JPRS ID: 74935 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040035-7
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• Document Page Count: 80
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 35
• Content Type: REPORTS

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1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ _

i~ ~ JRNUARY 19~0 ~ N0. ~067 ~ ~ OF ~
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= JPRS 74935
- 15 Ja?~uary 1980
~ st North ~frica Re ort
Near Ea p
No. 2067
, ~BIS FOREIGN BROADCAST lNFORMATION SERVICE
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REPOitT DOCUMENTATION ~E~~ 2� 3. R~cIDI~nY. ~c�,.~o~ Ho
PAGE JPRS 74935 i
1. litl~ �nd SuCt41� - S. R~port Dota ~
NEAR EA5T/NORTH AFRICA REPORT , No . 2 0 6 7 15 Jan ua 19 8 0
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7. Aulhnr(N... _ e. P~Aormin~ Orpnlt~llan R~Dt N.i
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JPRS 74935
15 January 1980
NEAR EAST/I~ORTN AFRICA REPORT
No. 2067
CONTENTS PAGE
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Tunis Arab Sur~mit Meetir,gs, Resolutions Discussed
(AL-MUSTAQBAL, 1 Dec 79)..0 1
Report on General D~scussions, by Ghassan Bayram
Summit's Secxet Resolutions, by George Bashir
Report on Compromises, by As'ad Haydar
USSR's Rslations With Southern Neighbors Reviewed
_ (Emile Pignol; DEFENSE NATIONALE, Oct 79) 25
- ALGERIA
Student Strikes, Demonstrations Disturb Authorities
(Daniel Junqua; LE MONDE, 7, 12 Dec i9) 33
'Arabizing' Students Strike
Teacher Shortage Hamp~rs Arabization
BAHRAIN
I:ighway Projects Announced by Director of Works
(GULF MIRROR, 1-7 Dec 79) 37
Briefs
Hyundai Cable Deal 38
IRAN
Soviet Strategy Seen 3ehind Present Turmoil
(Annie Kriegel; LE FIGARO, 16, 26 Nov 79) ..............0 39
Communist-Anticommunist Alliance
Soviet Strategy in Iran
a - [III - NE & A - 121]
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CO~ITENTS (Continued) Page
Mc~re U.5. Embassy llocuments Reveal Secrets
(KEYHAN, 3 Dec 79) 46
~ Staff Contacts With Locals
Ties With Capitalists
ISRAEL
Briefs
Uranium Production 52
,
LEBANON
Bashir al-Jumayyil Explores Possibilities of Solution
to Country's Crisis
(Bashir al-Jumayyil Interview; AL-NAHAR AL-~ARABI
" WA AL-DUWALI, 26 Nov-2 Dec 79) 53
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Abu Dhabi Tanker Firm Widens Operations
(Michael Fernandez; EMIRATES NEWS, 11 Bec 79)......... 74
- b -
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1NTI;lt-ARAB AI~FATft~
TUNIS ARAB SUA'R~IIT MEETINGS, RESOLUTIONS DISCUSSED
Report on General Discussions
Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 1 Dec 79 pp 28-31
- [Article by Ghassan Bayram: "Complete Dossier of Arab Summit No 10; Tunis
Summit Underlined Continued Wager on U.S. Position Till After U.S. Elections;
What Happened in Last Moments to Save Summit Resolutions on Southern Lebanon
From Failure; Lebanon Given Financial Aid for Which It Has not Asked and It
~ Has not Been Denied All It Went for"J
[Text] Tui.is--The Tunis summit which has not been able to constitute more than
extension to the Baghdad summit and which has not been able to do more than
renew the minimum-limit resolutions adopted by the Baghdad summit--what has
this lOth summit of the Arab kings azd presidents achieved insofar as the
problem of southern Lebanon is concerned?
Before the summit started its works on the morning of Tuesday, 20 November,
Syrian Foreign Minister 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam sat amonb a group of Arab jour-
nalists and talked about the accomplishments of the meeting of the Arab
ministers of foreign affairs which prepared for the summit.
Minister Khaddam considered the meetings of the ministers of forei;n affairs
among the most successful meetings held since he became minister of foreign
affairs. Furthermore, he believed that the summit conference being held under
the most serious conditions experienced by the Arab nation will not be less
successful than the summit held in Raghdad.
The statements of the Syrian minister have been interpreted in m~ny ways.
Some believe the statements to have emanated from the attitude of "expect
good and you will find it" whereas other Arab circles have considered minister
- Khaddam's statements to be justifiable. Days, and even weeks, before the con-
vocation of the summit, there were numerous wagers, and some of those wagers
were American in inclination and identity. The first wager had imagined that
if the Arab summit, or some of its leaders, tried to go further than the
Baghdad dummit had gone, it would be exposed t:o an explosion and that the
beads of the rosary of opposition to the Camp David accords would also be
exposed to the danger of being scattered.
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'Th~re were two Arab theories, each with its own vision of what should be de-
c�ided so that the Arab reply to Camp David may assume new and effective
~l~nu~ii;;iui~~; ;inc~ chr~t mean5 of pressure may be ~zdopted on the basis of the
It.ibl~clncl :~timn?1~ rc�~~>1u~1~~iiK m~~vc f,ruduully ,lncl ~~r.c~Kr~~y:~lvc~ly I r~~m ll~~~
minimum limit ta maximum limits.
The nrabs who had originally put their wager on the Americans have not changed
their vic:w oi affairs and they still insist on their wagers which call for
- awaiting U.S. positions and initiatives that will cancel or adjust the Camp
David course and will create new facts in the situation to help the realiza-
tion of a comprehensive Middle East solution, the achievement of the Pales-
- tinian people's legitimate rights to establish their state and withdrawal
~ of ttie Israelis from all the occupiea~Arab territories.
From the outset, the Arabs making these wagers dropped from their calcula-
eions any discussion of the use ~f Arab oil as a direct weapon against the
- U.S. policy, preferring to develop the means of political pressure on the
United States to achieve this goal.
On the other hand, the other Arabs, led by Syria and the PLO, believe that con-
tinuing the wager on the U.S. p~sition is a futile act and that Camp David
wlii.ch is now facing a dilemma and standing at a dead end has to be countered
with ~rab resolutions tl~at deal it the fatal blow and make the Americans
reassess their calculations and change their positions and policy. These
Arabs believe that the only means to achieve this goal is to use the Arab
- oil weapon.
It was evident Frem the concentrated side consultaticns, which surpassed in
their importance *_he summit meetings themselves, that the Arabs of the Soviets,
~ if we may use the term, are eager for the unity of. the Arab position as
re.flected by the Baghdad summit resolutions and do not want to lose in any
way tt~e minimum limit as the price of other demands, such as the use of the
oi1 weapon against the United States.
I'his eagerness for continued solidarity over the Baghdad resolutions greatly
helped to reduce excessive radicalism in the conference and to make moderation
the fundamental base for discussing and debating matters with the purpose of
reaching an understanding.
Libyan Chairman Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi refused from the outset to attend the
Tunis summit personally and delegated his minister of foreign affairs to re-
present him. But al-Qadhdhafi continued to express until the last moments
before the summit convocation his readiness to attend the summit provided
that a resolution to use the oil weapon against the United States and a
resolution in support of the Iranian revolution are adopted.
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Lt was very easy for the oil Arabs to accept the absence of the Libyan c~:airman
if this meant dropping the possibility of discussing boycotting the United
Stat~s and using the oil weapon against it. l-iowever, this was not enougl~, in
the view of these Arabs, to solve th~ problem and to avoid falling into cri-
_ tical pitfalls. It was feared that the Palestinians in the conf.erence, led
by Abu-'Ammar, would explode the issue of the oil weapon and would present this
issue as an inevitable option which the Arabs have to use to fight the U.S.
Camp David policy in the area. This issue commanded a large part of the con-
sultations which took place before the summit and during the "violent"
meetings that accompanied ttiis summit.
Meanwhile, the Palestinian resistanc leadership found itself facing one of
_ two options:
Either proceed to the end of the road with raising tne oil issue and with
insisting that an Arab resolution be adopted to usE the oil weapon a;: the
most successful means to compel the United States to abandon the Camp David
policy;
Or approach this matt~r flexibly in return for an Arab position supporting
the resistance's presence in southern Lebanon and opposing the Lebanese
working paper which the resistance had rejected, considering it a paper
intended to terminate its presence in the area of southern Lebanon.
The Arab oil countries have known how to exploit the card of the Palest~n.ian
resistance in southern Lebanon in the interest of the inclination calling
for not getting embroiled in the adoption of oil and political resolutions
aimed against the United States.
When the Palestinian resistance felt that its insistence on bringing up the
oil issue will cause it to pay the price in southern Lebanon, it accepted the
barter offered. it--a barter which called on it to forget about embarrassing
the summit with th? cii.l issue in return for ai? Aral~ position supportin~ its
r. igt-:r. to exist on the ~oil of southern Lebanon.
An Arab minister of foreign affairs said that the success of this deal saved tae
Arab summit from a failure that the summit had been certain to meet when it
started to discuss the developments of the Middle East crisis, the U.S.
~ Camp David policy and the means to bolster the confrontation against this
policy.
What contributed toward this success was the predoma.nance of the general
- Arab inclination insisting on guaranteed continuation of the Baghdad summit
resolutions as a fundamental base for Arab solidarity and on not exposing
this base to collapse should Arab differer.ces erupt in the conference over
what Arab position should be taken toward the United States in the coming
phase. Before the start of the summit's first working session, satisfaction
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wa5 evi.dent in the c:.rcles of the Arab delegations rejecting the adoption of
r~solutions against Washington. A member of these delegations said that the
compromise agreed upon in regard to the oil issue prepared the climate for the
adoption of moderate Arab resolutions reaffirming the course of the Baghdad
- resolutions in confronting Camp David on the basis of the minimum limit agreed
- upon in the Baghdad summit. ~
- Despite a~l th:is, the issue of oil as a weapon in the battle was not alto-
- ~;ettler absent from the Arab s~immit because the proposal made by Iraqi Pre-
sident Saddan Husayn somewhat ~ppeased the Arabs cn the frontline with Israel,
- including the Palestinians, while managing not to anger the oil Arabs.
-r;,~ rr_~~; nroposal called far ai~ economi:. Arab summit ta study tiie formulation
- of a plan tha~ links che oil weapon with the Arab nation's political interests,
- provided that this plan be submitted co the llth Arab summit scheduled ini-
~ tially to meet in Jordan.
The Arab delegations opposed to boycotting the United States and to adopting
= oil resoJ_ut:ions against it believe that between the present time and the con-
vocation o� the next Arab summit many new realities capable of changing the
present U.S. ~olicy will have emerged.
Th~ next Arab summit will be heZd, according to the estimates, in similar
days next year, i.e. at a time when the U.S. el2ctions will have taken place
and when it would be possible to talk about a new U.S. policy toward the
hiiddle East crisis--a policy free of tha election pressures and considera
tions.
`1'his is why the Iraqi resolution was approved quickly when pres~nted to dis- _
cussion, especially since it was supported dy the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
'rhe kings and presidents then proceeded to discuss the political means of pres-
sure to f oit Camp David and to continue tightening the blockade against chis
~~olicy at the Arab and inr_ernational levels without dwelling on the oil
issue for too long.
LJhen the Arab kings and presidents began to discuss the formulation of an ~
- Arab working plan for the coming phase, tihe discussion focused on the Euro-
pean role and there was almost unanimous consensus that western Europe's
position should be more clearly and effectively on the side of the Arab
right and the side of working to achieve a comprehensive settlement for the `
Aliddle East crisis--a settlement that brings about full withdrawal from the
occupied Arab territories and would give the Palestinian people the~r right _
to se.lf-determination and to the creation of their state on their own land-- -
and, consequently, on the side of the efforts to drop the Camp David policy
and to recognize the PLO officially.
4 -
~
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_ After reaching consensus on entrustir_g delegations of Arab ministers of
foreign affairs to tour the European countries, a tendency emerged within the -
conference to include the United States in the countries to be visited by ~
the ministers of foreign affairs. `
Sudanese President Ja'far Numayri initiated the proposal in this regard,
~ksing the confereiice to adopt a resolution calling for opening a new dialogue
- with the U.S. admini~tration and wi.th the U.S. constitutional institutions.
Numayri said that the signs of new transformations have begun to emerge in
- the U.S. public opinion and that big political and non-political sectors of
- this public ~~pinion have begun to disp].ay an ever-growing understanding of the
~ Arab right, especially tne Palestinian people's righ*c: This i_s why these
new conditions must be exploited to open a new Arab dialogue with Washington ,
to cumpei it to change its staaces toward the Palestinian people's rights _
and toward the Arab cause.
Th? strongest opposition to this groposal came from Syrian President Hafiz
al-Asad and PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat. President al-Asad has com2 ~o con-
sider the position of Carl-er's administration hopeless, as proven by experience. ~
He said that the U.S. administration considers the Camp David accords its
firm strategy in the Middle East and that ir approaches the crisis on the
t~asis of this logic.
~ President al-Asad addressed President Numayri, saying that the United States
is still plotting against the Arab and Palestinian right and that it has not -
and will not give anything to the Arab right. If I had a dim hope in the
possi'oility of effect~.ng a change in the U.S. position, I would be the first
to go personally to Washi_ngton ta hold a dialogue with it.
Abu-'Ammar followed the example of the Syrian president in opposiag Numayri~s
proposal and in launching a scathing attack on the U.S. policy, describing `
it as a policy opposed to the Arab right gener.ally and to the Palestinian
right in particular. Abu-'Ammar provi.ded a historical recount of tlle U.S.
~
positions that harbor nothing but hostility and plotting against the Arab
- and Palestinian rights. He called for dropping all the wagers on the U.S.
policy whose bankruptcy has begun to show in the dilemma being faced by the
Camp David negotiations.
Betting on time lias been the undeclared outcome with wtiich the Tunis summit
_ has emerged. The Arab kings and presidents who underlined with their con-
sensus the success scored by the Baghdad resolutions in fighting the Camp
David policy and in enabling the Arab solidarity to succeed in the face of
all th~ attempts made to bring the Camp David accords from the sphere of Lhe
partial solutions that have been confronted with the crisis of the self-rule
negotiations to the sphere of comprehensive solutions--these kings and presi-
dents believe that continuation of the Baghdad summit resolutions is the
only possible means for continuing the confrontation and that it i~ impossible
to formulate a new and more effective and influential policy in the coming
phase. ~
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A n,cr~ber of the Palc:stinian delegation has acknowiedged r.hat the Arab states
clemrni5trntc>d in th~ Tunis summit thlt they cannot go farther than the Ba~hdad
= tiummit wen~ because there are sti11 among r.he Arabs thosc~ whose wager on ~I?c
U.S. position and on the need to wait till after the U.S. elections.
- Excluciing the opening and final sessions, the Arab summit held only onP
working session whicli was devoted to discussing the f~rst item of the agenda
concerning the Middle East cr~.sis and Camp David. The second working session
in which the Arab kings and president:: were supposed to discuss the problem
of southerr~ Lebanon was not held because of the f undamental conflict existing
between the Lebanese working paper on the one hand and the Palestinian worlcing
paper on the other.
