JPRS ID: 9027 USSR REPORT ENERGY
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
Release Decision:
RIP
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
24
Document Creation Date:
November 1, 2016
Sequence Number:
20
Case Number:
Content Type:
REPORTS
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3.pdf | 1.11 MB |
Body:
APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= CIA-R~P82-00850R000200040020-3
V 1
9 ~ ~ ~ 1 0 F 1.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/8854
9 January 1980
- Latir~ America Re ort
p _
- (FOUO 1 /80)
I
Fg~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
~
NOTE
JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals ~.nd books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials frora foreign-language
sources are translated~ tt1GSP from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editori~zl reports, and material enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [TextJ
or [ExcerptJ in the first line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
_ tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes with in the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or at.titudes of the U.S. Government.
For further information on report content
ca11 (703) 351-2643.
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATIGN
OF THIS PUBLICATION B~ RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/8854
9 January 1980
LATIN AMERICA REPORT
(FOUO i/so)
CONTENTS PAGE
ARGENTINA
Incongruities of U.S. Foreign Folicy Toward Government
(Editorial, Mariano Grondona; CARTA POLITICA,
Nov 79) 1
Antarctic: Foreign Ambitions, National Sovereignty
(Oscas J. Gomez; LA OPINION, 7, 8 Nov 79) 5
CU BA
- 'PRENSA LATINA' Scores U.S. Use of Force as Instrument
of Pressure
(Ivonne Pastor Parra; PRELA, 14 Dec 79) 11
Briefs
Chilean Labor Delegation 13
NICARAGUA
Arce, Pastora Denounce Plots, Stress Anti-Imperialism
~ (PRELA; 6 Dec 79) ................o.................. 14
National Coordinator Gives Details of Literacy Campaign
(PRELA; 10 Dec 79) 15
Brief s
Cuba's Judicial System Praised 17
PERU
Madrid Paper Gives Chilean View of Nation's Military Might
(DEFENSE; Oct 79) 18
VENEZUELA
Briefs
' Job Losses 20
- a - [III - LA - 144 FOUO]
FOR OFFICIAL USE ON'LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY '
ARGENTINA -
INCONGRUITIES OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD GOVERNMENT
Buenos Aires CARTA POLITICA in Spanish Nov 79 pp 76-77
[Editorial by Mariano Gr~ndona: "It Has a Mane, It Yas a Tail Like
a Lion's, But Yet..:"]
[TextJ Aside from the goverr~i.~ent, whose acti~ns are at times
counterproductive precisely because they are taken by the govern:uent,
several private groups have been engaged for eome time in defending
Argentina's ~image in the cou*:tries of the North Atlantic, particularly
the United States. Thi~ silent but effective campaign is based on
the hypothesis that "the" United States is a pluralistic society
with infinite variations and that just as some of its representatives _
seem irrevocably committEd to the enemies of our icnage, there are
manv public and private sectors open to information and dialog. At
times, the pro-Argentina campaign comea in contact with U.S.
leaders who, despite being liberals and, therefore, backers of the
human rights campaign, have tempered and shaded their views concerning
us as a result of data and obaervations, or "experiences" when they
visit our country. A visit is the best remedy., because the
realities of our countrq lend credibility to pro-Argentine arguments,
~ which they were unfamiliar with. In contrast, it~ also comes into
contact with Americans who are further to the right, conservatives
or anti-communists or hawks, who are thus in complete and unqu~lified
agreement with our arguments. To them, Argentina is not, as it
is to the liberals, a country "with extenuating circumstances" in
its human rights problems, but a country that was able to struggle
and win for the West.. It is not paroled defendant; it ie a hero,
a bastion, a model.
On whom should we focus our action? On the liberals or the _
conservatives? This is one of the most discreet and moat interesting
debates in Argentina today. What we would like to present to our
readers on this occasion, however, is a succeasion of experiences
that we had with two of t:~e American visitora who have been arriving
here to see us close-up and who leave, without exceptions, with a
more positive attitude than the one they brought. One of them is a
young liberal (a moderate, almost a middle-of-the-roader) with
1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
promising political ~rospects in the north. The other is a feiaty,
veteran conservative. The same thesis was poaed to the two, and
from differing standpoints they both react~d in a way that was
ultimately similar. It was that aimilarity, as we wi11 see, that
pro:npted this commentary.
We were at a frank, lively and intimate gathering with the first
of our guests. A longstanding friend for whom I feel admiration
and esteem, aside from fondness, presented a vigorously-worded
Argentine case against the image campaign in the United States. Several
of his arguments impressed our guest. Things as harsh as this were
said that night: Argentina is being attacked, among other reasons,
because people think that it is a"Nazi" country, and it is thought
to be a"Nazi" country because it admitted several refugees from
vanquished Germany in the 1940's. Why don't people also remember
that a decade prior to that Argentina welcomed hundreds of
thousands of persons who were being persecuted by Nazi Germany?
