JPRS ID: 8835 WEST EUROPE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030054-7
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 54
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/8835 -
31 December 1979
~ West E u ro e R e o rt ~
p p
(FOUO 7 ~1 /79) -
~ F~~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INF(~RM~TION SERVICE
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NOTE
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_ other characteristics retained. -
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Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
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JPRS L/8835
31 December 1979
WEST EUROpE REPORT
(FOUO 71/79)
CONTENTS PAGE
THEATER NUGZEAR FORCES
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Institute ~tudy Claims NATO Superiority in Euromissiles
(Wolf Perdelwitz; STERN, 15 Nov 79) 1
" COUNTRY SECTION
FRANCE
Technic~l Military Training for Foreigners Described
(Claude-Louis Kern; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Nov 79)���� 3
Technical Military Aid to Saudi Arabia Describ~d
(Yves Salkin; ARNIEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Nov 79) 9 -
Technical Training for Foreign Air Forces Summa.rized
(Charles Mainguy; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Nov 79) 1G
Briefs
Counter-Terrorist Training 22
Operations Ba.ses Named 22
Trouble in PC 22 =
Militants Quitting Pa,rty ~3
_ Marchais ;Itrategy Viewed ~3
= SPAIN
Political Farties Vie for Control of Barcelona
~ (car~zo 16, 25 rrov 79) 24
Commentary Scores Interior Minister for I,a,ck of Action
(Jose Oneto; CAl~IO 16, 25 Nov 79) 27
- - a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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CONTENTS (Continued) ~~e
Martin Villa~s Political Star Believed To Be Rising ~
(Jose Onc~to; CANIDIO 16, 18 Nov 79) 29 -
'CA.NlBIO' Interviews Leaders of Police Union
(CAMBIO 16, 25 Nov 79) 31
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FEDERAL REPUBLIC. OF GERMANY
INSTITUTE STUDY CLAIMS NATO SUPERIORITY IN EUROMISSILES
Hamburg STERN in German 15 Nov 79 pp 229-234
[Article by Wolf Perdelwitz: "Dead Heat Between Hare and Tortoise"]
[Text] Where armament is concerned, they are in agreement like on hardly
anything else: Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and his challenger in the
CDU/CSU Franz'Josef Strauss want to satisfy the wishes of the Americans and
of NATO by upgrading the West European NATO troops' armaments with nuclear-
tipped medium-range Pershing 2 rockets and with cruise missiles. Led by
the FRG, NATO k*ill make its decision to build these weapons in mid-December.
But in the West too, there is diagreeement on the NATO doctrine of Soviet -
nuclear superiority. The Hamburg Peace Research and Security Policy Insti-
tute, under the direction of former Bundeswehr general and father of orien-
tation and indoctrination, Wolf Graf Baudissin, claimed Western superiority
on the basis of official and semi-official data. Dieter Lutz, deputy
institute director, provides the following conclusion to his analysis:
"Where `Eurostrategic atomic weapons' are concerned, NATO rather than the "
Warsaw Pact is in the lead in some sectors with a four-fold superiority."
As to "upgrading" for the:purpose of bringing th~ atomic seasaw back into
equilibrium, the East has this justification rather than the West. Says
Lutz: "Our comparison of forces.iindicates that there is no basis for find- -
ing a NATO military inferiority ~n the 'Euro-nuclear situation.' On the
contrary, i~ can be assumed that the Warsaw Pact feels that it must take
rearmament measures to counter the increasing quantitative and qualitative
NATO level."
In the category of atomic ground combat weapons, Lutz calculated a 4.56 to
1 NATO superiority: where the West has an atomic firepower of 986 howit-
zers, 320 rockets and 300 land mines, the East has an atomic .firepower
capability of only 311 support rockets. Lutz determined parity in short-
range rockets with 1,637 missiles east and 1,622 west of the Elbe. For -
the medium-range weapons category, Lutz calculated approximate parity
also: 538 rockets with 778 atomic war heads for the Warsat Pact; 194 _
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rockets with 674 warheads for the West. If, as Lutz tries to do, the indi-
vidual weapons are graded as to c:ombat effectiveness, the pendulum swings
far over to the NATO side in all aspects. Western superiority appears '
completely overwhelming upon listing total numbers of all nuclear warheads: ~
4,500 for the USSR; 12,000 for the United States; 500 for the UK and 200
for France. _
But from the NATO point of view the Soviets have started a new round in the ~
arms race. For a little more than 1 year they have been replacing treir '
up to 20-year old medium range rockets (SS 4 and SS 5) with brand new SS 20 ~
i
two-stage missiles. ~
The latter, with an effective radius of 4,500 1~, can reach all of Europe, j
Nort~. Africa and the Middle East. Each carries up to 3 atomic warheads,
which can independently reach their targets with an accuracy of 100 metiers--
more accurately than has been any Soviet rocket's capability to date. In '
addition, their launching ramps are transportable by being mounted on a ~
tank; they are therefore difficult to detect and destroy. ~
Therefore, says NATO, the Warsaw Pact has extended to medium range rockets ;
the advantage which it already had in tanks and personnel. i
In the Hamburg peace researcher's experience, these NATO arguments are i
merely a pret.xt for its own arms increases. Supposedly, he says, the de- i
velopment of the U.S. Pershing 2 rocket is merely a res.ponse to the intro- ;
duction of the Soviet SS 20. In reality, says Lutz, the first SS 20 was
detected in 1975 by the U.S. "Big Bird" reconnaissance satellite. But the '
development of the Pershing 2 had alre_9y been started one year earlier. ~
Says Lutz: "New weapon systems are developed and produced because research
and production facilities are not kept busy or simply because appropriate '
scientific and technological levels have been reached. Their military
functional applicability is determined afterwards. The 'gap argument' is
_ used as a rule to provide justification to the public." ;
" COPYRIGHT: 1979 Gruner & Jahr AG & Co.
'
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CSO: 3103 ~
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COUNTRY SECTION FRI~NCE
TECHNICAL MILITARY TRAINING FOR FOREIGNERS DESCRIBED
Paris ARMEE~ D'ALTJOURD'HUI in French Nov 79 pp 50-51
~Article by;Col Claude-Louis Kern*: "Technical Military Aid--An Up-to-Date
Training Program~
~Text~ The admission o� foreign military trainees to our military schools
as a form of cooperation is not new. The first foreigner to be admitted to
French military training was Japanese Infantry Lieutenant Harada who entered -
the Ground Forces Advanced War College on 1 N~vember 1884.
