JPRS ID: 74920 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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l4 JRNUAI~Y 1988 NQ. 2066 1 OF 2

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JPRS 74920
14 J~anuary 1980
~ N~ar E ast North Africa Re ~rt
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No. 2066
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FBIS FOREIC~N BROADCAST INFORIVIATION SERVICE
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so~r~
REPOKT DOCUMENTATION 1. REPORT NO. 2. 3. R~civi~nt's Acc~~sion No
PAGE JPRS 74920
1. 1~tl~ ~nd BuDtitl� - S. R~port D~te
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT, No. 2066 14 Jan~ar 1980
6.
7, Author(s) e. P~rforminQ O~~~nltation Rept Nu
9. P~rfoimin~ Or~~nlxat~on N~m� �nd Addr~sa 10. Project/T~ak/Wo~M Unit No.
Jutnt Publications Research Seryice ~
1000 North Glebe Road ii. co~�,�tci or Gnnt(G) No.
A.rl ington, Virginia 22201 cc~
cci
~ 12. Sponsorln~ Or~~nl=~tlon N~m~ ~nd Addnfs 13. Type of RepoR b Period Covered .
As above
~a.
~ IS. 9upplem~ntary Not~t -
I
16. A6otr~et (Umih 2W words)
This s~rial report contains inf'otmation on socioeconomic, government, political,
atid technical developments in the countries of the Near East and North Africa.
I
_ ~
~
17. Uocum~nt Anrlysls � O~uriptors
F'~,l[rical Sct~_nce x Inter-Arab Affairs Libya Sultanate
ti~,cic~logy North African x Mauritania of Oman
. Economics Affaira Morocco Syria ~
C�!.ture (Social Afghanistan x People's Demo- Tunisia
_ Scienc~~s) Algeria cratic Republic x United Arab
Ethnology X Bahrain ~ of Yemen Emirates
Geography Egypt Persian Gulf x Western Sahara
Techological x Iran Area Yemen Arab
- Military Sciences X Iraq Qatar Republic
Israel x Saudi Arabia x Islamic Affairs
Jordan Spanish North ~
x Kuwait Africa
Lebanon Sudan
b Id~ntlfl~r~/f~n�End~d T~rms
c. COSATI FI~Id/Oroup 5D ~ 5C ~ 5K ~ 15
ls. Av~ I~blllt at~ ~m~nt 19. S~eu~ity Cl~ss (This Raport) 21. No. of Paass
iln~im~tec~ Availability UNCLASSIFIED 125
ti u 1 d ~ y NT I S 2p, r~urity Cl~ss (Th~s P~~~) 2P. Price _
SprinRfield, Virginia 22161 UivCLASSIFIED
(S~~ ANBI~Z70.1a) ~ In~truetlon~ on R~wn� OrTIONAI fORM 272 (A-711
(Form~rly NTIS-75) _
O~paRment ot Comm~rc�
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JPRS 7492Q -
14 January 1980
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
No. 2066
CONTENTS PAG~
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
'Arafat: 'Our Battle Is a Battle of Civilization'
(Yasser 'Arafat Interview; LIBERATION, 23-29 Nov 79) i
Current U.S. Attitudes Tow;~xd Middle East Ccntemplated
(Editorial, Nasir-al-Ihn al-Nashashabi; AI~-
MZISTAQ~AI~, 8 Dec 79) 5
ISLAMIC AFFAIRS
- Religious Waxs in Third World Seen as Sgreading
(Editorial, Salim al-F'irzli; AL-HAWADITH, 9 Nov 79) 9
Text of Prophet's Pledge of Safety Revealed
(Antoine Shukrallah Haydar; AZ-HAWADITH, 9 Nov 79) ll
Koranic Concept of Security Discussed
(Muhammad 'Ali Hasan; AI~-HUDA AL-ISLAMI, Oct 79) 13 _
, Islamic Unity Fxpounded, Defended
(Muhammad Ahmad Salih a1-Hasin; AI~-HUDA AL-ISLAMI,
Oct 79) 17
BAHRAIN
Foreign Banking Concessions Closed
(AL-SIYASAH, 17 Nov 79) 21
Bahrain Seen Unique But Inseparable Part of Gulf
(Riyad Najib al-Rayyis; AL-MUSTAQBAI~, 1 Dec 79) 25
Brief s
Petroleum Industry Startup 30
- a - [III - NE & A - 121]
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
IR.AN
Those Who Vote and Those Who Don't
. (NAME-YE kUZ, 3 Dec 79) 31
Ghotbzadeh Appointment Seen Indicatir.g Tougher Policies
(NAME-Y~ RUZ, 30 Nov 79) 33
Khalkhali Wants Carter Condemned, Not ~iostages
(NAME-YE RUZ, 22 Dec 79) 35
Students Allege U.S. ~nbassy Documents Reveal Another Agent
(BAMDAD, 11 Dec 79) 36
Sistan, Baluchistan To Enforce Revolutionary Order
(BAMBAD, 12 Dec 79) 38
Ayatollah Lahuti Explains Split FY~om Guaxdians
(KEYHAN, 11 Dec 79) ~0
Hoseyn Khomeyni Speaks Qut on Arab, Religious Issues ~
(AL-HAWt1DITH, 16 Nov 79) Lt3
Paxis Court Rejects Fund Restitution Demand
(TEHRAN TIMES, 13 Dec 79) 49
Iran To Petition U.S., Foreign Courts for Shah Asset Freeze
(TEHRAN TIlKES, 13 Dec 79) 51 -
Exports of Pistachios, Rugs to U*~ited States Halted
(TEHRAN TIMES, 12 Dec 79) 53
- IRAQ
Modern Methods of ~~rop Protection Being Implemented
('abdallah Kati'; AL-'IRAQ, 15 Nov 79) 54
KUWAI T
Arab Surimiit Tied to Iranian Crisis -
(Editorial; AI~-RA'Y AI~-'ANA~I, 10 Nov 79) 58
American Elacks' Role in Middle East Discussed
(Editorial, Najib 'Abd-�al-Hadi; AI,-WATAN, 15 Oct 79) 60
. Deceptiti�e Propagaxida Against Arab Nation Deplored
~ (,~ditorial, Ahmad a.l_-Jarallah; AL-SIYASAH, l9 Nov 79) . 52
- b -
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
Paper Decries Ineffectual Actions Against United States
(Editorial., Ahmad Jarallah; AL-SIYASAH, 9 Dec 79) 63 -
Crown Prince Speaks on National Econorr~y
(AL-WATAN, 15 Oct 70) 65
U.S. Economic Measures Against Iran Opposed
(Editorial, Ahmad al-Jaxallah; AZ-SIYASAH, 17 Nov 79) . 68
Evaluation of Investment Policies Urged
(AL-SIYASAH, 17 Nov 79) 69
Preparations Made fcr Seashore Development Projec t
(AL-SIYASAH, 6 Dec 79) 71
MAURITANIA
' Briefs
Rural Exodus 72
PEOPLE' S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YF'~fi1
'Ali Nas~r Seen Gaining in Power Struggle "
(AL-DUSTUR, 29 Oct-4 Nov ?9) i3
Heaith Service Progress in Development Plan Reviewed -
('Ali Ibn Talib; 11~ OCTOBER, l~. Oct 79) 78
SAUDI ARABIA
Regionalism, Flindamental~sm Threaten Re~;ime ~
- (Harald 'Jocke; FRANKFURTER ALLGII~IEINE, 5 Dec 79) 82
Conscription Order Expected Soon
- (ARA.B NEWS, 13-14 Dec 79) 8Lt
New Industrial City of Yanbu' Detailed -
- (SAUDI BUSINESS, 30 Nov 79) 86
Dedication Ceremonies, by Jim Latiders
Industrialization Is Objective
NGL FY~actionation Plant
NGL Pipeline ~
Crude Oil Pipeline -
Petrochemical Complex
Petromin's Domestic Refinery
Export Refinery
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CONTF~iT5 (Continued) Page
Petrochemical ~'igreement Signed With Japan
(ARAB NEWS, 25 Nov 79) 98
Plant at Jubail, by John Rossax~t
Capacity of 600,000 Tons
Saudi Arabia~s Port System Surveyed
(SAUDI BUSINESS, 7 Dec 79) 102
Computerized Effort, by Mary Jo McConahay
Aim for 5tability
_ Darrmiam Port
Six Joint Gulf Vent~:res Under Study
(ARAB NEWS, 26 Nov 79) 110
Hejaz Railway Feasibility Study Will Be Examined
. (ARAB NEWS, 3 Dec 79) 111
Damman Sulfuric Acid Plant on Stream Soon
(ARAB NEWS, 17 Dec 79) 112
Hasa Project Has Cost SR550M ~
(AR.AB NEWS, 2L~ Nov 79) lll~
UNITED ARAB EMIRAT:~~S
New Legislation Claxifies Federal, Local Jurisdiction -
Over Gulf Companies
(AZ-SIYASAH, 21 Nov 79) 115
'AL-WAHDAH' Compares al-Sadat to Shah of Iran
.
(Editorial; AL-WAI'DAH, 12 Nov 79) 117
WESTERN SAHARA
Possible Effects of U.S. Military Aid to Morocco Explored
(Mireille Iluteil; DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE, 5 Nov 79) 118
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
~ARAFAT: 'OUR BATTLE IS A BATTLE OF CIVILIZATICN' _
a Casablanca LIBERATION in French 23-29 Nov 79 p 13
[Interview with Yasser 'Arafat, head of the PLO Executiva Committee,
by Bahij Bachir]
[Text] The lOth Su~,nmit of the Arab League was held at a c~ucial time. In
� fact, it took place 2 years after Sadat's visit to occupied A1 Qods, thus
beginning the process of his capitulation and initiatives which removed
Egypt from the conirontation front with the Zionist enemy.
The Camp David accords are confirming the fears of the Arab peoples as they
are applied. The Sadat administration, sti11 lulled by illusion, is stub-
bornly proceeding toward establishment of diplomatic and economic ties with
Tel Aviv. The Zionist enemy continues to defy the Arab world and interna- `
tional opinion by expanding its operations of annexation and aggression and _
by refusing to recognize the national rights of the Palestinian people.
In occupied Arab territories, it continiies its policy of colonization, judai-
zation and repression. In Southern Lebanon, the Israeli-isolationist camp
is preventing the Lebanese state from exercising its authority over its
- territory, is increasing aggressions to bring about partition of Lebanan and
is engaging in genocide against civilian populations.
All of these aspects of the problem dominated the work of the Arab summit in
Tunis and were reflected in the decisions made. In fact, the conference con-
demned American policy in the Middle East. It invited the U.S. Government
to reappraise its policy which might have a bad effect on the relations of
the Arab countries with the United States. The conference also reaffirmed
the d~cisions of the Baghdad Summi: which condemned the Camp David accords. .
What is more, the conference confirmed the total sovereignty of Lebanon over
all its territory, the safeguard of its independenze and its national unity.
It also affirmed the need for executing the Riyadh, Cairo and Beit E1-Dine
decisions and for taking all the measure~? required to this end.
The conference approved the efforts of the L~?~anese GovernmenC and the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) designed to establish coordination
and collaboration to settle all problems. _
1 ~
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Fina~ly, the conference resolved tc support the efforts of the Lebanese
people by givin~ particularly importance to the situation in SoLthern Lebanon.
It decided to supply $400 million worth of aid to Lebanon. -
The PLO did a lot of work in the preparation of this summit. Toward this
end, Yasser 'Arafat, head of the PLO Executive Committee, took a trip to a
~iumber of Arab countries. Our correspondent in Baghdad met with him and in-
eerviewed him c~r. the eve of the Tunis summit.
[Question] Mr Chairman, there is increasing talk of a common Lebanese-
Palestinian work program which will be submitted to the Arab conference at
the Tunis summit. Can you give us the broad outlines of this program?
[Answer] To tell the truth, it is not a question of a Lebanese-Palestinian
caork program. In this regard, it is very important that there be a Lebanese-
Palesti.nian accord before going to the Tunis conference. But I can tell you,
as I have told the heads of Arab states with whom I have met and will meet,
that the relations between the PLO and Lebanese authorities are friendly re-
.lations, relations of understanding. The PLO is concerned with preserving
the integrity of Lebanon, its unity, its independence. And it is absolutely
nec~essary that the lawful officials extend their authority over all Lebanese
ter.ritory. By that I also mean *_he border region which the Zionist state is
attempting to occupy through the intermediary of the puppet Saad Haddad.
For Saad Haddad is nothing more than Israel's shadow.
In this spirit, we can give Lebanon all the aid it needs to exercise its
authority.
[Question] On the eve of the Arab Summit, what is your assessment of the
- Camp David accords?
[Answer] You wish to talk about Camp David as a repetition of Sykes-Picot.
After World War I, the Sykes-Picot treaty divided our Arab fatherland; and
the entirz Arab nation rose up against it. Now, I can tell you that Camp
llavid is trying to again divide our Arab nation and to involve it in the me-
~ chanism of military pacts. Do not forget Begin's words. After having signed
the Camp David accords, he said: "Haifa and :~lexandria are two bases which
the Sixth African Fleet can use:' What does tiat mean?
Tha means the division of the Arab nation favors U.S. interests in our region
and in Africa. Sadat, for example, is in the process of defending such
interests in Africa. The commander in chief of the Egyptian army has said:
"We have military missions in 10 African countries." Thus we can understand
Sa.iat's role. Moreover, he has stated frankly: "I need arms to fulfill my
role which is to help the Americans in Africa."
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[~2uestion] In the mcantime, what is Israel doing?
~Answer] In the meantime, ~srael is receiving saphisticated arms to play its
role on the eastern front and to strike at the Palestinian revolution and
at the same time to strike at Jordan, Syria and Iraq. Its goal is to get
hold of the oil resources. As for the importance of the Baghdad conference,
~ it was a historical moment. Sadat had defied us, being of the opinion that
we could not meet without him. We can mEet without Sadat, but not without
the Egyptian people.
~ Incidentally, the Egyptian people were present in Baghdad but not the Sadat
government. The Baghdad conference was a blow again~t Sadat and against the
American and Zionist imperialists in our Arab region. But our region can
face up to such plots.
After Baghdad, American imperialism and the Zionist state launched an offensive.
Events in South Lebanon are proof of this. American arms were used against
~ the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples. American imperialism wanted to include
Jordan in Camp David.
However, we must point out in this regard that Jordan has always respected
the resolutions of the Baghdad summit.
The Palestinians in occupied territories were savagely attacked: that was
the autonomy plot; no Palestinian agreed to cooperate with the so-called lo-
cal administration.
But at the heart of the matter, what is this imaginary autonomy when everyone
knows that the mayors have greater responsibilities than those proposed to us? ~
Autonomy to reduce us to the state of slavery. No, our people are ready to
fight until a victory is won over such slavery.
[Question] The Tunis summit is at hand, and tne Lebanese question will be
, on the agenda .
[AnswerJ It is a very important summit; but thexe are those who wish to
forget the Baghdad victory, and want to make the Lebanese questiun the only
question.
We are ready to talk about South Lebanon, but within the framework of the
overall situation of the Arab nation.
We have to consider external threats, those concerning oil whi.ch justify the
American presence in the Arab ~ulf.
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Qil is a bothersome question. And it is the duty of our nation to use all
- t}ie weapons, including economic weapons, ~o win its rights. America has used
rh~, ec�onc~mic wc'tl(~OIl against China.
it is u5ing the econcmic weapon against Cuba. Why should we deprive our-
selves of it? We are at a histoxical watershed; our battle is not an ordinary
battle, it is a battle of civilization. Our existence is at stake. But
we are certain that future generations will write history in letters of gold
and will win a sure victory with the help of Gad.
~
~ 81~3
CSO: 4800
_ ~
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
CURRENT U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD MIDDLE EAST CONTEMPLATED
Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 8 Dec 79 pp 8~ 9
~ [Editorial by Nasir-al-Din al-Nashashabi] .
[Text] My informatian tells me that all of the generals of the Israeli
arny paid brief successive surprise visi~s to a number of important U.S.
army bases in the U.S. during the past month.
My information also tells me (and I returned this week from a visit to
_ some of the countries of the Gulf, near the powder keg) that U.S. Secre-
tary of State William ~filler expressed to his closest friends and advisers
his c~nsternation, dismay, and anger at the expressions he had heard from
the senior officials in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the iIAE of their oppo-
sition and caution against any military action to which the U.S. mi~ht -
tak e recourse against Iran in the future. This s~cretary returned, and,
during his short stop at the airport in London on his way back to the
U.S., said, "'I had understood fron~ the Arabs that they stood in a~ASition
of neutrality with regard to Iran, but their position of preventing us
from using force against it is a surprise to us:"
My information also tells me that, in spite of the broadcasting by the
Pentagon officials to the effect that they would adhere to the policy of
restraint with regard to the Iranian situation, their thinking after
reaching the point of no retur n has been by nu means confined to the
release of the hostages or diplomatic relations with Iran, but has reached
the point where the situation has begun to depend on all of the effects
attendant on any coming solut ion which depends orc the reputation of the
U.S. in the world, its influence in the Middle East, its petroleum, a~d
its strategy and policy toward the peoples of the area, And all that
depends on crushing the Khomeini re~?olutior and putting an end to it:
Finally, my information tells me that the U.S. military accounts, in the
e:=ent of U.S. dependence on thP strength of Israel duriag the coming U.S.
military operations in the ar~a, havE entered the stage of actual execu- -
tion, for negotiations betwe~~n Washington on one hand and Tel Aviv and
Cairo on the other hand f'or ~the U.S. to lease the Eitam and Etzion air
and military bases in the Sinai desert and use them as a principal base `
for the large B-52 aircr~,ft instead of moving those t~ao bases or doing
5
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ihis week, for the first time, I listened to the voice of U.S. Vice-Presi-
dent Walter Mondale as he spoke before a huge U.S. Jewish assembly cahich
_ met in Wasnington in honor of the Jewish leader Sam Rothberg, general
chairman of Israeli Bonds. He said, "The secret of U.S. support for Isra~l
depends on the strategic and military advantages which the U.S. receives,
and is nat limited merely to definite political commitments to Israel."
Thus, we entered once more this week into the atmosphere of 1956, c.ith
_ all of the secret meetings, all of the night encounters, and all of the .
_ mad military planning that preceded the tripartite a~gression on Egypt.
_ 'Abd-al-Nasir nationalized the Canal in defiance of the U.S., not out of
love of the Canal, and Khomeini imprisoned the hostages in defiance of the
_ U.S., not out of love of the sport of hostage-taking:
, There is rancor and bitterness on all sides today, just as there was i.n
1956, and likekise the exhaustion, the fanaticism, and the feelings of
need for vengeance :
- Carter called on world public opinion, and succeeded, re~rettably, in
rallying most of world public opinion against Khomeini in preparation for
the beginning of the aggression, just as Anthony Eden did in 1956 in New
Zealand, Australia, the nations of the Commonwealth, and all of the
bez~eficiaries of the Suez Canal and tried to ~,�in them over against E~ypt
anc~ Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, but Carter has failed because of the difference
between K~omeini's position today and that of 'Abd--al-Nasir yesterday.
