JPRS ID: 8832 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030049-3
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 49
• Content Type: REPORTS

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26 1979 ~ r ~ 1 OF 1
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JPRS L08832
26 December 1979 _
_ ~ ~lear ~ ~ .
Ec~st Nc~rth Africa, Re ort
p
(FOUO 49/79)
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= JPR5 L/8832
26 December 1979
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT ~ ~
(FOUO 49/79)
CG~t i ENTS PAGE
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
George Habash Discusses Diplorre,tic Efforts, Lebanese
Situation
(George Habash Interview; AI~-WATAN AL-'ARABI, ,
1-7 Nov 79) 1
_ Pa,ris Journalts Interview With Yasir tArafat
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, Oct 79) 15
~ Ai,GERIA
European Commissioner Cheysson Discusses Trade
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 26 Oct 79) 24
_ SONA'ITRACH Executive Discusses Cooperation -
� (MA:RCHES ZROPICAUX EI' NIEDIT~'RRA1vFFNS, 26 Oct 79) 25
~
Brie fs
Saudi Bank Loan 26 _
IRAN -
~ UK Journalist ~amines Strength of Iranian Military ,
(Robert Fisk; THE TIMES, 27 Nov 79) 27
Details of Automomy Plan Obtained by 'T~~E TIMES'
~ (Robert ~'isk; THE TIMES, 4 Dec 79) 29
Gotbzadeh's Position, Background Described.
(Renato. Ferraro; CORRIER~ DII,I,A SERA, 30 Nov 79) 31
Briefs
Reza Shah's House for Sale 34~
- a- [III - NE & A- 121. FOUO]
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CONTENTS (Con~;inued) pa,ge
LIBYA
International Symposium Held on 'Green Bookt
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITF~RA~NS, 26 Oct 79~���� 35 �
Briefs
Abolition of Legal Profession 37
Italian Pilots in Libya 37
MAURITANIA
Briefs -
Mauritania Undergoing Serious Crisis 38
SNIM Deficit 38
Drought Accelerates Rural Exodus 3$
- Tndustrial Development 39
MOROCCO
Moroccan-EEC Relations Examined
(r~xcxES ~xoPZCAtrx Er r~rr~~vs, 26 oct 79) 40
Briefs
Agreement With Iraq ~.3
Industrial Zones t~3
- Italian Solar Energy Missi on I~3
WESTERN SAHARA
Real War Said To Be Beginning in Sahara
(Raphael Mergui; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 31 Oct 79) ....o.... 4~+
- European Leftts Silence in Face of Saharan War 'Scandaloust
(Jean Ziegler; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 12-25 Nov 79) ~+7
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_ INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
- GEORGE HABASH DISCUSSES DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS, LEBANESE SITUATION
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 1-7 Nov 79 pp 29-33 -
[Interview With Dr George Habash, PF'LP Chairman and Palestinian Rejectionist
Front Leader, by Badr-al-Din al-Hajj; "Do We Proceed With Our Political
Activity on Basis of Settlement Course or Liberation Course; Has Our Goal
Become One of Setting Up a Palestinian Entity in Bank and Strip; Why Don't ~
We Present Our Issue as It Is From Its Roots; Why Don't We, as Revolution
and as Liberation Organization, Rely on International Resolutions; Can We
Fight Zionist in Isolation From Israel; It Is Serious Matter That Palestinian
People Be Given Some of Their Rights in Return for Recognizing Israel; We
Want to Strengthen Our Relations With Fatah and We Are Ready to Return to _
Executive Committee; We Call for Postponing Ideological Conflicts and We -
Are not Against Any Religious Current; It Is Time for Official Authority
to Realize That Palestinian Revolution Is a Reality Present in Lebanon"]
[Text] Beirut--Lebanese and Palestinians call George Habash al-Hakim [l~akim
means both physician and sageJ. A hakim in I.ebanon is a physician and Geo'rge
Habash is actually a physician. He is also a wise and judicious man who laas
gained experience in political action and in armed struggle action since hz
founded the Arab National Movement in the early 1950,'s and devoted all his
time and efforts for the strugg~e for his small homeland, Palestine.
It was natural for AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI to go to Dr George Habash to ask him
~ for his opinion on the turning poin.t on which the Palestinian revolution is -
now embarking. His opinion has special significance which is due, first to
his historical status in the national Arab and Palestinian struggle, and
second, due to the fact that Dr Habash embodies a current in the Palestinian
revolution that gives the rifle top priority in the popular liberation war. _
In front of the "phusician's" headquarters, the guard was heayy and the
Popular Front's youths with their covered faces were heavily armed. '
Inside the building, we are welcomed by Abu-'Ali Mustafa, Dr George Habash's
deputy. We then enter a modest office where wg were received by Dr H2bash
with his usual smile.
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On the wa11 there are two pictures. The first is that of Khalid Abu-'A'ishah, "
martyr of the Revenge Movement, which was formed by the Nationalists Movement,
who fell in the occupied territories in 1964. The second picture is that of
Abu-Amal, the Popular Front's military commander in the Palestinian camp of
Tall al-Za'tar who resisted the blockade of the Marunite National Front
forces for a long time.
I Support Movement in United Nations
[Question] You have described the PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine] approval of presenting the Palestinian issue to the United Nations
as "a new flexible policy" followed by the front for,the first time. At
presQnt, Palestinian diglomacy is active at the EuropQ~n and American levels.
How do you determine your position in the front toward the diplomatic
Palestinian activity, especially toward the efforts seeking to establish,a
U.S.-Palestinian dialogue?
[Answer] The diplom~tic efforts generally exerted by the PLO leadership at
present cover more than one sphere. There are diplomatic efforts taking _
place at the level of the friends, i.e., within the friendly camp--such as
the Havana nonaligned states conference and the forthcoming Lisbon conference.
Diplomatic efforts are being also exerted at the level of the United Nations.
Other efforts are being made at the level of Europe and, recently the United
States.
In fact, we in the Popular Front distinguisti between the diplomatic efforts
made in this or that sphere. We support enthusiastically the diplomatic
- efforts made at the level of the friendly camp because, as demonstrated by
the revolution's experience, we can come up with resolutions that condemn
the Zionist Movement as a racist movement, that denounce the Camp David
accords and the second peace treaty between the Egyptian regime and Israel
and that generally support the Palestinian people's national rights. This
- is why we feel that these efforts and the resol~tions that they produce
support us in our struggle. -
[Questioc~] What about the diplomatic efforts within the United Nations? _
[Answer] Insofar as the United Nations is concerned and in light of the -
change that has taken place in the organization's structure since its
formation, we have begun to feel that the balance of powers within the
United Nations, espec:ially within the General Assembly, has begun to tip
in favor of the interest of the progressive forces and of the national
liberation movements. An example is resolution 3226 which supports the
Palestinian people's rights without linking them to the Zionist entity and
the condition of recognizing the Zionist entity. There is no doubt that if
we mange to obtain from the U.N. organizations this kind of resolutions that
support our rights without ~inking them to the legitimacy of the Zionist
presence, then we consider this a gain. -
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We Are Against Contacts With Europe and United States ~
[Question] How about the contacts with Europe and the United States?
[AnswerJ We condemn strongly all the diplomatic efforts being made in this ,
phase with the United States in particular or with Europe. The Palestinian
and Arab balance of powers and the Palestinian revolution's intrinsic factor
have not yet reached the limit that enables us to deal with the eneury camp
(the United States and Europe) diplomatically in the manner that the
- Vietnames revolution did. `
The Vietnamese revolution started its flegotiations with the U.S. enemy under
the canopy of a very advanced phase of revolutionary growth and when it
was confident that it would wrench its rights from the hostile camp's
talons. As for the Palestinian revolution, it hasn't yet attained this
level. This is why we believe that the diplomatic efforts with the enemy -
camp, meaning the imperialist camp of the United States and Europe, are
efforts engulfed by pitfalls.
i
In this particular phase, we believe that the Palestinian revolution's -
position should be that of boycotting the U.S. imperialism and that the
revolution should be the voice urging all the Arab regimes to boycott the
United States diplomatically, politically, economically, militarily and at
all levels.
When the bilateral agreement was concluded between the Egyptian regime and
the Zionist enemy, a loud voice was raised demanding that the efforts be
turned against the snake's,head instead of being content with taking aim
at al-Sadat's regime. The slogan of boycotting tl-~e U.S. imperialism at
all levels was also raised. It i~ our evaluation that this slogan was
supposed to have persisted. For the PLO leadership to seek at this stage
to establish relations with the United States is a wrong position that
hinders the process of separating the camp of the friends from the camp
of the enemies--a process that should take place at this time.
~ [QuestionJ But isn't there a difference between the U.S. position and the
_ . European position?
[Answex] There is no doubt that there is some sort of a conflict between
the United States and Europe. A scientific thinking must take this conflict
- into account. But what are the dimensions di this conflict?
In our evaluation, Europe is presently attempting to be the link between
Camp David and future settlement plans that might be partly different from
the Camp David [accords], but not essentially different.
i
. This is why we can sum up our stance as a Popular Front toward this entire
wave of diplomatic efforts being exerted by the PLO as a stance of total -
opposition to all these efforts at the European and U.S. levels and a stance
of full and strong support for the efforts within the framework of the
~ United Nations.
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We Are Not Against Diplomatic Efforts But...
[Question] So you are against every diplomatic effort? What I mean is that
you are against politicizing the Palestinian rifle?
[AnswerJ There is the Popular Front's private view of linking the diplo-
matic activity to the revolutionary action in its entirety, We must also
clarify and explain our goal ~ehind the diplomatic activity.
We in the Popular Front are not against diplomatic efforts. But we believe
that the more urgent tasks facing the Palestinian revolution leadership are
presently the tasks of bringing about some kind of Palestinian national unity, -
~ mobilizing the Palestinian masses seriously, enhancing our military forces
, and capabilities and escalating the political and military struggle af our
masses in the occupied Palestine.
The efforts must be focused here primarily and any diplomatic efforts by
the PLO must be fully linked to these efforts.
~ The second, and fundamental, point is that these gains that can be made at
~ the level of the world publi~ opinion and the level of the U.N. organizations
should not at all demand as their price the PLO's slipping anew into the
settlement course and path.
We in the Popular Front agree, and this is nothing new, with the idea that `
says the full liberation of the Palestinian soil cannot take place in one
_ thrust and that it is natural for our goals of full liberation to pass
_ through phases. We also agree that in each of these phaseG it is necessary
to~'determine a phased goal. But it is also essential that this phased
~ goal actually form a phased goal on the path of the strategic goal, i.e.`, -
a phased step toward liberation.
This is the basic difference that distinguishes us from others. To achieve
some Palestinian gains at the expense of recognizing th~ Zionist entity's
- legitimacy is no gain at all. To achieve some g~~ns without acknowledging
the Zionist entity's legitimacy is, in our evaluation, something sound and
scientific. It is natural that the Palestinian revolution should proceed -
toward achieving its goals with this graduality.
Settlement Course and Liberation Course
[Question] Does not your interpretation of diplomatic action shackle the
political movement of the Palestinian struggle?
[Answer] The central point is: Should we proceed in our dealings within
this sphere of diplumatic efforts on the basis of the settle~nent course or
the liberation course?
We believe that the settlement course is a dangerous course. What is meant ;
here by the settlement course is to have the Palestinian people given some ,
of their rights in return for the price of acknawledging the Zionist entity's
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l.eg:ttimacy. The price of the~e given rights also means the creation of
the 1'alestintan state in a manner tt~at makes it allied with the U.S. im-
pefialism.
This, in fact, is the danger of this course. We are aware of the dangers
- of this course at all the Palestinian, Arab and international levels.
At the Palestinian level, there is real and legitimate concern in the
_ circles of the Palestinian masses. TY~is concern is accompanied by the
following big question:~. Have all the Palestinian revolution's goals come
to be summed up in the creation of a Palestinian entity or a Palestinian
_ state in the West Bank and the [Gaza] Strip at the expense of our legitimate
historical right to liberate the Palestinian soil in its entirety?