- Lebunese Problem
As of the moment the Arab kings and presidents started arriving in the Tunisian
capital, the lights were f ocused on the role awaiting the Syrian president
to bring the Lebanese and Palestinian positions closer to one another and to _
exert ~fforts to save ttie summit from failing to reach resolutions on southern _
Lebanon.
t:~ the side efforts he made in this regard, Syrian Foreigr. Minister 'Abd-
al-Halim Khaddam was stressing that Lebanon had rejected the Palestinian
working paper and that the Palestinians had rejected the Lebanese working
paper and that, therefore, the solution could only come by compelling both
sides to accept the Arab working paper drawn up by the co~ranittee emanating -
from the Arab ministers of foreign affairs because this paper was eager to
- establish a balance between the Palestinian. revolution's right to struggle
and the. right of the State of Lebanon to savereignty over its southern
~ territories. Khac~.dam added that as a consequence, a formul.a hzd to be reached
to make it possible to implement the Security Council resolutions concerning
the south.
What c~rew the attention of all the conference circles was the intransigence _
disnlayed by Lebar.ese President Ilyaa Sarkis in all phases of the side con-
sultations and meetings held to emerZ*,e w~th a solution formula for tne problem
of the south. The Lebanese president's intransigent position spread the be-
l.ief among s~me Arab delegations tha~ Lebanon had come to the conference to
put the Arabs face to f ace with one of two things:
Either produce an Arab solution that ousts the Palestinian re~istance from
southern Leoanon and restores peace to this area;
Or he will go seek an international solution that nay perhaps consist of
- joining Camp Daivd~
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_ 'I'li~~ I':il~~tillni.in clelc~};rttfon membcrv knew I?ow te~ 5lrc~n~;Ch~~n Ll~iti hc~ll~~f ~imun~;
the majority oE the Arab delegations and to create an arn~osphere of dissatis-
Caction w.ith the Lebanese positic,n.
The Palestinian delegation charged that the Lebanese working paper entails =
abolition of the Cairo agreement and the ouster of the resistance from the south
�or purposes that ultimately serve certain U.S. goals which the 'lat~st U.S.
initia tive had already tried to achieve.
The Lebanese delega*_ion found itse].f compelled to exert efforts to disperse
this atmosphere engulfing the Lebanese position. This caused President Ilyas
Sarkis to expand the circle of his contacts with the Arab leaders, especially
those with influence, to underline the dangerous sitiiation in the south and
to stress the enormous dangers awaiting Lebanon and the Arabs ir. case the Arab
summit fails to adopt ~?ecisive resolutions.
Lebanese Prime Minister Dr Salim al-Huss said that President Sarkis attended
the conference, and had even called for this summit, to avert three danger::
threatenin~ Lebanon through its southern part:
The f irst danger is that of Israel resorting to renewing its attacks on the
south in a more ferocious manner. -
The second danger is that of the eruption of a sedition in Lebanon that as-
_ sumes this time serious dimensions that would submerge the Arab area in re-
ligious and sectarian seditions.
Tr,e third danger is that of internationalizing the situation in Lebanon and
of the possible subsequent dangers that may cause more than one Arab country,
in ad dition to Lebanen, to pay the price this time.
Prime Mitiister al-Huss said that if the Arab summit could not guarantee an
end to the Israeli at*_acks, then it could put an end to the two other dangers,
namely: The eruption of a sedition and the internationalization of the Le-
banese situation.
In the mini-working sessions that included a number of Arab heads of state,
in addition to Abu-'Ammar, the Lebanese pr~sident explairied these dangers
very clearly and stressed that the Palestinians had misunderst~od the Le- _
banese positior., [saying]: "They thought that we have come to demand aboii-
tion of the Cairo agreement and the ouster of the resistance from the south -
whereas the truth is that we have come, through the working paper that we
have presented, to try to give priority to the implementation of the U.N.
Security Council resolutions concerning the south. These are immediate and ~
urgent matters. When we succeeded in implementing them and when Lebanon -
- regains its sovereignty, it will then become possible to discuss imFlementa-
tion of the Cairo agreement."
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I'resi.denC Sarkis constantly ~Lressed the need not to indulge in faulty inter- ,
E~r~tations. Even though the conference atmosphere was from the outset a �
PU~estinian atmosphere, the Lebanese position was understood and a strong
ccnviction developed among the Arab leaders of the need to give the Lebanese
pr~sident an Arab solution so that he~may not be faced with Che inevitability
of l.~oking for orher s~lutions through internationalization or any other simi-
lar ciiannels. .
it was obvious from the atmosphere that preduminated rhe sunu~ait conference as c
= a result of the open conf rontation which erupted between the Lebanese and Pa-
]_esti_nian sides that the Arab lea~ers felt that this was the f.irst time in
which they were truly f~.ced with a struggle between two rights: Lebanon's
rig}it to regain its security and sovereignty and to avert the fateful dangers
- suri-ounding it and the Palestinian revolutions's right to survival. Regarding
- these two rights, President Sarkis once again reaffirmed that adoption of _
ttie Lebanese working paper constitutes the beginning of the path toward _
- achieving security and peace in Lebanon, saying that it is not permissible -
that the Arab states continue to burden Lebanon with all the weight of the issue
because Lebanon has endured more than it can withstand and that it no longer
has the capacity to endure any more, unless it is at the expense of its fu-
ture and survival.
Lebanon's Fate and Palestine's Fate
'The Iraqi president was frank when he asked President Sarkis: Where do you
want to gc with the Palestinian resistance and the Palestinians? He then -
added: I want to be frank with you on matters that you already know, namely
that r.one of the Arab states is prepared to receive the Palestinian resistance
on ir.s soil. The Palestinians were in Jordan and you know what nappened to
them there. They then came to Lebanon and Lebanon has become their only re-
fuge. This has been their fate, as it has been Lebanon's fate.
Tne Iraqi president went on with his conversation with President Sarkis,
advocating more patience and wisdom and saying that Lebanon has no option other
than to reach an understanding with the Palestinians until their issue is
settled.
Ti~e fact is that what President Saddam Husayn said reflected the opinions of
all the Arabs kings and presidents who made it evident that nore of them is
rPady to take the responsibility for a decision to oust the Palestinian resis- =
tance from the south, keeping in mind that its presence in the south will
~ continue to be a source of danger to Lebanon or at least a justif ication for
continued Israeli attac?cs.
In the final session in which votes were cast on the resolutions concerning
the issue of southern Lebanon, the pre~ralent belief was that the Arab summit
had not been able to score a victory in connection with the situation in
southern Lebanon. This failure was reflected in the disappointment preva-
lent among the Lebanese delegation circles.
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. The source of this feeling was the mutual reservations expressed by both the
Lebanese and Palestii.ian delegations on some provisions of the resolutions.
The Lebanese side expressed i.ts reservation on the provision calling for
"regulating the armed Palestinian presence in the southern areas within
jurisdiction of the U.P1. forces in accordance with an agreement reached be- ~
tween the State of Lebanon and the PLO."
Un tlle other hand, the Palestinian side expressed its reservation on the pro-
vision stating that "the conference has taken cognizance of what the PLO
has done in regard to refraining from issuing statements from Lebanon on the
actions carried out by the resistance inside the occupied territories."
- At the conclusion of the final session and while the delegations were pre- -
paring to leave the Tunisian capital, Lebanese Prime Minister Dr Salim al-
Huss contacted Syrian Foreign Minister 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam and held with
him an urgent meeting in which al-Huss expressed his disappointment over the
conclusion of the conference with resolutions on which reservations are
expressed, saying that these reservations constitute a failure for the summit
because they torpedo completely the possibilities of implementation and turn
the resolutions into mere ink on paper. A1-Huss praposed that President
l~afiz al-Asad take the initiative to intervene quickly and persuade Abu-'Ammar
to drop his reservations.
Khaddam asked Prime Minister al-Huss: If Abu-'Ammar drops his reservations, ~
will President Ilyas Sarkis drop Lebanon's reservations?
Yr.ime Minister al-Huss replied that the situation is different insofar as
Lebanon is concerned and that Lebanon is for~ed to maintair~ its reservations,
or at Yeast to turn them into observations, because it will ask on the 19th
of next month for extension of the U.N. forces stay ir. southern Lebanon and
this extension may falter if there is an official approval for continuation
of the armed Palestinian presence inside the areas of the U.N. forces
- operation. ~
Prime Minister al-Huss, accompanied by Minister Khaddam, then proceeded to -
President Hafiz al-Asad's suite and reviewed the situation with him from -
this angle. The Syrian president was persuaded and immediately contacted
Abu-'Anunar who went to President al-Asad's suite and held a short private
meeting with him after which the Palestinian leader was persuaded of with- _
drawing his reservations.
It was also agreed to hold an emergency meeting at the airport VIP lounge
where the Arab kings and presidents will have arrived in preparation for de-
parting. -
9
~
t. ~
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I i I~~� V I I' I~i~ni~~,~~, AI>u-'Amm~ir. nnit~~unc�~~cl t~, 1 hc~ Ar,~h {c�(n}r,r+ ~incl ~~rc~:a (~I~~iit w f t I~- _
clraw,il ul Clie I'I~~':. r~servations on tlie summtl- r~~~~~.l.uelon conceriitng the sc~utli.
In liis address, Abu-'Ammar said: Our presence in Lebanon is temporary and
trar~si.tory. We hope it will not be prolonged and that it will end shortly.
Ile also said that the Palestinians reject a subst3tute homeland for Palestine
and reEuse to be resettled in Lebanon or in any other Arab country. Had
we wanted resettlement, we would hav~ accepted the Camp David accords which ,
~re tant~~mount to a plan to resettle the Palestinians in Lebanon.
- ~bu-'Ammar wanted to reassert this Palestina.an position against xesettlement
to disperse the many fears expressed by President Sarkis in the meetings ar.d
~ consultations held and in which he warned that the continued presence of the
Pa:lestinians in southern Lebanon in its current form is only a prelude to
~ their resettlement in the south. He said that this has begun to pose the
threat of a sedition erupting between the southern citizens and the Pales-
= tini~ns and assuming serious dimensions throughout Lebanon, and perhaps the
Arab area, because Israel and its supporters are still wagering on this kind
- of re~;ional and sectarian seditions and wars among the Arabs to pass the par-
titian plans.
Though th~ Palestinian delegation to the summit knew how to use the oil -
card to get an Arab position supporting the Palestinians in southern Lebanon,
the I.ebanese president also knew how to get benefits for Lebanon from the
evident race emerging between the Syrian and Iraqi presidents to satisfy
Lebanan and to achieve whatever gains may be achieved for it.
'('he most prominent aspect of this race became clear when Iraqi President Saddam
Ilusayn proposed that Arab financial aid be advanced to Lebanon to bolster
the steadfastness oF the south and to rebuild Lebanon. President Sarkis
expressed reservation on this proposal initially and said that Lebanon had
not come to the summit to get financial aid because money is worth nothing
in the face of the fateful. dangers threatening Lebanon's entity. The Iraqi
- presiclent then reaffirmed his proposal, saying: "Whatever the situation,
it is not permissible that Lebanon not be given big financial aid to partici- _
pate in irs enormous burdens."
'The. Iraqi president set this aid within the limits of 200 million dollars
annually, of which one half is to be set aside for reconstructing Lebanon
and the other half toward bolstering the south, given every year for a period
of S years.
At this point Abu-'Ammar spoke, s~ying that Lebanan has endured a lot and
that the proPosed aid should be bigger, suggesting tl~at this aid be raised
to 400 million dollars annually.
~ 10
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Af t~~r approval by the Arab states concerned to advanc~ this aid, Abu-'tinmar
- I~~unc~d roward Prc~siden~ Sarkis and said to him: "Do yc,u ~ee wh~~t I c~i~n dc~ _
I ur yuu whc~nc+ver you are posit~ive ~oward me."
At this point, s diplomat said: "Lebanon has been given what it did not de- -
~ mand and has not been totally denied what it had come for. "
Summit's Secret Resolutions
Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 1 Dec 79 pp 31-44
[Article by George Bashir] -
[Text] Tunis--Many had expected the lOth Arab summit in "i unis to fail.
Rather, many had not expected this summit to convene ~ut t o be postponed to
a later date when the Arab ministers of foreign affairs d i sagreed with each
- other on the propusals contained in the two Lebanese and P alestinian working ~
papers concerning southern Lebanon. The question posed 2 4 hours before the
conclusion of the summit was: What comes after the failure? But after the
final session, the question turned into: What comes after the success?
At a s~~ecial meeting attended by some of the Arab ministe r s of foreign affairs
participating in the Tunis conference, a diplomat asked Ar ab League Secretary
General (al-Shadhili al-Qulaybi) about the reasons that have always obstructed
implementation of the resolutions of Arab summits. Al-Qu 1 aybi answered:
Because the Arab summits failed to take the Arab reality into consideration
and because the resolutions were taken to appease sentimen ts. Thus, most ~f
the resolutions adopted were beyond the capacity of the Arab states and beyond �
their ability to implement them, especially since the exe c utive agencies needed
were not in existence. This is why most of the resolutio ns adopte~ at the _
Arab League meetings, whether those adopted in the League Council ~r in the
meetings of the ministers of foreign affairs or of the heads of state, re-
mained unimplemented. The world stopped believing the Ar abs whenever they
adopted weighty resolutions. One of those present at the meeting reminded
of the statement made by a participant in the Tunis conf er ence when the mem-
bers of the ministerial committee formed to settle the di s pute over the
solutions proposed for the situation in southern Lebanon. This participant _
had said: Why should we disagree? Leave the text as it i s"because these -
words are for consumption."
Those who attended the recent Tunis summit and observed the progress of its
work returned with their memory to the last Arab summit co nvened in Cairo
in 1976. After the final session of the said summit and while the Arab kings
and presidents w~re preparing to leave the Hilton Hotel i n the Egyptian
capital, they saw with their own eyes Lebanese President I lyas Sarkis asking
one of the Arab leaders to sign the Cairo summit resolutic ns. The said
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� luacl~.~r t.uulc r~n Immedi~irc oath and told rlie Lebanese president: It is a s~iame,
htr Prt~:;.[clent. 5i~;natures are not at all necessary and you will shortly see
~}i~ l~~~lnning of implementation of the resolutions.
'1'he ~r~ah Lea~;ur~ general secretary tias persisted in saying after the recent
'L'uniti summit chat the resolutions adopted by the conference were adopted
to be in,pl~mented and that before the first month of the new year passes, those
_ c~r~rnitte~ ~o implementation will see the first steps in this regard [sic].
The n.ight of lJednesday-Thursday last week was the longest night in the Tunis
conference because the entire world was awaiting the outcome of the Iabor
through which the conference had been going as a result of the various phases
of. fr sauthern Lebanon, both the I,ehanese and Pal.estinian teams emerg~d f r.om
tt.e summit "neither defeated nor victorious. The situation in all of Lebanon,
- and not just in the south alone, has become,"with the admission of all con-
~erne~i, a common Arab re~ponsibility. Spreading the national sovereignty,
the army and the full authority of the president of the republic and putting
.in enci to the classification act in which some Arab sides engaged against
the Lebanese on both the Arab and international stages are things upon which
the l~ade~s of Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait and the chairman of the Lib- ~
~;;ir~ ~l~~legation agreed wi.th President Ilyas Sarkis. The outcome of ~he new
resr tl:at will be undergone by the Arab world at the level of implementation--
iRiplementation of whaL was agreed upon at the Ti~.iis summit--will make it
poSSiUle to pass a final judgement on the Arab solidarity which is once more
in the scales. -
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Report on Compronises
Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 1 Dec 79 pp 34-35
[Article by As'ad Haydar]
[Text] Tunis--"The happy ending" of the lOth Arab summit was expected as a
natural and inevitable conclusion for such a meeting at such a level.
