JPRS ID: 8833 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030051-0
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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27 1979 ~ 1 OF 1
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' JPRS L/8833
27 December 1979 -
- ah~aran Africa Re ort
Sub ~
p .
FOUO No. 659
- ~
- Fg~$ FOREIGN ~ROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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, JPRS L/8833 -
27 December 1979
~ SUB=SA1{ARAN AFRICA REPORT
~ FOUO No. 659
~
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CONTENTS PAGE
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
' Use of African Armies Examined
(Hamza Kaidi; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 31 Oct 79) 1
~
, Original Medina Soumbounou Interview Creates Storm of Protest
-i (JEUNE AFRIQUE, 3 Oct 79) 11 _
-1
Reactions to 'Medina Af.fair', by Sennen Andriamirado -
~ Second Medina Interview, by Hamza Ka.idi
I Brief s -
Lib;a To Hand Qver Mali Dissident 16
' ANGOLA
U.S. Accused of Abandoning Conciliatory Policy
(August Conchiglia; AFP.IQUE-ASIE, 26 Nov 79)............ 17
, Briefs
_
~Belgian Sugar Agreement 19 -
~ �
_j BENIN
=1
~ Cadres Favor Revolution Rather Than Marxism -
-I (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 2 Nov 79)......... 20 '
BURUNDI -
_ EIB Loan Granted to Small, Medium-Si_zed Enterprises _
- (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 19 Oct 79)........ 22
CAMEROON "
Oil, Natural Gas Strikes on Cameroon
, (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET P:EDITERRANEENS, 19 Oct 79)........ 23
- a-- LIII - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
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~ CONTENTS (Continued) Page
~
� EIB Loan Granted ALUC~'~M ~
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 19 Oct 79)....... 25
Cameroon Cotton Production Reviewed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS, 19 Oct 79)....... 26
CAPE VERDE ;
Brief s -
Civil Aviation Agreement 2~
'
CENTRAL AFRICAN :tEPUBLIC ,
Gathering of Nation's Vital Forces
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANE~NS, 19 Oct 79)....... 28 I
Brief s
ASECNA Rejoined 30
CHAD
Government Airlifts Opinion Leaders to Unity Talks
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 19 Oct 79)....... 31
Brief s
School Term Begins 33 `
GABON ,
Alleged Corruption Behind Bongo Financial Deals "
(Fode Amadou; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 26 Nov 79) 34
GUINEA
Human Rights Policies in Sekou Toure's Guinea '
(Sennen Andriamirado; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 17 Oct 79)........ 36
Briefs
~rade Union Delegation to Czechoslovakia 40
_ IDA Agricultural Loan 40
BID Cement Loan 40
Detentio?i Camps Visited 40
GUINEA-BISSAU
Brief s '
French Presidez~t's Visit 41
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CONTENTS (Co.ztinued) Page
IVORY Ci1~~ST
Report on Foreign Trade in 1978
; (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS, 19 Oct 79)........ 42
MADAGASCAR
Growing Industrial Economic Prospects
_ (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 2 Nov 79)........ 59 -
MALI
Survey of Production Statistics Published
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 28 Sep 79)....... 63
; Brief s
_ FAD Water Supply Loan 65 =
French Financin~ Agreements 65
MAURITIUS
Left, Right Seen Pressuring Prime Minister
(Herve Masson; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 29 Oct-11 Nov 79)........ 66 ~
MOZAMBIQUE -
- Brief s
Possible Resumption of Relations With Portugal 69
- Port Traffic Statistics 69
Agricultural E~ports to GDR 69
NIGER ~
, Budget for 1980 Tops 72 Billion CFA ~
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 19 Oct 79)...... 70
RHODESIA
'THE TIMES' Praises Carringto~i Strategy
(Editorial; THE TIMES, 6 Dec 79)..... 74
SENEGAL
Islamic Forces Seen as Sole Tool Ab1e To Assure Unity
(Mamadou Samb; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 12-25 Nov 79)............ ' 76
- Brief s
ONCAD Director General 80
FRG Cooperation Agreements Signed 80
-c-
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_ CONTENTS (Continued) Page
TOGO
- Briefs ;
Government Reshuffle 81
ZAIRE
Details Concerning Zaire's Economic Measures
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS, 19 Oct 79)........ 82
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INTER-AFRZCAN AFFAIRS
USE OF AFRICAN ARMTES EXAMINED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French~31 Oct 79 pp 39-43
[Article by Hamza Kaidi]
[Text] Libreville, 18 February 1g64: the coup d'etat led by
the Gabonese officers aborted; French paratroopers put President
Leon Mba back in power.
Conakry, 22 November 1970: a commando force of Guinean exiles~
aided by Portuguese mercenaries, landed on the beach of the
Guinean capital. They knew little of the terrain. A few re-
sistance fighters from the PAIGC [African Independence Party of
Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde] and probably some Cuban instructors =
in Guinea: the Sekou To:are regime was saved.
Shaba, Zaire, 10 March 1977: Katangan refu~ees from Angola in-
vaded the province and attacked Kolwezi..;The Zairian army,
including the famed Kamaniola "elite" division, was routed by
fewer than 2,000 Katangan "gendarmes." Only the intervention of ~
Moroccan troops saved the Mobutu~regime. A year later the
' Katangans returned and this time took Kolwezi. ~l'he'intervention
of fewer than 500 French Legionnaires again saved the regime.
On 21 September 1979, several hundred French paratroopers landea
at the Bangui airport, bringing along with them a chief of state
handpicked to be the successor of Bokassa, whose empire fell
without putting up a fight.
- From Gabon to Ethiopia, and including Zaire, Angola, and Chad,
many regimes in Africa have survived only through the inter-
vention of foriegn forces, which sometimes have less than one
regiment of paratroopers. Others have fallen or nearly been
toppled by small units from abroad. Just several dozen mer-
; cenaries operated successfully in the Comoro Islands, but others
_ just barely failed in Beni~.
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Surviving with Dif~'iculty `
So what are the armed #'orces in these countries doing? W.iat
. good are they if they can't mana~e to do their essenti.al ,job,
to defend their national territory, even against smaller forces?
Yet the armed forces of 3~ of the 43 independent nations of -
Sub-Saharan Africa, as of 1 January 1979, had nearly 750,000 men
in military service and nearly 210,000 paramilitary forces.
These figures added togeth~r may appear astr.-onomical. But we -
~ m ust remember the unequal distribution of troops from one _
country to another. Only two armies have over 100,000 men _
(Ethiopia with 221,600 if we include its large militia, and
Nigeria with 173,000). One country llas over 50,000 men (Tan- -
zania: 51,600), and six have between 20,000 and 50,000 (Somalia:
; 46,500; Angola: 40,000; Mozambique: 24,000; Zaire: 20,500; i
Ghana: 20,000 Uganda: 21,000--before the fall of Idi Amin). The ~
others have often symbolic armed forces, whose troops range from -
1,200 (Central Africa) to 14,300 men (Zambia). -
Furthermore, if' we deduct from these figur~s the 394,600 men
~ of the two major military powers (Ethiopia and Nigeria), the
32 other countries of Sub-Saharan Africa would have a total of ~
355,~00 men, or about half of the ~roops that the country re-
puted to be the most pacifist and the most neutral in the world,
Switzerland, can mobilize. Nearly 625,000 men can be mobilized
there in 48 hours. Nor do these 32 African countries carry any
more weight against the other champion of pacifism, Sweden,
which can mobilize nearly 750,000 men in 72 hours.
While there is in Europe one regular soldier for about 100
inhabitants and for 0.30 to 1 square kilorr~ter of territory to
be defended, one soldier for 52 inhabitants and 0.6 km2 in Cuba, '
one for 23 inhabitants and 0.1 km2 in Israel, the two major i
military powers in Africa, Ethiopia and Ni~eria, have approxi-
mately one soldier for 406 inhabitants and 5.3 km2 of territory.
At the bottom of the scale, we find the countries with limited
resources, such as Niger: one soldier for 2,335 inhabitants and
- 589�3 km2. We also find the "big countries," such as Zaire,
which has only one regular soldier for 1,351 inhabitants and
722 km2 of territory. ~
These considerations by themselves show that the armies of
Sub-Saharan Africa are hardly capable of defending their ~
respective countries against external aggression because of
their small numbers and the exterit of their territories. Such
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gaps could be compensated by firepower, mobili,ty, discipline,
and good training, But that is not the case. Most of the
A#'rican armies lack all these advantages.
Limited Armed Forces
_ Firepower is limited by the lack of heavy artillery, of armored _
_ units, and by the inadequacy of air support. There again, the =
equipment is very unequal. While some countries, such as
Ethiopia or Angola, may have about 500 pieces of artillery
(canons, howitzers, and rocket launchers of all calibers), others
_ have only a few 60 or 81-mm mort ars. Whi~e the power of a con-
ver.tional army is measured in our times by the number of planes
and tanks, 23 countries in this area have never had the small-
est combat tank and 14 have no combat planes. Of the 1,205
tanks belonging to the nine other countries, 1,105 are owned
~ by just three countries: Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola. So
Nigeria, the leading African country in population and economic -
weight, which numerically has the largest regular army, does not
have a single heavy tank. The 50 light acorpion tanks used in
. its army are just enough for a coup d'etat. In aviation, the
- situation is about the same. There are 14 countries which do not
have a single combat plane. Ethiopia, Zambia, Zaire, Angola, and -
Mozambique all together have over half (22g) of the 384 aircraft
listed as belongin~ to all of the Sub-Saharan countries. And
as a comparison, Sweden has 432. Ov~r half of these African
planes (221) are subsonic aircraft. While they were still good
a few years ago for light tactical support or for anti-guerriila
operations, they can now be used for these purposes only at the
- cost of heavy losses, since the appearance of backpack surface
to air missiles of the Sam 7 type. Then there are 163 super-
sonic planes. Ethiopia alone has over half of these. More-
over, a good number of these planes are barely operational. The
~ck of an adequate ground infrastructure, the inadequacy of
maintenance services, and the lack of spare parts often keeps
them crippled on the ground.
Furthermore, it is not enough to have troops and materiel. The
troops have to be brought to the operating sites. But the
nature of the terrain (swamps, f orests, deserts), the poor road _
system, and of'ten the lack of transport vehicles are a heavy
burden impeding troop mobility. A"deta~l" of supply is illus-
trated by the story of a country which was tempted to cross
swords with its neighbor after a border iricident, but which had
to swallow its bellicose resentment: it did not have the fuel
it needed to transport its troops.
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Significant Gaps
Military training also o~'ten leaves somethi,ng to be desired
because of tlze a~sence of real firing manEUVers, whi,ch a
number of countries can not afford because of the cost of
ammunition.
Another handicap, and perhaps the most important one: the
officer corps. Most of the African national armed forces, de-
rived from the old colon~.al forces, were created by the former
home country which took responsibility for providing officers
and equipment.