We in the Popular Front are aware of such concern among the masses. Whenever
the masses hear of the triumphs of the Palestinian diploma~:y, they cannot
free themselves of linking these triumphs to the question: Are we paying
the price of these triumphs in the direction of entrenching the Zionist .
entity's legitimacy?
At the Arab level, the settlement course has caused numerous Arab regimes to -
present Israel as if it were an e~:tant reality.
What, for example, has al-Sadat done?
Al-Sadat used the settlement course as a cover to slip into the path along
which he has proceeded. In other words, it is as if these regimes say:
As long as the PLO leadership seems to be tacitly willing to recognize
Israel's presence if it can make some gains, then why.don't you allow me,
as an Egyptian regime or a Jordanian regime, to realize some gains, even
if at the expense of recognizing the Zionist entity's legitimacy?
[Question] Yes, but there are those who say that the Palestinian cause has
gained a lot from its movement at the international level?
[Answer] Even at an international level, the settlement course that no ~
longer pays atrzntion to the need to link the phased goal with the strategic -
goal has led to the following result:
The Palestinian issue is no longer projected at the international level on
the basis of the presence of this fascist, Nazi, Zionist entity and the need
to uproot this presence and on the basis that there can be no peace in the
area with the presence of a fascist, racist state. This is no longer in the
picture. It is as if Israel's existence has become an acknowledged reality. -
~
At the international level, it is as if the questian has become: What can
we offer the Palestinian people with the continued presence of Israel and
the Zionist entzty? This is why what determines our position toward the
diplomatic efforts is the following question:
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Do we proceed with these efforts on the basis of the settlement course or
the liberation course?
_ We in the PFLP do not oppose any form of the diplomatic efforts if it proceeds
clearly on the basis of the course of liberation and not the settlement caurse.
This clarity must not exist in the minds of the leaderships alone but must
- be projected among the Palestinian and Arab masses and among the progressive
world public opinion.
Moreover, why don't we present our issue as it is from its~roots? Isn't -
it a just issue?
.~~~n, I would like to refer to the international resolutions condemning
Zionism. We consider these resalutions among the best resolutions we have
been able to get in the Palestinian arena. ~here is the U.N. resolution -
condemning Zionism and the recent nonalignment conference resolution also
_ condemning Zionism. Why don't we, as a Palestinian revolution and as a ~
' liberation organization rely on such resolutions to ask all the states and
. all the forces that condemn Israel: Is there a distinction between Zionism ~
- and r,he State of Israel? Isn't the State of Israel the tangible embodiment _
of the xacist Zionist concept? Can any force condemning Zionism and wanting
= to fight it actually do so without fighting Israel?
Our issue is obviously just. It is my estimate that when the Palestinian `
- revolut~on continues to project its scientific understanding of Che Zionist
presence on the Palestinian and Arab soil and when the Palestinian revolu-
tion defines its objective position toward all these formulas, then this
projection and this definition will lead to abandoning the Camp David course
and to-proceeding along a course bearing the sign: Real liberation of the
Arab and of the Palestinian soil.
This is why the weight should be shifted toward putting the progressive
parties, organizations and ~trces face to face with their responsibilities
in mobilizing the Arab masses, in forcefully compelling the regimes to
carry out their duties or in forming the forces of change capable of topplin~
these regimes and replacir.g them by others capable of performing the national
and pan-Arab tasks existing on the Palestinian and Arab arena at present.
We Seek to Return to Executive Committee -
[Question] A question concerning Palestinian unity: Why doesn't the Popular ~
Front return to the framework of the PLO's Executive Committee?
[Answer] First, the Popular Front is fully prepared to raturn to the frame- .
work of the PLO`s Executive Committee. We were supposed to be within the
Executive Committee now had the latest session of the Palestinian National
Council succeeded in implementing and crystallizing the organizational program
that had been approved theoretically.
Second, we are still enthusiastic for achieving the highest possible level
of national unity now. The practical translation of this level is our
p resence within the framework of the Executive Committee.
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[Question] You say that the Popular Front is prepared to return to the
framework of the Executive Committee. Doesn't this mean a change in your
previous position of withdrawing from the committee?
[Answer] This change in our position as a Popular Front is due to two
~ reasons. What I mean by the change is the change from the front's voluntary
position of withdrawing from the co~nittee to its present position which is
- reflected in tis wish to return to the Executive Committee.
- The first reason is that the se~tlement course concerning the Palestinian
issue is presently blocked, even though there are Palestinian forces that
want t~ deal with the settlement issue. This is a very important reason.
The clima.te of 1974, 1975 and 197b was different from the present climate.
- At that time there was a real danger of the projection of a settlement
formula different from the Camp David formula and under which the PLO
leadership could have become a party in the settlement process.
The formula of the Camp David accards has put the PLO outside the framework
of the settlement. Therefore, despite our disagreements with the settlement
course, there is no settlement p r~jected for practical implementation on the
- Palestinian arena.
The second reason is the Camp David accords and the ferocious imperialist
- onslaught that seeks to totally annihilate the Palestinian revolution.
Therefore, we believe that we are on the threshold of a new phase insofar -
as the issue of the Palestinian relations is concerned, whether in terms
of our readiness to enter the Executive Committee or in terms of our wish
to bolster our relations with all the Palestinian organizations and, also,
- our warm desire to bolster our relations with our brothers in Fatah.
Despite any differences, there are two acute battles facing the Palestinian
masses at present: The first is the plot of self-rule in the occupied
Palestine and the second is the battle to annihilate the Palestinian rifle
in Lebanon.
I repeat that despite any differences, we are fully prepared to put our
hands in the hands of our brothe rs in all of the Palestinian revolution's
~ factions to foil the self-rule piot first and to protect the Palestinian
rifle on the Lebanese soil second.
- [Question] Do you have any conditions for returning to the framework of the -
Executive Co~nittee?
[AnswerJ I would like to point out that we do not bear the responsiblity
for our presence outside the fraxnework of the Executive Committee until
this moment. We are now struggling in a positive, democratic and comradely
~ climate so that the Palestinian National Council may hold another session
as soon as possible--a session that can result in the election of a new
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Executive Committee that is ?�vre in harmony with the organizational pro-
gram that was approved in the 14th session and that includes the Popular
- Front iri~:,its fold.
Yes There Is Decline and Bright Spots
[Question] Dr, can't it be ackno~~ledged that there is a decline in the
so-called Arab national liberation movement generally? -
[Answer] Of course. There is akreem~nt on,this question. However, it
~ is necessary to underline the pr~~sence of truly bright spots in the Arab
area desp~te the state of decline.
Take fox example the ceaseless and e~calating political and military
struggle of our heroic Palest:iniar~ people in the occupied homeland and
their steadfastness"~3espite this state of decline. _
~l~
What about the magnif'Ccent and constant position taken daily by our people, -
in the.occupied homeland since al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and until this
moment?
I say this so that we may see the struggle~capabilities with which our masses
are rich. There are other bright spots here in Lebanon, whether in the form '
of the T~ebanese National l~ovem2nt or of the Palestinian revolution. More-
over, there have be~nn persistant and active plans throughout the past 5
years to annihilate ~he Lebanese and Palestinian rifle.; _
Is the continued presence of the Palestinian revolution and of the Lebanese
National Movement until this moment and despite all these plans and their _
weight a mere coincidence? -
The answer is no. Coincidence may help us to avoid one blow. But to have
- survived all this time despite all these plans means that there are revolu- ~
tionary capabilities ralliel behind a just cause that will find its way,
regardless of how dark is the picture at present, toward creating a real
change in the balance of powers.
If we examine the Arab area in its entirety, we find that in the middle of
the state of the reactionary-imperialist tide there are seeds for a real
- revolutionary revi>>al, even in the Egyptian arena itself. I waiited to `
- underline this point so that our masses may see�what may be called the
regly that will be inevitably generated by this wave of the imperialist-
reactionary tide.
[Question] What is your interpretation--you who have lived with this tidal
movement--of the new phenomenon, namely the phenomenon of the growth of the
sectarian or denominational spirit?
[Answer] Imperialism uses all weapons to achieve its goals. One of the
weapon~ is that of inciting sectarian jingoism. Imperialism also uses the
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_ weapan of military threats, as is happneing at present in the Gulf area,
' and is singing the tunP of preparin~ military forces to intervene at the
right moment to prevent any change in the Gulf.
,
Imnerialism does not only resort to military threats but also embarks on ,
" military action against the revolutionary forces. At this moment, Israel's
- attacks against southern Lebanon ~onstitute one of the means of imperialism
_ to achieve its goals. Imperialism also resorts to diplomatic maneuvers to
_ foil the Arab revolutionary movements in the area. -
Imperialism thinks of all weapons without exception. One of these weapons "
is to incite s~ctarian jingoism. The most obvious example of this is what
_ is happining in Syria at present. How can we explain this issue?
In 1970, there was a clasYi between the Syrian regime and the resistance.
Where were these forces that are now trying to pretend to be struggling
- against the shortcomings of thE Syrian regime?
- When these acts appear in this historic moment on the Syrian arena, we
- cannot but link them to the imperialist plans. The reason is that Syria
is presently opposed to the Camp David accords, regardless of any argument
that can be made as to the funda~r~2ntality of this position and as to the
mobilizational me~hod of confronting the Camp David accords.
Regardless of any argument, Syria is currently opposed to Camp David. More-
over, its grographic location makes it a central link in uniting the Arab
� opposition to Camp David.
- This is why the imperialist plans seek to submerge Syria in a sectarian
sedition. We aIl know of course how imperialism relied on the sectarian .
rancors to distort the truth of the national war and the just and legitimate
- civil war existing on the Lebanese arena.
Let Us Postpone Our ldeological Conflicts
[Question] As a political thinker, is Dr George Habash against the religious
currents as a whole in the political arena?
[AnswerJ I hope that my aforementioned statements will not be understood
~ to mean that in the PFLP are against any religious current. This is wrong.
_ What is important is the political content of such a current.
Khomeini's current is one of opposition to imperialism and Zionism. There _
are, of course, certa~n aspects of Khomeini's line with which we do not
agree. But we see clearly that Khomeini's current is opposed to imperialism
and Zionism and this forms a meeting ground between us and all the progressive
_ Arab forces on the one hand and the Iranian revolution on the other. Re-
gardless of any details, what happened in Iran has, on the admission of the
imperialists and the Israelis, constituted one iyf-:the`~iigoest blow~"dealt to
imperialism and Zionism.
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Therefore, it is not enaugh for a current to proceed on the basis of a
religious ideology that we may oppose it. What is important to us is what
this current pro~ects at the political level.
We consider this concept one of the fundamental issues which the Popular
Front is struggling to entrench in the Arab area generally. _
What is .fundamental in.sofar as we are concerned is to postpone the ideolog~.~al _
conflicts and to try to agree on a number of political positions opposed ~u
imperialism and Zionism. I believe that any force moving in the direction of
- escalating.the ideological conflicts in one way or another, wittingly or
unwittingly, meets with the imperialist plans in this period.
If we examine the Arab arena at the ideological level currently, we find
that there are communist parties and Piarxist-Leninist forces that disagree
with one another, there is the Nasirist current, the socialist Arab Ba'th
Party current and the religious current. What will happen if the ideological
- conflict process begins and turns into the main feature of the relations
between these currents?
~ The result will be a conflict conducted at the expense of the main battle
against imperialism. Let us all now raise the slogan of the meeting of all ,
the forces opposed to imperialism and Zionism, regardless of their ideological
affili.ations. -
Egyptian Progressive Movement Is Absent
[Question] Let us returr~ to the decline of the so-called Arab li3eration
movement and let us take the Egyptian arena as an example. Don't you think
that the Egyptian national reaction to President al-Sadat's separate peace
_ with Israel has not been at the required level or at the level expected of _
this national reaction?
[Answer) There is, as you know, an economic, social and living crisis -
- exerting heavy pressure on the Egyptian citizen and on tfie Egyptian masses.
It seems that this crisis exceeds in its dimensions any crisis experienced
by our Arab masses in other parts of the Arab homeland.
