JPRS ID: 9023 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040016-8
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• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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= JPRS L/8850 -
~ 8 January 1980 -
ear E st/ rt A,fr' t =
N a ~1o h ~ca Re or
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JPRS L/8850
8 January 1980 -
NEAR EAST/NORTH` AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO i/8o>
CONTEN:TS PAGE
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Saratawi, PLO's Man for Difficul:t Tasks, Said To Have
Resigned ~
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 22-28 Nov 79) 1
Speculation on West German-Mossad Attempts To Assassinate
, Palestinian Leaders . -
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 8-14 Nov 79) 5
Briefs ~
Memorandum of Agreement With lraq 8
- Inter-Arab Steel Project 8 '
_ ~ISLAMIC AFFAIRS
Islamic Sulfism, Reform Discussed at Paris Symposium
(AL-WATAN A1-'ARABI, 22~�28 Nov 79) 9
ALGERIA
Opposition Leader Discusses Status of Revolution
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 8-14 Nov 79) 13 .
_ Progress of Cleanup Campaign Reviewed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 19 Oct 79) .....s. 21
Briefs
Oil Report 26
Reforestation Campaign 26
Algerian-Soviet Contra~t 26
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' CONTCNTS.(Continued) Page _
IRAQ
Bilateral [telations With Iran on the Decline
' (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 8-14 Nov 79) 28
Briefs
Aid to Zambia 29
MOROCCO ~
Maritime Transport Agreement Signed With France .
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 9 Nov 79) 33 ,
Moroccan Foreign Trade Bank Reports on 1978 Activities ~
(MARCN.ES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEFN~, 9 Nov 79) 35 ~
- Situation in Major Industrial, Tr~de Sectors Reviewed ~
(MARCHES TROPICA~JX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 16 Nov 79) 37
Briefs ~
Morocco-Iraq Shipping Line 41 ~
WESTERN SAHARA !
Ohoud 'Morocco's Most,Ambitious Operations Against Polisario'
M Mlamali`Adam� NEW AFRICAN Dec 79 42 ~
( � > > ) '
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Algeria: Polisario Front Official Acknowledges New Moroccan ~
Division
(Manuel Somoza; PRELA, 14 Dec 79) 45 '
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
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SARATAWI, PLO'S MAN FOR DIFFICULT TASKS, SAID TO HAVE RESIGPIED .
Paris AL-WATAN AL-`ARABI in Ar3bic 22-28 Nov 79 pp 30-31
[Article: "Kreisky's Sickness Afflicts Palestinian Heart Surgeon;
'Arafat: As We Have Military Fedayeen, W~ Also Have Political Fedayeen;
Difficult Missions Performed by 'Isam Saratawi Provoke Rejectionist Front"]
[Text] The Palestinian affairs editor has written: 'Isam Saratawi is the
man of the "difficult diplomatic tasks" in the PLO. He has resigned. No, ~
+ ~ he hasn't resigned. He has resigned! What is his story? And why all
this clamor over his role and his relationship with each of Kreisky and
'Arafat?
The subject of discussion was about Dr 'Isam Saratawi, the Palestinian
National Council member, and his contacts that have angered some of the
Palestinian organizations which have accused him of "treason" and af
violating the Palestinian national resolutions and the Palestinian national -
charter. When Yasir 'Arafat (Abu-'Ammar) took the f loor, he told the con-
ferees, who included leaders of the Palestinian organizations and other
Palestinian officials: "Brothers, as we have military fedayeen, we also _
have political fedayeen and brother 'Isam is one of these."
'Isam Saratawi, who is said to have presented his resignation from the
. Palestinian National Council to Yasir 'Arafat a few days ago--a resignation ~
on which the PLO Executive Chairman has not decided yet--joined the
Palestinian revolution' in ~.967. He founded at the time a PalesCinian
- militarv organization which included tens of fighters and which was called
- the Organization Working for the Liberation of Palestine.
The organization`s fighters were distinguished by wearing camouflage uni-
forms that almost covered the face completely. But this organization soon
_ merged in Fatah in 1969 when the Palestinian resistance was present in
Jordan. Before that, 'isam al-Saratawi had practiced medicine in Kuwait
for a short period after graduating as a heart surgeon from U.S. universities.
Dr al-Saratawi is from the village af Sarta in central Palestine. His .
father was a teacher who at one stage of his life took refuge in Iraq and
taught there.
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The issue that angered al-Saratawi, who is one of the very close confi-
- dants of Yasir 'Arafat, arid that is said to have caused him to submit his -
_ resignation is the violent'attack to which he has been exposed by a number -
of Palestinian organizations since Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky
announced last October that al-Saratawi and Arieh Elia.:'`, the leftist
Israeli politician, had won his personal award out of appreciation for
their efforts to realize a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue. Some of the
Palestinian organizations have accused al-Saratawi of treason and of
falling into the Zionist snare, demanding that he reject Kreisky's award.
But a1-Saratawi turned down their request out of his appreciation for the
Austrian leader, whom he appreciates very highly, and has preferred to
resign from the Palestinian National Council in order not to embarrass the
PLO and Yasir 'Arafat in particular.
Constant Contacts
It tcas also been mentioned that al-Saratawi had contacts with a group o� -
Israelis working under the name of the Israeli Council for Peace, led by i
' Reserve Gen M3tityahu Peled. ;
_ ~
Reports have also been circulated in Cairo that al-S~ratawi met with ~
' Egyptian Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil last Octobe.r.
i
What aroused the protests of some leaders of the Palestinian organizations
is that al-Saratawi was sitting next to Eliav at the award-giving ceremony. ~
The two shared the award of 24,000 dollar~_ in half. ~
A1-Saratawi is usually entrusted with the diff icult and complicated tasks
connected with some foreign contacts--tasks that could provoke arguments
- if revealed. Some of these tasks have actually created several crises
among the resistance factions, especially between Fatah and some of the
rejectionists fronts, because al-Saratawi holds his "suspect contac.ts," in
the opinion of the rejectionist fronts, as a representative of the PLO anci
not in his personal capacity. Many observers had expected for al-Saratawi
a fate similar to that of Sa'id al-Hamami "because he plots against the '
Palestinian cause," according to some Pal~stinians described as "radicals."
Meeting With Kreisky ~
~
_ Dx al-Saratawi has a strong relationship with Kreisky, the Austrian leader,
~ and is considered a friend of his. The beginning of the acquaintance ,
between the two came in 1975 through mutual friends, considering that al-
Saratawi is one of tilose who are active in the Palestinian revolution.
At the time, Kreisky was very interested in the Middle East issue and in
the PLO in particular. He had met 'Arafat during the tour which the
fact-finding committee of the Socialist International made under Kreisky's
leadership in 1974, i.e. after the October 1973 war.
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Since the fizst meeting 4 years ago, Kreisky and a1-Saratawi have met
more than 2Q0 times jsic] in various periods. During the meetings, al-
Saratawi was in constant cont~ct with 'Arafat and conveyed to him the vie*a-
point of tlie Austrian leader who represents the Socialist International
and holds the position of its deputy chai.rman. In return, al-Saratawi
was getting the viewpeint of the PLO leader and conveying it to Kreisky.
~ This is why al-Saratawi can be considered the maker of the "Vienna
meeting" befween 'Arafat, Kreisky and Willy Brandt.
In r2gard to the planning for the Vienna meeting, al-Saratawi says: "The
idea of the meeting was put forth at the end of September 1978. The truth
is that Kreisky put it f orth after the Camp David negotiations." A1-
Saratawi add: "Abu-'Ammar was not aware of the matter at the time. When
a worker in the political field, like me, finds an opportunity, he makes
, use of it. I did not put it forth in the name of_Abu-`Ammar. The idea '
occurred to me~and I asked Kreisky: What do you think? I met Kreisky in
Paris during the conference of the Socialist International and then in
Vienna a few days later. We reviewed the outcome of the Camp David nego- �
_ tiations and I explained to him their drawbacks from our point of view."
A1-Saratawi further says: "I proposed the meeting but did not set the
_ , place. Brother Abu-'A~ar was in Moscow at the time and was planning to
proceed to attend the Baghdad Arab summit. Kreisky approved the proposal
and the meeting date was set for November 1978. Certain circumstances
develop~d and did not permit convocation of the meeting in November because
of the elections in Austria which took place ahead of schedule and were won
by Kreisky's party. There were also circumstances that preoccupied brother
Yasir 'Arafat."
A1-Saratawi goes on to add: "After the Austrian elections, we had a working
plan for two me~tings: One bilateral with Kreisky and a second with the
Socialist International leadership, i.e. with Willy Brandt, the former
German chancellor, and a number of other leaders, in the prese:~ce of
Kreisky. We later combined both ideas. Several dates for the meeting
- we.re discussed as of, the beginning of May 1979 but none of them could be
met. SALT II, for:.example, caus~d the date to be delayed. Finally, the
date in which the meeting took place in the presence of Brandt was set."
~ Saratawi Entrusted Officially to Make Contacts
- The truth is that `Isam al-Saratawi has not made any contacts with any side ~
or any political personality in the world in his capac:ity as an individual
not connected with anyhody. Had it been so, nobody would have received ~
him. He has always been officially trusted with these contacts. Yet he
has shouldered personally the burden of the d~,ngers to which he and his .
- life ma}~ be exposed and has actually faced thE violent criticism to which
he has been exposed with the courage of "political fedayeen," as 'Arafat
_ himself has said.
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ihe first of the troubles facing al-Saratawi was the so-called "Kreisky ~
document'' issued on 27 January 1977. At the time, Kreisky asked al-Saratawi
after a meeting between them to sum up what he had said in a message con-
taining the gist of. the discussion that had taken place between the two. _
Strong clamor was raised over this message in the Palestinian National _
Council and in the Arab papers which asked `Arafat to explain the truth of
"al-Saratawi'~ message."
- The truth is, as al-Saratawi has said in a recent interview with SHU'UN
FILASTINIYAH [Palestinian Affairs] magazine, is that "the organization
received no document and no maps because I wrote the mF�ssage in my personal
name and on the stationery of the hotel in which I was'~~taying. The message
- was a summary of my view of what the organ~zation could 3ccept within the
framework of a just solution to the Middle E~st problem."
