the majority of the Senegalese people
support the PLO and the Palestinian people in their just struggle.
- Let me add, incidentally, that Mr Senghor's government itself agreed quite
early to the opening of a PLO bureau in Senegal. This clearly proves th.at
Senegalese public opinion is largely favorable r.o the Palestinians.
AFRIQUE-ASIE: Still within the framework of foreign politics, I would
like to remind you of a statement you made to LE DEMOCRATE, your party's
journal, on the French intervention in Bangui. In this declaration which
o~as Eound somewhat surprising, not to say disturbing, by some people, -
specifically among progressive African circles, you considered that the
French intervention which overthrew Bokr~~:sa was, if not legitimate, at
- least justified because of his crimes and his bloodthirsty and corrupt
system. Is this assessment not conEl.icting with your basic positions and
those of the PDS? Namely, that it is unacceptable for France to resort
to colonial methods and that Africa should be the mistress of her
decisions. Yet, everyone knows that Dacko arrived in Bangui supported
by French bayonets af.ter French paratroops had virtually occupied the
capital and set up their system of fake "protection" of the people.
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Abdoulayc Wadc: 'nc~re is no contradiction. I believe rhat the pcople -
show too big a tendency to forget that Bokassa was put in power by the
French. Naturally, Bakassa made a coup de 'etat. However, in the view
of the PDS it is obvious that without the complicity of the French
riu~hc~rities hc would n~~ have bcen ablc ro remain at nc~ hcad of nc~
Central African state. Under such conditions I do not see the reasons -
f~r which those same Frenchmen could not intervene to overthrow him. I
believe that the problem should be considered from this viewpoint. In
my view, one must be a realist: Principles are one thing, but each
specific case should be examined. Dictatorships are durable and I believe
that without foreign intervention Bokassa could have not only remained _
emperor for life but also, perhaps, placed his offspring on the throne
and thus created a real dynasty. Once dicta.torships become rooted, the
native population finds it tremendously 3ifficult to get rid of them.
This is the reason for which we considered that the fact of helping
Bokassa's departure was a positive element.
AFRIQUE-ASIE: Nevertheless, we find this strange. By what right does a -
foreign power which, furthermore, has a colonial past and a neocolonial
present, intervene under the pretext of having been asked to do so by
some individuals, individuals w'~o, themselves, bear their ~!:are of
~ responsibility in the massacre of the people? Do you .-~ot see the danger
of such a precedent?
Abdoulaye Wade: Then let someone tell us what other means could the
Central Africans use to get rid of Bokassa? However, our judgment does
not stop there. The moment Bokassa was overthrown, and since France
having been more or less directly responsible for the conversion of the
Central Arrican republic into an empire merely by providing Bokassa with
rhe means to pursue his policies, Paris should not have intcrvened on the
level of individuals in order to impose anything whatsoever. France
should have insisted that the essence of the republic be maintained and
that~the different political groups engage in a dialogue with a view to
establishing a democratic sysrem based on free elections. One may think
that this is an abstract and politically impossible matter. Yet, such is
~ our party's stand.
Nevertheless, we do not appreciate the method used to bring Dacko in,
giving him military protection, and imposing him on the Central Africans.
AFkIQUE-ASIE: Nevertheless, the very principle of the intervention of
armed forces wh.ich have occupied our continent for quite some time, and
their return through methods which, alas, rer~ind us all too strongly of
the colonial period, is triggering, even if it were a question of over-
throwing Bokassa, a strong hostility and a malaisa in African public
opinion, particularly because of the thus established precedent. France
had many other means for overthrowing Bokassa, the more so since the
latter subsisted only thanks co French sunsidies and armaments and,
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- finally, thanks to the protection offered by Paris. Theref.ore, there was
no need whatever to send an army which today appears like an army of
occupation in charge of protecting Dacko against, unquestionably, a
popular opinion which does not want him.
Abdoulnye Wade: Obviously, we agree on the fact that France goC rid ~f
Bokassa. Now, howcver, the question is that oE the means. I believe
tha[ this is a value judgment. Bokassa's reactions had to be raken into
cc~ntiideration. }ie could have made new alliances which, in fact, he tried
to promote.
I believe that it was the question of speed which led the French to use
military means. I would like to remind you, however, that the Cuban
intervention in Angola was of a military nature and that we approved of
it. . . .
AFRIQUE-ASIE: There will never be a comparison between interventionist
France and internationalist Cuba. Furthermore, Cuba sent its volunteers
on the request of a sovereign and legal government, to oppose the invasion
of South African racist forces and of Zaire mercenaries.