_ Therefore, and in the absence o.f an active and effective Egyptian revolu-
tionary movement offering the Egyptian masses the scientific explanation _
for this hardship and this crisis, al-Sadat and his effective central in- _
formation media have been able to mislead the masses temporarily on the
grounds that the cause of all the conditions experienced by the Egyptian
masses is the fact that Egypt has been in a continuous state of conflict
with the Zionist entity for 30 years and that the solution to all theBe
crises will come through putting an end to this conflict. ~
As I have already pointed out, the main reason is the absence of a progressive -
and effective national movement permeating the popular circles and offering -
- them the scientific explanation for this crisis. But naturally, I believe
that the Egyptian masses are becoming aware of the deception in which al-Sadat
_ has engaged.
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I also bel~.eve that the element of time will act in the interest of the
, progressive forces in Egypt, the interest of the Egyptian masses and of
- the process of change in Egypt for two obvious reasons:
The first is that after the passage of a period of time, the true nature
of al-Sadat's trick will 'become obvious to the Egyptian masses. A1-Sadat
has promised that within the 1980's every Egypti.an citizen caill live a
life of luxury. Naturally, we know that all these promises are mere
illusions. We will enter 1980 in a few months and the Egyptian citizen
will discover that the Camp David accords and the peace treaty have not
supplied him with the solutions for the economic and social problems
under which he labors.
The second reason is that with the presence of the seeds of progressive and
revolutionary forces capable of explaining the true conditions of Egypt,
I believe that the direction will be toward the decline of al-Sadat camp
_ and the growth of the masses' camp in Egypt.
[Question] My bag.:is not e~upty yet. I have questions on the Lebanese issue
and on the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. What is the Popular Front's
position toward the issue of dispatching the Lebanese army to the south?
_ [Answer] The Lebanese authority's current plan for the national Palestinian
= and Lebanese presence, both in the south and in the entire Lebanese arena, -
is crystallizing and becoming clear.
The Lebanese authority is currently focusing on the issue of dispatching
a strong Lebanese army to the south. 7~he opera~ion has reached a level
whereby the Lebanese army is now nearly 23,000-man strong. The plan seeks
to raise the number so that the Lebanese military establishment may have
40,000 troops. The monthly wages paid to the Lebanese soldier now amount
to about 900 Lebanese pounds, not to mention the other extras, fringe
benefits and services aimed at enticing people to enroll in the military
establishment.
The United States is very enthusiastic for the operation of building the
Lebanese military establishment and is providing this establishment with
its weapon requirements. As for the structure of the leadership of this
army, it is fully clear. I mean by this that it is an isola~ionist
structure.
The tasks projected for this army and reflecting themselves in the mobiliza-
tion and education pror_ess are also clear, meaning that the task of this
- army is to confront the armed presence. What is intended here in particular
is the armed national presence.
[Question] But the Lebanese authorities have given assurances to tihe
- National Movemerzt and the Palestinian resistance and have said that all
they want is to establish Lebanese sovereignty in the south.
~
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[Answer] I want to ask here: Is the task of this army that of confronting
the Israeli occupation of the south?
The answer is no. The task of this army is to confront the armed national ~
Lebanese and Palestinian presence. I am sorry to say that there is a
strong link between the authority's plan and what i:srael and Sa'd Haddad's
forces are doing. This connection is completely clear. There are the
continuous Israeli attacks against the south and there are the air raids
and the ground artillery shelling, etc., which create all the suffering
experienced by our masses in the south at present. There is also the
_ phenomenon of the evacuees and all the pains they are living with. There
are the human victims and there are the hard living conditions of all the
southern masses.
- What does the Lebanese authority say here? Does it say that all the
- tragedies of the southern masses are the result of the Zionist aggression?
No, the Lebanese authority says that the Palestinian presence is the cause
of all these aggressions.
The picture is distorted here. In the light of this, our position toward
the Lebanese authority and its plans and toward the Lebanese army and its _
entry to the south is determined.
Tf the Lebanese authority and the Lebanese army want to enter the suuth to �
confront the Zionist aggression and the Israeli occupation which form the
root of the tribulation of the southern masses, then we are ready to raise
the slogan of a front including tlie Palestinian revolution, the Lebanese
- National Movement, the Lebanese authority and all the forces to confront
the Zionist occupation.
But for the authority to move under the pretext of the conditions currently -
- existin~ in the south and not to confront the Israeli aggression but to
confront the national presence, then it is natural that we would be against
this issue in its entirety and that we would resist it with all the strength
~~e possess .
With Establishment of. Lebanese Authority
[Question] P4ay I be distrusting and say that you are against the presence
of a Lebanese army and of a Lebanese authority and against having this
j~; authority establish its sovereignty over all of Lebanon?
[Answer] Of course my words may be misunderstood. It may be said that we ~ -
are against the presence of a Lebanese army and against the presence of a
. Lebanese authority that imposes its sovereignty over all of Lebanon.
The answer is that we support the presence of a Lebanese army and of a
Lebanese authority. But what army and what authority? -
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[Question] Then how can you establish compatibility between the presence _
of a Lebanese authority over all of Lebanon with an armed Palestinian
presence on this soil?
[Answer} It is time for any Lebanese authority to realize that the
Palestinian revolution ~s an extant reality on the Lebanese soil, that it
� is defending a just cause and that any stability on the Lebanese arena
must proceed on the basis of this fact and the basis of acknowledging the
legitimacy of the re~volution's presence and of its right to defend its
just cause.
Let all-~~both the Lebanese authority and all the Arab governments surrounding
Palestine---know that without this realization, there will be no stability
- at the zxpense of striking the Palestinian revolution. Stability can be
achieved only in one case, namely that of supporting the Palestinian revolu-
tion and of creating and developing the capabilities of the Arab position
to confront the ceaseless Zionist aggressions against Lebanon and others--
aggressions that constitute the root of all the tragedies experienced by
the masses, both in the south and in the Arab area as a whole.
[Question] What is your visualization of what is currently taking place in
and what is being planned for Lebanon? -
[Answer] I only want to point out the link between the imperialist plan -
and the Israeli plan on the one hand and the Lebanese authority's plan on
- the other. In fact, we are now facing three plans contained within one
- framework.
It is true that there are three plans and it is true that the plan of the
U.S. imperialism is different in detail from the Israeli plans and that the
Israeli plans are different in detail from the Lebanese authority's plarts.
However, there is a common denominator among all these plans, namely that
of destroying the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese National Movement.
Efforts of Suspect Plans
[Question] We have forgotten the [Arab] Gulf. Do you think that something
is being planned and hatched for the area?
[Answer] I believe that there is an obvious link between the various
imperialist plans projected at present, including the plan dealing with
the Gulf area, on the one hand and Camp David on the. other.
' How should we fundamentally understand the Camp David issue? -
The Arab ma.sses and the Arab national forc~s may think predominently that
the danger of C~mp David lies in recognizing the Zionist presence and
norma.lizing the relations with the Zionist entity. This, naturally, is
a very serious thing in itself. But this danger only represents one aspect
_ of the dangerous picture.
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, The other, and no less'~dangerous, aspect in the Camp David accords lies in '
the fact thaf these accords represent an imperialist-Zionist-Arab reactionary ~
alliance on which imperialism wants to lean not only to entrench the Zionist
entity but also to achieve all its goals in the Arab area. ~
This is the other aspect and it is our duty to constantly present it to the
Arab masses and progressive forces.
Naturally, Israel's main goal behind the Camp David accords is to get the
ofFicial recognition of the first Arab regime of the legitimacy of its
_ presence. But what about the other imperialist goals behind the camp?
And have all the U.S. imperialist efforts to bring about the Camp David
accords been exerted for the sake of Israel's black eyes?
- No, the other side lies in the fact that imperialism views the Camp David
accords as the path through which it can realize its goals in this sensitive
area with its oil resources.
The camp David path is, insofar as imperialism is concerned, the begirining
of the creation of a new alliance on which it can lean to implement the
rest of its plans in the area. This is why we notice that after realiza-
tion of the Camp David accords, more than one imperialist plan have been
- active in the Arab area, including an imperialist plan in the Gulf. More-
over, the imperialist plan in Lebanon is intensifying. An imperialist-
al-.Sadatplan is also being currently prepared to launch an attack against
the Libyan Jamahiriyah. There are also active plans throughout the Arab
area and these plans rely on the Camp David accords and are linked with
them. ~
Imperialism, which scored this victory in Camp David, has begun to feel
that it can project other plans through which to achieve all its goals.
This is why what the U.S. is currently projecting through (Sultan) Qabus
(of Oman) is an imperialist plan completely linked with and dependent on
the imperialist accomplishments made at Camp David.
My bag ran out of questions and I was about to gather my papers when the
doctor smiled and hastened to ask me:
Now, tell me your opinion on the situation. Are you optimistic or pessimistic?
I said: I am in between. I am neither pessimistic nor optimistic. I am
moving between the ebb and the flow, between the dark spots and the bright
- spots about which you have talked.
COPYRIGHT: 19~9 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI.
8494
CSO: 4802
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS -
PARIS JOURNAL'S INTERVIEW WITH YASIR 'ARAFAT
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic Oct 79 pp 28-31
[ Interview with'Yasir 'Arafat]
[Text] From its;earliest da~~s AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has been favored by
special interviews or discussions with Yasir 'Arafat. Mr Sliafiq al-Hut
reports liere the text of an interview with the leader of the Palestinian
- revolutior~,. The interview, part of our continuing dialog with Mr 'Arafat,
deals with some of the problems facing the Palestinian revolution at this
difficult juncture in its history.
If Palestine did not play a unique role in hfstory or occupy a unique geo-
graphical.location, if it were not favored with a unique cultural heritage
contested by three religions, if it had not been a bridge between East and
- West, North and South, as well as the heart of the Arab world, with all
that entails, if Palestine were not all this and more, in short, if Palestine -
had not, been i`alestine, then'its independence and the freedom of its people
- would have been realized long, long ago..
~ But Palest;ine remains Palestine. It is as though it had been destined to
remain a"problem," fated not to become a home and nation until it had
. fulfilled a mission commensurate with its place in history and geography.
It seems, tou, that the burden of transforming Palestine into a home and -
- nation has fallen upon the shoulders of the man who started the Palzstinian -
revolution, the one who is determined that this revolution shall be carried
on until the final victory is achieved. He is the one who often appears
~to be standing on the battlefield alone, and yet at other times he seems
to stand at the center of the world. The fact is that his enemy,nothe, is
the one who stands isolated. He is the leader of a revolution which seems
to grow stronger and gather more momentum in proportion to the enemy's
determinat.ion to liquidate it.
For the past 6 months the Palestinian revolution has�been exposed to a
bloody campaign. And while the enemy and his allies have been hoping to
turn south Lebanon into a burial ground for this revolution, their hopes
have been dashed as the revolution appeared alive and well, first in Vienna,
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then in Havana, Madrid, Ankara and Berlin. Tomorrow it will move to Lisbon;
from there it will move ro yet another location in an ever-expanding circle
of support for the Palestinians and their struggle.
Berlin was the last step on Mr 'Arafat's agenda when I met with him in his
office. As usual, he was occupied with ordinary problems of ordinary
Palestinians: A student needing help to get into college, another asking
for weapons, a third seeking aid to get married, and get another asking for
assistance to make a pilgrimage [to Mecca]. We asked him when he would be
free for a lengthy interview.. "Right now," he said, "as soon as I finish
what I'm doing. Sit down and have a cup of coffee."
[Question] Tell us about the Havana summit conference and whether it
produced positive results, espe�ially with respect to the Palestinian
problem.
[Answer~ We must always remember that we ar~ a national liberation move-
ment and that we are a part of the international liberation movement. There
are many interlocking problems, and we have an obligation to contribute to
' their solution with the same enthusiasm that we ask others to contribute ~
to the solution of our problems.
With this in m.ind, the nonalined nations conference was successful beyond
our wildest expectations. Let me specifiy:
1. The fact that the conference took place and adopted a unanimous sEt of
resolutions despite all attempts to torpedo it, is itself a spectacular
achievement and a huge victory. Much of the cr.edit for this goes to Mr
Fidel Castro for his skill in organizing the conference. Our Cuban brothers
managed the conference superbly. Their hospitality toward their guests was
appreciated by all the participants.