When the question of the message was raised in the well-known manner in the
- Palestinian National Council, Yasir 'Arafat explained that it was a personal
message from `Isam al-Saratawi. This top-level Palestinian admission of
the presence of the message had a good effect on 'Isam al-Saratawi and
absolved him of the charge of forgery of which some Palestinians had accused
him, especially since a statement had been made denying the issue of the '
message altogether and exposing al-Saratawi to the charge of forgery.
_
Thus, al-Saratawi who was ex~osed to scathing criticism from some Palestinian -
organizations because of the so-called "Kreisky message" has fal_len anew the `
victim of the "Kreisky award" and has submitted his resignation from the -
Palestinian National Council, preferring to withdraw from the political _
- battle being waged by the PLO and in which he has been participating des-
pite all the dangers of falling a martyr of th~ political struggle and of :
being accused of "treason" as well. -
The Palestinian sources close to the chairman of rhe PLO Executive Commit~ee
say: "It is very difficult for 'Arafat to accept al-Saratawi's resigna- i
tion." ~
~
But will al-Saratawi insist on the resignation? And who has the courage ~
to replace him? ,
' COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI ~
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8494 '
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, INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
- SPECULATION ON WEST GERMAN-MOSSAD ATTEMPTS TO ASSASSINATE
PALESTINIAN LEADERS
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic~8- 14 Nov 79 p 26
~ [Article: "The Arabs Ask Bonn: Did German Intelligence Cooperate With
Mossad in Embellishing an Attempt to Assassinate "Arafat and Khalaf?"J
[Text] The scandal of the interrogation of Palestinians by Israelis in
prisons in Bavaria has developed into a"political scandal of the first
' order" in :Jest Germany. Meanwhile, the Palestinians and Arabs are
watching developments to learn if the Bonn government will. offer them a ~
reasonable explanation for a"plot" hatched by Israeli intelligence to
use some of the imprisoned youths in an attempt to assassinate Palestinian
leaders. -
The issue of the four Palestinian prisoners whom West German security
authoritizs allowed to be interrogated by Israeli intelligence agents is
interacting on various political and official levels, and is threatening to
develop into..a political scandal following the raising of the issue by
Arab diplomatic circles here as well as Palestinian circles in Beirut.
The Bundestag (lower house) is currently conducting a parliamentary inves-
tigation into the matter through two of its committees to ~.earn who is
primarily responsible and what steps must be taken to prevent the recur-
rence of such an incident.
The work of the two committees is not expected to be easy, however--
- especially since the state of Bavaria where the arrest and interrogation
of the Palestinians took place is governed by a conservative administra-
tion while theFederal Gouernment is made up of a Liberal-Dem~cractic coali-
tion. Both governments are exchanging accusations and trying to shift
the responsibility onto each other's shoulders.
- It appears th at officials of both governments are involved in the issue- `
scandal. It is reported here that officials of the federal inCelligence
- organization infor~pd their associates in the Bavarian security organiza-
tion that "Israeli agents" would be present at the interrogation.
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Mr Klaus Kenkl, head of the federal intelligence organization, has
acknowledged that he reprimanded assistants who permitted the Israelis to
attend the interrogation of the Palestinians. Meanwhile, it has become
clear that the Bavarian security official who allowed the Israelis to par-
ticipate in the interrogation did not inform his superios of his action.
Brainwashing Operations
It is also reported that the interrogation of the arrested Palestinians was
not confined to judicial questioning, but, according to Palestinian sources, ,
it developed into attempts at intimidation and forcible administration of
certain drugs as part of a brainwashing operation to convert the prisoners
into agents of Israeli or German intelligence.
In fact, the Israeli agents succeeded in making one of the prisoners, by
the name of Muhammad Yusuf, submit to being controlled and receiving
instructions to assassinate Mr Salah Khalaf (Abu Ayad), who'is described
as the number two man in FATAH.
Muhammad Yusuf returned to Beirut, but fell prey to uripleasant thoughts
which seized him, and in the meantime his conscience was awakened to the
seriousness of the mission which he had been assigned. He was afraid,
however, that the Israeli agents wosld take revenge on his family if he
did not carry out the deed. Finally, the appeal of his conscience won out ;
and he informed Salah Khalaf of what he had been assigned to do. How-
ever, Yusuf committed suicide by sh~oting himself on 18 October.
The Arabs and Palestinians Meet
The tragedy truly jolted the consciences of many. It has been learned
here that the concerned Palestinian organizations filed a protest caith ~
the German Embassy in Beirut over this shameful legal and judicial viola- ~
_ tion. The embassy reportedly received an implied threat that the Pales- I
tinians would resume opposition to German interests unless a full inves- ;
tigation is conducted and an acceptable explanation of~~the matter is
given. ~
~
In addition, the ambassadors of Iraq, Kuwait and Syria have begun to act
here, and have filed an official protest with the Foreign Ministry,
_ which quickly promised to provide an acceptable official explanation and
con duct an investigation. At the same time, the ministry asserted that
this incideat does not mean that it is part of German policy to side with ,
- Israel against the Arabs.
In a veiled threat, the PLO's representative here, Mr "Abdallah al-Ifranji, ;
said: "The Germans must not be surprised if a strong reaction occurs when
our sons are left in the hands of the Israelis to be interrogated."
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However, tlie statements of Salah Khalaf in this connection were wc~lcomed.
He announced that the PLO does not intend to take reveng~, "Because we
are no.t a vindictive people, and we will leave the matter for the people
of West Germany to judge." He said that the case of Muhammad Yusuf is only
a part of a`vast plot by German, Israeli and American agents to entice
Palestinian youths into coming to Germany and then attempt to buy them.
This case~has been made even more serious by hints that, in addition to
Mr Khalaf~, Yasir 'Arafat may also have been the target of an "implanted"
operation similar to those occurring in Gern~any.
A Palestinian youth reportedly said that he was ordered to commit "mis-
deeds", and revealed that Mr 'Arafat was the target of an assassination ~
operation. ~
German Reactions
_ Off icial and political circles here in Germany fear that this affair,
which has been described by the Bavarian minister of interior as a "
"scandal of the first order," will injure West Germany's reputation in
the Arab world--especially since the Bonn government has made tremendous
~ efforts this year to improve its standing with Ara.b governments as well
as the Palestinians.
As a result of these efforts, the Gern,an authorities obtained commitments
from the Palestinians to refrain from taking any actions against German _
interests as long as the Bonn government abides faithfully by its commit-
~ ments .
Still, there is nothing to indicate that the PLO wants to become entangled
in conducting terrorist actions against European interests at this time,
= especially since,it is no~a concentrating all its diplomatic efforts on
_ penetrating the European "barrier of silence." Consequently, the PLO
does not want all the effort it has put out during the past few months to -
collapse.
It can now be sai~~i, with full reservation, that the crisis in relations
between the PLO and West Germany has entered a phase of total settlement
- through Germany's provision of unequivocal and reassuring guarant~:es that
it will not deal with Israeli intelligence in the p rocess of carrying
out measures to manitor Palestinians who enter and reside in its terri-
_ tory .
COPYItIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
, 8951
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- INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS ,
~ BRIEFS ~
MEMORANDUMI OF AGREEI~NT WITfi IRAQ--A preliminary agreement on economic and
trade cooperation bztween A~geria and Iraq was signed in Baghdad on 11 October '
following the close of proceedings of the fourth session of the joint Algerian-
~ Iraqi commission at the expert level. The preliminary agreement was siqned by '
= Mr Abdelghani Akbi, Algerian minister of commerce, and by his Iraqi c~unter-
part, Mr Hassan 'Ali al-'Amiri. It includes a list of goods which will. be ex-
changed between Algeria and Iraq and provides for the opening of a maritime ~
link between the two countries and shopping centers to increase the volume of ~
~ trade and to familiarize people with both countries' products. During his i
_ visit to Iraq, Mr Akbi presided over Algeria Day at the 17th International
Fair of Baghdad. [Text] [Paris MARCFIES TROPICAUX ET NiEDITERRANEENS in French
19 Oct 79 p 2816J 11915
i
INTER-ARAB STEEL PROJECT--Meeting in Algiers last week, experts of the Arab ;
Countries Industrial Dev~lopment Center (IDCAS), the Arab Economic Unity
Council (UEA), the Islamic Development Bank (BID) and the Arab Mines Company
studied the possibility of setting up an inter-Arab steel project. The pur-
i pose of this project, in its initial stage, is to satisfy Arab iron and steel i
- needs, estimated at 18 million`tons for 1985 according to these experts. In
his speech opening the proceedings, Mr Slimar.e Bentobal, chairman of the board
~ of directors of the Arab Iron and Steel Union, said that "such a project is ~
possible only with the combined efforts of Arab countries. Individual efforts '
by each country will not enable such a project, despite its resources and po- _
tential, to command attention on the international market in view of the com-<
petition of industrialized countries." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET ~
MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2817] 11915 ~
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ISLAMIC AFFAIRS -
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ISLAMIC SUFISr1, REFORM DISCUSSED AT PARIS SYMPOSIUM
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'AREIBI in Arabic 22-28 Nov 79 pp 76-77
[Article: "Islam in Paris Symposium; Toward New International System"]
[Text] In the face of the strong western current against the east and
against Islam in particular and within the framework of the cultural sym-
posiums organized by the Islamic World League in Paris with the aim of
opening a healthy dialogue between the east and the west under the auspices
of Dr 'Abd-al-Halim Khaldun al-Kinani, the league director, an important �
symposium was held this week. Following are the details.
"Reforming Sufism and Making Reform Sufist" [Taslif al-Sufiyah Wa Taswif
al-Salafiyah] is the titie of the lecture delivered by Dr Muhammad Mubarak,
a former minister and a visiting professor at Jordanian and Saudi Univer- _
= sities, at the opening session of the symposium. Afghani thinker (Najm
- al-Din Bimat), the deputy general director of culture and information of
UNESCO in Paris; Dr Sa'id Mugharbal, the official in charge of UNESCO's
relations with the Arab countries; Algerian researcher (Muhammad al-'Ayshubi
and Dr Ma'ruf al-Dawalibi, a former Syrian prime minister, took part in
the discussion.
Islam and Civilization _
At the outset of his discussion, the lecture~r dealt with the social condi-
tions that accompanied the rise of the Islamic world and the religious con-
cepts derived from the Koran and the Sunna which were able to "build a ~
- civilization that spread throughout mankind." Islam thus "proceeded from
a broad popular base" because it responded to the masses' "material and
spiritual" aspirations and hopes.