Why don't all of these persecuted individuals, who were permanently
incorporated into the country, carry weight on the balance scale?
And anyhow, what about Werner von Braun? He had invented the "V1"
and "V2" that devastated London, and he later played a major role in
man's trip to the moon. Did the fact that he went to Florida and
not Buenos Aires perhaps make him democratic? Our American guest
acknowledged these and many other things to his Argentine companions
who were systematically expressing what, deep down, is a feeling of
justified indignation. But there was one argument that prampted
an objection. When the Argentine presenting the arguments pointed
out that a number of the characteristics of the human rights
campaign (which embraces victories like the Sandinists' in Nica-
ragua and ignores situationa like Cuba's, for example) would lead
us to suspect that Marxists might have infiltrated somewhere in the
U.S. political and media system, our visitor retorted: "Don't ruin
your magnificent plea with this particular argwnent. All you have
- to do in the United States is say that there might be Marxists
somewhere in the mass media or the goverrnaent, and they'll accuse of
yon of being a McCarthyist, and that'll be the end of your plea."
Our guest did not tell us that it was "untrue" that cases of
"infiltration" could explain some of the attitudea of those who,
from what we know, are receiving Argentine terrorists in their
offices and attacking our country while remaining silent on Cuba.
He told us something much more serious: that mentioning this is
taboo, to use American political jargon, and that, therefore, it
was inadvisable to expose oneself to the consequences of violating it.
This episode could have been regarded as an isolated incident, but
a few days later we were in the midst of a special feature interview
2
r
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
FGR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
with the second ~nerican guest of this story, this time a staunch
anti-communist, a?ailitant conservative. After he had explained
in full the eroding U.S. pcsition throughout the world vis-a-vis
Marxist aggression and commented in depth on the details of the
- West's retreat and the injustice of a human rights campaign that
punishes anti-communist countries and exempts communist countries,
I let him know that the next question would logically concern
infiltration: How can we believe that a political system like that
of the United States has tak~n the path of "hara-kiri" without
believing at the same time that at least some of the men and women
, pushing it in this direction are agents from the other side, not
just naive, misinformed individuals? Moreove:r, why shouldn't they
exist? Is it so absurd to think that coaununiam infiltrates and
penetrates its enemies' political systems?
This is what he told me in private: "Please don't ask me that
question in public. If I tell you what I think, that there is
infiltration, they'll call me a McCarthyist. That's what my
enemies are waiting for. Once they can accuse me of being a
McCarthyist with specific quotes, they'll drive me out of the
_ political struggle."
This confirmation confronted us with an unavoidable fact: regardless
of whether they believe it, regardless of whether they do nat know
what they should think of it, Americans "cannot" discuss the
- possibility of a Marxist infiltration of the ?.eft-wing of their
political system (among the activists in the human rights campaign,
in certain media that are particularly militant and c?ne-sided in
this area), because if they did so, they would immediately be
branded McCarrhyists, with all of the violence of a violated taboo.
Our suspicions that there "is" in fact significant infiltration in
the system do not stem, moreover, from a mere political deduction,
from the common sense argument that when a political system operates
in systematic opposition to its interests and friends and in favor of
its enennies, someone in that system knows what is going on. They
also stem from literature that, despite everything, is beginning
to reach an audience. In this regard, we would refer readers to a
detailed study by Allen Brownfield that the Council for Inter-
American Security has just published in Washington: "The Washington
Lobby on Latin America." It contains a list of names that are well-
known to us (some of them very big, others that became known through
the human rights campaign) and whose links with the U.S. Co~nunist
Party and other parallel organizations are minutely detailed.
Where thers is smoke...But taking up these accusations would be
acting like a McCarthyist. Why?, we might ask. McCarthyism was
an exaggeration of a defense mec?~anism that, in itself, was
3
FdR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
perfectly healthy. Americans, however, proceed from trauma to trauma
in their political life, and each trauma generates a taboo. Today,
they cannot engage in any war because in Vietnam they carried forward
their previous ~ietermination to fight in all of them, and they ~
supposedly went to Vietnam because Munich and Pearl Harbor had
traumatized them in the opposite direction. Similarly, they now have ,
a weak president because Watergate brought the trauma and taboo of
a strong president. Now, of course, they are suffering the Carter
trauma, which will have its own consequencea. Will the reversal of
the McCarthy taboo be among them? Only when the silence that they
have imposed on themselves in uncovering their real internal and
external enemies punishes them with evidence of a disturbing, obvious
and intolerable regression, will the McCarthy trauma be fAllowed by
trauma "X." With it the eurtain of anti-com~?unism will be lifted
once more. Then and only then wi.11 this animal with the mane, tail,
claws and head of a lion again be called, surprisingly, a lion.