2. Not only did the conference convene and go on as planned, but it con-
cluded with a burst of vitality which will be~reflected in the actions of
the nonalined nations in the next 3 years. Furthermore, the conference
once again renewed its adherence to the basic principles of nonalinement,
namely, its opposition to colonialism, imperialism and all forms of racism. '
3. With respect to the Palestinian problem, the conference was unanimous in
its determination to support any recommendation presented by the Palestinian
delegation. The Camp David accords and the Sadat-Begin alliance were con-
demned by name in clear language. The same was true with respect to al-Sadat's
position, which was deemed to be in violation of the principles of the
nonalined movement. In this connection, I must commend the tremendous efforts
- of our Arab brethren, particularly President Saddam Husayn of Iraq and
President al-'Asad of Syria, in support of the Palestinian delegation.
4. The conference provided an excellent opportunity for bilateral dis-
cussions among the leaders and presidents of four continents. I can assert
truthfully that our problem was listened to with respect and genuine con-;ern.
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There was no controversy regarding the Palestinian issue as pres~nted by ~
the PLO. Our positior~ received unanimous support.
- In summary, we emerged from Havana with a good deal of political ammunition,
which will serve us well as we take our case to the international community, -
. especially the United Nations, which will discuss the Palestinian problem
next November.
[Question] Could you tell us about your visit to Madrid and Ankara? How
do you inte~rpret or assess ~he PLO's initiative toward Western Europe,
beginning with your meeting in Vienna with Bruno Kreisky and Willy Brandt?
Some of these initiatives are causing concern that the PLO ma.y be changing its -
strategy.
[Answer] Before responding to these questions, I must emphasize the need
to listen to what our sources say before listening ta what our opponents
say. Those who oppose our struggle are careful to distort the truth and
cast our inYtiatives in a negative light. Unfortunately, similarly erroneous
- information is being propagated by some of our Arabic newspapers, some of
which are headquartered only a few meters away from here.. The extent of
distortion by our opponents, who have a penchant for misleading the public,
becomes:clear when one compares what our sources say with what they sa5�.
_ Their aim is to cast doubt on our work and to misrepresent our strategy,
principles and methods.
As far our political iniative, we must distinguish between a political
struggle and a political solution. From the moment our National Council
adopted political struggle as an indispensible component of our total
effort, we had no alternative but to wage a political battle alongside
our military one. We must realize more political victories. You must
- remember how difficult it was to take the first step in this direction,
when we decided to take our case'to the United Nations. There was a great
deal of skepticism about the efficacy of our move. Today everyone relaizes
the wisdom of that step and its beneficial impact on our case in the inter-
national political arena.
When we took that first step, the international community recognized only
Israel. Much of the world public opinion had already fallen prey to Zionist
propagand~. The world was ready to believe that there was no Palestine to
begin with,, or, at least, that Palestine and the Palestinians were finished.
Slowly and gradually, and wiih the aid of our martyrs, we managed to change~
that picture and to wrench some recognition. I believe that recognizing -
the existence of Palestinians is ~he natural prelude to recognizing their
rights, including their right to their own state. I must remind you that
many of the.countries who now support our case did so as a result of our
- long and patient struggle. A few years ago we had very limited relations
with the Soviet Union. A few days ago, before the leaders of the socialist
world and in the glare of television cameras, Mr Brezhnev, standing atop
the reviewing stand as he watched the military parade marking the 30th anni-
versary of the German Democratic Republic, greeted me with the words
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"Tovarish Arafat." I tell you this so that people may understand that our
case will not move forward by itself, without labor and persistence on our
part. Have you forgotten that even the Arab states came to recognize the -
PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people only -
after 9 years of arduous struggle?
Let us however, return to the fundamental question. Increasing the number
of countries which recognize us is one of the transitional goals established
by the Palestine National Council. Everyone knows that Western Europe and ~
the United States are the last holdoi;ts. We are recognized by the socialist
world, the nonalined bloc and the Moslem world. It is therefore natural
for us to concentrate our efforts on Europe. The atmosphere is now suitable, -
and we must benefit by this opportunity. Should some of the West European
countries react positively to our political initiatives, it is not a case
of generosity on their part; the credit goes to the martyrs in our occupied
- land and on the confrontation line with the enemy. It goes to the magnifi-
cent determination of our imprisoned people to remain steadfast. Those are
the twin makers of victories.
One of our young men asked me about my trip to Turkey, a NATO member, and
wanted to know the significance of our political initiative with that country.
Others reminded me that Turkey had annexed part of the [Syrian] Iskandarun
region. It is as though the Palestinian~revolution were to blame for the
territorial loss, or were responsible for its return. The responsibility
lies with the Arab states whose embassies crowd the streets of Ankara. I,
_ alone, the Palestinian, am charged with fulfilling our national aspirations.
We are honored by this great confidence in our ability, unless, of course,
the object is to place a greater burden on us than we can handle. ThesE
people would do better to permit the revolution to order its priorities in
a serious and rational manner. At any rate, our occupied homeland is our
first top~priority. As for the fact that Turkey is a member of NATO, I
beg permission to say candidly that if our po].itical initiative is a source
of discomfort to anyone, it is not to us but to Turkey. Because of its
membership in NATO, Turkey's recognition [of the PLO] was all the more
- courageous, particularly in view of the pressure to which Prime Minister
Bulent Ecevit was subjected. Everyone must understand that when we deal
with any party, we do so on the basis of a fixed set of principles from
which we neither hide nor depart. We do not barter over our principles.
We reiterated these principles to President Ecevit, who, despite our dif-
ferences over certain issues--Cyprus, to be exact--asserted that the new
Turkish attitude toward the PLO was based on principle and would not be -
affected by transitory differences.
- Follo~aing my visit to Ankara and the opening of a PLO office wi~th all
diplomatic privileges, let the skptics say whatever they please. I am
certain that Turkish-Israeli relations will gradually diminish and then -
cease altogether. I prefer to get things done and leave commentary to
others. Time will be the final judge, and victory will go to the one
who looks ahead.
~
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What I have said about my trip to Ankara applies to my trips to Madrid and
Vienna. tis one commentator--whose name i cannot recall--said: "These -
doors were closed in our face and open to our enemy." Today ;.~�e~e doors
are open to us. We enter them proudly, our principles intacts, thanks to
the blood of our martyrs. We proclaim the ~ustice of our cause, the
steadfastness of our people and the glory of the [Arab] nation.
[Question] What about the emerging support of black Americans and the
resignation of Andrew Young? How do you evaluate the visit to this region
by~black leaders, especially Jesse Jackson? What about all the announce- .
ments about nonviolence and the cease-fire in the south [of Lebanon]? -
- [Answer] This is another story which has been blow~ up beyond all propor-
tion by the media. This issue is simple, and our position on it is clear.
= I will not use this occasion to criticize those co~entators--supposedly
official Palestinian spokesmen--who expounded the issue in t~he strangest
manner. Ironically, some of them were with me when I met the Reverend
Jesse Jackson and were responsible for issuing the Palestinian position
in the final communique at the end of all my discussions with the black
leaders. Let them say whatever they wish. As I said before, my job is
_ to make things happen. What happened after the black leader Young resigned?
- There was a furor in the United States. Questions were asked about the cir-
cumstances surrounding the resignation. A new opportunity opened up to
bring the Palestinian problem to a large section of American society. What
were we supposed to do? Were we to stand around or to use tfie occasion to
explain our problem and our demands, especially in view of the distorted
publicity accorded our struggle prior to that? That is why we moved and
invited the black leaders to come and see the situation as it really is.
- Our commentators, appear to forget that tnese leaders are not Palestinian
or Arabs or� residents of our refugee camps. They are American citizens,
and our expectations as a result of their visit are not extravagant.
We deal with facts and with people, people who have their own views,
drawbacks and conceptions. What is important is that we ask ourselves:
Where did these people sta~id with respect to our problem before and where
do they stand now? I want;%to ask the commentators and skeptics whether
they have heard or read Jesse Jackson's statements after he returned home?
If they have, they would realize the extent of the political and publicity
gains we have made. The gains exceed any benefit produced by our official
announcements overseas.~ The reason: The new voice is the voice of an
American citizen, one who has credibility and a large following. It is
not the voice of a professional propagandist. It is the voice of one who,
like us, was the subject of deprivation, brutality and persecution. I
also wonder what prompted some of the commentators to take these unjustified
attitudes. Jackson and I issued a six-point communique, and I challenge
all the cr.itics to say which of these points represents a compromise or
retreat from our strategic position, the decisions of our National Council
or those of the joint Lebanese-Palestinian leadership. Furthermore, we
were careful in the communique to adhere to our national charter. Jackson
himself now defends the charter after having it read to him.
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This is quite a development in view of the fact that Zionism has long
managed to scornfully mislead American public opinion by misrepresenting
the.charter. I repeat that we are not dreamers; neither do we believe
that an acceptable solution to our problem can come easily. Supportive
communiques wi11 not solve our problem. But does this mean that we ought
to sit idly waiting for a solution from heaven knows where? No. We must
fight in ever arena and exploit every opening that promises to gain friends
and supporters for our case. We do not demand from our friends more than
they can deliver. In fact, some of our friends have delivered more than
our brethren. Let us therefore take initiatives and make things happen.
If there are some who would be content to play commentators, that is all
right with us. But let them not forget that without us there would be
nothing for them to comment about.
A~ for the cease-fire in the south, everyone knows that the joint Lebanese-
Palestinian command has Qrdered a cease-fire. Everyone also knows that we
have adhered to the cease-fire except when subjected to the hell of our
enemy's fire. Our reasons are purely political and no secret to anyone:
we want to deprive Israel and its supporters of their dishonest and oft-
repeated claim that Israel fires only in retaliation. For, despite the
fact that Israel has openly declared that it intends to wage a war of
annihil~tion against us and that it would fight us everywhere, there are
tho~e who still cling to that unfounded justification. That is why we
decided to adhere to a cease-fire in the south but not within our occupied
lands. All this was made clear in the six-point communique. Even Jesse
Jackson himself stated that "I could not in conscience ask the Palestinians
to cease their struggle from within the occupied territory before they
- regain control of the West Barzk and the Gaza Strip and establish their
independent state." Therefore, there is no change in our position. The
only new development is that our message is now being heard in the United
States. We now have a spokesman who will carry our message and get it
through, despite all attempts by the enemy to distort and by the audience
to plead ignorance.
[Question] Do you pTan other trips? There are rumors of a trip to Lisbon,
another to Paris and a third to the United Nations in New York.
[Answer) Our political initiatives are carefully studied and planned.
Simultaneously, our planning is subject to the outcome of our ongoing
contacts in the European capitals. Some of these contacts are direct;
others are indirect and made possible with the aid of politically or
economically influential Arab brethren in these countries. As for Lisbon,
it will be the site early next month of an international conference in
support of the Palestinian and Arab cause. I have been invited to attend
the opening session. I also received an invitation from the Portugese
Communist Party. I expect another invitation, and that will clinch my �
decision. '
As for my trip to Paris, I have received an invitation from our friend
George Marchais, chairman of the French Communist Party. I have accepted
that invitation gratefully, but have not set a date for the visit. There
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is an Arab effort, especially by Iraq, to qualitatively improve French-
Palestinian relations. jde are waiting to see the result.
The trip to the United Nations in New York is still under study by the
Palestinian leadership, and although we have not decided on it yet, I
have received an invitation frnm our Austrian friend Bruno Kreisky to
attend a party in my honor at the UN headquarters.
[Question~] What are your expectations for the coming Arab summit conference?
- What is the agenda? Will the conference be limited to the south Lebanon =
situation or will it deal with the entire region, and with the Palestinian
problem heading the agenda?
- [Answer] First, I must point out that we would like to have the conference
held on the date set for it by the Baghdad conference. Of course we will
- concentrate the discussion on ways to strengthen our resistance to the -
daily, criminal Israeli attacks on south Lebanon. Our attention to this
topic is inspired by the legendary steadfastness of the joint Palestinian-
Lebanese resistance on this front. Certainly, we will want to discuss ways -
to continue this necessary struggle, as well as to seek means to challenge
the Camp David conspiracy and the comic noti_on of self-rule in the occupied
territory. We must intensify our struggle and develop our strategy if we
are to contain the dangers ot the Arab nation of this unfolding shady deal
[the Camp David accords]. We will discuss the changing situation in the
_ United States in the wake of the budding support for our case by blacks
and religious leaders. We will look for ways to increase and firm up this
_ support, as well as to direct it in positive ways to serve our just cause.