Dr Muhammad Mubarak goes on to define the view of the westerners interested
in Islam, saying that "they enter Islam by way of perverted suf ism. This
- will lead to the creation of an intellectual current that turns away from
dealing with the vital contemporary issues, such as fighting colonialism
and combatting poverty."
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- 'I'h(v i~ wl~y th..~ lecturcr draws attention to the pitC~z.l1s to wl?icl~ lsl~im is
exposed in tfie west and why he warns of the need "to re-examine sufism
on the basis of the Koran and the Sunna. We can thus eliminate the split
_ among the Muslims over the concept of sufism in the Islamic thought."
Sufism and Reformism jal-salafiyahJ
The lecturer also dwells on the crux of the reformist thought and examines
its negative and positive aspects, asserting that "the best of things is
- the golden mean," i.e. "reforming sufism and making sufist to settle the
sharp conflict between the sufists and the reformists in some Islamic
countries because this conflict obstructs us from fighting the other ideas ~
' when our enemy is atheism." Dr Mubarak concludes his lecture with this
question:
= Can we enrich tiie sufism found in the Koran and the Sunna with the moral '
= psychological element because the westerners will then discover that we ~
liave not done away with their civilization and technology and that the
interaction has happened? 'rhe lecturer concludes that "the decadence i-
under which the Islamic society lives is due to intrigue by the enemies
- of Islam" and not to the Piuslims themselves.
' I
Even though the time set aside for discussion was short, the discussion
itself was daring and profound. Dr Sa`d Mugharbal's answer was clear and
truthful and Dr Mugharbal brought the audience back to the present reality i
when he said: i
One Half Billion Illiterate People ~
I am afraid that we may return the Islamic world to the yellow books. Our
orthodox religion which starts with the word "read" [in the imperative form]
has more than 500 million people who cannot read or write. I believe that `
a return to facility, simplicity and realism.is the solution because the
Islamic world is now going through a dangerous labyrinth that pushes the ~
_ Arab man toward what is old in particular. This is why the citizen has '
- begun to doubt and to cast doubts on everything, except for God's book.
There are even those who cast doubts on the Sunna.
God Is Great '
Afghani thinker (Najm al-Din Bimat) focused on a return to the Koran to ,
- eliminate the disagreement that has accumulated among the Muslims throughout
ages so that their unity may be bolstered and their sectarian rancors may -
be replaced by amity under the banner of "God is Great."
He announced to the audience that he will devote the rest of his life "to
_ defend Islam," having retired from diplomatic work in the UNFSCO this week.
The comment of Algerian researcher Muhammad al-'Ayshubi on the lecture
_ was:
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If we consider the dark pericd through whir,h the Muslims have passed and
_ the various injustices inflicted upon them, we can understand today the .
causes of the disagreement of the Muslims over their spiritual balance--
disagreement resulting from the various periods by which they have been
~ affected. Perhaps this explains the difference in viewpoints between
those who believe in a single creed and those who call for it.
Sufism of W~st
~ r-
If there are Europeans who enter Islam from the door of sufism, then this
_ is due to their escape from the psychological pressure and anxiety under
which they exist in a stifling material life that is void of spiritual _
values. They resort to Islam and take refuge in the sufist wa}s because
_ of the veneration and appreciation these Europeans find in them. -
This is in addition to the psychological calm that is free of strife and
struggle. Meanwhile, the non-European Muslims calling for the renaissance
of the Islamic world are muddling through the problems of development,
the strife of achieving progress, the in~ustices of oppression and the yoke
of colonia~ism. These people understand Islam in the form of fighting
and jihad [holy war]. _
The commentator adds: In essence, su.fism is nothing but a struggle to
purge the soul and to steer it clear off the vices of life and the passions
that desecrate it. This is what we find in the venerable Koran which says:
_ "He who fears God and curbs the passions of his soul shall have paradise for ~
his abode." Ttie Koran also says: "He who has purged it [his soul] has
succeeded."
If the essence of sufism is the element of purifying and elevating the
soul, then purification of the soul leads to straight and clear thought,
clear vision and firm belieF. Considering that our Islamic throught is
based on firm fourcdations, it urges us to correct the ;.oncepts of our life
so that we may rid ourselves of alien thought forever. -
Development From Within
: I asked al-'Ayshubi: Is the social and cultural structure that retains
its sufism and reformism forever in the Islamic society capable of rising -
and developing through "intermarriage" with the western technology? .
He said, eliminating the ambiguity: The Islamic world is in a dire need
to develop from within so as to rid itself of the tyrannical and oppressive
regimes that still close the doors of development and progress in the face
~ of their peoples. The Islamic peoples are now calling for reformin� and
changing the present conditions so that the Muslim individual may live in
a healthy Islamic society with his full rights.
There is no doubt that the Islamic peoples will rise one day to buil~: their ~
social, political and economic future on Islamic foundations. The pivot
, 11
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of these foundations is consultation among the nation's members, as God, may
He be praised, said: "Their affairs are run in consultation among them."
- The Is1am:Lc world cannot perform its role toward humanity if it is muddling
thruugh conflicts with itself, forgetting and neglecting its values and -
- the elements of its strength.
Development with all its aspects, be they cultural, economic or technical,
cannot succeed if it is not based on sound and firm economic foundations.
This is our condition for development and for the Islamic world to take
its place among the international powers.
Muslims and World ~ -
[QuestionJ Can we imagi.ne a certain role performed someday by the Islamic
countries among the major powers struggling in the world?
[Answer] Yes, this is possib le. The Is~amic world which was represented
a few years ago by weak and powerless states is now marching forth from '
popular bases that nothing can withstand. _
Thus, the age of colonialism which usurped the rights and exploited the
resources has gone and the Islamic peoples have risen to dictate their
will, to stress their entity and to determine their f uture. ~
_ The Islamic world is now going through a phase of transition which will ~
inevitably lead to rejuvenation. This world is proceeding to fortify itself '
with structures, bases and establishments that respond to its Islamic ~
aspiractions and goals. When it achieves this, it will be able to perform _
a role and to prove its ability as a balancing international power. ~
There is no doubt that the military, industrial and financial powers will ;
, try to maintain the status quo, even if the matter requires the use of ;
intimidation and violence. But the inevitable will for change to which ~
peoples cling cannot be deterred by violence or intimidation. I-
i
Toward New International System ;
A1-'Ayshubi adds: The Islamic world must reject continuation of the status ~
~ quo imposed by the international pawers and must struggle to establish a ;
balance international situation. The strength of the Islamic peoples wi11 ~
provide the proper opportunity to restore the Islamic civilization to its
place. ;
I
I
- COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI ~
~
~
~
849 4 -
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~ ALGERIA
~ OPPOSITION LEADER DISCUSSES STAT'US OF REVOLUTION
_ Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 8-14 Nov 79 pp 34, 35
[Interview with Mohamed Boudiaf: "One of the Historical Leaders of the
. Revolution of a Million Martyrs Explains How His Country Won the War but
Lost the Peace; Mohamed Boudiaf Says, 'Border Army Rules Algeria; Ben Bella
Is Wonder�ul Person When One Is Alone with Him
[Text] Mohamed Boudiaf is one of the historical leaders of the Algerian
Revolution, but he differed with Ben Bella and has been living in exile
ever since, away from the homeland for whose independence he had fought
- and struggled. Today, Boudiaf chairs the Socialist Revolutionary Party,
_ which is a national, Marxist, leftist party that is classified politically
to the left of traditional communist parties.
- if. AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI is making its pages available to the statements of
- this political leader on one of the most noble occasions which modern Arab
histor.y boasts of--the 25th anniversary of the Algerian Revolution--it is .
affirming its interest in serving as a platform from which political and
pogular leaders can express their views. Accordingly, AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
� is prepared to be responsive to opinions that contradict or oppose those
of Boudiaf. ~
This year's celebrations of the silver anniversary of the outbreak of the
Armed Popular Liberation Revolution in Algeria on the first of November
- 1954 were not confined to the huge and unexpected military parade that
took place in the Algerian capital under the cover of MIG 25 airplanes.
The celebrations were not confined to the popular demonstrations which
marched through the streets of the capital proclaiming that the past was
over and that a new leaf would be turned in the history of independent
Algeria under its third president. The celebrations were not confined to
� the broad cleanup and security campaigns which the capita.l of the million
martyrs was experiencing for the first:time in its new history. All these
phenomena and celebrations have rather coincided with an examination rios-
ture. Officials of Algeria headed by Ch~?dli Bendjedid adopted this;~;ostura;
and the historical leaders of the historical revolution adopted t1'~i.s pos-
~ ture also.
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Among those leaders is Mr Mohamed E~oudiaf who has been associated with the
revolution ever since it was a mere idea in the minds of some fighters.
Mohamed Boudiaf celebrated the silver anniversary of ti?e revolution with
3n open letter to President Chadli. [Iie wrote the letter] in his capacity -
as a foundir.g member of the Liberation Front Party, a former deputy for the
provisional government of the Algerian Rspublic and a founding member of
the Socialist Revolutionary Party which is described as the most important
leftist oppoeition party in Algeria since independence.
Boudiaf Recalls
In this open letter of his Boudiaf bemoaned the absence nf the numerous
f igiiters who had made the first move on the f irst of November. He reminded ,
[readers] of the story of that handful of fighters, the members of that ,
- special organization, who had exploded the first bomb with the limited means
they had at that time. There were 22 fighters who had refused to become
entangled in the political struggles between the leaders, and they under-
took the responsibilities of the struggle regardless of the consequences. ~
Boudiaf inentioned the names of those who lost their lives because they be- ;
lieved in the freedom of the people: Ben Boulaid, Ben M'hidi, Didouche ~
Morad, [Suidani?], Ben Abdelmalik, Zighout, Baji Mokhtar, Chihani, Dhabana ~
and others. ~
After these preliminary.remarks in his open letter to President Chadli, i
Boudiaf shifted to the abnormal conditions [that have been evident] since
independence. He accused "a group of opportunists, businessmen and adven-
turers" of takiing advantage of the vulnerable points in the Liberation
front during the days that followed independence. He alsa accused this
group of attacking the revolution's accomplishments.
