JPRS ID: 74803 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030044-8
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 92
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 44
• Content Type: REPORTS

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28 bECEMBE~t i979 NO. 2068 i OF i
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soz� �i
PtEPORT DOCUMENTATION R~POR* ?+o. 748.~3 R,~~o~.~~~. ~~u.sio~ Ho.
i PAGE JPRS _ ~
71t1~ ~nd dubtltl� 5. R~poR Dat~
NEAR EAST/NORTI~I AFRICA REPORT, No. 2060 20 December 1979
~
~ 7. Author(~) 6. P~Ao?min~ Or~rnlx~tion Rept. No.
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This serial report contains information on socioeconomic, government, political,
- and technical developments in the countries of the Near East and North Africa.
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= P~~tirical Science x Inter-Arab Affairs Libya x Sultanate
- 5ociology North African Mauritania of Oman
~ Economlcs Affair~ Morocco Syria
Culture (Social Afghanistan People's Demo- Tunisia _
Sciencc~s) Algeria cratic Republic United Arab _
Ethnology Bahrain of Yemen Emirates
- Geography X Egypt Persian Gulf x Western Sahara
- Techoiogical Iran Area Yemen Arab
- Military Sciences Iraq Qatar ' Republic -
_ X Israel � ~Saudi Arabia x Islamic Affairs
Jordan Spanish North - -
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x ~..ebanon ~Sudan
b. Idenflll~n/Op~n�End~d T~rms
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O~IONAI FORM 272 (h77)
(Form~rly NTI~~~?
D~p~rtm~nf of Comm~re~
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- JPItB 74803
20 December 1979
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
No. 2060
- CONTENTS PAGE -
- INTER-AR.AB AF~'AIRS ~
_ Interview With Madrid FLO Chief
_ (Munzir Dajjani Interview; EL PAIS, 14 Oct 79) 1
- Salim Iawzi Looks at Iran as Defender of Islam
(Salim La.wzi; AL-AAWADITH, 2 Nov 79) 13
Salim Lawzi Views Palestinian Influence in Arab Oil-
Producing Countries -
(Salim Lawzi; AL-HA.WADITH, 9 Nov 79) 16
_ ISLAMTC AFFAIRS
Islamic Precedents for Diplomatic Imnnznity Studied
(Maxime Rodinson; LE MONDE, 25-26 Nov 79) 23
Draft of Islamic Constitution Prepared _
(Mustafa Kamal Wasfi; AL-DA'WAH, Oct 79) 26
EGYPI' ,
U.S. Suppor~s Egyptian Military Strategy
(Zetev Schif; HA~ARETZ, 31 Oct 79) 38
Egyptian, Arab Reaction to Diplorratic Ties Viewed i ~
(Ze'ev Schif; HA'ARETZ, 29 Oct 79) . 3 ~
_ 4
rs~
Chief of Intelligence Reviews Lebanon, Iran, Islamic
World
(Yehoshu'a Sagi Interview; YEDI'OT AHARONOT,
7 79) 47 -
_
- a - [III - NE & A - 121]
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CONTENTS (Continued) pe,ge -
Briefs
a Unemployment Situation 56
Increased Intersst Rates 56
New Settlement Housing 56
KUWAIT =
_ United States Will Exploit Iran Crisis for Its Own
Interests ~
(Fditorial; AL-RA+Y AL-'AI~I, 9 Nov 79) 57
American Lack of Understanding of Middle East Decried
(Editorial; AL-RA'Y AL-'ANIM, 8 Nov 79) 59
'AL-SIYASA.H' Warns of Iranian Crisis' Potential for
Disaster
(Editorial, Ahmad al-Jarallah; AL-SIYASAH,
11 Nov 79) 61
Editorial Speculates on Khomeyni's Role
(Editorial, Ahmad al-Jarallah; AL-SIYASAIi,
12 Nov 79) 63 -
LERANON ~
- Briefs
Sarkis To Visit Moscow, Washington ~ 64
~ 1
SAUDI ARABIA
King Reaffirms Support for Pa.lestinians
(AL-MUSTAQBAL, 1.o Nov 79) 65
Contract for Large Fertilizer Project Signed
(Al-Bazi'i; AL-RIYAD, 8 Nov 79) 66
Briefs
Airport Construction 68
South Korean Troops 6g
SUDAN
- Ousted First Vi.ce President Works Against Regime ~
(AL-DUSTUR, 4-lo Nov 79) 69
- b - _
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.
= CONTEN'~S (Continued) ~ge
SUI;I'ANATP OF OMAN
~ First 3 Years of 5-Year Plan Show Good Results
('UMAN, 18 Nov 79) 72
- WESTERN SAHARA
POLISARIO's Abdelaziz Reviews Struggle Against Morocco
_ (Mohamed Abdelaziz Interview; EL MOUDJAHID,
Dec 79) 78
Saharan tPrime Minister' Lamine Gives Interview to
Algiers Pa,per _
(Mohamed Lamine Ould Ahmed; EL MOUDJAHID, 12 Nov 79) 81
- Briefs
Attack on Moroccan Base 85
~ Village Attack Repulsed 85
- c -
~
~
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS ~
INTERVIEW WITH MADRI~J PLO CHIEF
Madrid EL PAIS in Spar:ish 14 Oct 79 pp 19-22
[Interview with Munzir Dajjani, PLO delegate in Madrid, by Soledad
Alameda; date and place not given]
[Text] The Palestinians who were children in
- 1948 are 35 or 40 now. Since that time, many of
them have known nothing but wars and refugee -
camps. Many of them have been and are guerrillas.
Many have died. Tfie youngest adults were already
born in exile or as refugees. Munzir Dajjani was _
one of that era's children, but for many years
his fighting name was Abu el Ezz. He now holds
the post of head of the PLO delegation in Madrid.
He speaks to us today in these pagea, and what he _
says is similar to an X-ray view of himself, his
people and his country.
[Question] The concept of fatherland is less passionate, less
_ present in European countries, for exa~gle, than in countr~es in
_ which liberation struggles are going on, Nicaragua, to cite a
recent case. How do Palestinians, how do you yourself, feel about
your fatherland? -
[Answer] European, African or Asian citizens who live in their
own countries devote their attention to work and family and to
pursuing facets of life and feelings that are common to free men.
When they are asked about their desires or hopes, they will naturally
say that they want more money, a better job, greater family harmony,
a brilliant future for their children. But when a Palestinian is
asked that question, he re~lies without hesitation that what he
wants is to return to his romeland, because it has been 30 years
since he lost it and because he knows perfectly well what he is, that
he is an exile. I think that this iack, this loss of identity -
definitely~makes him sad and prevents him from devoting himaelf to
' love, to happiness and to the normal work that most men do. I would
1
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Huy [l~iit I'alestiniane ~re .very much in love with their lai.~d precisely
because tF~ey are aeparated from i~, and as happens with all paeeionate
- love affairs, it extends to everything that their land produces, even
poisonous plants. Palestine determines everything in my life, even
my attachments and social relationships. To me, to us, Palestine
is simply the past, present and future.
fQuestion] At what age did you realize that you were an exile,
that your land had ~een occupied?
[Answ�e=1 I was 4 years old when England, the United States and
the Zionist movement brought in hundreds of thousands of European -
and Arab Jews to Palestine, despite the opposition of my people to
thai policy. My father and my uncle, a pharmacist and surgeon,
reEpectively, had a hospital in Haifa, the best hospital in the Near
East. The entire family had to move to Gaza, where my mother had a
small house and a garden. It was clear that the Pales*inian people
_ had to pay the region's price "~r the Second World War, and they paid
it with their land, their sovereignty and their economy. In 1948
the Palestinian people were like strangers in their own land,
subjecied to all sorts of terrorism and massacres, expelled and
living in refugee camps. I was gaing to school in Gaza in 1955. It
was th~ last day of the school year, and it was on that day that I
had my first encounter with death. The Israelis bombed the city, and
all of us students ran out. A close friend of mine and I each went
to our housese The next day, this friend, whose name was Jaled,
didn't make it to school; he had been killed by an explosion. I did
not know what death was; T was quite young. But I had a strc~ng
feeling that it was something like permanent absence. I also fcund
out that the bombs we*e Israel's present to our school commencement
celebration.