The process first began for French-speaking Africa in Cameroon.
- When this country was due to become independent on 1 January
1gE0, the French authorities decided to provide it in advance
with a tool that would enable it to maintain public order and
political stability. So they decided to transfer to the authori-
ty of Car~eroon all of the gendarmerie forces in the territory.
The operation took place smoothly, sj,nce this body was composed
_ essentially of local people. Other units were to be formed
later through French military assistance.
Unequal Equipment
~ased on this experience, the French armed forces ministry
presented to the government a plan to form national armed
~ forces for the future African states, a plan called the "reason-
able plan." This plan called for the pure and simple transfer -
of renamed units, but also for the training of cadres for the
future armed forces to be done as quickly as possible. The plan
immed~.ately ran up against almost insurmountable problems. For
security reasons, the French command had applied a policy of ~
"mixing" in all its colonial troops. Now it had to reverse the
policy, that is, to group forces based on theix~ origin. The '
operation immediately revealed gaps. Some countries, where
France h~.d always conducted intensive recruiting, were now
"advantaged over others which were left practically without
officers ."1
I
Thus, until 1939, there was not a single off-icer from Ubangui ~
" (r.ow the CEntral African Republic) in the French Army. The
l. Moshe Ammini Oz: "The Training of African Military Cadres ,
- during the Establishment of the National Armed Forces."
REVUE FRANCAISE D~ETUDES POLITIQUES AFRICAINES, No 133,
February 1977.
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- first lieutenant, promoted because of World War II, died during
the conflict. His successor, in the person of Jean Bedel
Bokassa, came only in 1958. Right before independence, outside
of the auxiliary guards, there was a sinole Central Af~ican
gendarme, Sgt~ Izamo. He became a captain in 18 months . -
In February 1960, there were in all a total of 86 African and
Malagasy officers3. The "reasonable plan" called for 800 of- ~
' ficers (620 in the armed forces and 180 in the police forces),
and 2,200 non-commissioned officers. The French authorities
managed to assemble 415 RTOM [Natives of Overseas Territories]
officers in military service, student officers, and Frencn of-
ficers made available to the future African national armed
forces . They still. needed nearly ~{00 more.
Lack of Infrastructure
But the RTO~I officers belonged mostly to the overseas infantry -
forces, where they had served as nati.ves. The top-level African
officers could be counted on the fin~ers of one hand. Rarely
responsible for staff or command functions, confined to posts
as advisers on African affairs, they werE ill prepared to deal
with organizational and administrative matters. Only a few had
ever commanded anything above a battalion level.
In addition to these forces needed to set up the ground forces
(mainly infantry), the training of air for.ce and naval officers
also had to be planned for. In 1g60, there was no officer from -
Sub-Saharan Africa serving in the French Air Force. About 50 _
officers and at least U50 no:~-commissioned officers had to be
- train~d to serve as pilots, mechanics, and technicians of various
types . In any event, they could only become operational after
5 years. So it was decided that until 1965, the crews serving
in the Afric~~.n and Malagasy forces would consist of French "
_ personnel.
2. Captain Bussiere: "The Central African Republic wi~hout
Boganda." Publication of the Center for Advanced Studies
cf :~Iodern Africa and Asia, 1g63.
3� ?~Iajor Lucazeau: "The Advancement of African Officers and
the Africanization of the Officer Corps." CMIDOM [Militar.y _
Center for Overseas Inf ormation and Documentation], Febru- '
ary 1g60.
4. Moshe Ammini Oz . 0~. Cit .
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- The training of African national naval forces i,n the coastal _
states was to encounter the same problem. The h~gh level of
technical skill required of officers necessitated a training
program lasting 5 years. The F.rench general staff had estima-
ted the needs of the African navies at 90 officers and 180 non-
commissioned officers. But in 1962 there were only two Malagasy
~ officers serving on board the French training ship, the Jeanne
d'Arc. One of them, Didier Ratsiraka, was later to become the
Malagasy chief of state.
The French schools which were to train officers for the African
armies based their progratn on the "reasonable plan" and the
_ French military authorities drew up an accelerated training pro- i
gram, bas~d on the educational. level ~f the African entrants.
Admission standards were softened in favor of certain applicants. '
Others were accepted just at the rec~uest of their government. i~
This second method was used by most of the applicants. I
The Lack of an Officer Corps
This program planned for. the military cadres from French-speaking _
- Africa is in reality an example of what was done in the countries
under Belgian or British influence. Here and there, the lack of
specizlized cadres at the time the national armed forces were
created was to place a severe handicap on the future of the Afri- _
can military institutions. _
, ,
Some countries provided top-level officers for their a.rmed
forces in rather strange ways. The former president for life of
the Central African Republic, Bokassa, provided his country's
_ army, which had about a thousand men (a little more than a bat-
talion), with a marshal--himself. At the time the Congo-Leopold- ;
= ville became independent, Sergeant Mobutu was promoted to the
rank of colonel, chief of staff, and then to general, commander i
' in chief. In Gabon, Sergeant Bor~~ became a reserve captain
and later was made a general at the request of the armed forces.
The marshal's rank was "conferred" on Idi Amin Dada by his
- own tribe. The most rapid rise (but which was also quite
ephemeral) was in Zanzibar, where Sergeant Okello became a
marshal through a coup d'etat. But he was quickly returned to
civilian life and his job as a mason. But it was the soldiers
and officer�s of the public forces which became the ANC [Congo-
lese National Army] who, at the time the Congo-Leopoldville
- became independent, received the most "original" promotions.
At the request of Patrice Lumumba, the officers were "demo- _
= cratically elected" by their troops. However, it is true that
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the French revolt~tionary armies had given an exam~le of this in
~ 178g and again in 1792. Now, 20 years after i.nde~endence, the
- national armies are sti,ll suffering from.the way in which they
were formed. The Zairian Air Force gave an example of this on
8 December 197$, when two Mirage aircraft from the Zairian Air
Force, registered as M22Q and M4~0, were returning from a mis-
- sion to Bangui. They were unable to land at the Kinshasa air-
port because of bad weather. The crew members, Maj Uzapango
Kanzeka Mba, Capt M'1'ele, and Lt Luanba Nguy Wamguy, found a
strange solution to this problem: they parachuted out and aban-
doned the'ir planes. The ~lanes flew on and crashed in Angola
~ after running out of fuel .
Sophisticated Arms and High Costs
It is true that Africa spends the least on national defense.
Between 1963 and 1973, military spendin g of South Afr~ica was
= larger than that of the rest of the continent combined (not -
_ including Egypt). In 1978-1979, 34 countries of Sub-Saharan
Africa spent $4 bill~_on on their national defense. This figure -
may seem fabulous. But all these mi litary budgets together
are hardly more than the budget of a small European country
- without any great military amb.itions, such as Belgium (which
spent $3.636 billion). This spending is less than a third of _
the money spent by Saudi Arabia for its defense ($14.180 bil- -
- lion in 1979). It is less than a fifth of' French military
spending ($21.510 b illion) and a sixth of West Germany's ($24
billion). U;hile spending per soldier is estimated at $318,651
in Saudi Arabia, $42,215 in France, and $48,651 in the Federal
Republic of Germany, it is only $559 in Somalia, $g52 in -
Liberia, and $10,116 in Nigeria. But Gabon heads this list,
spending $40,461 per soldier.
"We are setting up weaport~.systems which are nothir.g on a world
scale, but which are a crushing b:u.rden for our countries," a .
Latin American statesman once said. This remark is applicable
to all the African countries. Although reduced in relation to
other regions of the planet, military spending is very burden- ~
some for our countries. The high cost of sophi~t.a.cated equip-
ment, often old-fashioned when it is first acquixed, limits our
armament potential.
5. AFRIQUE DEFENSE, No 10, January 1979. .
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- Comk,at Aircraft South of the Sahara
~
_ Angola 31 12 lg -
Benin 0 0 0 ~
Botswana 00 0 0 -
Burundi 0 0 0 ~ _
Cameroon 4 0 4 ;
Central Africa 0 0 0 '
Chad 5 0 5
- Congo 10 0 10 '
Djibouti 0 0 0
Ethiopia 100 77 23
Gabon 9 ' 5 4 '
- Ghana 12 0 12 ~
Guinea 13 3 10 ;
- Guinea-Bissau 0 0 0
Ivory Coast 0 0 0 ~
Kenya 21 12 9 -
Liberia 0 0 0
_ Madagascar 8 8 0
Malawi 0 0 0
Mali $ ~ $
Mauritania 13 0 13 ,
Mozambique 30 30 0 ; _
Niger 0 0 0
Nigeria 21 3 18 '
Rwanda 0 0 0
_ Senegal 0 0 0
Sierra Leone 0 0 0 ;
Somalia 25~2) 7 1$ ;
Tanzania 20 0 20
- Togo 11 0 11
Uganda 31 (1) 21 10
Upper Volta 0 0 0
Zaire 31 13 18 ~
Zambia 37 0 37 '
Total 440 191 249
Destroyed or out of service -56 -28 -28
(1) Destroyed
(2) Out of service. !
Note: Of the 34 countries, 14 do not have a single combat
plane.
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An armored division costs $400 million. A flight of fighter
bombers of the F-5 type, now outmoded, costs $120 million.
' According to UNESCO, :tMe~price of a ne~t prototype bomber is
equivalent to the annual salary of 250,000 teachers, 30 facul-
ties of science with 1,000 students each, 75 hospitals. How
many African countries can afford such luxuries?
,
Over and~above the price of equipment, another factor limits the
' capabilities of our armed forces. Relyi~ng totally on forei~n
~ sources for all weap~ns supplied, from a simple rifle cartxi dge
i to a fighter or transport aircraft, they can not undertake the
slightest.large-scale operation without the support of a non-
African power to replace worn out or destroyed equipment.
The case of Somalia, during the Ogaden conflict, illustrates to
~ perfection this dependence, which may be just as significant in
, peacetime. For example, a good supersonic intercept aircraft
uses, on the average, nearly a third of its cost in spare parts
every year. To illustrate this, a western diplomat has said that
a modern jet fighter has to change tires after about six landings,
and some maintenance procedures can only be done by the aircraft
manufacturer or in highly equipped shops that are located only
in the developed countries.
So, what good are these armies? Many of the African countries
have asked themselves this very questicn. Some have decided
to relegate this budget-devauring institution to the background, -
feeling that the purchase of war materiel is an anti-social
act. How can they spend tens of millions of dollars on the
purchase of armored vehicles and planes, when their citizens
are suffering from malnutrition, illiteracy, etc.? Isn't it
~ better to spend this money in more productive sectors? Per- _
I haps, but for many of the newer countries, their army is one
~ of the principal symbols of ttieir restored sovereignty. In
~ what state would the celebration of their national day be com-
I plete without a military parade?