Abdoulaye Wade: Naturally, we approved of this, f.or we considered that
to the extent to which Angola and its people were the victims of
ag~ression on the one hand, by South Africa and, on the other, by inter-
ventionist forces through Zairc, it was entirely norm~l f.or the legal
~overnment in Luanda to ask its f.oreign friends to help.
Ilowe~~er, in the Central African c.ase, who could have asked for a military
inrervention? As to democratic principles, the Bokassa regime, which had
come to power througn a coup d'etat being illegal, in my view, the
other Central Africans had perfectly the right, in turn, to request
_ foreign military assistance. Actually, I publically approved of
the Tanzanian military intervention in Ouganda to overthrow Amin Dada,
and of Vietnam to overthrow Pol Pot.
Naturally, there are differences. The Cubans have no wish to colonize
Africa, any more than Nyerere has the intention of colonizing Ouganda.
It is only a question of knowing, in the Central African case, the means
- which they had to get rid of Bokassa at that time. Therefore, in my view,
there was no contradiction in the PDS positions.
AFRIQUE-ASIE: Currently Africa is undergoing a crisis. Some consider it
a growth crisis. We believe that it is rather a question of ar~ssen-
tially political crisis or, more accurately, of a manifestation of the
struggle waged on the international level against p~wers which try to
dominate thelcontinent and recolonize it. What is your assessment of
this period?
1. See AFRIQUE-ASIE No 202. e
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Abdoul;iye Wade: I shlre yaur views. Our position is Afric~n. Un-
qu~titionably, we should use our foreign relarions 1nd foreiKn ~lli;~ncc~5.
Flowever, they should be such as to help us protect our identity and help
Africa to ensure its political independence. Such is our objective.
Within this framework, some of my friends and I thought of promoting the
idea of an African alternative to development, in order to break the
vicious circte which consists of wondering whether we should ally our-
selves with the East or the West. We believe that an African posi[ion
should exist between these two a[titudes, a position which, so far, has '
never been defined and which we would like to define in order to help the
Africans find themselves after crossing a certain number of gaps in-
herited from the colonial system or more or less imported from the out-
side. Naturally, we do not want to involve the states. It would be a
question of ineE:tings among African personalities, political parties, etc.
This is a way o,E expressing nonalinement in development terms. Such is
our target. The~ idea is in the air. We have prepared a draft letter and
are calling for a meeting by the African political groups and person-
alities which have always proven their unconditional loyalty to the con-
t inent .
AFRIQUE-ASIE: Let us discuss briefly Senegal. How do you characterize
its present situation?
Abdoulaye Wade: My answer will be extremely clear: It is catastrophic.
First, the economic and f.inancial situation is bad. It is believed that,
normally, the indebtedness of a country should not exceed 10 to 15 per-
cent, whereas, currently, Senegal's indebtedness i; 27.5 percent. Start-
ing with 1~80 we shall have to meet annual payments of 24-25 billion CFA
francs. Whatever the government may be saying, we are no longer able to
pay. Our balance of payments is chronically negative and we do not see
what economic mechanism would enable us t~ repair the situation.
Our position in terms of the Central Bank of West African States is
disastrous. The Central Bank may advance funds to a state within a ratio
of. 15 to 17 percent of its revenue. Yet, we have exhausted all our
facilities in this area and this very day drawings by Senegalese financial
~nstitutions can no longer be honored.
From the economic viewpoint the situation is worsening. As a result of
poor.ly spaced rains, we should not expect the type of harvest which could
promote an economic upswing. There if one financial scandal after -
another. Companies in which the state owns stock are failing one after
another. A number of misuses and misappropriations, with complicity on
the highest levels, are being discovered.
All this creates a particularly grave situation.
F
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A~R1(2UF-AS1F.: Whai ~irc y~ur solueion~ ~nd how do you h~pc to h~vc them
implemented, by parliament for example, where the PDS has only 18
deputies?
Abdoulaye Wade: The "drama" of Senegal is that it is seeking solutions
without undertaking the required structural reforms. The problems I men-
tioned are merely ~he symptoms of a deeper ill which could be healed
through structural reforms alone. Yet, the Senegalese Socialist Party is
unable to do so. Obviously, the party in power is trying to make changes,
borrowing from the PDS program. However, we believe, first of all, that
even from the point of view of political ethics, a party which has failed
should yield its seat. The only solution today is for the Socialist Party
to abdicate the power. I believe that this idea is advancing. As far as
we are concerned, we believe that the PDS is a replacement properly
conscientious and organized, and supplied with a realistic program.