There have also been changes in the eastern front, which bears the brunt
of the burden in facing the Zionist enemy following the collapse of the
western f~ront [EgyptJ. This will be the important topic on the agenda.
We will also discuss the necessity of mobilizing all Arab capabilities ~.n
our battle of destiny, especially the o~.l weapon and oil money.
[Question] How~ do you assess the PLO's relations with the Arab countries?~
What is your position on the disputes among some of the Arab states?
[AnswerJ The Palestinian revolution is a separate phenomenon, but it is
- not unrelated to developments in the Arab world. It is not a national or
regional liberation movement but is intimately related to all Arab develop-
ments. In its strategic depth, our revolution is essentially Arab and
national. What happens between Algeria and Morocco--particularly after
the open Egyptian attempt to further inflame the situation--affects us -
directly and inc3irectly. Similarly, what happens on the eastern front
affects us deeply whether we wish it or not. The same is true of the
effects of the Iranian revolution on the Gulf states. For this reason,
my latest trip to Tunis, Algeria and Morocco was prompted by m}� determina-
tion to rob al-Sadat of an opportunity to exploit the situation and to
divert the attention of this part of the Arab world from our central
- battle of destiny. The same is true with respect to the Gulf region.
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- The PLO q~~etly e~erts tremendous efforts to return things to normalcy.
Following my visit to Imam Khomeyni in Iran, I repeated what he related
to me to the leaders of the Gu?f states. His message: "There is no quarrel
between the Iranians and the Arabs in the Gul~, because the Gulf is Moslem
territory," Abu Ziyad's visit to Tehran is prompted by similar considera-
tions: to seek stability, improve and expand relations and cement friend-
ship on a realistic foundation. We are ever conscious that our struggle
against the Zionist enemy must remain uppermost. It is a fateful struggle,
threatening our nation and our land. Consequently, it is essential that
we mobilize all our forces and do everything possible to insure victory.
[Question] Iraq's President Saddam Husayn reportedly stated recently that
_ the solution to the cri'sis rests with Syria, Iraq, Jordan and the PLO. Any -
comments? ~
[Answer] I have talked briefly in my response to your question on my
expectations for the forthcoming Arab summit conference, on the necessity
of discussing the eastern front, being the first defense line following _
the collapse of the western front. I referred to that as perhaps the most
important item on the agenda. My opinion is based on the geopolitical
importance of this front, which includes Iraq, Syria, Jordan and the PLO.
But I want to underscore what President Saddam Husayn meant when he made
_ his remark. He did not imply that these four partners should act alone
and in ~solation from the remainder of the Arab world. Because of their -
position, they must be first to act, but in conjunction with all Arab
capabilities.
[Question] In his visit to New York, King Husayn praised the state of
- Palestinian-Jordanian relations. He mentioned your meeting with him
after the Havana summit as important in improving these relatior.s. News- -
- paper reports indicate that you plan a new trip to Amman. What can you
tell us about relations with Jordan?
[Answer] Our relations are improving constantly. We attempt to coordinate
our common policy as agreed upon at the Baghdad summit. Our aim is to
_ scuttle the Camp David agreements and the farcical idea of self-rule. We
are in agreement that only the Palestinians can speak for the Palestinian
people and that they have chosen the PLO as their sole, legitimate repre-
' sentative.
- The Palestinian people's right to determine their own destiny is a God-
given one, and no one can deprive them of it. We work to liberate our
occupied 1and. The most important task is to liquidate the occupation of
Palestinian and Arab land. This is more important than ever now, particu-
larly in view of the Zionist enemy's conspiracy to give a Jewish character
- to our land and sacred shrines, to extend its control to our water sources,
to subvert our traditions and values and to restrict our right to land
ownership. We shall continue our struggle, and my visit to Amman fits in
this framework, upon which we h.ave already agreed.
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An interview with Yasir 'Arafat is never over. The rapid developments
s urrounding the Palestine problem make a continuous, unpredictable chain.
, What is new today becomes old tomorrow or perhaps in a few hours. There =
- is no 'problem like Palestine, as I indicated earlier. It is the problem
of our homeland, a land marked by history and unique in its geographical
~ location. Had Palestine been a different place, the problem would have
been solved a long time ago, and the Palestinian people would have had
the~Cr independent a~~ld sovereign state. But Palestine is Palestine, and _
~ the j ourney is 1ong.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 A1-Watan al- Arabi
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- AI,GERIA
EUROPEAN COMMISSIONER CHEYSSON DISCUSSES TRADE -
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in Erench 26 Oct 79 p 2877 _
[Text] Economic relations betw?en Algeria and the European Economic
Community were the focus of the talks held by Mr Claude Cheysson,
European commissioner responsible for cooperation in development, with the
Algerian authorities during the official visit which he made to Algeria
from 15 to 17 October [MTM of 19 October, p 2817J.
Mr Cheysson noted especially during a press conference given before his
departure fram Algeria on 17 October that "the relations between Algeria
and the EEC have hardly developed at all in the past 3 years." He described
as "serious and grave" the imbalance in trade between Algeria and the EEC, -
which reached 9 billion dinars (about 10 billion French francs) in 1978,
to the detriment of Alger_ia.
- According to Mr Cheysson, this imbalance cannot be appreciably modified over
the short term, despite a predictable growth in the next few years of
Algerian exports of refined petroleum groducts to the Common Market. '
The visit of Mr Cheysson, which had been preceded by a technical mission,
should permit the rapid implementation of the clauses of the cooperation
- agreement signed between Algeria and the EEC, particularly the utilization
_ of 600 million dinars (about 720 million French francs) granted by the EEC
to Algeria. This sum should be divided mainly among the sectors of pro-
fessional "training, agricultural, and road infrastructure.
The North-South dialog and the relations between the EEC and the Arab world
were also touched upon during the conversations which Mr Cheysson had with
Algerian officials, especially with President Chadli, during this visit. _
_ On this occasion Mr Cheysson also met a delegation of the POLISARIO Front,
which was not appreciated in Rabat. .
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979
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AI,GERIA
- SONATRACH EXECUTIVE DISCUSSES COOPERATION
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Oct 79 p 2877
[TextJ SONATR.ACH (Algerian National Hydrocarbon Company) seems satisfied
with its technical cooperation relations with the French companies.
~ The results of cooperation with the French Petroleum Company (CFP) in the
tield of production and distribution of hydrocarbons are "satisfactory,"
said Mr Mohamed Mazouni, executive vice president of SONATRACH, during a
conference organized on 19 October in Paris by "plus consulta,nts," an
economic studies group reporCed by AFP.
The director of SONATR.ACH also described as "promising" the results of
cooperation in the gas sector with the American company E1 Paso and
Gaz de France, for the liquefaction units of Arzew and Skikda. But,
added Mr Mazouni, the price of gas must be alined with that of petroleum
_ and then indexed to the rate ot inflation in the West and on the value of
the dollar, the currency in which the prices of hydrocarbons aare expressed.
Concerning petroleum, Mr Mazouni expressed doubts concerning the utility
of replacing the dollar by a basket ~ currencies to fix the price, saying,
"It's six of one and a half dozen of the other."
COPYRIGHT: Rene Mureux et Cie, Paris, 1979
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ALGERIA ~
~ BRIEFS
, SAUDI BANK LOAN--A loan of $30 million was granted to Algeria by a
consortium headed by the Saudi Bank under terms of a contract aigned on
17 October at Algiers with the Credit Populaire d'Algerie. The 8-year loan,
with a grace period of 4 years, carries an interest rate based on the
international free market on Zondon (Libor). It is destined for the
financing the socioeconomic infrastructure i.n Algeria. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Oct 79 p 2877] 6108
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IRAN
UK JOURNALIST EXAMINES STRENGTH OF IRANIAN MILITARY
LD271223 London THE TIMES in English 27 Nov 79 p 8 LD
[Dispatch by Robert Fisk: "Glint of New Steel in Iran Army"] �
[Text] Tehran, Nov 26--Iran's army, the broken backbone of monarchical
power, is feeli,ng its way cautiously back to life at a critical moment in
the history of the Iranian revolution.
As Ayatollah Khomeyni continues to invoke the spirit of martyrdom and
calls for the training of 20 million armed youths amid predictions of an
American invasion, the new Islamic republican army is trying to rebuild -
its strength to its pre-revolution complement of 280,000 men.
After the appointment of the Bazargan government last spring, every officer
from the rank of general and above was retired (more than 300 of the former
shah's commanders departed in just two weeks) and conscription was lowered -
from two years' service.to a crippling one year.
Now it has been raised to 18 months and about 200,000 men are reporting
for duty, a figure much higher than that propagated in the Pentagon's most
recent assessment of the Iranian Army,
Nowhere.have the army's problems since the revolution been more apparent
than in Kurdistan, where ad hoc units were thrown together to fight Kurdish
rebels dPmanding autonomy for their region. So great has been the turnover
of troops in the Kurdish battles that every Iranian army diviaion, espe-
cially the 28th which is based on Sanandaj, has been involved in the fight-
. ing . .
Yet Kordistan gave the army a new motivation and revived its old command
and control structure. More important, it proved that the revolutionary
guards, ~the Islamic praetorian guard which owes its allegiance prima.rily
- to the clergy and not to the government, could not cope with serious inter-
, nal unrest. The guards were unable to overcome the Kurdish guerrillas.
Zealous, over-enthusiastic and inexperienced, they suffered heavily in
- Kurdisran, and while the force, which numbers about 8,000 acts as a
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coordinating central command, it at least has to acknowledge the necessity ~
of maintaining a regular army.
The commander of the army's first diviaion in Tehran, which contains the
pro-Khomeyni elemente of the o1d imperial guard, eaid only laet week that
the Kuidistan campaign had proved that "the army still has a role to play
in Iran".
But maintaining an army ia one thing: Maintaining ite equipment ie quite
another. In theory, the army can mobilize up to 1,600 tanks, including
800 British-manufactured Chieftains and 600 American M60s.
Most of the American tanks are in good working order as they are compara-
tively easy to maintain and repair, but the Chieftains, with their~sophis-
ticated firing mechanism, ma.y already be down to half-strength through
lack of maintenance. Some of them have been cannibalized for spare parts.
The Iranians also use the American M47, which made an appearance in Kurdis-
- tan recently, but they are almost useless in armoured warfare and could not
be employed against an invading force.
The new army is co~nanded by Ma.jor General Hossein Shaker, an allegedly
_ genial man regarded as a good military coordinator, who was trained at
Fort Leavenworth. But the old Turkish and Kurdish blood in the officer
corps has been sapped away. ~
The only senior officer of ethnic minority extraction is Brigadier General
_ Zahir Na~ad, who was promoted from colonel to command the 64th infantry -
divisior? at Orumiye six months ago. He is of Turkish descent.
Some regular officers are now helping to train the revolutionary guards,
who are also rumoured to have a cadre from the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation assisting them. Certainly the guarda act not just as a paramilitary
gendarmarie but as a check on the army's power as well.
Dr Mustafa Chamran, the minister of defence, has bemoaned the fact that
his officers are not more "revolutionary". They are certainly regarded
as a moderate, politically disinterested group of inen who;'are more con-
cerned about the army's national prestige than in advancing the Islamic
cause.
In the right environment, the army in Iran could reemerge as a credible
force capable of putting up considerable resistance to a limited military
assault on the country.
But once the army's power is rebuilt it may also present a political threat;
and there are those in Iran who may prefer to risk the dangers of outaide -
attack in order to safeguard their revolution. ~
_ COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1979
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IRAN
DETAILS OF AUTONOMY PLAN OBTAINED BY 'THE TIMES'
LD041121 London THE TIMES in English 4 Dec 79 p 6 LD
~ _
--'i [Dispatch by Robert Fisk: "Iran Given Kurds' Autonomy Plan"]
[Text] Mahabad, Dec 3--At a secret meeting in the mountains of north-
western Iran, leaders of the country's five million Kurds have presented
the Iranian Revolutionary Council with an eight-point plan for Kurdi3h
_ autonomy.