~ An Uncertain Sort of Defense
~ Then, in our countries, the armed forces, whether revolutionary
or descended from colonial days, have as their main ~ob to de-
fend the established regime, often against its own citizens.
Defense of the territory against an external danger is secondary.
- And don't they handle the first job better than the second?
E
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r
~HOTO CAPTIONS
1. p 39. Aside ~'rom the Maghreb and the few countries which
_ have really had to fight a war, the African nations
are maintaining troops more ready to take power than -
to defend a territory. -
2. p 41. The Zambian army at Lusaka (at left): 14,000 armed
men, a symbol.
~ 3. p 41. A Zairian soldier (above): an army which barely has -
20,000 men. '
4, p~{2, Guinean soldiers: to save the Sekou Toure regime.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique, GRUPJIA, 1979 _
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
- _
ORIGINAL NIEDINA SOUMBOUNOU INTERVIEW CREATES STORM OF PROTEST
- Reactions to 'Medina Affair'
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 978,3 Oct 79 pp 14, 15
LArticle by Sennen Andriamirado]
[Text] A man told a journalist that an African chief of state had provided
him with arms to overthrow another African chief of state. The man, a Malian
citizen, is named Didi Demba Medina Soumbounou--better known as Soumbounou.
~ He took refuge in Tripoli, the Libyan capital, a year ago. The journalist _
is a JEUNE AFRIQUE [JA] reporter, Mohamed Selhami. He was introduced to -
- Soumbounou by a(very) high-ranking Libyan official. The chief of state in
command of the operation was allegedly none other than Col Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi.
, And the chief of state to be overthrown was the president of the Republic
. of Mali, Gen Moussa Traore. JEUNE AFRIQUE published an interview with
Mr Medina Soumbounou (No 975) and the "Medina affair" was born.
For the would-be "liberator" of Mali went even further, maintaining that he
would spearhead a vast operation aimed at no less than establishing.the -
"United Islamic States of the Sahel" and involving many other countries.
Besides Libya, Medina Soumbounou also listed Iraq, Benin and Togo among his
supporters. He even implied that Algeria and Saharan guerrillas were also
"in on it." Besides Mali and Libya, he declared that the "United Islamic
States of the Sahel" would include Algeria, Mauritania, Niger and Chad,
whose chief of state, Goukouni Oueddei, had allegedly already agreed to
the idea. This last statement brought a flat denial by the Chadian Transi-
tional Government of National Unity (GUNT).
Barely 48 hours after publication of the Medina Soumbounou interview in JEUNE
AFRIQUE, we received this cable from N'Djamena: ":If it is true that the
president of the GUNT met with Mr Didi Demba Medina in a Tripoli hotel to
discuss African problems at the heart of FROLINAT's (Chadian National Libera-
tion Front) concerns, he never spoke about any establishment of the United
Islamic States of the Sahel."
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~
The second reaction was from Mali, which had nothing to deny but which, very
officially, provided E,xtensive information on the person of Mr Medina Soum-
bounou: a crook who llad brushes with French, Moroccan, Liberian, Nigerian
and Swiss courts. As far as Mali was concerned, the "Medina affair" was
obvious. An adventurer of that caliber could not seriously aspire to being ,
the "future master of Bamako."
Other governments reacted in turn. The ambassador from Morocco to Libya,
Mr Driss el Fellah, was ordered to ask Tripoli officials for clarification
concerning the reality of this proposed establishment of the United Islamic
States of the Sahel (JA No 976). In Egypt, Radio Cairo constantly remarked
on the interview published by JEUNE AFRIQUE and seized the opportunity to
question on,ce aqain the mental health of Colonel Qadhdhafi, who is reportedly
at the root of the plan. As for Libya, it adopted a diplomacy of silence ~
for 2 weeks before deciding to invite a JEUNE AF'RIQUE journalist to meet ;
again with Medina Soumbounou, who provided general confirmation and re-
tracted details. i
Of all the countries implicated by Medina Soumbounou, only Mali understood
(or was willing to 'understand)--which is all to its credit, since it was
the main target--that by uncovering the "Medina affair," JEUNE AFRIQUE had
only done its duty. Col Filifing Sissoko, President Moussa Traore's discreet ~
confidant, even congratulated us on our "determination to seek out informa- I
tion and our absolute duty to report it."
We were reproached, if not insulted, by other governments. In Chad's view, ;
"the JEUNE AFRIQUE interview was intended only to spread discord and confu-
sion among Chadian and African brothers." In Niger, the statement was made
on 20 September that "Niger authorities have at no time sought to prevent
- the sale of the JEUNE AFRIQUE issue in question, although it challenges the
integrity of the country." Togo "categorically rejects Medina's fantastic
allegations," who claimed that he was maintaining relations with Togo. ,
Finally, Benin--broadly implicated by Medina Soumbounou, it is true--said ,
that it had "never endorsed any movement aimed at undermining a broadly
established government. Thus it is with great contempt that we consider ~
these wild claims by Mr Medina, that ridiculous puppet in search of notoriety."
The Cotonou daily EHUZU went even further and this time accused JA: "Who do _
they expect to deceive with this press campaign cleverly orchestrated by
JEUNE AFRIQUE, whose sympathies and ties of allegiance with high finance and ,
anti-African reactionary circles of every kind are so well known?"
The matter is settled: JEUNE AFRIQUE is being manipulated by imperialism to .
spread discord among Africans. Yet the stubborn facts are there and unfortu-
- nately for those intoxicated with their fantasies while reveling in slogans
and watchwords, JEUNE AFRIQUE has only done its jpb. The fact that in doing
so we h~4?ve.lifted the veil surrounding the wildest and most deranged.ambitions,
as well as certain preposterous schemes, does not eliminate the reality. We
did not invent Didi Demba Medina Soumbounou. He exists, he has a past and a _
Malian passport of his own creation--a passport which also bears the stamp of ;
the border police of the People's Republic of Benin. This is proof, should
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there be ariy need for it, that--at least unknown to its leaders--Benin
definitely received on its s~il that individual possessing a passport
not recognized internationally_
Medina Soumb'ounou is not just anyone in Libya. He has a large following.
- Showered with poorly invested petrodol~ars, he enjoys a certain degree of
esteem, so much so that it was a very high-ranking Libyan official (we
confirmed this) who showed our reporter to his quarters. The fact that
Medina Soumbounou has since been ac:cused of paranoia changes nothing.
It is even more disturbing. -
. For this "Medina affair" again shaws that Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi's
intentions are not at all clear. In fact, this is unfortunately not the
first time that Qadhdhafi's ambitions have been laid bare. As early as
September 1975 (JA No 766), JEUNE AFRIQUE disclosed the military occupation
of the Aouzou strip in Chad by Libyan troops. In spite of OAU principles
regarding the inviolability of borders inherited from colonization, Qadhdhafi
at that time considered it his right to appropriate part of Chadian soil,
just as he considered it his right to have designs on other neighboring lands.
Qadhdhafi has often revealed his designs on countries other than his own.
� Thus, dispatching Libyan troops to Uganda to fly (in vain) to the aid of an
� Idi Amin was only a hapless attempt to implement a secret agreement: Idi `
,
Amin had previously agreed to the principle of installing an Islamic radio
station in Kampala to cover all of east Africa in return for the pro:,iise of
Libyan aid to keep the Ugandan dictatorship afloat.
More serious than these aims is the rash extravagance of the ruler of Tripoli. -
Authentic revolutionaries and the least respectable adventurers live together
in the Libyan capital. The Palestinians (with just reason) as well as the
few Malians (no doubt without just reason) serving as courtiers to a Demba
Medina Sc~tmbounou are living off Libyan wealth. But between Yasser Arafat
and Goukouni Oueddei (formerly aided by Qadhdhafi) on one hand and Idi Amin
or Medina Soumbounou on the other, there is a wide gap. Thus we cannot help _
but note that, as a decidedly extravagant backer, Colonel Qadhdhafi finances
anyone to do anything.
Thus when Libya supports Amin Dada and successively aids each of the Chadians
who fought (and are still fighting) each other in order to divide them, it is
not surprising that an adventurer of the caliber of the Malian Medina Soumbou-
nou has also managed to sponge off Qadhdhaf i, in the name of a mythical federa-
tion of "United Islamic States of the Sahel." Whether he was the victim of a
hoax or whether he really financed the operation, it is a sad affair for
Qadhdhafi And it would have been dishonest of JEUNE AFRIQUE to conceal
this information.
Fantastic or not, paranoid or not, the statements and claims of a Didi Demba
Medina Soumbounou were accurately repor.ted by JA, or at least almost, since
- we toned down the slanderous remarks and insults to chiefs of state. It is
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not the individual whom we considered important, but rather the danger which
- he represents and the danger represented by his contacts and claims.
~ It was our duty to inform; we did so and will co,~tinue to do so. If we have -
- been accused of informing, we take pride in it. It is n~w up to the nations
' involved to assur.ie their responsibilities. Some have done so, but others
have not. '
Second Medina Interview =
;
_ Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 978,3 Oct 79 p 17
[Article by Special JEUNE AFRIQUE Corresgondent in Tripoli, Hamza Kaidi] ~
[Text] At the invitation of officials of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, I went
- i
to Tripoli to meefc with "DOCtor" Medina Soumbounou, who apparently wanted to
deny the remarks made to my colleague, Mohamed Selhami (see JA No 975). ,
The reception was very cordial. But very soon the complaints against Mohamed
Selhami began to fall like rain. I began by reminding the "doctor" that his
interview with my colleague had been recorded and that I had listened to the
tape. Apparently that hardly seemed to bother him. Much to ~he contrary,
that material evidence only served to intensify his denials, which would sub-
sequently be challenged by other statements in a tangle of contradictions. i
Contradictions I
Had he intended to forcefully overthrow the government of General Traore? I
- "Doctor" Medina began by dismissing that idea. His movement prefers 3
peaceful solution. But General Traore (whose rank Mr Medina disputes) '
allegedly said recently "that he came to power by force and that he would
leave only by force." Medina Soumbounou's movement, the UDRM (Union of
Malian Republican Democrats), wants "Moussa to change his policy and to ;
allow Malian exiles to return to their country to practice their occupations '
accordi.ng to their abilities." If that were done, "Dr Medina would be the '
first to side with Bamako." But he does not think that "Moussa can give up ~
the power which he has tasted." .He therefore considers himself forced "to ~
take him in hand."
~ _
According to its leader., the UDRM has 30,000 active members in Mali. Its
. militants include "close associates of Moussa, members of the armed forces,
the police and the national police force." Then why seek the aid of Libya, '
Iraq, Benin, etc.? Mr Medina considers this necessary because "the movement
needs funds." '
Need for Funds
This idea was rejected a little later: the UDRM has tens of thousands of
members paying their dues regularly. "This has enabled its Executive Com-
mittee to contact the officials of 47 countries." A delegation has allegedly
even been dispatched to the Maldives.