Failure to issue the final communique declaring "detente and reconciliation"
would have meant a"divorce" between Lebanon and the Arabs and the reemer-
gence of the conf licting axes and alliances among the Baghdad summit partici-
pants. It would have also meant a subsequent rise in temperature turning
some of the current cold and silent wars into hot wars on more than one front.
The half success achieved by the summit eliminated the question prevailing =
in the halls of the Tun is Hilton and in the air of the Arab homeland, namely
the question: What will happen now and how will Lebanon, the Arabs and the
Palestinian resistance face the situation? But the "half failure" which is
evident in the summit's f inal communique that has not sa~is*ied either thE
Lebanese or the Palestiiiian side and that has imposed somekind of an under-
standing based on the status quo and the intensifying danger in the Middle
East situation have imposed another question, namely: What will happen from
now until the next Arab summit in Jordan in November 1980?
With the initiation of the works cL the conference of the Arab ministers of
foreign affairs at the same Hilton on 14 November 1I79, it was eviden~t that -
the achievement of full success by the summit conference would lead to the
approval of a unified Arab policy that would transfer the Arab position from
steadfastness in the f ace of the Camp David accords to a position of con-
frontation primarily. It also seemed that defusing the situation in southern
Lebanon and bringing to end the endless and inconclusive Lebanese war were
almost impussible. Each of the Arab delegations fundamentally concerr~ed with
the conflict came carrying a working paper that meets at some points with the
- other papers. But there were among these papers gaps that the goodwill and
the deep desire to keep the situation from exploding could not bridge. Per-
_ haps the disagreement and the conflict between the Lebanese and Palestinian _
- working papers was the most evident. The Lebanese delegation, led by Foreign
Minister Fu'ad Butrus, came on the basis of "either a comprehensive solution
or no solution." This is what Fu'ad Butrus expressed in one of. his statements
when he said that "the contents of the working paper are not negotiable and
not subject to concessions." Perhaps the only time in which Butrus (resorted
to tactics) in his stiff offensive was when the provision in the Lebanese
working paper on opening the Arab fronts to the Palestinian resistance was
discussed. After approval of the provision on terminating military operations
from southern Lebanon and when discussion of the next provision started,
the Lebanese delegation tried to add ~he word "other" to the phrase of "all
the fronts" so that the phra5e may end up as follows: "Open all the other
Arab fronts." But the Palestinian delegation, led by Abu-al-Lutf, realized
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- the po.litical meanings of this linguistic addition and thus hastened to d?mand
~liat. tl~c wc>rd "uth~r" be omitted, and got what it wanted. The Lebanese de-
~c I rc~ i u~~iner~;c� wi t.li an Ay~nb acceptaace of the Lehane~e working p~zper reached
~I?c ~~~lia~ whcrc~ Chc Lebanese delegation refused t;o dlscuss the bases of thc
financi:il. aid to Lebanon because money comes after, and not before, the solu-
tion. This intransigent Lebanese position urged a prominent member of one of '
the GulF delegation to tell AL-MUSTAQBAL; "Fu'ad Butrus deserves to be a
minister ~F defense and not the minister of foreign affairs." The Palestinian
delegation asserted that in the absence of a comprehensive solution to the
- Middle East problem, there is nothing for it after the south but the sea.
The delegation asserted that it will not accept this [end] after these long
years of struggle.
The conclusion of the conference of the ministers of fore~gn affairs comple-
mented the course of the conference's works. The first working paper, con-
cerning the Arab-Israeli conflict, was approved and the working paper con-
cerning Lebanon was referred, along with both the Lebanese and the Palestinian
reservations, to ttie summit to adopt a resolution on it.
At the summit which was attended by the largest number of Arab kings, presi-
denl:~ and amirs, totaling 14 altogether, the side meetLngs and the bi.lateral
meeLin~;s Ln ~he chambers of the heads of state were the ones whLch dotted thc
- ii's and crossed the tt's insofar as the conference works were concerned and
the~ were the meetings that made the resolution that was later announced ~
at al-Qayrawan hall where all the delegations met. What had happened in
the conference of the ministers of foreign affairs also happened at the sum-
mit. The Arab-Israeli conflict paper was approved in the summit's first
session and the issue of southern Lebanon continued to be the problem. On
Wednesday, 21 November 1979, the issue was presented to the summit. Addresses
came in succession from the Arab l:ings and presidents. The situation became
more tense and the ~ntransigence in stances was translated into violent words
exchanged loudly. The stance of President Ilyas Sarkis was that Lebanon
can no longer endure the war, that it has gotten tired of continuing to be
~1 card in the Middle East game and that nothing could compensate Lebanon
other than the restoration of peace, stability, territorial integrity and
ful]_ legitimacy over all of its lands. This is why the Lebanpse working
paper presented by Fu'ad Butrus has to be [Sarkis said] approved or at least
the joint Arab working paper, especially its fourth and fifth provisions
concerning the Palestinian resistance's withdrawal from the south, has to
be amended.
Abu-'Ammar, the PLO chairman, answered the Lebanese approach with a word
whicti he intentionally addressed to all those present and not just to Presi-
dent Sarkis alone. He said: "If I withdraw from the south, you will not let
me into this hall and I personally would not come. So, what is the meaning
of my presence here when I have nothing? Had I stopped or agreed to stop
the f ighting, you would not have welcomed me here. We will proceed on our
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path~ unril we are able to fly the Palestinian flag over Jerusalem." All
left the session with the ghost of failure casting its shadow on the summit.
This situation urged the most prominent Arab delegations to clarify or re-
affirm the positions in side contacts with the journalists. In an interview
with AL-MUSTAQBAL,. Tariq 'Aziz, the Iraqi deputy prime minister and member
of the Revolution Gommand Council, said: "Nobody can impose all he wants.
Every inf lexible position will be countered by another inflexible position
and every flexible position will be countered by another flexible position.
Lebaiion should approve the Arab working paper as a prelude for further Arab
action in the next summit one year from now. Lebanon must accept the Arab
aid so that it may contri_bute toward helping the southern citizens to dress
their wounds." As a result of these Arab efforts, rather as a result of the
absence of the official Lebanese media, Prime I~finister Salim al-Huss held
- a meeting with the Lebanese journalists at his chamber and explained to them _
the Lebanese postion by saying: "A distinction must be made between two
provisions in the Lebanese demand for withdrawal of the armed presence from
the south. The first provision deals with the zone of the U.N. forces opera-
tions and defines the withdrawal with the words "all the armed elements," _
i.e. the resistance and Sa'd Haddad and will not do the resistance great
harm because ail know the small size [of the armed elements] the resistance
t~as in this sector. The second provision deals with the area extending until
the Litani River and coticPrns the armed presence of tlie Palestinian z~esistance
alone. This provision does not deal with the issue of the "joi.nt forces"
which are Lebanese forces. The question of the withdrawal of these forces
will be left alone until the issue of withdrawal of all the armed forces from
all the Lebanese territories is brought up. Despite Prime Minister al-Huss's
efforts to explain the Lebanese position and to stress the need not to be
carried away by a counter-propaganda campaign, he was not able to achieve
what he wanted. This situation urged a prominent member of t}ie Lebanese
del.egation to say: "We came with a just and legitimate cause but we have
not known how to present it. We have forgotten that we are before an Arab
summit and not before a Lebanese round table."
'Cripartite Summit I3efore Agreement
lluring the evening session, news of the incidents in the venerable Mecca was
received and the atmosphere became charged. Talk of Pxince Fahd's imminent
departure from'Punis for his country dominated the halls of the Hilton Hote1. -
This would have doomed the summit to failure. But Prince Fahd's composure
and the support of the Arab kings and presidents for Saudi Arabia and their
public condemnation of the attack prepared the atmosphere for completing the -
summit's work. However, this situation led to ~ancelling tne meeting that
was scheduled co include Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, the PLO and Kuwait
to find a joint solution.
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~t Ut~UU un 'L'hursday, ttie day set for ending the conference works, the decisive
~~nd ori~;inally needed meeting took place. President Ilyas Sarkis and Abu-'Ammar
rnet :i~ President Hafiz al-Asad's suite. During this tripartite meeting,
cfic a~;reement facilitating the establishment of the legitimate authority over
thc Lcbanese territories and preserving, at the same time, the Palestinian
resistance, was ap'proved. It wasn't long before the final session, in which
the summit's final communique was issued, was convened.
According to reliable sources, some points and resolutions in the two work-
ing papers w~re amended in the following manner: In the first working papzr
dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict, the following phrases were added:
l. The need for the Arab states to participate in the Islamic Solidarity
Fund and in the joint prc~jects, to fulfill their financial commitments toward
the General Secretariat of the Islamic League Organization and to advance
moral and material aid to this organization.
. Support the Arab Fund for Aid to the African and Arab Countries and support
other i.nternational funds and organizations.
3. Replace the phrase "within the framework of not separating" by the phrase
"on ttie basis of" in the issue of cooperation with the European group count-
ri.es. Another phrase was also added to make the passage read as follows:
"Cooperation with the European group countries to enhance the joint Arab-
f:uropean interests and to develop the positions of the European group on
the basis of noL- separating dealings in the economic rela~ions from the poli-
ti~al positions of the countries of this group toward the Arab causes and their
central link, Palestine." In implementation of this provision, five committees
were Cormed, each headed by a minister of foreign affairs. These committees
are divided among Latin America, Asian ~ountries, West Europe, East Europe
(Syria will undertake this task) and A~rica (the De~nocratic Yemen, Mauritania
and the PLU will untertake this ta;-'-.,1.
4. 'i'he addition of a f u11 point to the llth provision concerning the re-
lations with the United States. This point is "condemnation of the policy
i ~xercised by the United States in regard to its role in the conclusion of -
Clle two Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and stressing that
thc~ continuation of this policy will have a negative impact on the relations
and interests between the Arab countries and the United States of Ameri~a.
S. Ca11 for a"special" session instead of an "ordinary" session to support
the Arab and Palestinian right. -
6. The addition of a new provision, namely provision 14, concerning the con-
vocation of the Arab Economic and Social Council which includes the ministers
of. foreign affairs and of economy to discuss the Arab situation.
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Amendments and Reservations
In addilion to these amendments, which have been considered a stiffening of
the Arab position and the beginning of formulating a new line for an Arab
strategy to counter Camp David and while taking into consideration the efforts
not to is olate the people's Egypt and to continue isolation of the Egyptian
regime, a nother resolution was adopted but not announced. Ttiis resolutlon
calls, ac cording t~ reliable sources, for granting Somalia, on the basis of
a Saudi proposal supported by Iraq, an aid of 40 million dollars shared in
half by Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Meanwhile, Kuwait pledged to advance an _
aid of 10 million dollars after bilateral talks with Somalia. Dr 'Ali al-
Turayki, the Libyan secretary of foreign affairs, objected to this aid by
saying: "Some Arabs remember the Arab causes only when financial issues are
discussed . "
Insofar a s Lebanon is concerned, an Arab working paper was approved. This
paper can, in case it is implemented, give Lebanon rest and leave the Pales- -
tinian resistance as a fait accompli. The resistance has taken a moral
~ commitmen t be�ore the conference to stop its operations from "southern
~ Lebanon," keeping in mind that the resistance has maintained its reservation
on the third provision which concerns "taking cognizane of the organization's
~iction of refraining from launching military operations from the south,"
instead of the phrase "across th.e borders" which was proposed originally.
Meanwkiile, Lebanon has maintained its reservation on the fifth provision,
especially on the phrase "regulating the Palestinian presence" instead of
the phrase "withdrawing the armed Palestinian presence."
In addition to these resolutions, Lebanon has been given an aid of 2 billion
dollars d ivided over 5 years, beginning with 1980 and ending in 1984. AL-
riUS'CAQI~t1L has learned that one half the annual aid, amounting to 400 million -
dollars, will be set aside for the south to help its population stand fast
and reconstruct their damaged property.
On the basis of these resolutions whose only secrecy lies in the word "secret,"
the observers are again asking the f undamental question, namely: What will
happen in the future, particularly in the coming year? _
First, it must be taken i.nto consideration that Lebanon's problem is tied to a
sc~lution for the situation in the Middle East area. But at the same time,
Lebanon cannot wait until the Palestinian problem is solved. This is why
- what happened at the Tunis summit constitutes, as viewed by a prominent member,
a partial solution on the way to the comprehensive solution. This partial
solution will permit Lebanon, through t'ne Arab financial aid, to dress some
of its present wouiids, both at the level of reconstruction and development
and the level of building a modern military force. Such wound dressing will
help Lebanon in the future to establish its control over all the Lebanese
territories in a manner whereby the legitimate government will not be again -
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_ I;��~~cl wi~l~ cl~e question: "What has Che government don~~ with the ]inyt-al-Din
resolutic~ns and why isn't the legitimate government establishing its control
over Beirut, ttie mountain [Mount Lebanon] and the north as it wants to establish
it over the south which is hanging from the rope of the non-Lebanese wills,
~is well as the Lebanese will?" _
`1'l~is solution will also permit the PLO to continue its diplomatic offensive
in Westerii Europe, this time with obvious Arab support and with a well-studied
- p13n based on a clear economic plan. This will enable the PLO to gain addi-
tional positions, perhaps the first of which will be France [which may be won
over] during Yasir 'Arafat's fortheoming visit to Paris. Moreover, the
1'alestinian rifle will continue to be raised and capable of threatening with
military action against Isra.el and also capabie of touching off the situation,
depending on the developments and requirements of the coming phase.
The .limits of the future possibilities do not stop at these options. There ~
are the ~ther Arab fronts and there is the flaring Iranian front in the Middle
East area. The balance of these conditions in all the fronts collectively or
in each of them separately [will determine] whether Lebanon can wait another
year to make more partial gains or whether it will not be able to stand
any l.onger in the Middle East station with all the Arabs (excluding Egypt)
and will look for another means to transport it [to a new situation] that may
begin with an explosion and conclude with an unhappy ending, exactly as the -
beginning of its war was tragic for itself and for the Arabs.
8494
~ CSO: 4802
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
' USSR'S RELATIONS WITH SOUTHERN NEIGHBORS REVIE~~TED
Paris DLFENSE NATIONALE in French Oct 79 pp 55-64
[Article by Emile Pignol:~ "The Soviet Union and Countries of the Southern
Arc: Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey"]
[Text] Is the Soviet Union seeking to exploit recent
reverses met by Western nations in that arc of coun-
- tries continguous to Russia's southern borders from
the Black Sea to the Himalayas, a region of turbulence,
revolutions in the name of Islam, and economic depression? _
Emile Pignol, a young researcher at the Political Science
Institute and a specialist on that region, answers this
question.
The balances of power which have existed for more than 30 years along the
Soviet Union's southern border were upset by the April 1978 coup d�etat
which placed a pro-Soviet regime in power in Ka.bul, and also by the Islamic
revolution in Iran.
L'?:til recently, countries ui~ the USSR's aoutnern tlanx were conspicuous, -
in fact, by their pro-Western attitudes and their mistrust of their big
northern neighbor. This mistrust did not, however, prevent them from main-
taining satisfactory relations with that neighbor.
Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan continued to retain, officially at least, their
membership in CENTO 1, a military organization supported by the United States
although it was not legally a member. Only Afghanistan, a long-standing mem-
ber of the nonalined movement, confined itself to a position of strict neu-
trality. -
Today, however, the deteriorating economic situation in Turkey and Pakistan
as well as the political crisis in both of those countries, all constitute
factors of instability that appear likely to mortgage their future. _
25 -
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All L-hings considered, the USSR's entire group of neighbors from the Black
Sea to India are, therefore, "destabilized" or in danger of being so.
i -
We shall examine the role the Soviet Union has played in these develop-
ments, ttie opportunities they ~ive that country, but also the obstacles
Soviet policy is encountering. In so dving, we shall try to answer the
question of whether, and in what instance, the decline of Western influence _
in tl~e region has meant a strengthening of Soviet positions.