AFRIQUE-ASIE: Yet, how to achieve such changes? Would it be through
elections and, in such a case, do you believe that the party of Leopold S.
Senghor, which enjoys a parliamentary majority, could yield? Secondly,
do you consider possible the formation of a government of national union
in which your party and, perhaps, other political groups would be repre-
sented? Finally, the question which is asked by sympathize.rs of the PDS
and of the other parties is to know why you are not trying to organize a
front of opposition political parties, specifically in order to strengthen
- the opposition.
~J
Abdoulaye Wade: The next ele~tions are scheduled for 19$3. However, I
do not believe that Senegal could wait until then to implement a new
policy. The economic circumstances which lead to an ever worsening
social situation could result in disturbances which could break out any-
time unless the government is contemplating the holding of elections,
which is not a hypothesis to be dismissed.
AFRIQUE-ASIE: You believe, therefore, that the~Assembly should accept
the anticipated elections?
Abdoulaye Wade: It is a possibility, for the Assembly no longer precisely
reflects Senegal's political panorama.
As to the creation of a government of national union, that is yet another
possibility! However, in any case, a national union government led by
the Socialist Party would be absolutely unacceptable, for it would mean
an attempt [o implement with ~ew faces a program which proved incapable
o; changing the situation. Therefore, the possibility of a national union
government can be enterta~ined anly if the government is headed by the PDS.
Our party has an extremely broad concep: concerning this viewpoint.
Furthermore, everyone well knows that were we to be asked to head such a
government, we would do so in association with honest, credible, and `
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competent elements, whether members of the Socialist Party, the RND
[National Democratic Rally] or other political groups.
We have always said that after sincere and ciemocratic elections which
would the level of representation of each political group, the various
~ parties should set up what WP. call a national front, based on a minimum
program. It is not a question of a front consisting of two or three
parties or of a common program, but of a truly national front. At such a
point a government could be formed under the guidance nf the party which
has won the election, so that this minimum program could be applied with
- the participation of inembers of all political groups which took part in
the elections. Outside this minimum program each party would be free to
defend its own specific program and to promote it with an eye to new
elections. Let us further specify that, in any case, the PDS would
reject such a government headed by the Senagalese Socialist Party.
Some African countries have chosen the one-part_y system. In Senegal we
have Eour. We believe that all we would need would be two large parties
plus a Marxist-Leninist party. Some may say that we are presenting the
Marxists with a rather large gift. The point is that the Marxists have
such a particular design for a~ociety that they should be given the
� opportunity to defend their ideas. Conversely, we believe that all other
~ Senegalese should either be members of a group holding the power or of an
opposition group. Senghor, who recognized a conservative party, went -
further. Experience justified us, however, since, subsequently, we saw a
number of other applications for the founding of parties. It is a
question of making a courageous choice, and being firm about it, whatever
imperfections might exist and gn forward. The Marxists aside, there are
no basic ideological differences between the other opposition elements
and the PDS. To blame us for having established a party before them is
human. However, the problem of the Senegalese opposition is one of
personalities and goes no fur[her. Therefore, we should be able to find
the means to settle this matter. We are sufficiently democratic to be
ablc to tell the other opposition elements, as we have always done, the
Eollowing: "You have no political groups while our party is here. It is
ready to open its doors to you." Anyone could apply for any position,
including the one I hold presently, but democratically.
To sum it up, I believe that there are two problems which arise. The
first is that of a~ertain unification among opposition forces. There-
fore, we have repeatedly issued appeals and are currently discussing with
the t9arxists a means for engaging in joint acti:~n, either within the
framework of the PDS or otherwise. Before the founding of the PDS I had
contacted all po~itical personalities and had asked them to set up, with
me, a party which . had no intention whatever of leading. However, these
people did not believe in [he possibility of setting up a political
opposition group. They believed, at that time, that such an initiative
would have only enhanced the Leopold S. Senghor government. In my view,
this was a wrong estimate. I had answered them as follows: "I would not
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fail to open my umbrella, if I needed it, even though someone else might
srek sheltcr under it."
The sccond problem is extcrnal. I believe that thc rcalir.ies of Sene~;al
arc understoocl very poorly ab road. 'Che rcason Cor which we are so
popular among the peasant masses is because we are figh[ing for the
elimination of the ONCAD [National Office of Cooperation and Assistance
for Development], and because we are supporting the farmers' claims.
As [c the question of recogn izing the parties, an eventual amendment to
the constitution, etc., this should be a problem to be resolved among the
Senegalese. It is not up Co the people abroad to express their views on
such subjects.
Therefore, we find it incred ible to hear some people abroad speaking of
an "institutional crisis" in Senegal!