The document, which contains the most detailed and specific demands to have
been made by the Kurds since their secessionist revolts began more than 30
years ago, ca11s for an enlarged Kurdish province. A freely-elecCed Kur-
dish assembly and a guarantee of autonomy to be written into the new Iranian
constitution.
_ The paper listing these demands, a copy of which has been made available to
THE TIMES, was handed over by Shaikh Ezzedin Hosseini, the Kurdish apiritual
leader, to Mr Daryush Forahar, the Iranian government negotiator, six days
ago, Mr Daryush is scheduled to return to Kurdistan tomorrow to give the
Revolutionary Council's reply. ~
If the Kurds receive no satisfaction from this, then the latest ceasefire--
which was implemented after ferocious fighting around Mahabad and Sanandaj
last month--may not be renewed when it runs out in a week's time. And
since voting is already taking place on Iran's new Islamic constitution, -
at least one of Shaikh Hosaeini's demands cannot be met.
The paper was signed by Sh4ikh Hosseini and by leaders of the three taain
political groups in Kordi~.tan; the orthodox Conmmunist Kurdish Democratic -
Party, the Marxist-Leninist Komala movement and the left-wing Fedayeen.
In a preface, it pointedly recalls that Ayatollah Khomeyni, whose revolu-
tionary guards imposed their own ruthless pacification on parts of Kordis-
tan last month, has several timea stated that the economi~, political and
military oppression which the Kurds believe they endured under the shah's
regime should be removed.
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The demanda are liated as follows:
1. Autonomy for Kordiatan ahould be officially recognized and be specifi-
cally referred to in the constitution.
2. That the Kurdish region which ie at present divided into four Iranian
provinces, Ilam, Kermansah, Kordistan and West Azerbaijan, should be recog-
nized as an autonomous unit.
3. A"national assembly of Kordistan" should be elected by a free, direct -
and secret vote. The asaembly will choose an autonomous government of
Kordistan which will control all economic, social and cultural life and
local security in the Kurdish region.
4. The Kurdish language snould be recognized as the primary language in
schools and for official letters. After the fourth year of primary studies,
the Persian language wi11 also be taught in schools,
_ 5. Part of the national budget should be devoted to Kordistan and that
this regional budget should be expanded to take account o~ the backward
economy that has been imposed on Kordistan in the past.
6. Kurdish representatives should play a role in central government. `
7. Foreign policy, national defence (the army), the national economy
and long-term economic planning should rest with the central goverament.
- 8. Democratic freedoms, such as freedom of the presa, free apeech,
political and religion Iran.
The document makes it.clear that the Kurds are prepared to "negotiate" on
_ these dema.nds and that Shaikh Hosseini might therefore be prepared to
' make some compromises. He would, for example, have to accept a govern-
ment promise of later changes in the constitution i� his firat condition
was to be fulfilled. ~
Although the eighth demand is theoretically met in the wording of the
constitution, such basic rights are not going to be allowed to infringe
the tenets of Islam--a caveat in the constitution of which the Kurda are
deeply suspicious.
The Revolutionary Council agreed last month that the Kurds should be allowed
some form of self-government but they did not specify the powera that might
be given to a Kurdish assembly and no reference was made to "autonomy."
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1979
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IRpS1
- GOTBZADEIi'S POSITION, BACKGROUND DESCRIBED
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 30 Nov 79 p 5
[Article by Renato Ferraro, special correspondent of CORRIERE DELLA SERA;
"Gotbzadeh, the 'Muskete~r' Promoted by Khameyni"]
[Text] Tehran--Sa~gh Gotbzadeh, the new minister of foreign affairs, is
one of Ayatollah Khomeyni's "three musketeers," along with Bani Sadr, whom
he replaces as head of the Iranian diplomatic service, and Ibrahim Yadzi,
the man who in turn had been replaced by Bani Sadr. During the brief Paris
exile of the Imam, the three had been the spokesmen of the Islamic revolu- -
_ tionary movement in the West. Still remembered are the contradictions -
and the comfusion with respect to the speeches of the three, which several
times gave rise to dangerous doubts concerning the tactical decisions of .
the supreme leader of the movement.
- Bani Sadr was, and it is not known if he still is, Khomeyni's ideological
counselor i;n economic matters. With a degree in sociology and economics,
Bani Sadr--an exile for 15 years in France--was an assistant professor.
During his long stay in Paris, while remaining a convinced and fervent
Moslem, he became imbued with the principles of the French Marxist school.
Yadzi, instead, had spent the long years of his exile in the United States,
where he organized Iranian student demonstrations.
Gotbzadeh, the third "musketeer," had a more tumultuous career. He was
born in Tehran in 1936; and studied sociology in the United States and in
Canada. Upon returning to Iran, he militated in the ranks of the National
Front with the followers of Mosaddeq. Arrested by the political police in
1958, he fled to America, where he founded the Association of Islamic
Students. Arrested during a demonstration against the s'hah, he was
expelled from the country. The Iranian authorities confiscated his pass-
port and he turned for help to the Syrian government, from which he
obtained an identity document.
A professional agitator and revolutionary, he travelled a long time in
Africa and in the Middle East, wiiere he made contacts among the Iranian
revolutionary forces and the Palestine Liberation Organization. In Cairo, .
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along with Yadzi, he took a training course in guerrilla warfare.
He ret::rned to the United States in 1967 and was again expelled. Because
of differences with Iranian leftist militants, he was then expelled from
the student organization. At this point the biography of the new minister =
becomes confused. It is known only that he went to An Na~af, in the Iraqi
~ desert,~ where Ayatollah Khomeyni was exiled. From that moment on, he
visited the religious leader of the opposition regularly once or twice a
year.
As a result of these frequent contacts with Khomeyni, he was chosen as
- counselor and spokesman during the Paris period. He returned to Iran in
February as part of the ayatollah's retinue. After the revolution, he
was put in charge of radio and television, an assignment that did not come
up to his ambitions, but still a very important one because of the possi-
bility of molding public opinion, an assignment that Qotbzadeh decided to
_ retain when he became minister of foreign affairs.
Unlike Bani Sadr, Qotbzadeh seems to be a faithful executor of the direc-
tives of the Imam, as he, himself, told the journalists yesterday.
- It is nevertheless foreseen that in the practical implementation of the
Qom directives, he will encounter some difficulty. In meetings with
Western diplomats, he will in fact have to�translate into rational language
the mystical principles that Khos.eyni thinks he reads in �the holy Koran.
The ideologist Bani Sadr was "fired" as minister of foreign affairs in
precisely the same manner as he had "fired" Mehdi Bazargan. For months he
had attacked his radical positions, accusing him of insufficient revolu- -
_ tionary spirit and of not knowing how to interpret the wi11 of Khomeyni.
The Bani Sadr dismissals caused the former head of government to re~oice.
But, in spite of his "temporary" exit from the scene, Bazargan does not at
all believe that he no longer has a political~~role. On the contrary, he
thinks that he is the man around whom the moderate lay and religious
forces, represented in particular by Shariat-Madari, the most influential
ayatollah after Khomeyni, will group. Bazargan is negotiating a coopera-
tion pact with the Karim Sanjabi National Front, the movement for civil
and legal rights.
However, it does not seem, at least for now, that he will have much
success, because Sanjabi, too, aspires to head the opposition; and the
other 1ay moderates consider Bazargan to be too close to the religious
leaders, in spite of his dismissal from the government. "During the entire
time that he headed the executive," they say, "he proved to be too submis-
sive to the ayatollah. It is his nature and he cannot change. It is not
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in him to be a political leader, only a capable and intelligent executor."
Another man who is trying to return to the forefront is Shapour Bakhtiar,
the ehah's last prime minister, who is inundating Iran with his insurrec-
tional~messages that are recorded oa cassettes. Bakhtiar, however, is
unanimously considered by observers as "done for," because he was too
involved with the hated Pahlevi government.
8255
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IRAN -
~
BRIEFS
REZA SHAH'S HOUSE FOR SAI,E--A two-hectare property, with a fine Dutch-style
house, is for sale at Mountainview, in Johannesburg, for 600,000 rands.
It was the residence of former Shah of Iran Reza, who died in 1944. The
Iranian Goveriunent had converted the property into a museum to the glory
of the shah, and it had been maintained with filial piety until last
January's revolution. Today, the property is up for sale, along with the
Iranian consulate general premises in Melrose, another area in Johannesburg.
The latter is known as the "White House." It is offered .for the price of
250,000 rand. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
23 Nov 79 p 3287]
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LIBYA
INTERNATIONAL SYI~OSIUM HELD ON 'GREEN BOOK'
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Oct 79 p 2882
[Text] An international symposium on Colonel Qadhdhafi's "Green Book,"
held in Benghazi from 1 to 4 October, brought some 400 scholars, teachers
and sociologists together from 40 countries. Several French professors
participated in the sessions.
It should be recalled that the "Green Book" is based on the "third univer-
sal theory" which pits capitalism and communism against one another, drawing
its inspiration from the Koran and Arab-Islamic traditions. The first volume
deals with "democracy by means of the people's government, the second has
to do with .the solution of the economic problem by socialism and the third,
just published, discusses the organiaation of social life.
While Western speakers criticized parliamentary government and the party
- system, the Third World speakers, particularly the Arabs, emphasized the
failure of the single party experiment in countries in the sacialist bloc and
- the Third World in establishing democracy in those countries.
On the other hand, the speakers hesitated to make a statement on the applica-
tion of Libyan theories outside of Libya and on their possible negative as-
pects. The only point to give rise to a lively discussion between Colonel
Qadhdhafi and the speakers, mainly the women, was his chapter on the eman-
cipation of women. Furthermore, Colonel Qadhdhafi lamented "the lack of
criticism and the effusive praise f or his book." He added: "The 'Green
Book' is not an attempt to provide a final solution to the evils afflicting
mankind. It is one alternative among others. The result of the practical
application of this theory will determine its success or failure."
. The final communique published at the conclusion of the symposium included
four resolu�tions:
~ 1) the publication of the studies and speeches delivered at the colloquium
in Arabic and foreign languages and their distribution to institutes and
universities so that they might serve as reference works;
35
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2) tne establishment of a liaison committee to be in charge of the holding
` of the next symposium in October 1981 at I:1 Fate.h University (Tripoli);
3) the in*_roduction of studies and speeches from the collnquium along with
expJ.anatians given by "the revolut~onary thinker Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi" as an
appendix to the explanations of the "Green Book," considering the quality
- of certain studies; and
4) the holding of seminars at certain Arab and foreign universitiPS in
order to grant more attention to ~he principles of the "Green Book" and their
_ effect or. the political, economic and social transformation of the Jamahiriya.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979
11,464
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LIBYA
BRIEFS
ABOLITION OF LEGAL PROFESSION--Colonel Qadhdhafi met in Tripoli with the
Council of the Union of Libyan Attorneys and expressed the opinion that the -
establishment of the people's government in Libya imglied the abolition of
the traditional system of private law practice. However, Colonel Qadhdhafi _
did not specify which fonnula will be chosen to replace the profession of
pri.vate attorney and did_not say whether defense attorneys will be put into
a cooperative, as was the case w~.th all commerce. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Oct 79 p 2882] 11,464
ITALIAN PILOTS IN LIBYA--According to the Dutch newspaper NRC HANDELSBLAD, , `
some 50 former pilots from,the Italian Air Force are now acting as military
instructors in Libya.~,According to the newspaper, the pilots are officially _
in the service of Aero Leasing Italiana in Rome, which is paid by the Libyan
Government on the basis of $2,500 per month per pilot. The Dutch newspaper
goes on to say that 250 former techn~.cians from the Italian Air Force are
working in Libya and that 100 members of the Italian Air Force have submitted
their resignations. The Itali~n pilots are reportedly dissatisfied with
their treatment. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French 26 Oct 79 p 2882] 11,464
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MAURITANIA
BRTEFS
,
_ MAURITANIA UNDERGOING SERTOUS CRISIS--Pierre Messmer, former French prime
minis~er, who was accompanying a parliamentary delegation to Morocco, in
answer to ~ question, gave his opinion on the current situation in Mauritania, ~
a country he knows very well, having held high functions there for 4 years.