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The UDRM's chairman also stated that he has not received any Libyan aid to
date, although he came to the Jamahiriya 9 months ago for that purpose.
The Libyans.were simply contacted. "They have promised to study the matter,
but they have not yet made a decision to date." Medina has simply been allowed
t0 settle lri ~the Jamahiriya, "since Libya 1S Mali" and ~~DOC'tOY'" Medina SOllI[lbOll-
nou is in his own home in this country, as much as any Libyan. _
Iraq? It was simply a matter of sending a delegation there to request its.aid.
As for Benin, it was never involved. The same is true in the case of Togo.
Mr Medina simply stated his admiration for President Eyadema, "that humane
leader who pardons those who wish to kill him. He is worthy of his rank -
of general.�
According to the UDRM's leader, he did not bring up tr.e plan for establishing
the United States of the Sahel. It was Mohamed Selhami who got Colonel Qadhafi
to endorse that idea. However, he said that Mali should support the plan for
a federation combining Chad, Li.bya, Algeria, Niger, Mali and Mauritania. In
the case of Niger, "Doctor" Medina does not wish to meddle in its internal
affairs because he is not Nigerois.
He is not aware of the existence of a Goukouni in Niger. As for Goukouni
himself, "Doctor" Medina is deeply fond of him. "Goukouni is Medina and
~ Medina is Goukouni."
For the time being, the UDRM's only concern is to liberate Mali, which has
been impoverished by "Moussa, that puppet of the French and imperialism."
When the UDRM comes to power, French, Germans and Americans, etc., will have
to leave. Yet France was spared and its cooperation desired in the first
interview.
Psychiatry
In the meantime, "Moussa Traore only has to sit tight." "Doctor" Medina has -
7,000 men ready to take up arms. He will "blow up all of Bamako if necessary."
The Malian chief of state will be judged for his crimes by a public tribunal.
It is not for Medina to execute him with his own hands. But he will be hanged
in Bamako in public. The UDRM's leader swore to this on his honor.
Without claiming any professional knowledge of inental illnesses, all these -
- contradictions (and many others which I cannot relate) lead me to believe
that I was dealing with a megalomaniac whose case deserves psychiatric ~I~-
treatment. Libyan officials think so too. Embarrassed by "this person's"
schemes, which have harmed the country at a time when it is preaching moder'!-,
tion, officials are thinking of withdrawing the asylum granted him. But ir.';r
- the meantime, contrary to what has been said, "Doctor" Medina is totally free
i
to move about in Tripoli.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979 -
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BRIEFS ;
LIBYA TO HAND OVER MALI DISSIDENT--Libya has promised to hand over Malian
dissident Medina Soumbounou to the Mali Government. Soumbounou had stated
that.he was plotting to overturn the Bamako regime with help from Tripoli. -
The promise to turn th~ man over was made to a Malian delegation headed by
the secretary general to the Foreign Affairs Ministry, wh.o had come to (
Tripoli to ask for explanations from the Libyan leaders. It was confirmed
on 5 October in Bamako by Mr Hamed Ed Houdeiry, Colonel Qadhdhafi's
special envoy. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Oct 79 p 36] 6182
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- ANGOLA
U.S. ACCUSED OF ABANDONING CONCILIATORY POLICY _
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26 Nov 79 p 29
[Article by Augusta Conchiglia: "The Permanent Invasion"]
[Excerpts] The fourth anniversary of Angolan independence. celebrated this
year with a measure of austerity, was marked by the ever-increasing threat
of South African attacks.
' At the commemorative meeting~-the first public manifestation since President
Neto's death---the new president, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, referred to these -
problems.
"We have multiplied our efforts to ensure the defense and stability of our
territory. We have no claims on foreign territory, But we are compelled
to maintain and develop a powerful army to defend ourselves against our
enemies abroad."
Indeed, the Angolan armed Forces (FAPLA), have progressed r3pidly in the
use of modern and sophisticated weapons. Of course, the element of surprise
and the vastness of the terrain (nearly 1,000 kilometers of frontier), as
well as the blind selection of targets, may momentarily ensure a degree of
~ impunity for the aggressors. However, any probability of occupation of
Angolan territory by the enemy is now out of the question.
Moreover, the contingent of internationalist Cuban forces--now held in
reserve--would immediately intervene on the side of the Angolan army in
case of need. Consequently, Pretoria is atte;mpting to hit the national -
economy, to terrorize the populatio~t by continuous air raids, commando
raids and sabotage actions, and is trying to intimidate the Luanda govern- ~
ment in hopes that it will give up its support of SWAPO~
_ :Lt is also a fact--as the Angolan minister of foreign affairs, Paulo Jorge,
stressed--that the impunity enjoyed by South Africa, which professes total
disdain for the United Nations, is possible through the direct support _
provided by the Western powers, with which it shares the benefits of economic
looting and the subconti.nen+t's strategic positir~ns, notably in Namibia.
These are the powers which are encouraging Pretoria to continue its
, attacks against Angola.
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Among these Westerners, Paulo Jorge has singled out the United States, which
again distinguished itself by hostile maneuvers against the People's '
Republic of Angola. Lucio Lara, the secretary of the MPLA Central Committee,
had denounced these maneuvers when he had referred to the campaign about
the ''Soviet brigade in Cuba" on 26 October. Indeed, the Americans seem
to have abandoned their velleity of initiating a dialog with Angola, .
- adumbrated last year, opting instead for the resumption of a policy of
threats and pressures. The puppet Savimbi's visit to the United States
and his meetings with high officials of the White House and the CIA are
important indications. _
Consequently, the FAPLA's and the ODP's [People's Defense Organization] ~
task remains crucial. The militia, whose political and military training
will be reinforced, will act against both foreign enemies and a reactionary
petty bourgeoisie's attempts to oppose the workers' and peasants` interests.
The armed populace is on guard.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique--Asia
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ANGOLA
- ~ F-
i ~
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' BRIEFS
I BELGIAN SUGAR AGREEMENT---The Luanda government signed a 20-year contract
~ with a Belgian company, the SOPEX, aimed at reorganizing sugar production
~ in Angola, which fell to 30,000 tons since the nationalizations began.
j The primary goal is to boost production to 80,000 tons. [Text] [Paris
- j JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 986, 28 Nov 79 p 35]
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BENIN
CADRES FAVOR REVOLUTION RATHER THAN MARXZSM
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Nov 79 p 2951 .
[Article: "The Cadres: Yes to Revolution, No to Marxism-Leninism"] .
[Text] People will not say tomorrow that the cadres who are not members of
the party have been accofnplices to the improvisation now being observed in
- all fields Such was the conclusion drawn by a"comrade cadre" at the
conclusion of a meeting in Cotonou from 5 to 17 October 1979 called by the
~ head of state in order to enable the national cadres responsible in various
economic sectors to emerge from their isolation and join the People's Revolu-
tion Party of Benin [PRPB] or one of its base organizations.
This meeting will have enabled the cadres to evaluate the regime whose
"failure and improvisation" they noted, characteristics which led to the
adoption of Ma.rxism-Leninism as an action principle whereas "our people are "
not inclined to understand it." They felt that a flight forward was involved
because the regime was "cut off from the masses and the realities of our
country."
They denounced the product~on drive as it was pursued, the struggle against
sorcerers, and against corrupt merchants. They exposed the failures in the
application of the "new school" reform.
Thus, after drawing up a critical survey of the regime since 26 October 1972
the cadres proposed that the regime should request all the other social
classes of the nation to state how they are implementing the revolution.
In all cases, the cadres of the Beninese nation are saying "yes" to the
revolution but they reject Marxism-Leninism at the present stage which is
for them that of the struggle for national liberation. They refuse to join
the party. _
In the social realm the cadres requested that the regime of President ,
Mathieu Kerekou should decree a general amnesty in favor of those who went
on strike in June 1975 (a general strike which followed the assassination
of Capt Michel Ai:kpe, the then minister of interior--see MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11 July 1975, p 2059), who had been misled "by some of
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~
~ those who are in posit:ions of command today.~' This amnesty should be extended I-
to all those who have nor tried to undermine the state~s 3.nternal security.
I~
Thc cadres decided to set up a l~aieon committee between themselves and ;
the head of state to ass3st the latter in the implementation of their recom- ~
mendations. ~ -
When the conclusions oF the meeting were voiced, President Mathieu Kerekou
listened very carefully to the spokesman for the cadres and then, while -
congratulating them for their candor, he severely criticized the wait-and-
see attitude of the interested parties whom he reproached with staging "an
intellectual coup d'etat" by means of this document.
~ ,
For his fellow-citizens who are familiar with his abrupt reactions, President
Kerekou's closing speech, free from any customary verbal abuse, evidenced
that he approved the analysis, the evaluations, and proposals of the cadres ;
at least in part.
In a single-party country where the party members are always tempted to tell I
themselves that what they do is just, a certain amount of courage was neces-
sary to gather 300 or 400 cadres of the nation in order to tell an African _
head of state in public that he was mistaken.
This step taken by Colonel Kerekou is undoubtedly to his credit, but he ~
would prove his good will even more by carrying out some of the recommenda- I
tions that were made such as the amnesty measures to enable both sides to -
place their abilities at the country's service. The motto should henceforth
- state: "Courtiers are not the best advisers."
~
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COPYRT.GHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979 ;
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I
BURUNDI
~
_ ~
~ -
_ i EIB LOAN GRANTED TO SMALL, MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISr~
,
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2840
[Text] The EUROPEAN INVESZMENT BANK (EIB) has granted, within the
- framework of the Lome Convention, a conditional loan of 500,000 European
Currency Units [ECU] (1 ECU= 5.85 French francs), that is, about
64,2 million Burundi francs, to aid financing of small and medium-sized
industrial and artisanal undertakings in Burundi.
~
This operation, the first by the EIB in Burundi, has taken the form of
~
~ an inclusive loan to the NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BANR. This
~ institution, whose capital is held chiefly by the State, was created
~ in 1966, and plays an important role in development planning in the
country. The CAISSE CENi'ItALE DE COOPERATION ECONOMIQUE (Paris) and the
DEUTSCHE ENTWICKLUNGSGESELLSCHAFT have equally underwritten a portion of
_ the capital.
- The loan was granted at 2 percent i.ntereat on risk capital pro'vided for by
the Lome Convention from budgetary resources of the European Community (EC),
_ administered by the EIB in its qualitq as EC agent. ~
The loan is intended primarily for financing studies for the preparation
of ~ndustrial, agri-industrial, mining, and tourist trade investmenta,
- and, eventually, for minority ahare holdings in these same sectors.
i
~ COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979 _
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- CAMEROON .