Carter dreams today that interrial Iranian resistance will materialize to
assure the elimination of Khomeini and rescue him from the futur~ gamble,
jus.*_ as Eden dreamed that Egyptian resistance the Moslem Brotherhood -
or ~he [ti'afd Party, or an Egyptian military movement woulcl materialize
to save Britain from the gamble of 1956:
F'urthermore, Carter still dreams that some of Iran's neighbors (and there
is no need to mention names) have a large role to play in resc>>ing the
situatior.: . � ~ .
Carter is driven by the relentless challen~e of his rivals in the coming
electiols, just as Anthony Eden was driven by the relentless challenge of
his opposition in the Labour Party in 1956.
Israel stands behind Carter today as it stood behind Eden in 1956. Yes-
terday it was David Ben-Gurion, and today it is Menachim Be~in, and the
goal in both instances is the closing of the old and the new accounts.
Yesterday, Zionism was making war on Arab nationalism, and today the Jew-
ish fanaticism is makin~ war on Islam. And in all instances, the picture
of Jerusalem, its future, and its cause is prominent:
The big question remains: In 1956, the U.S. was led by Dwi~ht Eisenhower,
- and .it may be true that it alone deserves the credit for compelling Anthony
~ 6
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~
- Eden, Mollet, and Ben-Gurion to withdraw from Egypt. Then to whom do you ;
~ suppose the credit will be due this time for compelling Jimmy Carter to~
withdraw from Iran? ~
i
I was told on the coast of the Gulf this week, "The purpose of the U.S.
plan of' occupying parts of Iran with the object of fragmenting it, break-
_ ing it up, and dividing it in agreement with the Soviets like a nerr Yalta
is to internationalize the issue of energy in the world and seize it from
the hands of some of the "kids", as the U.S. calls them. And then the
U.S. economy, the dollar, and the shipments of petroleum would be exposed
- to deadly blows, and in the long run they would be exposed to a situation
no less dangerous than their situation in Iran. And western Europe would
never be rescued from the results of such a gamble as this disaster, and
neither would Iran. I heard this and more during my last visit to the
area of al-Barud on the Arabian Gulf.
Someone else said to me, '�We are approaching a catastrophe in which there
will not be a single winner: The U.S. will lose in Iran if it gambles,
and will lose if it keeps silent. Likewise, in sp~.te of the feelings of
the revolutionists that their ~amblP has brought them to the point of no
return, and in spite of the belief of their leaders that they have an ap-
pointment with heaven, nevertheless the unity of the land of Iran and the
safety of its resou~ces have fallen into danger:"
I said, "And what does that mean to us Arabs?"
They said, "The U.S. is ea~er to win the Arabs to its side in the current
crisis, and in the results of it also. That is no secret. We have heard
- plainly and clearly from the lips of the U.S. secretary of the treasury
yesterday:" _
On the Kuwaiti aircraft flying back to London, I said to myself, "If the
reason for all that has happened were the person of the deposed shah, then ~
the matter would be of small consequence, and if the reason tirere ttie
release of the hostages who were captured, then the solucion would be easy. -
But the reason is the absence of full confidence between the U.S. on one
hand and every one of the Arab and Islamic peoples on the other hand. The
U.S. has succeeded in earnin~ the enmity of every ehild, every woman, every
old man, every individual among the r;oslems of Iran and the Arab Moslems
in the rfiddle East, if not in the iahole world. If it is hard for the U.S.
to exercise restraint in the issue of the 50 American prisoners in Iran, ~
then it is harder for the rfoslems and Arabs to do so in the issue of their '
Grand ~fosque in Jerusalem, c~hich is held captive in the hands of Israel.
If Khomeini is responsible for the seizure of the hastages, and we oppose `
him in this matter, then the U.S. and its leaders, Johnson, Nixon, Ford,
and Carter ar_e responsible likewise for lettin~ al A qsa hlosque, as well
as i.he rest of the Christian and Islamic holy places, remain captive in
- th~ hands of Israel;
The U.S. is the supplier of arms to Israel, the supplier of wealth, the
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I
support, the armor, the shipherd, the protector, the America of Anwar ~
al-Sadat and his deviation and capitulation, America the accomplice and
confederate, the America of Camp David, the America which is Jewish in
policy, in positions, and in hostility and enmity toward all that is Arab
and all that is Moslem from 1940 till the ~rriting of these lines.
The U.S. moved its ally, the deposed shah, to a U.S. base in Texas to be
near his son, who is studying there, and so that he might spend there what
the U.S. spokesman calls his convalescence.
Do you suppose that the U.S. has decided to make this period of convales- -
cence a prelude from which the U.S. forces may cross to Iran to reach the
pett~oleum Yalta of 1979, as it did with the political and military Yalta
- Yalta ~�ith Stalin in 1946?
What shall I say? ,
Just yesterday, I saw a picture of Frank Church, the filthy U.S. senator '
who reviled me in the newspaper and cursed Islam in a sPeech, assailed
Saudi Arabia in a book, and praised Israel in his waking and sleeping
hours, sitting beside the U.S. delegate to the Security Council to submit
the Iran issue against Ayatollah Khomeini, and so, for my own part, I did
not hesitate to applaud the life of Ayatollah Khomeini:
If not for love of 'Ali, at least out of defiance of a bitch:
To be explicit, out of defiance of Carter, Frank Church, Israel, and
Anwar al-Sadat too.
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ISLAMIC AFFAIRS
RGLIGIOUS WARS IN THIRD WORLD SEEN AS SPREADING
London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 9 Nov 79 p 14
[Gditorial by Salim al-Firzli: "Religious Wars in the Third World"]
[Text] It seems that religious wars in the Third World will become the
distinguishing features of the struggles in this period. This is be-
~ cause such wars conceal all kinds of strife that do not reach the status
of warfare. If religious wars were possible and expected in certain
locations where no historical reasons for friction and repression do
exis t, the outbreak of such wars in locations where they were not expected
signifies that there is an international disposition towards that trend.
Religious strife is commonplace in the Near East and on the Indian Con-
tinent, bu~t it is new to the Far East, at least as far as murder and
bloodshed for religious considerations are concerned. Malaysia and Thai-
- land have recently experienced broad acts of violence between the follow-
ers oE predominant religions there and those who belong to some religious
minorities. This week in Thailand scores of people were killed by bombs
~in the temples.
But in Africa the problem has been getting worse since the Biafra War in
Nigeria. ~The religious strife which tore up Chad in recent years has
moved to the Cameroon where no less than 1,000 Moslems were killed in
operations to avenge the death of 15 influential Christians in Yaounde. ~
The majority of the population in Cameroon is Christian. Christians con-
trol the south even though the chief of state, President Ahmadou Ahidjo,
is a Moslem from the north. Northern Moslems accuse southern Christians
of controlling the reins of power, oE influence and of the economy. They
- accuse them especially of controlling the army, the pclice and the vital
_ ~conomic facilities. They accuse them of monopolizing jobs and benefits
so that their,areas became advanced and prosperous, whereas Islamic regions
in the north were left iri a state of neglect and poverty.
Thus, there were class and political reasons behind the acts of violence
and murder which began on last 2~ October. News about an attempt to
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assassinate i'resident Ahmadou Ahidjo became widespread. At the same time
Christian civil :;ervants in the north were accused of wasting funds that
fiad heen earmarked for opening schools and building roads in tlie Islamic
r.egions in order to keep those Islamic regions backward.
'I'here are, of course, outside reasons [for this unrestJ. '1'he government
of the Cameroon is stating that some of the Pioslem elders who were financed
by Libya had crossed the borders from Chad aiid had begun inciting the peo-
- ple to mutiny and rebellion. It is being sa:i.d that a similar situation has
begun to develop in Mali.
But the brutality with which the Cameroon arnry crushed the recent rebellion
in the north of the country in response to tlie murder of 15 policemen, as
- some said who witnessed this massacre, left ;i feeling of bitterness and
rancor so that many did not believe their eyes. Government circles, how-
ever are saying that the army dealt such a brutal blow deliberately and
intentionally to announce to all that it will not permit the Chad situa-
tion to move into the Cameroon. Observers, however, are saying that the
army's action accomplished the opposite.
When the European countries ruled Africa and the East directly, such a -
struggle used to assume a patriotic and a national feature since it was
directed against foreign, colonialist forces. Th~ Algerian War was the
example and the model [in that regard]. It is now being said that the
s:ituation is sti11 the same, although indirectly, considering the fact
that Christian affiliations there are imported and are remnants of the
old conditions.
But this leaves no room for anything but civil wars, because even though
affiliations are imported, those who are affiliated are citizens of the
co un try .
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ISLAMIC AFFAIRS
- TEXT OF PROPHET'S PLEDGE OF SAFETY REVEALED
London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 9 Nov 79 pp 77
[Article by Antoine Shukrallah Haydar: "The Pledge of Safety from the
Prophet to the Monks"]
[Text] Among the holdings of St Catherine's Monastery is a holograph copy
of the Safety Pledge that God's Prophet, Mohammad, may God bless him and
grant him salvation, granted the monks of the monastery for the protection
of their lives and their property under the Islamic religion. The monks
of the monastery have revealed this valuable, ancient copy for the first
time. It's been said that the Ottoman Sultan Selim the First took pos-
session of the authentic copy when he conquered Egypt in 1517, and after
having the copy translated into the Turkish language, he gave it as a gift
to the monks. The text of [the document] follows:
"In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate whose assistance we
seek. This is a scroll copy of the pledge written by Mohammad, the son
of 'Abdallah, the messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him salva-
tion, to all Christians.
"This document was written by Mohammad ibn 'Abdallah to proclaim, to
admonish and to entrust all the people to commend God's creatures to His
protection so that people would have no excuse after the messengers. God
was mighty and wise. Mohammed wrote this document to the people of his
religious community and to all those who subscribe to the Christian faith
in the eastern and western corners of the Earth, those who are near and far,
those who are fluent in the language and those who are not, those who are
known and those who are unknown. Mohammad wrote this document as a pledge
b~them. He who breaks the pledge, goes against it or goes beyond what God
ordered, whether he be a sultan or another one of the Muslim believers,
would be breaking and contradicting God's pledge and covenant, ridiculing
His religion and asking Por the curse of God.
"If a monk or a traveler were to seek refuge in a mountain, a valley, a
cave, a populated place, a plain, a desert, a meadow or a church, I myself
and my assistants, my kin and my followers will be behind them, protecting
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them from all preparations [mlde against them] because they are my sub-
~ jects, and they are free non-rtosler.? suhjects. I wil_1 protect their
supplies from damages, and all. those who have been granted the pledge
- wi11 not have to pay any land tax, except that which they voluntarily
pay. They wil7. not be forced or compelled to pay. No archbishop is to
change his bishopry; no monk is to change his monastery; no hermit is to
change his hermitage; and no traveler is to change his travels. None of
their houses of. worship or their churches is to be torn down, and none
of the materials that are used in the construction of their churches is
to be used in the construction of a mosque or in the construction of the
homes of Moslems. Anyone who does any of these things would have broken
the pledge of God and will have disobeyed his messenger. The monks and
the archbishops are not to be converted, nor are they to be subjected
to payment of a head tax or a fine. They are under my protection wherever
they may be: on land, on sea, in the east, in the west, the north or the
south. They are under my protection, guarded from all evil by my covenant
and my pledge. Likewise, those who worship by thenselves in the mountains
and in the holy places are not to be compelled to share what they culti-
vate, to pay a land tax or to pay a tithe for what they consume. They
are to be relieved of having to supplement their crops by taking off one
keddah [of grain] as a consumption fee from every ardeb. They are not to
be forced to go to wars or to pay a tithe of more than 12 dirhams in kind
every year--not even those who pay a land tax, ~~ho have funds, real prop-
erty and commercial houses of business. None of them is to be charged
excessively, and discussions with them should be amicable. They are to
be treated with mercy, and thE~y are to be shielded from the harm of
adversity wherever they may be and wherever they settle. If a Christian
community were to come to a Moslem r_ommunity, :~ioslems are to sanetion it
and to enable Christians to pray in their churches. Moslems are not to
come between Christians and their faith. Anyone who disobeys the pledge
of God and adopts its opposite would be disobeying His covenant and His
messenger. Christians are to be assisted in protecting the sanctity of
their churches and their hermitages, and this should help them in their
religion and in their interaction with the pledge. None ~f them is to be
forced t~ carry arms. Moslems should rather defend Chr'_stians. Moslems
should never disobey this pledge until the end of tim::.
"This pledge, which was written by Mohammad ibn 'Abdallah, the messenger
of God, may God bless him and grant him salvation., was granted to all
Christians who are to comgly with everything st:ipulated therein and was
sworn to by the undersigned witness."
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ISLAMIC AFFAIRS
KORANIC CONCEPT OF SECURITY DISCUSSED
Tripoli AL-HUDA AL-ISLAMI in Arabic Oct 79 pp 21-23, 30
[Article by Dr Muhammad 'Ali Hasan: "Security as Indicated by the Texts
ot the Koran; One Moslem Seeking Refuge with Another"]
[Text] The fact of the matter is that this is a recent opinion, and it
is based on the notion that the multiplicity of Moslem states is permissable.
Anyone who endorsed this principle has acknowledged this security, and anyone
who refused to acknowledge it, has repudiated it. I will cite statements by
those who would allow multiplicity so that we can examine them closely. I
will then respond with what I think is truthful and correct.
Professor Dr Wahbah al-Zahili says, "The purpose of establishing a government
of the land of Islam is to protect the priaciples of the law of Islam, of
truth and of justice. The purpose is not ~~o form an international govern-
ment and to let an Islamic group contrc? 2he entire world. The aim of the
matter'is to have an Islamic ruler manage the affairs of the country in
accordance with Islamic law."
Then he says, "The principle upon which there has been agreement is that
only one sovereign is recognized in the land of Islam: it is the sovereignty
of the law over all those in the land of Islam. This sovereignty is
in.divisible regardless of the multiplicity of actual sovereigns. The truth
about sovereignty in the land of Islam is that it be comparable to the
sovereignty of non-Moslems in their different countries, other than the land
of Islam. There are no objections to having a large number of governments
in Islamic countries as long as the constitution of each government is not
at variance with the stipulations of the Holy Koran and the precedents
established by the prophet, is based on consultation and does not contradict
the general rules of Islamic legislation. This is because the aim of the
unity of the Islamic Government is in fact the unity of political, defense,
cultural and economic goals and objectives. The Islamic nation can achieve
this by treaties, by regional or international organizations or by political
alliances that have different objectives. Theologians have decided that a -
large number of imamates is permissible when distances are great and regions
are distant, [Such an arrangement] would give the imamate the ability to
manage the affa}rs of every region and to understand its needs from a close
vantage point."
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'fhen he corroborates his statements and says, "Moslems put this conceFt into
practice a lon~; time ago in Andalusia, Morocc~~, Egypt and Baghdad when the
Islamic Government was broken up into small states."
Accordingly, Dr al-Zahili asks, "Does the necessity of preserving peace and
public order require that a Moslem or a free non-Moslem subject in a Moslem
country other than his own be considered trustworthy on some occasions?
[�lould r~e then be subject to the restrictions imposed on foreigners? Would
he carry a passport and pay customs fees? Can his residence be confined to
certain locations? And can he be prevented from entering another country or
be banished from it?
The fact of the matter is that rioslem rulers can do that because necessity 2
warrants forbidden actions, but the necessity must be determined proportionately.
Dr al-'Lahili then says, "The need to preserve security may require that a
person's residence be confined to certain locations, that he be placed un~er
observation, that he be banished or prevented from entering the country."
These statements are false and bear within them the seeds of their own
extinction. The texts of the Koran, the precedents. established by the
prophet, the collective opinion of the Prophet Muhammad's disciples and
analogy disagree wholeheartedly with these statements.
1. He began his statements by saying, "The agreed upon principle is that
only one sovereign is recognized in the land of Islam. This is the sovereignty '
of the law over all in the Islamic nation. The sovereign states. As long
as there is agreement on this matter, no Moslem can make a conflicting state-
ment. In fact, there can be no contradictory agreement to nullify the first
agreement. T.his is legally impossible. Likewise, if consensus about a
matter does exist, that matter is firmly and irrevocably established because
[such] a consensus is irrevocable and cannot revoke another. This is because
it is only the Koran, the legal precedents established by the prophet or
another consensus *_hat can supplant [a religious law].
"The texts of the Koran and the legal precedents established by the prophet
do not supplant a unanimous opinion. In fact, one cannot conceive of a
unanimous opinion existing along with the texts of the Koran and the legal
precedents of the prophet. Thz rules to be followed then are those ef the
texts and not those unanimously agreed upon by the disciples.
"Regarding Lhe notion that a unanimous opinion does not supplant another, -
scholars have agreed that a unanimous opinion does not revoke another and
that it is itself irrevocable.
"Accordingly, the legal opinion remains unchanged, and statements [that
claim) otherwise are unfounded."
2. Then he says, "The truth about sovereignty in the land of Islam is
that it be comparable to sovereignty for non-rioslems in their different
countries, other than the land of Islam." -
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He may be comparing one matter to another. The analogues are the countries
of the infidels and the numbers of those countries, and the standard is the
land c~f Islam. I do not know where the occasion might be that would bring
- togetlier the analogue and the standard. This is a false statement that is
based on a false foundation. The fact that the countries of infidels are
numerous stems from the fact that godlessness has numerous systems and numerous
forms and colors. It stems from the fact that the ways of the devil are
numerous. But the state of Islam is the state of one nation, the state of
clinging to faith in one God. It is a monotheistic state, a state that -
believes in the unity of God. The relevant statement is that which contra~ts
and does not counter; it lies in contradiction and not in conformity. "This
path of mine is straight. Fo~low it and do not follow other paths, for they
will lead you away from Him." "This nation of yours is one nation, and I
am your lord, worship Me." -
3. Then he says, "There is no objection to having numerous governments in
the countries of Islam as long as the constitution of each state does not
violate the stipulations of the Holy Koran and the precedents established
by the prophet."
We tell him, "Moslems have one law, and one group of Moslems may not deviate
one iota from the community of Moslems."
The law emanates from the Koran and the precedents established by the prophet.
Statements ].n the Koran and precedents establislied by the prophet differ
from what Dr al-Zahili says. God Almighty said, "If two parties of believers _
take up arms the one against the other, make peace between them. If either
of them commits aggtession against the other, f:ight against the aggressors '
till they submit to Al1ah's judgment. When they submit make peace between
them in equity and justice; Allah loves those who act in justice."5
In this verse God encouraged believers to prevent any split from taking
place between two groups within one country. How then would it be were
� there two states and two caliphs? According to the prophetic tradition,
"If allegaince is pledged to two caliphs, kill the other one of them."
Dr Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Hamid says, "Breaking up the unity of Moslems to get the
upperhand is a precipitous decline into political extinction. Leaders and
- commanders are impelled by their inflamed spirits and covetous appetites to
seek mastery for expanding their regional or moral influence. This may be
accompanied by a general weakness that affects the majority and tempts
foreigners to gain control over Islamic countries, as is the current painful
_ reality. Until recently this situation existed in a worse fashion. About
this, God, may His name be glorified, s~~iys, 'Cling one and all to the faith
of Allah and let nothing divide you.' '...do not ~iis~ute with one another,
lest you should lose courage and your resolve weaken.' The prophet, may
God bless him and grant him salvation, says, 'When someone comes to you and
commands all of you to break your sticks or to disperse your group, then
fight him.' This was narrated by Ahmad and by Musallam. The import is even
c1E~arer in Musallam. It is being said that th2 prophet, may God bless him and
grant him ~alvation, said, 'If allegiance is pledged to two caliphs, kill one
of them.