COPYRIGHT: CARTA POLITICA, 1979
8743
CSO: 3010
4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~
ARGENTINA
ANTARCTIC: FOREIGN AMBITIONS, NATIONAL S(?~/EREIGNTY
Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 7, 8 Nov 79
~ [Article by Oscar J. Gomez: "The Antarctic: Argentina's Frozen Territory"]
[7 Nov 79, p. 8]
[Text] On 17 September 1979, the Undersecretary of Foreign Relations at the
Argentine Foreign Ministry, Commodore Carlos Cavandoli, received cable number
. 2836, which originated from Washington and was labeled "urgent." Under the
title "The Falkland Islands-Press-Politics-Nortn-Legal," Ambassador Angel
Maria Olivieri Lopez was sending the complete text of the speech that he _
was to deliver moments later at the opening session of the Tenth Consulta-
tion Meeting, where the signatories of the Antarctic Treaty were awaiting
our country's opinion. Signed by the Argentine ambassador to the United
States, Jorge Aja Espil, the telegram, which took up three legal-sized sheets
of paper, stated in its second paragraph that "It is a secret ta no one that
the Antarctic problem has become increasingly complex in our day, as a re-
sult of the development of its natural resources that we are jointly under-
taking during this stage. This is unquPstionably a challenge, inasmuch as it
involves reconciling positions that are not always in agreement, even on
basic points, under terms that are satisfactory to all. It would be illusory
and futile to embark on such an exercise without always keeping in mind and
recognizing the poLitical realities that are at work in this area." The
~ deliberations of this Tenth Consultation Meeting of the Antarctic Treaty
were to last 18 days, and it was n.~t in vain that the participating coun-
tries, pursuing their geopolitical ~ims, took up the first point on their
agenda, the "exploration and development of minerals" on the frozen conti-
nent: Parallel to this major ~opic, informal consultations were undertaken
on a draft conservation agreement and on an ocean project in the Antarctic.
The situation was becoming especially delicate because the signers of the
Antarctic Treaty were not recognizing Argentina's sovereign rights in the
region. Thus, the dangers lie along a pendulum path charted and regulated
by the countries that own the technology needed to undertake projects in
the Antarctic region and that possess the capital to bring in th.eir own
sources of development, which would trigger a new string of conflicts.
5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
There are two aspects to the aforementioned complexity of the Antarctic is-
sue that run directly counter to Argentina's interests. On the one hand,
there is the refusal to recognize sovereignty, and on the other, there is
the underlying intention of the 13 treaty nations to convert the area into
a source of natural and ocean resources for their own utilization. The cur-
rent efforts of the Foreign Ministry are therefore designed to balar..ce out
this difficult mosaic with a view toward the future, because the United
States is thinking about applying pressure with one of its last tactics,
extending territorial waters in arder to cut off the always-difficult
access to natural resources to some and to make it available to others.
On the other geopolitical extreme, we must not forget the designs of the
Soviet Union, r~hich is going to be after just as much as its powerful rival.
Caught in the middle are Australia, Chile, South Africa, Great Britain,
- France, Japan, Norway, Belgium and Poland, the other signers of the Antarctic
Treaty, along with the FRG, Brazil, and other claimants.
Meanwhile, the area that the Argentine Republic is claiming is bounded by
the 25th meridian west and the 74th meridian west, the South Pole and the
60th parallel south, and we are the only country claiming sovereignty based
on the so-called "sector" theory, which is sim:.lar to the one applied in the
Arctic to demarcate frozen surface areas. Moreover, the Argentine Antarctic
Sector is marked by the geological continuity of the mainland territory up
to the frozen continent. Seven countries have claimed territory in the Ant-
arctic, and another country has made claims in the islands near the Antarctic.
- They are: Great Britain in 1908 (20� west to 80� west, south of the 50th
paraliel south); New Zealand in 1923 (150� west to 160� east); Australia
in 1933 (45� east to 160� east); Norway in 1939 (20� west to 45� east, a
coastal sector, and it had also claimed the island Peter I); France in 1938
(136� east to 142� east, and the Kergeulen, Crozet, and Amsterdam Archi-
pelagoes); Chile in 1940 (53� west to 90� west); South Africa in 1948 (the
Prince Edward Islands and Marion); and Argentina in 1957 (25� west to 74�
west).
Although our country was the last to make claims, we should point out that
this was merely a formal declaration made by the government that year, nur-
suant to the creation of the Administration of the Territory of Tierra del
Fuego, the Antarctic and South Atlantic Islands. In reality, Argentina's
claims originate~, with the birth of our country in 1810. Now that we have
explained the main characteristics of the Argentine Antarctic sector and
how the claims of Great Britain and Chile overlap ours and impair our sov-
ereignty, we will take up this issue in the second article of this series.