~ i
In a posture of examining 17 years of independence Boudiaf made the fol~ ~
lowing sketch: ;
I
There is a keen interest in the accumulation of capital at the expense of i
the Primary needs of the masses. i-
- Gran~iose projects are preferred over a genuine policy for development which
would be supervised by the Algerians themselves. :
- There is a preference, regardless of the cost, for imported technology and ,
modernization over the establishment of a national economy and the develop- ~
ment of different resources, especially agricultural resources.
There is a move tio force the country into a position of subordination to
the western market in technology, eommerce, finance and even food.
There is an inequitable distribution of wealth instead of the establish-
ment of equitable social relations. This 1ed some people to accumulate
tremendous fortunes aC the expense of the majority of the people. It led
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to the creation of numerous problems such as unemployment, migration from
the rural areas, a housing problem and pro~ilems of health and migrant labor,
etc.
,
'1'he masses ar~`'being removed from the political arena, and everything is
being concentrated in the official agencies. =
Instead ~f ma~ing an effort to unify its peoples, the area of Arab Maghreb
is being turned into an arena for the etruggle between the superpowers.
In order to get out of all these crises under the leadership of Chadli
Bendjedid, Boudiaf auggested several reforms. The most important of these
reforms are: issuing a full pardon to all political convicts; guaranteeing
the freedom of expression and freedom of the press; guaranteeing freedom
for political acti~vity and for professional organizations; and aba~ndoning
the one party system. .
This is the picture that Mohamed Boudiaf aketched of the Algerian Revolution
a quarter of a century after it broke out in the open letter he wrote to
President Chadli. -
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI met with Mr Mohamed Boudiaf on the occasion of the 25th
' anniversary of the Algerian Revolution, one of whose historical members
he was. It also met with him on the occasion of the letter that he wrote.
AL-WATAN AI,-'AR,ABI interviewed Mr Boudiaf abflut his opinions and his points
of view on Algeria today.
Secrets That Are Being Announced for the First Time
Boudiaf began his statements by going back to tihe conditions that paved
- the way for the outbreak of the revolution.
Boudiaf said, "Messali Hadj, who founded the Algerian People's Party among "
whose members the revolutionary spark was ignited, was in the last days of
his life without a theory and removed from the party and from the masses.
"The first time that carrying out the revolution was seriously considered -
was in 1952 when we established a revolutionary committee that included a
group of orficials. The purpose of that committee was to bring about a
- revolution thr.ougtiout Northwest Africa."
Boudiaf went on to explain this secret that is being announced for the first
. time and said, "In March 1952 we established the revolutionary committee
in the hope of saving the party fro~ division. It was an expression of a
_ course of thought that existed among the ranks of public opinion. Between
March and June of the same year we published a magazine entitled LE PATRIOTE;
only five issues of that magazine were published.
"The purpose of this first attempt in 1952 was to bring about a comprehensive
revolution. We charged some persons with contacting the base (al-Hamadi
- and al-Hashimi who had trained Boumedier_ne). Abdelhamid Mehri, the present _
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minister of informati~n was among those who had been charged with this task.
Ti~istafa Bula'id had manufactured bombs himself and stored them in Batna,
which was an important center for the revolutionaries. Our collea~ues
- Crom htorocco contacted us, and we intended to work ttiroughout all of NorLl~
AFrica.
"But this first attempt did not succeed. The police placed restrictions on _
Che .Eighters, and they were dispersed, but in 1954 they were reunited. "
"In practice, the revolution began with the Committee of 22. k'e had 200
guns, and the fourth and the fifth provinces embarked upon the revolution
with no weapons whatsoever." `
Boudiaf went an to reveal another secret, "We had basically decided to fire
the first shot on October 15, but the fact that communications with some '
groups had been impaired delayed the date to the first of November. I -
remember that Rabah Bitat, the present speaker of the People's Assembly ~
. used to ask, 'What will we do if the people do not go along with us?' .
- And we would reply, `If the people go along with us, we succeed, and if
they don`t go along, this would be another experience that would be added '
- to our people's history of struggle.' Ben Mahidi had only two bullets in !
his gun. Ramadan Abdelmalik was the revolution's first casualty. He
died on the first of November. '
"Our only hope was the people, and the people accepted us and went along ~
with us." -
i
Weakness in the Political Structure ~
[(luestion] Why then did these divisions happen later, and.why didn't the I
leadership of the revolution preserve its unity? I
[Answer] The launching point [of the revolutionJ comprised a minority,
_ and this minority was characterized by several weaknesses. First, it did
not have enough time to shape itself in a completely revolutionary fashion.
None of the bases and principles that had been formulated prior to the
first of November was sufficient. I=
Second, the fighters were encountering considerable difficulty in forming ~
a political agency along with being revolutionaries. Ninety percent of ~
the Algerian people participated in the revolution. But this was not the
situation of the political organization--the front which represented all
the people. ;
~
When the Soummam Conference took place, the front was responsive. It was I
unfortunate that this conference asked all the other agencies on the scene,
such as the group of Ferhat 'Abbas and the Association of Ulema to join
- it, but it did not have a unifying theory.
Most of those who fought the war in Algeria died. The rest ?eft the country
to proclaim their ideas, but those who remained inside the country worked _
hard. 16
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:
Among the [revolution's] other weaknesses are the strugg].es over power. -
Independence faced all these problems. When the country got its independence,
more than 1 million persons had lost their lives and more than two and a
iialf inillion'persons were in prison and in camps. The problems which the '
J
c;ountry f:aced were difFicul.t problerns. It di~. not have 1 stlble ~zcimin~[s!~ra-
- tion, and there was no established course. -
The only organized force at that time was the border force. This is what is
- being written.'today in the Newspaper, EL MOUD.7AHID. Weapons shaped the
force that contemplated power. Slogans controlled the situation, but there
was no political organization.
The Border Army Rules
[QuestionJ Does this mean that the border army has been ruling Algeria since
independence?
[Answer] One of the fighters compared the crisis of coming into power in
1962 to an elephant with a head the size of a pin. The Evian Agreements
between the provisional government and France were mysterious. The sovereign
pocaer was divided as it came into the country: one part was in Algiers
and another was in Tlemcen. Colonialism took maximum advantage o,f these
disturbed conditions. It withdrew from the country, carrying with it all
state archives including papers and accounts. It took advantage of the
- fact tl~at there was no savereign power and of the fact that power had nor
been transferred in a normal and orderly fashion.
Algeria won the war, but it lost the peace.
[Question] But don't you think that regardless of its identity, the
leadership did pursue a course that was politically progressive?
[Answer] It is the border army that rules; the rest is political cover.
They took three of the five leaciers whom France had kidnapped and imprisoned.
Al1 those who have not been in agreement with the government ever since rhat
time were called all kinds of names, the simplest of which was that of
traitor. Algeria has the disease of slogans.
[Question] What were the effects of that on the popular level?
[Answer] Today, there are two standards in Algeria: there is socialism -
without a foundation, and there are people who are poor on the one hand,
and a leadership that has enriched itself, on the other. I have often asked ~
myself, "Did Boumedienne have a history of struggle?" I believe he does
not.
_ The dispute over power arose on the anniversarj~ of independence in August
1962. Was it possible for us to go along with obscure forces whose prin-
ciples and features were not clear? There was a bourgeoisie constituency
' in the provisional government, and we called for a meeting for clarification.
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Boumedienne objected and said, "No. The government comes first." There
were 15,000 fighters in the front at that time. They constituted a minority
in relation to the people. From this minority another minority emerged to -
coilfront the leadership. [Certain] ob~ective difficulties and circumstances
were responsib].e for these excesses.
Charters Were Written in OfficPs
[~uestion] The present Algerian regime has adopted the 1976 Charter as
~ its constitution. It is known that this national charter was subjected
to broad popular- discussions and was accepted by the people.
[Answer] The charter does not express anything. There was a series of
_ charters before it. The upshot of the matter is that a group of intellec-
tuals was brought together and placed in an office to write this charter. ' :
The charter is merely a written work that will join other written works
which preceded it. ~
The deliberations over the charter remind me of an anecdote that used to ~
be told during the days of the Algeria Charter. One person called for the '
boycott of the elections, and when he was asked why he was doing so, he -
said, "I read the charter; it has useful things and, useless things. If
I said yes to the charter, I would be accepting the useless things; and
if I said no I would be refusing the useful things." ;
i
[Question] But those who visited Algeria during that period noticed that
there was relative freedom to criticize [the government] and to speak. I
- [Answer] The regime became fearful of this phenomenon and tried to prevent ~
people from speaking their minds. There were successive strikes immediately
after the discussions about the charter, and the workers asked for a wage ;
increase. ~
There is another frightening phenomenon, and that is the deterioration
of political and social morals. Everyone who did not support the writings
and the slogans of the government was considered an instigator and an
enemy. Everything that came from outside the regime was viewed in advance
as hostile and was confronted with hostility, rejection and accusation. I
- [Question] Are you thinking of going back to Algeria? What are your per-
sonal conditions for going back?
[Answer] As far as I am concerned, the basi'i~ conditions that we are pro-
pusing are, first, the freedom to move about, the freedom to discuss matters
, with Algerians and the freedom to organize---to organize the party.. ~
i
[Question] Are there court sentences against you? ` ~
[Answer] In 1964 Ben Bella sentenced me to death. ~
18 -19
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Ben 13e].1a Is Wo`nderful, but...
[Question] By~the w~~;, what do you think of Ben Bella?
~
[Answer] Ben Eella is a wonderful person when one is alone with him. But
as soon as he is in the presence of more than two people, his conduct is
changed completely, and he immediately begins to talk like a leader with
_ a major propensity for power and leadership.
~
[Question] What do you think about current political activities in Algeria?
[Answer] The~media is being monopolized in Algeria. Everything is official
and the PAGS Group, that is, the Socialist Vanguard Party which functions
through the Liberation Front, includes former communists and may be found
in some organizations and institutions--the Youth Alliance and the Agri-
cultural Revolution--is practicing political terrorism and creating a
difficult situation.
[Question] How do ycu explain the good relations that exist between the
French left and the Algerian regime?
- [An~wer] The French left is playing the game. Take, for example, Marchais's
repeated visits\to Algeria. We 3iscovered that there was a plan ~to cooperate
with Algeria. This plan was drawn up by the French left prior to the former
French parliamentary elections. The plan would have been implemented in
case the French left had won the elections. This plan, which was revealed
after the left failed to win the elections, was in reali.ty a new colonialist
plot to gain control over Algeria's capabilities.