Afghanistan
Afgtianistan has long-standing ties of large-scale, but not exclusive, mili- _
tary, economic, and cultural cooperation with the Soviet Union. Yet until
last year it had retained its independence from its powerful neighbor by
following a policy of nonaltnement. The Apri1 1978 coup d'etat and the
resultant establishment of a Moscow-backed Marxist regime in Kabul marked a
radica.l turning point in A�ghan policy and its regional consequences are con-
sideraUle. While it has not been possible to prove any Soviet involvement
in the coup, it does appear likely that Soviet leaders were kept informed of
its preparation.
The ICremlin could not have been anything but pleased to see Afghanistan ~
= rapidly enter into the Soviet orbit, as is evidenced by the way Afghan
diploiuacy lias invariably alined its positions with those of Moscaw. Wasn't
Afghanis~an one of the first countries to recognize the new Cambodian Govern-
ment 3nd condemn Chinese intervention in Vietnam?
The considerable economic but primarily military aid the Soviet Union quickly
granted the Taraki government and the USSR's alacrity in signing some 50
ag.reements, the ino~t important of which is the 5 December 1978 tre~ty of -
- fr.iendship and cooperation, clearly show that Moscow does ntit intend to
skimp ou ways and means of ensuring the survival of a pro-Soviet regime in
Afghanistan.
The USSR's interest in that country is, of course, prompted by a combination
of strategic and political coi~aiderations. The Soviet Union has, in effect,
always endeavored to surround itself with friendly countries that act as
buffer states. In addition, Afghanistan's geographical situation, the first
"step" to the Indian Oceans enables I~oscow to adopt as its own the old
czarist dream of gaining access to warm waters, by taking advantage of
Afghan irredentist designs on the Pakistani provinces of Ba],.uchistan and
Yatchunistan.
Furthermore, the Soviet leadership's attachment to the dogma of the irreversi-
bility of socialism's conquests cannot help but connnit it to maintain its
support of a regime which, without being officially socialist, openly re-
lates to the Soviet experiment.
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_ In addition, this Soviet commitment has been increasing i.n the face of the
expansion noted in the Islamic rebellion since March.
This growing commitment has resulted in accelerated deliveries of military
equipment and in an increase in the number of Soviet "advisers."2 -
Because of the magnitude of the rebellion and the increasing number of purges
and def.ections that are thinning Afghan of.ficer ranks, the Soviet "advisers"
are now playing a decisive role within the armed forces. Actually they are ~
very closely involved in combat operations. Despite Moscow's denials, it has
definitely been established that Soviet pilots are taking part in harassing
_ missions being flown against the rebels.
While Soviet assistance has thus far made it possible to contain the rebel-
lion after a fashion, we wonder what would happen if that assistance were
to become insufficient. Should that occasion arise, would the Soviets con-
sider resorting to direct intervention as Afghan Prime Minister Amin has
- hinted they would? Under the present circumstancPS, we can ~nly speculate _
about what might happen. Admittedly, Soviet leaders have on several occa- _
sions clearly indicated their firm determination to sustain the present
Afghan regime. In this connection, Brezhnev's statements during the June
visit to Moscow of Indian Prirue Minister Desai--"We will not abandon our
friend the Afghan people in its hour of need"--were meant to demonstrate
Moscow's determination.
_ Tn all likelihood, however, the Soviets will do their utmost to avoid having
to make this difficult decision. According to certain rumors, they have ad-
vised Taraki to broaden his political base,3 to halt massive purges, and to
slow down the implementation of reforms that are too premature for a back-
ward country.
There is no evidence that this moderating advice will be heeded by Kabul
officials who, on the contrary, seem determined to pursue a policy of
repression. It is questionable, therefore, whether a policy of national
reconciliation would have any chance of succeeding in view of the intransi-
gence of not only the authorities but also the rebels who are engaged, with
the support of most of the population, in a veritable holy war against the
"atheistic" Kabul government.
For the time being, the progress of the rebellion is not such that it can
threaten the regime's existence, particularly because of divisions among
the different rebel movements. This situation could change rapidly, how-
ever. The attitude of the armed forces is still the major unknown factor.
The revolt by a garrison in l~abul in early August--the third dissident action
within the army in the past few months--was crushed with the help ctif Soviet
pilots. Such defections make one wonder about the army's loyaltq to the
Taraki regime.
The fact remains, however, that any possible intervention by Soviet armed
forces would not fail to have considerable consequencea, particularly on the
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USSR's relations with Pakistan and Iran who would feel directly threatened.
Thcrc Ls no doubt that such intervention woL1d constitute a new stage in tne
cleterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. In addition, at a time when the
summit meeting of the nonalined coun~ries hae recently c~ncluded its deliber-
ations in Havana, ~his intervention could not but tarnish the Soviet Union's
image with the nonalined movement. Furthermore, it would certainly not con-
trib�te to improving the climate of detente and would most likely jeopardize
ratification of the 5ALT II treaty.
Iran
1'he Soviets abandoned the posture of neutrality they had been observing ever
since the start of the Iranian crisis only when the victory of the religious
leaders became certain. 'I'hey apparently did not intervene in the revolu-
tionary process, being merely content to deter the Americans from doing so.
We cannot exclude the possibility, however, that they~y have encouraged the
Iranian Tudeh Communist Party to campai~n against the United States so as to
cha.nnel the Iranian people's discontent in a direction more compatible with
Soviet interests.
The creation of a focus of instability on their border may have caused the
S~~viet leaders some anxiety, but they were, nevertheless, pleased by the fall
of Lhe pro-Western Shah's regime and the attendant loss by the United States
~ of its most powerful a11y in the Persian Gulf, and especially an~ally who in-
tended to act as "policeman" of that region against "progressive" subver-
sion.4
Consequently, Moscow was one of the first capitals to recognize the new
Iranian regime and offer it assistance. The Soviets viewed with great satis-
faction a certain number of "positive" decisions made by the Islamic authori-
l-.ies, such as elimination of the American presence, the closing of electronic
monitoring stations, withdrawal from CENTO, cancellation of contracts for the
- purchase of Western arms, severing of diplomatic relations with Israel and
South Africa, rejection of agreements with the oil consortium, etc.
Yet developments in relations between the Soviet Union and Iran these past
Few months have not confirmed the Kremlin's initial expectations upon the
establishment in Iran of a regime hostile to "imperialism." On the contrary,
these relations have deteriorated rapidly, notably because of the part played
by the Soviet Union in quelling the Islamic rebellion in Afghanistan.
The Islamic fundamentalism of the new Iranian leaders has actually led them
to denounce Soviet activities in that country. For instance, in receiving
the Soviet ambassador on 13 June, the Ayatollah Khomeyni warned him in
rather. undiplomatic language5 about the Soviet Union's interference in the
- internal affairs of Afghanistan and Iran. A week later,relations between the
two countries deteriorated even further with the Iranian foreign minister's
annot~ncement that the provisional government intended to cancel simultaneously
the two basic treaties between Iran and the USSR and between Iran and the
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United States. This nieasure only appears to be balanced.6 Actually it would,
if implemented, deprive the Soviet Union of the "right of inspection" in Iran
which it has had for more than 50 yeara. It will be recalled that the treaty
of 1921. allows the USSR to move its troops into Iranian territory if the lat-
ter is being usecl by a third power as a base ~or aggression against the USSR.
_ This treaty was the basis for the warning Brezhnev issued to the United
States in Nbvember 1978 in a statement noting that any American intervention
in favor of the Shah would be viewed by Moscow as an attack on its security.
For the moment, the Soviets are adhering to the policy of appeasement they
have practiced toward Iran ever since the Shah's departure. Yet they are
no longer limiting themselves to protestations of good faith whenever they
are taken to task. While avoiding a11 polemic as much as possible, the
Soviet press no longer hesitates to criticize Iranian leaders--with the ex-
ception, however, of the Ayatollah Khomeyni--who make remarks hostile to the
USSR. It also more frequently denounces, and with less verbal precautions,
Tehran's favorable attitude toward the Afghan r~bels.
_ Moscow is convinced that the Islamic revolution has an "unfinished" aspect
about it. But in view of the present weakness of the Iranian Marxist left,
particularly the Tudeh~ which is now but a shadow of the large communist
party it was shortly after the war, the Kremlin has no choice but to seek
some accommodation with the Iranian authori~ties. Consequently, the Tudeh
has up to now followed, probably on advice from Moscow, a"national front"
policy that has led it to support the Ayatollah Khomeyni and his proposed
_ Islamic republic. The apparent open clash between the Marxist left and the
ayatollah's supporters could place Moscow in a quandary of bej.ng obliged to
take a definite position on the matter. In another connection, Moscow has
refrained from expressing any opinion on the worsening of the situation in
those regions of Iran populated by non-Persian minorities: Kurdistan, Azer-
baijan, Khuzistan, and Baluchistan. Nevertheless, the growing agitation for
autonomy, and especially the Kurdish rebellion, offer the USSR a formidable
potential means of exerting pressure.
Economically, the Soviet Union wanted to continue the very flourishing co-
_ operation it had with Iran during the time of the Shah. It also entertained
the hope of benefiting from Iran's cancellation of numerous contracts with
Western companies. But the USSR has been treated no better than those com-
- panies by the Islamic authorities. In f.act, several major projects with
the Soviets have been cancelled these past few months. The largest one was
a 3-billion dollar project involving construction of the IGAT-2 pipeline
designed to deliver Iranian natural gas to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia,
Austria, France, and the FRG.
Pakistan
~'akistan's relative isolation on the international scene, particularly in
relation to Western cuuntries, has not brought about any rapprochement be-
tween Islamabad and Moscow. As a matter of fact, the government of General
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'Lia-ul-Haq remains essentially true to Pakistan's basic foreign policy orient-
ations founded by Ali Bhutto on active cooperati~:. with the Islamic world and
on close ties with China in the face of the Indian "threat." Although Paki-
stan's relations with the United States have been noticeably affected by
Pakistani nuclear plans--the Americans suspended their economic aid last year--
leaders in Islamabad are weli aware that the American Government cannot take
the risk of a break that would accentuate instability in the region. The
alternc~tive policy Pakistan seemingly wants to initiate, after its with-
drawal from CENTO and its entry into the nonalined movement, cannot be inter-
- preted as a desire for rapprochement with Moscow. On the contrary, there
has been an obvious rapid deterioration in Soviet-Pakistani relations as a
result of the mounting antagonism between Islamabad and Kabul. In fact,
Pakistan does not hide its sympathy with the Afghan Islamic rebels Kabul
accuses it of helping and of harboring within its territory.
The Soviet Union for its part has issued several warnings to Islamabad and
accuses it of playing into the hands of "imperialism" by actively supporting
the rebel.s Moscow claims are being trained by Pakistani and Chine~e advisers.
More or less inspired by the Soviets, Afghan leaders now appear to be serious-
ly considering encouraging Pakistani autonomist movements (the Baluchis and
Patchuns). In warnings issued to Islamabad, Taraki has openly threatened
to give these movements direct support. Under these conditions, Pakistani
authorities cannot help but be pessimistic about the future of their rela-
tions with the USSR. For the time being, they are striving to thwart, af ter
- a fashion, the Soviet propaganda that likens the Afghan rebellicn to foreign
aggression. We can see, therefore, that the USSR's relation with countries
in the eastern part of the southern arc are far from satisfactory. Are they
any better on the weatern end of the arc?
Tu.rkey
Disappointed by the attitude of both NATO and the United States during the
Cypr~ut crisis--the embargo on arms sales imposed in February 1975 by the
U~S. Congress was lifted in September 1978, but with severe conditions--
Ecevlt's government decided to pursue a more open and liberal policy toward
the Soviet Union in order to free itself from an altogether too exclusive
"tete-a-tete" with Washington.
The rapprochement between Moscow and Ankara was marked by Prime Minister
Ece~it's visit to the USSR in June 1978. Even though the theretofore very
loose political ties were drawn closer and the already long-standing eco-
nomic cooperation between the two countries was diversified, one has to note
that this evolution was always in conformity with the norms of the policy of
detente and was not marked by any important concession by Turkey.$
For instance, Turkey rejected Moscow's military-oriented advances, including
proposals of cooperation made by Marshal Ogarkov during his March 1978 visit
- to Turkey, and Soviet attempts to get Turkey to agree to a sort of bilateral
military detente. Nor can Turkey's desire to diversify its foreign relations
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bc tntcrpreted ae a mean~ o,f exertin~ pressure on its Western allies znd
even l~es r~b a reorien~atlon of it~ foreign policy.
Under present circumstances, it does not appear likely that Turkey, despite
the gravity of i'ts current economic and political crisis, can give up the
"Atlantic umbrella" or the economic aid from which its belonging to the
West has enabled it to benefit for the past 30 years. Nevertheless, if the
military were to assume power through a coup d'etat, Turkey might conceiv-
ably question its ties with tne West and revert to a policy of suspicious
and sensitive nationalism. In that event, the USSR could not help but be
pleased with a situation it seems unable to instigate itself.
We note, therefore, that there are cracks in the rampart which has been
blocking Soviet attempts at penetrating in the direction of the Persian Gulf
and the Indian Ocean. Afghanistan has become a Soviet satellite. Iran is
once again on the brink of civil war. Turkey is weakened by very serious
internal problems. Pakistan is in danger of a secessionist explosion: This
particularly gloomly assessment must be qualified, however. The expansion
of Soviet influence in the region faces sizable obstacles. The largest of
these is the antagonisms between Islam and Marxism. Events in Afghanistan
_ have been most revealing in this respect. It was in the name of Islam that
Afghan rebels took up arms against the pro-Soviet Taraki regime. The fact
that the two neighboring countries, Iran and Pakistan, are also deeply de-
voted to Islamic fundamentalism could not fail to compel them to rise up
against Soviet encroachments. Moreover, the continued unlawful status of
the Tutkish and Iranian cotranunist parties--there is apparently no communist
party in Pakistan--does not facilitate the USSR's action in those countries.
- It is interesting to note that the draft constitution published in Tehran
includes a provision banning communists from directorial positions. Lastly,
we must not forget the lessons of history--particularly where Turkey and
Iran are concerned--which have made these countries highly suspicious of
their big neighbor. ~v'hile the successes achieved by the Soviet Union along
its southern border are undeniable, their irreversibility remains to be
shown.
FOOTNOTES
1. CENTO's activities had actually been extremely limited sincE 1965.
2. An estimated total of 3,000 to 5,000 Soviet advisers control to a large
extent the armed forces and the governmental administrative machinery.
3. The Khalq commur.ist party--now in power after eliminating the Parcham, -
a pro-Soviet rival faction--has but a very limited membership.
4. The Moscow-sL~~ported Marx3.st Dhofar rebellion was crushed i n 1975 by
an Iranian expeditionary force.
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5. '1'ile conversution between the Ayatollah Khomeyni and the Soviet ambassador
was broadcast over Iranian radio, in all probability without the ambas-
sador's consent.
6. The American-Iranian treaty is merely a regular defense treaty.
7. M. Kianouri, Tudeh's secretary general, is considered to be "Moscow's
man."
8. It should be noted, however, that the Turkish Government has been most -
obliging on several occasions such as when Soviet military aircxaft
have flown over its territory and when the aircraft carriers Kiev and
Minsk passed through the Straits. Like~oise, the negative reply given
to the American request for usa of Turkish airspace by U-2 aircraft
was attributable to Turkey's anxious desire to deal tactfully with
Moscow.