He stated that Mauritania was going through "the greatest crisis of its
history since its founding, that 3s, since 1912. For a long time," he said,
Mauritania was considered by France, by Morocco, and by the Mauritanians
- themselves much more a military march than a genuine political entity...
The ethnic composition of the country constitutes an added difficulty."
After having underlined that for many Mauritanians, the problem at issue
is simply one of survival, Messmer was of the opinion that.it was "inevitable
that, in i~s present state of physica~. weakness, added to political fragility,
the desire of the Mauritanians was to steer clear of the Sahara conflict." -
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79
p 2822] 9330
SNIM DEFICIT--According to the balance-sheet for fiscal 1978, published 3
October at Nouakchott,-c.the Mauritanian National Mining and Industrial
Company [SNIM] registered in 1978 a financial loss of nearly 700 million
ouguiya. The deficit of this largest Mauritanian company increased by 570
million ouguiya in comparison with 1977. This is principally due, according
_ to SNIM, to the decrease in the volume of business (5 billion ouguiya compared -
to 6.5 in T977), to the drop in the parity of the ouguiy~t in relation to
- European currencies, to the large drop in the price of iron on the world
market, and finally to the consequences of the war in the Western Sahara.
SNIM production reached only 6.5 million tons of ore instead of the ten
= million tons planned in 1978, a goal which the company should, however, be
able to reach this year. [TextJ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 7~9 Oct 79 p 2822] 9330
DROUGHT ACCELERATES RURAL EXODUS--The nomads who constituted 65 percent of
the Mauritanian population in 1965 represent no more than 36 percent of the
population 11 years later (end of December, 1976, the date of the latest
census). The country numbers about 906,000 sedentary residents, 446,000
noma.ds within its borders and 67,000 others who spend a part of the year
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abroad, paxticularly in Ma1i. Nouakchott had 5,800 inhabitants in 1961,
12,300 in 1964, 104,000 in February, 1975, and 133,000 at the beginning of
1977...In 15 years, 3ts average rate of growth has been 11 percent. The
rate of growth of towns like Nouadhibou (22,000 inhabitants), Zouerate
- (17,500 inhabitants) and Ak~oujt (8,000 inhabitants) has been 9.3 percent
a year. The average rate of growth of the population or urban centers was
' 10.2 percent. The most populated regions of the country are in the South-
west 216,000 inhabitants in the Trarza and Rosso regions) and in the
Sour_heast. The region of Tiris-Zemmour, that of F'Derik-Zouerate, which is
half the size of France, now numbers only 742 nomads. In 1965, the country
had 279,000 jobs in the traditional sector and 32,400 in the modern sector. -
~ At the end of 1976, the first had only 224,000 jobs, but the second had
48,700 jobs, of which 39,700 were in urban centers. In rural areas, the _
shrinkage of the job market affected husbandry (82,000 as compared to
_ 122,000 in 1965) as well as agriculture (65,000 against 75,000). The number
of artisans (32,000) remained unchanged. In urban centers, there were
13,50d jolis in small commerce, 8,900 in the administration, 5,500 in con-
_ struction and industry, 5,500 in mining, 1,300 in transportation, 1,600 in
the fishing sector, and 1,300 in banks, insurance and commerce. [Text] `
[Paris PiARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2822] 9330
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT--Government recommendations: Mohamed E1 Mocktar Ould
Zamel, the Mauritanian minister of Mines and Industry, chaired the fifth
meeting of the.Study Committee on Industrial Promotion which will soon present
to the Mauritanian government a report containing certain recommendations,
particularly the creation of a financial institution appropriate for industrial `
development and an agency for industrial promotion. The committee has indeed
- pointed out that in all the developing countries such structures exist and
contribute effectively to the development of small and medium-sized enterprise.
_ It also recommended that the government should grant priority to industry
- processing local raw materials for domestic consumption. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPI~AUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2822] 9330
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MOROCCO
MOROCCAN-EEC RELATIONS EXAMINFD
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Oct 79 p 2879
~ [Text] Mr Claude Cheysson, EEC development commissioner, visited Rabat
from 17 to 19 October, where he talked with Moroccan officials concerning
Morocco-EEC relations, and the extension of the.Coaomon Market to Spain, -
- Greece, and Portugal, as well as the resumption of the North-South dialog.
In a press conference given in Rabat on 19 October, Mr Cheysson expressed ~
the view that "Morocco is right not to be satisfied with its association
with the EEC," adding that the deficit registered by the Moroccan balance
of trade with the EEC countries (about 4.5 billion French francs in 1977)
was a"serious matter" and that "a joint search for mutually satisfactory
solutions:" was worthwhile.
More Than Ha1f of Trade With the EEC -
On the occasion of this visit, the Moroccan national agency MAGHREB
ARABE PRESSE [MAP] disseminated a dispatch, datel~ined Brussels, detailing
Moroccan trade with the European Community as well as technical and
financial eooperation.
Trade between Morocco and the EEC saw great growth since 1973. A softening
in trade was nevertheless noted during 1978.
Moroccan imports from the EEC, which consisted mostly of industrial products,
tripled between 1973 and 1977. The proportion of the European Community
in total Moroccan imports rose by about half. -
Morocco exports to the EEC primarily raw and processed agricultural
products, raw materials of mineral origin, and certain finished products,
like textiles and Morocco leather products. The European CommuniCy is the
main customer of Morocco, with 57 percent of its total sales. It should
be noted that about 50 percent of the total exports of Morocco to the
Common Market were destined for France.
Exports from Morocco to the EEC rose steadily betweer~ 1970 and 1974.
After that they sCagnated. The deficit of the,~Moroccan balance of trade
1~p
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thus became 3teadily more serious. It even seems that it representa 47
percent of the total foreign trade defici t of Morocco. An improvement
was Rhown in 1978, hawever. This improvement, the MAP emphasizes, is
due to decisions taken by the Moroccan Government in the framework of the
Rebound Plan (1978-1980).
The main causes of this stagnation are to be found mainly'at the level
of the mechanisms of the common agricultural policy of the Nine as well as
of tariff concessions granted to various EEC partners. As an example,
the community policy toward three Moroccan products, namely prunes, tomatoes,
and canned sardines, is analyzed.
For prunes, the freeze of the tariff reduction to a ceiling of 80 percent,
the concessions granted to products of competing countries (Spain, Israel)
~ and the rise in the penetration bonus for Community producers, deeply -
affect Moroccan exports to the profit of its competitors and this precisely
at a time when the country has uiidertaken a reconversion of its orchards
for the purpose of improving quality.
With regard to canned sardines, it is noted that the complexity of the
system of management of the quotas is translated in practice into
obstacles to the conclusion of long-term contracts, added to the strictness
of the system of distribution of the quotas, which prevents the Mor~ccan
product from adapting itself to and following the trends in demand.
Concerning tomatoes, the constant rise in the reference price (to protect
particularly Dutch tomatoes), associated with the strict calendar of the
tariff concession (60 percent from 15 November to 30 April) penalizes the
- exportation of Moroccan tomatoes.
Expansion of the Community Threatens Moroccan Production
This situation runs the risk of becoming worse through the increased supply
once Che E~C is enlarged. Actually the economic configuration of the
candidate countries (Greece, Spain, and Portugal) is comparable in many -
respects to that of Morocco.
In this regard four common points merit attention: a heavy weight of the
agricultural sector, a predominance of ~anufactured products in industrial =
exports, a strong orientation of foreign trade toward the C amnon Market,
and finally a storehouse of labor for the EEC.
_ The breadth, size, and complexity of the problems raised by the enlargement ,
of the EEC require an urgent, overall approach, based on constant joint
- planning and trade between Morocco and EEC. If a procedure of joinC
planning is not set up, the agricultural and agro-industrial sectors
of Morocco risk suffocation, and as a result, Moroccan production would
undergo total disorganization.
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The Beginnings of Technical and Financial Cooperation
Technical and Financial cooperation between Morocco and the Europe an
Community began to be implemented this year. A firat financing contract
wae signed last 12 June in Luxemburg under the aegis of the Morocco-EEC
C~uncil of CooperaCion.
It concexns the Jorf Lasfar port project. The EEC is participating
in the financing of this project by contributing 40 million accounting units
in the form of loans granted by the European Investment Bank and 14
million accounting units in the form of loans under special conditions.
It is also planned for European experts to make visits to Morocco soon
to evaluate and begin work on the instruction of the other projects
contemplated by the Moroccan Government. Among the investment projects
_ there is, a transportation network for the ONE [National Electricity
Office], supply of potable water to the towns o� Safi, A1 Hoceima and
Nador, p.~rt super-structures and risk capital for ODI [Office of Industrial
Development]. -
As for technical cooperation activities, the Brussels Commission of
European Communities made two financing decisions last 28 September.
One is a subsidy of 2,750,000 European accounting units [UCE] destined
for the financing of industrial promotion activities, camprising technical
- assistance and promotion of cooperaCion with foreign industrialists, mainly
in the EEC.
The other is a subsidy of 140,000 UCE, granted to enable the Moroccan
Government to finance for a period of 2 years the technical assistance
necessary to set up the Moroccan Center for Export Pramotion.
The largest projects, both in cost and in social effect, concern
professional training. They comprise Cechnical assistance to and the
, equipment of ten instituCes of applied technology which will soon be
created in Moroccoo
Other projects are also contemplated: manufacture of vaccines and
veterinary serums, official chemical analysis and research laboratories,
a cereal technology laboratory, cartography of the soils of Morocco, and
other nonreimbursable assistance concerning promotion of trade and the -
_ Institute of Study and Research for Arabization. _
The sums, allocated for this cooperation are modest compared with the needs
of Morocco, the MAGHREB ARAB PRESS emphasizes.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979
6108
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- MOROCCO
_
BRIEFS
AGREII~NT WITH IRAQ--Having returned from Baghdad, where he presided over '
Morocco Day at the International Fair, Mr Moussa Saadi, minister of energy
and mines, announced on 11 October in Rabat that an agreement had been
_ signed concerning the supply of Iraqi crude petroleum to Morocco. [Text] ~
- [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET N~DITERRANEENS in French 26 Oct 79, p 2880J 6108
INDUSTRIAL ZONES--To be established in 25 towns. The establishment of
industrial zones, within the framework of the policy of industrialization
_ and econamic development of the country, was the subject of a work3.ng
session on 11 October in Rabat, presided over by the prime minister, Mr -
Maati Bouabid. During this meeting, Mr Azzeddine Guessous, minister of
trade and industry, spoke on the present situation of Moroccan industry,
emphasizing that the strongest stimulant to industrializat~on was precisely
the establishment of industrial zones and endowing them with basic
equipment. He announced that his departmeret, in collaboration with the
ODI [Office of Industrial Development] had completed an overall study
of the needs of the country with resgect to industrial zones. It was
decided to create such zones in 25 towns. The minister of industry and
- trade is charged with coordinating the activities of a c anmission created
_ for this purpose and comprising representatives of the two ministries
concerned. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
26 Oct 79 p 2880] 6108
ITALIAN SOLAR ENERGY MISSION--On the initiative of the Italian minister
- of foreign trade, in collaboration with ~he Italian Embassy in Rabat,
the Italian Institute of Eoreign Trade and representatives of the
private industrial sector (Che Montedison company), a solar energy study
mission spent last week in Morocco. The purpose of the mission was to study
the possib.ilities of exploiting solar energy in Morocco in the fields of
agriculture, industry, and building, taking into account the possibilities
offered by Italian technology, [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
P~DITERRANEENS in French 26 Oct 79 p 2880] 6108 ,
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WESTERN SAHARA
- ~EAL WAR SAID TO BE BEGINNING IN SAHARA
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 31 Oct 79 pp 24-25
[Article by special correspondent Raphael Mergui: "And in Sahara the Real
War is Beginning"]
. '
[Text] Suffice it to read a map and consider the latest confrontation, the
6 October Smara in particular, to draw the conclusion that at this point the
- Polisario forces are partially in the interior of Moroccan Sahara. An =
_ officer whose liking for truth has not lowered in the l.east his determina-
tion confided to me that "The Polisario keeps in Algeria its logistics and
its sick. Its men are among us." One sentence recurs endlessly in talks
with Moroccan officers: "The real war is only beginning. Before the
Smara battle, there took place, in August and September, the clashes of.