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4. it is being said that what is in fact intended by the unity of the Islamic
(~overnment is the unity of political, defense and cultural goals and objectives.
The Islamic nation can achieve this unity by defense treaties, by regional
or international organizations or by political alliances that have different
objectives. Such statements have no legitimate or rational basis because
the real unity of the objective lies in the unity of the Islamic nation. The
unity of the goal lies in fighting all those who deviate or stray from the
community. The prophet of God, may God bless him and grant him salvation,
said, "The blood of a Moslem cannot be rightfully shed except for one of
three reasons: submission to adultery, ta~ing one life for another, and
abandoning the religion of the community." A Moslem's blood is shed if he
were to abandon the community. It is not right for Moslems to think of
- themselves as scattered in small states that are tied together by frail
treaties or organizations.
The unity of the goal lies in the unity of the ranks to face every greedy enemy
and to spread Islam.
FOOTNOTES
1. "The Ravages of War," page 181. _
_ "l. Ibid., pages 283-284
3. Ibid., page 284
4: Cattle: 153
5. The Chambers: 9.
6. A1-Imrans: 103.
. 7. The Spoils: 46. ,
8. "International Relations in Islam," by Dr Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Hamid, page 3.
9. The statement occurs in a conversation with Ibn Mas'ud and is narrated
by al-Bukhara and by Musallam. It was mentioned by al-Nawawi in
al-'Arba'in [the Forties] the fourteenth discussion.
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ISLAMIC AFFAIRS
ISLAMIC UNITY EXFOUNDED, DEFENDED -
Tripoli AL-HUTiA AL-ISLAMI in Arabic Oct 79 pp 15-17
[Article by Dr Muhammad Ahmad Sali.h al-Hasin: "Islamic Unity"]
[Text] Islamic unity is a fact established by virtue of the Koranic texts
and the prophetic tradition. Islam does not recognize separation: it does
not distinguish b~tween white, black or red. God Almighty said, "The
believers are a band of brothers" [The Chambers: 10], and He said, "The
noblest of you in Allah's sight is he who fears Him most" [The C?:amber~: 13j.
The prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, said, "An Arab is
not better than a non-Arab unless he is mor2 pious."
We are satisfied with a minimum of unity. We build upon it in stages until
Moslems reach the highest levels of this unity in a matter they agree upon
under any form.
- We have divided this investigation into four parts.
First, there is a foreword to explain the intentions of Islam from human
unit. [This part) explains that Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him
salvation, was sent for all people.
- The second party deals with the composition of Islamic unity during the age
of the prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, and the establish-
ment of Islamic unity during the age of the orthodox caliphs instead of the
caliphate in Islam.
The third part deals with the reasons for disunity after reunion. We show
the reasons for this disunity and what the objectives of the separatists
were.
The fourth part explains the unity that is possible now.
Foreword
1. Islam looks upon humanity as a unit, making no distinctions among races,
colors or regions. If land separated the sons of Adam, [theirJ humanity
united them. All people are the children of Adam and Eve. They were created
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= from the same spirit and from the same clay. God Almighty conferred this
truth upon people and said, "Men, have fear of your Lord, who created you
fr.om a single soul. From that soul He created its mate, and through them
He bestrewed the earth with countless men and women. Fear Allah, in whose -
name you plead with one another, and honour the mothers who bore you. Allah _
i~ ever watching over you" [Women: 1].
This holy Koranic text directs those who read and listen to it to the fact
that kinship does exist among the sons of man:, those who live in the east
and those who live in the west; ~he white, the black snd the yellow; those
who dwell in the desert and those who dwell in urban areas; those who are
ignorant and those who are learned; those who are whole and those who are
lacking.
The difference in colors and languages [among people] is one o.f ttie miracles
of God Almighty in ~he universe. The difference was e~tablished--praise be
to God--by Him wh~~ created the hea~;ens and the eart:~ and all the universe.
His creati.ons are disparate, such as shade and hot winds; quiet, fertile land;
harsh, rugged land. Therefore, God Almighty said, "Among His other signs
- are the creation of heaven and earth and the diversity of your tongues and
colors. Surely there are signs in this for all mankind" [The Greeks: 22].
Althougr the earth was divided among the sons of Adam its climates and
conditions kept them apart. Although people's languages and their life styles
varied, their brotherhood was established by virtue of Islam, and by what
, was stated in the Koran. Becoming mutually acquainted was a duty. If land
separated people, human ideas brought them closer together and united them.
God Almighty, may He be praised, said about this matter, "Men, We have
created you from a male and a female and divided you into nations and tribes
that you might get to know one another. The noblest of you in Al1ah's
sight is he who fears Him most. Allah is wise and all-knowing" (The Chambers: 13J.
Getting to know one another strengthens universal unity and fosters harmony
among people. Getting to know one another undoutedly requires equality
and human dignity which God Almighty gave ~o man by virtue of the fact that
he is numan, as God Almightysaid, "We have bestowed blessings on Adam's
ctiildren and guided them by land and sea. We havp provided them with good
things and exalted ttiem abovemany of Our creatures" [The Night Journey: 70].
In order for people to become acquainted with each other, the residents of
every region must spread their surplus wealth among the residents of the
region whose land is dwindling and did not produce wealth similar to that
of the region that had a surplus.
- A region that has a grain surplus must not throw this grain in the sea and
raise prices, but it must rather give this grain to those who do not have any.
He who has clothing materials is to give them to those who do not have them.
If fortunes in the land of GodAlinight~y are disparate, the fruits of those -
fortunes are to be brought together and gathered for the residents of each
region by virtue of the fact that humanity is united. Disparity would then
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be good so that ever}�one would have plenty. It is for this reaaon that
some of the verses that have been attrihuted to the prophet, may Cod bless
him and grant him salvation, state, "Pec~ple are blessed when they difFer;
they perish if tt~ey compatible."
~ Becoming acquainted witt~ eacti other req~iires that people cooperate in
upholding virtue and diminishing evil. It requires that virtue and just
equality prevail among the sons of man and that inj ustice be driven away
from all the sons of man. It requires that the residents of every region
stand in support of the weak in any one of God's countries so that injustice
does not corrupt the peaple of the Earth. God Almighty, may He be praised,
- said in this regard, "Had Allah not defeated some by the might of others,
the earth would have been utterly corrupted. But Allah is bountiful to
His creatures" [The Cow: 251]. -
2. While the Koran stipulates the unity of humanity in spite of differences
among regions and races, it does stipulate the unity of human nature. The
people of one region do not have a natural manner that is different from
that of the people of another region. Rather, the origin of psychological
behavior is one; the reasons for righteousness and deviousness are one; and
the reasons for differences and disparities are one. Disagreement does not
stem from different natures, but rather from the same nature. It is thus
not said that the nature oi a negro differs from that of a white man. [Human]
natures rather have the same origin. The difference [between one person and
another] stems from guidance and direction and not from the origin of [human]
nature. Human nature is one. It is for this reason that God Almighty said,
"Mankind were once one nation. Then Allah sent forth prophets to give them
good news and to warn them, and with these He sent down the Book with the
truth, that it might judge the disputes of inen. (None disputed it save
those to whom it was given, and that was through envy of one another, after
veritable signs had been vouchsafed them.) So Allah guided by His will those
who believed in the truth which had been disputed. Allah guides whom He will
to the right path" [The Cow: 213].
This noble text indicates that humanity is united in its instincts, in its
behavior, in the origin of instinct and in the dispute between capricious
whims and compelling appetites. This unity inevitably leads to disparity
and conflict because if reason alone were the judge, people would not have ~
disagreed. But the control that whims and appetites have over some souls make
a conflict inevitable between virtue, which reasons advocates, and evil, which
passion and lust induce. It was becausE~ of these disputes within people's
souls and among people that the prophets were sent. Another verse [of the
Koran] states that the original composition of spiritual unity does inevitably
entail difference. God Almighty said, "There was a time when men followed but
one religion. Then they disagreed amon~; themselves: and had Al1ah not deferred
their punishment, their differences would have long been settled" [Jonah: 19~.
This indicates to us that the text points out that unity is derived from
differei~ce. If all souls were united in the existence of conflict and if they
were prep;ired for good and for evil, disagreement, conflict and even slaughter
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I
may b~ ttle inevit~ble result. Disagreement stems from spiritual unity.
c,od Almi~;hty said, "by the soul and Him that moulded it and inspir.ed it
with knowledge of sin and piety" [The Sun: 7]. God Almighty said, "Have
We not shown him the two paths?" [The City: 7]. Thus does the Koran declare
the �nity of the human spirit in its attitudes and inclinations. It is
education, social envir~~nment and directions that create differences among
c�ommunities. One does not say that this is the spirit of a free man, and
tliis is the spirit of a slave. One does not say that this is the spirit of
a negro, and this is the spirit of a white man. One does not say that this
is ttie spirit of a Bedouin and this is the spirit of a city dweller. Spirits
are one; they differ because of environments and societies.
Anyone who attributes one spirit to one group and another spirit to another
is unfair to facts and to humanity.
r 3. Islam does not consider one nation's generation a unit, but it rather
~onsiders all generations one c~;,~mmunity that is united in its opposition to
and compliance with the prophets. This is because the human spirit has
heen one in the past and in the present, and man is the son of man, just as
some of our illustrious professors have determined. May God Almighty bless
them.
'I'he F:c~ran mentioned this spiritual unity in all generations. God Almighty
.~id in the chapter, "The Believers," "Apostle~! ~at of that which is
wholesome and do good works: I have knowledge of all your actions. Your
religion is but one religion, and I am your only Lord: therefore fear Me"
[51). And God Almighty said in the chapter of "The Prophets," "And of
the woman who kept her chastity. We breathed into her of Our spirit, and
made her and her son a sign to all men. Your religion is but one religion,
and I ani Your only Lord. Therefore serve Me" [91-92].
'Ihis holy text, just like the text we cited earlier, is evidence of the unity
of nations in their defense of truth if evidence to support this truth exists.
'Che text indicates the fact that many believe in it. Its authority, like
~i [radiantJ light, has emerged, and people stepped knowingly into its light.
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~
BAHRAIN
FOREIGN BANKING CONCESSIONS CLOSID
Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 17 Nov 79 p 7
[Article: "Did Bahrain Offshore Banks Perform Their Roles? Bahrain
_ Suspended Licenses of Foreign Banks, Thereby Terminating Special Stage
in History of Gulf Banking"]
[Text] The recent decision that was issued by Bahrain to stop granting
any new bank licenses marks the end of one of the stages 3n the develop-
- ment of the Bahrain money market. This development stage had lasted 4
. years. Bahrain, like its neighboring countries, depends on oil returns
since oil is the backbone of the economy.
But Bahrain differs from the countries of the Gulf in that it has con-
tinued to enjoy its oil and the benefits therefrom for more than 40 years.
This initiative [it demonstrated] in benefiting from oil was not futile,
according to MIDDLE EAST DIGEST Magazine.
In 1975 when the oil producing countries were beginning their search for
ways to deal with the increasing monetary surplus that was the result of
the rise of oil prices in 1973, the Bahrain Currency Agency, which had
been recently created, was putting the final touches to a bill that led
to the introduction into the Gulf area of more than 50 of the world's
largest banks.
In October 1975 City Bank and the Allgemein Bank.received the first
licenses for an offshore banking unit. These licenses allowed them some
. exemptions from banking restrictions inside the country, but restricted
[their] business activity outside Bahrain.
By November, 15 international banks had applied for such permits, and the
applications were considered by the Bahrain Currency Agency. The first
bank that was granted [a license] after the two aforementioned banks w~s
the American Express Bank. The spring of 1976 is considered the date when
a large number of international banks began doing business in Bahrain.
But these banks faced problems at that early date. There was a shortage
in the,number of workers, and the banking labor force that was made available
was expensive.
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The situation was not exemplary. After banks were invited to open offices
in Bahrain, it became evident that the office space [that was available]
was insufficient and thae the facilities for housing the employees and
the workers of the banks [were inadequate].
This was a temporary setback even though this new direction had re;i.ied on
a we11-considered plan that had been approved by all international
financial organizations.
Allan Moore, adviser to the Bahrain Currency Agency and the aut:~or of this _
plan for granting licenses to offshore banks, says that he was expecting
the complete success of the plan because it had succeeded in Singapore.
It was the success of the plan in Singapore that had encouraged him to bring
ug the subject with the Bahrain government. Bahrain has all the components
for the success of this plan. It is located in a time zone that would
enable it to fill the vacuum hetween the markets of the East and the West.
Its location would allow commercial activity to be conducted around the
clock. Bahrain also has a good communications system and an exemplary
geographical location in the midst of the richest area in the world.
The timing was decisive. This offshore banking project was announced during
the period when the Gulf states were accumulating huge oil returns, and
there was nothing to do with those funds but use them in trade in markets
outside the area. There was no Arab financial center, and the civil war
in the former commercial market--Beirut--was still raging and had not been
settled. Bahrain suddenly emerged.
In 1976 reports issued by the Bahrain Currency Agency indicated that the
total assets of 27 offshore banks in Bahrain amounted to 6.2 billion dollars.
Before the end of 1977 the total assets of offshore banks had risen to
15.7 billion dollars. Then this total figure rose to 23.4 billion dollars
in 1978, and the number of offshore banks came to 42. The Bahrain Monetary
Agency was preoccupied with preserving the excellent quality of the offshore
banking units.
The agency a~sures itself that the banks are international banks. This is
the reason why it re~ected the applications of small banks or of banks
with meager capitals.
Although Bahrain has succeeded in attracting prominent international banks,
it has so far failed to attract Japanese and Glest German banks.
It is true that the Bank of Tokyo, the Nipon Credit Bank and the Sumitomo
Bank have branches on the island similar to those of the two German banks,
the Dresden Bank and the Commerce Bank, not one of these five banks has
acquired an offshore banking unit license, even though one of the Japanese
institutions is still awaiting a response on that matter.
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Mr Moore thinks that the restrictive governmental legislation pertaining
to the activities of Japanese banks overseas constitute the principal
reason why these banks [stay away from Bahrain]. The Germans, howeyer, are
satisfied with the current level of their banking performance.
hIr Moore calls attention to some of the other problems and says, "If one
of the financial markets reaches a certain degree of development, the bank
will not find it necessary to be in the market to benefit from it. Although
this market has grown in Bahrain, it has not received sufficient support
from neighboring Gulf states."
Offshore banking ux~its in Bahrain have received some of the blame for this
because they are considered the reason behind the 1977 dirham crisis.
This is because they sgeculated against the currency of the emirates.
However, there is no truth to this charge.
These banking units in Bahrain were criticized also because they were able
to borrow money from Kuwait with little interest, and then they lent those
funds at competitive rates.
All this led the Central Bank of Kuwait to announce in March that financial
deposits in Bahrain must not be counted as part of the bank's liquid funds.
The offshore banking units in Bahrain responded to all these charges by
saying that the fact that they had attracted business that could have gone
to other Gulf states was due to the fact that they were more efficient and
more competitive. The critical remarks were undoubtedly inevitable. More
than 30 percent of the business of these banking units is conducted,in -
local currency whose worth amounts to 8 billion dollars. Saudi riyals are
at the forefront [of this business], and the opening of the Saudi National
Commercial Bank early this year has strengthened the position of the market
and increased its activity.
The opening of the Saudi National Commercial Bank was welcomed enthusiasti-
cally, especially since it has 65 branches in the kingdom. This bank
opened the riyals market to the offshore banking units in Bahrain. The
fact that the other Gulf states have not supported this offshore market
in Bahrain has not diminished its success inside the country. The Bahrain
government collects 1 million dollars annually in the form of licensing
fees from the offshore banking units where approximately 1,000 persons arp
employed. Half of those are Bahrain citizens. The collective expense~
- of these banks for telecommunications services, for telex services, for
office equipment and rent represent 50 million dollars that are added to
the sums which the Bahrain governme~t obtains from these banks.
Mr Moore says that these banks have other positive effects. Many visitors
come to the country and carry out other businesses that meet the needs of
the offshore banking group.
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For any assets worth 500 million dollars a single bank can collect payments
in annual interest that amount to 1 million dollars, after subtracting
expenses.
- Mr Moore affirms tiiat the new banking units will be able to make up the
expenses [they incurred] in opening the units and will realize satisfactory
profits. But towards the end of 1978 it was noticed that growth rates
were slowing down and that the average interest had dropped from 0.7
percent to 0.64 percent. This reflects a general decline in interest [rates]
in international money markets.
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aAHRAIN
BAHRAIN SEEN UNI~UE BiTr INS~ARABIE PART OF GULF
Par'~s AL-P;t)STA@BAL in Arabic 1 Dec ?9 pp 26-27
[Ar+:icle by Riyad Najib al-Rayyiss "Bahraini Concerns"~
[Te:;t~ Bahra.in: there is no na.rrower island, and none Hith xider horizons
or rnore hispitable people. When this small isla.nd Kas '~ilmun" in ancient
timE3s, it competed with Pho~ecia for the coa.sts of the Gulf. ~ven today it
_ is. a political and commercial listAning post for the entire Arabian Peninsu-
- la. ,When you are in Ba,hrain you are at a loss whom to talk to, xhere to be-
gin~ and what to a~~k. You ~;et even more confused aver xhether you xant to -
obsE:rve the Arabs ~~f the peninsula and the Gulf~ or Iran and itc revolution.
or i;he northern Arabs and their Middle East. All questions are permitted~
and everyone is overfloxing with something to say.
There is a sincere friendJ,y relationship betxeen ~yself and Bahrain, dating
bacl: more than 15 years full of the joy of looking for nexs, during which I
was able to get to I~ox most of its leading men before it became an indepen-
dent. state and they became ministers, directors and rich men. The journal-
ist coming to ?3ahrain after a long absence must begin by talking xith one
of t.he four authorities who determine the cha.racteristics of the winds Which
blo~r through the region and xho give it its proper orientation, its extreme
speE:d~ its real axis and its firm starting point.
~ Infc~rmation Minister Tariq al-Mu'ayyid is one of these authorities. Discus-
siori begins with him and it frequently ends with him. This young man~ Kho
left, a job with one of the oldest commercial houses in Bahrain, was able to
buij.d up within a few short years informa.tion agencies which today are among
the most advanced in the Gulf~ Hith modest budgets and even more modest re-
venues. He was able to maintain Bahrain's position as an infax~mation center
for the entire Gulf, into which the news pours and out of which f1oHS analy-
ses. Bahrain is still the best listening post. From Tariq al-Mu'ayyid�s
office, one must cross the curridor to see Deputy Informa.tion piinister Shaykh .
'Isa ibn Rashid A1 f~alifa, so that he can discuss the dimensions of Bahrain's
strength of character. He xill ana~yrze Bahrain's unique role in the Gulf ~
Hhich derives from the Bahrainis' having nursed the milk of polit3cs and
trade from ancient times until today. He will ma.ke a connection betxeen re-
gional events and their reverberations in the Gulf and their effects on
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Bahrain. He is acquainted with everyone, ca,n classify their orientations,
and can define their roles for you.