OIL, NATURAL GAS STRIKES ON CAMEROON
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2832
[Text] A new communication from the COMPAGNIE FRANCAISE DES PETROLES
(CFP), dated 11 October 1979, indicates that, following the discov~ry,
announced last 27 September, during drilling at Sanaga A-1 South, off
_ the shore of Cameraon, a large flow of inethane gas, together with con-
densates, was obtained during tests which have just been carried out.
Four tests were made, at depths between 1,200 and 1,500 meters. The flows
vary from 170,000 to 420,000 m3 a day. Further drilling will be necessary
to determine more accurately the size of the deposit whose reserves already '
appear significant.
~ The Sanaga A-1 South drilling, located about 120 km southwest of Douala,
- was made under auChority of the H-38 permit within the framework of an
association including the following companies:~ MOBII, EXPLORATION
EQUATOR7AL AFRICA, the operator: 54 percent; TOTAL EXPLOITATION PRODUCTION
CAMEROUN, a 100 percent owned affiliate of the CFP: 18 percent; OCELOTS `
INDUSTRIES LTD: 16 percent; DAMSON OIL C~tPORATION: 12 percent.
A MOBIL communication also confirmed the discovery, and also indicated
~that the drilling was continuing and that technical testing would be
carried out as soon as the maximum depth was reached. We have also
already mentioned elsewhere that pramising indications, which might point
towards the presence of oil, have been discovered by the ELF-SEREPECA.-PECTEN
group, off the shore of Victoria in Rio del Rey, not far from Nigeria
(cf. MTM, 12 October, p 2769). -
- In any event, in both cases, official sources in Yaounde indicate Chat it
- wi11 be advisable to continue exploration before being able to determine
the size of the deposits.
It will be recalled also that three groups of companies are currently con~ .
tinuing exploration off the shores of Cameroon and in the Wouri river basin
around Douala. Since 1978, the ELE-PECTEN-SHELL group has been operating
~ 4 wells off the shore of Victoria. Their present production is estimated
at about 2 million tons.
_ y
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r~n vrri~~L u~L v~vLi ,
. 1
Three years hence, apecialists estimate Cameroon's petroleum production i
could reach 5 million tons whereas national conaumption is estimated to
be 600,000 tons a year. Petroleum production will make it possible to
fully aupply the Victoria refinery, work on which began 1 year ago
and which i~n 1981 will have a 1.5 million ton capacity, expandable to
2 million tone. ,
Construction of the refinery, which ia being managed by a semi-public i
company, SONARA (National Refinery C anpany), with CFP participation,
is underwritten by Che PROCON-FRANCE Company, an affiliate of the
American group PROCON. Its cost is estimated at 66 billion CFA's. ~
If Cameroon is presently undergoing a petroleum boom, an AFP
correspondent writes, it is doing it most discreetly, at the instigation, ;
it appears, of the Ghmeroon authorities, who fear the "demobilizing effect"
of petroleiun fever, at a time when the country is involved in giving new
impetus to its agriculture, especially in the cocoa and coffee sectors. ~
Furthermore, petroleum resources are still limited and nothing makes it
possible to affi~rm, in spite of the recently discovered indications, that I
the country will experience abundance in this domain.
~
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, CAMEROON
EIB LOAN GRANTED ALUCAM
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2832
[Text] The EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK (EIB), the longterm financing in-
. stitution of the European Community, lent, on 11 October, within the
= framework of the Lome Convention, 7.6 million European Currency Units
- [ECU] (one ECU is worth about 5.85 French francs) for the enlargement
and modernization of the Edea aluminum plant. This financing has been the
object of two different operations: (1) a loan of 5.3 million ECU's
granted the CAMEROON ALUMINUM CONIPANX (AI,UCAM), the exploitation company
' of the plant and affiliate of the French firm PECHINEY UGINE KU~~NN;
the loan is for 10 years at an interesC rate of 6.35 percent; which includes
payment of 3 percent interest on the resources of the EUR.OPEAN DEVELOPMENT
FUND (EDF). (2) a conditional loan of 2.3 ECU's for 20 years at 2 percent -
interest on risk capital provided for by the Lome Convent3.on and administered
by the EIB in its capacity as agent of the European Community; it has been
granted the United Republic of Cameroon, in order to cover a portion of its
subscription to the increase in ALUCAM capital. The enlargement and modern-
ization of the plant is expected to increase its first melting aluminum
_ production from about 50,000 tons to 80,000 tons a year; this increase
will promote a rise in aluminum exports from the Cameroon, as well as
- supplying various local plants. It is expected that about 150 jobs will
be created. The entire cos~ of the project is estimated to be some
100 million ECU's. The CAISSE CENTRALE DE COOPERATION ECONOMIQUE (CCCE)
and the SOCIETE FINANCIERE INTERNATIONALE (SFI) will equally share financing
the plant.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie,Paris,1979
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L' VL\ VL'L' 1.Vi~fL VJL' VlYLl .
CAMEROON ,
CAMEROON COTTON PRODUCTION REVIEWED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct %9 p 2832
[Text] The Development Committee of the North Cameroon Province, which
_ met recently, examined the progress of cotton producCion which continues '
to be the largest industrial crop of this province. I
The Fourth 5-Year Plan (1976-1981) assigned ambitious goals based on
the 1969 production. It forecasts reaching 120,000 tons on 130,000
h~ctares 3.n'1980-1981. In 1978-1979,cotton production is estimated
at about 60,000 tons with 34,000 hectares of intensive cotton cultivation
against only 40,000 tons.
~
~
It is hoped, for 1979-1980, that 55,000 hectares will be under intense '
cultivation in addition to sevexal thousand hectares under traditional
cultivation. A harvest in the range of 75,000-80,000 tons may be ~
reasonably anticipated with only very moderately favorable pluviametry. '
- For 1980-1981, 70,000 hectares of intensive cultivation are planned, giving
the possibility of a harvest of around 100,000 tons. The plan~s projections !
could only be reached in 1981 or 1982. For a harvest of 100,000 tons the ~
plant capacity of the province would be satisfactory. ~
i -
Nonetheless, planting 70,000 hectares with intensive cultivation poses ~
financial problems, representing making available to growers 14,000 ~
tons of complete fertiliz~r, 3,500 tons of urea,,1,200,000 liters of ~
insecticides, and 150,000 litera of herbicides of a total value of '
about 3 billion CFA's.
i
' ~'urthermore, within the framework of the WORLD BANK--Central North Rural
Development--project, consideration is being given to confering on SODECOTON
(SOCIETE DE DEVELOPPEM~'NT DU COTON AU CAMEROUN) the task of carrying out ~
an integrat~d development act3.on comprising several panels [volets]:
agricultural development, retimbering, rural runways--and social programs:
health and education. ~
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979
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' CAPE VERDE
i
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BRIEFS
CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT--Italy and Cape Verde will sign a cooperation agree-
_ ment next January. This was announced in Praia following the visit of an
- Italian delegation headed by Ambassador Rossi Arnaud. During this visit,
- the delegation studied with the Cape Verdean Ministry of Transportation the
possibility of cooperation in the field of civil aviation: Cape Verde
~ requested this cooperation, which should encampass the fields of professional
i training, organization, administration and equipment. [Text] [Paris
; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3330] -
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
GATHERING OF NATION'S VITAL FORCES
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRiANEENS in French 19 Oct 79
P 2833 =
[Text] Mr David Dacko~s government called a meeting in Bangui
on 1$ October, called a"gathering of the nation's vital for-
ces." It was the ~irst meeting of the various political par-
ties and groups since the imperial regime was overthrown on 20
, September. -
Attending the meeting, in addition to President Dacko, were
_ such political leaders as Mr Ange Patasse of the MPLC, and
Mr ldi Lala, of the FPO [Ubangi People's Patriotic Front) .
Speaking in Bangui at the opening�session of the meeting, the
president said that "security in the CAR could be assured only ,
by a national army, well organized,and well trained. We do not -
yet have this army. and therefore.the Public Safety government
approves keeping the French troops(~.....) With Bokassa extradi-
ted and his killers disarmed, in other words, when the danger
to Central Africa's people is past, the French army will leave."
Mr Dacko also dwelt on the need for a cleanup in the institu-
tions of the state, stressing the fact that "the situation we -
have inherited is worse than catastrophic in every domain."
When Mr Pataase took the podium~ he excoriated "the arbitrary _
power that has taken over in the CRA," particularly "the ille-
ga1 confiscation of radio transmitters by the gang of fascist
reactionaries in power." The MPLC leader called for "negotia-
tions with France for an immediate withdrawal" of its troops
and their replacement with OAU forces.~' He did, however, ad-
vocate cooperation with France, "made dynamic and atrengthened
on an egalitarian foundation." He then called for presidential
and legislative elections within 6 months.
~
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Mr ldi Lala also called for the "immediate withdrawal of French
troops," and for elections wi~hin 6 months, to be organized by
a Public Safety government. The FPO, he said, demands the ar-
rest and banishment of "all of Bokassa's former collaborators." ;
The labor unions and the youth and student movement also took
part in the meeting, which broke up into committees for work ,
on .L$ and 7.~ Oc~ohe~r. ~
The situation in Bangui is still tense, with strikes complica-
ting matters. Mr Alphonse Koyamba, first deputy prime minister '
in charge of the economy, flew to Paris on 1$ October for "tech-
nical" talks about Franco-Central African cooperation.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris~ 1979
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i ~
' CLNTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
~
j
BRIEFS
ASECNA REJOINED--The government of the Central African Republic decided on
12 October to rejoin the Agency for Air Navigation Safety in Africa and
~ Madagascar (ASECNA), from which it had withdrawn in 1974. Following that
decision, Bangui airport had been without civil air traffic on 13 and 14
I~ October. The traffic shutdown came as the result of a quarrel between the
~ new government and some categories of airport staff, centering on Mr Jean
I Mete Yapende, director of ACESNA (Central Africa's air safety agency). The
i agency had been created by the imperial government at the time of the
~ decision to pull`out of ASECNA. Mr Yapende told reporters that he had been
; given assurances by the authorities that discussions would be undertaken i
~ as to the future of employees of the old ASECNA. [TexC] Paris MARCHES
~ TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2833] 6182
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CH AD
GOVERNMENT AIRLIFTS OPINION LEADERS TO UNITY TALKS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRL~NEENS in French 19 October _
79 pp 2833-z834
_ [Text~ An air shuttle service was provided between Ndjamena
and Dou~ia, a town some 80 kilometers north of the capital at
Ndjamena, to serve the conference on national unity there.
, Attending the meeting on 11 October, in addition to the presi-
dent of the National Union transition government, Mr Goukouni
_ Weddeye and his vice president, LtCol Kamougue, were Messers
Hissene Habre (of the armed forces of the North), Brahim Yous-
souf (of the People~'s Armed Forces), Ngangebe Kosnaye (of the
Chadian Armed Forces), Moussa Medela (of the Western Armed
Forces), Dr Fatcho Ballam (of the National Democratic Union),
and Dr Abba Siddick (of the original FROLINAT). '
Mr Ahmet Acyl, ailing chief of the ~Revolutionary Democratic
Council, sent Mr Adoum Manani as his representative.