- [Question] What then is the role of your organization, the Socialist Revolu-
tionary Party?
[Answer] It is unfortunate that opportunities for dialogue were broader
during the days of the occupation. Dialogue [then] was more meaningful.
At the present time we are the only political organization that has an
organizational base. We have existing structures, and we are, therefore,
calling on others to organize and to debate. Every one of our chapters
; is financially independent. This allows us to exist in different sectors.
[Question] Finally, you are one of the leaders of the first of November
[Revolution], and you are living in Morocco. What is your opinion of the
Sahara problem'
_ [Answer] What is happening today is harmful to both countries and is
totally inconsistent with the notion of a united Arab Maghreb. Such tension
which is in existence [todayJ serves the interests of no one.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
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ALGL RI A
PROGRESS OF CLEAl~1UP CAMPAIGN REVIEWED
i
_ Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET NIEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 pp 2807, 2808
[Text] In launching the campaign against "social ills" in early September, -
the president of the Algerian Republic, the FLN and the government apparently ~
intended to revive that revolutionary enthusiasm so often invoked but actually
neutralized by a whole series of factors: the people hardly believed in it ;
any longer, the party no longer had any impact, too many government officials i
- were passive or negligent and authorities reacted only with isolated and poorly
coordinated efforts. PresidEnt Chadli Bendjedid's merit is having understood ;
that the Algerian people were vaguely waiting for something to happen and that ~
if authorities energetically plunged into it together, the people would join !
in that initiative.
I
i
In this campaign against "all forms of negligence, bad behavior and waste," ~
unity of action has been achieved among party organs, the administration, the !
police, the courts and elected officials. Every citizen inanediately under- i
stood the hope which an effective cleanup would produce and that the economic ~
and social ills from which he suffers, shortages, waste, bureaucracy, corrup- j-
tion, lack of good citizenship, could be eliminated if he did his part. For ~
"those who jeopardize the Revolution who hinder the development effort `j
who scoff at the principles of the Revolution and its options those respon- I
sible for waste parasites " must be punished "at whatever level of re- i
sponsibility they are found." But information media immediately stressed in-
dividual responsibilities: "Everyone must be~ome aware of his shortcomings
and strive to eliminate them Everyone must do his job properly" (EL ;
MOUDJAHID, 6 September 1979).~-~~: fact, the youth of the capital, stimulated ~
by mass organizatioris, immediately lent their assistance, particularly in
removing trash and cleaning. ;
It was the party coordinator, Mr Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui, who pointed out for
the Algerian Press Service (8 September) that this operation, which "is neither
improvised nor temporary," is in keeping with the public will to "decisively
and equitably put an end to all forms of delinquency," but requires "a self-
- critical spirit impartiality and great inspiration," The operation ~
is aimed at "respect for order and moral principles Once all social struc-
tures have been unified: from the family to the school, to the mosque, to the
~ 21
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enterprise, to the party cell, to information and communications media, we _
will then�be able to isolate fringe elements, for it is better to prevent
than to cure.�
Recalling this verse of the Koran: "God will not change the situation of a
people unless they change themselves," and maintaining that "Islam is the -
first religion which called for agreement between faith and action," Mr
Mohamed Salah'Yahiaoui completed his statements by referring to the Arab-
Islamic heri~age and to Algerian social traditions, the sources of the
Revolution's moral values. "?1~1 precepts of Islam," he explained, "encourage -
cleanliness; even acts of piety require cleanliness for the mind, for the body
and for the environment In our. current terminology, corollaries of a per-
son's responsibility to his neighbor, which Islam considers important, are
freedom, responsibility, civic duty and limits to individual rights."
~ Launched in Algiers, the cleanup operation was extended to Oran and Constantine -
several days later and by early October it involved every community of any con- _
sequence in the country. The initial enthusiasm continued with partic~~lar ease
as positive results became immediately apparent. The transformation of the
urban landscape was striking almost everywhere: clean sidewalks and fronts of
buildings, removal of garbage and refuse, disappearance cf vagrants, illegal
street vendors, those with time on their hands, etc., improvement of the flow
of traffic. New buses put into service in Algiers coincided very timely with
the removal of vehicles from illegal parking places.
New Problems Caused by Cleanup Effort
However, the effort could be effectively continued only if people's zeal did
not diminish and if material resources were available. With regard to the _
= f irst point, the authoritarian framework was not enough; "Every citizen must
actively participate in the management and control of public affairs" (EL
MOUDJAHID editorial, 6 October). As for the second point, important financial
" efforts were announced, in particular by the municipality of Algiers; but needs
were considerable and just when people were congratulating each other on the
rest~red appearance of the famous Casbah, 16 houses on the verge of collapse
had to be evacuated and emergency relocation had to be provided for 150
families
Tt~e educational and therefore edifying aspect of the cleanup operation was
demanded by its organizers; but inspections were sometimes indiscreet and
the repressive aspect immediately took on considerable importance. Household
visits were made, especially in outlying districts and suburbs, and sometimes
resulted in the hasty destruction of installations of a"shantytown" type on
terraces and balconies, as we 11 as the order to slaughter or remove sheep and
poultry raised "in town." Checks were made to track down civil servants ne-
glecting the office for the cafe and certain municipalities banned card games
or dominoes in bars and drinking establishments during working hours.
After hunting down evidence of urban livestock breeding, actually terrible for
sanitation and public peace, some people also advocated the elimination of
, ,
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- "underground industry," as in the Casbah of Algiers, which employs underpaid -
youth in deplorable sanitary conditions. All of that is certainly justified; -
but traditional li=e-styles and livelihoods are destroyed in the }~r.ocess and
must definitely be replaced. A change in customs will also be essential fot~
such changes to take root. Thus the cleanup, while being educational in it-
self, requires an additional educational effort. This is also a path to
which Algeria is committed: the cleanup operation is only one episade that
is more striking than others and must not be judged separately.
As the repressive aspect of the campaign aroused some Western press agencies, ~
however, the public prosecutor and president of the Court of Algiers, Mr
Hocine Ait Chalal and Mr Ahsned Med'~ihouba held a ~
~ , ~ress conference on
3 October. They poirited out that the courts had acted completely within
the law, punishing only outright violations: theft, insalubrity, nonobser- -
vance of highway regulations, etc., and that no major incident was reported.
From 6 to 30 September, 981 individuals were brought before the public pro-
_ secutor of Algiers and 452 of them were given sentences equal to or greater
than 6 months in jail, 103 with lighter sentences; nine were acquitted and
the others were released on bail. Nearly 70 percent of those sentenced to
more than 6 months are recidivists, who will be punished by being banned'
from the capital; the sentences will be served on the esparto harvesting
and reforestation sites of Saida and Tlemcen, respectively, in compliance
with an ordinance of 12 February 1y72 for the social rehabilitation of j
- those concerned. ~
. i-
At certain timES, however, the poZice appear to have acted so obviously
accarding to traditional Moslem standards of the "Commandery of Good" that -
some people considered this to be evidence of righteousness; thus unwed
couples were harassed to a slight extent. Referring to Mr Mohamed Salah -
Yahiaoui's aforementioned statements, however, it will be noted that the -
authorities urged the application of Moslem faith and morals only very -
cautiously and mod~rately. And the tone of the appeal to workers, made on
8 September by the Algiers wilaya [governorate] chapter of the UGTA
- [General Union of Algerian Workers] was tot ally secular. ,
FLN Commissions in Full Swing
~
Paralleling the cleanup operation, the activities of national FLN commissions
were stepped up: it was planned that the operations of several commissions
would coincide with this operation, thus providing a framework for it.
In early September, the commission for social affairs organized among its
subcommissions (moudjahidines and labor, health and sickness insurance,
hygiene and living conditions, social action and social security), a series
~ of 27 task forces covering areas as diverse as population and demography in
relation to family policy, information and bureaucracy, social ills, immigra-
tion, purchasing power, wages and prices, etc. On 8 September in a plenary
session, the social affairs commission heard a long report by Dr Mohamed Amir,
its chairman and a member of the FLN Political Bureau, who boldly examined the
most specific details and clearly stated a certain number of resolutions to be
taken, methods to be selected and problems to be solved, and also without any
fear of referring to Islam, which he looks at from a very modern angle. _
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Dr Amir, among others, said that the commission must find out how to make
the masses sensitive to prob~ems of public hygiene and to establish the
foundations for such a policy. During the years of formulating major legal
texts, "a significant minority of profiteers, egotists, antisocial and un-
civic elements, through their antinational, antisocialist and anti-Islamic
action," covered the country with an unhealthy climate, from which everyone
suffers by rejecting his responsibility to other~. It would be necessary
to stop mentioning a person's responsibility to his neighbor in order to
plan his own~individual participation: "if that were no longer in keeping
with socialism and Islam What can be said," the speaker continued,
"about illiteracy and feudal mentality, which are incompatible with the
liberal spirit of Islam and the logic of socialism, and backward ideas from
which women continue to suffer? About the id~eness which prevails during
the month of Ramadan, when people fight, traffic, speak and live only for
food How is it possible to achieve true social justice when a distinc-
tiori is no longer made between the city and the country, between men and
_ women, and when nepotism is ignored? Social action consists of combatting
material and cultural disparities and must bring about the disappearance of -
the welfare mentality from our society How is it possible to cover the
shortaqe of 1 million dwellings and build another 2 million by returning
to 1966 employment levels in 1990? How is it possible to eliminate slums
- and shantytowns, to provide sewers, water, electricity and gas for everyone,
to establish a housing policy which must not just be based on the cost
price of a square meter of construction?" ~
Meeting again 3 days later, the commission for education, training and culture _
gave its attention to illiteracy and Arabization, formulati.on of a E~olicy L-~r
scientific research and a cultural policy, etc... Its draft resolution will
be binding for the respective ministries when it has been adopted by the
C2ntral Committee and the FLN Political Bureau. Such action shows the extent
of the responsibilities which the party intends to assume in formulating
general policy and is reason for wondering about the role left.for the
National Popular Assembly.
_ The commissions for nolicy studies and formulation on one hand, and for r
economic affairs on the other, opened their proceedings on 18 and 20 September.