From information to politics. Here we must get the keys to the heart of
Bahraini diplomacy, Hhich Foreign Minister Sha.ykh Muhammad ibn rlubarak Al
Khalifa has made into a model of what the diplomacy of small nations Kithout
monev or weapons, in the midst of big~ rich nations, ought to be. If only
Shaykh ~Iuhammad ibn Mubara.k could ha,ve been the foreign minister of a la.rger,
stronger state, or a professor of diplomacy at a la.rge university. Perhaps
his experience in this post for the 10 years since independence will give
him this aspira,tion~ if he so desires.
From politics to dreams--the big dreams which can be appreciated only by pe-
ople like Minister of Development and Industry Yusuf al-Shiraxi~ another old-
timer in the Bahraini government. Without a doubt Yusuf al-Shirawi has one
of the most fertile political and practical minds in the entire Gulf. His
mind is like an "amusement park" beca.use of the clamor and dreams going
~ around in it. When you listen to him, you are convinced that Bahra,in is the
San Francisco, New York or ever~ the Germany of the Gulf. His thoughts move
from topic to topic so rapidly that hou almost ca.nnot follow them. Yusuf
al-Shirawi is one of the few people still faithful to the American Universi-
ty of Beirut, and is one of its first Bahraini graduates. He has suffered
the loss of Faysal's Restaurant and the old Uncle Sam, and misses the old-
timers of Ra's Beirut. Yusuf al-Shirawi's dreams are the dreams of all as-
niring 3a.arainis who look beyond the shores of their shallow island.
From persons to ideas, to the reality being experienced by Bahrain day after
day in the shadow of the difficult politica,l condi~tions surrounding it on
all sides, and the cha.nges taking pla,ce so rapidly. The chaotic political
and economic conditions in Iran since the start of the revolution have
brought Bahrain ba.ek into the circle of political struggle touched off by
some Iranian revolutiona.ry leaders in an attempt to reduce domestic pressure
on the revolution and divert the people by re-opening the dossier of Bahrain's
Arabism, in the na,me of defending the rights of Shi'ism or in the name of
the history of the Farsi empire hundreds of yeaxs ago. Ayatolla,h Sadegh
Ruhani's threat to re-incorporate Bahrain into Iran~ or Ayatollah Husayn
'Ali hluntazari's appeal to the rulers of Bahrain and Kuwait to "follow the
pa,th of Islam" out of fear of a"fate worse than the Shah's" have had no
result other than ensuring that this matter has been historically, political-.
ly and psychologically decided with respect to Bahrain. There is no spa,ce
here to go into this topic. ~
~ahrain may be the only country xhose nationa.lism was decided with inter-
national supervision when its national loyalty was put to the test. The
people of Bahrain 8ecided this matter in 19?0. Even those of Iranian origin
whose families have been in Bahrain for hur~dreds of years told the UN dele-
gation at that time~ "I am not an Arab, but I am a Bahraini~ and Bahrain is .
- an Arab is la.nd . " ~
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Therefore, wha.t is going on in Iran directly affects the region as a Khole.
There is no place where the interaction of large and small Iranian convulsions
are fe].t like Bahrain. Therefore, the dimensions of revolutionary Iran's
renewed cla,im to Bahrain are greater than the boundaries of this sma,ll island.
If you as{ced in Bahrain about Iran's stand towards the Arab Gui~� states~ the
answer xould be, "But f irst, what is Iran's stand on Iran?" If y~~u also ask-
ed about the uneasiness caused in the Gulf region by current Iraniein circwn-
stances, you would get the a,nswer~ "We in the region are uneasy abo;it Iran,
but Iran is not the source of our anxiety. The Arabs of the Gulf axe the
ones who are taking on the Iranian concerns~ and not the other Hay arc~und."
In Bahrain you hear the historic question~ "Are they our friends or our
- enemies?" The Soviet Ur.ion alone knows its friends and stands by them~
exa.mples being Afghanistan~ South Yemen and ~,'thiopia. The Arabs always want
to know who is the enemy an3 who is the friend. The United States has c~iv-
ided its loyalty between the Arabs and their enemies. The traces of trie Am-
erican Embassy hostage incident in Tehera.n will remain in the minds ~i the
people of the Arabian Peninsula for a long time. There is a sort of convic-
tion that America does not distinguish its friends from its fo~a~ and doesn't
even know its own interests. France alone of all the WestFrn states has de- -
fir.ed its friendship with the Arabs~ and with its interests has stood along-
side them. The Arabs of the Gulf don't like divided loyalty. If you stand
in Salman Port you can hear the movements of the American aircraft carrier
riidway and the American, British and Australian na.vy ships Hhich arrived
in the Arabian Sea last week to conduct military maneuvers at the entrance
to the Gulf. You can also hear the scornful talk about thf; giant with feet
_ of clay. What maneuvers? No one believes that America will stick by its
friends~ if it ha.s any. With its interests? rlaybe, bv.~ protecting its in-
terests does not begin on the deck of an aircraft carrier standing timidly
at the Straits of Hormuz.
Yot~ hear much talk in Bahrain, but the most important talk which you hear
clearly and pc;rha.ps for the first time is about distinct Gulf personality.
They feel that the Gulf states have similar poli~ical and economic systems
just as they have similar geographic and social ~:onditions. Therefore,
there must be periodic, org3nized coordination araong them. But they are not
a bloc within the Arab whol?; the last al-Ta'if conference demonstrated that
to a certain extent. Iraq'? I~aturally a Gulf state participates in all the
- Gulf-related regional and international conferences~ but Iraq Kas not invit- ~
ed to the al-Ta'if conference because it was a special conference for Arab-
iar. Peninsu].a states ha,ving "similar regi.mes." A veiled statement~ perhaps?
But Gulf-Iraqi rela.tions are definitely at their best now.
Gu~.f security--what do you hear about it in Bahrain? '~forld security issues
ha.~�e become so intricate that no country in the world can defend itself by
. it:;elf. The Arab states, including the Gulf states, have tried to establish
a t~nifi~d Arab defense for themsQlves. But the Arab pla,n has not been accomp-
lished, and today the defense pla.ns are either part of a regional or an inter-
national strategy. Regional defense is always linked to a big na,tion or a
b].oc. Today no country can defend itself apa.rt from its neighbors. Arab
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interests require security cooperation among themselves. Gulf security must
be part of this cooperation, which must not be permitted to remain a word
devoid of action.
What about the American role in the Gulf? Nothing new, outside of tha: desire
that the Arab Gulf states rema.in outside the struggle among the supsrpowers,
or the desire that firm relations be established on the basis of the inter-
ests of the pa.rticipating parties. But no one has any confidence in the Am-
erican rale, and no one really kn~ws where tne America,n interests are and
with whom they lie.
If you ask in Bahrain about the servi.ces island, you get the reply that Ba,h-
- rain is not trying to take Beirut's pla.~�e, and tha,t if it tried it would fail.
Even Bahrain doesn't want to be the Culf Singapore. Why? Because it kxiows
ttia.t its size and its resources do not permit tha.t, and because it doesn't
want to beccme like ~eirut is for the Arab world--the extraordinary rarity.
It doesn't want to become like Singapore is for Southeast Asia--the diffi-
culty which daily chall~nges everything around it. Bahrain, even with its
distinct personality and its unique nature, wants to remain an insepa,ra.ble
part of the Gulf, no more adva,nced than some and no more backwaxds than
others. If it can do things that others cannot~ that is because others do
not appreciate or want those things, and because Bahra.in can absorb them more
than its neighbors can. Bahra.in's concern today is to deny itself any su-
rrer,a.�^y wherever it exists. The bridge whi~h is being built to connect Bah-
rain and Saudi Ar~.bia is something for:the future, the next 4 years. If one
supposes that the Saudis will go to Bahrain on the weekend.s, then the reverse
supposition also holds. Bahrain is a cramped island whose population ha.s
filled up its sma,ll bordersi ~he Bahrainis will want to escape to the expa,nse
of the deserts, And, beca.use the Bahrainis have lower incomes~ they will
find in the Eastern Province the opportunity for change they are looking for.
The Saudis, now that the world ha.s become sma.ll, will find in Bahrain a neax-
by recreation spot if they don't want to fly to Europe or Asia.
The :~iahrainis are worried about the immigration of foreign manpower from
:;orea, the Phil.ippines, India and Pakistan to the various Gulf countries,
and they fear that the Gulf is facing a problem simila.r to tha.t of the Asians
in "r~ast Africa some years ago. Therefore Bahrain has shown great interest -
in the conference of Gulf ministers of industry and development which con-
vened last t~iay in Riyadh to study this very problem, far from the clamor of
the press and the spotlights of publicity, There are more than 100,000 Kor-
ean workers in Saudi ~rabia, and a simi].a,r number of Philippinos in the king-
dom and the Gulf~ in addition to Indian, Pakistani a.nd Iranian laborers and
the like. The foreigr labor problem is one Which must be treated on a pan-
peninsular level through a clear-cut, positive policy which will pla.n for the
final quarter of this century. It is true that in Bahrain there is a reser-
voir of Lahraini ma.npower, but it is only in the services~ literary and
civil service sector, not on the manua.l la,bor level. Bahrain hopes that the
s~:ills of its young people will fill positions on this level in the Gulf
countries if the opportunities in Bahrain itseli become limited. 3ut for
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- the next few years 3ahrain will be capa,ble of accomodating its graduates,
technicians and la,borers.
~ahrain's worries are not few, but this small, ponr island lying on the
eastern shores of the Arab Gulf, not possessing any of the Gulf's tradition-
al resources, has one of the greatest resources--people. If the oyster some
day no longer bears pearls, and if the oil wells dry up~ Bahrain will still
be a source of inen. Ever since the beginning of Bahra.in's history the word
has been "a?an." In Bahrain's men is its resource, the truly significant re-
source. r`ay God protect 3ahrain.
~559
CSC: 4802
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BAHRAIN
BRIEFS
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY STARTUP--Bahrain announced yesterday that it will
complete measures to take possession of its oil industry by the end of
this month. This announcement was made by Minister of Development and
Industry Yusuf al-Shirawi in an interview published by the Bahraini news-
paper AL-ADWA'. Mr al-Shir3wi said that the Bahraini Government recently
approved the financial arrangements necessary to implement such measures.
He added that the Bahrain field, the oil, gas and production and its ,
marketing facilities will pass completely into the ownership of the state,
and the Bahrain Petroleum Company Limited (BAPCO) will retain possession -
of the oil refinery and foreign marketing operations only. He said that
the company will supervise production operations in the field in return
for specified fees. This will be on a temporary basis until the National
Petroleum Company of Bahrain becomes qualified to Cake over all these
operations. He added that his country can reconsider the arrangements
pertaining to BAPCO's ownership of the refinery at any time and under any
circumstances since these arrangements are not tied to a specified time
period. [Text] [Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 14 Oct 79 p 7] 8591
CSO: 4802
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IRAN
THOSE WHO VOTE AND THOSE WHO DON~T
Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 3 Dec 79 p 1
[Article]
[Text~ Yesterday and today a referendum is being held in Iran for the
approval of the new constitutional laws of the Islamic Republic. In spite
of Khomeyni's last message all political parties and groups have boycotted
the referendum except the Islamic Republic Party, under the leadership of
Beheshti, the JAMA Party (Islamic lef t), the Iranian Freedom group (Mehdi
Bazargan) and the Tudeh Party. Among those who have boycotted the refer-
endum are the National Front, the National Democratic Front, the Radical
Party, the Pan-Iranist Party, the Iran Party, the Moslem People's Party,
the Fedayane Khalq and the M~ojahedine Khalq. The Kurds, the Turkomans,
the Baluchis and the Azaris have either b~ycotted the referendum or have
not participated in it and the cruelties that took place yesterday in
Azarbaijan, Baluchestan and Kurdestan indicate the seriousness of this
matter. The progressive [leftists~ groups believe that the biggest weakness
of this constitution is its Chapter S"religious jurists" which gives
_ Khomeyni certain powers which have no precedent in the political history
of the w~orld and thus for the first time "a dictatorship" rsceives lawful
recognition.
According to Article 110, Khomeyni and his successors, as commanders-in-
chief, have the power to appoint and dismiss the military connoanders, to
appoint judges, declare wars, sign peace treaCies, elect candidates for
the presidency, dismiss the president, and to close the National Assembly
and the Supreme Court of Justice. They can reduce sentences passed by the
- courts or annul decisions made by them. These are rights that no owner
can enjoy even in his own land and no dictatorship has ever enjoyed these
rights--at least officially.
In this constitution there is no reference to the basic rules of democracy,
such as the right to strike, the formation of unions, the equality of women
and freedom of beliefs. In a country like Iran, where unity among its
tribes contributes to its power, there is no word mentioned concerning the
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rights of these tribes. We saw how Reza Khan and Mohamarad Reza Khan abused
the old constitution, in which the power of the people was recognized. This
new constitution has giver. the ruling power to the religious community and
we shall see how the rest of our countrymen will become second class citizens.
The new constitution~il laws are b eing placed in referendum at a time when the
people of Iran are struggling for the return of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and
his par tners. Many of the Iranian people, such as the Kurds, the Baluchis,
the Turkomans, some of the Arabs, the Azaris and all the progressive groups
and a large part of the middle class will vote. Among those who will vote,
some are going to give a yes answer to the constitution. However, their
positive vote will be one for in unity in the present struggle of the Iranian
: people for establishing justice and resisting probable attacks from foreign
governments. In the light of these facts can one believe that the new
constitutional laws have been approved by the majority of the people? Would
it not have been better to have delayed the referendum to a later date in
order to prove total support for it?
CSO: 4906
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IRAN
GHOTBZADEH APPOINTMENT SEEN INDICATING TOUGHER POLICIES
Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 30 Nov 79 p 1
~Text~ The replacement of Bani-Sadr wi.th Ghotbzadeh as the minister of
foreign affairs is considered as a new step towards toughening Iranian
foreign policy towards the United States.
This change, which took place three days prior to the Bani-Sadr departure
for New York and his participation in the United Nations Security Council
meeting, indicates that it is becoming more difficult to find a solution
to existing problems. While Bani-Sadr did not strongly defend the takeover
of the American Embassy and the capture of the hostages, Ghotbzadeh supported
this action, and from the beginning used national television and radio,
which came under his supervision, to broadcast in detail the events taking
place around the Embassy. Ghotbzadeh is the fourth foreign minister in the
nine months following the revolution, after Dr. Sanjabi, Ibrahim Yazdi and
Abol-Hasan Bani-Sadr. With each change of the minister there has been a _
change in policy. Foreign policy during Dr. Sanjabi's tenure was based on
quiet diplomacy, Yazdi changed that to a diplomacy of alliance, Bani-Sadr
supported a revolutionary foreign policy and now Ghotbzadeh is following a
very harsh revolutionary policy. The appointment of the first foreign
minister, who had a brilliant record in the struggle against the old regime
was made outside of a religious framework and this indicated the unity of
the different political groups which wanged to make the revolution a suc-
cessful one. However, the appointment of the last foreign minister, whose
struggle in these past years has always been within the framework of the
Islamic revolution, indicates that now power is in the hands of the religious `
leaders. Bani-Sadr diff ers from Ghotbzadeh in that he has a political and
economic philosophy oF his own whereas Ghotbzadeh leans on Khomeyni's beliefs
and is the only member of the Revolutionary Council who has been able to
maintain his position as the head of national television and radio since the
Ueginning of the revolution. Therefore, it can be expected that from now on
one can hear some of Khomeyni's opinions through the statements made by
Ghotbzadeh.
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While Chotbzadeh, due to his acquaintance with Khomeyni is able to have a
better understanding of his beliefs, and through his nearness to the
students in the Embassy can convince them of some probable agreement with
the United States, he also can through this relationship impede the start
o� talks between the two countries. And it must be remembered that no
problem can be solved unless there is a dialogue.
After the revolution, Bazargan, Yazdi, Bani-Sadr and Ghotbzadeh were the -
' advisers around Khomeyni. Today only the fourth person is in power and the
first three have stepped aside. Will the future president be one of those
who have been put aside or will it be he who is closer to Khomeyni [Ghot-
bzadeh~?
CSO : 4906
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~
IRAN
KHALKHALI WANfS CARTER CONDEI~IIJED, NOT HOSTAGES
Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 22 Dec 79 p 2
[Excerpts~ The Revolutionary Council, at its meeting of Thursday night,
has adopted a final decision in connection with the ~U.S.~ hostages. The
contents of the resolution have not been revealed, but it was said to have
been adopted after a 4-hour discussion held at Khomeyni's residence.
This information was released by the PARS News Agency on Friday (yesterday),
. which quoted also Ayatollah Beheshti as saying that the meeting was a
"very useful" session.
On the other hand, following the resolution of the Revolutionary Council,
Sheykh Sadeq Khalkhali, in an interview with the London TIMES, stated that -
the hostages should be released, because they are "innocent." He also ~
added that "In my opinion, these people are innocent, and they are our
- guests. I want them freed and returned to the Un~ted States. Even if
_ they are spies, this is not an adequate reason to have them held here.
Every embassy has its spies. We cannot, according to Islamic laws, execute
_ a spy. We cannot condemn them if even we were to try them. We want to
have Carter and the U.S. government condemned."
CSO: 4906 ~
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?
~
IRAN
STUDENTS ALLEGE U.S. EMBASSY DOCUMENTS REVEAL ANOTHER AGENT
Tehran BAMDAD in Persian 11 Dec 79 pp 1, 3
~Article: By the student followers of the Imam: "Documents are Published
Revealing Collaboration With the U.S. by Hushang Ram"~
[Excerpts~ By publishing a document on cordial relations (that existed)
- between former Bank Omran president Hushang Ram and former United States
ambassador in Tehran the student followers of the Imam have unveiled his
activities during the last days of the Shah, aimed at strengthening the _
deposed Shah's position. The text of the document is as follows:
"From i1,S. embassy in Tehran to the State Department. Confidential,
T'ehran 12163, llec. 13, 78 - 27th Azai 1357.
Subject; Meeting with Hushang Ram on Bank Omran.
1. Bank Omran president and the Shah's confi.dant, Hushang Ram, visited me
on Dec 13. He wanted to inform me that he h 1d organized a group of young
intellectuals to stimulate poli.tical discussi_ons among middle class Iranians.
He wanted to know if this could be of any use~ to us.
2. I told him that we would like to be in touch with such groups hopin~
they could have a calming effect in the current political arena.
3. I pointed oLt that in my opinion people had no time for political
analysis (discussions) at a time when the nation's economy was near collapse.
Ram agreed and gave detail description of problems his bank had with the
Central Bank and the Melli Bank.
4. I told him that his statements confirmed my views and urged him to
organize a group in his bank and approach Central Bank directly. I also
suggested that they (members of the group) should go to various sections
of the bank and quietly identify the young people who interfere with regular
banking transactions. Bankers could then find replacements (for the trouble-
makers). I said bankers (banking officials) must now be weary of such
conditions and it was time to act correct the situation. Ashura (mourning)
- is now over an~~ it is the time for the country to return to normal.
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S. He said the Shah was opposed to strong measures. I said that the Shah
considers the shooting at people as a strong measure and said that I believed _
that some strong actiona in various government departmenta short of shooting
could be fruitful. He (Ram) agreed to discuss my suggeations with his
colleagues at the bank and departed rather determined.