- [Question] This is your first recollection of death. What was
yuur first encounter with a weapon?
[Answer] In 1956, after a bombing run that also scattered white
- sheets of paper calling for the surrender of the Palestinian people.
My brothers and I had taken refuge underneath a tree, where we hid
for the entire day. When my mother allowed us to come out, we headed
home, and I saw an Egyptian soldier throw a rifle under a tree. I
picked it up. It was a British rifle. I hid it on the roof of my
_ house. A long time passed before I told my father anything about it.
It was like a secret that I wasn't sharing with anyone. I often wen.t
up to take a look at it and clean it. Soon thereafter I became a
member of the Association of Yc,ung Christians of Gaza. At that time
I was very fond of listening to older people. They spoke about
Palestine, about how long we had been living under the occupation,
about Arab unity, ahout ?Vasser. They sat down and kept on talkine. ~
2
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_ Meanwhile, my rifle was still in hiding, and I didn't even really
_ know why I was keeping it. Perhaps I was waiting for my elders to
say somEthing in this regard, but they said nothing.
[Question] How did you make contact with A1 Fatah?
[Answer) During a vacation at my sister's house. My brother-
- in-law, who was an engineer at some oil wells near the Red Sea, had
a small, thin, dirty magazine. For the first time in my life I saw -
: in print that Palestine had been betrayed. It said who the
_ Zionists were and recounted the treason of the British and of many
Arab regimes. The magazine was called OUR PALESTINE, and it was
put out by A1 Fatah. A year passed (I really don't know why) before
- I spoke about it with my beother-in-law. Shortly thereafter, I
entered ~yniversity to study engineering, 350 kilometers from Cairo.
_ Around that time I began talking more or less every day with my -
companions about this, about A1 Fstah. But neither I nor the -
others really knew what the ~rganization was, although most of us ~
_ agreed w~th what they were sa~~ng. We decided to run in the
_ university elections to establish relations with A1 Fatah later on. -
We were elected and we c~ntacted the organization. We were put in
charge of organizing the movement in the university. I have to say
that from that moment on, as far as I was concerned, the university
wa~ only a cover for my work in the organization. No one discovered -
us, despite the secret services, and in 1966, before leaving on
vacation, they entrusted me with buying weapons and getting ready
several men who knew the road from Palestine to Gaza. I got a
revolver, a machine gun and two grenades and I made an agreement
with two companions to entrust them with missions later on. -
[Question] How important were university students at the outset
of the PLO?
[Answerj University students have played an extremely important
role in the organization. This is absolutely certain. Even Arafat
and all of our comrades in the leade:-ship started their work as
- students. You can obviously do more when you're better prepared, no
doubt because consciousness-raising is earier for a person who is
prepared. -
[Question] When did you meet Arafat?
[Answer] In 1964, at an underground meeting in Cairo. He was
with comrade Faruk Kacdumi, who is in charge of the organization',s
foreign affairs today. I met him again in 1968, coming back from a
- mission in Jordan. On that occasion he sent me to southern
Palestine, and when I protested that I was used to working in crowded
cities (because I was being sent to the countryside), he told me in
- reply that the invader was evPryc,wherg r~;w* hz~ 6~ -
3 -
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of him. he went on to say that unfortunately the enemy unuerstood -
only the language of force and that we would be victorious because
we were in the right.
[Question] Would the PLO have been the same without Arafat?
[Answer] The organization's leadership is collective, and the
process of succession is too. Arafat is unquestionably the leading
figure, but if he died or fell, it would not mean the death of the
revolution. His reg2acement has already been prepared, in fact,
because, as I said, our work is collective. Of the nine comrades who
beg~n the revolution, five have fallen (at the hands of the Zionist
forces or Arab regimes), and the revo;.ution has moved forward.
[Question] To what degree have relations between the Palestinians
and the other Arab countries deteriorated because of the revolution
that you are fighting, and what consequences could this have if the
war ends some day?
[Answer] The Palestinian people, who aze spread throughout many
Arab countries, unquestionably identify with the struggle, and they
back or oppose the regimes in these countries to the extent that they
~upport the Palestinian struggle. But we cannot speak of
deteriorating relations between Palestinians and other Arabs, just
certain Arab regimes at a given.moment. Relations between the
Palestinian people and the Arab peoples are excellent. I could cite
for you so many cases that confirm what I am saying...For example,
I can tell you that the first time that I went i.nto Jordan, I reached
Amman with a mission. There, I went to look for my uncle, whom I
didn't know and who was a cabinet minister. He gave me refuge in
his house for 3 days, offered me an arsenal of weapons that he kept
hidden and took me in his official car to the meeting with my comrades.
But, above all, this man sincerely cried when I told him of our
struggle, what we were after, why we were struggling. And this is a ~
very little compared with the mothers who are willing to sacrifi~e
- their sons, with entire families who risk their lives by hiding
Fedayeen.
[Question] How did your mother react when you joined the armed ~
struggle?
[Answer] When the Six Day War (1967) broke out, we received -
_ ir.structions from the organization to join the struggle in full force.
6Je left from Cairo airport for Damascus. There were 22 of us, and we
were armed. My mother came to say good-by to me; she didn't ask
me anything. The only thing that she said was: "What's going to
- happen with your studies?" I told her that I would complete my
_
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I
_ studies when we had a land and a house to hang my ahingle. Soon
_ thereafter we traveled to the training camp that A1 Fatah had near
- Damascus. -
,
[Question] You were a political commissar at this camp. What -
- did you do? -
' [Answerj T,~e gave talks about the revolution, about why we were
fighting, against whom, how to do it. In addition, every afternoon, =
groups of us headed for occupied land on operations through the
Jordan and the Golan Heights. We took special suitcases containing `
weapons, explosives and books to be handed out among our people.
Other groups headed for recently occupied lands to pick up arms that ~
the Arab armies might have left behind while retreating.
(Questionj Haven't you at times wanted to live a normal life,
like a person not involved in~a war?
[Answer] I believe that a per.son like me, like Palestinians in -
general, without a fatherland, without an identity, is a~warped
person and that we will not develop, in the normal sense of the word,
_ until we return to our fatherland. This is the case botr individually
and as a group, as a community, as a people. But I think that this
is difficult to understand for a person who has not experienced what
- we have. You could even say that this is a defect of ours, but it r
is not a defect that stems from Palestinians themselves, from their -
makeup as a people. It is a painful and artificial elem~nt that -
has been atttached to, superimposed on the personality of Palestinians.
But I think that this is a defect that will be corrected by returning
to our fatherland.
[Question] And how does this defect show up, especially in a man
' who has been a guerrilla, like you? What do you lack? What do you -
- miss?
[Answer) I would sunanarize it in one word: my land.
[Question] How has the struggle affected relations between people
who love each other? _
[Answer] A normal couple can determine the kind of relationship
they want to live with, in accordance with their own feelings and
circumstances. They can marry, live together, begin and end
relationships, have or not have children. A Palestinian can never
' think about a relationship that way. Before all else, he thinks about
whether the relationship will fit in with the struggle, whether his
love will enable him to continue in the struggle or not, whether
it contradicts the struggle.
5
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~
[Qu2stion] And how do you feel about the idea of death?
~ [AnswerJ I take it for granted that we live in an abnormal _
- situation, and therefore, it is hard for me to imagine how I would
feel about death if I were a normal, regular man. Death is something
~ quite different to me and my family. To begin witn, as head of
- the family, I am not afraid of wh;_t would happen to them if I
passed away. My family is so bad off that my death could never
worsen their situation. Of course, n~ one to~aily loses his fear
of death. But I think that from our viewpoint there are expensive -
and inexpensive deaths, some that are worthwhile and others that -
are not. When a person dies for something sacred, for a principle
= or the fatherland, his death is unquestionably worthwhile. We have
a scale of values. I have values. It is not the same thing to
die suddenly as to die struggling. Nor is it the same to die
struggling against the enemy inside our homeland as outside it. To -
die while struggling and to die in Palestine comes first on the
scale as far as I am concerned.
- [Question] What problems are these feelings that you call
_ abnormal, this warping, going to cause for your pe~ple in adapting?
[Answerj There will be no problem. It is like a person who
has a tumor and, suddenly, he is operated on, it is removed, and
he perks up and regains his health. I think that when we return to
our homeland we are going to be happier and enjoy everything that
- we cannot now.