8041
CSO: 4800
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_
ALGERIA
STUDENT STRIKES, DEMONSTRATIONS DTSTURB AUTHORITIES
'Arabizing' Students Strike
Paris LE MONDE in French 7 Dec 79 p 4
[Article by Daniel Junqua: "Authorities Fear Protest by 'Arabizing' Stud-
ents May Turn Into Anti-American Demonstrations"]
- [Text] Student-organized strikes and demonstrations have generated a certain ~
degree of agitation in Algiers these past 2 days. Police have been able thus
far to channel or disperse marches and rallies that have never consisted of
more than a few hundred participants. Authorities are, nevertheless, care-
fully watching developments. They undoubtedly fear that this agitation,
whose origins are purely local, may mount and ultimately turn into anti-
American demonstrations, as has been the case in other Arab capitals.
Such a development cannot be ruled out especially since this upsurge of agi-
tation is being fomented basically b~ "Arabizing" students from the Faculty
of Law and Economics, students who are probably more eager than others to
_ demonstrate their solidarity with the Iranian Islamic revolution. These
students have been on strike for 2 weeks along witr. students from the -
Institute of Political Studies. They are requesting that some postgraduate
courses be taught in Arabic. At the present time, all their postgraduate
courses are taught in French. They are also demanding better job opportuni-
ties upon graduation and Arabizati~on of the civil service.
Slogans posted on walls o.f faculty of law buildings and the Ben-Aknoun stu-
dent resident hall are revealing: "Unity of languages, unity of spirit
(mind)!", "The Arabic language is part of the 1954 revolution!", "Is Algeria
a French colony?"
This very determined protest movement comprises some 3,000 students. The
problem is not a new one. Last year, "Arabizing" students from the Univers-
ity of Science and Engineering of Bab-Ezzouar, near Algiers, boycotted
classes and then examinations because they refused to be "condemned" to
only one job market, namely teaching.
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~
'L'he coexistence of two separate curriculums or streams, one "bilingual" the !
otlier "Arabized," is becoming an increasingly explosive situation. The =
~~rinciple of Arabization [replacement of French by Arabic as the dominant
lang~iage in all realms of national life] was solemnly reaffirmed by the
December 1978 congress of the Algerian Youth and subsequently by the FLN
congress in February 1979. But the spread of Arabization is plagued with
difFiculties, the greatest being the shortage of qualified teachers.
Algeria is currently engaged in an accelerated development effort. Hence
in all fields, particularly the industrial, the country needs highly quali-
f~Led executive and managerial personnel skilled in modern methods an~. tech-
niques, personnel who are in constant contact with the West. The majority
uf such personnel in Algeria are French-speaking. The ",Arabizers" a.re -
confined to minor positions or to tasks that are not directly productive.
~rhey are tolerating less and less being shunted off in this way when offi-
cial policy views Arabization as a veritable dogma. This do~ma waG reaf-
firtned more strongly than ever with the removal, in March 1979, of Mostefa
Lacheraf as minister of primary and secondary education and his replacement
by Mohamed Kharroubi, a stanch supporter of Arabization.
~arly in the week, law students were joined in their strike by lycee
[un~versity-preparatory secondary school] students. The latter are protest-
~ng a measure which restores certain subjects to the baccalaureat [final
E~xamination], subjects on which such examinations have not been required for
several years. Under this new measure, science majors will henceforth take -
E~xaminations in history and geography, while literature majors will take them
in physics and natural sciences. This protest movement involves all of the
capital's lycees: boys and girls lycees, inner.-city and suburban lycees. -
'l'he thot~sands of young students boycotting classes are thus at loose ends.
In the present climate created by the Iranian situation, this student unrest
di.sturbs the authorities who fear a possible deviation of the protest move-
ment .
For instance, despite the precautions taken and the police forces assigned to
maintain order, authorities in Oran were hard pressed Monday when a protest
marcll suddenly headed for the U.S. consulate and got to within 100 meters -
of the building before being stopped and dispersed. Although no official
demonstration has thus far been organized in Algiers, authorities there have
taken precautions for guarding and protecting the American embassy.
Public opinion does, of course, largely disapprove of the acts of violence
that have been committed in other capitals, and particularly in Tripoli
and Karachi. But Algerian authorities must reckon with a large number of
young persons who flare up easily and whom certain fundamentalist movements
wo~ild no doubt like to mobilize. In this regard, the posters displayed in
Bab-Ezzouar by a new group calling itself "Students of the EI-Harrach Mosque"
are quite revealing. The posters announced that the Grand Mosque in Mecca
had been bombed by American F-5 aircraft and called upon students to support
the Islamic revolution instead of lazily spending the afternoon "in musical
siestas by couples" on the university lawn.
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'1'cachcr Shorta4;e llamp~rs Arabizat ion
Par is l.J: MONDI: in French 12 Dec 79 p 7
[Article by Daniel Junqua: "Calm Returns to Algiers' Lycees While 'Arabizing'
University Students Remain on Strike"]
[Text] Calm returned to lycees in Algiers on Monday 10 December in the wake
oF the Ministry of Education's brief statement on the front page of 9 Decem-
ber's EL MOUD,~AHID announcing that "no new subject matter would be added to ~
the 1980 baccalaureat examinations." The authorities had reportedly planned
to include examinations in the natural sciences and physics for literature
majors and in history for science majors. "Leaked" reports of this plan
liad prompted a large week-long protest movement that made several attempts
to marc}i to the Ministry of Education.
'['hese demonstrations were in all likelihood the expression of a general
feeling of utter dissatisfaction, and the rumors about the baccalaureat mere-
ly served as a detonator. As a matter of fact, lycee students are grumbling
ribotit ttleir working and living conditions: overcrowded classrooms, inade-
quate libraries and laboratories, shortage of textbooks, transportation dif-
ficulties, meager scholarships, etc. They were able to voice all these
grievances Monday afternoon at a working meeting organized by the National
Union of Algerian Youth (UNJA) attended b~ university student representatives
and several senior government officials. Delegates from the lycees, 10 per
school, submitted their demands and deplored the "absence of a rorum of
expression" capable of taking official cognizance of their problems. In so
doing, the students were implicity condemning the UNJA which appears to have
been unable to cope with this problem.
In contrast, silence continues to surround the strike by some 3,000 "Arabiz- _
ing" students of the Algi.ers Faculty of Law who coiild well continue their
protest action until the meeting, on or about 26 December, of the FLN Cen-
tral Committee, the supreme body of Algier's single political party. The
committee is scheduled to examine, inter alia, educational problems and more =
particularly t}~e ticklish Arabization issue.
The striking students would like to see the central committee establish, at
this meeting, a definite and compulsory timetable for Arabization of the -
civil ser.vice. Such a timetable is the only procedure, in their opinion, -
that is consistent with the principles proclaimed in the Constitution, the
national charter, and the resolutions of the most recent FLN congress, and
also the only procedure that permits effective monitoring of the implementa-
tion of Arabization. They have written letters to this effect to President
Chadli I3endjedid, party coordinator M. Yahiaoui, and chairman Boualem
Benhamouda of the FLN's education and training committee with whom they have
unsuccessfully requested a meeting. The students reject any acr_usation of
"Moslem fundamentalism." They explain: "We are operating within the FLN
framework and are simply requesting that officially stated policies be -
implemented." -
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Recruitin~ of 'Ceachers
'I'I~i~c [ti, tli~~refc~re, pe~lIlical issue thar is clearly beyon~i thc~ scope of
I.I~c~ Mt~iislry c~P Ili~her l~ducation. Since his appointment, however, tlic new
I~cacl ol- that department, Abdelhak Berlieri, former rector oF t}:e University `
of Constantine, has not spared himself in his ef~orts to forward Arabiza-
ti~r~ oF the universitv. One of his first actions was to visit Syria, Iraq,
.~nd .locdan in May 19%9 for the purpose of recruiting teachers. Teachers
;~re, in fa~t, the major "bottleneck." The results of his recruiting trip
werc disappointing. Only 22 Syrian teach~rs have joined the nearly 500
Middl.e F.astern teachers--~0 percent of the total teaching corps--already in
Alg~>ria. The cooling of relations with Cairo has not helped the situation,
]~.gyPt l~ei.ng the principal pool of cultural assistance personnel.
.
~ Yet several pertinent decisions have been made recently. These include: the
_ opc_ning on 1 llecember of the National Ai~ab Translation and Terminology Cen-
' ter; establishment, within the master continuous education program, of an
Arabiz,zlion program for French-speaking Algerian teachers, some of whom could
i,~ sent to the Middle East for training; and lastly, preparations for estab-
]ishment of an Arabic university-level summer school. Furthermore, "decennial
planning guidelines" for the Arabization of the university, beginnin~; with
tlie sncial sciences, ~aere formulated recently.
'I'he Arabization measures taken by the ministry are coupled with a series of
sucial measures, a fact which undoubtedly accounts for the calm prevailing in
- a:l_7 other departments of the University of Algiers. Stu3ent grants given to _
~ fute~re. secondary and technical school teachers have been doubled and all
schol.ar.ships are to be increased 20 percent effective 1 January 1980. Special
emphssis is also being pl 111 milli~in, s~~ road. Mina Sulman approach road, Kuwait Road (BD 485,(?UU);
clcvclupmcnt c~vcr thc ncxt Kuwait Road, and thc future ~Ni~vtmber'SO - Frhruary
twei years cuuld he inereased south ring road to Kawari �gl - roaci for new hi~using
hy l,0 per crnt. Bridge and the Saudi Arabian ~evclopment in nurth-catit -
New ycar will sce major Highway. This project will Muharraq (HU 250,(1O(?);
pr~~grcss on the six-lane start in January and last until
= highw.iy to providc a February 19$1. .Dcccmhcr '8O - Augu.t
- "scenic" ruutc from the Next September, work will BI - servire n~adx in thr
Muhsirray causeway to startonphasconeofthemain 5ulmani~~:i arr;i (BO
f3ahrain ,iiip~~rt. west ring rc>ad, to bc knuwn ?Illl.llO(I).
3 7
csc~: 4820 -
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BAHRAIN
BRIEFS
_ HYUNDAI CABLE DEAL--Midal Cables in Bahrain has signed a$6 million
contract w ith Hyundai for the supply of aluminum conductor cable.
Hyandai is carrying out an electrification project in North Yemen, and
- wil.l take delivery of the 3,000 tonnes of conductor from February next
year, over a six-month period. Midal, a private sector joint venture
between Olex Cables of Australia and Intersteel, a Bahraini company owned -
- by the Zayani family, went into commercial production at the end of last
year. It takes hot metal from the Alba smelter, for dra~�ing into rod or =
a wide range of wire cables. [Text] [Manama GULF MIRROR in English
1-7 Dec 79 p 46]
CSO: 4820
38
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zx,~
SOVIET STRATEGY SEEN BEHIND PRESENT TURMOIL
- Communist-Anticommunis~ Alliance
_ Paris LE FIGARO in French 16 Nov 79 p 2
[Article by Annie Kriegel]
~[Excerpts] Qn~one side we see an America:~, that still has not managed to
extricate itself from an initially explos~.ve and then creeping crisis which
continues to strike at its moat deep-seated convictions, a~crisis that does
not challenge America's existence but the exercise of its power. Thie fact
ia glaringly manifeated by the unpromising dearth of candidates of auitable
stature for the position of chief magistrate at a time when the United
States abounds with top quality men headin~ its various business and in-
duatrial firms.
On the other side we see the Soviet Union continuing its steady upward climb
which, at times, seems lightning fast. The USSR has, of course, definitely
depleted the reservoir of high expectations which existed at the beginning
_ of its Promethean effort to create a new man in a better and more equitable
society. Yet at the same time, ttie USSR has ama.zingly succeeded in getting
its loyal supporters who initially viewed it as a architect of a halcyon
future to now view it, with undiminished loyalty, as the essence of con- -
stantly expanding power.
_ We muat make it clear, however, that the power in question is not economic
power. Hence there is nothing '4nodern" about this power if we define modern-
ity as the primacy of economic considerations. One of Khrushchev's fantasies
was his proclaiming or even believing that the Soviet economy, in ite civilian~
- componenta, would have to stand comparison with the developed economies. The
sources of Soviet power are, on the contrary, altogether traditional, namely
the armed forcea and diplonacy, but, of course, with the peculiar connota-
tion these two terms have in the communist system. It has become obvious ~ -
in very recent times that the famous gap between the military capabilities of
the two superpowers has narrowed, and to such a point that experts currently
waver between two conclusions: either the balance of forces--which is dif-
- ferent from the "balance of terror"--has now been achieved, or else has
already been upset in :favor of the Soviet Union.
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But what the 1970's have settled is something which is more in the sphere
of diplomacy, provided we cnrrectly deffne diplomacy as the conetruction of
a system of alliances, or what is known as a"camp" in socialist term3.nology.
Iran: Revolution and Strategy
What is most striking, and rightly so, about the latest evenrs in Iran ia
their frenzied character. It is a fact that what has juet been violated in -
Tehran is an immemorial taboo, a foundation of internatioaal society ~ust as
the taboo of incesti is the foundatiion of human culture. But frenzy is not
a sufficiently specific stigma to cover what is peculiar to the Iranian .
, event. For after all, the 20th century is replete with frenzied episodes in
- whi~.h peoples, who perhaps had less excuses than Tehran's wretched masses,
have become hallucinated peoples. I recall to mind Germany and its un-
- employed in the 1930's, Argentina and its "descamisados" in Peron's day,
and also~ excuse me, America during Watergate. After all, how could anyone
possibly draw the utterly ludicrous parallel between the Shah and Hitler
and get some people to believe it, other than in an atmosphere of frenzy? _
' In most cases, nowever, frenzy does not exclude a e'.rategy, in other words,
a logical method of development. The taking of U.S. Embassy personnel as
hostages in Tehran was in response to a dual idea, whether that dual idea
was preconceived and prompted the seizure action itself or whe~her it came
to the actors in the course of their action.
The first idea: it was necessary to put an end to what remained of the ini-
tial alliance between the Khomeyni revolution and the liberal bourgeoisie
which Bazargan could be said to represent. That alliance had lasted as
long as was required to destroy, through widespread anarchy and the.exercise
of power on two levels, the socioeconomic framework of the former soc3.ety,
a framework that had continued to exist even after the Shah's departure.
The second idea: it was now necessary to move on to the reconstruction
phase, the reconstruction of a radically new regime.that could be built,
not on the Koran which offers no base whatever and for a very good reason, _
but solely on the base offered by the only model which is an alternative �
to the lit~eral model, namely the socialist model. And that base.is anti-
imperialism whose concrete form in this case is anti-Americanism. This is
what accounts for the apparent "miracle" that has caused Khomeyni, whose
anticommunism is not merely apparent but is very real, to no longer be
indirectly approved in a relatively neutral and reserved manner b.y the
pro-Soviet socialist world, buC to now be directly acclaimed and vi~orously
supported as the champion of "national independence" and "anti-imperialism."
. Reading L'HUMANITE and the Soviet press this past week has been most con-
vincing in this respect, even if the Soviet Union, as a state, could not, .
in the United Nations, avoid deploring the taking of diplomats as hostages. -
For example, on 12 November, L'HUMANITE reported: "The demand for independ-
ence is asserting itself more intensely every day in Iran where the struggle
40 ~
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+i~,nliiNt (mpurlal lr+m rc'flltllllH tht~ prinu~ movcr ol t~he I"t?VOIUCIOIl." 'fli1H Iclc~n
wu~ Lraiislnt.ecl Lnto ~~oiicrelc l~tnguage, ~nd incieed perhape in a somewhat
venturesome manner, by'roreign Minister Bani Sadr: "Believe me, the USSR
would not remain neutral in the event of military aggression against Iran"
(LE T10NDE, 14 November).