The training of military personnel for foreign goveznments did not actually _
reach its current level until arounc] the 1960's.
! A total of 75 foreign countries have benefited ta date from our military
training, but only some 50 countries are currently sending trainees to our
~ schools on a yearly recurring basis. These are pri.ncipally the French-
speaking countries. The African countries and Madagascar fill more than
half the available openings for trainees every scholastic year, while one-
third of the openings are reserved for the North African countries.
The growth in total number of trainees admitted has been typical: From a
modest beginning in 1963-1964 (1,300 trainees), it rose rapidly to a total
~ of 3,000-3,500 trainees per year between 1964 and 19&9, the period during
' which various African states fielded armies.
I
~ P,dmissions have remained at this level after having gone through a sharp
drop and recovery in the early 1970's.
* A graduate af Saint-Cyr, class of 1945, Col Claude-Louis Kern served in
' various organizations and officer schools in France, and in several overseas
' general staff and technical aid assignments, until 1970, when he assumed the
' duties of military_attache to a French embassy in a French-speaking African
i country. Since 1973, he has been ct,ief of the "Foreign Trainees in France"
~ section o� the Armed Forces Gene.ral Staff's Foreign Relations Division.
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.Thus, between 1964 and 1978 the Armed Forces received some 40,000 foreign
' military trainees in their schools. ~
- Traininq At All Levels
~
It has been customary for some time to distinguish between two types o~
military cooperation: the traditional form of cooperation inherited from the
- past, which was geared especially to the French-speaking countri~s, and a ;
form of technical assistance that was associated with the sale of arms. This I
distinction is more and more losing'its validity. However, it will be used j
in this article for explanatory purposes. ~
Thus, foreign trainees are admitted to French military training either on the ~
basis of traditional cooperation or on that of technical assistance associa-
ted with arms sales. '
The first form of cooperation involves essen:~~ially personnel admitted on an ~
. individual basis for general. miLitary trainirig under overall aid agreements ~
spread out over an extended period. Admissions are granted for scholastic
- or calendar terms comprising "classic" courses of instruction listed in a
, catalog which is updated annually. The curriculum conforms to an annual ~
program established in advance. ~
~
The second form of assistance involves personnel admitted generally in larger I
or smaller groups for pinpoint training c:~ specific equipment sold to the
interested country. Admissions are granted for terms of variable duration
based on "a la carte" curricula outside the regular annual program. '
I
Trainees are thus enrolled in: '
--Advanced military training (advanced war colleges of the various Armed
Forces components, the Advanced Interforces War Co].lege, the Advanced Inter-
forces Course);
--Basic officer training and specialized service schools (Coetquidan Special
Military School, Salon Air Schoal, Brest Naval School); this group properly ;
includes the university-level institutions of professional training that .
come under the DGA ~General Delegation for Weaponry~ (see chart);
--More than 650 very diverse study and practical training courses organized
by the three Armed Forces components, the Gendarmerie, and the Public Health
Service, with durations ranging from 14 to 665 days in the last couple of
years. ,
Rfter this quick outline of the current situation, I have thought it inter-
esting to very briefly summarize the process involved in preparing for these
admissions.
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The process can be summarized as follows:
After the interested countries have presented their requests for training
of their personnel:
--these requests are studied by the appropriate Foreign Affairs and Coopera-
tion departments, which m~ke the final decisions on the courses to be offered
and reimburse the Defense Ministry's expenditures;
. --the Defense Ministry organizes the courses, and is therefore merely a pur-
- veyor of services.
The processing schedule calls tor the steps that must precede the above
decisions to commence 1 year in advance.
This long t~meframe is nec~ssary to meet the pressing requirements of many
of our partners, who need to know our decisions well enough in advance to
= provide for the teaching of French to their candidates and for the timely
inclusion of the expenses associated with this training in their annual
expense budgets. '
Training Facilities and 'Special Courses'
An activity of this scope is hardly without its problems. I
Disregarding a few minor difficulties such as ari inadequate technical back- ,
ground occasionally encountered here or there among a very few trainees, the .
two principal difficulties encountered arise from:
--the i.mbalance between the number of admis~ions requested and the number
available, and
--the exceedingly scant knowledge of our language possessed by many of the I
candidates.
_ As regards the imbalance be tween the volume oE requests presented by the I
interested countries and our capacity tor satisfying them, the ratio between
the latter and the former in the last few school years has been not more than
half in total, and not more than one-third in the cases of some schools and
courses that are especially in demand. ~
This problem goes back several years. Zt was first felt by the advanced ,
military training sector, then spread to the basic officer training schools,
: and 3 or 4 years ago reached the Ground Eorces specialist schools, particu- ~
lar~y those ~f the Infantry, the Armored Corps and Ordnance. ;
The available training facilities havi,ng proven insufficient, a solution was
sought through the creation of "special courses" whicr,, in certain cases,
also have the advantage of being better suited to our partners' needs. ;
( '
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_ The first endeavor of this kind was that of the Navy, which, in 1971, created
and added to its Naval Academy a"Naval Academy Special Course," open to 20
_ candidates. This endeavor proved successful and, in 1972, it was decided
to enlarge the experiment.
~
The year 1973 saw the birth of an "Air Academy Special Course" and of a
; "Quartermaster Specialist Training Course."
~
; In January 1974, the "Advanced Interforces War Colltge" opened its doors to
admit and train some 40 senior ofticers from the three armed forces compon-
ents ~i.e., army, navy and air force~ (including the French ones) before admit-
tirig them to the Advanced Intertorc~s Course with French and foreign students
~ who we re graduates of the traditional service academies.
i After~an inevitable period of hesitation and adaptation, the results being
~ obtained are now considered satisfactory.
This solution, which helps to overcome, in part at least, the first major
difficulty mentioned above, has gradually unfolded: 1980 will see the open-
~ ing, at the Montpellier Infan try Specialist School, of a special "Overseas
~ Combat" course especially designed for our Atrican partners.
~ _
' There are also, after a fashion, "special courses" for trainees whose mastery `
of our language is deemed inadequate. Prior to their military training ~
~ courses, these trainees follow a civilian remedial French course organized
I by the Ministry of Education a t Besancon. A~mission to these courses, as well
' as financing of transportation and of the courses themselves, is exclusiveljt
the province of the Foreign Ministry, which centrally processes all requests.
~ The duration of these courses is 10 ~aeeks.