[Question] You realize that there could be repercussions... _
[Answer] I am cor.vinced that on a psychological level everything -
has repercussions and also that we will have to resolve these
"k~arpings." I also know that it is not going to be done overnight. ~
The Palestinian people will need some time to regain psychologi.cal.
_ normality, to have ''normal" reactions. But I am sure that it is
going to be very easy because the joy of living in our own land will
help us. �
(Question] There are two factors that are perhaps causing the
- most trouble: religious fanatacism and violence...
[Answer] Obviously. Som~ of our people have become exasperated '
with false promises and feel great mistrust, especially towards the
great powers. Under these circumstances, some people have backed
_ out and turned to God for want of anything or anybody else, in
search of confidence. At the opposite extreme, others have turned '
- to violence. These two issues will unquestionably have to be dealt
_ ::ith :;~;~a the i31eF~Yniari people return to their 1and. There will =
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be reiigious fanatacism, but not among a majority, and there will
be violence to take care of. These are reactions triggered by the `
_ aituation in which people are living.
[Question] Nationalisti~, religioua fanataciem and violence
usually brix?g on fasc?sm. This could happen with the Palestinians,
as some say it has with Israel's Jews.
[Answer] There is a difference. Spanish, French or American
Jews live immersed in a society and carry on a normal life within it.
_ When t~e Zionist movement took them to Palestine to become part of "
_ Israel, it did so at the cost of uprooting them from th~ir
customs, the society in which they lived, their past. And in
Israel they came face to face with a mixture of people from many
different societies and with different outlooks and customs. This
- created complexes in many of them that have led to the Israeli
Go~ernment's current attitude. The ex~ct opposite happened with the
_ Palestinian people, who were homogeneous, with the same customs and
- circumstan~es, and in whom all of the warpings and abnormalities that
we are commenting on were caused precisely (don't doubt it) by -
- their dispersion into many different countries. Thus, Palestinians
- will be no;ma] again when they return to their land, when they
regain their place as a gr~up. In contrast, I think that the
citizens of Israel will regain their normality only when they retu~rn
- to the society from which they came. This is a distinction that
we ought to be very clear about. Don't forget that they speak more `
- than 100 languages in IsraeJ.. _
[Question] And do you think that Falestinians who were born in -
exile and return, let's say, at age 50 are algo going to adapt
right away? Won't their case be more difficult?
- [Answer) A Palestinian child born in a refugee camp and returning
- to his land, as you say, at age 50, has grown up, from the very -
moment of his birth, immersed in the questi~n of Palestine. As soon _
- as he opens, his eyes after birth, his father, following an ancient
" custom, puts water, or sometimes earth, from Palestine on his
eyelids. And when he is 4 or 5 years old, his father takes him by
the hand, ~akes him outside the army tent where they live in the
- refugee camp and says to him: "You see tha~ land a few kilometera
from here? Well that's where we had a better life and were happier."
This means that or explains why a Palestinian will be happy when
- he returns to his land, no matter what age he is, because he has
finally go~ten to where he dreamed of all his life.
[Question] Do you hate an enemy when you struggle against him?
[Answer) You lose your hate. I lost it one day when several
~ comrades fell during a mission. I couldn't explain it to you; I
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think that only a person who has experienced it can grasp it. I
_ felt as if thoae dead brothers were growing inside me, and I also -
felt that I no longer hated the enemy. Perhaps that's why later
on, during a mission on which we were supposed to destroy a factory
that produced heavy water for a nuclear powerplant, we didn't care
about running riska to prevent the bomb that we had set from
exploding when the factory was full of civilians at work. We
_ preferred to bury ourselves up to our noses in sand for 10 hours,
while the Israelis louked for us, rather than kill civilians and
have more time to get away.
[Question] It must be easier to kill when you feel hate, mustn't -
it2
[9nswer] There comes a time when you cannot forget that the
enemy has a wife and children and that he is no doubt an innocent
' fellow who was brought in under the illusion that the land was
empty, uninhabited.
[Question] But tell me, is it more difficult to continue
killing when your hate is gone?
[Answer] A person at times does things very much against his
~ will, very much so, things with which he does not agree psycho~log~cally.
[Question] And this creates a conflict in a person's head, in '
yours, for example, doesn't it?
[Answer) Well yes, there are conflicts. A person's homeland
at times forces him to do things that are at variance with his
- way of being or his feelings. This has happened to me. In mid-1969
- I felt completely drained and was sent to London for treatment.
; After all of the necessary examinations, the doctor told me that ~
my illness was due to an internal conflict caused by the will to ~
do certain things and the body's ability to do them, to hold up.
According to what the doctor told me, this is.such a typical and ~
clear-cut illness that it only occurs in wars. The internal
- conflict between what I had to do and what my conscience dictated
could have had very serious consequences if it had not been treated
in time. The treatment consisted of getting away from everything, -
from the struggie; I remained a year in drydock. -
[Question] Does the struggle make you harder, more understanding? -
' [Answer] I think that a person who struggles for a just cause
- becomes more human, more understanding. When the struggle is
_ unjust, a person becomes inhuman, harder, and I think that the
- 8 -
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conflict must be greater. Juat look at th? American soldier in
Vietnam. He was not convinced about his own struggle, and the
upshot was a great deal of crime and violence when he returned to
his own society.and country. And let's not talk about internal _
crises. We do not know of a single similar case of crime and
violence in a Palestinian soldier.
[Question] The Jewa in Israel are having problems because of
their low birth rate. Exactly the oppoaite is the case with your `
= people; you are reproducing incessantly. Is this a"weapon," so
to speak, or is it simply a longstanding custom?
- [Answer] In 1948 there were 150,000 F'alestinians in Pa~estine.
Taday, the statistics of the Israeli Government itself show that
therc are 600,000 of us. The fact xs that Paiestinians in
occupied land had their reasons to have more children: they were
convinced that they were being subjected to a war of extermination
and that they needed a lot of children to survive. Golda Meir said
in connecrion with their situation that it was a time bomb against
the Jews, and when she said thatt the Palestinians didn't exist,
their reaction was to bring more children into the world.
[Question] And don't the motives of survival coincide with the -
lack of birth control methods? Because you would also think that
in a situstion like the one that the Palestinian people are living -
in, in refugee camps, ete, it would be better not to bring children
into the world. Perhaps that would be how a very educated person
would react.
[Answer] No one wants to see his children suffer from hunger and ,
_ calamities, without a chance to get an~education.. Palestinians would not
have been so prolific, I assure you, if.there were not reasons that
- I would call war-related.
[QuestionJ When a person has fought for his entire life, like
you, what do you feel life or the struggle has taken away from you?
[AnswerJ I think that we have not passed through the decisive
stages of adolescence and youth and everything that it is normal to
know and experience during those years. `I have apoken about this -
with a number of comrades, and we mentioned, fox example,that we
did not have sexual experiencea during our youth, as would be normal.
But when you're involved in the struggle, the fact is that you don't
have the time to think about this, and you don't even try to. Some
psychiatrists recommend that parents keep their teenage children
occupied so that they don't think about all these sex-related things. _
Well, our parents didn't have to worry about this; it was .taken care of
- for them.
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[Question] You have also miased strolling in the moonligii~, ~
= reading, going to the moviea...Do you regret this?
- [Answerj I miss not having been able to continue my atudies as
= far as I would have liked, and, sure, other things, like reading.
. But now, at age 35 and at this point, I have come to the conclusion
that what I did, what we did, was the best thing that we could have,
and I also think that the books that we read or the struggle that ~ _
we pursued enriched our experience. I have not acquired the =
conventional culture, but I unquestionably have a different sort of
culture, one that I have acquired over many years of guerrilla
- warfare.
[Question] For some time now you Palestinians have been hijacking
fewer planes and launching fewer indiscriminate attacks. Your
struggle is becoming more political than combative.
[Answer] I have two things to say about this. Firat, the PL0
has never been in favor of these overseas operations or plane
hijackings. But there is another parallel concept. Previously, the
voice of the Palestinians was not heard in the world, and a number
of Palestinian groups, fortunately in the minority, wanted this
- voice heard in the world and utilized the means that you have mentioned
- to accomplish this. Erroneous means, obviously. Nowadays, thanks
to this struggle and the political struggle, carried on in parallel,
- the world listens to us and with increasing attention. At last we
no longer have to resort to other than a strictly political atruggle.