Meeting under the chairmanship of an eminent former minister, Mr Belaid
Abdesselam, 12 acting ministers, 11 of which were actually present, and about
120 other members, this commission set up eight subcommissions; it is con-
sidering the regulation of large fortunes, establishment of the limits of
- "nonexploitive ownership," acceleration of economic integration and the for- _
mulation of precise, complete evaluations before preparing the next plan.
Mr Abdesselam stressed that the mission of this body, entirely different from _
a simple interministerial commission, is to use grass roots opinion as its
_ primary reference and to give considerati~n to the daily problems of the
masses. Since it is not a body which parallels government structures, it
' must clarify the party's decisions for the information of the masses and
include the latter in discussions of economic affairs, so that the Central -
Committee will have a complete idea of problems and will be able to solve
- the:n definitively. "The party's entry into the country's rconomic management,"
- � EL MOUDJAHID concludes, "is a factor which in itself provides much hope"
(23 September).
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- The commission for legal affairs and general organization, also chaired by
a Political Bureau member who is not a member of the administration, was
, set up on 29 September. Its chairman, Mr Said Mazouzi, referred to the
- role of social transformation which the party is assuming, which implies
"that the party is qualified to conceive, prepare and especially implement
a policy in keeping with the revolutionary aspirations of the masses." _
- Meeting in turn on 4 October under tlie chairmanship of former minister
Ahmed Bencherif, the Higher Council for Youth and Children includes,
together with five ministers, the general secretary of the UNJA [National
- Union of Algerian Youth] and the general secretary of the UNFA (National
Union of Algerian Women], who will be its reporter: Mrs Fatma Zohra
Djeghroud, a Central Committee member, is thus being given a great respon-
sibility. The council intends to be "a f~rum for young people." Like the -
commissions themselves, it is "a permanent structure of the Central Committee." ~
One of its tasks could be, its chairman suggests, to formulate an ordinance
providing for the liberation of Algerian women.
These activities of FLN commissions represent a unique feature of Algerian
political life, which is seeking its own forms of democratic expression. ~
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris 1979 ,
11915 ~
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ALGERIA `
BRIEFS
~IL REPORT--The Algerian Press Service [APS] confirmed on 9 October that
Algeria will export less crude oil next year in order to market more refined
products. Accordinq to the APS, raising the capacity of the Hassi-Messaoud -
refinery and opening the In-Amenas refinery in southern Algeria, and particu-
- larly the opening of the Skikda refinery, will increase "production avail-
abilities of refined products for export" next year (MTM [MARCHES TROPICAUX
- ET MEDITERRANEENSJ of 12 October, p 2754). The APS recalled that the giant ~
Skikda refinery--with an annual capacity of 15 million tons--will open in 1980
and will operate at 50-percent capacity that year. "This will enable SONATRACH,"
the agency stated, "to market more refined products than in the past, to the -
' detriment of crude oil." "To provide its regular customers with a maximum of
crude oil," the APS also stated, "SONATRACH had to prepare a strict plan, of
which it informed its customers." The APS further stated that "erroneous in-
terpretations" originating abroad, according to which SONATRACH wished to re-
serve certain quantities of crude oil for sale on the open market, have already
been denied by the national company. Finally, with regard to condensate, the
- APS said that "it is planned that SONATRACH will practically double its exports
in 1980 as a result of the impending opening of new processing units at Hassi
R'Mel," where Algeria's main deposits of natural gas are located. [Text] -
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2816] 11915
REFORESTATION CAMPAIGN--The 1979-80 reforestation campaign was simultaneously
opened in early October in the areas of the green dam, Mouilah (Djelfa wilaya
~governorate~) and E1-Bayadh (Saida wilaya), by colonels Mohamed Atailia and
_ Kamal Abderrahim, Central Committee members and respectively in command of the -
lst and 2nd military regions. This campaign, as pointed out in Algiers, is
part of the continuation of the work started in 1974 by young people in the -
national service and the project of building the green dam, which is to cover
an area of sevexal million hectares. The green dam, a long-term project, is
� also part of the integrated development operation based on the need to protect -
the steppes against desert encroachment. ~Text~ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2816~ 11915
, ALGERIAN-SOVIET CONTRACT--An Algerian-Soviet contract amounting to 22.4 million
dinars (nearly F23 million), and involving a study for establishment of a heavy
- electrical and mechanical equipment industry in Algeria, was signed in Algiers
on 10 October. The contract was signed on behalf of Algeria by Mr Redha
Amran~., assistant director of the Ministry of Heavy Industry, and on behalf of
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the USSR by Mr Andre S. Slivinski, economic affairs adviser in the Soviet
_ Embassy in Algiers, in the presence of the general secretary of the Ministry _
of Heavy Industry, Mr Mourad Castel. The amount of the contract will be
- totally financed by Soviet credits, in accordance with Algerian-Soviet
economic and technical cooperation agreements. Under the terms of this
contract, the Soviet Union has been commissioned to prepare a technical -
and economic report on the expediency, ways and means of providing Algeria -
with a heavy electrical and mechanical equipment industry. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRA~TEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2917] 11915 -
CSO: 4400
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IRAQ
,
BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH IRAN ON THE DFCLTNE
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 8-14 Nov 79 pp 22-23
[Article by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI's correspondent in Baghdad: "What Is
Expected of Baghdad? And What Is Expected of Teheran?"]
' [Text] The ayatollahs are greatly mistaken if they think that they can
- guarantee stability in Iran by exporting trouble to their neighbors.
- Have Iraqi-Iranian relations become more tense in the course of the last -
few weeks? Yes, but what are the considerations which, in positive and
negative terms, dominate Iraqi-Iranian relations? And in what way? And to
what extent? And what are the bases on which it would be possible to build
healthy, sound, normal relations between the two countries, regardless of
' the difference in their ruling regimes?
= Once again Iraqi~-Iranian relations are becoming tense and coming to a head.
= This is a direct result of the anarchy, confusion, and chaos which dominate
_ Iran's foreign relations which are, in turn, the result of a real lack of
political stability in this important country which shares with the Arabs
the coastline of the Arabian Gulf.
It is clear that those who are running the new government in Iran have not
possessed in the past, nor do they at the present time possess, experience _
_ and expertise as statesmen. Consequently they do not possess the [type of]
wisdom, which officials acquire from this [experience], which teaches them
- that silence quite often is golden, whereas letting fly with words, -
haphazardly, not only Ieads merely to internal crises, but also to foreign
crises which afflict relations with other countries.
At this stage Iran is by far the country which is most in need of being '
- cautious--until some of the ayatollahs learn how to keep their tongues
inside their mouths and reflect on what is happening to their country
before casting their eyes to places beyond their own borders.
_ And as for Iraqi-Iranian relations, since the rise of the new Iranian
regime at the beginning of this year these relations hav.e passed through
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run urrl~lru~ u~~ v~uLl
fluctuating periods of instability, dominated by crises which have been
~ reflected by reverberating and resounding declarations from the mouths of
- the ayatollahs. All of these [declarations), one way or another, have
expressed views and aims wh3ch could not be described as showing any
feelings of brotherhood in religion, [common] h~.story, or wanting to be a
good neighbor.
_ Iraq in particular is virtually at the head of the list of Arab countries,
bordering on the Gulf, that suffered from the abuse and policy of the
regime of the deposed Shah. And his hostile attitude toward the present
nationalist regime in Iraq reached the point where he felt impelled to give
- virtually obvious backing to Barzani's rebel.s, hoping to wear down the ;
- material resources of Iraq, and [change] the direction of its young
revolution. Plotting together with forces hostile to the Arab nation~ he
_ hoped to plunge [the revolution] into a state of psychological frustration.
This was due to his opinion that [the revolution] was incapable of
concluding, in its favor, the battle against the separatists. But the '
traqi revolution consolidated itself and took up the challenge which
previous Iraqi regimes had been unable to confront. Then the Shah finally '
realized that he too had become a victim of his costly [war of] attrition, ;
and that Iraqi determination to win the war was unequalled by anyone else's
_ determination. So he yielded, and in Algeria in 1975 an agreement was
arrived at which established principles which guided relations between the
two countries and restructured th~m according to the priorities required by
the circumstances--with a11 their positive and negative aspects--o.f that !
period in time. Iraq's primary aim therein was to express its good
intentions and turn over a new leaf in its relations with Iran, regardless
of the nature of the regime which existed in [Iran]. ;
However Iraq was surprised, right after the rise of tfie present regime in `
Iran, by its negative attitude for which [Iraq] could not find a logical, -
reasonable explanation. Iraq preferred to observe a policy of wisdom and ~
prudence, realizing--by virtue of its own well-established, firmly-rooted,
durable political regime--the extent to which a new regime suffers from ;
problems, contradictions, struggles, and negative phenomena.
But Iraq was not able to simply idly stand by when the negative and hostile ,
_ declarations and statements, which were dripping with both open and
concealed hatred for everything that is Arab, changed from being merely
words into being encroachments upon the security of the Gulf under various
pretexts. ~
'
Nevertheless Iraq perferred to be courteously patiEnt, favoring efforts to ;
- quiet matters down, and even refrained from replying to the slander and
provocation. Iraq never was the one who started trouble. Its reply was
also as a reaction and it never struck the first blow, since it kept in
mind all the considerations that served as ties between it and Iran. But
when faced with [Iran's] ignoring its good intentions and throwing out
accusations, by various means, against it, [Iraq], so to speak, reached the
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~ .
limit of its patience. Iraq today is not the Iraq of 1968, nor is it the
Iraq of 1973, nor even the Iraq of 1975. Th~s is sensed by political -
_ observers he~e. And everybody who is familiar with Iraq's conditions,
situation,'and its growth in its capabilities and potential, knows this.
If an observer wants to make a statement by using a comparison, [he will
say that] Iian does not find itself today, nor would it find itself -
tomorruw, able to export its negative phenomena to Traq or to influence the
course of events there. This is due to the disintegration of internal
conditions in Iran and the weakness of the new regime which actually did
bring down the Shah's regime, but is still unable to serve as a positive
substitute for it and to present itself to its neighbors as a factor of
stability, stabilization, cooperation, and tolerance in the region. -
Perhaps Iraq, due to its previous troubles with Tran, has a right to
express its suspicion and alarm and has a right to adopt sound and clear
- attitudes which embody its will, feel3ng of independence, and stauiich
determination to confront every challenge with an even stronger reply.