AFRIQUE-ASIE: We are witnes sing today in Iran an extraordinary growth of
the power of Islam. Have these events had repercussions on public
opinion in Senegal, an Islam ic country?
Abdoulaye Wade: Naturally, the situation in Iran has led to happenings
throughout the worid and, a f ortiori in Senegal. However, such happenings
have remained limited. I re c ently received statements of aEfiliation
with the PDS of Senegalese priests who made public statements. They
requested of ine the application of the principles of the Koran, should
[he PDS one day come into power.
It is obvious that this is more or less inspired by the events in Iran.
However, personally, I am not worried on this subject, for I am a prac-
ticing Moslem myself, as are many PDS members.
As to the principles of the Koran, the population has never observed them,
ever before colonization, be cause of the power of African customs. There-
fore, it is hardly likely that a Se.iegalese system would ever adopt the
ayatollah system. . . .
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
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SENEGAL
RICE SUPPLY, DISTRIBUTION PROBLEMS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3329
[Article: "The Rice Supply Problem"]
[TextJ Rice, a high-consumption commodity, was in short supply on the
Senegalese markec in mid-November. In Cape Verde the shortage of this
product threatened to turn into dearth, and rice was selling at 100 CFA
francs, instead of the Afficial price of 80 CFA francs.
, The Senegalese cozsume approximately 18,000 to 20,000 tons of rice a
month. ONCAD (Nationa~ 0ffice of Marketing and Assistance for Develop-
ment), which is m~rketing this product, has a rice stock capable of satis-
fying national requirements for several months. On 19 November, however,
ONCAD decided to suspend the distribution of rice.
The origin of this situation is the fact that the minister of finance and
economic affairs asked the office to sell during the month of November the
stock of "old rice" which it has been holding for several years. A com-
mittee of experts has found the rice to be fit for consumption.
After this decision only 124 quota-holders agreed to take their shares,
or 4,000 tons of "Siam" rice and 827 tons of Argentinian out of a total
quantity of 12,896 tons for both rices. Seven thousand nine hundred
sixty-nine tons still renained for 57 other quota-holders who delayed
coming f orward.
It seems that certain quota-holders had sought to put pressure on ONCAD _
for this stock of old rice to be sold off cheaply, indeed, given up to
certain persons, as used to happen in the past, affording certain persons _
an opportunity to speculate and make considerable profits.
The director of internal trade indicated that the refusal to collect the
quotas will be penalized by the reduction of certain enterprises' quotas.
The quarterly revisions of the quotas are based on the effective collec-
tion of the preceding quarters.
. An agreement was finally reached, hcwever. At the close of a meeting with
the minister of finance :ind economic affairs on 21 November, the Office of
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Economic Pools of Senegal required traders to collect their quotas
before 28 November. Under this agreement, the traders thus agreed to
yield to ONCAD's requirements, that is to say, to take one-third of
their quota in Argentinian rice, the other two-thirds being composed of
"S1rim" ric:e. A~ T.F S~T,i:TT, of 23 November wrote, the contest of strength
betwcc~n certain quota-tiolJing traders and ONCAD has thus been resolved, a
fact which makes ~_t possible to avoid selling off cheaply 4,000 tons of
entirely edible rice. _
Reform of ONCAD nonetheless stands a good chance of being realized. In
particular, the marketing of rice would be entrusted to the Price
Equalization and Reductian Bank.
The Senegalese press wish that the minister of finance and economic affairs
would seize this opportunity *o eliminate from the market distribu tors who
give little thought to regularizing distribution or who are incapable of
adequate stocking for want of financial means.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Monreux et Cie, Paris, 1979 -
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SENEGAL
DATA ON NEW LANDS COMPANY
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3329
[Article: "New Lands: Four Projects Spread Out Over 7 Years"]
[Text] On the occasion of the meetir~g on 6 November last of the Regional_ -
Committee of the Development of East Senegal, Moctar Tall, the director
general of the New Lands Company (STN), declared that 20 years from now
the population directed by~th~.s company in East Senegal could reach _
~ 100,000 persons, mesnbers af 10,000 families (versus 7,000 persons and
900 familie~ at present) cultivating a total area of 70,000 hectares.
~ This is the objective assigned to 4 projects for extending the perimeters
of the STN, which will cost 11.5 billion CFA f rancs in total. In return,
_ the value of the added production would be on the order of 2.5 billion per -
year. Diversified agricultur~ and integrated livestock-raising are pro-
- vided for. ~
The first project is located in the Sandougou Valley (the province of
Tamba) and involves the improvement of a zone presently occupied by
classified forest and having a very high percentage of high quality lands
in terms of a.griculture.