[Question] Everyone feels fear some time, even a hardened fighter
like you. When did you feel most afraid?
[Answer] In 1971. We were in northern Jordan, surrounded~by ~
_ the Jordanian Army. It was the last stronghold, the final ~
escalation of the developments of September 1970. We had reports -
that the army was going to launch a general attack on our last bases.
It was a combination of personal fear and fear for the revolution. _
[Question] As far as you are coacerned, what ia the relationship
- between revolution and personal future? -
_ (Answer] iJithout any doubt many of us could, with our degrees,
- lead or make normal lives, but tha,t doesn't interest us. To me,
to talk about the future is always to talk about the national and
_ ~olitical future of all of us. My future and the future of the -
- revolution are one and the same thing, something inseparably joined. ~
Perhaps this is not easy to understand, because the relationship
_ between a man and his people, his land only comes out when the
land is in danger, when he does not posaess it.
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Plotes, Memoire and Memoriea
_ During Yasair Arafat's recent viait to Spain, Marcelino Oreja asked
him in one of their talks whether h~ was planning to write his
memoirs. "I could, I might, as soon as I have the time," the PLO
leader replied. He went on to say: "We Palestinians have a very
good memory; we meticulously file every political and military _
situation. But if our memory fails us, if we fall during the struggle,
I recomme~d to my people that they carry a small diary to jot ~
down daily events and their reflections on them." Arafat then showed
Oreja a small notebook with tiny handwritten notes. `
- Munzir Dajjaniis the head of the PLO's diplomatic delegation in
Madrid. He also keeps a small notebook and has a memory that is
_ long in rime and extensive in events, some of them tragic. During
his adolescence and youth he even tried to change the.course of
some of these events. Travel, the desert, death and exile have been the
constants throughout hislife. He came into contact with the PLO
_ whil~ at t~niversity. Shortly thereafter, he was the organization's
university representative. Later on, for several years he also
held the post of political co~nissar at an A1 Fatah camp near
Lebanon, with incursions into occupied territory. He thus became
a Fedayee, an outatanding Fedayee who held poa~ts of the highest
military responsibility in Egypt, Syria and Lebanon.
He has now held a diplomatic post in Madrid for the last 4 years.
_ "I might stay here and I might also be sent back to the organization's
_ military ~pparatus. We Palestinians are willing to come and go ~
_ wherever we're n~eded. The organization trains us to work in all
of the facets of the revolution. You could call it a veritable
transfer system." Munzir Dajjani has four children. The eldest's
name is Eaz, after his father's name in the underground and which
his comrades still know him by: Abu el Ezz. Arafat's, for example,
is Abu-Ammar. Munzir Dajjani was born in Jerusalem 35 years ago.
With his sad eyes that seem to look inward, weary and somewhat
timeless eyes, he still says today that the revolution and his
personal fate are indivisible, inseparable, so much so that he could
not imagirie what his life would be like if the revolution were to
fail, because iC would make no sense then. But the international
stand on tfhe Palestinian issue has changed, and therefore, the _
notion of a Palestinian homeland has begun to gain momentum.
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8743
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~ 12
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TNTER-AR~B AFFAIRS
SALIM LAWZI LOOKS AT IRAN AS DEFENDER OF ISLAM
_ London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 2 Nov 79 pp 28-29
[Article by Salim Lawzi: "Can Iran Take the Place of the Ottoman State in
Filling the Role of Protector of the Sanctuary of Islam Throughout the
World?"]
- [Text] The 500 years of Ottoman rule over the Islamic countries, including
the Arab aountries, are justified in the eyes of history by the fact that _
the Ottomans were the protectors of Islam in the face of the invasion of
the Crusaders. Indeed, the Turks were the most heroic of the Islamic
- elements in the war against the European attackers against Jerusalem. And
because they filled the role of protector of the sanctuary of Islam against
Islam's enemies, their state remained well-loved by Moslems, and even Arabs,
until the �las~ days nf Ot~oma~x rul~. By na me~ns did the majority of Arabs
support the outbreak against Turkey during World War I. After mentioning
_ Husayn ibn 'Ali's revolution against the Turks, some Arab colonists would
follow this reference to the fighting sherif with stinging criticism. In
Egypt, for example, the revolution against the Ottoman state is considere~
to have been based on an erroneous position which caused harm to the Arabs
and served the influence of the Western powers which inherited the Ottoman
rule.
One who reads the statements of the de facto officials in the Iranian
revolution--namely, the leaders of ~he leader~ and the ministers of the
ministers--notes that Iran is now seeking to fill the role of protector of
Islam and is taking its place as successor to the Ottoman state. The
struggle �or the liberation of Jerusalem made the Turks masters in the past,
and this same struggle is appropriate to make the Persians masters today--
at least in the Gulf. -
- But can Iran rightfully.a~sume the capacity of protector of the sanctuary
of Islam ~n this region? _
The differen~e is that the Gulf is now governed by families which protected
before they ruled. The deputqship or trusteeship which is in their hands
charges them with combating the threats emanating from the countries
_ 13 ~
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surrounding the entities or societies--or Arabism, as it is now called. The
Sabah, Khalifa, Thani, and Nuhayan families, among others, became the leaders
in their sacieties becau~e they wore the sword of protection and represented
the Arab purity of origin going back to Bedouinism. If the ancestors of
these rulers could be asked now which description or name they would prefer--
that of ruler or that of protector--they would probably choose the latter. -
- While it is true that they protected the Gulf against other Arab's on
occasion, they also protected it from non-Arabs. Thus Kuwaiti history,
for example, records the near reverence accorded to the battle of al-Jahrah,
which was led by the Sabah family.
= However, the quintessence of the struggle waged by the Gu1f families was
the defense of the Arabism of the Gulf. For the Sabah family is still in
Kuwait, and the Khalifa family is still in Bahrain. On the other hand, the
shaykhs of al-Muhammarah from the Khaz'al family and the shaykhs of Basra _
- from the al-Naqib family are pure Arabs who have been overtaken by time. -
The Khaz'al family was destroyed by the force of the Iranian victory, and
the al-Naqib family disappeared as a natural development. A long time has
passed since the days of ancient glories when popular poets in Basra said
of Talib al-Naqib: "One-third is for God and two-thirds is for Talib, and -
God's third is claimed by Talib." The current fear for Basra, the Shatt-
_ al-Arab, ~the islands, and the entire Gulf is now centered on Iran, in
contrast to the days when people feared for Iran's safety from the shaykhs
~f Basra, the cavalry of the Shatt-al-Arab, and the sttacks of the Qasims.
_ It is not easy for Iran to fi11 the role of protector of the sanctuary of
Islam, whether in the Gulf or elsewhere, even though Egypt's absence from
the Arab arena has encouraged all other powers to assume larger roles.
Khomeyni's standing grew in importance after the role of the rector of al-
Azhar diminished. For Khomeyni is an exceptional man, and there are no
exceptional men in Egypt. After Israel succeeded in taking possession of
parts of all the Arab states surrounding it, the might of all Arabs weakened,
not just that of the Egyptians. Nevertheless, the Arabs continue to hold
the privileged position among Moslems, because in the final analysis Islam
is Arab, and the Arab countries are the richest of the Islamic countries,
have been most of ten in the mainstream of common universal history, and are
the most important of the Islamic countries strategically, both in military
and nonmilitary terms.
It is not permissible for a non-Arab power to use the Arabs' reversal to
diminish their role, as Iran is now doing. For if Khomeyni loves Jerusalem
and Palestine, then he as an imam is in keeping with the teachings of his
religion, and this act does not entail any benevolence or reward except
the reward of God in heaven.
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The shah fell because he went against Arab national feelings, and out-
bidding is the counterpart of opposifiion in terms of throwing salt in
the wounds and offending aensibilities. The Paleatiniana have the first
right among Araba and MoslemQ to reap the fruits of a revolutior~ which,
beyond the slighteat doubt, they ~?ad a part in making. They would be
- neglectfu~ of themselves and their cause if they failed to interest freely
and completely with the Islamic revolution in Iran--especially since the
Palestinian revolution itself also developed in an atmosphere of Islamic -
revolutionary ideology, and the success in Iran is a success of the one
- ideology, not ~ust a success of military and political cooperation.