To document the history of this prominent geopolitical issuP, we should men-
tion that the current baselines stem from the Antarctic Treaty that was
signed in Washington in 1959 and that took effect in 1961. The International
Geophysical Year had been held in 1957 and 1958, and 12 countries had worked
in the Antarctic, exchanging scientific information that would lay the
groundwork for future efforts. Those countries were Argentina, Chile,
6
FO12 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI.Y
~uo ~ i~u rr~, lM�u.,1
ftlr4Y,~a'laat
G~aE&~y! '~Cm'ASAr.9~
~ H~^� .[QtdtfSlJk� _
[ /iCml
~!~l17
~QavR~ah'! lOrtll I~ OCfAAO AILCN1k~Q S(p ~~`Qbdl
A~rifara ~ ~ ~.~d~oldd.4~;
A6o drlbnwr P~ .iiCd~ , � .
dGa.9M6~loMS/y ~ ~Qr~~Sv ~
~ j � '
� 6+is/~Fd/9?
ANTAIIfqA
MfyOes i '
y~8rnr~QeNaht[a~r .
~ ...3
~ ~ ~ '~T!
AROENTMIA
~4~~ \ w
.ro''Bns~drHekaFwbhu
`f.
'�i, ti, `:i _
,,~a
- .
. ~ '
Mapa de A/ejandro ~l?s/o~
CnptT;!ht La Opinl6n. 19i9 f
Two claims infringe on our sovereignty.
- 7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
_ _ _ _ _
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Great Britain,�Norway, France, New Zealand, Australia (territorial claim-
ants) and the United States, Japan, Belgium, South Africa and Russia (non-
claimants). Under this treaty Antarctica was made a natural laboratory
and a w~rld reserve; the life of the treaty was set at 30 years, during
which no sovereignt~ would be recognized.
[8 Nov 79, p 8]
[Text] During 1960, nine countries ~atified the Antarctic Treaty, while
three consulting members (Argentina, Australia and Chile) did so in 1961,
on the last day of the year, to be exact. The reason was that these are the
three countries clai.ming territory that most strongly defended and still
defend their claim to sovereignty. Why, then, did Argentina ratify a treaty
that ran counter to its stand regarding sovereignty? Argentina would have
been ostracized and thus unable to utilize international forums to assert
its position; neither would it have been able to prevant other countries
from entering its Antarctic sector, and much less could it have declared
that it owned these areas. Moreover, the passage of time has shown that
to many of the c~untries it is more important to share in the development
of their natural resources than to claim a portion of territory.
This has a direct impact on the political situation in the Antarctic,
inasmuch as seven countries claim large portions of territory, while
another six make no such claims but do not recognize the sovereignty of
the others either. This entire situation has arisen under the s~-called
Antarctic Treaty, whereby 13 nations have jurisdiction over and deal with -
the problems stemming from the sector of their agreement. Now then, as we
had mentioned in the first article, when the Antarctic Treaty was ratified
- and its articles taken as a reference point for interpretation, individual
sovereignties in the Antarctic were not recognized. Meanwhile, three of
the territorial claimants have overl~.pping claims: Great Britain, Chile
and Argentina; and the demarcation of their jurisdictioris has not yet
b een resolved. Great Britain has in its favor that four claimants have
come out in her support; in turr, there are six treaty signers that have
not recognized anyone's sovereignty.
As far as the overall political picture is concerned, we should emphasize
that the rest of the world's nations (some 150) are
not involved in the Antarctic, but they can ask to be associated, although
several of them advocate internationalization. In view of the picture that
we have outlined, we would have to agree that the word "uncertain" must be
attac}ied to our country's future ambitions in the region.
The arguments of Great Britain and Chile should, therefore, be of interest
because their ambitions are the ones that most affect Argentine sovereignty.
According to the Chilean claim, voiced in 1905 by the newsman Fagalde, all
of the waters of the Beagle Channel are Chilean, and Argentine jurisdiction _
ends along the southern coast of the large island of Tierra del Fuego and
Staten Island. The two countries have taken on the common defense of the
_ 8
- FOF: OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040240040020-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
sector, which Great Britain also claims, and have made joint declarations
in this regard since 1947. They have thus decided to wait for a better op-
~~ortun i ty to dem:ircntc rhe respectivo s~ctors , liowever, we must a] so t,iko
into account Chile's cl~~im of sovereignty in the sector bounded by the 53rd
and 60th meridians west. This sector does not stop with the 60th parallel,
though; it continues on to the mainland, uninterrupted by the Drake Passage.
This, then, is Chile's Antarctic province, with its capital in Puerto
Williams on the northern coast of Navarino Island.
The eastern part of this claim is based on the Tordesillas Treaty of 1R94,
since the western part constitutes South American AntaretiCa, a limit
established by the 1927 Reciprocal Assistance Treaty.