Sullivar~,
U.S. Ambassador to Iran
CSO: 4906
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~
IRAN
]
SISTAN, BALUCHISTAN TO ENFORCE REVOLUTIONARY ORDER
Tehran BANIDAD in Persian 12 Dec 79 p 23
[Article: "People of Sistan and Baluchistan, Guided by Humanitarian and
Islamic Principles, Are the Enforcers of Revolutionary Orders"]
[Text~ Zahedan--Pars News Agency--Following a BBC broadcast regarding
demands made by the Islamic Union of the province of Sistan and Baluchistan,
the Sistanis' community in Zahedan yesterday issued the following statement:
"By ttie name of God the merciful. In connection with the report broadcast
by i3BC on 16/9/58 (Dec 7, 79) the Sistanis' community registers its strong
protests to the poir~ts raised (in the broadcast) as follows:
1. The community views with respect all moslems and responsible Iranians,
local or others, who have rendered valuable services to the oppressed people
of the province. Leaving the affairs of the province in the hands of incom-
- petent people, who are mostly the sons of chiefs and feudals and who pass
themselves as local people, will not help the needy people and will only
prepare the way for the blood-thirsty feudals and the sons of the chiefs
- in the area to once again assume power.
2. In its prosecution, Revolutionary Courts must disregard personal consid-
erations and act according to the Islami.c laws and punish all criminals
regardless of the group they belong to.
- 3. Revolutionary guards who have, since their arrival in the province,
established relative security, are approved by the community and are
supported in their efforts to achieve their humanitarian and Islamic goals.
4. In one part of the BBC report it was noted that there had been some
thirty thousand Baluchis in Sistan. While deploring such reports, which
only help create division among moslems, we deny it vehemently. We warn
people who try to exploit such issues. The Moslem people of the province
are the enforcers of the orders issued by the revolutionary leader Imam "
Khomeyni.
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S. Finally, we declare thf~t any group threate~ning armed struggle (will be
faced with) the Sistanis' community, which will put to use all its might
- and its armed czpabilities that are in ready stage to put an end to such
a deplorable action, the true perpetrators of which are internatianal
imperialism and Zionism.
CSO : 4906 ~
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IRAN
AYATOLLAH LAHUTI EXPLAINS SPLIT FROM GUARDIANS
Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 11 Dec 79 p 3
~Article: "Ayatollah Lahuti: 'Why I Resigned Directorship of the Guardians"~
[Text~ In an exclusive interview with the Keyhan newspaper, former director
of the Guardians, Ayatollah Lahuti, gave the reasons for his resignation.
In the interview he, who had (previously) given heart trouble as reason for
his resignation, at the beginning reviewed factors that had necessitated the
setting up of the Guardians Corps, its operation and its present status and
the dangers threatening the Corps at the present time.
Q. What was the reason for your resignation?
A. In order to make it clear to all and leave nothing in the dark there are
certain issues that need to be aired and I have prepared notes that I would
like to refer to.them rather briefly.
1. The necessity to withstand torture and imprisonment and to prepare plans ~
for the struggle (revolution). '
2. Speaking frankly and openly under difficult conditions and presentation
of Islamic ideology for the young generation at a time that it was feared
it was losing faith and leaning toward ma.terialistic school of thoughts (sic).
- 3. Imam's leadership at a grave period of time in these past twenty years
and the showing of a way leading to firial victory--that of an Islamir_ rule
in which an Islamic Republic is crystalized.
4. Transfer and deportation of the Imam from Iraq to France and the giving
of a new shape to the revolution.
5. The f~ight of the Shah from Iran and the return of the Imam and the
- subsequent fall of the Bakhtiar government which was no less important than
the Shah's flight.
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6. Ninety percent popular vote in the referendum for the Islamic Republic
and the 44 percent vote for the Assembly of Experts and the 10 to 8 percent
- for the city, county and provincial councils and far less votes than the
first referendum (Islamic Republic) for the confi.rmation of what the Assembly
_ had approved in connection with the constitution. It is noteworthy that
the Imam~s call to the people to go to the polls for the conatitution had
been answered and obeyed by the majority of the clergy.
7. The necessity of setting up the Guardians Corps which was conceived by
- the Imam himself .
8. Formation of the Corps under the Deputy Prime Minister for Revolutionary
Affairs and a representative of the Imam to assist and coordinate its affairs.
9. Changing of the directorship of the
Revolutionary Council and the various interpretations and analysis, its
becoming the arms of the revolution, a single party corps and the appointment
of inember of the Revolutionary Council to coordinate the various groups that
were involved in military operations which in the long run was catastrophic.
Unfortunately, appointment for a six-month period of individuals in the
Com~nand Council from one party (faction) further complicated the matter even .
though procedure demanded that the Conmand Council was to be elected
(appointed) after a period of six months.
10. Reappointment of the same people after a six-month period and the
dictatorial behaviour of the Command Council coupled with the lack of
qualification of the Council to run the Corps and the already existing
problems and lack of cooperation and efforts to influence the reappointment
of the Command Council (members) along with incompetence of those in charge
and their acceptance of too many co~.itments and their inability to carry
them out all resulted in the resigning of the director o� the Guardians.
The director was one of the oldest members of the Corps and familiar with
_ its problems more than anyone else. For many reasons the appointed (members)
Command Council refused to withdraw (resign). We must recognize and learn
what the Imam's line is to realize to what extent the Corps has now deviated
from that line. I believe that we must once again try to define the Imam's
- line. For one, it is th~ anti-imperialism of the struggle (revolution) and
that the Imam is its leader. Second, it is Islamic. Thirdly, it supports
the disadvantaged and the poor which overshadows his program. Sixth (sic),
is the non-compromising nature of the movement. A man should not give in
to compromise and the Imam himself is an example. Seventh, daily problems
should be faced determinedly of which, once again, the Imam is an example.
Q. What were your objectives when you were the Corps director? _
A. Allow me to first go into a little more detail of some of what I just
said. As I am the subject (of the discussions) and as to why I resigned,
and as one of the newspapers had suggested that I should break silence and
that if I kept quiet it would be catastrophic, I had already declared that
!~l
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_ I will spell out the reasons for my resignation. I believe that I even
- announced my intention to radio and televisio n stations which I am not sure
if it was agreed upon (to tiold). Anyway, once again I ask them to allow me
to tell people as to why I quit. I also like to tell people more about the
. Corps. At the start I said that there are a number of issues I would like
to raise in connection with my resignation. I have already spoken about the
withstanding of tortt~re, imprisonment a.nd formalization of the struggle
(revolutionary movement). This subject. (of being in prison) is a bit smelly.
I spent some time in jail and so did my son. Well, that is it if one wants
to achieve a goal. There ~ire people who suddenly appear after victory is
achieved and the goals reached and want to lay claim to its fruits. Society
identifies these as opportunists. There are numerous individuals who were -
not in the movement when it began. There was a period when the oven was
burning hot and the end result was burned hands and feet and possible death
by torture. There were ma.ny who, at this time, had accepted (joined) the
struggle in order to bring about changes in the government (system) and were
prepared to accept the consequences. I said that there was a time when the
oven was burning hot and healthy people were taken inside a room and his dead
body came out through another door. There were people who joined the struggle
at such a stage and there are many such people in the country now. Z'he
nvmber of people who emerged from prisons in the last few days (of the past
re:gime) was about 5,000 though some reports have put the number at 20,000 to
50,000. I believe they are all out (not in power) and those who were not
there (not taking part in the struggle against the former regime) are now ~
in (power), This i5 an issue that makes people wonder where were these -
people when the struggle needed committed individuals. There were many
_ people who did not want to forget their normal business and waste their
time in taking part in the struggle against the former regime and were busy
taking advantage to the conditions acquiring land and more fortune. They
did not care what the conditions were in the country and what a moslem
should do or how dangerous the government (former regime) was for Islam and
what the exiled Imam was demanding from people. For a group of people coming
to power now or later (who did not participate in the struggle) is an issue
for those who took active part in the struggle who, at the same time, ask
themselves where have all these people been?
CSO: 4906
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IRAN
H~JSEYN KHOMEYNI SPEAKS OUT ON ARAB, RELIGIOUS ISSUES
London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 16 Nov 79 pp 68-69
[Text] It is being said of Hojjat ol-Islam Hoseyn Khomeyni* that he is
the "influential man" in Iran. He is the oldest grandson of Ayatollah
Ruhollah al-Musavi Khomeyni (this is the full name) and the son of
, Khomeyni's son, Mustafa who was killed by SAVAK in al-Najaf in Iraq. He
visited Lebanon twice and met with senior officials, with officials of the
- state and with leaders of the resistance, He also toured south Lebanon
and debated Farid al-Khatib on the cultural dimensions of the Islamic
Revolution in Iran, the problem of south Lebanon, relations between tre
Iranian Government and the PLO, the oil weapon, tthe situation in the Gulf,
women, musi~, alcohol and executions. Before leaving Lebanon, Khomeyni's
*Hojjat ol-I~lam Hoseyn Mustaf a Khomeyni was born in Qom in 1958. He
grew up in Qom, and he saw the events of 1962 during which Imam Khomeyni
was arrested. After tha Imam's retur~i from Turkey. to Iraq, Hoseyn and
his sister lived alone with the Imam in al-Najaf. The other members of
the Khomeyni family lived in Iran. A strong relationship developed
between Hoseyn and his grandfather. Hoseyn studied philosophy, religious
subjects, philology and Arabic literature in al-Najaf. Despite his
youth, he participated in political events when the struggle of the
' Iranian people abroad was one of the principal dimensions of their
_ struggle inside the country. He was mak~ng preparati.ons for the Islamic
[tevolution. He wsnt with the Imam to Paris, and he stayed there with
him, but he went to Tehran 1 week before the Imam. Hoseyn Khomeyni con-
siders his father, Mustafa to be the principal figure of the Islamic Revo-
lution in Iran. Soon after Hoseyn's Eather died in action, the groups of
mourners turned into demonstration~, and there was a general shutdown
[of all services and activitiesj, in that year Irar_ian newspapers also
launched a campaign against Imam Khomeyni on the 40th day of his son's
death. The death of his father made Hoseyn continue his struggle,
withstand mare and become morF hostile to the Shahinshahi regime.
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~;ranclson left an article at the Beirut office of AL-HAWADITH. Fie included
in his arricJ.e his point of view on all. these matters. When he delivered
the article, he explained that he had written it as a revolutionary and
not as a member of government. He said he represented a sector of young
- peopl_e, university graduates and intellectuals in Iran. The text of what
he wrote follows; it is closer to being a review of ideas than to an
essay dealing with a specLfic idea.
Islam gives Moslems freedoms that are broader than those given by liberal-
ism in the West on the basis of "enjoining justice and forbidding evil."
Islam gives the ordinary citizen the right to criticize the president of
the republic, the chief of the government or the commander of the army if
[any one ot them] committed some error. Although the West states that such
criticism is permissible, Islam says that it is one's duty. This is based -
on [the dictum] that "You are all to watch over each other, and you are
responsible for your charge."
Just as in Iran, social freedoms [everywhere] are created by circumstances.
These freedoms can be found in Iran on a broad scale. Every group can say
what it wants. There is no doubt that social freedoms must be available
so that there would be no pressure on citizens, from the high-handedness
of persons or individuals, to take positions other than those they prefer
~ to take.
An Islamic government has the right to disseminate its doctrine. Although
it recognizes the doctrines of minorities, it does not allow their promo-
tion. This was what happened during the days of the prophet in Mecca when
th.P Jews were free within their domestic framework and their social affairs
but wt~e not free to disseminate their doctrine and promote it among people.
In the futu~P, after the constitution is put into practice, the new reality
will not permit *he dissemination of doctrine and religion for the purpose -
of getting people t~ adjure Islam. We will be ready for a candid debate
on television and in the ~*.her media. Under better circumstances other doc-
trines may be disseminated i.: a broader fashion.
The rebels want to rule; they want to rule so they can enforce values.
Every revolution that grew out of hu~~anitarian and ethical values wants
to put those values into practice and w;nts power to be its way to putting
those values into practice. But if the re~~olution has to choose between
its humanitarian and ethical values and power, it should leave power and
adhere to the values. We will isolate ourselves from every regime without
values that may be established in Iran. We will consider it to be similar
to the regime of Reza Phalavi, and we will fight it.
The foreigner has not and will not succeed in changing the situation in
Iran into a civi~ war, but he did succeed in stirring up an ideological
and a political war. Leftists and rightists are struggling with each other
just as the reactionary religious movement is struggling with the progres-
sive religious movement. Nevertheless, those who subscribe to those
. ~
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~
b~liefs, or most of them, believe in the leadership. Therefore, the
leadership is a principal factc~r at the present time for achieving
n~tional unity. But if the leiiderahip were to go, the situation could,
God forbid, deteriorate and turn into a civil war.
The situation in Iran is considerably different from the situation in
Lebanon. The sects that are found in Lebanon can be found in Iran. But
" the ideological unity that exists on a broad scale among the people in
Iran is unmatched anywhere in the world, and the single leadership which
the people in Iran recognize has no parallel in Lebanon. These matters
would not allow the situation in Iran to be altered and turned into one
resembling the situation in Lebanon.
Executions do take place after every revolution, and there are executions
that are inevitable. But I do believe that some members of SAVAK who had
- been executed should have been pardoned. In fact, all members of SAVAK
who were paid small salaries should have been pardoned. SAVAK took all the
files of the Eighth District, and those included the files of the real -
spies in the area who used to strike at the foundation of the revolution.
The files of a few thousand persons of the Third District were left behind.
Only those persons wer.e considered to be SAVAK members. The revolutionary
courts became preoccupied with those powerless members of SAVAK although
they should have been in pursuit of the real members of SAVAK who could
still be in government positions.
On the other hand executions that were carried out on the basis of atroci-
ties that had been committed were grievous errors. We recognize "Islamic
punishments" that are carried out in an Islamic but not in a barbaric
manner. This requires the presence of "four honest witnesses" who had
witnessed a cer_tain action openly. If the judges, the revolutionary courts
or the governm~nt suspect a person of adultery, they have no right to in-
vestigate the charge. Instead, the witnesses should have been present
where the acr took place, and four of them should come forward to testify.
If three witnesses and not four enter their testimony, the accused is
punished by a whipping. This is the Islamic premise.
We are now living in a Shahinshahi society, that is, in an ignorant society
and not in an advanced society. The executions and the "punishments" must
be put into practice in the real society and in the actual culture. As
long as there is poverty in society, the hand of a thief must raot be cut
off. As long as there is poverty, an adulterer must nor_ be whipped. I
am opposed to executions. Executions must be carried out in an Islamic
society, but before the executions [are carried out], the problem must be
dealt with, and I do not think that execution is a realistic remedy for
the problem.
Imam Khomeyni did not ban music. However, music has been banned from
television and radio. Television does, nevertheless, show a small number
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of films, and these include music. Besides, music is sold on tapes and
- records in the streets. It is likely that educational and cultural pro- -
grams, which Iran has a great need for at the present time, will replace
music on television and radio.
It would have been better to sell the alcohol that had been in storage in
the country for sums of money instead of destroying it. Islamic law,
however, does not consider alcohol property or capable of becoming
~roperty.
As a revolution--and not as a government--we want realistic equality for
all. We want to advocate and call for equality among all those who worship
God outside Iran and among all the people in the world so that the revolu-
tion would not be confined to Iran.
Religious scholars and politicians took two positions on the problem of
"autonomy" which was brought out by our Kurdish brothers. The first posi-
tion agreed to granting the Kurds autonomy, and the second position advo-
cated that we zxplain the purpose of the revolution to the Kurds. The
revolution is different from the government. The Kurds should be per-
suaded that the revolution is better for them than autonomy. The question
that Yasir 'Arafat asked Imam Khomeyni about the destiny of the Kurds dur-
ing his visit to Iran after the victory of the revolution may have been an
invitation to us to explain the revolution to the Kurds [and to tell them]
ellat the revolution exists and that its purpose is to establish justice
and equality. If justice and equality were not made available, we would
not be revolutionaries, and there would be no revolution.
I know that Zionist and foreign functionaries can be found in Kurdistan
and that they are inflaming the Kurdish problem there. We do not vindi-
cate ourselves or officials of the Iranian Government from some suspicions
concerning this question.
The solution in Kurdistan must be a political solution. It is to be based
on negotiations and on clarifying matters for people. At the present t~me
we must not strike th e armed Kurds. This would cause the traitor not to
appear, and in fact, people may rally around him. On the contrary we
have to reveal the identity of the traitor to the people~ Herein lies the
real solution. We must also implement broad construction projects in
Kurdistan.
We are not against the army, but we must raise a question around it. We
are still calling for a further purge of the army. It was for this reason
that the "revolution's protective" army was established. As long as it
exists and as long as people maintain their frame of mind, a military
coup cannot be achieved.
The problem of south Lebanon is neither a south Lebanese or a Lebanese =
problem. It is a Middle Eastern problem in south Lebanon, and it is a
world problem in south Lebanon.
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We a re involved in south Lebanon, and we are responsible for it!
~ A deci5ion on south Lebanon and on the Palestinian Revolution in south
Lebanon is not made in Beirut; it is rather made in Tel Aviv, in Washing- -
ton and in Moscow. The problem of south Lebanon is being dealt with from
outside Lebanon. The oil exporting countries in the Gulf, therefore,
must exert greater pressure on imperialism and Zionism and must carry out
an oil threat against them until they abandon south Lebanon. Iran should
play the same role because it exports oil. It is to fly the banner of
the revolution and to control the Straits of Hormuz. If this does not
happen, south Lebanon and Lebanon will in future years turn into a state
where Israelis would be found in an official way. Their presence would
constitute a threat to the nation. At the present time the nation is re-
sponsible for removing this threat.
The people of south Lebanon have great faith in the Palestinian question.
This is evident in the fact that they have been hosts to their Palestinian
brothers during the last several years. They offered sacrifices for the
Palestinian Revolution, and they sent their young men to struggle from
within the PLO.
But there is in fact a matter tha*_ must be dealt with. It is the fact
that the resident of south Lebanon wants the Palestinian Revolution to be
victo rious, and he wants to be victorious with it. He does not want to
perish on the road. The continued Israeli shelling and the fact that the
method of the Palestinian Revolution's military struggle has been main-
tained on the same degree and mode for 10 years in south Lebanon--along ~
with political victories in Europe and the United States--raise a question
in the mind of the resident of south Lebanon: "How long will this go on,
and how long will the camels remain on the mountain?"
Residents of south Lebanon can undoubtedly hold out in their positions with
the Palestinians if a change in the Palestinian Revolution's style were to
take place. Residents of south Lebanon can also work on the Gulf front.
Oil exporting countries--and Iran is among them--can also issue an appeal
on behalf o~ the Palestinian Revolution and the question of south Lebanon.
Several shelters can also be built in south Lebanon, and requirements for -
resistance, including fiinds, can be provided. In addition, an "order '
for unity" can be issued by Imam Khomeyni.
~'The legal situation in Iran is that of the revolution, and the legality of
the government is [to come about] by change, that is, by legalizing the
revolution in particular. The revolution, which did authorize the govern-
ment to rule, has the right to exert pressure on the government to make it
adopt the revolution's positions. We will, God willing, exert pressure on
the government from our revolutionary premises so as to make it assume
responsibility postures vis-a-vis south Lebanon and the Gulf. "
We consider the PLO "the legitimate and the sole representative of the
Palestinian peo~le." We bel.ieve in the Palestinian question which has a
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cultural and a civilized character that outweighs its military character r
and operationG. [The PLO acts] not only to liuerate Palestine, but rather,
like the Iranian Revolution also, to achieve a cultural change for the
Arab and Islamic nation. Therefore, our coordination with the Palestinian
question and with the PLO emanates from the identity of the Islamic Revolu-
tion everywhere.