- However, despite the Palestin3ans' right to be proud of the Iranian =
revolution, they still have a duty to remain realistic and nationalistic
in their dealings with the Arabs, and in particular with the Gulf states.
The people of the Gulf, on the other hand, must understand balance, for
every side retains its full right. The Iranians, the Palestinians, the
people of the Gulf, and all other Arabs and Moslems have their rights.
The ruler~ of the Gu1f are highly skilled in maintaining balances, and
~ they are unlikely to make a mistake 3n this regard. If they avoid such
- a mistake, and if the Palestinians and in particular the Iranians do
likewise, then the balance will continue to serve all sides. But if this
does not happen, the cost will be high. The struggle will not be ended
easily, once it has begun, and the revolution which is a hope today could
turn into a curse tomorrow. -
If Israel wanted to create a conflict which would rid them of the Arabs,
the best place to do it would be the Gulf. From an ob~ective standpoint,
the conflict in the Gulf is an Israeli conflict, even though Israel itself
is remote from it. Thus the failure of a three-way balance among the
- people of the Gulf, the Palestinians, and the Iranians would be Israel's =
most significant victory. In fact, it would be nothing short of being the -
most significant conflict on the Israeli-Arab border. ~
An avenue to the failure of this balance exists at the present time in the .
Iranian ambition to fill the role of protector of the sanctuary in the
Islamic region!
8591
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_ 15 _
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~
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS =
_ SALIM LAWZI VIEWS PALESTINIAN INFLUENCE IN ARAB OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES .
London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 9 Nov 79 pp 20-21 ~
. [Article by Salim Lawzi: "Confere~ace of Understanding and.Communication
Between Gulf Rulers and Khomeyniites, Arranged by the PLO and Supervised -
by Abu 'Ammar!"]
[Text] If Qadhdhafi and Abu 'Ammar have a disagreement, which one of them
will win the loyalty of the Palestinians who comprise 30 percent of, the
- military strike vanguard of the Libyan Army? Does the importance of the
Palestinian revolution lie in its growing military strength, estimated at
~ 250,OQ0 f.ighting men, or in its potential for aggravation and penetration in
Arab and Islamic countries--especially those countries of the Arabian
Peninsula and the Gulf that contain oilfields? ~
Is the cautious position of the Gulf rulers regarding the Iranian revolution -
merely the result of fear for their oil?
Most people I met during my recent visit to Kuwait and Bahrain asked me:
What is the nature of the alliance between Khomeyni and Arafat? Is it a
strategic or a ta~~tical alliance? How long can it continue? Is it true -
that Khomeyni is trying to use his al].iance with the Palestinians to confront
_ the demands of Arabistan?
These and other questions contain suppressed concern that the Palestinian- .
Iranian alliance will be reflected in difficulties, problems, and currents.
For there is a fear in the minds of Gulf rulers that the Palestinian revo-
_ lution's rapproachment with the new Iranian regime is taking place at the
cost of aggravating the historical problems which continue to exist between
the Arabs and the Persians--problems concerning the identity of the area,
the nature of the geographical bou~~iaries, and the quality of relations. _
These.relations must be good and strong, without deceit by either side, and '
without either side having strong supremacy, whether this supremacy is
alloyed with Islamic slogans or not. Therefore, my answers to the questions
- posed to me did not generally satisfy the questioners. I was content to
reply that whether the Palestinian-Iranian a113ance is strategic or tactical,
the two sides benefit from it, and it will continue to exist as long as the
benefit remains mutual!
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I
This summarization was intentional. For I know that the Gulf rulers' fear
of Iranian aims predates the arrival of the oil era and is ~_d on specific -
_ human and geographical factors that can be termed national_stic, territorial
or sectarian. But they are absolutely r~~~t material factors based solely on
oil.
Moreover, it would not have been easy for me to give a lecture on the nature -
of the alliance between Khomeyni and Arafat when the feeling in the Gulf is
that anq approach which the Palestinian revolut3on makes toward the Iranian
regime withcut tak3ng the view of the Gulf residents into consideration is
an indictment of their ~oint national and Arab bond with the Palestinians.
One Gulf leader told me frankly: The Palestinian revolution is entitled to
~ have all mther revolutions and revolutionaries in the world rally around it--
- and especially a11 Moslem revolutionaries--but with one condition: that this
- does not happen at the expense of the Arabism of any other Arab region. For
when they reach out to the Iranians, their hearts must continue to beat for
the Arabism of the Gulf as well. In Iran, there are extremist elements
within the Iranian revolution which proceed from a position of hostility
to the Arabism of the Gulf. These elzments form a nucleus of deep misunder- -
_ standing between the Iran3ans and the people of the Gulf. The tragedy is
that the Palestinians f ind themselves swept up, with or without their
knowledge, in a deepening of this misunderstanding!
During the storm stirr~d up by Imam Khomeyni's son-in-law, Huj~ah-al-Islam =
'Abbas al-Mahri, in Kuwait and by Ayatollah Sadiq Ruhani in Bahrain, a
~ press conference was held by the Iranian ambassador to Kuwait, Dr Ali Shams
Ardkani, to soothe Gulf apprehensions about Iranian ambitions. The ambas-
sador related what the Iranian revolution had given to its sister move-
ment, the Palestinian revolution: "Iran lost $750 million worth of oil -
which Israel did not pay for because we dared to cut off relations, although
in practical terms we are not in a state of war with Israel. We cut off
our relations with Egypt after the signing of the Camp David agreements,
without concern for the debts Egypt owes us, which amounts to $2 billion.
We threatened to cease our dealings with Turkey unless it cut off relations
with Israel, because the imam believes'that any Islamic country which deals
_ with Israel commits a sin against its religion."
The ambassador also said: "Moreover, the new Iranian constitution includes -
a provision which makes the Arabic language compulsory at all stages of
education, from elementary school to university. This is the first time
anywhere in the world ~hat a state has included in its constitution a
stipulation comp~lling its citize~.s to learn a Ianguag~ other than the ~
official language of the country."
_ Dr Shams revealed that a large contingent of responsible officials in the
Iranian revolution participated in the Palestinian resistance struggle. Dr
Mostafa Shamran, the current minister of defense, is the coffinander of the
Iranian group that fought in the Palest~nians' ranks for 5 years. Their
headquarters was located near the city of Sur (South Lebanon).
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I went to see one official in the Gulf and found him with the statement of
the Iranian ambassador to Kuwait in front of him. He had underlined certain
passages in red to indicate their importance. When the ambassador says that
the Government of Iran halted its shipment of oil supplies to the Philippines
because of the Philippine Government's oppressioa of the Islamic minority,
and that it warned Turkey to sever its relations with Israel, this confirms
the remarks made by Dr Sa'dun Hammadi in an interview in New York: "Tt~ere -
are Iranian attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of Iraq. The
group acts on the basis that the Iranian revolution is a world revolution
ready for export!" _
- Offering me a photocopy of the interview with the Iranian ambassador to
Kuwait, the Gulf official asked:
--Have you read it?
--Yes.
--Do his words inspire confidence?
I tried to use all my diplomacy in ordex to reply tactfully.
--I do not believe that these words were directed at the rulers. The
~ Iranian r~volution, and in particular its representatives in the Gulf, most
of whom are from Imam Khomeyni's group, are trying to speak to the people '
- in a way that will win their hearts. The statements about the bond~ of
Islam, the liberation of Jerusalem, the triumph of the Palestinian cause,
and the severing of rel3tions with the Zionist enemy--"because the imam _
believes that any Islamic country which deals with Israel comt~its a sin
against its religion"--are words which delight Arab ears and awaken responses,
dreams, anxieties, and stirrings in the depths of Arab souls!
He asked irritably:
--How will all of that be interpreted? If Iran believes that it has the
capability to exp.ort difficulties to us, then are we also capable of exporting
difficulties to them?
_ --I don't believ2 it would be wise for you to allow things to go that far.
_ I met with Abu 'Ammar in Beirut before coming to the Gul.f, and he to1r1 me -
that the Khomeyniites are their allies and they are in a position to contain
. the f ires with ease if they are ignited. So why don't you call on the
- Palestinians for help?