Bir Anzaran, Lebouirate, and Zag. Immediately after them, there was Tizgui
Re~nz and Mahbes. Forget about the harassment of posts or attacks on convoys.
, A new war has truly broken out. ~,scalating its activities by several
notches, the Polisario has committed to all these battles f.rom 1,000 to
5,000 men. .Today it has 12,000 troops largely recruited in the half-starvi~d
Sahel.
Large-scale attacks succeed one another at a rhythm too rapid to have been
exclusively prepared on Atgerian territory. In particular, the Polisario
has two firm bases in Aussert, the former Tiris el-Gharbia, and in Ouarkziz.
Located sonth of the Draa Wadi, the Ouarkziz area is a mountain chain
which splits the Sahara going from east to west. It has no less than 10
forgotten passes, all of them under Polisario control. Quite undisturbed,
using bu118ozer.s, the Polisario has organized its bases here. The targets
chosen by the Front over the past three months clearly show that it is
attempting to complete its implantation through the occupatian of key or
strategic positions (Bir Anzaran, Zag, Mahbes, and the Tizgui Remz Pass).
The taking of Smara was to provide this "liberated" area with a political
capital.
Naturally, the Polisario maintains its umbilical cord in Algeria (training
camps and logistics).
. �
. 44
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In .~ny casc, firml.y enrrc~nched in its mountain redoubts, sheltered (rom air
powcr and armor, it~ c7n be displaced onl.y by foot soldiers. Such a"pierc~-
meal" clearing would require thousands of soldiers waging blood-letting
battles, hand to hand. "Such implantation," an officer told me, "offers,
nevertheless, an advantage to the Moroccans: Today the Polisario has an
~ddress." . _
Actually, it is quite probable that the Front has woven a close network of
_ advance posts around Smara which remains threatened. The army deemed it
hazardous to let us see the battlefields outside the city. The C 130 which -
brought us here had to land and r.ake off in spi.rals ta remain outside the
range of. the Polisario Front SAM 7.
- Therefore, able to avoid pursuit.s quite quickly and seek refuge in bases not
far f.rom its targets, the Polisario did not experience losses as heavy as
. those projected by the Moroccan Ministry of Information. The Smara battle -
provides many indications in this respect. The Polisario forces did enter
the town without, however, accupying or hemming it in, as it claimed. The
city has remained untouched and shows no trace of battle. The airport strip
which was damaged was closed for civilian aircraft until 10 October. The
5,000 guerrillas who, split in three columns, converged on Smara in the
night oE 6 October, not only crossed a security line considered unbreachabl.e
but were detected only at the tast moment, betrayed by~the noise of th;sir
engines, contrary to what Mr M'hamed Boucetta, Moroccan minister of state in
charge cf f.oreign affairs and cooperation, said in the United Natians.
- Thrc�~n back after 36 hours o� heavy fighting, thanks ta the in[ervention of
the iKirages F 1 and the courage of the defenders of Smara, the attackers do ~
not appear to have panicked.
First of all, as is customary, the Royal Armed Forces (FAR) took no prisoners.
The systematic removal of. the dead and wounded by the Polisario accounts for
a gceat deal in this matter. At Bir Anzaran, where hand to hand combat was
particularly extensive, the Front had taken the time to remove its dead and -
its wounded. Nevertheless, it is str.ange that a rebel army, regardless of
how well it is organized, could lose 1,000 men wi.thout, apparently, letting
a singl.e prisoner fall into enemy hands.
Secondly, all the war trophies that the FAR off.icers coutd show us amounted
to no more than 1G''destroyed jeeps, meticulously lined up in a Smara
barracks. Yet, both a reliable source and films made by the Mirage show
that the latter destroyed no less than 200 Polisario vehicles. The key to
the mystery is str.ange: The FAR are unable to display more wrecked Land
[~overs because the Polisario removed them as well. Fighting during rhe
day it recovers the wrecks at night.
Thirdly, had the Polisario lost in Smar.a one man out of four or five, it~
would have been so demoralized that it would have certainly been unable to
attack Mahbes and the Tizgui Remz Pass shortly afterwards. There is no army
in the world able to withstand such losses without suffering deep psycho-
logical damages.
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Smara is a Moroccan half victory but even the Ministry of Information was
_ unabte to exploit it as such. Rabat faces a new challenge. So far, Hassan II
has been abte to correct severely compromising situations through spectaculars
which are successful because they appeat to the Moroccan attachment to "th+eir"
Sahara: '~he Green March and annexation of Rio de Oro. Today no one knows
what trump the sovereign holds in reserve. Yet, had a political solution
been dragged out, and if Algeria were not to change its positions, a recon-
version of the army and a change in military doctrine would inevitably
become items on the agenda.
President Carter's very controversial decision of. 22 October to recommend to
rhe American congress the shipping to Morocco of OV 10 reconnaissance air-
planes and Cobra combat helicopters has been good news for Rabat. Involving
Washington furt.her, it is a very needed Moroccan diplomatic victory. On the
military level the OV 10 would filt a very substantial gap, as confirmed by
Smara, in�the deployment of Moroccan defenses. As to the Cobras, which
proved their terrible effectiveness in Vietnam, they would reinfor.ce the
air force tahich looks becoming the spearpoint of the FAR. This shall be
discussed further.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1979
_ :
5157
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~ WESTERN SAHARA
- EUROPEAN LEFT'S SILENCE IN FACE OF SAHARAN WAR 'SCANDALOUS'
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 12-25 Nov 79 pp 26, 27
[Article by Jean Ziegler: "Western Sahara: Enough Bloodshed!"]
[Text] A professor of sociology at the University of Gene.va
and at the Institute of Development Studies of Geneva, Jean
Ziegler is a Socialist Party deputy to the Confederal Parlia-
ment. In particular he has written: "Les Vivants et les _
Morts" [The Living and the Dead], "Une Suisse audessus de
tout soupcon" ["A Switzerland Beyond Suspicion"), "Main Basse
dur 1'Afrique" ["The Looting~of Africa"] and "Le Pouvoir
_ Africain" ["African Power"] to which additions have just
been made and reissued in the "Points" series by Seuil pub-
lishers. Jean Ziegler has just returned from a lecture
tour at American universities.
More than 900 Moroccan occupiers killed at Smara in October; 653 Moroccan
soldiers killed at Zag, headquarters of the South Moroccan command, in
September; 532 others fallen at Lebouirate at the end of August; 125 more
dead in the crushPd casemates of Bir-Enzarane; 227 during the attack on
Tarfaya last June... For their part, the Moroccans announced that in the
battle of Smara alone nearly 1,000 enemies were "disabled." It matters
little whether the figures furnished by the two billigerents--the Polisario
Front, the Moroccan Army--were correct o,r not, what matters is the unending
litany of death which for 5 years, week after week, has put hundred of
Maghreb families into mourning.
The European anticolonialist, anti-imperialist Left's silence in the face
of the Saharan tragedy strikes me as totally scandalous. I have returned
from a stay of several weeks at United States universities and institutes
where research is devoted to the societies of the Third World. It is the
- Western Sahara conflict which is of concern today to American university
professors, to the militants, more than Southern Africa, more than Ethiopia.
It is about the European, the French stance in the face of that conflict that
the visitor is questioned. An intensive debate is taking place within North
American intellectual opinion. Everyone knows Morocco will not get out of
= the Saharan mess without American weapons--attack helicopters, specialized
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detection aircraft, materiel for electronic surveillance devised for desert
warfare--which it has been insistently requesting for 2 years. The pro-
Moroccan lobby is powerful: It is made up of some of the most active Zionist
organizations, by prestigious university professors and by a substantial
conservative Right which includes many representatives in Congress. An ar-
ticle in the NEW YORK TIMES* signed by Professor John Damis, an influential
specialist in Maghreb affairs, summed up the stands of the pro-Moroccan for-
ces: A Moroccan defeat in the Sahara runs the risk of costing Hassan II his
throne; now, the monarch is one of the rare friends America can count on in
the Thirld World. His role was a decisive one in preparing the alliance
between Sadat and Begin. In short, the Carter administration--if it wishes
~o regain its credibility in Africa and the Middle East--must turn to a
policy of active support to King Hassan II.
But a strong current of opinion--in which university professors and black
militants are heavily represented--is endeavoring to counter the actions of
the pro-Moraccan lobby. In that current's view, Hassan II remains the one
responsible for_the assassination of Mehdi Ben Barka in 1965; he embodies
a backward regime, is an enemy of human rights and of fair distribution of
national income. The Carter administration--which displayed wise restraint
at the time of the Shah of Iran's downfall and that of Somoza in Nicaragua-- -
must remain reserved with respect to Hassan II's regime.
The debate taking place in the United States is far from being an academic
one; in September the House of Representatives' Subcommittee on Africa concluded
its hearings on the present practice of "restrictive arms sales" in north-
western Africa. A majority of the "witnesses" questioned by the subcommittee -
concluded that this practice was ineffective. This means that the majority
of the ~ndividuals summoned and questioned by the representatives advised
a policy of active support to Morocco. I do not know what the recommendations
formulated b~y the subcommittee will be; even less what the House's decisions
will be or later those of Congress. One thing is certain: A revision of Amer-
- ican policy in Western. Sahara and throughout northwest Africa is under way.
Already last 23 October President Carter requested Congressional authorization
to go ahead with an initial delivery to Morocco of a number of "Cobra" heli-
copters and "OV-10" planes.
How can one brsak down European public opinion's indifference--in particular
- that of France--in the face of that conflict? How can the Left--parties, trade
unions, anti-imperialist movements, churches--be mobilized in the face of
� the war's escalation and the possible genocide of the Western Saharan people?
An analysis of the ratio of strength between Algeria, a privileged ally, with
Libya, of ttre Polisario Front on the one hand and Morocco on the other, seems
relatively secondary. What people ~ust be made aware of is the existence of
- a Western Saharan people. For over 400 years Che Western Saharans have been
. nomads over a territory of more than 270,000 square kilometers. They have
created one of the richest, most original, most significant cultures in the
universe. The present Western Saharan people and their avant-garde--the
Polisario Front--are the heirs of this very complex nomadic civilization.
_ *Issue of 20 August 1979 . . '
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The Europeans, who are the heirs of many sedentary, agrarian and urban so-
cieties, analyze the world through concepts--of state, nation, territory,
people--stemming from their own social experience.
In other words: The ethnocentric limitation of their pe~ception of history
limits their capacity for political analysis; they have difficulty in conceivin~*
that a nomadic society, having for centuries ignored borders, can today
furnish the social, ideological matrix for an authentic national liberation
movement. Now, in the world of market rationality, state violence, in which
we live, no people survives without the framework of a state. The young
Western Saharans who emerged from the first Spanish schools of the 1960's
understood that. They have gradually transformed a declining nomadic society,
one of clans, into a new, original, unprecedented society in which the values
of nomadic solidarity join with the rigorous demands for advancement, for
autonomy for the individual. The instrument for this transformation is the
Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Harma and Rio de Oro (Polisario Front).
' Let us conclude: It is useless to want to reduce the Western Saharan people
and their liberation front to an artificial creation of Algeria, As in the
case of the Palestinians, here too reality is stubborn: This people, this
~ tront do exist. They have been struggling since 1973, since the generalized
insurrection against the Span~.:sh occupier. Nothing nor anyone--not even the
United States' commitment to the Moroccan side--will crush their determination.
_ ~Jithout the diplomatic, military support of France to Morocco, without the
discreet support of '~ther EEC [European Economic Community] governments to the
Moroccan side, the riar and its interminable litany of death would cease. In
our democratic societies, public opinion--and especially that of the LePt
has a historic res'ponsibility today: That of imposing an immediate halt to
- the fighting, the'~,departure of the occupation troops and recognition of the
Western Saharan Democratic Arab Republic by the community of nations as a
whole.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
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