Iran must support the Palestinian and the Arab question with its policy, _
its o il, its weapons, its p eople and all means and methods�[it has]. That
is whar the revolution is teaching us. But there are problems in Iran
from which the revolution is suffering. So far, these problems have not
- permitted this support *_o be accomplished. There are also reservations
[regarding this support]. We are prepared to reduce o il production and to
cut off oil [st~ipments] to support the positions of the Palestinian Revalu-
tion.
We consider the Islam which finds justifications for the positions of
tyrants and for the treacherous positions that despots take towards their
- people a non-Mohammedan Islam. This
is because Mohammedan Islam came into i~
existence to strike at desp ots and to _
combat injustice. If we abandon
[this principle~, we are not real
Moslems. The position that the
Siiaykh of al-Azhar took in the legal
opinion he issued on the Camp David
accords emanates from a non-Mohamme.-
dan Islam.
, ~
[Imperialists] are looking for someone ~
to succeed the shah after his depar-
turP from the Gulf. They want this
successor to be President Anwar al-
- Sadat. Therefore, propaganda is
being spread that Iran wants to
occupy or carry out a strike against
the Gulf. This is colonialist propa- ~=r!
ganda ~ahose purpose is to get the ' t -
el.ders and the rulers of the Gulf to '~�t~;
te11 al_-Sadat, "Be so kind as to come ~ ~ ~3 _
to the Gulf," to justify Egyptian
intervention and also to get Egypt out
of the i~olation in which it is living. ~~~L.
This is the plan [that has been drawn ~
up] so Egypt can achieve a major success. ' ~
- 1^; .
~ j. ..i ~ . .
8592
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I~: ~
PARIS COURT REJECTS FUND RESTITUTION DEMAND
Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 13 Dec 79 p 1
[Text] The Paris court ruled yesterday Iran has no right to demand the
immediate restitution of a$50 million deposit, blocked in the vaults of
Citibank Paris.
The decision meant the Bank Markazi Iran had lost the first round of its
battle to win prc,mpt restitution of its funds held in the French branch of
~ Citicorp and foreshadowed a protracted court battle, legal sources said. _
- Pirs. Simone Rozes, the court chairman, decided the $50 million was not a
deposit that could be withdrawn on sight but a time deposit to be kept in
the bank for a certain period of time.
The judge thus ruled in favor of Citibank which had argued that on Dec 4 the
Iranian Central Bank agreed in telex exchanges to keep the funds in the
Citibank for two more weeks--until Dec 19, at 13-3/4 interests.
The judge, flanked by two assistants, ruled that under paragraph 1186 of -
the French Civil Code a party that had agreed to a time deposit, cannot
claim funds back before the final dateline had run out.
Judge Rozes said, however, that on Dec 19, the Iranian State Bank may -
file a new court case if Citibank refuses then to return the funds.
F. Rancois Cheron, attorney of the Iranian State Bank said he will appeal
the court decision.
Monday, when the case was argue~ before the Judge, Cheron asserted the
Iranian Bank agreed to keep the funds in Citibank vaults for two weeks
because it had no ~hoice, after being told by Citibank officials they were
abiding by President Carter's executive order f reezing all Iranian funds
- in U.S, banks and their overseas branches pending the liberation of Ameri-
can host:ages in Tehran. -
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Diplomats said the French court`s moye.may set a precedent for other `
litigations launched by Iran's Islamic Regime against foreign banks to
recover its deposits abroad.
1)iplomats also said the French court's action may sour relations between
France and Iran. The Iranian Embassy already Tuesday complained in a note
to the French Foreign Ministry that Iranian refugees such as ex-premier
Shapour Bakhtiar are allegedly enjoying too much political freedom.
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IRAN
IRAN TO PETITION U.S., FOREIGN COURTS FOR SHAH ASSET FREEZE
Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 13 Dec 79 p 2
[TextJ Iran will petition U.S. and European courts within days to freeze
personal bank accounts and pr~perties of the deposed shah and his family
worth $100 million, officials announced Tuesday.
Central Bank Governor Ali Reza Novbari declared the bank had documentary
proof that the ousted royal family amassed the assets, including properties
in Switzerland, Spain, France and the United States with embezzled state
f unds .
The suits, Novbari told a news conference, were the Revolutionary Council's
first step to recover the fortunes of the Pahlavi family. He estimated the
f ortune totals $10 billion.
Since the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on Nov 4, Novbari has sought
to accumulate proof of mass corruption both to get back the assets and to
bolster Iran's demand for the return of the shah to face trial.
The Central Bank filed a 277 page petition with the Iranian prosecutor
general Tuesday for forwarding to European and U.S. courts.
He said foreign courts will be given documents which show haw the royal
~ family misappropriated state funds and accepted bribes, and deposited the
funds in personai accounts.
"My strategy will be to show how money was taken from government accounts
to buy houses, not from the shah's personal account, and how the shah's
personal account filled with government money or with bribery .money,"
lvovbari said.
Novbari`s move came as U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance began Tues-
day a swing through Europe seeking joint economic retaliation if Iran con-
tinues to hold the 50 hostages.
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Novbari, 32, said he would leave ~dednesday on a trip to sympathetic Algeria,
- bePore going to Europe to try to counter yance.
"We want to explain our position to the F:urope3n people, and hopefully in
the near future to the American people, so the:a will not be deceived by
American propaganda," he said.
Novbari has filed a series of suits against U.S. banks in Europe. He
maintains the banks should not have frozen Iranian funds on deposit, in
compliance with U.S. President Jimmy Carter's order to American banks.
Novbari says the bank branches should obey the rules of ttte nations in
which they do business.
Novbari reported Tuesday the Central Bank has suits pending against five
America.n banks in Britain an~. three in France, with suits planned against
U.S. banks in Germany and Switzerland.
Meanwhile, the government of Iran has filed suit against the Swiss canton
, (state) or Grisons, seeking to force it to disclose detailed information
on the St. Moritz villa of the former shah, it was learned Tuesday.
Erich Diefenbacher, one of the Swiss lawyers of the Iranian government,
said he has f iled an administrative complaint with the Swiss supreme court
after the Grisons authorities refused to reveal the requested information
last month.
Iran's request that the ex-shah's Swiss assets be blocked was rejected
by rhe Swiss government last February. Now Tehran's lawyers are trying to -
discover the origin of the funds used for his real estate purchases in
Switzerland.
Diefenbacher said the authorities of the canton of Geneva supplied similar
inf ormation.
The shah's "Villa Suvretta" lies just outside St. Moritz, the famed ski
resort in the eastern Swiss Alps, and was reportedly purchased in 1968 for
�
four million francs--$930,000 at the time.
- Diefenbacher said Grisons authorities had rejected his request on the
- grounds the shah had never abdicated and therefore the new Iranian authori-
ties were not entitled to the inf ormation.
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.
.
IRAN
~ EXPORTS OF PISTtiCHIOS, RUGS TO UNITED STATFS HALTED
Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 12 Dec 79 p 3
[Text] Iranian exporters of Traditional goods have refused to export such
goods as rugs and pistachios to the United States during the last 45 days,
to show their solidarity with the Iranian anti-imnerialist struggles.
The director of a pistacitio exporting company told the TEHRAN TIMES y2ster-
_ day, "Even though America is one of the most important markets for Iranian
_ pistachios, importing more than eight thousand tons of the nuts yearly,
- the Iranian exporters have refused to send their goods to that country to
show their unity and solidarity with the Iranian people."
In the current year, said the official, Iran has exported 35,000 tons of
pistachios to France, West Germany, England, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland
and Arab countries.
_ Mehdi Kazemi, director of an~ther pistachio exporting company said that ~
the harvest of Iran's pistachio crops was greatly reduced as a result of
cold weather, adding, last year's production was about 50,000 tons,, most of
which c,~as exported to foreign countries due to the Iranian Revolution.
He said that as a result of the reduction in the Iranian pistachio harvest "
the price of the nuts has gone up. He said the present reserves of Iran's
pistachios are about 1$,000 to 19,000 tons.
The increase in price of Iranian pistachios, said Kazemi, has presented the
exporters with difficulties in a sense that the prices are not acceptable �
to importers. The price of every ton of pistachio nuts is about $8,000
to $9,000, according to quality.
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IRAQ
MODERN METHODS OF CROP PROTECTION BEING IMPLEMENTED
Baghdad AL-'IRAQ in Arabic 15 Nov 79 p 7
[Article by 'Abdallah Kati': "To Protec:t the Crops: The Latest Technological
Methods and Modern Aircraft Are Being Used"]
[Text] There is great activity in the ~igricultural sector both in devising
and implementating the agricultural plan in which a large mass of farmers,
civil servants, specialists and officials in the Ministry of Agriculture
and Agricultural Reform ~:~:1 the other ministeries are participating through
the annual agricultural conferences, which have won the attention and
guidance of President Sadam Husayn.
The agricultural sector agencies and the responsible agencies in the chief
circles are accustomed to the vital revolutionary interaction between the -
leaders and the principles in planning ~ind implementation, and in investing
all the capabilities and effort available to improve the agricultural sector.
It is clear that the sharp increase in ~igricultural production is being
achieved through the use of advanced met.hods of production which depend on _
scientific progress in this direction. There are numerous factors which
influence the achie~vement of this sharp increase, among them concern with
protecting the crops from damage by various agricultural disasters such as
ins~cts, plant diseases, overgrowth and various harmful animals.
Providing Protection _
Therefore the agriculturalprotection services provide agriculture with the
protection that is necessary against the spread of plant diseases and the
attack of agricultural disasters which ~ahen they rage sometimes cause the
loss of approximately a third of the co~intry`s annual agricultural production.
Increased Efforts in the Struggle
The technical apparatus in the State Organization for Farm Protection has
shown particular interest in expanding the struggle against agricultural -
disasters, and has redoubled its efforts :.n keeping with the other concerns
about specific kinds of agricultural production.
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A source in the above organization said that there are many ways currently
in use to combat agricultural disasters, such as sprays of various kinds:
surface-land carried on automobiles, applied by means of applicators, and
- others available in large quantities distributed through all the country's
governorates in accordance with the efforts there.
- Agricultural Aircraft in the Battle -
In addition, according to the source, the State Organization for Farm
Protection is provided with agricultural aircraft, both fixed wing aircraft
and helicopters, in sufficient numbers to cover all the requirements of
the battle in the country's regions. Furthermore, these aircraft with all
their crews offer their services to neighboring countries, especially the
sister countries of the Arab Gulf.
The Areas Committed to the Battle
The area committed to combat this year--still according to the source from
the State Organization for Farm Protection--in light of the agricultural
plan amounted to 9,089,017 dunams, among which is an area of 6,277,313
dunams in which a campaign is currently underway to disinfect wheat seeds
with chemical pesticides to protect them from wheat "blackening" disease
and to obtain a crop of good variety an~i quantity for this basic food crop
for our citizens.
_ The remaining area is represented in the battle against the remaining
agricultural disasters which afflict gardens and other agricultural land.
Pioneering Agriculture's Battle Against Overgrowth
There is an important aspect to the farm pratection services; the battle
against overgrowth in the pioneering agriculture in the country's regions.
[Pioneer agriculture] provides good economic returns for our important food
crops such as wheat, rice and cotton. Furthermore, the Farm Protection
services provide protection for grain stored in siloes and other grain
storage places from damage caused by the disasters which afflict stored grain.
(This is accomplished] by treating it with chemical pesticides appropriate
for preserving it. The State Organization for Far Protection is committed
to treating large quantities of stored grain in the country's regions.
The Use of Applied Field Research
Due to the increased use of modern technological methods such as portable
spraying equipment and modern aircraft, services pertaining to farm pro-
tection have expanded and .improved. There are agencies which specialize in
scientific research in the fields of plant diseases, entomology, overgrowth
and chemical pesticides, and which are carrying out scientific research,
studying the problems of plant disasters and discovering safe ways to combat
them, reduce their harmful effects and provide effective methods for the
farmers.
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The State Organization for Farm Protection is committed to carrying out the
following experiments and applied scientific research:
' In the area of research to combat insects the organization is committed to
_ carrying out 124 applied field experiments.
It is cummitted to carry out 72 applied field experiments in the area of
research to combat plant diseases.
In the area of research to combat overgrowth the State Organization for Farm
Protection is committed to carrying out 43 applied field experiments and
35 educational field demonstrations for the farmers in combatting overgrowth.
Improving the Technical Cadres
The State Organization for Farm Protection is endeavoring to improve its
technical cadres working in the sexvices Co combat plant disasters in all
the governorates by organizing classes within the country and training
abroad under the auspices of agreements for technical and economic cooperation
with the sister and friendly nations.
The Spread of Plant Disasters From Abroad
; The work of the State Organization for Farm Protection is not limited to
combatting plant disasters ~zlone. Its work and activities include concern
with reducing opportunities Lor the spread of plant disasters from abroad
technologically through the development of agricultural prohibition agencies.
Technical cadres are being trained to work in this speCial area as well as
the agricultural prohibitioii agencies in the various border locations and
the country's other gateway:~, such as the various airports, in accordance
with the great expansion in the volume of imports and exports of plant
products.
Preventive Measures
The Organization is committed to taking preventive measures on the following
types of plant shipments:
Inspection and fumigation of. 5.8 million tons of plant import shipments.
_ Inspection and fumigatioi~ of 200,000 tons of plant shipments for export.
Inspection and fumigation of 50,000 tons of plant shipments in transit.
Expanding Beekeeping
Because there is great benefit in honeybees from their [ability to] increase
_ fruit and seed production in general while at the same time providing good
income from the honey, a great effort has been made to create trained technical
cadres capable of improving the methods of ra:l.sing honeybees and establishing -
I
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centers in most of the country's r~gions to cr~.ate a nucleus for beekeeping
and centers to train the farmers and beekeepers in technical methods and to ~
supply them with the requirements for modern beekeeping. The State Organiza- -
tion for Farm Protection is committed to the following in this connection:
Production of 2,320 swarms of bees to expand these services in every party
of the country.
Production of 929 swarms of bees to be sold to the private sector.
The production of 1,675 young queen bees to replace the old queen bees to
preserve the vigor of the hives or the producing swarms to improve their
productivity.
Production of 45,000 kg of honey as an "incidental" product.
9123
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KUWAIT
_ ARAB SUI~QIIT TIED TO IRANIAN CRISIS
Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AN~1 in Arabic 10 Nov 79 pp 1, 23
[~ditorial: "The American Embassy and the Arab Summit"]
[Text] The picture looks like this at present: No one knows the answer
to the question of how ar.d when the hand-biting action taking place
between Tehran and 4Tashington will end.
That is to say, the question itself is unexpected, and thus it is
inevitable that there is a total lack of answers.
The United States knows that very few mediators exist. But at the same
time, it knows that its problems with these "mediators" are more complicated
than its present problem with Tehran. Possibly, Tehran has turned its
back on the poss ibilities of such mediation efforts in order to achieve
the goals for wh ich it is striving.
There were those who "wished" that the shah would take the initiative to
leave the United States so that this problem could be solved.
But the shah came to New York ill, and in all probability he will be unable
- to bring his i?lness to an end--even if he gets well--lest it be reported
that he is not, in fact, ill. Moreover, the shah--inwardly at least--wants
fighting to break out and a state of "war" to be reached between Washington
and Tehran so that he can get revenge on both at once--Tehran which revolted
against him and toppled his regime, and Washington which renounced and
~ abandoned him dur ing difficult times. But what is the solution?
The Egyptian ruler immediate].y volunteered his services to host his friend
the shah and his doctors. But this is not the solution. Nor will the
solution be provided by internationalization, i.e., submitting the issue
to the Security Council as the United States has done.
Therefore, how will the problem be solved? It appears that the dilemma
has arrived, but is this the dilemma which was sought?
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Som~~ experts ~~n Che Am~rican disposition suy tfir:t some time aga Waahingtun
beg;~n to feel uneaay about ~hese small oil states which possess some sort
of control over tlie fate of the West. It was uncertain about which method
- it should use to put these states "in their true place," as U.S. Senator
Moynihan said. Perhaps the United States has found in this affair an avenue _
to implement its plan for the next phase.
How? The coming hours will bring many indications of this plan as it
concerns the Gulf and the size and kind of role the United States wants to
play here.
_ Some observers feel that Washington will pay the price to create a new
situation in which oil will move away from its essential--and disconcerting
--role in the Arab fro:~t of steadfastness and confrontation.
These obsQrvers also feel that in the earlier stages of this game Washington
was able to involve the PLO in a swift appearance in the guise of inediator
for ttie release of the American hostages, despite repeated denials by the
PLO, and in this context the Unite~'. States scored a winning point.
In addition to--or perhaps prior to--this, Washington has, by using the
action against the American embassy in Tehran, spread a dense fog before
the Arabs who will be going to the summit cnnference in Tunis in a few days,
where sir~ce a solution to the problen of Lebanon, and south Lebanon in
particular, is supposed to be produced in the midst of the complex web of
inter-connections between the Lebanese problem and the Palestinian presence--
in other words Syria and ultimately the eastern-northern front.
It would be unwise to forget what the American embassy incident in Iran
_ could mean in terms of excess attentian to the choice of Arab positions--
and their repercussions on Arab relations, in particular--on the eve of the
preparation for this summit. This action will be used to increase suspicions
and kindle conflicts between one Arab state or organization and another.
All of this would tend to destroy the pote~t~alities of the unified Arab
decision, if not the way tp the summit, completely.
Tlie odd thing is that we are always victims, even when the problem begins
completely outside of the Arab sphere. in'~ are always easily trapped.
And tliis is not entirely an imperialist plot!
8591
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KUWAIT
.
AMERICAN BLACKS' ROLE IN MIDDLE EAST DISCUSSED
Duwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 15 Oct 79 p 10
[Editorial by Najib 'Abd-al-Hadi: "Black American Tactics"]
- [Text] No sooner had the international political and media uproar raised
by Andrew Young's meeting with Zahdi al-Tarzi quieted down when another
"storm" arose. The hero this time was the black minister, Jesse Jackson,
who toured the area and met with a number of its leaders in a trip
described as a facts-finding and familarization tour.
In Cairo, Reverend Jackson met with President Anwar Sadat, who was able to
~ brainwash the black leader to hire him as a"mailman",to carry his messages
_ to Abu 'Ammar and Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad.
As a result of his visit to Cairo, Jackson's statements began to differ
from the statements he made during his visit to Beirut, South Lebanon and
the West Bank. The black miniater forgot the huge crowds which carried
him on their shoulders in the city of Nablus as if he were the rescuing
hero and the awaited Mahdi!
Yesterday, another hero appeared on the black American stage whose name has
been added to the list of black champions. His is Bayard Rustin, the head
of the A. Philip Randolph Institute in the United States. In an open and
. shameless attempt at one-upmanship, this hero said: "The United States
must give Israel everything necessary to maiatain its existence and
continuation."
At another point he said:
"My visit to Israel will serve to confirm the standing of black Americans
in the United States and prevent a break in our relations with American Jewsl"
In short, we can say that the Arab media made a big mistake by believing
- that black power in America is capable of changing the course of political
matters in the Arab region. Moreover, it made an even bigger mistake by
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imagining that this force is capable of exerting real and effective pressure -
on the U.S. administration in order to gain recognition of the PLO.