- To gain a better understanding, on Chilean maps the Cape Horn meridian does
= not mark the end of the Pacific Ocean, which extends up to the Southern
= Antilles.
The British base their claim on the alleged discoveries they made and on
the successive explorations that they undertoaic from that point on. Great
Britain presented its case in 1955 and accused Argentina and Chile of being
usurpers at the International Court Justice. A map attached to the claim
shows the territory starting from the SOth meridian west and including the
South Georgia and Sandwich Islands. The document is signed by Dr Fitzmaurice,
who, incidentally, presided over the Arbitration Tribunal that ruled against
Argentina and in favor of Chile in connection with the Beagle problem. There
are currently more tl�ian 30 foreign bases in the Argentine sector; Chile has
6, and Great Britain 24. There are also two Soviet bases (Bellingshausen _
~ and Druznaya). Argentina's claims to sovereignty over the same sector that
Great Britain and Chile claim have several grounds. For example, even though
the British contend that they discovered the terrxtory in 1819, historians
have demonstrated that prior to this, sealer vessels from the River Plate -
(the "Spiritu Santo" and the "San Juan Nepomuceno") frequented the frozen
continent in the search for marine resou.rces. Moreover, the geographical -
continuity of the AndPS mountain range is clear-cut and well-recognized,
as is the geographical proximity to our mainland (1000 kilometers).
We should also stress that our country has, in fact, occupied the terri-
tory since 22 February 1904, when it took over the observatory that had
been established on Laurie Island in the Orkneys. It has operated uninter-
ruptedly to our day and was 30 years ahead of the next regular base. Lastly,
there is the essential issue of heritage. Based on the "Uti possidetis
juris," all of the lands that belonged ta Spain and to the Viceroyship of
_ the River Plate belong to Argentina. This goes back to the bulls of the
1493 discovery and to the Tordesillas Treaty of 1494.
9
FOIt OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
~
FC~R OFFtCIAL USE ONLY
� 1
w~u n.,�'t
~ ~
~
1wr~.w , Q ~Ol1N" ~ ~ ~ .
. - - - _ ii
_ _ r~wr
~
. .
- 5;;;~-:`::~:^?,FE
..l.i:.:
.~rw~y!~r:fli:"dic:iii: iiiii'~'~.--'.~=:ii?::~Ei~i:
==CHILf ~
- :~i:u
~~~..`7:~ry~ un~ ~r
- :::::a:_..._::::.:....
- - ANGENTINA
~ :~:::"T~ ,
= - OCfAM~A7lAN/1C~0
_'~IC~~ .
' = _ _ _ I~ ~rr~r
~v
, - - _ w~
' -:=a ~!.�'~eti-~~-- e~~rs. �
OCfANOH~IUi/C0 - -'�..~:.~.r�y,~~+~... rMatiw~r
w
-~~=3 =~=4i.~
~ytre~.~ 4r
~ - _ : ~ 'VItM~ 7~~lr..~wfr
- l:
~:~}iw~awrma~
4 =
a ~
r
_ ~w.a.mt d ~AfohodrAl~jondoMobfi4
Chile's theory and its pretensions in our territory.
COPYRIGHT: LA OPINION, Buenos Aires, 1979
- 8743
CSO: 3010
10
FOk OFFICIAL USE ONLY '
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200044420-3
FOR OFFICIr~I, USE OD1LY
CUBA
'PRENSA LATINA' SCORES U.S. LTSE OF FORCE AS INSTRUMENT OF PRESSURE
PA142230 Havana PRELA in Spanish 0025 GMT 14 DE~c 79 PA
[PL feature by Ivonne Pastor Parra]
[Text] The decision of U.S. President James Carter to proclaim the govern-
ment's policy which states that positions of force are essential to U.S.
national security constitutes in the opinion of analysts a serious threat
to the progressive goverriments and to world peace.
' Carter said Wednesday that the U.S. military budget for fiscal year 1981 will
be increased by 5 percent and will amount to $157 billion. He added that
in the following 5 years, the Pentagon's budget will be increased yearly
_ by over 4.5 percent.
- The U.S. President affirmed that the foundation of the U.S. "national secur-
ity," as in the past, is its military might and claimed that "only from posi-
tions of foree" can the Washinoton goverim?ent and nation maintain negotiations
with the Warsaw Treaty on the reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe. ~
The 5-year military program submitted by the U.S. head of state at a meet-
ing in the White House with U.S. businessmen, representatives of the U.S.
industrial military complex, includes the following measures:
The reinforcement of strategic forces. (Carter announced the construction
in 1980 of Cruise missiles and said "The United States needs a new MX stra-
tegic missile capable of attacking many objectives in the territor~ of the
Soviet Union.")