- Such is the "anchor" to what so frequently seems absurd to observers who are
too set in the ways of their mechanical logic. I refer to the political
convergence and the alliance between "frenzied" anticommunists and the inter-
national communist movement. Admittedly this convergence or this alliance
is and will remain rather fragile as long as the anticommunist component is
not done away with. I am not saying that in Brezhnev~s view there is no
- real difference between 1Chomeyni and Pham Van Dong. Sometimes the anti-
communist component ends up ruining the alliance in a situation where the
anti-imperialist component is no longer sufficient to justify that alliance.
Such was the case with Nasserism.
But sometimes too the alliance ends up toning down the most rabid anticom-
munism and becomes stabilized. Such was the case with Qadhdhafi and his
conversion to a bizarre type of "Libyan socialism." Such was the case with
Boumediene and his conversion to a kind of socialism less ludicrous than
- the preceding one and almost limited to a state military bureaucracy. Such
was the case with Castro in his gradual submission to pure and simple com-
munist orthodoxy.
Soviet Strategy in Iran
Paris J.,~ FIGARO in French 26 Noi~ 79 p 32
[Article by Annie Kriegel: "Iran: Keys for a Revolution"]
[TextJ The taking of hostages in the American Embassy in Tehran is the end
result of a remarkabl.y contrived operation whose real objective was to move
Iran successfully into the second stage of the revolutionary process, and to
do this "economically;" in other words, "peacefully."
Under l-hese conditions, it is understandable that the captors may "concede"
to release the hostages whose seizure was never any more than instrumental
and meant solely to permit achievingthe~results that have actually been
- obtained. Continued detention or slaughter of the hostages would now risk
compromising these results. We cannot, of course, theoretically exclude the
possibility of the execution of one or two hostages by captors enraged at
the release of their prisoners, or by uncontrolled persons who would not
have understood the imperatives of a program justified by the necessities
of the science of revolution. But such apprehension is based on the idea
that the embassy incident was produced by "spontaneous generation," by an
outburst of frenzy at the height of a sort oi "May 1968" relived by fanatics,
and that these "students" think and act as they please with nobody having
any real control over them.
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Such an assumptic~n is almost ridiculous. Even though we are far from having
;iny ~letsiled knowledge of the ins and outs of the operation, a person has
to f~,~v~ a large amount of naive ~onfidence in the "spontaneousnesa of the
masses" t:o view the whole occupation of the American Emhassy in Tehran as
an lraui,in equivalent of the occupation of the Sorbonne by the harebrained
Culin--l3enclit .
'~'op~>1_~~.:_; All of iran
'1'l~c crut.h is that the incident thus created did, in fact, imply preliminary
decLsi~~ns and choices at the very highest level. The Soviet Union first
iiad t.o clecide to switch from a minimum objective to a maximum ob3ective.
Tncidentally, a few weeks ago, I wrote, in this column, that it was up to
~he ~~oviet Union "to get into the act" after a period of necessary discretion,
a pe.ric~d long enough to allow for completion of the breakup of the govern-
mF~nta1 and power structures of the former Iranian society.
Tt~e Soviet Union's minimum objective was to retrieve Stalin's only stinging
deFeat in the immediate post-World War II period when he had to abandon his
~~.c~pe o1= incorporating the Iranian provinces of Kurdistan and Azerbaijan into
t~ls ~~mpire as two new "Soviet republics." The Soviet Union felt that by
supporting the demands of autonomists and separatists in defiance of the
Pezsian government, even Khomeyni's government} it might be able to obtain,
at the expense of the imperial entity, a limited bL~.t clear success in the
- northern provinces. Hence the period of acute tension between tY~e Kurds and
Khem~;~~i last spring and summer.
'["ne n:axi_mtim objective is not only to retrieve the Stalinist defeat but to go
nveti further by neutralizing and tihan toppling all of. Iran. The fact that
the Kurds have just recently rallied to Khomeyni's now "anti-imperialist"
v2nt�re is evidence that the maximum objective is definitely the current
~bjeci~ive.
;~o Di r. er_ t :Intervention
i.c: ~;o~s without saying, that this in no way means that at this stage the
~,ovi_et Union has to move up onto the front line and take direct frontal
acti_on, especially military action.
Nor does it mean that the Soviet Union would like to see Ir3nian-American
tension per se degenerate into open war. ~conomic war would be sufficient.
Coirununists in general and Che Soviets in particular have no tendency to
v~i.ew war, even a"just" war, as purifying or regenerating. For them, the
- 3i)-year war in Vietnam is not L-he most ingenious model for the expansion of
soc i_a]. i sm .
The Soviets then had ro consider that the time had arrived when it was
nc~ssibl.e to consummate the collapse of the alliance established 6 months
42
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ago, an alliance uniting in so-so fashion the reformiat, liberal, and moder-
ate upper and lower middle clasaes grouped behind Bazargan and the under-
~~rlvi.le~;ed workin~ mas~es rallied round Khomeyni's Talamic banner.
The Mti-Imperialist Second Wave
Last but not least, it was necessary to define a shock-producing incident
sufficiently spectacutar but still sufficiently meaningful to permit setting
off a second wave that would rouse the Iranian masses as intensely as last
winter's first wave had done, but a second wave rousing them in a cause that,
this time, would no longer be essentially religious--Allah akhbar--but prim-
arily political: "Down with American anti-imperialism." The new alliance
between Tslami,~ and Marxist populists would be formed in the wake of this
"anti-imperialist" second wave. Yet it would not be simply a new alliance
but also an alliance whose "common program" would fully conform to the Marx-
ist--or rather Leninist, to be strictly exact--view of the world, a view
- whose central governing concept is known to be imperialism.
~ The plan outlined above has been implemented and well implemented.
What should we deduce from all this? First of all, that highly effective
use has once again been made of all the pretexts and ruses designed to mis-
- lead world opinion and make it lose sight of what is really happening. One
of the most successful of all the pretexts employed is the "gadget" of
- "the Islamic revival" coupled with reflections on "religious fanaticism,"
- "Koranic fundamentalism," and "irrationalism." It should be no surprise to
find that such a powerful event has a religious dimension in an area of
culture and civilization where the process of secularization has barely be-
gun.
This must not hide the fact, however, that the specifically religious dimen-
sion is already secondary. Proof of this? The rapprochement with Soviet-
ized Afghanistan, a country that only a few months ago Khomeyni was still
holding up to the Moslem rebellion's public scorn. As a matter of fact,
the Ayatollah Khomeyni's "providential" role is now very close to being
spent, even though there is no need to put an end to it by a coup which
would be at least premature and probably superfluous. Having been spoliated
by the "white revolution" of the Shah--who perhaps acted unwisely in this
matter--the Shiite church was a ready-made mass--like the "nobiliary reac-
tionary attitude" in pre-revalutionary France of 1788--with which to over-
throw the Pahlavi regime in the name of a nebulous dream of fundamentalist
restoration combined witY~ some very powerful clerical appetites. Having
finally "put the revolution back on its anti-imperialist feet" as it were,
there is no reason for the Marxists to quarrel with Khomeyni unless he
eventually rejects "anti-imperialism." Yet any attempt to compare Khomeyni
to Gandhi; as Jean Daniel has done, is far-fetched: Khomeyni's anti-
imperialism has none of the authenticity that was Gandhi's distinctive mark.
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1
Diversionary Maneuvers
Ar~d what about the stray sparks of revolt in Saudi Arabia or Pakistan,
sparks ttiat also bear evidence of that "religious fanaticism"? It is too
early to assess their consistency. We cannot help but suspect, however,
that these are "diversions," spontaneous or not. Who does not recall how
tlie Soviets consolidated their hold over Central Europe at the beginning
oL- th~~ 1950's, shielded from any prying eyes, the latter being riveted
on the t~irbulent spectacles in Western Europe and notably in France?
T~Il~at else can we deduce from this situation? That the deceptive power of
decEptive cognates is still as dangerously effective aa ever. The life and
death of hostages are flesh and blood realities each with its own distinctive
" f.ace. Diplomatic immunity is a thoroughly defined rule of law that conditions
the most routine aspects, the very realities of international life. Yet all
of tltese realities are scornfully rejected by communists as being mere "form,"
apparent and superficial. If such is the case, what does constitute "sub-
stance"? That substance is "independence" and "the struggle against imper-
ialism." These are two "open sesame" words, spell-binding and ambiguous
catchwords whose meaning in this case is fixed according to the cotmnunist
ideology. Hence in communist terminology Czechoslovakia and Angola are
independent states while France must, according to an appeal issued by Georges
~1a.rchais, "struggle for i.ts national indepen3ence" and Iran must "gain its
independence." In short, "independence" is determined not by criteria de-
fining the exercise of sovereignty but by membership in the socialist camp.
Standa~d Stalinist Arguments
For that reason it is quite futile, in my opinion, to scrutinize such Ameri-
can moves as the Shah's admission to a New York hospital in an effort to
assess whether the U.S. Government was not imprudent or frivolous. Any
o~:her move would have done just as well. Similarly, Andre Fontaine's
comments (in the 22 November LE MONDE) on the partially justified, if not
~ _legitimate, "hatred of America" are very flimsy. The frenzy of those mobs
shouting "Go home"! is not prompted by any visceral anti-Americanism of the
people. What is visceral is rather the fascination of America, because that
gr~at country, where millions of poor transplanted men and women were able
to create very quickly a prosperous and free society, remains, no matter
cahat may be said about it, a poor man's dream come true and the dream of
those who are still poor.
Anti-Amer.icanism is, therefore, merely the current version of anti-imperialism
and its tenor does not depend on the possible faults ox crimes of the real
America. Moreover, this fact explains that rather strange attempt made by
~rari--the cradle of Indo-Europeans (the whitest of the white!)--to divide
and pit American Blacks against American Whites by releasing the Black
American hostages and calling upon American Blacks to revolt. Is this a
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"wild idea" of the "Islamic students" or of Khomeyni? No, it is aimply a
revival of the standard Staliniet argumenta which in the 1930's had com-
pelled the American Co~uniat Party to consider the American Blacks as "a
people" struggling for its "national independence" against "Yankee imperial-
- ism." These arguments were, in fact, revived for a time during the 1960's.
Now we see them being advanced once again in Tehran.
8041
CSO: 4900
~
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IRA~1
r10RE U.S. EMBASSY DOCUMENTS REVEAL SECRETS
Staff Contacts With Locals
Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 3 Dec 79 p 2 -
[Text] The Islamic students, followers of the Imam
occupying the American nest of spies have issued their
16th revealing statement. It exposes what the criminal
United States had been doing in Iran, from where and ~
which sources it received its information and to whom they
were given. In addition, after the revolution, it was
- revealed how the treacherous Shah's dreaded SAVAK
gathered its information from its network of informers -
throughout the country. As it [SAVAK] was the hand-made
produc+_ of the world-devouring United States imperialism
and rae CIA, it became well-known that the American
Embassy, this spy center of the CIA, had, in cooperation
with the SAVAK, its own spy center and informers and
various other sources of intelligence, collected infor-
mation and passed it quickly to the embassy. These people
were treacherous mercenaries serving foreigners against
~ the Moslem people of Iran. These elements, facing the
fisted arms and determination of our struggling people,
have retreated, but not completely wiped out. The fol-
lowing document reveals the relations that existed among
the network and the spies with the embassy. Here is the
text: _
From the United States Embassy to Washington, D.C. Confidential.
Subject: The Luss of Embassy's Sources of Information.
1. The entire subject is confidential.
7_. In brief, the end result of the deterioration of the U.S.-Iranian
relations has been the lessening of the desire of Iranians to meet with the -
embassy staff. This problem, as was noted in previous communications, is
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~ect[n~; more ;~erious. Continuous pressure in connection with the appoint-
ment of Cutler. as U.S. ambassador and the ever continuous charges of the
U.S.-CIA interference in Iran have helped increase Iranians' fear of talking
to or being seen with the embassy staff to a point which will destroy all
our efforts in collecting intelligence.
3. One of the grave conseq_uences of the deterioration in U.S.-Iranian
relations has been the disappearance of our best sources of information.
It has also resulted in making many Iranians reluctant to talk or to be
seen with embassy staff. These started with the 7 May Senate condemnation
of the execution by the Revolutionary Courts which was~followed by demon-
strations in front of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on 22 and 26 May and culmi-
nated in the extensive reflection of Yazdi's views in the press and the
increased attacks on the U.S. by the media. All these have made our position
more shaky and even worse than it used to be at the beginning of the
revolution.
4. A staff inember in the economic section, with four years cf experience,
reports that many Iranians who used to meet with him in his off ice or gave
answers to his requests over the telephone now could at the most, be con-
tacted for an appointment or reached by telephone at night. They now are
reluctant to talk about issues which they discussed freely some six or
eight months ago. There are a number of people who, because of warm and
close relations [in the past], feel embarrassed at not keeping their
regular and business appointments with us and they continuously try to
postpone them. A Persian speaking employee of the oil company who has had
three years of training [sic] has reported about problems he has had because
of his extensive coatacts with us. Some people no longer have access to
sources of information which they had in the past and almost all of them are
reluctant to talk to us.
S. All the staff inembers in the political section of the embassy have had
the same experience. Some of our intelligence sources have left the country
and even those who have had close and friendly relations with members of
the political section for four years, now are not showing willingness to
meet with us. Although there are some who are still willing to meet with
embassy personnel at their homes. There are, of course, individuals who
still meet with members of our political section but their number is not
sufficient and are not the ones we would like to contact. Staff inembers
who have been in Tehran even longer have noticed this reaction even from
their old friends.
6. Our charge d'affaires reports with regard to a number of former Iranian
ambassadors with whom he had been in touch, that none have contacted us
after their return to Tehran. A retired ambassador told a political section
staff inember that many of his colleagues consider contacting the embassy as
a highly dangerous venture in the Islamic Republic of Iran. We must now wait
and see how many Iranians will be cooperating with us after those who have
been woi~ing with us leave the country next month.
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()ur past experience indicates that one of our best sources of iiiformation
were the Jewish Iranians. However, when we looked for sources of infox�mation ~
they all were concerned about grave consequences if contacted by the U.S.
- ~embassy].
8. A number of intelligence sources in Tehran have indicated that the ~
suspicion of their colleagues and friends ~zad increased. This is more tr.ue
at university campuses where militants have been attacking intellectuals
from an anti-American position. As a result, this group [intellectuals]
- and even those who are more aware of the current situation, are disappearing
from the scene.
9. No doubt, in such circumstances collecting of intelligence needed by us
becomes more difficult. Conai~;nns have not yet reached the point where, as
i_n some Third Wo~ld nations, contacts between the embassy staff and the people
is under strict control. However, pressure in recent weeks has moved Iran
toward that direction. -
'rhe above-mentioned document reflects and confirms the existence of a United
States intelligence and spy network in Iran. One wonders if those who are
living in Washington, especially Mr. Carter, still refuse to admit that this -
[U.S. embassy in Tehran] was not a spy nest.
Moslem students, followers of the Imam.
Ties With Capitalists
' Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 3 Dec 79 p 3 _
~ [Report: "Relations Between an Iranian Capitalist and United States' Nest of
Spies"]
[Text] Following is the text of the document revealed by the students, fol- ~
lo~~ers of the Imam, that was broadcast two nights ago by radio and television.