~ The Advanced Interforces War College completes this language training with
; a 6- to 7-week specia7. course given on its premises prior to the opening of
i the regular curriculum.
~ The Navy, for its part, has in stituted a 5-week remedial French course at the
~ Saint-Raphael Air Petty O�ticers School.
~
The Air Force has contracted with a civilian company to provide "rudimentary
drill" training for certain categories of trainees. These courses are given
at Rochetort. This is a new and very effective approach that is to be picked
up and considerably developed, on the same basis, b~ the DGA, whose constantly
growing needs have now reached substantial proportion s.
Complex, constrictive for the Armed Forces, burdensome on credits and staffing,
and at times difficult to organize though it may be, this form of cooperation
continues nevertheless to be highly important. It has made possible the
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fielding of national armies by the French-speaking countries of Africa.
It has proven to be one of the easential components in the training of the
advanced national cadres of which these young countries are so greatly in
need.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 - Rewe des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui"
9399
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY S~C7.'ION FRANCE
TECHNICAL MILITARY AID TO SAUDI ARABIA DESCRZBED
Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Nov 79 pp 52-53
~Article by Gen Yves Salkin*: "Cavalrymen of the Desert"~
~Text~ Blue kepis �luttering among the AMX 30's over an expanse of desert,
black kepis surrounding a GCT 155 positioned among shadowy thornbushes,
mouse-colored kepis hovering over an engine in front of a workshop...mythi- -
cal scenes in an Oriental tale? No, They are actual scenes in the field
of Franco-Saudi military aid in full operation.
The practical ~olu tions that had to be devised in this new area o~ problems
- handed to the French Army, and an assessment of the initial results of this
worthy undertaking being carried out by volunteers in this Arauic peninsula
--this land that is stil]. so full of mystery and that is still so talked
about throughout the world--are the topic of this article.
~ A Venture
~ The ultimate aim was clearly defined a few years ago by the Saudi govern-
~ ment: Field as rapidly as possible a combined-components force complete with
~ the most modern French equipment and the most advanced weapons systems.
; The tasks embodied in this overall objective were laid out:
i
~
~ --delivery of orciered equipment
~
--construction of installations (training, support, living accommodations)
* A graduate of Saint-Cyr,class of 1943, Gen Yves Salkin commanded the 30th
Dragoon Regiment at Valdahon from 1969 to 1971, directed training at tt-,e
EAABC CArmored Corps and Cavalry Training School~ at Saumur from 1971 to
1974, served as army attache in Mexico from 1974 to 1977, then as head of
the French Military Aid Mission in Saudi Arabia from 1977 to 1979. Since
1 September 1979, he has been director of the ESORSEM ~College of Reserve
Of~icers in General Staff Service~.
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--training of battalion and unit commanders
--instruction of cadres ar?d crews
--involvement in the overall logistical support operation
These tasks were in turn particularized with the utmost care and articulated
_ within a ne twork of' contracts for equipment, technical assistance, and
grosnd structures. ~
A most alluring problem on the whole...but at the same time full of uncer-
tainties because of its vast scope and the widely diversified types of aid ~
requested. ;
- An Innovative Effort
Stimulated by the Saudi originators of the "tank project," the French gen- ~
eral staffs went to work on it. As a new problem, it called for innovative i
solutions. i
First, there was a need to become thorouqhly familiar with the environment ~
_ in which these variou"s operatiol~s were to be carried to fruition. A military ~
mission was created, the chief of which installed his office, symbolically, j
in the Saud i Ministry of Defense, alongside that of the Saudi armored corps I
commander.
A team of high-level instructors under his direct authority was attached to
the Saudi Armored Corps School to train battalion and unit commanders.
Also placed under his control were:
--a "post-sales supportive structure" staf�ed and maintained by the equip-
ment supplier; ~
I
--an "aid structure" staffed and maintained by a specialized firm, whose !
- first assignment was to build from scratch two training centers, one for
training in the use of the equipment and the other in its maintenance. ;
. Concurrently, volunteer personnel had to be recruited: active cadres "out- ~
side the budget" or "detached," young retirees, civilian specialists.
A form of practical instruction had to be worked out specifically to over- .
come the language barrier, despite the presence of qualified interpreters.
The proven principles o� our military schools were applied: "one learns -
more with his hands than with his head," "hands in the grease, not in your
pockets"... These principles were enhanced by a number of training aids '
(sectionized motors, demonstration models, breadboards...). ~
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11
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I
Lastly, with respect to the courses ot instruction, it became evident that
to avoid any "war of devolution'' a determination would have to be made of `
respective future Saudi roles. The "progressive transfer of responsibili-
ties" system adopted proved successful: French instructor with Saudi obser-
ver, Saudi instructor with French adviser, Saudi instructor alone or with
French assistant. Development of instruction was enhanced by regular incre-
ments of French-speaking Saudi officers trained in our language institutions
and in our training schools after the start of the project.
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A Positive Balance Sheet
The road traveled to achieve the established goal was long...it was not
without ruts.
Finding Saudi personnel in sufficient numbers, fitting the schedule of train-
ing to that of equipment deliveries, keeping the operation on schedule des-
i pite sudden changes in French staffing...these are a few examples of the
kinds of difficulties encountered.
Although it is too early yet to draw up a f inal balance sheet of the entire
operation, some of its results can, however, already be assessed.
We cannot presume, of course, to judge the results achieved from the Saudi '
viewpoint, but we need ~eel no constraints on calling attention to in~terna- ~
tional press agency reports according to which the armored brigade cut a
very fine figure during the June 1979 large-scale maneuvers. ~
From the French viewpoint, the benefits derived from the operation by our ~
cadres have been highly positive. ~
i
From the technical standpoint, they have become experts on equipment some ;
of which has not yet been issued to the French Army. '
I
In the training domain, they have learned better than they could have within j_
the metropole how to use the most effective training methods to get their
message across. '
From a tactical standpoint, they have become aware of factors the importance :
of which they had not suspected: the vastness of spaces for maneuver, the ~
extensiveness of firing ranges, the cruel tolls of heat and thirst, the
tyranny of logistics in desert regions... I
I
!