This is based on its belief in itself as an Arab nation and its desire to
exercise sovereignty over its lands and to participate in building the -
future of its greater [Arab] homeland.
Therefore Iraq was not speaking haphazardly when it said that it may be
forced to review everything which has a bearing on its relations with Iran.
Perhaps even today the average Iraqi will consider that he has the right to
sympathize with persecut!ed minorities which have been crushed within the
framework of the "Empire" or [sympathize with] the nationalities of the
"Iranian Empire." At the head of this list of minorities is an Arab _
minority, [the members of which) have been living practically as beggars
while riches have been snatched right from under their feet,
And if this is the thinking today of the average Iraqi who is observing the
course of events and losing his patience, then a visiting political
observer'or journalist could well imagine that similar feelings and
considerations might have the upper hand in the emotions and logic of those -
who have the reins of power here.
Judging by the declarations and statements issued and attributed to
authorized Iraqi diplomatic sources last week--all of which came as a
surprise ta Iraqis, to political circles, and maybe even surprised Iran--
can it be said that the tenuous ties which bind Teheran and Baghdad are
either about to be severed or [in fact] already have been completely cut?
The truth is that it is a mistake to think that Baghdad's political and
diplomatic behavior, especially on the level of international relations,
can be characterized as being of the rash nature which is dominant in the
Iraqi temperament. Any observer here can sense that the regime is intent
on calculating its moves and steps carefully, deliberately, with a high
degree of objectivity, and on the basis of the national interest and
national policy. ~
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And for this reason it is also po~sible to say that the authorized
statements issued--concerning the 1975 agreeiqenti the three Arab islands
that Iran has occupied since 1971 in the Strait of Hormuz, and also the
cause of the Arab minority in Arabistan (Khuzistan)--have not been all, or
even partly, spontaneous or merely probes or "balloons" which were released
- into the air.
TE C}~e Iraqi's hot-blooded nature is embodied precisely in such behaviort
it is [also] embodied in honestly and purity which knows neither
capriciousness nor fickleness. An Traqi 3s candid about his love and his
hatred. And he does not show the negative side of this equation, which ~
- dominates his behavior, unless he i~ provoked and pushed in that direction.
The observer who reviews the positions [taken] and the sequence of events .
finds that Baghdad has always been in the position of being exposed to ;
provocation on the part of the other side which thinks and ~imagines that ~
the Iraqi house is made of glass, which will crack or break when one merely I
throws pebbles at it.
In spite of all of this, a political observer here feels that Iran, not ~
Iraq--I repeat, not Iraq--is capable of doing a great deal in the way of
eliminating all of the causes which have led to the recent disintegration
in relations with its Arab neighbors, with Iraq, in particular, being at
the head of this list.
Unless the new Iranian regime takes into account the fact that Iraq h~s an ;
active role [to play], is of effective size, has a great deal of wei~ht,
- has its distinctive viewpoint and also has moral and material interests in ~
[t~e Gulf--by virtue of the national, spiritual relations that bind it to
~ its sister [Arab states] there and by virtue of the fact that the Gulf is ~
also an artery for Iraqi cil which is exported to the world markets--then
it will be difficult for relations to once again become what they were. In ~
fact it is more accurate to say that it would be difficult to establish ;
(relations] on any but these bases and principles which Iran must recognize, '
no matte'r who seizes the reins of power in Teheran, whether he be a shah or
one of the ayatollahs from the religious establishment.
There remains another point. Perhaps a political observer here can address '
- it on his own behalf and by virtue of his awareness of the nature of the '
- circumstances and principles which govern policies [followed] in the region.
This [point] is that it is better to ;~pare the parties concerned with
mediation and peacemaking efforts if they aim at achieving gains for those
undertaking the efforts, or if they have in mind bargaining or expecting
- Iraq to bargain--that is, to bargain over any of its rights or principles
of national sovereignty and point of view with regard to its national rule
- and role in the Arab world, and especially with regard to its role in the
- Gulf .
COPYRIGHT: '1979 AL-WATp1V AL-ARABI
9468
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~ rvx ur�r~iu.~w u~~ uivLY
,
IRAQ
BRIEFS
_ AID TO ZAMBIA--Baghdad--President Saddam Husayn's invitation to the African
president, Kenneth Kaunda, to visit Iraq clearly reflects the course along
which the Iraqi political leadership is proceeding 3.n order to build
fundamental and close relationships with the Afiican countries. This is
rooted in a firm belief that Africa is a basic ally of the Arab people.
The bonds of friendship between the two presidents were strengthened during
the summit conference of the non-allied nations in Havana a few months ago.
Iraq's expanding interest in the,black continent expresses its support for
all of the African liberation movements and its desire to support Zambia's -
' steadfastness and defense capabilities since it is one of~the confrontation
- states which opposes the collapsing racist regime in Zimbabwe Rhodesia. In
= an effort to contribute toward strengthening Zambia's economy and growth
plans, a loan and aid agreement between the two countries was signed,
according to which Iraq wi11 offer Zambia a cash grant of 9 million dollars
as well as a cash loan amounting to 30 million dollars. Iraq has revealed
the fact that the Iraqi Fund for F'or.eign Development is prepared to assess
the eccnomic benefits of the development plans which Zambia is coming
- forward with in order to determine its share in the financing of those -
plans. The two countries have also decided to strive to set up ~oint
projects. One important accomplishment of the visit is that the two sides
have agreed to establish a joint bank, in [the activities of] which other _
friendly African nations will be invited to participate if both sides agree
on their participatione Iraq has also decided to supply Zambia with crude
oil, and an allotment of 150,000 metric tons will be delivered during the
course of 1980. He [Kaunda] also praised the Havana summit conference, -
emphasized the right of the Palestinian people to recover all of their land
' and rights, and condemned the Camp David agreements. And the Zambian
president praised the revolution in Iraq and President Saddam Husayn,
saying: "The revolution is in safe hands. President Saddam Husayn is an
extraordinary leader." [Text] [Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 22-28
Nov 79 p 17] 9468
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~ ~ MOROCCO
MARITIME TRANSPORT AGREEMENT SIGNED WITH FRANCE
' Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Nov 79 p 3012
[Text] French Minister of Transport Joel Le Theule was in Rabat from 2 to
5 November. While there he signed a maritime transport agreement with Mo-
' roccan Minister of Commerce and Tndustry Azzeddine Guessous. The agreement
_ provides that Morocco and France will share the activity equally on a strict
basis of reciprocity. Le Theule said, "The basis for line traffic will be
40 percent for Morocco, 40 percent for France, and 20 percent for third
, parties--in other words, 50 percent for each of the two parties." ~
According to an AFP dispatch from Rabat, this agreement officially caps the
arrangement agreed on last 28 September by t}ie shipowners of the two coun-
, tries concerning regular line traffic. The agreement, which was negotiated
and initialed in May 1978, provided in particular for a harmonious develop-
- ment of maritime trade between the two countries and for balanced participa-
tion by their merchant fleets in that trade. But difficulties arose at the
end of this summer with the implementation of Moroccan cabinet circulars
providing that only Moroccan shipowners could carry the products listed on
a special schedule--representing nearly 90 percent of the traff ic--and re-
- quiring cargo declaration procedures considered difficult to comply with by
French shipowners.
The dispatch emphasizes that the signing of the agreement comes only a few
weeks after a reorge:nization of jurisdictions within the Rabat government
that took the merchant marine away from the Ministry of Transportation and
assigned it to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
During his visit, Le Theule met with Prime Minister Maati Bouabid and the
ministers of equipment and transportation, who expressed to him their de-
sire to see the development of bilateral cooperation, notably in the fields
of fishing, port facilities, and technical assistance in connection with
rail, road, and air transportation. Le Theule said that for that purpose,
the two parties decided to set up special expert commissions "to work out
- the best ways of fostering bilateral cooperation in those fields."
During a press conference given in Rabat on 5 November shortly before his
, cleparture for Paris, Joel Le Theule confirmed that the France-Dunkerque
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shipyards w~uld deliver three phosphoric acid carriers to the Moroccan
shipping firm of MARPHOCEAN [expansion unknown]. He said that those ships,
"costing several hundred million French francs," represented 40,000 gross
registered tons.
An agreement for the acquisition of those ships was signed last 24 October
between the Dunkirk shipyard and MARPHOCEAN. Its financing was worked out
- at the conclusion of recent negotiations between the Moroccan Budget Depart-
ment and departments in the French Ministry of Economy. Le Theule said,
"This order is now definitely decided on in pri.nciple, and an option even
remains open for the later purchase by the Mc~roccan shipping industry of
additional ships of a larger kind before 3 March 1980."
COPYRIGHT: Rene Nbreux et Cie, Paris, 1979
11798
CSO: 4400
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MOROCCO
J _
MOR(JCCAN FOREIGN TRADE BANK REPORTS ON 1978 ACTIVITIES
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in ~'rench 9 Nov 79 pp 3012-3013
[Text] Throughout 1978 the I~oroccan economy felt the effects of the deteri-
orating economic situation. The government did its utmost to maintain the
" basic equilibriums by acting on the burden of public spending, the volume
of imports, and the d istribution of credit while also putting the 1978-1980
3-year plan into shape. That plan is centered on an annual growth rate of
4.9 percent in the gross domestic product, compared to 7.4 percent during -
the third plan.
_ Despite a temporary f inancial squeeze, the Moroccan Foreign Trade Bank re- ~
corded satisfactory activity and improving results.
The consolidated balance sheet as of 31 December 1978 (Morocco and the Paris
agency) totaled 4.7 billion dirhams (an increase of 11.69 percent in Moroc-
can operations and of 166 percent for the Paris agency). In off balance
sheet financing, commitments through the opening of confiYmed and secured
credits amounted to 4.1 billion dirhams.
;
~ At the end of December 1978, customer deposits totaled 2.2 bi1 lion dirhams
I (up 26.11 percent in Morocco over the end of 1977). On the opposite side,
commitments in the form of bills, advances, and credits totaled 2.7 billion
( dirhams. The total in treasury bonds came to 0.7 billion dirhams.
i Financial participations amounted to 1U4 million dirhams following subscrip-
tions during th~ year to the Arab-European Bank, MAGHREBAIL [expan~ion un-
known], and the National Economic Development Bank.
On the asset side, outstanding bills and claims were recorded at 43 million
dirhams; a corresponding reserve was set up on the liability side of the
balance sheet.