At this point the off icial's nervousness increased, and he said: ~
--We do not need the Palestinians or anyune else. We are capable of con-
fronting this by ourselves.
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In an effort to calm him down, I said:
--Frankly, I don't see the reason for this senaitivity, for in the final
analqsis the Palestinians are your friends. When it comes to a choice
between Arab welfare and Iranian welfare, it is well known which one they
would choose. -
I conclud~d:
_ --Isn't that better than turning to the Syrians for help and thus arousing
the sensitivity ef our brother Iraqis?
I do not recall his reply exactly. Officials in Kuwait and Bahrain label
Syrian me~iation "co~endable efforts." But just by posing the question -
I realized that Gulf rulers prefer to deal with the Iranian revolution on
a sectarian basis rather than on a revolut~onary basis. In the first case
there is $ potential for exploiting sectarian differences, while in the
- second case there is limited room in which to maneuver. For although there
is a sectarian relationship between al-Assad and Rhomeyni, the relationship
between Khomeyni and Arafat begins with Jerusalem and the position on Israel,
and extends to hostility toward the Americans and military cooperation.
- I asked Yasir Arafat when I met him on the eve of my trip to the Gulf:
--Have you read the pamphlets issued bq the mass movement in Arabistan?
_ They say that you are the ones who train Khomeyni's militias known as
. "al-Jarik," or the Revolutionary Guard.
Abu 'Ammar replied: _
' --This is not a charge. We really do train the Revolutionary Guard!
I also aslted Abu 'A~nar about a story I had read in a diplomatic report
concerning an incident which took place during the 1 September celebratio~hs ~
- in Libya. 1~'he story says that a noted Arab personality was beside Abu
- 'Ammar when Soviet T-74 tanks--which are among the most advanced tanks in
the world and are called by some military men "armored fortresses"--passed
by, folloi~ed by squadrons of MIC~23 aircraft and missile-carrying vehicles -
of every kind and description. The quality of modern weaponry which appeared
_ in the celebration was fantastic and impressive. The Arab personality -
whispered in Abu 'Eimmar's ear: "Is it plausible that Libya has military
experts c~pable of using all this weaponry?" Abu 'Ammar smiled and said: -
"Between 50 and 60 percent of the men driving the tanks, planes, and missile
' carriers are Palestinians!"
~ Abu 'Ammar corrected the information in the diglomatic report: "I did not _
~ say SQ percent. I said about 30 percent!"
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Naturally, those who read this story posed the question: If Qadhdhafi has
~ a disagreement with Abu tAmmar, who =~rill win the loyalty of the Palestinians
who make up this high percentage of the Libyan Army? Tn exactly the same _
- way, Gulf rulera poae the queation of the organic alliance between Khomeyni `
and Abu 'A~nar, which has reached the point that the Palestinians have taken
over the training of Khomeyni's militias, known as the "Revolutionary Guard."
- The information available on this military force, which the Revolutionary
Council under Ayatollah Husein Montazeri has decided to increase to 1
million men, indicates that Khomeyni's intention is to transform these
militiamen into a force equal in strength to the Iranian Army. The theory
on which the formation of the Revolutionary Guard was based was that the
guard will prevent the Iranian Amry from assuming internal security
responsib ilities. For if the Islamic revolution finds itself compelled to
seek help from a professional army--an axmy whose loyalty is above all to
its military principles, aside from the fact that most of its leaders were
schooled in concepts which differ from those of the Islamic revolution led
by Khomeyni--and if it uses this army to confront disturbances such as
those which are cropping up in Kurdish and Arab regions, then the army's
_ hold wi11 inevitably become stronger and its inf luence will increase, as is
always the case in such instances. If this occurs, the army could easily
be induc~d to seize power, making the Islamic revolution a cover for mili-
tarism, rather than remain a suppressive tool in its hands.
Of course, the process of forming the Revolutionary Guard is still just
beginning. However, this does not keep the battles which the guarr.is are _
f ighting with Kurdish revolutionaries and those demanding independence in -
Arabistan from accelerating the process of formation or from working to _
- fuse the guards in unity and to make their needs readily perceived. It
was recently decided to furnish the Revolutionary Guard with armored cars
and APC's in'addition to setting up its own organizations for domestic and -
foreign surveillance. Palestinian experts who oversee the Revolutionary
Guard's training in fighting stree~ battles say that the imp~rtance of this -
Islamic army--if this label is permissible--lies in the fact that it believes
- in its ideology and is devoted to its spiritual leadership. Moreover, this -
army does not have fixed levels of pay, but rather each volunteer receives
what he needs for himself and his family, regardl.ess of whether he is an
~ ordinary individual or has a high military rank. They call this pay a
"stipendl"
One informed Arab asserts that one of the reasons why the Americans and
- Israelis have moved quickly in seeking to remove Egypt from the ~rab arena
is Egypt's acceptance in recent years of ample numbers of Palestinian students _
- in high military academies, including both the naval academy and the air
colleges. Now, all of a sudden, the Palestinian revolution is making up for
its losses in Egypt with important gains in Libya and Iran, to the extent
that the Israelis are nQw saying that if a Palestinian state comes into
being, it will have a military force of 250,000 fighting men.
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~
- ~
Of course, it is to Tsrael's advantage to exaggerate the size of the Pale-
stinian revolution's military force in order to try to show the dangers to
peace that the existen~e of a Palestinian state would create. The ob~ective
assessment, however, is that the importance of the Palestinian revolution .
does not lie in its growing military strength so much as in its capacity -
for aggravation and penetration in the Arab and Islamic countries, especially
those countries of the Arab Peninsula and the Gulf that contaii~ oilfields.
When Fulbright was chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
he had a Jewish aide who was constantly saying: "It is impossible to bring
about a secure solution for the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula unless the Middle
East problem is solved. And the Middle East problem cannot be solved -
without a solution of the Palestinian problem!" Thus for more than 10
- years--that is, ever since Britain announced its decision to withdraw its
military forces from areas east of the Suez--maintenance of the security
of the Gulf has occupied an important place in the thinking of policymakers
in the United States. Although American strategists used to advocate
reliance on its two ma3.n allies in the Gulf , Iran and Saudi Arabia, Dr Henry
Kissinger planned for the shah's regime to be the sole rock upon which the
United States would build its defense aystem in the Gulf. This was done
for various reasons, one of which was the widespread notion among American
military leaders and politicians that the shah's regime was stronger, more
stable, and more powerful than any other regime in the Gulf area--a notion
which has since been proven false. Another reason was the secret and open
- cooperation, if not to say alliance, which existed between the shah's
regime and the state of Israel. Now, af ter the Iranian rock has been
smashed and the system for the defense of the Gulf and its oil is exposed and
even in dnager of collapse, what country will form the new rock?
The inability of the United States to control events in the area, and the
Ca~ter administration's inability to oppose the Soviet Union's penetration
_ of and increasing activity in the Gulf ~tates, have brought about a whole-
sale reshuffling of the cards, a reversal of alliances, and the development
_ of axes. Saudi Arabia has turned its back on Egypt and moved toward Baghdad,
and an alliance has arisen between Khomeyni and Arafat in place of the
alliance that once existed between the shah and Israel. Even more serious
than all this, however, is the whetting of the app~tities of all those who
demand change to become active in the area and ride the wave of the Iranian
revolution--a movement which is allied with the Palestinian r~volution,
considered by itself to be the fuel which ignites the feelings of the Arab
masses from the Atlantic to the Gulf.
What can the Gulf states, or even America itself, do to counter the effects
- of the Iranian upheaval? Talk of special military forces ready to carry
out military operations patterned after the Israeli action in Uganda known
_ as the "Enteb'be operation" is idle conversation, by the adm3ssion of
American military leaders themselves. For the era of direct military inter-.
vention has ended, and its only importance is as a bargaining chip in the
game of dividing up interests and inf luence. The United States has
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realized that the Achilles heel of security in the Gulf is its connection
with the Arab-Israeli struggle. However, the United States continues to
avoid facing this fact for reasons related to Jewish influence, and is
- making an effort to continue posing hypothetical dangers which are still
~ in the inviaible realm, such as the repercusaiona which wi11 eneue from
the coming of power of Shiite clergymen in Iran, the dangers .,f the
alliance between the Islamic revolution and the Palestinian revolution,
_ and the instability which could bring about a rise of military regimes in
_ place of conservative regimes!