_ And lastly, their experience as human beings has been an enriching one. They
have worked side by side with men who did not live in the same manner as ~
_ they and who reasoned ditferently fLOm them, but with whom they nevertheless
became comerades-in-arm~. ~
Launched a few years ago by a handfull of enthusiasts, French Military Aid ~
to Saudi Arabia has become a living reality. Centered initially around the -
AMX 30 tank, it is growing with time; new equipment is being unloaded there ,
and workshops are mushrooming out of the sand. '
Still in its adolescent stage, it has alrea~3y won its letters patent of ;
nobility; it is always part of the agenda of the talks held by the highest .
officials of the two friendly countries whenever they meet.
i
i
~
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It is still an unfinished symphony that should be carried forward concord-
an tly to its concluding chord.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 - Re we des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui"
9399
CSO: 31U0
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COUNTRr SECTION FRANCE
~
TECHNICAL TRAINING FOR FOREIGN AIR FORCES SUMMARIZED !
. i
Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Nov 79 pp 56-57
~Article'by Brig Gen Charles Mainguy*: "Under All Skies"I
~Textl Cocperation between France and foreign countries in the field of ~
military a.eronautics is almost as old as the militarization of the first ~
airplanes. ~
Three and one-half years after awarding mil.itary pilot certificate number 1 I
to Lieutenant Tricornot-de-Rose, Australian Capt Walter Watt was awarded
certificate number 508 on 3 August 1914, the first military pilot certifi-
cate ever awarded to a foreigner. ~
In the 3 years that followed, to 3 Auqust 1917, 100 citizens of foreign ~
countries were awarded certificates in France: 36 Russians, 24 italians, ~
22 Serbs, 7 Portuguese, 4 Americans, 3 Japanese, 1 Romanian and 2 Indochin- (
ese, Caodac Minh and Phantat Mao who wsre serving in the French Foreign ~
Legion. These two legionnaires were the first beneficiaries of a technical '
aid undertaking that subsequently assumed major proportions: the training ~
of cadres and aviation specialists i.n the former French commonwealth. I
~
Aeronautical cooperation took another forward stride immediately following i
World War I. Close ties were tormed with various countries, especially in f
South America where the potential of aviation was understood very ear'y. +
In the 1950's, it was not unusual to meet very highly placed officials in
South American ,aviation who were holders of a French certif icate earned
between the two world wars. ~
~
* A graduate of the Air Academy, class of 1949, Gen Charles Mainguy, bomber :
pilot, took part in operations in the Far East and ~former~AFN CFrench North -
Africa~. Af ter passing the Air War College in 1967, he served as chief of
the Oftice of Forecasts and Studies, commander o� the Villacoublay Air Base,
and chief of the Air Force General Staff's Technical Aid OfficE. Since 1 ~
November, he has been deputy director of Weapons Research, Project Studies
and Technologies.
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Technical aid missions were sent to many coun tries. In Colombia and Vene-
zuela, they played an important role in settinq up a national aviation. ~
, After the Second World War, two factors brought about a substantial growth
in techn ical aid :
--the fielding of national fleets by newly independent countries: 24 coun- ~
tries, most of them E'rench-speaking, benefited from French technical aid in
this initial phase and 14 ot these still do.
- --the growth of French military aircraft exports. �
French Air Force orders represent oniy one-fourth of all the Mirages manu-
factured by AMD-BA.
The same ratio applies to helicopters in service ~n the Armed Forces as co~n-
pared to the total number manufactured by AEROSPATIALE.
The Air Force currently provides technical aid of three types to more than
30 foreign nations:
--training of foreign personnel,
--assignment of technical advisers to foreign air forces,
--exchanges of information, specialist missions and various services on
request by foreign air forces.
Necessary Adjustments
While the admission of French-speaking foreign trainees posed no new prob-
lems for the Air Force, since it was already training many Africans and
citizens of the Indochinese peninsula in its schools, the rapidly growing
number of requests from countries of non-French cultures did give rise to
new requirements:
--the teaching of French,
--the organization of elementary science courses to bring certain candidates
up to minimum required levels,
--use of foreign languages or of in terpreters by French instructors for -
courses o� short duration.
F~r the past 20 years the Air Force has admitted more than 1,000 trainees
annually.
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This represents a substantial effort, in that, while the training given
qualifies the foreign trainees for the same diplanas awarded our own trainees,
major adjustments are trequently necessary to prepare them for the instruc-
tion given in our schools.
The fact is that foreign instruction programs are not necessarily e~uivalent
to those of our own national education system, that French manners and cus-
toms can differ substantially trom the habits acquired by the trainees in
their own environments, and that, in sum, too many of the candidates must
moreover learn, in a country that is entirely strange to them, the basic
- rudiments of the military prnfession. ~
I
A combination of all these conditions makes a candidate's entry into our ~
scriools much more difficult. ~
I
Most foreign trainees spend at least 1 year in the Air Force, and some remain
in it.more than 3 years. In elementary pilots school, they have at times '
represented one-third oE the total annual enrollment of trainees. i
Each year, the Air Force places at the disposal of the Ministries of Coopera- I
tion and Foreign Affairs all the availabl.e openings for trainees. The num-
ber of openings is unfortunately always less than the number of requests
received.
For the last several years, studies have been made and all possible steps ~
i
taken in an effort to satisfy the growing requirements of countries that
request French training. '
An Air School Special Course ~CSEA~ has been created for foreign trainees ~
~ whose prior form of education has not prepared them for the normal competi- ~
tive examinations. These trainees receive the same military, general and
professional training as do our own officer candidates recruited through
competitive examinations. Only the theoretical science instruction given ;
~ them undergoes certain adjustments. Each year, the Air Force makes avail- :
able 30 CSEA openings in addition to access to the normal Air School
competitive examinations. '
(
A Fr.ench language school created in 1972 at Rochefort together with the I
SATI ~Industrial Technical Aid Company~ to satisfy the Air Force's own
internal needs has just been converted into the CIFL ~Interforces Language
Training Center~.
Another step has consisted of providing openings for foreign military
transport pilot-trainees at the Amaury de la Grange (Hazebrouck) and Cipra
(Dinard) civilian pilot schools. After earning a profes~ional pilot certi-
ficate and IFR ~Instrument Flight Rules~ qualification there, these trair~ees
_ go through a brief complementary specialist training course with the Air
Force before being awarded a military transport pilot certificate.
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Other pilot irnprovement facilities exist in the form of national and inter-
regional schools to which P'rance may contribute needed assistance.
An example of this is the group of Moroccan Royal ~ir Force schools located
in Marrakech, which each year admits more than 100 African trainees and
obtains the assistance of some 60 French P.ir Force instructors.
This aid will be further developed with the setting of an Alpha Jet pilot
training school at Meknes.