The leaders of four other factions were absent: Messers Maha- =
mat Abba SPid, of the Peo.plP~'s Liberation Front (FPL),~ -
Abdoulaye Adoum Dana, of the "Volcan" Army, Aboubakar Abdel
Rahmane, of the People~s Movement for the Liberation of Chad _
(MPLT), and Hadjaro Senoussi, of basic FROLIitAT.
The Dougia meeting had raised tremendous hopes among Chad's
population groups. Nevertheless, it does not appear to have
been much of a success. In f act, the scheduled conversations _
had barely got under way when the conference was postponed,
without any date's being set for another meeting.
The French ambassador, Mr Marcel Beaux, made a quick trip to
Dougia, where he spoke for the first time with LtCol Kamo2,tgue.
His visit was part of the new envoy's round of getting-acquain -
, ted visits with Chadian government people, following the pre- .
sentation of his cred~ntials to P.r.esident Goukouni Weddeye.
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According to the Chad Press service (ATP), demilitarization of
the capital city of Ndjamena is now well under way. The forces
which have withdrawn from the capital have moved into the fol-
- lowing localities: ~
Dougia and Massaguet for Mr Goukouni Weddeye's FROLINAT People's
Armed Forces;
Massenya, Bokoro, Dourbali, and Koundoul for the Armed Forces
of the North;
Chongole, Liwa, Bagassola, Choukahadjia, Maom and Moussouro ~
for the Western Armed Forces; and
Sahr for the Chadian Armed Forces, a detachment of which was
station~d in mid-October at Mandelia, SO kilometers south of ~
Ndjamena.
A decree by President Goukouni Weddeye of the transitional
National Union government repcirted on 10 October by ATP, abro-
gates all orders and decisions re~arding appointments to po-
- sitions of responsibility by the previous government of Mr
Lol Mahmat Choua. From now on, only the president of the
transition government and of the interim committee may make i
such appointments.
;
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979 -
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CHAD
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I
~ SCHOOL TERM BEGINS Classes for school children in Chad are _
; set to begin on 1$ October, "despite the particularly diffi-
' cult situation the count rp is going through right now," said
the president of the transitional National Union g~vernmc~r3t,
~ Mr Goukouni Queddei. Classes are to resume in phased order,
i beginning with the elementary schools. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
! TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2823] 6182
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GABON
ALLEGED CORRUPTION BEHIND BONGO FINANCIAL DEALS
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26 Nov 79 p 26
[Article by Fode Amadou: "O~nar's Pearls"]
[Text) Gabonese dissidents had been able to read confidential documents _
which had been carefully stored away in the presidential archives of the
- Omar Bongo republic. Today, these same dissidents are disclosing some of
the pearls in these files.
One learns about the role played by certain French personalities in the
signing of economic and f inancial agreements benefiting Gabon, a role they
had played "after the payment of significant commissions." One learns
that these same personalities, as we11 as others (whose nam:~s are mentioned
in the files) had helped Omar Bongo, always after the payment of commis-
sions, to acquire several properties (notably in France, Switzerland and
the United States) through "loans" or even through donations of French
organisms with interests in Gabon, An example: Bongo purchased a large
property in Beverly Hills, California, for $2.2 million thanks to a City
Bank of New York loan, wh3ch had been granted him because it carried the ~
guarantee of "certain French banking circles," Another example: Bongo
reportedly purchased in France a second property worth 20 million francs -
and a third in Switzerland, whose price was not disclosed. Gabonese
dissidents (and they are not alone) are saying that "one wonders with
what 'salary' was Bongo able to purchase these 'small' country properties."
One learns that Gabon is directly financing a number of periodicals printed
in Paris or elsewhere and sold in Africa. One of these~ published in
Paris, reportedly received "several tens of billions of CFA francs" through
intermediaries, often French, who reportedly also earned commissions,
Some others, directly or indirectly, reportedly also earned important
_ sums for publishing voluminous information on, for instance, 'Gabon's ~
prosperity under Bongo's leadership."
- One learns that "foreign personalities" (French, Swiss, German and others) _
have secretly invested capital in private or semi~governmental Gabonese
companies, In three of these so~called "Gabonese" companies, foreign
capital reportedly amounts to 65 percent,
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_ In sum, there is a Bongo scandal never reported so far in the international
' press. When this press will decide to do so, Gabonese opposition circles
, are saying, we shall provide names and details that could arouse as much :
indignation as the Bokassa affair.
Fo r the moment, it would be interesting to find out whether Jean-rr.ancois '
Ntoutoume, Gabonese minister of information, who has just stated that
freedom of the press (domestic or foreign) reigns in his country, will
allow the Gabonese to read what we have just written. One th.ing is certain: ;
it is that AFRIQUE-ASIE, already banned in Gabon for years~ will not be
permitted to circulate in the codntry very soon. Of course, we are not `
surprised: too often, supported by irrefutable evidence, we have denounced
Bongo's neocolonialist policies, his complicity with the mercenaries who
attacked Benin, with Hassan II, with the Angolan puppets of the UNITA and ~
FLEC, with the conspirators who are attempting to overthrow the popular ;
Sao Tome government. Too often, again, we have written that his is a ~
corrupt regime. Thus, the Gabonese must resign themselves to reading only
the newspapers financed by their master..~. ~
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GUINEA
~ HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES IN SEKOU TOURE'S GUINEA
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 980,17 Oct 79 pp 24-27 ~
[Article by Sennen Andriamirado]
[Text] Of 4,000 political prisoners held, 300 have been
_ freed. What happened to the others? Sekou Toure says:
"All those sentenced to death are dead. Our prisons are
empty."
- ~ "If, 20 years from now, independent Guinea is to look like Haiti, it would �
have been better for Guinea not to be independent."
That statement is attributed to Mr Seydou Diallo, Guinea's ambassador to
Cuba in 1959. He said it 20 years ago. Seydou Diallo fled to Mali 10 yeaxs
ago, escaping arrest by the skin of his teeth on charges of "conspiring"
against Guinean President Ahmed Sekou Toure. Guinea has come quite close -
to what Haiti was in the days of Dr Francois Duvalier, the sinister
Papa Doc, the Haiti of the Tontons-Macoutes, hired and paid to arrest
people for no known reason, and to kill often without reason. As a sign
of the times, Haiti--willed by his father to Jean-Claude Duvalier, who has
in turn become president for life--entertained President Sekou Toure as
his guest from 13 to 16 September. A month earlier (from 5 of 7 August),
Sekou Toure was in the United Stutes, where he was warmly received by the
man who passes for a crusader for human rights, Jim~my Carter.
Just prior to his trip to the United States, the supreme ruler of the
Guinean revolution had taken the precaution of getting rid of a thorn in
his side by freeing, a few months after Valery Giscard d'Estaing's visit
_ to Guinea, the archbishop of Conakry, M~r Raymond-Marie Chidimbo, who had =
been languishing a prison (for conspiracy, of course) for several years. _
Handled under U.S. pressure through Liberian head of state William Tolbert,
that particular operation was designed to soothe American public opinion.
The man Washington was preparing to welcome was no longer a bloody tyrant.
President Sekou Toure did even better than that. Now that Mgr Chidimbo
has been freed, Guinea's jails are practically empty.
A Pris-based opposition movement known as the Coordinating Committee for
the Defense of Democratic Freedoms in Guinea (CDLG) recently announced that
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right now there are 9,570 people being held prisoner in the infamous
Guinean concentration camps. The CDLG report--from the same outfit that
last year prematurely announced that I~Igr Chidimbo had been executed--is !
wrong again. Another opposition organization, the Regrouped Guineans ,
Abroad (RGE), comes close to the truth when it charges in a communique
released in Paris on 3 September: "Since the events of 22 November 1970, ~
the number of persons arrested and imprisoned for political reasons is j
estimated at somewhere between 4,000 aud 5,000. The number of dead (by
execution or for all other reasons) is somewhere between 3,000 and 3,500. ;
About 250 prisoners have been released--; about 100 prisoners are still ~ ,
being held..."
- The truth is unfortunately more blood-chilling. According to other ~
informants who roughly agree, of the 4,000 people arrested since January 1971, ~
only 280 have been released and less than a score are still rotting in jail.
In a?1, 300 survivors. The rest? Dead or vanished. This means that more
than 3,800 prisoners have undergone the final solution, and been swept away. !
Lightened now by the weight of those prisoners, Sekou Toure could cross
_ the threshold of the White House with his head held high, to shake the
waiting hand of the virtuous Jimmy Carter. The curtain had fallen on the
concentration camps, a new leaf had been turned over. Sekou Toure was `
cleansed and whitewashed. Long live democracy.
Why this quashed indictment, not to say good conduct star, for the man who ~
used to be known as the one who showed Idi Amin, Bokassa, and Macias Nguema ~
how it should be done?
The fact is that Sekou Toure cannot be compared with the former dictator of
- Uganda, Central Africa, and Equatorial Guinea. Mere improvisers, they did ~
their killing without finesse. The first of them delighted in having his
_ alleged opponents executed in front of everybody. The second specialized i
in picking ~ictims who saw tR~ clearly: children. And the third $taged `
massacres in public places, sports arenas, by preference.
- i
There was nothing so crude in Sekou Toure's way. He set up a well oiled,
smooth-running machine for repression. Invariably, things started with a ~
plot. Sometimes it was true, as in November 1970, when some of his opponents i
felt it was not beneath them to call in Portuguese mercenaries to invade !
Guinea. Or it might be false, as in 1976, when the former secretary general ~
of the OAU, Diallo Telli, then Guinea's minister of justice, was arrested i
- (and then executed) on trumped-up charges of a conspiracy against Sekou
Toure. In both instances, the repression machine worked perfectly. ,
The first phase: rounding up conspirators (or alleged conspirators) chosen
for their public conspicuousness so that their arrests would make a huge
sensation. That is what happened to some mercenaries who had tried to
' land in Conakry on 22 November 1970. The same thing happened to Diallo
Telli, whose "plot" was announced amid great sensationalism (see JEUNE
AFRIQUE, Nos 814, 815, and 826).
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Second phase: the confessions. All political prisoners in 6uinea have
gone through this phase. How was it done? Simple indeed: physical
torture (the~most brutal involving the use of electric shocks) or psycholog-
ical torture (threats against the prisoner's family). The n?ost effective
of. all kinds~of torture, though, is what prisoners in Camp Boiro or Camp
Kinda call "the diet." Again, the method is simplicity itself: nothing to
eat, nothing to drink. Thst is how Diallo Telli died (J.A. No 931). "As
a rule," ane who escaped from Camp Boiro told us, "they don't last more than
a week. I watcf~ed a cellmate crack after 4 days. Another hung on for
8 days. After that, they'll confess to anything at all. I mean anything
they're ordered to confess."