The reinforcement of strategic submarine forces through the development of
"Trident" submarines for the Navy and the Army.
The construction of new naval units--aircraft carriers and others--(a mea-
sure that will insure, according to Carter, that in 1990 the U.S. Navy will
possess 550 warships.)
s
11
FOR OFFICIA�,., USE ONl~Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
U.S. military reinforcement in NATO. "Carter stressed that Washington's
commitments within the framework of the Alliance continue to be "permanent
and changeless."
Military reinforcement of U.S. forces in the Pacific. (According to the
U.S. President's statements, the U.S. military force in that area insu:es
the framework of "mature friendship"--with Japan, South Korea, Australia,
New Zealand, the Philippines and Thailand, and he indicated that Washing-
ton's allies in Asia and Europe must assume a proportionate responsibility
in military expenditures.)
- The creation of army and navy "quick reaction" intervention forces to act in
; areas not covered by the military blocs created by the United States. (Car-
ter noted that in this respect there are plans for the creation of a new -
military transport fleet which will store weapons and provisions for three
marine brigades and which will be fo~und in "the aclvanced regions" in which
"their services may be required.")
The troops participating in U.S. intervention operations in the Caribbean,
Africa, Latin America, Asia and Oceania will be transferred by air. (Ac-
cording to the U.S. head of state, a new military aircraft transport fleet
will be built which, together with the C-130 and 141 Hercules and the C-SA
Galaxy, will transfer tanks and other war materiel to intercontinental di-
stances.)
In his speech Carter also said that "the 1980's will be riotous and un-
stable politically, particularly in the area of the developing nations.
He claimed that "the United States must be prepared, together with its al-
lies, to turn back the threats of political instability."
Referring to the current Iranian-U.S. crisis, which has served as a pretext
for the Pentagon to expand its military forces in the seas around the Arab-
ian oil peninsula, Carter claimed that "these incidents have accutely shown
his country's "need for might and unity."
"We have learned that it is a mistake to intervene militarily in the inter-
nal affairs of another country," Carter said, "but we must understand, he
added, that a demonstration of the use of firm power does not imply a po- ,
tential Vietnam."
Observers note that the United States, in an open challenge to world public
opinion, which rejects the increase of the arms race and favors interna-
tional detente, in 1979 increased its military presence in the Caribbean,
Latin America, Africa, Asia and Oceania.
- .
- CSO: 3010
12 `
FOR OFFICIl~I. USE ONLY
. . y:... . ~ , . ~ . . .
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
FOR OFrICIAL USE ONLY
CUBA
BRIEFS
~ CHILEAN LABOR DELEGATION--Havana, 8 Dec (PL)--Roberto Veiga, secretary
general of the Central Union of Cuban Workers (CTC), has met here with a
delegation of the Chilean Trade Union Confederation (CUTCH) in exile. The
CUTCH delegation is headed by Executive Committee Chairman Mario Nararro.
During the meeting they discussed the labor situation in Latin America and
the struggle ~f the Chilean people and workers against Gen Augusto Pinochet's
military reg~e. The Chilean delegation also includes CUTCH Vice President
Eduardo Rojas, Secretary General Rolando Calderon 3nd representative in
Cuba Calvarino Melo. President on the Cuban side were Jesus Escandel, CTC
' executive secretariat member, and Antonio Lopez Lama, chief of the CTC
Americas section. [Text] [PA091929 Havana PRELA in Spanish 0031 GMT
9 Dec 79 PAl
CSO: 3010
13
FCR OFFICIt~:. USE OPJLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NICARAGUA
ARCE, PASTORA DENOUNCE PLOTS, STRESS ANTI-IMPERIALISM
Havana PRELA in Spanish 1530 GMT 6 Dec 79 PA
[Text] San Jose, 6 Dec (PL)--At a rally held to salute a Nicaraguan
_ delegatian that arrived here on an official visit, Sandinist Commanders
Bayardo Arce and Eden Pastora denounced the foreign maneuvers being _
plotted against their count*_y.
Arce affir'med that the Sandinist leadership is seeking the solidarity of ~
the geoples of Costa Rica, Latin America and the world, who are strug-
gling for their freedom in order to advance and overcome all obstacles.
He also referred to national sovereignty and dignity, which the Sandinist
revolutionary process have turned into one of the most important popular
banners. He noted that if any effort is made abroad to impose a single
condition on the aid given to Nicaragua, the revolution is willing to
abstain from receiving a single dollar. He also stressed the people's
broad support for the new Nicaraguan Government's measures. In this
- regard, he underscored how the workers en masse have given up their
Christmas bonus, thus permitting the formation of an employment fund.
Elsewhere in his speech Arce insisted on the anti-imperialist nature of
the Sandinist revolution and said the greatest ideals of the revolu-
tionary process are aimed at the formation of a new man in Nicaragua.