The Paris agency subscribed bond issues in Kuwaiti dinars at an exchange
value of 23.6 million French francs (36.1 millibn as of 31 December 1978).
The agency expanded its operations considerably, and its capital was in-
creased to 10 million French francs.
~
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After deductions for amortization, reserves, and taxes, the consolidated
profit came to 20.5 million dirhams (17.2 million for Nbrocco and 3.], mil-
lion for the Paris agency, with the Tangiers-free zone agency showing a net
profit of 0.2 million dirhams) .
The general meeting on 16 June 1979 distributed a dividend of 9 percent on
capital of 70 million dirhams (increased during the year to 80 mill~on by
the incorporation of reserves). The consolidated balance sheet as of 31 De-
cember 1978 showed 55 million dirhams in reserves).
- Attached to the bank's report are tables covering Nbrocco's foreign trade
in 1978: the distribution of imports (12.4 billion.~iirhams) and.exports (6.3
billion), a breakdown by trading area, a list of the main suppliers and cus-
= tomers, and a table showing the main products imported and exported.
- Represented on the bank's board of directors are the Bank of Morocco, the
- Moroccan Treasury, and various public organizations (the National Economic
Development Bank, the Deposit and Management Office, the Moroccan Phosphates ~
Office, the Marketing and Export Office, the National Tea and Sugar Office, ;
and the Maghreb Credit Finance Company), as well as several important Moroc-
can individuals.
E1 Hadj Abdelmadid Bengellaun is now chairman and general manager of the
bank. -
COPYRIGHT: Rene Nbreux et Cie, Paris, 1979
11798
CSO: 4400
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MORUCCO
SITUATION IN MAJOR INDUSTRIAL, TRADE SECTORS REVIEWED
Paris MARCHES TROFICAUX ET MEDITERR,ANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 pp 3200-3201
- [Text] The CGEM (Nbroccan General Economic Federation)
held its first monthly meetin~ of the new season at the
, start of August. The meeting was held in Casablanca un-
der the chairmanship of Mohamed An~or. As is tiaditional, -
this first meeting was devo ted to a debate on the eoo-
nomic situation. Tfie company heads and representatives
_ of the various professional associations turned their at-
tention to the general development of the economy in I979
and to developments in the major industrial and trade
sectors.
In view of the effects of the Saharan war and the reper-
cussions of the austerity policy--a policy made worse by
the measures adopted since June 1978--the Moroccan busi-
nessmen expressed their willingness to assume the respon-
sibilities incumbent on them as a result of the lower
- level of activity and the difficulties of the moment, -
notably those resulting from the decline in government
purchases and the reorganization of certain financial
- and commercial operations, such as those concerned with
credit and imports. ''i _
II
In its report on this businessmen's meeting, CEDIES (the
organ of the CGEM) sums up developments in the majar sec- II
_ tors of industrial and trade activity. That part of the -
� document is reprinted here in full.
Public Works and Construction
The characteristic factor in this sector is the circumstance that three-
fourths of its turnover ir, recent years has come from the state. Durinq
the last 5-year plan (1973-1977), the f irms in this sector invested heavily
in order to satisfy the considerable volume of government orders. But since
1978 those orders have been sharply reduced, with.tY~e consequence that the
firms involved have been placed in a difficult situation. -
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The effects of that change in government policy were not actually sharply
felt until 1979, since in 1978 the firms managed tA operate more or less
satisfactorily thanks to jobs under completion.
In view of this situation, the public works sector finds itself facing a
certain number of constraints, mainly the following:
1. The need to provide a minimum guarantee by the state in operations that -
the firms might undertake abroad (notably in black Africa and the Middle
East), considering that in such cases the formulas for revising contracts
- as a result of price changes are not recognized everywhere.
2. The need to permit those firms to apply the declining-balance method in '
depreciating the heavy equipment they have accumulated and to grant tax ex- ;
emptions under the Investment Code as is done for other exporting firms.
Mining Industry .
Since the difficult years of 1975 and 1976, the situation in the mining in- '
dustry has gradually improved for almost all ores with the exception of ~
zinc, iron, and copper.
Even so, mining remains excluded from most of the opportunities and induce-
ments made availab].Q to other industries. Moreover, the latest budget ame,:.i-
- ment burdened it with an ad valorem tax of up to 10 percent on exports. That
- levy takes into account neither the financial equilibrium of the firms nor
_ their prospects, considering the highly uncertain prices on the world market. '
~
- In such conditions, although the situation in mining is not bad overall, '
its fut~ire prospects depend 4~.o some extent on adequate recognition of the ~
- realities characterizing it. ~
Trade and Services ~
The first half of 1979 .is seen by the professionals as a transitional period ~
between the satisfactory developments of the preceding years and the situa- _
tion that has developed parallel with the difficulties experienced by the
other sectors of industrial activity. One of the main causes o~ concern '
- expressed in this connection involves the latest measures limiting imports,
since those measures have further aggravated the situation caused by those
adopted in June 1978.
The problem here lies not only in the absence of dialog between the adminis- ~
tration and the importers, but also in the generalized application of deci-
- sions directly harmful to the carrying on of industrial activities, one
example being the extension of restrictions on spare parts to include. the =
basic semifinished materials needed by industry.
Moreover, the new regulations do not give adequate recognition to operations -
currently underway and do not allow for the necessary flexibility in their
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application. This concerns notably the period of validity of operations
extending be~yond 31 December 1979 and the commitments to be assumed beyond _
= that date in order to avoid any break in supplies at the start of 1980.
~
~r
The trade sector is also faced with a certain number of anomalies in the
distribution ct~iannels. These are due in part to the practices of some manu- -
facturers, wHo!do not market their products through normal channels, and in
part to the'growth of parallel markets that escape regulation and thereby
counteract the beneficial effect of incentives to the substitution industry.
In every case there is an almost general decline in the volume of business
~ in this sector, as can be seen in the drop in the vehicle market (a drop of
- 20 percent in the case of passenger vehicles and of 40 percent in the case
- of utility vehicles) and in the farm equipment market (of from 25 to 50 per-
cent, depending on the kind of equipment).
_ Industrial Sector
As far as the industrial sector is concerned, activities are developing dif-
_ ferently depending on the branch of industry involved.
In the case of the mechanical, metal, and electrical industries, import re-
_ strictions have had beneficial effects on household equipment goous. In the
_ area of heavy industrial equipment, on the other hand, the drop in state in-
vestments has had such a severe effect on structural and boilermaking activi-
ties that layoffs have occurred.
Concerning this branch, the possibilities for steady growth do exist, con-
sidering the country's need for those products. At present only 11 percent
of tr..e total demand is met by national industry.
Sizable projects are planned, but they are a long time in coming (notably in
the sugar and phosphate industries), with the result that local industry is
in danger of being caught unprepared when they do start up. -
To that must be added the general problem in relation to the law on indus- .
trial integration and equalization--which has no t yet been passed--and the
cash problems resulting from delayed payments by government offices and de- -
partments.
As far as the electrical industry is concerned, orders have declined by 10
percent in comparison with 1978, and the prospects for 1980 seem to give
grounds for concern.
As far as metal packaging is concerned, activity seems to be tied mainly to _
developments in the production and exporting of canned %~oods. It is feeling
the effect of weather conditions, which are affecting f'arm production (the
aprico t crop was 50 percent below that of 1978), and also of the uncertain
conditions in fishing and the marketing of canned fish.
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Lastly, there is the food industry. Sugar consumption should remain at last ~
_ year's level, while the soft drink industry seems to be experiencing a sud-
den standstill in consumption after a long period of growth (up to 40 per- ;
cent annually). This is apparently in keeping with developments in consumer
_ purchasing powar.
_ COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979 ~
11798 ;
CSO: 4400 ~
_
~
I
i
I
;
~
;
, ~
I
~
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MOROC00
BRIEFS
MOROCCO-IRAQ SHIPPING LINE--Begi.nning this November, two merchant ships--
one Moroccan and the other Iraqi--will provide regular service between Mo- ~
rocco and Iraq at the rate of one round trip in one month by the first ship
and one round trip the following m~nth by the second. This deci~ion, which
_ is intended to strengthen cooperation between Rabat and Baghdad in the field
of maritime transport, was reached during the talks held in Rabat at the end
of October by an Iraqi delegation headed by Mohsan Abdelali, presa.dent of
_ the Iraqi General Maritime Transport Company, and officials nf the Nbroccan
Nlinistry of Transportation. A protocol of agreement to that effect was
signed by the two parties. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TRAPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
- in French 9 Nov 79 p 3012] 11798
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WESTERN SAHARA
OHOUD 'MOROCCO'S MOST AMBITIOUS OPERt1TI0NS AGAINST POLISARIO'
I.ondon NEW AFRICAN in English Dec 79 pp 15-17
[Article by M. Mlamali Adam]
[Text]
ENDICOT(' Hn~ise is a villa on tf~e outskirts Eleven years later, however, the
of Roston, US. Althoukh it was the Scene of Endicott House war gnme still looks
a hnrd-fouKht I~attle a mere decacle ugo, it dur~ble. Admittedly it failed to predict the
bears nc~ scf~rs becnuse the hattle was change of leadership in one key country,
Fimul~ted. At tlic time ~he unarmed Algerin. But that is a minor drawback.
conflict in~~v~e~led onl,y~ w;~r ~ameti Chadli Benjedid, who succeeded t3oum-
enthntii;~tits. l~ hF,v 5ince ca~>~in�ed thc edienne, is committed to the same policies _
curia~ity ~if ~~~�n~ile uu~,icli~ tlu~ hlrisxn- concerning the Western S~hare ns his
chu:;c~t:+ In~~i~uii~ ~,f 'I'~~~~liu~,l~~t~v undcr predecessur. Conr.eivnbly this h~~s dis-
mayed Iting Hessan of Morocco who lel
whotie a~~iv the hattlc was joined. The himself believe that Al~erin's hard line on
r~~,i~c,n is dcar. 1'hc simiilated clash ~~f the Suhara was of Boumedienne's own -
llcc~~mhrr, 1S)1iH nuw looks rnore and more making.
likely nctunlly to ht~p~~en.
'1'hc� li:;t ~,f pl~iyi~r, who took p~rt in lhe ~l1te1'N~eW
~~~ar ~;.nni~ li~~l~sri�n Al~~cria tind 1lururcu -
~,~