In the second project, located in the district of Bala, the improvement
of virgin lands at the Nieriko-Mayel Samou perimeter is contemplated.
The third concerns the classified forest of Maleme-Niani Sud (the district
of Koumpentoum), while the fourth project involves the improvement of a
potentially irrigable zone by bringing in new population.
The realizacion of these different pro,jects should theoretically be staggered
over 7 years, from the 6th to the lOth Plan.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979
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SENEGAL
BRIEFS
PROJECT REPLACING BUD-SENEGAL--The liquidation of Bud-Senegal has left _
a void in Senegalese market gardening that will be diff icult to fill,
given the ambitions which accompanied this exceptionai agro-industrial
project at its start. In order to fill this gap a more modest project
has been begun. It involves a popularization project employing some 200
persons, plus a framework which would insure crop rotation and cultivation
and marketing techniques. This would be a temporary solution, since tha
liquidation of Bud-Senega? has put some 3,000 persons out of work. At the
production level, the former~Bud workers would prefer to grow tomatoes,
' for example, instead of inelons, whose yield is too uncertain. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAJX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3330]
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- SIERRA-LEONE
3RIEFS
- AMNESI'Y INTERNATIONAL REPORT--In its last annual report for the 12-
~ month period ending on,30 April, Amnesty International expressed its
satisfaction with the reconciliation policy conducted by president
Siaka Stevens and his ~overnment in dealing with the old opposition
members of the SLPP (SI-erra-Leone People's Party). It noted that,
since the implementation of this policy--which, we recall, made it
possible to include cer'tain former opposition members in the mini-
~
sterial team cons*ituted on 15 August 1978 (MTM [MARCHES TROPICAUX ET -
MEDITERRANEENS], 25 August 1978, p 2255)--there were no more scenes
of political violence similar to those early in 1977. In February of
that year, it was necessary to declare a sr,ate of emergency; it was
again ordered in February of the next yea~;- and even last February. In
May 1978, there were 150 political prisoners but almost all were re-
leased one month later following the approval of the new constitu-
tion, by the population, establishing the single party (MTM, 23 June
1978, p 1751). In March of that year, Amnesty International--ir~ spite
of the continuation oF the state of emergency--was informed by the
government tliat no pri~.oners were being held in the Freetown prisons.
[TextJ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 December
- 1979 p 3625] 5058
FRG FORES`fRY EXPERTS--At the end of 1978 six experts from the Atlanta
Co,~sulr. Company, in Hamburg, had gone to Sierra Leone to consider the
problems relatcd to the r.eforestation of the country. Its mission,
financed by the European Economic Community, was to be the basis for a
~ational development program of forestry resources. The Atlanta Consult
- team noted that the local. forestry administration could not, as it was
said, with its lack of skilled personnel and of organization, undertake a
proper development project. It also noted that the somewhat obsolete
legislation in this area would be another handicap. Therefore, they
suggested the modification of both the administration and the legislation.
Studies concerning such modiEications would be conducted un[il next
- spring and make it possible at that time to consider the implementation
of. a program within satisfactory conditions. The studies cover, on the
one hand, the reorganization of the administration, strictly speaking,
ar~d, on the other, all regulations, ranging from the right to the utiliza--
tion of the land and measures for forestry protection to the standard-
ization of concessions, fiscal measures, and measures related to the con-
version and treatment of the timber. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Dec 79 p 3680] 5157
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TAN7.ANIA
BRIEFS
- PETROLEUM PRICES INCREASED--The Tanzanian government increased prices
on petroleum products and lubricants between 41 and 56 percent, the
Tanzanian ministry of water, energy, and mineral resources announced
on 15 December. This decision is in keeping with the demands of the
_ locat oil companies whose prices had not been raised since 1976. The
rise in petroleum prices will a'so affect Zambia which gets its petro-
leum'from Tanzania. fText) [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
= in French 21 Dec 79 p 3632] 5058
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ZAIRE
~
BRIEFS � '
ZAIRE DELIVERS ITYDROCARBONS--Zaire has just supplied 90 tons of gasoline
and gas-oil to the Central African authorities, the Kinshasa authorities
announced on 26 November. This motor-fuel, the delivery of which follows
a request by President Dacko, was sent on 2~ and 26 November via C-130
Hercules airplanes of the Zairian Air Force. It has also been indicated
that 30 Central African students registered at the Faculty of Law of the
National University of Zaire (UNAZA) at President Dacko's request are
expected very shortly in Kinshasa. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3340] 9380
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