In all probability, the sole Arab group which has not made a mistake and
has not fallen into the trap set for it is the PLO, represented by Yasir
'Arafat, who realizes better than anyone else the significance and
dimensions of the tactics now being carried out through the American blacks.
We realize that the uproar concerning Young, Jackson and, most recently,
Rustin is nothing more than a cleverly prepared action, and the only
concern of these individuals is to serve their own interests and those of
their country. Thus, there is no need to go overboard in issuing judgements
or to persist in giving advice and offering admonitions. For the resistance -
knows when to act, when to remain silent, and when to win. More important
than these, however, is that it realize just what standing and importance
A.-nerican blacks have in America. _
8591
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- KUWAIT
DECEPTIVE PROPAGANDA AGAINST ARAB NATION DEPLORED
Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 19 Nov 79 p 1
[Editorial by Ahmad al-Jarallah: "Harping on Imaginary Tunes"]
[Text] Part of the tragedy is that some Arab leaders still believe that
trifling with their people is acceptable behavior even if the ~est were
beyond possibility and defied reason. There is a well-known traditional
, Palestinian sayingt " If wha~ you want is not to hit someone, take a
larger stone." This means that the large size and the heavy weight of
the stone will be one's convincing excuse to stay out of a fight. We are
reminded of this proverb in the course of what we hear.d that the Palestinian
Revolution was prepared ~to support the Iranian Revolution with weapons and
with men if the United States wer~ to intervene. Is there a stone bigger
than this one that would cause us to doubt that the whole process is a -
joke playeci on our people? If the Palestinian Revolution does have this
capability, it is South Lebanon that needs it and not the Iranian Revolul- -
tion which has more useful means it can use in its clash with the United
States.
- It is certain that the Arab nations feel humiliated when they hear stat~-
ments that imply a degree of [proficiency in] the art of th~ absurd. They
feel humiliated because there are those who are insulting their intelligence
by ascribir~g unrealistic proportivns to facts whose proportions and real
strength ar.e known to these n,itions. The Iate Prime Minister of Britain
Idinston Churchill told the Br.itish people when he was facing war, "I can
offer you nothing but patience and blood." Churchill did not tell them
that his [forces] were victorious and overpowering, nor did he tell them
that he would confront Hitler, dssist France and defend the Netherlands.
In his appeal to the Br itish people he carried a reasonable stone with
which he could seek refuge.
The Arab nation has gone through a period of inedia deception. Any exag-
geration of this kind or any harping on imaginary tunes is ultimately
an exercise in futility. Victory in the end belongs to the leader whose '
promises are limited to his capabilities. A nation would thus not think
that it has storehouses of imaginary rower that it would know nothing
- about except from the thoughtless statements that defy logic.
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i,t,~n i 'r
~'APrli U!�:CRIF.S INEF'E'ECTUAI, ACTIONS AGAINST UNITED STATES
1�;ucaai.t AL,-SIYASAH in Arabic 9 Dec 79 p 1
CI~:Qitorial b}~ Ahmad Jarallah~
['1'eYt ~ I i. has been observed that the victories of some of the Arab and
tiliddle Eatite~n a_rmies have been limited because they have been either
i.nternal victories or victories in maneuvers in which it was kr~own in
advanc~ that nobody would die. Because the Palestine revolution knows in
advance that war between the U.S. and Iran caill not happen, it sees no
t~arm in ~roclaiming its readiness to stand beside the Iranian revolution
i.n irs war with the U.S. and in sending Palestinian armies to 7ehran.
'~inc~~ th~ action is a maneuver in which nobody is to be killed, there is
no im~edi,-nent to a hullabaloo of propaganda.
It is not the I'alestine revolution alone that proclaims that. There are
nati.ons t.hich are conter.t to adopt this attitude in the knowled~;e that,
if the situation caere earnest and seri.ous, they would have to cut off
their 1~etroleum from the U.S. in solidarity ~aith Iran, ar.d iaould likekise
have to cut off their diplomatic relations with the U.S., the stron~hold
of colonialism and monopoly, down to the last of those designations which
w~e face with starched collars and deference which sometimes reaches the
r>oint of servility.
- The ~.5. is a pocaerful nation, and we do not deny that c.e envy its .mi~ht
and ~~ish i.t to be t1~eak, feeble, and in decline. Nevertheless, its weak-
ness, its feebleness, and its decline caill not come about throu;h raisin~ ~
Fists and shoutin~, ~~Down with President Carter:" It will come about ~
throi.~~;h the preparation of our people and the raising of their nroductiv-
ity. It will come about when our peoples are independent and a1~1~ to c;orlc
in their own countries and develop them instead of f.leeing from them and
instead of having the victories of our armies turn in~o justifir:ations for
askin~; for more obedience or for the destructi.on of countries atid villa~es
ti�hose whole of.fense was a situation of unrest growing out of po'.itical
maladrninistration.
~ince the departure of the shah, Iran has lived in an atmosphere of suc-
cessi.ve daily demonstrations and rallies, tc the point where they have
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hi_ndc~reci thr. c~o,antry's ~ro~iuetivity, as if demonstrations and rallies w~re
all that is required of the shah's departure. ldhen he left, it was as-
~ sumed that there would he a new ~olitical activity there that would bring -
about a changc~ from the bad economic and political situation. Instead of
that, there has been more misery. However, God is magnanimous.
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~
KUWAIT
CROWN PRINCE SPEAKS ON NATIONAL ECONOMY
Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 15 Oct 70 p 7
[Article: "Amir Receives Gulf Chamber of Commerce Delegations Today"]
[Text] His Highness the Amir and Frime Minister Crown Prince Sa'd al-'
Abdallah al-Sabah will meet today the heads and members of the delegations
participating in the second meeting of the chambers of commerce, industry
and agriculture of the Gulf states. These states include Saudi Arabia,
the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, the Sultanate of Oman and Kuwait. The Iraqi
delegation did not attend yesterday.
Tlie conference opened yesterday with a short speech by the president of
the Federation of Chambers of Commerce of Saudi Arabia, Shaykh Isma'il
- Abu Daud, in his capacity as chairman of the first conference which was
held in Jiddah in October 1976. Abu Daud expressed his hope that this
; meeting will give a boost to strengthening economic ties among the Gulf
states.
'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Saqr, president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry
of Kuwait, also gave a speech following his election as chairman of thP
current conference. He said: "This meeting opens to announce the formation -
of the General Federation of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture
of the Gulf states."
He described the federation as the basic frameworlc for cooperation and
coordination of efforts among the Gulf states, so that it can completely
~ fulfill its role in economic cooperation p13ns representing the private
sector.
He said: "Th~: announcement of this federation is based on three main
considerations:
"The first is that this effort by the chambers of commerce is in harmony
with, integral to, and interconnected with the efforts which a11 their
governments are making in support of economic cooperation and integration -
among all the states in the area.
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"The second is that the realization of economic integration among our
countries is not dictated only by fraternal attachments, nationalist
feelings, historical and geographical ties, and a common purpose and
destiny. Rather, the achievement of this integration is above all an
inevitable economic necessity imposed by world economic trends, ob~ective
scientific theories and the urgent need to preserve and protect the area's
resources. This integration is in the interests of all of us without
exception, and is our sole means to industrial and economic advancement
without any alternative. Moreover, it is our way to take advantage of the
historic opportunity given to us today to build a decent future for our
children tomorrow. -
"The third consideration on which our efforts are based is our belief that
any eftort to achieve regional economic cooperation among the Arab and
Gulf states must be seen and planned for as a part of a more general and -
comprehensive concept and a stage in the attainment of a more far-reaching
and more complete goal, namely, economic coaperation or. the level of the
_ greater Arab homeland. Without this view, or outside of this strategic
framework, Gulf cooperation will be unable to achieve its desired results."
Confrontation With Lloyd's
Mr al-Saqr praised the role of the chambers of commerce in confronting the
decision of the Lloyd's Group to consider the Persian Gulf and ad3acent
waters--including the Gulf of Oman--a war zone, and the consequent increase
~i in war insurance rates for ships passing through this area. Lloyd's
also decided to impose an additional premium to cover risks of detention,
embargo or seizure as of 14 August 1979. The Chamber of Commerce and
Industry of Kuwait immediately opposed this decision and did its duty in
seeking to confront the move and to explain the "suspicious background
circumstances" be~iind it and the serious economic and other effects which
could result. The huwait chamber sought assistance in these efforts from
all its fellow Gulf Arab chamber of commerce organizations so that this
decision could be confronted firmly aiid with studied scientific and technical
measures and in complete coordination by the area as a whole. Indeed, the
agreement of your chambers of commerce was swift, admirable and unanimous,
due to the fact that all of you expressed total support for the Kuwaiti
Chamber of Commerce and Industry's viewpoint on the interpretation of the
"secrets" and "backgro~:nd circumstances" behind the decision, as well as
on the seriousness of the decision's effects and the need to contain this
action in a firm and coordinated manner. Al1 of you made commendable
efforts in supporting the national insurance companies in their meetings
and negotiations with the Llo~d's Group. Our great pride in the admirable
results of these efforts was crowned by the Lloyd`s Group's withdrawl of
it~ decision. We must not forget tti*o facts:
The first is that this test is a guiding example of what can be achieved
through action based on cooperation, coordination and the objective
presentation of our common problems.
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The second fact is that the federation of Gulf Arab chambers of commerce
can justly constitute a stable organizational framework to insure that
coordinated activity such as this will have a firm foundation and ample
scope for preliminary research and swift and flexible action. .
Formation of Joint Company
rir al-Saqr also said:
"Because the formation of this federation achieves one of two resolutions
adopted by the Gulf Arab chambers of commerce in the~r first meeti.ng in
Jiddah, it gives me great pleasure to mention now the second resolution
calling for the establishment of a joint investment company aimed at setting
up [word illegible] projects in various fields of economic activity. This
res~lution was broadened and developed in a more general manner so that it
would include all the Arab states and would be embraced by the General
Federation of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture of the A,rab
Countries. This is what has occurred, and a charter has been issued for
the company in Dubai, UAE, with a capitalization of 700 million diriiams.
Shares will be offered in most of the Arab states before the end of this
year, God willing.
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KUWAIT
U.S. ECONOMIC PIEASURES AGAINST IRAN OPPOSID
. Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 17 Nov 79 p 1
[Editorial by Ahmad al-Jarallah: "Equally Strong Opposition to U.S.
� Measure"]
[Text] The U.S. president's decision to freeze Iranian funds has undoubtedly
cracked the principles of U.S. financial policy. It is basically incon-
ceivable for a country lika the United States to tie political action and
economic action. In spite of U.5. assurances made in letters which President
Carter sent to a number of financial and oil leaders in the world, the
certain fact remains that President Carter's decision did draw attention
to the possibility of utilizing or universalizing the use of such a prin-
ciple with any country that is engaged in a struggle with the United States.
We are not talking here about the Arab oil countries who, have no more than
80 billion dollars in funds invested in the United States, but we are
talking about the dollar coverage for Japanese currency which is invested
in the United States; we are also talking about the funds of German banks
which are in excess of 200 billion dollars. The U.S. president's -
decision has created an atmosphere of sharp apprehension in international
circles. It is true that oil countries or other countries may not take ,
action to withdraw their funds at the presenC time, but they, undoubtedly,
- cannot ignore some of the warnings that have now been generated. These
state that it would be unwarranted to invest these funds in the future in
any fixed investments such as real estate or anything that would be difficult
to dispose of quickly.
We have been opposed to what tias happened in Iran, and c:~ still are opposed
to it, but we now declare our opposition to the U.S. decision regardless
of its interpretations and justifications. The question is one of prin-
ciple, and the U.S. president's decision is tantamount to the action of
occupying the U.S. embassy in Iran. There is nothing equal to the action
of holding a human being hostage than that of withholding his funds. We
all realize that had not the internal situation in Iran been whaC it is,
Iranian leaders would not have supported what has happened. Their lack of
support or their opposition to the students have been futile since the
absence of law in Iran is making every individual think of himself as a
national ruler.
- The U.S. president's decision has created a major fracture even if it
were demonstrated on the surface that the international money markets
have assismilated and overcome it.
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KUWAIT _
EVALUATION OF INVESTMENT POLICIES URGED
Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 17 Nov 79 p 5
_ [Article by Economics Editor: "Reactions in Market to Decision To Freeze
Iranian Funds: (1) Expanding Considered Internal Investments Where
Political, Financial Returns Are High and Guaranteed; (2) Expediting
Reduction of Oil Production To Avoid Accumulating Surplus That Would Be
Subject to International Economic and Political Ups and Downs"]
[Text] "Once again all circumstances indicat~~ that local and regional
investments, that is, investments within the Kuwaiti and the Gulf markets,
continue to be more advantageous and more secure than investments in
international markets." This is what AL-SIYASAH heard late last week from
numerous sources in the financial and real estate markets and in the stock
exchange. This followed the decision of U.S. President Jimmy Carter to
freeze Iranian funds in U.S. banks. Although the U.S. administration gave
assurances to Arab capital, these assurances did not prevent a climate of
apprehension from spreading. [It was feared that] over the long range
such capital may be subject to a similar step from the United States or
from Europe. A market source co~ented on the incident by saying:
"The occupation of the U.S. embassy in Tehran--according to the current
story and theory--was an accidental action by the students. It did draw
the Iranian and the U.S. administration into a confrontation that neither
had counted on. Every country in the world is ttieoretically subject to
emergency or surprise actions that may not have been considered or intended.
What guarantee do we have that the United States or Europe will not repeat
the action of freezing the Arab countries' funds?"
Regardless of the political implications of this decision, the spontaneous
reaction that came out from the market was a conviction that investing
national capital in the local market and in joint Gulf ventures continued
to be th~e major security for these funds.
The cap-~tal returns in the local market and in the Gulf are high. The
high return rates are concrete and politically guaranteed. In addition,
s~~ch investments yiel~ returns that subsidize the national economy and the
Gulf economy and constitute security returns that are ultimately advantageous
to the area.
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The second reaction in the market supported the official call to reduce
oil production, that is, to keep the oil in the ground as an investment
so that there would not be any financial surpluses that would be sub~ect
to the economic and political fluctuations of the international market.
The freezing of Iranian funds in the United States will most certainly -
expedit~ official programs locally and in the Gulf area to regulate
production and to be satisfied, as much as possible, with [a level of] pro-
duction that would meet the needs of national development.
8592
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KUI~'AIT
I'ItG]'ARATIONS hiADE EOR SEASHORE DEVELOPM~NT PRO.TECT
l:uwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 6 llec 79 p 3
- [Excerpts] Engr Fahmi al-Zamami, director of the administrations of buil-
din~ and constructions in the municipality [of Kuwait], said recently that
planning has been done for the Kuwait seashore project, which extends for
about 21 kilometers bettJeen the coast and the Gulf road and from the port
of al-Shuwaykh to Ra's al-Ard in al-Salimiyah. The project comprises
several recreational and tourism projects.
The seashore project is included in the coast and geodetic survey which
is in progress. It will be offered at international auction, and it is
hopeci that t.~ork on it will begin in the middle of 1980. The cost of it
~aill be about 62.5 milli.on dinars.
The ~roject consists of 6 stages: (1) al-Jazirah al-~hadra' and the resort
complex in Da~.~hat al-Sha'b; (2) the area surrounding Abraj al-Kuwait
(Dasman and Bunayd al-Qar); (3) the old ships museum (eastern zone); (4)
the al-Sharqiyah children's areas in al-SY:uwaykh, al-Idatyah, and al-Qiblah;
(S) the waterfront museum� in al-SalimiyaY~ (al-Salimiyah--Ra's al-Ard); ar~dF
(6) the coast of Sayf al-~Amm and the aaichorage.
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MAURITANIA
:
BRIEFS
RURAL EXODUS--A rural exodus of extraordinary scope has emptied the Mauritanian
countrysides and has caused poorly controlled growth of the cities. Of the
1,490,000 persons in the country, the number of nomads in 1976 fell to 446,000,
representing 36 percent of the population compared to 65 percent 11 years
earlier. During the same period, the number of sedentary persons increased
to 906,000, while the last census revealed that 67,000 Mauritanians spend
part of the year abroad. Con~equences: Nouakchott has 135,000 inhabitants
compared to 12,300 in 1964; and its population, over the last 15 years,
has grown at the rate of 22 percent per year. The average annual growth
rate of the urban centers is 1U.2 percent. Similarly, the structure of
employment has changed profoundly: the traditional sector offered 279,000
jobs in 1965 but only 224,000 for approximately the past 3 years, since the
last census; the modern sector, during the same period, has had a population
increase from 32,400 to 48,700. [Text] [Paris DEMAIN LiEiFRIQUE in French
19 Nov 79 p 64] 8143
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PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
'ALI NASIR SEEN G?.INING IN POWER STRUGGLE
London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 29 Oct-4 Nov 79 pp 16-17
[Article: "A New Shift in the Power Struggle in Aden: A Temporary Recon-
ciliation Among the Party, the Security Machinery and the Army"]
[Text] The relations among the various components of the ruling group in
the PDRY do not seem to be going well. On 18 September, the Beirut daily
AL-NAHAR reported the emergence of a new, though unstable, balance of power
in Aden. On 3 September, the Cairo weekly ROSE AL-YUSUF had reported the
arrest of "Muhsin," chief of the revolution's security machinery. Earlier,
cn 13 August, the Kuwaiti AL-SIYASAH carried a report--which later turned out
to be incorrect--to the effect that Mahmud Sa'id al-Muhi, a member of the pre-
sidential council, has replaced 'Ali Nasir Muhammad as the head of government,
in a new chapter of the power struggle in Aden. Al1 those reports, regardless
of how true they are, direct attention to events goin~ on in the PDRY.
The outbreak of a political crisis in the PDRY unfolds the file of political
infighting in that small country--a file which often lends crede~ice to the
political "maxim" that revolution, like a cat, devours its own offspring.
Some people date the crisis back to a time preceding the "Nation~ilist Front's"
assumption of power, specifically to 1963 and 1964 when the front's leadership,
which was made up of inembers of "The Ar~ib Nationalists Movement," began to
liquidate tribal leaders with the purpose of converting the front into a mo-
dern political organization. During th~it period, Salih Ibn "Awwas al-Haw-
shabi, 'Abdullah al-Maj'ali and others were dismissed from the front. A
long pincession then began during which liquidations continued while the front's
popular base continued to shrink and become confined to certain educated
groups. In the meantime, the settlement of political disagreements began
to take on a style akin to isolated terrorist action. The latest vict~m of
such action was former President Salim Rubayyi " Ali, or "Salimin" as he was
more commonly known.
Ttie same observer.s say that the proclamation later of a"Marxism-Leninism"
which is extremely radical in its language and quite alien to Yemen was the
clearest expression of the growing isolation which drove out Qahtan a1=Sha'bi,
= Faysal 'Abd al-Latif, Muhammad 'Ali al-Haytham and Salim Ruba}~yi' 'Ali for
much the same reasons in the end.