Technical Aid: A Temporary Solution
The above form of cooperation falls directly under the second type of techni-
cal assistance demanded of the Air Force: foreign assignment of technical
advisers.
With 300 highly qualified officers and noncommissioned officers assigned
_ as technical advisers abroad, the contribution being made by the Air For~e
from its own resources is substantial.
It is all the more felt as the advances in modern aviation year by year
demand an ever higher level of technical knowledge and competence on tne
part of our personnel.
In this domain as well, the demand far exceeds the availabxlity. The Air
Force is trying to increase the number of locally qualified cadres, by
way of new solutions to the problem of training them either in France or in
their own countries, as a means o~ reducing to the minimum the.extent of
this form of "substitute" aid, which from the viewpoint of a country's own
development can only be considered a very temporary solution.
` A properly conducted te~hnical aid has as its dedicated aim its own gradual
disappearance over a specified period of time. Only the continuing pro-
curement by many coun tries of new and more and more sophisticated equi'~ment
can justify maintaining the present number of aid personnel assigned abroad
in 25 foreign air forces.
Services On Request
The third type of technical assistance comprises a number of different ser-
vices requested of the Air Force under the heading of good relations with
friendly countries that value the quality of our production, our organiza-
tion and methods.
These requests have to do especially with:
--maintenance of our equipment,
--instruction programs and documentation,
~g
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--organizational studies,
--plans for air base ground structures or for special technical installations,
_ --airlifting of equipment,
--special orientation courses ot short duration at our air bases and decision
centers for personnel occupying positions of high responsibility.
This list is far from being exhaustive and the number of each type of request
is high. Since the beginning of 1979, some 40 countries have requested Air
r^orce specialized assistance under this heading.
The magnitude of the activities of all kinds in the f ield of technical coop-
eration with foreign air forces has necessitated certain organizational
adjustments:
--a special office has been created within the EMAA ~Air Force General ;
Staff~: the Technical Aid O�fice; ~
--a new division has been set up within the General Headquarters for Air
Force Schools; ~
--at Rochefort which is frequently called upon to handle over 300 foreign
trainees on the base, a special division has been set up to handle all
problems relating to these trainees.
Taken toge ther, the Air Force personnel working full time in technical aid
activities represent numerically the staffing of a medium-size air base.
The services thus provided are voluminous, but the essential point is the
degree to which they fulfill the expectations of the countries that request
our cooperation.
There is not the least doubt that the diplomas awarded by the Air Force are
held in high esteem, that the rigorous training given by our schools is
hiqhly valued, and that the technical competence and devotedness of our
technical advisers are beyond question.
Nor can there be any doubt that the present form of our training, requiring
as it does a high level ot general knowledqe, places ;aevere demands on
certain rapidly developing countries whose elite are drained by the many
demands of national interest, of which aviation represents but a small
sector.
The requirements we place on others, in the same way that we place them on
ourselves, are, however, commensurate with the camplex technologies we seek
_ to master.
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Despite the urgency of the demands placed upon us, nay, despite certain
foreign pressures, we find it necessary to avoid the temptation to produce
a greater number of lesser qualified specialists. It is the price that
rnust be paid Eor the confidence of those countries that do us the honor of
. entrusting their requirements to the French Air Force.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 - Revu~ des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui"
9399
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
' BRIEFS
_ COUNTER-TERRORIST TRAINING--Officials of the National Gendarmerie are con-
vinced that the risks of a terrorist attack on the high sea, particularly
one involving the taking of hostages, are increasing. The~likely scenario:
the capture of the crew members of some French oil tankers in the Strait of I
Hormuz at the entrance to the Persian Gulf. The GIGN [National Gendarmerie ~
Intervention Group] will henceforth be trained for various operations at
sea such as underwater attacks; the transfer, by helicopter, of a commando j
group to the bridge of a[hijacked] ship; and the immobilization of a ship '
by jamming its propellers or draining its tanks. [Text] [Paris VALEURS
ACTUELLES in French 3 Dec 79 p 21]
OPERATIONS BASES NAMED--Three towns in South France--Frejus, Bonifacio and
Perpignan--will serve as bases for possible French overseas action. They
are (or will be) the encampments of the units making up the 31st intervention
demibrigade. These locations are not far from the world's two "hot spots"
where French interes~s may be directly threatened: Africa and the Mediter-
ranean. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 3 Dec 79 p 21]
TROUBLE IN PC--Because of Georges Marchais' attitude in the Boulin [suicide]
affairs, hundreds of letters and protests continue to arrive at the [PC
headquarters] Place du Colonel Fab~en. Militants are quitting the party,
_ especially in the Paris federatiaris, the Paris region and in the Bouches-
du-Rhone. [PC] parliamentarians have refused to back the attacks by "a
certain press" [i.e., the PC press]. There is even said to have been some
uproar at the offices of L'HUMANITE and HUMANITE DIMANCHE. To fight it,
Ma.rchais and Roland Leroy are said to have made up. In early December, a
meeting of the Central Committee was to decide whether to keep Leroy on as
head of the PC daily. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in Franch 3 Dec 79
p 21~ ,
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MILITANTS QUITTING PARTY--The tension that has existed in the Paris federa-
tion of the PC during the past 2 years has resulted in the loss of a third -
of the party's militants. [Text] [Paris LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in French
26 Nov 79 p 4]
MARCHAIS STRATEGY VIEWED--The recent communist meeting (of French, Spanish
and Italian communists) in support of the Polisario is part of [Georges]
, Marchais' strategy. He wants to emphasize his Eurocommunist image and
quickly overtake the PS on international affairs. He is getting ready to
take a long trip in 1980 (through Angola, Mozamblque, Vietnam and Japan).
[Text] [Faris LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in French 26 Nov 79 p 4]
CSO: 3100
23
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COUNTRY SECTION SPAIN
POLITICAL PARTIES VIE FOR CONTROL OF BARCELONA
- Madrid CAAIBIO 16 in Spanish 25 Nov 79 p 37
[Text] The renewal of the Municipal Pact between the -
Catalonian socialists and the Convergence nationalists
on Barcelona's City Council has made the communists so
nervous that they have launched charges of electoralism at ~
both parties and the socialists of playing into the hands
of the Right.
After the April municipal elections the key towns and cities of Catalonia
remained in the hands of the socialists and communists helped in many places
by Jordi Pujol's nationalists and the Christian Derac~crats of the UCD [Demo-
cratic Center UnionJ. This agreement limited to 6 months by Convergence and
Union and called the "Pact for Progress" expired a few days ago.