He recalled and highly valued the participation of Costa Rican combatants
in the Nicaraguan struggle as well as the broad and significant solidarity
shown here to Sandinist revolutionariea.
Commander Eden Pastora said the attacks and maneuvers against the
Nicaraguan revolution can be explained by the vigor of the measures
aimed at the formation of a new man, like Commande~+_- Ernesto Che Gu~vara
wanted.
"We are being honest when we say the Nicaraguan revolution is anti-
imperialist. We remain alert to keep the revolution from being betrayed
or interfered with," he stressed.
Commanders Arce and Pastora are members of a Nicaraguan delegation that
includes Commander Tomas Borge, government 3unta member Alfonso Robelo
and Foreign Minister Miguel d'Escoto.
CSO: 3010 ~ 14 �
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NICARAGUA
NATIONAL COORDINATOR GIVES DETAILS OF LITERACY CAMPAIGN
PA102227 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1800 GMT 10 Dec 79 PA
[PRENSA LATINA special feature: "Nicaragua: The Second Liberation War"] -
[Text] The national literacy campaign has a great so~ioeconomic and poli-
tical significance for Nicaragua because it will permit the people's full
integration into and participation in the country's social and productive
process.
For Fernando Cardenal, general coordinator of the national literacy commit-
tee, "it means the second war of liberation of the Nicaraguan revolution.'.'
In an interview with the new Nicaragua News Agency, Cardenal stressed that
the first proclamation of the junta of the government of national reconstruc-
tion included among its emergency measures the eradication of illiteracy,
the establishment of adult education programs and the organization of an
' educational system in line with the national liberation process. "This
struggle was begun from scratch virtually during the first few days of the
government," he added.. '
The organization and planning phase in undertaking this task began on 15 Aug-
ust. An initial census was conducted and the structures which will permit
the campaign to begin in March 1980 have been created.
The results of the national census indicate there are 900,000 illiterates
out of a population of 1,809,242. This amounts to a general illiteracy
rate of 49.6 percent among those over 10, but there are areas where the
rate reaches 87 percent.
According to the studies undertaken by the national committee, there are
196,570 illiterates living in the urban areas out of a population of 977,923.
There are 704,430 illiterates in the rural areas out of a population of
831,319.
15
FOR OFFICIAI, USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Cardenal said this shows the Somozist dictatorship's marked interest in
keeping the people ignorant in oxder to guarantee a supply of cheap and
_ semislave labor. This enabled him to control the resources and revenue.
- "The elimination of this situation means the liberation of man," the nation-
al literacy coordinator stressed.
But it is not solely a matter of learning how to read and write. It is also
a matter of being politically and ideologically aware, he added. This aware-
ness will lead the popular masses to active participation in the national
reconstruction and the country's development, Cardenal said.
The Nicaraguan man, who for almost half a century has been subjected to
oppression and repression, must regain his human dignity, integrity and cul- -
tural identity and become part of the goverimnent's overall socioeconomic
plans.
Cardenal said it is an attempt to break the system of domination through
division which the dictatorship had imposed. "Our objective is the integra-
tion of the urban and rural areas, the Atlantic and the Pacific, and the re-
gions which were neglected for many years. It is also an integration of di-
spersed and forgotten cultural elements, folklore and myths."
The national literacy coordinator announced that the literacy campaign be-
ginning in March will also be used to gather accounts of the insurrection
with the cooperation of the culture ministry. "This will enable us to learn
about the complete history of our people's struggle in the most remote places." -
CSO: 3010
16
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NICARAGUA
BRIEFS
CUBA'S JUDICI.~I, SYSTEM PRAISED--Judges of the Supreme Court and the Superior
Labor Court w zo visited Cuba recently have stated here that they are very
impressed witi the good judicial system in that country. Humberto Solis
Barker, president of the Superior Labor Court told the press yesterday that
the Cubans are very advanced and have a good ~udicial system. The Cuban
judicial system, he added, is a guarantee for the citizens as well as for
state institutions. The president of the Superior Labor Court said that he
and his companeros have acquired a positive experience in Cuba "which we
feel has helped us in our idea of what a revolutionary judicial structure
in line with the present needs of our people should be like." For his part,
Judge Hernaldo Zuniga Montenegro said, "The Cuban legislation does not ex-
clude the existence of a limited form of private property and this contri-
butes to the economic and revolutionary progress of the Republic of Cuba."