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Analysis pauses at an important stat3on, namely, the fifth congress of the
Natton.~l tr;t Fr~nt which was held at MAdinat al-Sha'b [the people's ~�ity]
_ L~i M~~re:l? 1973. 'Phe congress convened 4 years after the toppling of (~ahtan al-
Sha'bi and his cousin Faysal 'Abd al-Latif al-Sha~bi. It appeared at the
time that certain political factors have emerged internally and on the pan-
Arab level which were in favor of the stability of the regime. The divisions
, withir~ the front seemed to have disappeared, relations with the north took a
positive direction and the campaign against the "petit bourgoisie" within
_ the Arab regimes turned into an in~.onsequential and pointless one.
In the atmosphere of that temporary lull, the fifth congress voted to halt
the process of building the "mass organizations" which the opposition had
demanded to Qahtan al-Sha'bi. With respect to the army, which is the most
important element, the legitimate status of the armed forces was firmly
established and the demand for the dissolution of the armed forces, which
was one of the major causes of contention between Qahtan al-Sha'bi and the
leftist opposition, was finally droppEd. The congress considered that the
military situation was stabilized through purging the army of the officers
and soldiers who supported the enemies of the regime and through promoting
an ideological indoctrination of the army by means of a program of education
and guidance. That and the recurrence of border wars between Aden, on the one
hand, and Riyadh or San'a, on the other, created a new map of the relationships
among the various powers and f orces and placed the army in the heart of poli-
tical activities.
It should be noted tl~at 'Ali 'Antar, cominander of the armed forces, was able
through his tribal ties to establish an accord between the tribal setup and
the army. The accord brought about great gains for Aden in its wars with
neighbors, especially in terms of having the tribes, or some of them, join
the conflicts on the side of the "Marxist" government.
On the other hand, the party apparatus--the Nationalist Front--was growing
under the leadership of 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il and was developing a radical
socialist language which placed it in conflict with the security machinery.
The conflict is one which distinguishes most "building-of-socialism" ex-
periences in the non-Eurogean world. While the public role of 'Abd al-Fattah
Isma'il as party theoret.i~ian and leader was growing, another role was growing
silently, secretly and alarmingly, namely, that of Isma'il's ally, Muhammad
Sa'id 'Abdullah, the former minister of state security better knwon as
"Muhsin."
It seems that this is the crux of the struggle: the party and the security
machinery, on one hand, ~nd the army, on the other. The struggle assumes se-
veral manifestations. If it is true that the prime minister, 'Ali Nasir,
is allied with the defense minister, 'Ali 'Antar, against 'Abd al-Fattah
Isma'il who tends to be autocratic after having gotten rid of "Salimin,"
then we can assume that a bloc with strong tribal roots and firm ties with the
army establishment is pitted against a bloc which had grown with the growth
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of the bureaucracy of the modern state but ~,hich has no true roots in the
society. Although he is an Arab, 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il comes from a northern
family wnich lives along the borders between the two Yemens. He began his r
political life in the trade union movement when the "working class" was in-
debted to 'Abdullah al-Asnaj and supported him politically. A1-Asnaj later
bncame a Leader of the "Liberation Front" which became a rival of the Nationa-
- list Fronr. 'Abd al-Fattah Tsma'il has not played any significant military
role, and has spent the greater part of the struggle against Qahtan al-Sha'bi
receiving treatment in Bulgaria.
The tcao :aen who really tuppled Al-Sha'bi were Salim Rubayyi' `Ali who led the
famous uprising in his district of (Ibbin), known as the May uprising,
and Mutiammad 'Ali al-Haytham who controlled the junior officers hailing f rom
his region of Duthaynah. Disagreement over the army between him and Qahtan `
al-Sha`bi was one of the most important factors which exploded the struggle.
The two men who are said by some to have been the victims of 'Abd al-Fattah
Isma'il (i.e. 'Ali and al-Haytham) share with the gresent pzime minister, 'Ali -
Pdasir Muhammad, and his defense minister, 'Ali 'Antar, similar backgroun3s
and experiences with the power structure. 'Ali 'Antar is the former leader
~>f r_he military operations against the British. One of his many achievements
in ~_he struggle against them is his liberation of the Dali' region. Since
~izc.n~ber 1969, he has been the commander of the PDRY armed forces. He shares
~hi:: important position with premier `Ali Nasir who is known to have strong
su~E~.~rt wi~hin the army and who was defense minister until August 1971 when
he r.eplaced Muhammad 'Ali al-Haytham as prime minister.
It seems that the present problem started when Muhsin, the former minister
of state, tried as security chief to extend his influence a_nto the army.
In doing so, he clashed with 'Ali 'Antar who wants to keep a firm and absolute
~,rip on the army. 'Antar's resentment found response from prime minister
Nasir and two other prominent ministers, Foreign Minister Muhammad Salih
;lutayya` and Planning Plinister 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Abd al-Wali. All three share
a resentmenc against the excesses of Isma'il and Muhsin which have been
- growing at the expense of the powers of the government and the cabinet
ministers.
According to very reliable information, the Soviet Union and several communist
parties and elements in. the Arab east offered to mediate between the two
sides, but the offers were turned down on the grounds that the crisis was
- an "internal" matter.
- Qn 8 August the Central Committee of the Socialist party in the PDRY held
an extraordinary meeting in an attempt to deal with the internal disputes
within the framework of a general reassessmer.t of the PDRY's internal and
foreign policies since the overthrow of Salimin in June 1978. It is said
that 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il and Muhsin came under severe personal attack at
the meeting--the former for his excessive inclination to disrupt the other
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I
~extr:i-p~irty] ~o.L'ttical organiaation and concentrate power in his own hands
:in~i his radical bureaucratic practices which alienate the people, the latter
_ �or tlie atmosphere of intelligence surveillance which he has spread all over
the cuuntry. The opponents of Isma'i1 and Muhsin stressed that exaggeration
in attacking the late president Salimin and persistence in emphasizing the
' leadtrship role of the party conceal certain implications and rebound one
way or the other to the benefit of the Isma'il-Muhsin axis. They also
attacked the practice of accusing all those who do not profess absolute aile-
giance to Isma'il and Muhsin of treason on the grounds that they are sup-
pcrters of Salimin and opponents of the leadership role of the party.
The outcome of the meeting, which was considered to be an unstable compromise
between 'Abd al~Fattah Isma'il and 'Ali Nasir, can be summed up as follows: -
`Ali Nasir was able to accomplish the following:
1--R~moval of Muhsir. from the post of minister of state security and the
� formation of a callective committee to oversee security affairs.
'~--Consolidation of 'Ali 'Antar's position as minister of defense.
3--rromotion of former minister Muhammad Salih rlutayya' to a party position
which makes him directly respensible for the PDRY's diplomacy and the chief
oF the .r.ew f~reign ministry and the promotion of former planning minister
'Abd al-'Aziz 'Abd al-Wali to a position which makes him the direct chief
oF ~ill nlanning and development operations and rhe ministries related to them. _
'AL-d al-Fattah Isma'il, in turn, was able to acco~nplish the following:
1--A declaration by the extraordinary session affixming "the strengthening
of ttie par.ty's leadership role."
'?--Appuintment of Lt Col Ahmad Salim 'Ubayd, member ~f the Yemeni Socialist
narty's central committee, as director of the defense ministry's political
department. _
3--Re~oval of Inter.ior Min~ster Salih Muslih who is known to be Salimin's
lsst supporters in the gove;:nment.
At any ratt, the compromise favors Salih 'Ali Nasir. All the gains he made
- were at the expenGe of `Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, whereas Isma'il's "gains"
, came within tfie framework uf reorganization. The reaffirmation of the
~~arty's leadership role is ultimately a fcrmal matter, while the removal of
Sal.ih Muslih under the gui~;e of promotion within the party ranks is simply
a que~~ion of 5ettling old scores which are not part of the present power
~:~ruggle. The only sarious gain scored by 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il is the
appointment of Ahmad Salim 'Ubayd as director of the defense ministry's
political. dep~rtmenr_. It is said that 'Ali `Antar agreed to this decision
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reluctantly. Tf~c appointment may prove to be the catalyst of a future ex-
plosion in the series of the power struggle. 7t wotild not be easy for some- ~
one like 'Ali 'Antar, with his long record of ;;truggle, his important tribal
status ~nd his membership of the political burE~au of the ruling Yemeni So-
~ cialist Yarty, to accept, finally and decisively, ideological control of the
army by a member of the central committee.
A Final problem remains, namely, the problem of unity between the two Yemens
which may overlap with the current struggle in Aden. About 3 months ago, an
"ideological symposium" was held in Aden to discuss some problems of the
Yemeni revolution. The seminar was attended by representatives from Arab
communist parties and organizations as well as members of the Yemeni So-
cialist Party. The discussions which took place at the symposium showed
that there were two conflicting opinion~. One opinion contended that the _
question of Yemeni unity should precede the task of "building socialism"
in the FDRY, the other argued the reverse case.
If we recall that the elimination of Salim Rubayyi' 'Ali in the south and the
assassination oF Al-Ghashmi in the north set off a bloody conflict between
tl~e n~rth and the south, then it is noteworthy that the present conpromise
[i.n the PDRY] was accompanied by another development--the 3-day visit by
- 'Al.i Nasir P~[ul~ammad ro San'a after which a joint statement was issued by
'~l.i Abdullah Salih, the president of the Yemen Arab Republic, and 'Ali
Nasir ~Iuhammad affirming that unity between the two parts of Yemen is essential
and sf~ould be achieved by peaceful and democratic means. The two leaders
- also pledged to exert further efforts to achieve unity. While it is diffi-
cult tr~ be certain about the existence of a connection between the power
strugfile in the south and the situation in the north, it is clear that 'Ali
Nasir ~eeks to push the bilateral relations forward in the hope that he may
at the right moment seek the help of the strong neighbor 'Ali Abdullah
Salih against the weak Comrade 'Abd al-Fattah Isma`il.
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PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
HEALTH SERVICE PROGRESS IN DEVELOPMENT PLAN REVIEWED
Aden 14 OCTOBER in Arabic 14 Oct 79 pn 5, 6
[Article by 'Ali Ibn Talib: "The Medical and Health Services Achieve
Significant Progress"J
[E:XCERPTS] When one takes a searching look at any country to gauge its pro-
gress and the correctness of its course, the first thing he would investigate
would be the state of the social services which are provided by the state
to the people. He would try to determine the ratio of doctors; nurses and
- hospital beds to the population, the ratio of school seats and teacriers to
the population and so forth. In other words, the enquirer would try to probe
what the party has planned and what the state is providing for the citizens -
in the way of social services which necessarily reflect the interest being
stiown in developing and improving the life of the people.
Since we are celebrating today the 16th anniversary of the revolution, how
can we monitor the development and expansion of the health services in our
country? We will not go back too far, but it is necessary to point out that
with the issuance of the Popular Clinics Law in 1973, private clinics came
to an end and medical and health services became free to all in the PDRY.
In recent years, public health was not strictly associated with conventional -
medicine, but we began to see the emergence of various health institutions
dealing with health care in the schools, health care in the professions,
maternity and child care and other such areas. This in itself ineans greater _
expansion and specialization in medical and health services.
Looking at the country's health map during the 1970's, we detect visi.ble
changes in its features. Eleven new hospitals have been opened in various
provinces of the republic. Of these, three are specialized hospitals--the
first time any sucti hospitals have been established--for maternity, chest
diseases and children. Moreover, a large number of health units and centers
- were also established in the rural and remote areas of the country.
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Several hospitals and health centers will soon be completed. Th~~y include
a hospital in A1-N:ukalla with a capacity of 200 bec:s, a hospital in M-3
with a capacity of 120 beds, a new childrens hospital with a cap:icity of 300 -
beds and a hospital for mental and psychological diseases with a capacity
oL 300 beds, in addition to two health centers in the Yafi' area.
Free Treatment for Hospital Inmates and Outpatients
During the past 2 years, health services were extended for the f.irst time to
many remote and rural areas, bringing to 252 the number of health units in
the villages, in addition to five mobile health units, using vehicles and
camel.s to reach remote areas.
In the field of mother and child care, there are 29 care centers in various _
provinces, while 26 popular clinics offer medical and health services in the
- highly populated areas twice a day--in the morning and the evening, in addi-
tion to the existence of 49 dispensaries and seven popular dental clinics.
The health ministry also ~perates an old people's home with a capacity of
26 beds. But this home sti11 requires greater attention and care to enable
it to provide more services to its inmates.
I~rc~e medical care has become a reality, and the state's expenditurt on health
s~rvices has increased in recent years. Suffice it to know that in 1978
the state spent 118,000 dinars to buy medical and preventive materials. In
1 year, this figure jumped to more than 1 million dinars--an increase of
45 percent.
- Providing care for citizer~.s is no longer confined to the services offered by
the medical and health in:,titutions in the country. A citizen suffering
from a disease which cannot be treated locally is entitled to go abroad for
treatment at goverr.ment expense~ In 1 year, the state expenditure on treat-
ment outside the country increased by 33 percent. It reached 200,000 dinars
this year. -
Euture uf Health Services
Certainly, the health and medical services have not yet reached a fully
satisfactory level, in terms of the number and kind of services offered to
the citizens. T3ut there is no doubt that those servic~s are expanding and
improving continuously.
- 'I'o explore the future of health services in this country, one has to look
beyond stat.istics and into the minds of leaders in the health ministry as
well as izto the files which contain the future plans of the ministry.
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In an interview, bxothe~ Dr 'Awad Sa13,m Ba~Mutax'x'af, the deputy minister of
health, gave us a view of the ministry's plan from a new perspective.
_ "Previously," he said, "the ministry concentrated on the treatment aspect.
But after the health seminar which was held recently and after the health
conference, greater attention began to be paid to the preventive aspect which
has become a direct target. This attention to preventing the occ.urrence
of diseases has become a practical reality."
Dr Ba-Mutarraf explains that preventive medicine is directed at diseases
connected with the environment of the country. Statistics collected by the
ministry show that those diseases, such as Malaria, bilharziasis, child
_ diseases and diseases caused by parasites and contagion, are the major di-
seases in the countryside. Those environmental diseases are being focused
upon b~cause of their direct connection with the public health and because
they affect a part of the work force, as the malaria does, for example.
Other Concerns of the Ministry
We will here let Dr Ba-Mutarraf tell us about the ministry's other interests
and concerns: "In the international year of the child, we wish to emphasize
the attention paid by the revolutionary government and the Ministry of Health
_ to the tiealth of children aiid their mothers. The Childrens Hosp:Ltal provides
medical services and treatment to the country's children, while the various
maternity and child centers provide the necessary care and services to ex-
pecting mothers and children, including such services as comprehensive immuni-
zation of children against contagious diseases and providing medicines, tonics,
vitamins and any other material related to the state of malnutrition which
has plagued our children for many years in the past.
As a result of the industrial and productive expansion in many projects, the
= number of workers has risen significantly. The ministry has therefore opened
_ a special center for medical care for prof.essionals and equipped it with mo-
dern equipment to serve as a center for supervising the health of workers,
protecting them in their places of work and treating thea~ from occupational
diseases and accidents. In this regard, the ministry coordinates its efforts
with those of the Ministry of Industry and the General Federati.on of Workers.
- It is also cooperating with them in drawing up plans for setting up clinics
- in work centers to provide help for workers on duty. Following the return
of scholarship grantees from abroad where they acquired their specialiaation,
the center will witness further improvement and development.
In cooperation wir_h the Ministry of Education, we also show concern for health
in the schools ar:c~ seek to improve the health of students in the schools and
provide them with treatment and protection against contagious diseases.
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We shoulJ not forget the tuberculosis plan which is considered one of the pro-
minent health improvE~ments in the country. We have been able to achieve
major progress in treating this disease scientifically. The results thus far
achieved by the project are impressive. Several branches of the project have
been established in the provinces.
The plan places a special emphasis on health conditions in the island of
Suqqatra where health services used to be below zero, as witnessed by the
high mortality rate among children. We will try to make up for the island's
previous lack of inedical services by providing even better services than those
being offered now.
The files of the Ministry of Health include a project which represents an .
important qualitative leap by the sector of inedical services in the country,
and for which funds have been allocated in the second five-year plan. I
asked Dr Ba-Mutarraf to give us an idea about this project and its future po-
tential. He said that the project is huge and involves.first aid and first
rate medical care. In addition to the state's interest in the project, the
project has also attracted the interest of the World Health Organization and
- other international agencies, especially after the international Alma-Ata
conference in the Soviet Union which had emphasized this aspect. The project
wi1~ be implemeated in coordination with the Ministry of Plannin~ and coopera-
tio~i with international organizations. Those will be invited to a health care
coiiference which will be organized by the ministry in November 1979. The
project aims at providir~g full health care to the citizens by consolidating
protective and treatment medicine and making it available in all parts of
t}le republic by means of first rate health care units. Because of th~ vastness
of tliis project, health units will be able to operate in every village with
a complete team including a medical aide, a health inspector, a midwife and
a nurse. Naturally, the praject will not be implemented in its entirety,
but will begin in the remote and backward areas and continue to spread until
it covers the entire republic.
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SAUDI ARABIA
REGIONALISAI, FUNDAMENTALISM THREATEN REGIME
Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 5 Dec 79 p 1
[Article by Harald Vocke: "Saudi Arabia ls Sick
[Text] "A lion who commands an army of a hundred foxes wins every battle.
A fox who commands an army of a hundred lions loses every battle." By
such a vivid metaphor, they summarize in Arabia what they think c~~f leader-
ship qualities in army commanders and statesmen. Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, the
founder of Saudi Arabia, was a lion who conqiiered a kingdom with a handful
of Bedouins. Since President Carter last winter dropped the Shah, an old
ally of the West, without much ado, the Arabs see the head of state of the
Western leadership-power as a fox who does not have the lion's courage for
victory. After the Shah's departure from Te}iran, the House of Saud also
began to be uneasy. In Arabia, they have vir.tually lost all faith in the
United States. Would, in an hour of need, America stand by the Arabian
kingdom, as Carter's predecessors had promised again and again during the
past few decades?
Because ~f its oil riches, Ibn Saud's formerly poor empire has developed
into the Near East's economic superpower. Only if the West has at its
disposal Saudi Arabia's oil fields, which arP richer and can be exploited
more rapidly then the Orient's other oil deposits, can the industrial
nations cover their energy needs in the 1980`s. Should Saudi Arabia drop
out as oil supplier for only a few montl:s, the consequences for the West's
economy would be more decisive than the earlier oil boycott, in the winter -
after the 3~973 Arab-Israeli October War, had been for the United States.
The revolutions in Libya and Persia t-aught the industri~.l nations what
unreliable oil suppliers revolutionary governments are. An overthrow in
Saudi Arabia would probably mean that in the kingdom welded together by
Ibn Saud, several power centers, hostile to one another, would emerge.
The West Arabian Hijaz territory which, apart from the harbor town of
Jiddah also encompasses the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, has little in
common with the East Arabian oil territories on the Persian Gulf. In the
Hijaz' towns live austute, cooly calculating merchants whose enthusiasm
_ for the puritan piety of their East-Arabian comrade-in-arms, Ibn Saud, -
had never been very great.
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,
'l'h~~ l~..i~:t ~1r,~hi:~n tribes whc~ are ].oyal t~ thc~ cr~~wn, ~n Lhc c~tt~c~r h~md,
Icu~k ~I~~wn w(th clls{~le.i~urc~ on the ~~c�tivity c~f thc~ peo~~l~~ c~f Ilt j~~z ancl of
the