7.'he CDC [leadership body of the Democratic Convergence of Cataloniaj drew up _
a hardly favorable announcement: "We consider the so-called "Pact for Pro-
gress" very negatively because we believe it did not respond to any real
programmatic agreement serving the city but rather to a will to impose a
political formula that na~o and in the future could establish a hegemony of
the Marxist parties in Catalonian society."
The broadside was a strong one and Reventos, leader of the Catalonian social-
- ists, was not slow to react: "Any abandonment (of the agreements) can only
be a r.esponse to the opportunism of an electoral campaign for the Catalonian
parliament or to the unjustifiable aspiration to expand the power areas of
the town councils."
. Nevertheless, despite the strong pressures of the CDC's most extreme right
wing and the unilateral abandonment of the pact by the UCD at the very time
when the council of the nationalists was meetin$, the progressive sector of
Roca Junyent exerted sufficient pressure so that a new pact might be negotiated
"under conditions permitting a more effective city government."
A short time later, Roca was to reach the point of resigning as deputy sec- -
retary general of his party using as an excuse his dedication to his par=
liamentary tasks and responsibilities although various sources note that the
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resignation was the culmination of a series of fric.tions with the sector of
Trias Fargas, author of the final drafi; of the council's note which so harshly
attacked the expired "Pact for Progress."
PSUC: A Big Hoax
- Tbe negotiations lost by Convergence began an Tuesday, 6 November, at the
highest level. Jordi Pujol, Josep Maria Cu11e11 and Antoni Comas, on behalf
of the socialists. After 3 days of total silence and long days of negotiations,
a pact emerged in which references were made to 11 different areas of the City
Council dnd the desire to strengthen the roT~ of the regular council was made
patent, guaranteeing f.ull cohesion between the municipal agreements and the
parties' activities, institutionalizing the meetings of the various political -
groups' spokesmen and seeking the presence of a representative of each party
at press conferences following regular council meetings.
The communists' reaction was immediate and ~~ery tough. The PSUC's [Unified
~ocialist Party of Catalonia], Antoni Gutierrez, said as a result of the ~
agreement that the formula was wrong and that it was a matter of a maneuver ~
to separate communists and socialists and to weaken the policy of progress (
in Catalonia. ~
I; ~
Josep Miguel Abad, PSUC deputy maynr, was still tougher and went as far as
to term the pact a great hoax and an electoral fraud for the city. He affirmed
that the agreements made are already in operation or are in sight, including
some, such as the purchase of 50 buses, that have been pending since the ad-
ministration of the former "digito" mayor Socias Humbert and insinuated that
socialists and convergentists had spend the 3 days discussing other issues,
a clear reference to the coming elections to the Catalonian Parliament.
The statements by the deputy ma.yor immediately provoked a strong response
among the socialist ranks. Reventos went to the extend of threatening to
suspend the talks arranged with the PSUC to heighten the value of the municipal
pacts if Abad were not disapproved by his party. It was not a major fight. ,
The Barcelona I.ocal Committee supported Abad�s political assessment, adding
the nuance that the form in which it was said was a personal matter.
CDC: "We Have Not Asked for a Larger Share of the Pie"
Josep Maria Cullell, deputy mayor, a member of Convergence and a leader of the
Council's Treasury Department, told Julian Castello of CAMBIO 16, what his
party's intentions are: "The "Pact of Progress" has of course expired because
it was only for 6 months. Now, everyone thought ~oe wanted a larger share of
the pie but we have not even brought that up. What we want is to have the
city councils work and not spend time at the plenary meeting discussing issues
such as divorce or public and private schooling, issues that belong to _
parliament."
25
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Cullell dc~es not really agree with the assessment oF the "Pact of Progress"
made by his par.ty's council. "Six months ago a program was agreed upon," he
stated, ":~nd it has been fulfilled with interest." [Jith respect to Communist
nerves, Cullell considers them to be justified.
"Pujol said it earl.ier at his lecture in Esade, that Catalonia's future policy
depends on the PSC [Socialist Party of Catalonia] and the CDC. We worked to-
gether in making this pact. The PSUC, being on the outside, has become nervous
and also the UCD; consequently I am not surprised that they want to destroy
and descredit it," Cullell concluded.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 informacion y revistas, S.A.
8094
CSO: 3110
. `
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COUN7'RY SECTION SPAIN ~
COMAfENTARY SCORES INTERIOR MINISTER FOR LACK OF ACTION
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 25 Nov 79 p 21
[Article by Jose Oneto: "Ibanez Freire"]
~ i
[Text] A week after the abduction of the UCD's jUnion of the Democratic
Center] secretary for Internal Relations and deputy for Cuenca, Javier
Ruperez, it is not yet known what kind of ineasures the minister of interior, `
Antonio Ibanez Freire, has taken to bring a little tranquillity to public ~
o~~inion increasingly terrorized by the ease with which people here are killed,
abducted, subjected'to extortion and deals are made.
Two weeks after the reports by Deputy Juan Maria Bandres on the alleged tor-
turing of Basque prisoners in a few areas of Euskadi, the~minister of interior,
- Lieutenant General Ibanez Freire, continu2`s to remain totally silent in a
deliberate effort to get the government's spokesman, Josep Melia, pull his
chestnuts out of the fire.
The reports of alleged tortur~ ma.de public 2 days following a personal inter-
view between deputy Bandres and the minister of 'interior have up to now not ,
been worth any commentary on the one whose main mission is watching over the
honor of the state security corps and punishing any individual excess which ~
might occur in any Civil Guard police station or prison. By responding with
silence the minister of interior has deliberately allowed the colors which are
everyone's to be snatched from him by the ETA organization which has included
them among the petitions for t?~e release of UCD deputy Javier Ruperez.
Ibanez Freire, who as a politician has succeeded in getting even the opposition
to speak well of him and embrace him daily in the corridors of Parliament, is
deliberately not fulfilling his duties as minister of interior among which is
providing minimal security to some citizens who, perplexed, are contemplating
the way in which the minister of interior for the sake fo a personal political ;
career systematically refuses to face up to things, a spectacle which is already '
becoming commonplace in Prime Minister Adolfo Suare2's government. ~
At this stage the minister of interior should have already appeared on tele-
vision (as abussd Rodolfo Martin Villa did on many occasions) to explain if
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torture has heen applied or not, what measure,; have been tak~n, what kind of
investigation is ~oing to be set in motion... And to explain whether or not
there will be negotiations with the ETA, what measures have been adopted to
resolve the Ruperez case, what the results are in the anti-ETA struggle...