It reveals the relations between an Iranian capitalist and the not so United
States. The text of the staterznt by the students, followers of the Imam,
is as follows:
F'ollowing the document which was revealed to you, our dear people, we now
~xpose another one which deals with a capitalist and the sucker of the blood
of ti~e underpriviledged people, named Mehdi Rowghani. The text of the
document is as follows: Document No. 1.
"A gr.oup led by Mehdi Rowghani plan to form a large commit;.ee to aci. as
iiaison between the provisional government of Bazargan and Imam Khomeyni's
committee. It is hoped that this could be accomplished by 10 March, 19
Lsfand. Rowghani (a Khomeyni confident) told the embass~'s political
- officer, Stenple, [sic] on morning of 5 March that he, Mehdi Rowghani, had
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SpE~nt the weekend in Qom and had been busy forming the committee which will
try to harmoni.ze relations between Bazargan's government and the Tmam's
rc~imni t~c~e. H~~ y~ ici th~~e ;~s of 4 M~rch, relations between the government nncl
~I~c~ Imam';; commlLtce had been badly str.ained aild added that in several arear~
the committee ignored the government. -
I~c~w~hani is after forming a group made up of 100 people, broken down j.nto
units consisting oF 8-10 people, who will be responsible for specific
problems. Rowghani did not mention the names of ttiese individuals, but
said ttiat the gr.oup censisted of reputable and influential elements from all
areas of the revol.utionary movement.
"The center of the liaison committee will be in Tehran. He said that the
main goal of tt~e committee was to draw the Imam's conunittee to a position
- so that it would adopt a more cooperative attitude toward the government.
}ie hoped to go to Qom on 18 and 19 Esfand [10 and 11 March] to complete the
arrangement. tie also said that the Imam approved of this idea and talks
' with the government of Bazargan were in process. He was asked by a political
officer if the Iorming of another committee would be helpful in solving some
problem~? Rowghani, who apparently was unhappy about the lack of law and
order in the first three weeks after the revoiution, said he was very hopeful
and ~I~~it something had to be done."
Note: At the end of his report to ~lashington about the meeting, the political
officer remarks that Rowghani's application for a business visa to go to the
United States indi_cated long-term benefits from him.
Following is the text of another document: Conf idential.
May, 1979. From the American Embassy in Tehran to Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance. Subject: Meeting With Rowghani. Strictly confidential.
"Rowghani left for the United States this morning for a six to eight week
- visit. 'Bluff' gave him 'Precht's' name and telephone number and urged him
to get in touch with 'Precht.' Rowghani had asked 'Bluff' if there were
people he s}iotilcl meet. Rowghani is willing to meet 'Precht' and probably
, would be willing to hold secret talks with others as well. Because of his
family ties coith Imam Khomeyni he could be an important source of information
about people surrounding Khomeyni." -
Signed [no name given]
Document 3, Regarding connections with Mehdi Rowghani. rrom the United
_ States embassy, Tehran to the State Department, Washington. Subject: Mehdi
Kowghani.
With the possibility of being accused of pessimism we would like to indicate
~h1t Rowghani's optimism has grown in relation to his distance from Iran. In
May, whe~.i he lef~ for four to six weeks, he was very much disturbed about
conditions in Qom and was not quite sure what had g~ne wrong with the revolution.
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i~~~~' ~ ~ ~~~~ndi tions tiave changed why does he need a'~ken card" [ green
~,~r~l J~~r n c I ci�r.enship card. In one of the Persizn-language newspapers we
,~;~~n~~ r~~~r~~~;~ new~; item which indl.cated that he had fled the country one
_ ~n~~n r I< mpany has agreed to pay Mr. Rowghani a four percent commission for all cars
solu o~ttside Ir.an and then taken into the country. Following the agreement
~"orcl Company had requested and apparently received information about cars
insici~ the cauntry. The report was examined twice by Ford. There are about
1_ , 5('i0 such cars involved and we reached an agreement about the amount to be
~>ai.j to Rowghani. In the year 1357 (1978-79), a Ford company representative
_~E`er twice examining the report on the existing cars in Iran, the payment
, ~~f c~~~runission cn 1,500 cars to Rowghani was promised. Mr. Rowghani wouid
~ Like co know when is the Ford Company going ta pay him. The liaison in
London is Deputy Middle East and African Operation Chief, Roder Benifice
( si: ]
3. Fur London. When answering please inform the Department [of State].
~'n the bas:is of information determined in London contact and corr~spondence
uJi.th r_he Depar.tment may or may not be proper [sic].
4~ l il ;:~cldition to the commission problem, Rowghani has another difference
~;Ji t.h ~lie: Por.d Company which concerns the sale oE some 60 heavy trucks to
ei~e lraiii~.in National OiI Company. He claims that the difference between the -
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export price and the sale price to the oil company should be paid to him as
the agent of the company. The oil company has paid for the purchase directly
to the Ford Company. He believes he should be compensated, This proh~~~n is
four years old and is still dragging. Any information provided wi`'-. .egard
to the Ford Company's position and their willingness to pay and cl~ar the
acco unt will be greatly appreciated. Signed: Sullivan.
Note: The man called Stenple [sic] is a well-known agent of the dreaded CIA. -
Attention should now be paid to the Imam's statement in which he said that
these westernized intellectuals are the ones that will cause our revolution
to deviate from its course. By publishing these two documents we have exposed
the attitude of the western-inclined intellectiials an~ the capitalists, the -
two elements who would like to bring the United States back to our country.
They favor the Western rule of Lran. Our nation will no longer be fooled
by these intellectuals and capitalists who call for compromisP with the
United States. They are condemned by our people. Our peopl~ are alert and
intend to uproot these elements of corruption and do away with the American
- bases of power in our country.
9561
CSO: 4906
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ISRAEL
- BRIEFS -
URANIUM PRODUCTION--Tel Aviv Dec 21: Israel will next year start produc-
ing uranium for power plants, Eliahou Teoumin, Managing Director of the
Negev Phosphates Company Chemicals, Israel said today. It has reserves
of 40,000 tons enough to supply eight to 10 one-megawatt nuclear reactors
for several dozen years, he said. The 0.1 to 0.2 percent uranium content
~ in the Dead Sea and Negev phosphate deposits is insufficient to ~ustify
direct extraction. But extraction is commercially worthwhile as part of
fertilizer, acid and phosphate derivate extraction he said.--AFP [Text]
[Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 22 Dec 79 p 8]
CSO: 4820
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LEBANON
BASHIR AL-JUMAYYIL EXPLORES POSSTBILITIES OF SOLUTION TO COUIJTRY'S CRISIS
Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 26 Nov-2 Dec 79 pp 10-15
[Interview With Bashir al-Jumayyil_, Chairman of Lebanese Forces Military
- Council, by Ilyas al-Dayri and May Kahhalah; "This Legitimacy [Legitimate
- GovernmentJ Cannot Achieve Any Detente; I Don't Believe That There Will
Another War in Future; Who Will Fight Whom; I Defy Walid Junblatt to Agr.ee
to Meet With Me; I Am Ready to Go to Him Wherever He Wants and Ready to
Meet Ibrahim Qulaylat and All; For First 3 Months, We Fought With 30 Rifles
We Purchased From Palestinians; We Had Fear of Lebanese Muslim But Now We
have Freed Ourselves of This Complex So Welcome to Muslims in al-Ashrafiyah
and in Al1 Our Areas; President Sarkis Must Be Convinced That Forces on
Stage Are Ones That Can Close Ports, Control Violations and Administer Jus-
tice" ]
[Text] "There will be no war after now but the intellectual terror insists
on putting the country in this charged atmosphere. The state is weak and it
must seek the help of the actual forces on the stage. I want to reach an
understanding with the state to put an end to the wave of crime and chaos.
Legitimacy [legitimate government] is a point of ineeting among all the parties -
concerned. We are studying a common denominator and practical cooperation with
the state. I address this appeal to my brother the Lebanese Muslim: I am
a sword in your hand and I am not against you." These are the words Bashir
al-Jumayyil, the chairman of the Lebanese Military Council, uttered in his
interview with AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI.
- [Question] Let us start with the Lebanese war. The war climate is still
prevalent and Lebanon is still suffering under the burden of its consequences.
Why did this war occur, what good has it done us and where do we now stand
in comparison to where we were before the war?
[ArswerJ When the war started, none of us knew where it would reach and what -
its consequences would be. I remember that in the Phalanges Security Council �
_ we had 30 (Slavia)rifles which we had ~urchased from the Palestinians. During
the first 3 months of the war, we fought with those 30 rifles. Can it be
still said that we are the ones who imposed the war? They are the ones who
imposed it. They forced us to fight and we fought.
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~qucstionJ You always repeat "they imposed the war." Who are "they?" What
state, what faction, what side?
[Answer] I don't want to again talk about plots, agreements and issues of the
sort. The war was imposed and its factors were numerous. It so coincided that
the Lebanese soil was mobilized politically and socially. We must focus
in tl~i:~ interview on the social aspect which will constitute a considerable
part of o~ir battle. It is not essential that the battle be a military or a
~~olitical. battle because we have today a social crisis that is more serious
than any other crisis. It is possible that national unity will be achieved
through the social crisis whose whirlwind we have begun to enter. This
crisis is more serious than any military battle.
[Question] We will not say that there are factions. There are big, ramified
and common international factos that have no objection to Lebanon staying
as it is now or even to Lebanon disappearing.
[Answer] They will have rest and we will thus solve a large part of the -
cr.isis.
Not Us and not President
- [Question] We, therefore, ask this question: What do the Phalanges actually
have, other than Pmotional and amicable words, to offer and to implement for
the restoration of this country?
[Answer] I don't know if I have the right to speak in the party's name.
Buy my answer, and perhaps it is the feeling of everybody in the Phalanges
and in the National Front, is that we are under occupation in the full sense
of the word.
You ask what, other than nice words, we can offer. These words are necessary
because we will one da~ return and reap their fruits. These words prepare
For a certain climate after the elimination of occupation. We may not be
capable at present, and nobody is. Even President Ilyas Sarkis is not able
to realize the national unity. The legitimate government to which they de-
liver military vehicles, jeeps and trucks and with which they write statements
and offer verbal support--even this legitimate government is not able to
achieve any detente. -
It is my opinion that talking about detente at pre.sent is like deceiving our-
selves. The Muslim faction is eager to return to its previous Lebanese roots
because it has suffered the worst of evils and becau~e it has found out where
its experiment has led it. The Lebanese Muslim l:as begun to feel now that
his position is different from that of the Muslims of any other country.
Even the personality of the Lebanese Muslim is distinct from that of any
other Arab Muslim. The Lebanese Muslzm has now begun to be aware of this. `
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What we arp thinking of practically at present is to be prepared when the
Syrian occupation disappears, and it must disappear. We ~re no longer trapped
because the countdown has started and Syria will not stay long among us. So,
the practical thing tor us is to stand fast, as we did in the summer of 197~3,
i.e. to preserve a part of Lebanon free--not only for the Christian community
but for the Lebanese society as a whole--where the Christian and the Muslim
c~ommunities can see that this resistance has been for the sake of all of
~ I.ebanon and the sake of all the Lebanese factlons and where these communities
c:an see that any Lebanese can benefit from the resistance of al-Ashrafiyah
- and 'Ayn al-Rummanah.
This resistance has succeeded whereas the Syrian control af Lebanon or of the
free areas constituting the starting point for the Ziberation of al-Bastah,
the sou.th, 'Akkar and al-Biqa' has failed.
We can now see what is happening in Burj al-Barajinah and al-Shiyah. A
~ Syrian patrol passed under a Shi'ite woman sitting on~the balcony of her
t~ouse and the woman hurled at the patrol a flower pot that "split open" the
}iead of a Syrian soldier. This woman is not Marunite, isolationist or an
agent of. Israel. This means that we hope that our resistance in al-Ashrafiyah
will expand. The practical thing that the Phalanges are offering is to pre- ~
serve the spirit of resistance so that when Syria withdraws from our country
. under the impact of events or developments which we do not know, Lebanon
will move in order that we may establish detente and that President Sarkis
may perform his role. Even if he doesn't wish to do so, we as a people wlll
be prepared to perform this role, having gained suff icient maturity and a
= 5ufficient sense of responsibility. At that time the Phalanges, along with
the other factions, will call for a roundtable or for a national conference.
And we m~lst agree.
Lebanese State Will not Do It
[Question~ But to reach this result or this solution, we must have two
things: A state capable of saying to the Syrian "thank you for your coopera-
tion and services" and then to take chaxge of affairs. This state cannot
exist as long as you have your separate state and as long as you don't re~og--
nize the legitimate state.
[Answer] No, no. I object to both projections. I object to the first be-
cause the s~ate is no longer required to tell Syria: Go. The state is no
longer required to do so because, first, the State of Lebanon will not do it
for numerous considerations and, second, because Syria is not here with our
approval but acts as an occupation army. The proof is the offhanded arrests
which are the basic characteristic of any occupier. An occupier can collect
funds and protection money, can levy taxes on plants and can dissemble
them, as states did in World War II.
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The basic characteristic [of any occupiex] are the haphazardly arrests.
Luok at the shaykhs that they have arrested and who do not know whether they
will come back or not or look at our people who have been detained in Syria
for 16 months and witn whom we have lost all communication and about whom we
. know nothing. There are things imposed by the Syrian on the army, on the
~~ub.li.c security, on the judiciary and on a17. the state agencies. This is
why the state is incapable of asking the Syrians to leave.
Compret~ension and Smashing
[Question] But if you give the state power, if you let it get strong and
iF you help it...
[Answer] I beg your pardon. If the State of Lebanon te11s the Syrians
to leave, a small army detachment will be sent to B'abda Palace or to al-
Yarzah and will throw everybody out. Such an act has become ordinary.
Historically, the examples are numerous. France under the occupation was
- in a similar position and (Beitan) was not required to tell the Germans: Go.
We must not [sic] view these i~sues from a different angle because the State
of Lebanon is incapable of expelling the Syrian. You also say that the State
of Lebanon will grow strong if I give it i~s strength [sic]. Here permit me
to say that we all know that when President Sarkis was elected in 1976
Pierre al-Jumayyil compelled all the party deputies to go under fire to vote
for President Sarkis. Pierre al-Jumayyil was able to persuade ex-President
Camille Sham'un to elect Sarkis as president of the republic. I was the
middleman who conveyed Shaykh Pierre's message to ex-President Sham'un to
come to the council [Chamber of lleputies]. We opened all the possibilities
and gave the state all the means at the beginning of 1976 so that it may
"take oFf" and regain all its positions and strength. Regrettably, the state
caas living in the climate of 1958 and as if nothing had happened. It was
living in the climate of indifference of the 3 years of the war.
Thus, I was compelled to go along with the state and to surxender all my
resources to the ministers who ruled us in the first 3 years. At the same
time, we were forced to act as an authority or with some of the legitimate
government's powers to preserve some of the accomplishments made and also
to preserve our position and entity. But instead of understanding all the
effective forces on the stage, the state tried to smash them. This is where
the dispute erupted between the state and the forces that considered themselves
- no longer committed to the state for any thing.
We tell the state: Do not ask us to give you everything on a silver plate.
The state must take these powers away from us and if it fails, we are not
~ ' responsible.
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Sarkis ls to Blame!
[QuestionJ We are not talking about the legal powers nor about the legiti-
macy of the Syrian presence. However, from your point of approach, how can
the ho:neland be liberated and regained when the legitimate Lebanese government,
represented now by Tlyas Sarkis, does not give your resistance or the resis-
tatice of any other faction the benefit of legitimacy and of constitutionality?