These confessions provide the starting point for another round of arrests.
- So, after the mercenaries' attempt to land on 22 September 1970, President
- Sekou Toure could arrest those he called "the fifth-column soldiers":
peasants who had never heard of inercenaries, intellectuals who belonged to -
- the PDG, who suddenly became "lackeys of imperialism, mercenaries or
intellectuals...tainted, dishonored."
- Once arrested, the fate of the accused is sealed. Innocent or guilty,
they are shipped off to the concentration camps: to Boiro, the most
notorious, quasi-permanent headquarters for the general staff of the -
revolutionary Inquisiti.on, traditionally headed by Ismael Toure; or to
Kinda, an enormous detention cente-r where political prisoners are often
- handed over to the mercies of common criminals; or to Kankan, the place
no prisoner has ever left alive.
" There are other camps, scattered all over Guinea. Everywhere there are
secret cellblocks, built to hold 400 people apiece, "half of whom die of
starvation or asphyxiation," according to testimony from escapees. Which
are the most unbearable places? The metal cells. Cages of sheet iron:
walls of sheet iron, roofs of sheet iron, in which the heat kills as well
- as does hunger. A hell, where there is nothing to do but to die. These
are usually reserved for Africans, with Europeans--even those who are
"mercenaries"--having a right to "easier" places.
- All these macabre details are all too familiar. We knew all about them
long beFore the atrocities of Idi Amin, Bokassa, or Macias Nguema were
committed or heard of. Idi Amin, though, ran away. Bokassa has gone to -
earth in exile, P4acias Nguema was shot. In the name or human rights and
= of the rights of peoples.
~ Sekou Toure, though, stayed where he was. For 21 years, now. Because he
was smarter than his political doubles, he put together a repression
machine that was more precise, more discreet, more efficient. When Amnesty
International exposes the secrets of his death camps, Sekou Toure never
lets himself be put on the defensive: he attacks: "Amnesty International,"
hP says, "is a vicious mob." When the French Socialist Party--even though
it is headed by a man like Francois Mitterand who used to be his
,
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friends--voices concern over the fate of his prisoners, Sekou Toure moves -
straight to the offensive: "The Socialist Party," says he, "is the party
of French filth." Equally offensive, and effective, is his charm when
he ,~urns it on for the French establishment: Edgar Faure has the highest
praise for Sekou Toure's humanitarianism; Valery Giscard d'Estaing is ~
struck with admiration for the real leadership qualities of the tribune ;
who, 21 years ago, kicked De Gaulle's France out of Guinea with a single
speech. '
Adored by some, loathed by others, Sekou Toure is certainly no ordinary ~
man. Personally fascinating, he has always been keen enough to make
shameless use of his skill at the about-face. Now that he has emptied ~
his prisons, nobody can accuse him of being a common jailer. Political ,
ideology has never governed his acts. His alliances with socialist
countries, like those with the capitalist powers, have all seen stormy ~
times: one after the other, France, the Soviet Union, the United States,
and,Federal Germany have tried, according to him, to bring him down. ;
1
In the last analysis, Sekou Toure has never belonged to any camp but his
own. One of his former friends and advisers, who escaped from Camp Boiro,
wrote: "The political and moral image of Sekou Toure always comes before
anything else. He has never permitted anyone to contradict him, instantly
equating contradiction with sabotage. Sekou is an intelligent man, though. I
Nobody can ever accuse him of perversion or corruption. As to his ideology,
he has never had one. He has only one aim: there will never be a'former'
_ President Sekou Toure."
;
This inability to make an ideological choice is not a defeat. It is, in
fact, the initial decision. In September 1959, Sekou was already proclaim- ~
ing: "There are those who say of us, 'They are in the socialist camp;' ~
others say, 'They are in the Western camp.' But we, we want to make our-
selves over. Even if a devil were to come down from the sky, bringing '
Africa's freedom with him, we would deal with him." If that devil exists,
maybe he has already landed in Sekou Toure's Guinea. He has not, however, '
brought freedom with him. Except for those who are dead. ~
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979 ~
~
6182
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~
_ ~ GUINEA
~
i
i
I
~
~ BRIEFS
I
TRADE UNION DELEGATION TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA--A delegation of the National Con-
i federation of Guinean Workers (CNTG), led by CNTG general secretary Kandas
j Conde, visited Czechoslovakia from 11 to 15 September at the invitation of
~ the Central Council of Czechoslovak Trade Unions (ROH). The delegation was
received by Mr Tomas Travnicek, deputy chairman of the Czechoslovak National
Front, and held talks with representatives of the World Federation of Trade
, Unions (WFTU), whose headquarters are in Prague. A cooperative agreement
between the CNTG and ROH was signed by the leaders of the two trade union
j organizations, Mr Kandas Conde and Karel Hoffmann. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
~ TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Sep 79 p 2635] 11915 _
I
~
IDA AGRICULTURAL LOAN--Two IDA [International Development Association] loans
amounting to $23.4 million will be used by the Republic of Guinea to help
, finance a second road project ($13 million) and a project for developing
rice growir~g ($10.4 million). With regard to the road project, some 1,500 km
of roads will be repaired and 4,600 km maintained. The project for developing
rice growing will help to strengthen local structures: manpower and technical
capacity, in order to develop rice growing. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Sep 79 p 2635] 11915 ~
BID CEMENT LOAN--The Islamic Development Bank (BID) granted Guinea on
- i 26 November a total of $6 million for the purchase of cement. An agree-
' ment was signed in Djiddah by BID President Ahmad Mohamad Ali and Abou
Bakr Sidki, assistant director general of the Guinean state campany
IMPORTEX. [TextJ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
j 30 Nov 79 p 3331]
-,i
~ DETENTION CAMPS VISITED--A French lawyer was able to visit the Boiro deten-
tion camp. On a mission for the International Human Rights Federation,
attorney Yves Jouffa went to Guinea in November. He was received by
President Sekou Toure, who granted him permission to visit the well-known
' prison and hold a meeting with Guinean engineer Bah Mahmoud, arrested in
; August together with 10 other opponents of the regime who had returned, -
~ as he had done, following the appeal for "national reconciliation" made
by the chief of state. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 986,
} 28 Nov 79 p 35]
~
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GUINEA-BISSAU
BRIEFS -
; .
I .
- i
! FRENCH PRESIDENT'S VISIT--French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing will
;
~ go to Guinea-Bissau on an official visit at the beginning of 1980. This
~ was reported by the Portuguese news agency ANOP, which cited "reliable"
~ sources in the capital of the former Portuguese colony. According to
; ANOP, the French president would include a visit to Bissau in a tour of
, various African countries. [ExcerptsJ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
i MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3330]
~ ~
~
_ ,
; CSO: 4400
~
~
_ ,
I
~
.
i
~
i
~
i
~ 41
,
; I''
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IVORY COAST
REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE IN 1978
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 pp 2809-2813
[Text] When one examines the statistics of foreign trade of the Ivory
Coast for 1978 one notes a sudden decline in the values of the exports, -
while imports continued their progression at an almost lin~ear rate. The
development since 1975 is shown by the foilowing figures (in billions of -
CFA francs);
,
Year Exports Tmports Balance
1975 254.5 241.4 +13.1
1976 392.5 311.6 +80.9
1977 529.2 429.5 +99.7
1978 524.4 522.5 + 1.9
The balances was just barely achieved. -
~ i~=~ _
,
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;
Ndl~ards ! ) 1000
de f Cfe ` ~ / honne ~
100 ~ ~su ~
?
?
?
?
f
r^�'s�~~ '
901
_ ~
~
~
~11 1O
I
EXPORTATIONS
~ 2 ~ ( lonnage ) ;
i
3 f
- ~ ~ ` EXPORTATIONS
) ( valeur )
' 211 IMPORiATI0N5
~ ~4, ~ 1 valeur 1 I Erolution
~ du commerce ( 6 )
~ ett6rieur
de I~ CBte d'Iroire
IMPORiR(IONS_,~I F4V Rca.~ L en valeur ~ 7~ ~
~ l lannage 1 iMn ,...w.~~. f p
. '"P } en fonnage ~ V ~ ~
EaP.
, 7~~~ -
~ ~~~5 ~
I `
Key: i
1. Billions of CFA francs 6. Development of the foreign trade ~
2. Exports (tonnage) of the Ivory Coast ~
3. Exports (value) 7. in value ~
4. Imports (value) 8. in tonnage ~
5. ImForts (tonnage) I
Furthermore, if one speaks of tonnages--although this point of view, quite I
theoretically has no formal value--~one notes the following development: ;
~
Exports Imports ~
_ Tonnage Index Tonnage Exports ~
(1,000 tons) (1975=100) (1,000 tons) (1975=100)
- 1975 3789.5 100 3126.8 100
. 1976 4558.2 120.2 3486.4 111.5 ;
1977 4481.6 118.3 4259.6 136.2
1978 4041.1 106.7 4627.4 148
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t
One sees that ~~hile exports had increased by 20.2 percent in 1976 compared
wi[h 1975, they are no more than 106.7 in 1978 compared with 1975. And
this occurred while imports over the same period rose to 111.5 in 1976
(1975=100), tHen to 136.2 in 1977, reaching 148 in 1978, or 1 and 1/2 times
the volume of 1975. And suddenly the tonnages imported greatly exceed those
imported. [as published; miist mean exported]
Finally, if ~~e takes account of the average value of the ton exported
and imported, one obtains the following trend:
Value of the ton Value of the ton
exported imported
CFA francs Index CFA francs Index
1975 67,180 100 72,200 100
1976 86,100 128.2 89,380 115.8
1977 118,100 175.8 100,850 130.6
1978 129,770 193.2 112,910 146.2
' This means that in comparison with 1975, export prices have an index of 193,
while import prices have ati index of only 146. .
a Therefore, despite this trend in prices and rates favorable to the Ivory
Coast, the situation of the exchanges is deteriorating. Is it a trend or
temporary business conditions. The answer to that question is of vital -
i.mportance. One concrete example will enable one to judge.
Actually, let us consider certain important items of export and import _
and engage in the following speculation:
In the hypothesis of stability of rates and average prices between 1977 '
and 1978 and by applying these same values and rates to the tonnages
, achieved in 1978, what would have been the effect on the balance of trade?
Let us look at the theoretical results:
1) On exports.-- Coffee: the tonnages achieved would have obtained
yields of 196.7 billion CFA francs (against the 131.4 billi.::~~i actually
obtained); cotton: the figure would have been 20.3 bill.ion instead of 16.5;
loss of profit for these two items: 69.1 billion CFA.