Although people are getting irritated and there is the risk of an increased
spiral of violence, the minister of interior has to ma~e the honor of Che
members of state security very clear, he has to brin~ about some sort of calm
in the country and has to be in contact with a citizenry which is left devoid
of explanations and security. Even if he ruins himself.
The spectacle is much more shameful if one looks at the ranks of the oppusition, -
an opposition which crushed P~4artin Villa and which is now delightedly con-
- templating the figure of Ibanez Freire, one of whom no explanations are asked
as to his professional behavior which leaves much to be desired.
In the last ministerial crisis, after the March legislative elections, the
prime minister, Adolfo Suarez, chose to place a military man at the h~ad of
the Ministry of Interior.
More than an effort to involve the army in the problems of public order, the
c}ioice implied a hidden wish to silence the opposition by installing in the
Ministry of Interior a lieutenant general who would stop any kind of criticism.
By gambling on the idiocy'of *.he socialists and communists in the face of the
military estate, Suarez was resolvirig a problem that had brought him into
serious conflicts with the uncompromising maintenance of order by his pre-
decessor.
The move has produced so many good results that neither the minister of in-
terior is attacking the Left when it should be attacked, nor does the Left
attack the minister when there is good reason to attack him.
Furthermore, the Left is deceiving itself, is changing, is becoming trans-
figured when it sees Lieutenazt General Antonio Ibanez Freire in the corridors
of Parliament. And Ibanez Freire becomes transfigured too when he embraces
_ Carrillo, when he greets Enrique Mugica or when he is interviewed--to speak
of torture in private--~,rith the deputy of the Euskadiko Ezquerra [Basque
Left] Juan Mari.a Bandres. �
Obviously something is off the track here. In the government and, of course,
in the opposition.
SCOPYRIGHT: 1979 informacion y revistas, S.A.
8094
CSO: 3110
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COUNTRY SECTION SPAIN
MARTIN VILLA'S POLITICAL STAR BELIEVED TO BE RISING
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 18 Nov 79 p 21
[Article by Jose Oneto: "Martin Villa"]
[Text] After 6 months of silence, Rodolfo Martin Villa, former minister of j
interior, has returned to the foreground in current political affairs to ~
present what virtually amounts to a government program.
I
Attached from all sides while minister of interior, confronted by many military ;
sectors charging him of being a traitor, hated by the "blues" of the extreme !
Right and criticized by the democrats, Rodolfo Martin Villa left the government
6 months ago because he could no longer continue to head the Ministry of In-
terior and because the alternatives which Prime Minister Suarez proposed to
him at a time of his choosing were not acceptable.
He could have been a good minister in the cabinet of the present government
or perhaps an effective political vice premier. Perhaps the latter, because
- of his loyalty to the prime minister and because of tl~e time he had to spend
in the Ministry of Interior against his will, would have been an appropriate ~
reward. But at ttiat time Suarez did not want to have two centers of power ~
and he had a feeling that an economic vice premier like Fernando Abril and '
a political vice premier like Martin Villa could paralyze the Council of
Ministers and cause a daily confrontation.
When it appeared that Martin Villa was already practically finished (and cer-
tainly no politician in recent years has worn himself out as much as he has
in the government), he has showed up again to draw up an entire program which
. is also a veiled criticism.of an policy made up wholly of concessions.
In a newspaper interview and at a public appearance on the tribune of the
21st Century Club, Martin Villa has shown himslef to be what he has always
been: One of the pillars on which the party is based.
Because in the UCD [Democratic Center Union] those who hold the real power
are nat the social democrats of Fernandez Ordonez, nor Joaquin Garrigues'
liberals, nor Alvarez Miranda' or Jose Luis Alvarez's Christian Democrats,
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but rat}ier the men who came from the old apparatus of the dictatorship who
wcre ia tf~e txade unions, in the ministries and above all in the provincial
and local organizations.
These men are very close to the chief who at this time is Adolfo Suarez and
are completely identified with Martin Villa, a prototype of the politician of
the former regime, skillful at finding openings and without whom the transition
would have been impossible.
Despite all the criticism and all the defects, Martin Villa, one of the mast
important politicians this country now has, was an excellent minister of in-
terior. Especially when compared with the persent one, a lieutenant general
who has committed errors similar to those of his predecessor but whom the
opposition respects and fears (and at times foolishly praises him) because of
the stars shining on his cuff.
On reappearing, Martin Villa criticized the UCD of which he requested internal
democratization; he has criticized Parliament for whi~ch he asked greater
authority and effectiveness, and has also criticized the government for its
lack ot political far rightedness. And above all he has sounded the alarm for -
something which at this stage is elementary: The government should achieve
fulfillment of the law and the tribunals of j ustice should apply it.
_ Throughout his two public statements, Rodolfo Martin Villa has called attention
to two issues (autonomy and the economic crisis) and has pointed out that the
government`s present policy of lagging behind problems cannot go on. On the
one hand the proliferation of demands for autonomy can place, and in Fact
are already placing, the f unctioning of the state in jeopardye
On the other, the economic crisis, and on this presidential adviser Fuentes
Quintana has been far more categorical, can put an end to the democratic
system itself if there is no real growing awareness by all of the political
forces.
_ And most important: One ~annot lag behind problems. One cannot continue
governing by the day without any perspective, without any proposals for so-
lutions on a medium-term basis. One cannot go on in a makeshift way.
; Finally, the analysis which the former minister of interior is making as to
the fundamental attitude of the Spanish people is aso important. "Rights and
freedoms have been accorded too much importance to the detriment of duties,
solidarity and social respect. People are constantly resorting to demands
and requirements forgetting performance and individual contributions. A major
campaign must be carried out one restoring to our community a feeling of con- -
- cepts of solidarity in work, a sense of duty, of respect for others."
COPYRIGHT: 1979 informacion y revistas,S.A.
8094
CSO: 3110
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COUN~I`RY SFCTION SPAIN
'CAMBIO' INTERVIEWS LEADERS OF POLICE UNION
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 25 Nov 79 pp 31,33 '
[Interview by CAMBIO lfi with USP [Police Union] members in Zaragoza circa
mid-November 1979] ~
" " La t I
[Text] If torture is going on, let it be revealed. s
June the USP embarrassed the administration. It took the (
Ministry of Interior to court and won its case. But they I
continue to be the "illegal" policemen who are opposed to ~
torture and for the right to strike. '
On 28 February 1979 more than one high police official received a shock. At
the little window of the Ministry of Interior 102 policemen presented the
statutes of a new association: the Police Union.