[Answer] Right.
[Question] If you give the state strength, you would be giving this strength
to the homeland. So if Sarkis tells the Syrians to leave and they fail to do
so, then he can create an international crisis. But how can Sarkis say this
[tell Syrians to go] when he does not have control even over a single police
post?
[Answer] He is to blame because instead of building a modern army in every
' sense of the world in the first 3 years, he smashed the remnants of the Le-
banese army. Instead of showing respect to the officers who fought for a
cause, who never asked about their salaries and who sacrificed everything,
Sarkis and the army command resorted to breaking those officers (here
Bashir mentioned the names of some officers). They broke these officers in-
stead of giving them an opportunity with officers from the other faction.
I am not denianding a factional army or an army that belongs to one faction.
Let them rely on the persons who fought for a cause and who performed the
duty of blood, not on television but on the soil. President Saikis committed
a mistake when he thought that by breaking tnese elements he can build an
army. Now Sarkis has reached a situation where the army is rionexistent.
Some ambassadors persuaded Sarkis that what he was doing was great. There
were parades on television but at the first tremor, his army splintered in
the port and in "Uyun al-Siman.
Free by 180 Degrees
[Question] Even if the state responds to what you are asking it for we
would not achieve anything because we are emerging from a bloody war and
Sarkis cannot gather people tainted with blood and who were enemies in a civil
war and form an army and a state with such people.
[Answer] This is ttie mistake in the thinking of President Sarkis, of some
ambassadors and of those who are in charge of Lebanese affairs. They were
mistaken when they thought that rearranging the Lebanese situation comes
through ousting the groups present on the arena. They committed a mistake
when they started to classify the opponents as moderate and radical elements,
describing this as a fighter and that as somebody who creates sensitivities
and saying that we must rely on persons who represent nothing so as to avoid
~
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sensitivities. Here I say that it is a million times easier for you to reach
an understanding with a person who knows what he wants and is capable of
carrying out what he wants than to reach an understanding with a person who
doesn't know what he wants and incapable of carrying out something on which
- you agree with him.
[Question] Why didn't you agree to a cabinet representing all the opponents?
[AnswerJ We did not accept? Who vetoed it?
[Question] All the opponents vetoed each other.
[Answer~ Why, who does Talal al-Mar'ibi represent? And does Salim al-Huss
represent me?
Abu-Hasan and National Movement
[Question] We see that there are the Lebanese Front parties on this side and
the National Fro~t parties on the other side.
[Answer] Abu-Hasan used to tell me that there is no such a thing as a Na-
tional Movement but there is a Palestinian resistance with a screen called
the National Movement.
[Question] They say that Israel is behind the Lebanese Front and if each
faction continues to cling to his part we will need a miracle to regain the
country and the legitimate government. But practically, we are doing nothing
to save the country that can endure no more dragging and no more heroics.
The practical thing...
_ [Answer] Yes, we took the initiative to do the practical thing. I visited
Kamal Junblatt.
[Question] That was in the past. What prevents you from meeting Walid Junb-
latt now?
[Answer] I defy Walid Junblatt to agree to meet with us. In invite him to a
meeting and I am ready to go wherever he wants or wishes. I defy him to
accept.
[Question] Why don't you meet Ibrahim Qulaylat? Have you tried to establish
bridges with the Shi'ite leaders and with the Sunni leaders?
[Answer] The bridges are numerous but they are timid because the person who
w will hold a dialogue with us today is exposed to assass:~nation at any moment
as a result of tlie occupation under which such a person lives.
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[Question] This is said to be because of your relationship...
(Answer] With Israel. This story has become like that of the oil ~ar. This -
t~ ,z ~~relext. I am nol: the ally of anybody. T am the ally of my cause.
- one time we were compelled to cooperate with those who were able to help _
- us. When Abu-Iyad believed that the path to Haifa passed to Junyah, what
option did we have before us?
_ [Question] What limit did this cooperation with or help from the "devil"
~ into which you were forced reach?
[Answer] I will not say that I co~perated with the "devil." We cooperate
with whoever agrees to help us, regardless of who he is. ~
[Question] To what degree can Israel commit you to any decision?
[Answer] I am free in my actions by 180 degrees. We are free and we work for
our interests as Lebanese. When our interest requires cooperation with this
or that, then we do so. When our interest requires us to fight so or so, -
then we fight him. We are not committed or tied to anybody. We are Lebanese
~ and free and we wish the entire world had the degree of freedom th.at we have.
We Want Al1 of Lebanon _
~Question] It is said, and only you have the proof, that Shaykh Bashir is
~ the leader of the cooperation with Israel because he has a vijualization
for a specific Lebanon and because he accepts nothing but the Lebanon of
- t;ashir al-Jumayyil personally.
[Answer] Right. I want this Lebanon whose borders [contain within them] _
10,425 square kilometers.
[Question] They say you want less.
[Answer] Less! When you read some newspapers that abound with fabrications
and you listen to some radios that are well=known for their inclinations, how
do you want the Muslim public opinion not to "believe" all that is said,
especially when what is said is groundless. They fabricate news. One time
they bring Sa'd Haddad to Junyah and another they have me meeting with Begin in
Israe].. Every day, hirelings fabricate these stories and, naturally, the Mus-
lim public opinion is affected by them. I address to the Muslim public opinion
and tell it that everything it hears and everything that some people try to
ingrain in its mind is wrong. The Lebanon that we want has an area of
10,425 square kilometers and it is a Lebanon for the Muslim and the Christian,
but within a certain constitutional framework that spares them and spares us -
~ another massacre like the one we have gone through. Is there anything to be
_ said about this?
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[~2uE~stlonJ W}iat is said about your wanting a Christian Lebanon or a Phalang-
. ist Lebation is reinforced by a fact emanating from the war, namely the fact
that the Phalanges have clashed even with their allies and it has appeared
that they have tried to reduce the weight of all their opponents so that they
may impose themselves as the sole power on the Lebanese stage.
~ ~AnswerJ Do you think that we can reduce the weight of Camille Sham'un?
~c~uestionJ You have clashed with Sham'un, with Franjiyah, with the Armenians
and with others and it seemed as if you, as the Phalanges Party and as Bashir
al-Jumayyil, want your own state.
[Answer] At the end of a war like the one we have gone through, the clashes
could have been more crushing and bloodier, especially since there is no
state, no army and no police. There was a popular war and weapons were in the
tiands of people in an unimaginable way. There were individual interests on
ttie part of r~any in this faction and the ather faction. I do not deny these
clashes and we are all pained by them. However, we and ex-President Sham'un
~.re a single hand to solve all that has happened.
(Qc~~tion] The question is: Does Bashir al-Jumayyil have a plan to set up -
his own state? -
[Answer] Do you believe that this state can come into existence by destroying -
all the existing institutions? Impossible. The clash with the Armenians
started because of a trivial matter and we needed 2 3ays before we could settle _
it. t3ut ultimately, we and the Armenians restored our previous relation~.
- We liave political objections against the Armenians that go back earlier than
2975. These issues must be dealt with and we are dealing with them. We
have held several meetings with the social leaderships and we will very shortly
come up with a unified working paper so that we may feel a stronger organic
unity ttian before.
(Question] What is the basis?
[Answer] I prefer not to speak now because we are in the heart of the nego- _
tiations with the Armenians. After nearly 2 weeks, we will emerge with some-
thing unified which, I hope, will end the dispute finally.
State! Can We?
[Question] So you in the Phalanges Party don't want to set up your own state.
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[Answer] Can the Phalanges Party set up a state? Where would we go with the
c~thc~r Cactl~ns? Wl?y :lre they trying to portray the matter in a manner that
conf t ic l:s wi th ~hc~ trutli?
[Question] Because you have been eager in the Lebanese Front areas to keep
a certain type of people. In al-Ashrafiyah, you rarely find a Muhammad, a
Hasan, a rfustafa or a... ~Muslimsj.
[Answerj Have you passed by Bayt Baydun Quarter and by al-Burjawi iahere there
is a Druze c~ncentration and in Karm al-Zaytun where there is a Shi'ite con-
centration. They remained there throughout the war, fought on our side and
had martyrs fall from atar~ng them.
[Question] These are the ones who fought with you. But those who do not
watit to fight...
[Answer] We still have a Druze community and a Shi'ite community that re-
mained among us.
[Question] These proofs don't deny that you have wanted an area where no-
body other than you is present. `
[Answer] Because at one time I had a fear complex.
[Question] And now?
[AnswerJ Now I have been freed of it.
[Question] Why don't you do something, for exampl~, to let one third of the
Muslims who were in al--A~shrafiyah retur~ to it? This means that you have been
freed but that the residues are still present among the fighters.
[Answer] I say that we, not as fighters but as a group of people living in
this part of the free Lebanon, have frned ourseives of this complex. We
now know that the Lebanese Muslim has come to cling to the entity like us.
It has taken us 600 years to free ourselves of this complex. Now the Lebanese -
Muslim is supposed to return and consider these areas his own. The individual
problems will persist and we will continue to be exposed to incidents of this
kind here and there. This means that these issues will not be controlled in
24 hours with a magic wand. But now the leaderships are supposed to move
closer to each other, to hold dialogue, not to insult each other and to in-
spire trust in the base on one part may mingle with the other.
Take, for example, Walid Junblatt's statemer_t in Paris that Pierre al-Jumayyil
is senile, that Sham'un is a bandit and that I don't know what. Is it proper
atter S years of war to return to the expressions and methods followed before?
Walid Junblatt is the chairman of a party speaking about the chairmen of
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~,th~~r parties who have their glorious history. These things complicate rather
~fi:~n f zc� i] it~ite. We, as leaders, are supposed to rise above these methods
that ~u not befit a responsible and refined person and that do not facilitate
Lhe r.c~5toration of conditions to normalcy. We mut be eager to reach under-
~tanding with each other. The Syrians will go one day and the Palestinians
wi_].1 t~ecome, and must become, disciplined. The Palestinian must know that
hc c�.au no longer l.ive in the chaos under which he has lived and that the
rcd car~~c~~ ttiat he is spreading in Europe will be riddled with holes and
I~Luwn up as a result of a small problem with the Marunite or the Shi'ite
in Lebanon.
Palestinian's Profits and Losses
[QuestionJ And why are you excluding the Sunni?
(Answer] This is possible yet... the days will come. But the Palestinian
must know that all the propaganda and diplomatic gains he is achieving in
the west will disappear when he returns to faulty or irresponsible practices
in Lebanon. Tt~is is why we, as Lebanese, must understand this. The Pales-
ti.nian diplomatic openness to the west makes the Palestinian's cause more deli-
- cate and his position more critical and the Palestinian will not be able to
- do wi~~it }1P_ used to do previously. T hope that these words will reach the
simple and ordinary Muslim: The driver, the grocer, the stud~nt and the family
head, i.e. the true Muslim Lebanese conscience. My words are addressed to them
and not to t;he leaderships that do not represent them. Samir Furnayjah does
ilot repr.esent the Islamic public opinion and neither do George Habash,
Ueorbe Hawi, riichel... It is preposterous that the real Islamic public opinion
is represented by a group of Christians who have nothing to do with Islam.
A5 Lor the Islamic public opinion, it must rest assured that the r.esistance
in which we have engaged has been in our name and in its name and that the
liberated areas are for us and for it so that this public opinion may march
forth and liberate its own areas. One day, the hour and the opportunity will
come and this public opinion must be prepared to proceed with the act of li-
beration as we were in 1978 prepared to proceed with the act of liberating
ourselves. National unity can be achieved from this angle. The true pro-
blems are not jobs and lies alone [sic]. Lebanon had been built on lies,
on business and on interests of which we were proud in our financial and
economic system. We us~~ to say that the country was prosperous. This pros-
perity was built on lies, theft and cheating.
Now w~ must all understand that the true national unity will consist of par-
ticipation ir the responsibility. So f ar, we have been given the responsibi-
lity. But the day will come when the Lebanese Muslim will participate with
us so that we may march forth together. We want the Lebanese Muslim to be-
lieve that any action we carry out is carried out in our name and his name.
- One day, he will see that all that has been done was done in Lebanon's name
and not in the name of one faction for building the state of one party or of
one faction.
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[Question] But the Muslim is still very wary. .
- [Answer] I understand this.
[Question] What bolsters this wariness is that you were the one who accused
the Muslim previously of having little ailegiance for L~~banon, rather than
this allegiance was nonexistent.
[Answer] And he admits that he was so at one time.
We Don't Trust Army
[Question] But it has now ~:ecome evident that you, as a faction and not
as a person, are not letting the homeland return to legitimacy by your pre-
venting the state legitimacy and the state army from returning, to your area
as long as you have no Syrians and no Palestinians among you.
[Answer] You are talking like Salim al-Huss. Is there still a spot in this
small area of Lebanon in which the army doesn't exist? There are seven road-
blocics between al-Madfun and this place. The army is in the center of al-
Ashrafiyah and in all the areas.
[Question] But for every army roadblock there are two Phalangist road-
blocks.
[Answer] This is another subject. However, it doesn't mean that the army
is not present among ~is. But we do not trust the army. This is a television
army and not a real army.
[Question] So you are saying that the army is nonexistent, even though there
are no dangers in your area. What will the resident of al-Bastah and the resi-
- dent of the south say? National unity cannot be restored through any milit~a
other than the state militia.
[Answer] Okay, okay [said in English].
[Question) So, you must give the example by showing that the state militia
can enter al-Ashrafiyah in order that we may ask it why it doesn'c enter
Sabra, for example.
[Answer] Let it enter. Am I or is Salim al-Huss preventing it?
[Question] Casting doubts prevents the army from entering. _
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[Answer] I don't accept this analysis. I refuse it because the Lebanese
~irmy hasn't received so far any backi~g and any support from anybody except
us . The army er~tered Bur~ Rizq and it should have entered Bur~ al-Murr at
the same time. The Palestinian resistance didn't allow it and Salim al-Huss
agreed with the resistance on not permitting the army's entry to Burj al-Murr.
I don't trust in the Lebanese army at present because it is no~ in charge of -
any front. It did not come to 'Ayn al-Rummanah untll 2fter the events that
we know. The Lebanese army is uot in al-Zu'rur and not in any area where
there is a front or tangential lines. The army is in our internal areas.
Yet, we have accepted it. But we don't trust it because it has not been _
tested. We ask Salim al-Huss to permit the army to ~nter the markets [al-
aswaq] front. We ask him to deploy the army in Fatral building..and in the -
port, not on gate No 9 to watch for thefts, if there are any thefts, but on
the f irst pier where zhe front is, in Ashmun building, in al-Tabaris and on
r.he wall. Let the army enter a1-Damur and al-'Ayshiyah. Why should it
enter al-Ashrafiyah and not al-Dawhah or some other place? This is why we _
don't trust the army. Yet, ~t is present in our area.
I Say to Lebanese Muslim =
' [Questior.j But the others consider the "Deterrence" our army. Your position ~
vis-a-vis the Syrians is clear but the Muslim believes that the Syrians
~ defend him against you more strongly than the army.
' [AnswerJ Tk;e Lebanese Muslim is still holding this position? ~
[Question] He still has the complex of f ear of you.
[Ans~~er] Thi.s fear is there because the Syrian and the Palestinian make the f
L,ebanese Muslim think that if he comes to our area the Lebanese Forces, t�e
- Phalanges and Bashir al-Jumayyil will slaughter him. This is the pretext
of the Syria~: and of the Palestinian to secure their continued presence in
Lebanon. He