One Gulf ruler asked me about the truth of a story ascribed to Yasir Arafat--
- that he is using his alliance with Khomeyni to catch the rulers of the Gulf
in the same way that hunters use a falcon to catch bustards when they go
hunting in the desert. I said:
_ --Even if Arafat didn't say that, it undoubtedly reflects a possibility that
has been raised. The mistake is that Gulf rulers are not making use of
this alliance, but rather are fearing it or attempting to encircle it!
I added:
--�I suggested to our Palestinian brothers that they organize a conference
under the powerful slogan of former Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam, "Understanding
- ~nd Commu;.ication," which would bring Gulf leaders and Khomeyniites together
and would be supervised by Abu 'Ammar himself. At this conference, all
the cards would be laid on the table in order to create the least pos-
sible amount of misunderstanding!
He said: But we have not heard about this idea.
I said: It is still in the talking stage. And it's up to Abu 'Ammar to
give the word!
8591
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TSLAMIC AFFAIRS
. ,
ISLAMIC PRECEDENTS FOR D~PLOMAT7C IMMUNITY STUDIED
Paris LE MONDE in French 25-26 Nov 79 p 2
[Article by Maxime Rodinson, Director of Studies at the Ecole Pratique
des HauCes Etudes: "The Immunity of Diplomats in Inslam and the Prophet's
Example"J
[Text] The states of the Moslem world in the classical era, as in any
other, wer�e necessarily obliged to negotiate with foreign powers. No nego- -
tiations without rules to safeguard the negotiators, that has been recog-
_ nized since prehistory.l
The vast corpus of ideal norms called Moslem law barely goes into this -
_ problem. It talks of the rights and obligations of believers or of the
community of believers. But there were rules derived from pre-Islamic -
Arab customs and confirmed by Islam according to which a believer could
give real or potential non-Moslem enemies safe-conduct, protection ("aman").
Diplomatic envoys automatically enjoyed "aman."2 I1~':,_
~
Like any Moslem rule, it was justified by the Prophet's example. Here is
the interpretation of a"hadith," "a prophetic interpretation," a normative
account f~und with slight variations in several collections of traditions. ~
In it, i~ is said that the "false prophet" Mosaylima, a rival of Mohammad ~r~
~ in the central part of Arabia, then called Yemama (not to be confused with
Yemen), had sent a letter to Mohammad to suggest to him that they divide -
the A~ab territories between them. Under the concepts of Islam the heading
was blasphemous: "From Mosaylima, the envoy of God, to Mohammad, the envoy -
of God." Two messengers delivered this letter.
"A sheik of the Ashja' (the author of the oldest traditional biography of
the Prophet, Ibn Is'haq who died about 150 A.H. [after the hegira], 767
A.D.) tolde me that according to Salama Ibn Mas'oud A1-Ashja'i who heard it
from his fa~her No'aym (an esteemed companion of the Prophet--note by Maxime
Rodinson): "I heard the envoy of God tell those two emissaries: "And y.ou,
what do you yourselves thirck about it?" They replied: "We say the same as
he does." He (Mohammad) then asserted: "By God, if it were not for the
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fact that one does not slay envoys, I would have beheaded both of you..."
This happened at the end of 10 A,H., that is, at the beginning of 632 A.D.3
"I Do Not Hold Envoys"
Among others, this account is found in the collection of traditions ("sunan")
compiled by Darimi (died in 255 A.H., 869 A.D.)4 and in that of Abou Daoud
As-Sijistani (died in 275 A.H., 889.A.D.). -
- These two traditionalists turn this example of the Prophet into a norm
- which the very pious and extreme~.y venerated companion of the Prophet,
Abdallah Ibn Mas'oud, applied in an exemplary fasion at the time he was
administrator of the city of Koufa in Iraq some 10 years after the Prophet's
death and the repression of the revolt (which came soon after) against the
new Moslem government of the Banou Hanifa tribe. This tribe in fact fol-
lowed the "false prophet" Mosaylitua who was a member of it. It was reported
to Abdallah Ibn Mas'oud that some of the Banou Hanifa tribe were extolling
Mosaylima as God'S envoy in a place of worship ("masjid," literally a place
for prostrating oneself, a"mosque"). He had the guilty ones brought before
him, exhorted them to repent, then pardoned them with the exception of one
'Obada Ibn A1-Harih, known as Ibn Nowaha, whom he had beheaded. To those
_ who were amazed at this different treatment, Ibn Mas'oud explained that
this Ibn Nowaha was one of Mosaylima's two messengers mentioned above who
_ had refused to disavow the "false prophet." Mohammad had not had them -
ehec~:ted since at th~t time they wers protected by their status as ambassa-
dors. Now things were no longer the same and Ibn Nowaha deserved to die
because he was a "renegade."6
The learned and pious contemporary Maslem writer, Mohammad Hamidullah, in
his Life of the Prophet,"~ cites two other cases. During the Prophet's
first campaign against Mecca, a Moslem negotiator was held by the people of '
Mecca and a rumor spread that he had been assassinated. During this time
Mohammad in his encampment was succeeding in concluding a truce with nego-
tiators from Mecca. He retained them until his own ambassador had been
returned to him. In another case, an ambassador of MPn~a to the Prophet
~~~a~ touched by Moslem grace. He wanted to remain with his new coreligion-
ists. But Mohammad refused to allow him to stay. "I do not violate pacts,"
he said, "and I do not hold envoys. If you continue to think 3s you now do,
you may come back (to us)." The ma.n in question, a Copt, it would seem,
returned to Mecca. Then, no longer having the status of ambassador, he
did come back to the Prophet at Medina and embraced Islam.
_a It is seen that for the Islamic religion also the immunity of diplomatic
missions is a norm regarded as sacred.
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FOOTNOTES
_ 1. See Ragnar Numelin, "Les Origines de la Diplomatie," Paris, Flammarion,
1945.
2. See the article "Aman" by J. Schacht in "L'Encyclopedie de 1'Islam,"
se~oad edition, Volume 1, Paris (G. P. Maisox~neuve) and Leiden (Brill), _
1960, p 441 ff.
3. Ibn Is' haq, "Vie de 1'Envoye de Dieu (Sirat rasoul Allah, published by
Wustenfeld, p 965; published by M. M. Abd A1-Hamid, Cairo, 1365/1937,
Volume 4, p 272).
4. Book 18, Chapter 60, "On the Prohibition to Kill Envoys," Damascus,
1349/1920/1931, 2, p 235.
5. "Sunan," Book 15, Chapter 154, "Concerning Envoys (Messengers, Ambassa-
dors)," published in Cairo by A. M. A1-Tazi, undated, 1, p 434. -
6. Cf Baladhori, "Kitab fotouh A1-boldan," published by De Goeje, 1866,
p 87, published in Cairo, 1350/1932, p 97, translated by Ph. K. Hitti,
"The Origins of the Islamic State," New York, 1916, p 133.
7. "Le Prophete de 1'Islam," Paris, Vrin, 1959, 2 volumes, Vol 2, p 649.
- 8094
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~
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ISL~iMIC AFFAIRS
- DRAFT OF ISLAMIC C.ONSTITUTION PREPAREU
_ Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic Oct 79 pp 22-24 and 41
- [Article by Dr Mustafa Kamal Wasfi, vice-president of the [Egyptian]
council of state]
[Text] If there has been any reason for not applying the Islamic
religious law, as some say, it has been the shortage of Islamic scholars
who are capable of preparing the Islamic canstitution. This, then, is
- the draft of an Islamic constitution which is just about complete.
What is needed after that? This Islamic conatitution insures that it
is possible to establish God's law immediately if intentions are good.
The Draft of the Islamic Constitution
In 1977, the co nference of Islamic religious scholars, which took place
_ in Cairo, issued a resolution that al-Azhar University should prepare the
draft of an Islamic constitution to be consulted by any government that ~
wants its constitution to be Islamic.
A committee, called the Higher Committee for the Draft of the Islamic _
Constitution, was formed at A1-Azhar, and there were some subcommittees
under it. I had the honor of being appointed to this Higher CommiCtee,
but circumstances prevented me from attending its meetings.