2) On imports.--For all items taken together: fish and crustaceans; milk
and milk products; lime, cement; cottons and cotton goods; iron, cast iron
and steels; aluminum; tools, hardware; industrial machinery; electrical
apparatus and navigational materials, the expense would have been 199.2
billion CFA instead of 242.7 billion. The excess of expenditures due to
� the increase in prices = 43.5 billion CFA.
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One sees that only for the items examined, the loss of prof it + excess of
expenditures = 69.1+43.5=112.6 billion CFA. The surplus of maneuver would
have been comfortable.
_ Unfortunately industrial prices rose unceasingly and the world prices of
nonvalorized or transformed agricultural products are at least fluctuating
or fragile.
But the Ivory Coast must still mainly count on exports deriving from its
great agricultural or agricultural food production, yield from which in ;
1978 amounted to: coffee, 130.9 billion CFA, cocoa, 200.6 billion CFA;
wood, 71.3 billion CFA; fats and oils, 14 billion CFA; fresh fruits
(avocados, bananas), 9.9 billion CFA; fruit juices and preserves, 9.8 bil-
- lion CFA; canned fish, 4.9 billion CFA; or a total of 441 billion CFA francs, '
or 84 percent of exports.
The favorable trend in cocoa and the effort in agro-food constitute positive ~
elements, the latter still unfortunately representing only a small fraction ~
of exports. ~
The problems of Robusta coffee have little chance of diminishing, due to
the prices having become almost uniform, which has led buyers, especially
in France, to turn increasingly to the more aromatic varieties, such ~s
the sweet Arabica types of Central America. The only way out over the
intermediate term will perhaps be found in exploitation of the Arabustas.
With regard to wood, one will see below that af ter the record exports in ;
1977, the trend is downward, and the average prices per ton are dropping i
rapidly. Furthermore, the proportion of exports attributable to the wood
industry is still too small in comparison with exports of timber. i
Finally orie notes, with regard to cotton and cotton goods, that if the ~
Ivory Coast exports more than 8 billion CFA of cotton goods, it imports
almost 10 billion. !
On the import side the equipment effort continues, but it requires growing !
parallel purchases of raw materials for industry, plants, spare parts,
tools, etc. The rise in the prices of consumex products (meat, fish, milk, '
flour preserves, sugar textiles...) is very noticeable. Finally one must ,
note the increase of almost 29 percent (in value) in one year of certain
products related to the rise in the living standard, such as perfumes,
pharmaceuticals, books, underwear, etc., which represent more than 6 per-
cent of imports (see below).
Some questions ~
In the present state of development of the Ivory Coast economy and the world
context, one has the right to ask some questions, especially in the short
term, for even if the effort is great:
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--world industrial prices will probably continue to rise;
--the prices of the main agricultural products are rising, true, but
demand is becoming increasingly urgent, which implies a sustained but long
search in the direction of quality-price relationship;
--the big programs under way will nee~ still more time really to produce
. economies or receipts;
--total Ivorian manufactured products still represents only a very small
part of export,s;
--the operation and maintenance of equipment will require more and more
care.
But one element in the valuation of trade could, in our opinion, shed useful
light on decisions to be taken in this sphere. It consists of this: if one
excepts the suppliers of petroleum products, it is very instructive to throw
into relief the value per ton imported or exported by trading partner.
Average value per ton by partner in 1978
(thousands of CFA francs)
Imported Exported
1. Switznrland 1390 1. USA 492
2. Austria 1111 2. Netherlands 351
3. Great Britain 812 3. Niger 330
4. Japan 728 4. Japan 259
~ 5. Federal Republic of 5. USSR 255
Germany 538 5. South Africa 195
6. Netherlands 281 7. Poland 188
7. U.S. 245 8. Senegal 142
8. Italy 230 9. France 136
9. France 158 10. Great Britain 134
- 10. Belgium-Luxemburg 11. Federal Republic of Germany 99
Economic Union 153 12. Algeria 90
11. Canada 121 13. Belgium-Luxemburg
12. People's China 98 Economic Union 89
13. Senegal 79 1~?. Mali 82
14. Taiwan 75 15. Upper Volta 71
15. Spain 43 1G. Spain 50
16. Nigeria 26 17. Italy 44
17. Iraq 25 18. Greece 31
18. Venezuela 25
While the statistics are content to "quanti�y" trade, such a value makes it
possible to a certain extent to "qualify" them overall as to the terms of
trade: the degree of elaboration and sophistication of the products, -
quality, reliability and toughness of materials, reputation of the partner, -
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etc. Judging thus the mutual interests of the partners one may then using '
- as a departure point, push the analysis further and define and orient future
trade strategies.
The table of average value per ton by partner confirms that:
--France is located in the middle as partner, supplying 158,000 CFA francs
for purchases of 136,000 CFA francs. ~
--The British supply expensive products (812,000 CFA francs), and are ,
content to buy products of average interest, while the United States
buys products clearly more expensive (492,000) on the average than what
it supplies to the Ivory Coast (245,000). ~
~
--The German Federal Republic sells rather expensive products (538,000 CFA
francs), but buys at a low price (99,000).
I
--As might have been expected, Switzerland sells the most elaborated pro- i
- ducts, but it is not among the 18 main clients. I
--Likewise Austria, Canada, China and Taiwan are practically speaking
suppliers only, thP last two selling products of small value.
One will note, finally, that this table restores the crude petroleum
suppliers to their proper importance, since they occupy, and by a con- !
siderable distance, the three last places in imports.
'
I m p o r t s
Suppliers
Nine~y percent of I~vorian imports are concentrated on 18 suppliers. In
addition, among the 10 percent remaining, one should note a certain number
of countries the importance of whi:ch is due only to specific items or to
state markets which do not reflect actual business relations. Thus:
I
Iran, Oman, Trinidad, Curacao..... 6.5 billion CFA (petroleum)
- USSR, Poland 3.6 billion CFA (fresh f ish)
- Algeria 3.2 billion CFA (wines)
Argentina, Brazil, Ireland........ 3.2 billion CFA (meats) j
Cameroon 1.9 billion CFA (aluminum) !
' Pakistan, Mexico 1.6 billion CFA (rice)
represent a total of 20 billion CFA, or 3.8 percent of imports.
--The main supplies from France. --Iron, cast iron, and steels (28.9) '
Machines (27.6)--Automobiles (26). Electrical apparatus (20.2).--Pharma-
ceutical products (9.4).--Plastic materials (5.8). Milk products (5.7).--
Cements and clinkers (5.4). --Cereals (5). Published articles (4.5).--
Aluminum materiel (4.1).-- Paper,, cardboard (4).--For a total of 146.6 ~
- billion CFA (71.4 percent of the total).
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The products
Food products and beverages. Out of the total imports of 522.5 billion
CFA for 4,627,000 tons in 1978 (against 429.6 billion for 4,260,000 tons
in 1977), these products represented 12.4 percent by value of the imports
(1977: 13.3 percent), with 64.6 billion for 645,000 tons (against 57.1
billion and 629,000 tons in 1977), the rise amounting to 13 percent by value.
Of the above figures, beverages were 7.2 billion (1977: 6.9) a slight
advance despite a decline in the quantities imported (5 percent less).
Meats represented 5.4 billion (coeff icient 127 in comparison with 1977:
4.3 billion) for 15,224 tons.
Fresh fish and shellfish: 8.4 billion (coefficient 120/1977=7 billion).
~iilk and milk products: 11.9 billion (of which milk was 9.7) against
9.7 billion in 1977 (of which milk was 8). The coefficient of increase
in value is 123 despite a heavy drop in tonnages: 46,000 tons against
62,000 tons in 1977 (coefficient 74).
~ Cereals: Imports remained stable at 278,000 tons (14.9 billion against
' 14.4 billion in 1977). These figures and the imports of wheat declined in
tonnage and value: 5 billion (1977: 5.5), while those of rice rose,
reaching 9.4 billion (1977: 8.6).
A strong increase in imports of flour and semolina which rose from 25,000
(1977) to 46,000 tons (coefficient 184) for values of 2(1977) and 3.3
billion (1978) respectively.
_ - Food preserves and preparations. - These items remained stable in quan-
- tity (17,000 tons), rising in value from 4.3 billion (1977) to 4.7 billion
(+10 percent).
- Sugar. - Imports of sugar (saccharose) are at a coefficient of 179 in
tonnage (125 in value), with more than 30,000 tons in 1978 (1977: 17,000
tons) for a value of 2 billion (1977: 1.6 billion).
- Textiles. - The cotton item (55) represents 10.2 billion (1977: 9.9),
a figure of which cloths account for 9.7 billion (1977: 8.81 coefficient
of increase: 110). The impcrts of synthetic and natural fibers (items
56 and 57) declined slightly: 2.8 billion.
- Petro~eum products. - Imports of petroleum products remained stable at
49.8 billion. One will note, nevertheless a decline in crude (38.6 bil-
lion against 41.6 in 1977), compensated by a corresponding rise in refined
products, oil, and miscellaneous.
_ - Materials for industry (84). - These materials represented 54,000 tons
(1977: 47,000) with a value of 77.1 billion (1977: 62.4), or a coefficient .
oF value increase of 123.
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The 18 principal suppliers of the Ivory Coast in 1978
; -
. ~21~ _ ~.22~ ~23~ _ . (.g5j _(2 )
r:�.-r~~s ~~~~.~,;s ~c % Key:
~19~ ~2p~ noco i~~,:~~~:,? a~ (24) e~ (1) France -
c~-~ Fe~s Icr.resl CiA) L:el fur.r~,-r'rsL�ua.tc~rs ~c:al Rxnp
- _ _ - - - (2) Japan
O ~ F� ~:�;~a 1G5.2 ss3 r::~~~~:~si~~~i (27~ 39.4 t (3) Fed. Rep. of Germany
- 2,e;cn St.l 3B )3 r_'FS11E~1 Ea:t~cR 5.2 1 jJ.$.
i~~5i ~.,:orv.(28) (5) Italy
~ ) 3 r,~ ~o.~ 3~.> !~~['.'fSI~ZI Y~~~:U~ei ~.a 3 ~6) Netherlands
. ;6i Px'.~~s c.`. r.~;2e91 ~
'ri. �cn'e, etar. ~ (7) Belgium-Luxemburg ~
~4~4 US4 111.J 71.4 5.2 ?.',:.�...:e: ~t.11 F,r i3.91. 7,6 z Economic Union i
1':h~::,'~s i3.91 :.::t~uls 30)
~~�,~,~~~.s Pi~.er.anon. ~H~ Spain ~
~
~5~5 l;a!.e �E.1 12.1 4.t Nech~nrs1411.Chaus� , 3.3 7 ~9~ Nigeria
swes 12.11 Fer.lunte, ~lO~ United Kingdom '
- eciers VEt :c:e: ?it~o4
,:;~t~E~~:.~~. ~,a~� (11) Venezuela I
P~