Zuniga Montenegro and Solis Barker returned from Cuba on Tuesday where they
stayed for several days accompanied by judges Roberto Arguello Hurtado,
Aquiles Centeno Perez and Santiago Rivas Haslam. The other Nicaraguan Supreme
Court members--Rodolfo Robelo Herrera, Rafael Cordoba Rivas and Vilma Nunez
de Escorcia--left for Havana on the same day. [Text] [PA100112 Havana PRELA
in Spanish 1507 GMT 9 Dec 79 PA]
CSO: 3010
17
FOR OFFICII~L USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PERU
MADRID PAPER GIVES CHILEAN VIEW OF NATION'S MILITARY MIGHT
Madrid DEFENSE in Spanish Oct 79 pp 69-70
[Text] Peruvian and Chilean Military Might
_ The Chilean Government is accelerating its strategy in the face of the
military might of Peru which has 13 divisions, 953 tanks, 80 ships and 568
planes of every kind. According to Peruvian sources, "Peru~s military
potential presents a threat not only to Chile but to peace in the southern
cone of Latin America." The sources said among the 24 countries in Ibero-
America, Peru is second in spending per soldier annually and fifth in in-
vestments in arms, supplied to a large extent by the Soviet Union.
General Mercado, Peru's minister of foreign affairs under former President
Velasco Alvarado, recently said that for the first time in the last 100
years, "we have succeeded in eliminating the strategic imbalance that al-
ways favored Chile.�' For this reason, Pinochet's government has found it-
self forced to adopt "a defensive military policy, mining its border zones,"
according to Mercado.
Still according to Chilean sources, the Peruvian land army has 13 divisions,
9 of which are infantry, 2 cavalry, 1 paratroopers and another commandos
specializing in jungle guerrilla warfare. It also has six battalions of
engineers and artillery with 75 mm, 105 mm, 130 mm and 155 mm cannons, and
four reconnaissance squadrons with 580 armored vehicles made in the United
States. The complement of tanks the Peruvian army has is impressive: 950
in all, 733 of them acquired from the Soviet Union, 140 from France and
only 80 from the United States. Of those made in Russia, 33 are T-54 tanks,
400 are T-55's and 300 are T-62's, the most perfect model, weighing 37 tons
with 115 mm cannons. Peru leaned toward the Soviet T-55 which cost 130,000
dollars each. Between Russian and French tanks, the Peruvian army has spent
some 200 million dollars.
As for its naval strength, the Peruvian n.avy has a total of 80 ships, 30
helicopters and 12 antisubmarine missiles. The ships include four destroy-
ers--two with 16 rockets each--two escort destroyers, 12 frigates, 3 cruis-
ers, 2 corvettes, 9 patrol boats, 7 gunboats, 30 landing craft, 8 torpedo
boats, a mine layer and 8 submarines.
18
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040240040020-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Notable among the air force`s 568 planes are the 140 French Mirage aircraft.
Four other squadrons have 12 U.S. F-86 planes and three others have 10
Hunter F-52 pursuit planes. Moreover, the Soviet Union sold Peru some 60
planes of all kinds in addition to 18 Mig-21 and ground-to-air missiles.
The Peruvian armed forces comprise some 60,000 men and Chile's about 75,000.
Both countries figure among the world's top 30 with a per capita income of
between 500 to 2,000. Chile's is higher with 1,100 dollars income per per-
son per year, while Peru's is not quite 800 dollars. ~
Of the 24 Ibero-American countries, Peru, with a population of 15 million,
is in 15th place among those with the highest military spending, 422 mil-
lion dollars annually, after Brazil (107 million population and 1,872,000,000
dollars), Argentina (26 million population and 800 million dollars), Mexico
(60 and 581), Venezuela (13 and 569). Chile is seventh with a population
of 11 million and 300 million dollars.
As for the annual spending per soldier, Venezuela is the first country in
Ibero-America with 13,000 dollars and Peru the second with 7,356 dollars.
Brazil, 7,370; Mexico, 7,085; Trinidad-Tobago, 6,000; Argentina, 5,970, and
Chile is in seventh place with 4,110 dollars.
New.Missile Frigate
The Peruvian navy has incorporated into its fleet a new missile frigate
built in an Italian shipyard and which, according to the official version,
"is considered the most advanced of its kind in the Latin American coun- _
,
tries navies. The one that came into E1 Callao, the first Lima port,
last 7 September was christened "Villa Visencio," in honor of one of Peru's
naval heroes in the war with Chile 100 years ago. With this vessel Peru's
navy increases its power and efficiency to fulfill its national protective
mission of national security in the first line of defense, which is the
sea. The frigate has been called "extremely modern and sophisticated";
it is armed with missiles, rocket launchers, torpedoes and rapid-fire can-
nons, besides carrying antisubmarine helicopters. Among the main charac-
teristics of the ship, it has a 2,500-ton displacement, is 112 meters long,
has a beam of 12 meters and a complement of 150 men including officers and
crew.
COPYRIGHT: Ediciones Defensa, S.A., Madrid 1978
11937
CSO: 3010
19
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
PPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
STATINTEL
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040020-3
STATINTEL