The union wanted to negotiate with the administration when civil servants
were merely allowed to cooperate, and they did not want to give up the right
to strike.
~ What concerned the upper levels of the police was however that the USP would
emerge confronting the other union, the Professional Association of Policemen, i
which those first mentioned accuse of being "yellow." '
A week ago, the USP held a gathering in Zaragoza to grant an interivew to ~
Cambio 16. On the following day, Modesto Garcia, Antonio Plaza, Mariano ~
Briones and Mauricio Moya agreed to talk with this review.
(Question] Why do they persist.in prohibiting the union? ~
[Modesto Garcia] Perhaps because at the Ministry of Interior they know that ;
thay are not going to be able .to control us nor settle with us through
- sinecures as they can another association. For tnat reason too sonieone with
the police corps is seeking to discredit us by calling us "reds." .
[Question] And is the USP in fact "red?"
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[GarciaJ The USP is an independent trade union in which there is room for all
~~olicemen who respect democracy and political pluralism. Policemen fit into
- it who politically may be either in the Communist Party or in the Popular
Alliance.
[Question] Does tarturing go on in the police?
[Garcia] We do not have proof that it goes on. In any event it would be a
matter of sick individuals, unbalanced people, whom we, their own comrades,
would be the first to request that they be expelled from the corps.
[Antonio Plaza] We are for having any individual who considers himse~f mal-
treated by the police inform the judicial branch of the facts. The USP will
cooperate with judges and prosecutors on the data in which the existence of
ill treatment appears. However, care will also be taken to demand respon-
sibility when it is proven by the judicial action that there was no torture
_ and that the honor of officials of the High Police Corps has been questioned.
[Question] Why did the police fail with respect to the ETA?
[Garcia] Basically beca:~se a sector of the people subscribes to the ETA's
~ doctrines ~vhereas they reject the police. So it is very difficult for the
police to obtain the information we need to struggle against terrorism.
On the otl~er hand, it must also be noted that we have always felt that the
solution for the Basque country resided in the Statute of Autonomy wtiich has
just been passed and which s~iould lead to a reconciliation between the Basques
- and the rest of the country.
[Question] What do you think of Basque terrorism?
[Mauricio Moya] We are opposed to a denial of the right to life. Consequently,
we are against the death penalty whether it comes fram the state ar from other
groups wtiich may be able to defend interests that are negotiable in a peaceful
way. �
We therefore condemn killings by the ETA whether or not its victims are police-
_ men. The policemen who die in the Basque country are workers defending their
family's livelihood something the ETA should not forget.
We know there are good policemen.and~.bad policemen,that there are hardly any
Basque policemen, that there is a great gulf between the police and the citizens
in those provinces. We believe that the police are the people and have to
serve the people and we believe that we are in a period of reconciliation and
ardently desire that there be peace.
[Question] Is it true that the policemen who go to the Basque country are
the lowest of every [police training school] class?
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[Antonio PlazaJ It is true. It is paradoxical, but it does happen that way
in that the top graduates can ask for what they want and no one wishes to go
to the Basque country.
With the police stations the same thing happens. On one occasion Martin Villa
said that he was going to send those who performed the best in the course for
inspectors. And indeed he did send them. They went there, but the majority
of them returned a short time later to their for~ner positions. Wirepulling
and special contacts achieved the miracle.
[QuestionJ What is the present situation of the police?
[Garcia] The situation is that of transition toward democracy. Within the
police it has caused upheavals at all levels. The establishment of police
stations in towns of more than 20,000 inhabitants, for example, has been a
total failure.
[Question] So Martin Villa's reform was to no avial? ~
[Mariano Briones] Over all, the reforms initiated by riinister Martin Villa
are not as negative as they appear. What is happening is that Rome was not ,
built in a day and Rodolfo Martin Villa did not have time enough. ~
i
[Question] Was creating the BC [Central Information Brigade] also another ~
Martin Villa success?
[Briones] Experience is proving that this brigade has achieved nothing up to
now. ~
~ [P1azaJ The system is not an operational one. With the central brigade
system there is a tendency to centralize the police whereas centralizing any
service does not improve its effectiveness.
On the other hand, the RCI's investigation is directed at a very specific
extreme. Instead of devoting itself to obtaining information on all extremist
political groups so that the state may take action, the Spanish extreme Left
is the only one to be exclusively pursued. ~ '
[QuestionJ And why is that?
(Plaza] Perhaps because at certain levels the extreme Right is too closely
related to the past.
[Question] How does the administration look on the police?
[Garcia] For the administration as personified by its leaders, a policeman
is in a servile position. A servile policeman is most favorably regarded by
his bosses and, in contrast, the one who exercises his rights and who demands
and fulfills his obligations is a"red" and is passed over.
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Within their respective limits, the upper level police officials are real
viceroys. They have more than enough resources for punishments. One of them
is to refer~constantly to the needs of the service as a means of pressure.
' In addition, to initiating disciplinary expedients for insignificant reasons
including that of exercising rights recognized by the constitution.
[Question] You are not able to speak out?
; [Briones) Speaking out is dangerous even if some general issues are raised,
those that are mentioned in the newspapers and in the street every day.
I
~ We have a recent example in Inspector Alcobendas Jesus Merino de la Hoz who
~ was disciplined for having expressed his opinion of an editorial in EL PAIS.
~ The high police officials continue to operate with the previaus system's
j inertia and apply the same norms and concepts of a totalitarian system to one
that has freedoms.
I [QuestionJ But the police are surely at least well paid?
~
[Plaza] A few policemen, of course. And I am referring to those services
where the pay envelopes are still in effect.
On the other hand, the vast majority of the officers rece-_:~p modest salaries
without any account being taken of the incompatibility of the work the police-
, man is obliged to perform.
; [Question] Aren't the policemen who co~bat ETA terrorism probably better
paid?
[Pioya] They are not paid much better considering the social rejection from
which they suffer and the fact that they are risking their lives every day.
[Question] Wtaat training does a policeman get?
; [Plaza] The only thing superior about the High Police Corps today is its
name. One aught to have at least 4 years at a school and today one goes there
for 9 months.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 informacion y revistas, S.A.
8094
CSO: 3110 E~
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