When this committee was finished with the preparation of the draft, the
late l~mented imam Shaykh 'Abd-al-Halim Mahmud, shaykh of al-Azhar, had
the kindness to send the committee's draft to me so that I might express
my observations in the f orm of a draft. I did so, and submitted it to
the subcommittee, which resolved to submit my draft to the conference ~
as a scholarly treatise because the appointed time for conducting
the conference has approached and there was not time enough to review
the committee~s draft.
The convocation of the conference was postponed sine die because of
the state of affairs at that time, and then I found no objection to
submitting my draft to Islamic public opinion, praying to God for guidance
and success.
The draft consists of an introduction and 78 articles, followed by an
explanatory discourse. ~
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The Text of the Islamic Constitution
Chapter One
The Islamic World -
_ Article 1.. The Moslems are one nation.
Article 2. The state may unite with another Islam3c atate in a form which
is consistent with the interests of Islam, and the state will act toward
bringing about economic integration among Islamic states.
- Article 3. To defend and support Islamic minorities and to act toward
their liberation is a duty enjoined on all Moslems.
The Form of the State
Article 4. The state of....is an Islamic state. The supreme authority
in it is God, whom we exCol and to whom we pray, and He is the source of _
sovereignty. Islamic law is its aupreme jurisprudence, and its supervisor
is an imam who will exercise suthor~.ty in the land. He will be assisted ~
by the consultative body and will have jurisdiction over the policy of -
Islamic law.
Chapter ~ao _
The Basis of the Islamic Society
Article 5. Belief in God almighty, unity in accordance with the Islamic
creed, and solidarity among the Moslems and between the people and the
authority is the basis o~ the society and the way of life in the state.
Seeing that the nation adheres to the Islamic belief is an Islamic
duth which will be perfomned by the individuals and by the state by all
means, and the Moslems are earnestly desirous of it.
- Article 6. The Islamic law is the fundamental source of legislation.
Islam is the religion of the state. The Arabic language is the official
language in the atate. The hegira date will be used in correspondence.
Article 7. The Moslems will perform those duties which are enjoined -
on them in the sacred writinga and will carry out their public duties
of enjoining thoae things which are lawful and prohibiting those things
which are unlawful, instituting the Islamic religious lew, keeping harm
from the people, and upholding the lawful public interests and the public
expenditure. The state will guarantee that individua.ls may do so, oblige
them to do so when they are remiss, and do it (for them] when they are
unable to do so.
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- Arricle 8. The public governance is concerned with the interest of the
community, protecting religion, individuals, posterity, intellect, and
property.
Article 9. Since there is no appropriate specification in the sacred
texts or in the Sunnah and there is no~norm, [the following] will
be observed in all public and private actions, instruments, executions,
and planning: preserving the necPssities, then that requirements, then
refinements in mattera of religion, then the individual, then posterity,
then the intellect, and then property.
Article 10. The quest for knowledge is a religious duty, and instruction
is the duty of the state and the religious scholars. Religious inculcation
is a basic curriculum in a11 stages of intstruction.
Chapter Three
Rights and Liberties
Article 11. Rights and liberties are social functions whose exercise is
carried on in accordance with the Islamic religious law. The service of
legitimate interests is observed in them before all else.
The exercise of rights and liberties will be done within the limits of
Islamic religious law, and every guardian is responsible for his flock.
Article 12. The covenant of protection of the Moslems is one, and the least '
of them will work toward it, representing the community of the Moslems '
- in whatever public freedom he undertakes to exercise in accordance with
the provisions of the Islamic religious law.
He will institute the claim for reckoning in defense of the Islamic public
welfare. _
ArticLe 12. Protection of self, honor, and property is a right of
every Moslem and of everyone who is legitimately present in the territory
of the state, and is considered a basis for the rights of the individual
= and Ialamic legal judgments.
Article 14. Non-Moslems as well as Moslems will observe the provisions
of Islamic religious law.
Article 15. The expression of opinion, so far as it is consistent with
Islamic religious law, is a duty which the staCe will enjoin and toward
= which it will set all necessary means in motion.
There will be a commitment to the opinion of the majority in whatever =
is in conflict with Islamic religious law.
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Article 16. The state will guarantee to all of the individuals all of
the freedoms that the Islamic religious law permits, and it is not
" permissible to infringe on them, curtail them, or regulate them in
contravention of Islamic religious law.
- Anyone who is treated un~ustly may aeek redreas in accordance with the
provisions of Islamic religious law.
Article 17. Every aggresaion on personal liberty or the liberty of -
the persorial life of the citizens and other rights, such as the rights
and liberties which Islamic religious law guarantees, is a crime the
criminal or civil action ariaing from which wi11 not be dropped on account
of limitation, and the state will guarantee just restitution to anyone
against whom the aggression occurs. .
Article 18. The state will guarantee freedom of possession and property
rights and their inviolability, and public canfiscation by any means
whatever is not pern?issible. Private confiscation will not take place
except by judicial ruling. Territory Qf countries which have been taken
by force will be the private property of the state, which may distribute
it to individuals for them to exploit by heritable tenure. The territory
oP a country which was taken peacefully wi11 be property of its owners
in fee simple.
_ Article 19. Ostentation, and likewise all th~t is contrary to the Islamic -
commands, prohibitions, and proprieties are forbidden. Islamic public
sentiment should be guarded by all means from debasement. -
Chapter Four -
The Islamic Econany
Article 20. The Islamic economy is based on the Islamic religious law
so as to insure legitimate interests. Whatever economic laws are
established to be sound may be considered to be among those things
which are lawful, and resource may be had to modern economic means _
within the limits of Islamic religious law.
Article 21. Freedom of trade, industry, and agriculture are guaranteed
within the limits of Islamic religious law.
Article 22, Transactions involving the giving or taking of interest -
are prohibited. This means all interest in which any dealing is done.
Article 23. The state will concern itself with promoting the economy
- in accordance with Islamic religio~s law.
Article 24. Anyone wh o is in need may obtain that which will satisfy his
need by all legitimate means. -
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= Article 25. Considerations of solidarity and the realization of
legitimate interests will be heeded in the econamic efforts of the state
and of individuals .
The Nation
Article 26. The nation consists of the religious scholars and the generalit}r ~
- of the Moslems. The people and Che authorities in it will be two
complementary elements which will assist each other mutually in acting
on the sovereignty of the Islamic religious law.
Article 27. The body of religious scholars is the religious scholars of
the nation according to the dominant sects in the territory of the state.
Article 28. It is the duty of every Moslem, whether he is one of the body
of religious scholars or of the generality of the M~slem community, to
be a member of the m~sque of his quarter or village, praying there,
performing as much as he can of the five religious duties of Islam,
- and concerning himself with the affairs of that mosqueto the extent that
he will not fail to attend it except when excused fran doing so. The
principals will be agpointed with the consent and approval of the congregation.
Article 29. It is not permissible to conduct the Friday prayer in a mosque
except by official permit from the appropriate quarter,in the largest
and Foremost mosque i.n the city or metropolis. The local administrative
chief in the cit,y or metropolis must perfoxtn the office of the imamate
and deliver the sermon. The sermon will be addressed to the current
problems and will be discussed after prayer.
Article 30. The principals in the city or metropolis will be appointed with
the consent and approval of the members of the Friday mosque. ~
Ar~icle 31. The mosquea will have a legal entity and a special inviolability,
and will be represented in their contracts, in the custody of their
property, and in statements made in their name fore judges and other
quarters by whomever the administrators choose.
Article 32. The principals in each mosque will organize the affa~rs of
the quarter, village, city, or metropolis, collect the necessary funds
for doing so, eatabl3.sh the legitimate public interesta, bring about
conciliations among the people with the counsel of the official authorities, -
and represent the people of the quarter, village, city, or metropolis in -
all of their public affairs. The principals of the mosque wil.1 supervise ~
_ the waqfs and expenditures and the collection and distribution of alms in
the district and the administration of the necessary local services for the
city or metropolis.
Article 33. The principals of the mosque will pay the duties of homage to
the imam on behalf of those whom they represent, and [engage in] .
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~
_ consultation if the imam and the local chief asks for it. They will also
have the duty of eatablishing Islamic religioua law, public inatruction
in religion, Islamic missionary activity and exhortation, and upholding
morality and. condemning immorality.
Article 34. The generality of the Moslems will undertake to perform
the duties of giving aupport and advice to tl~e imam, of public expenditure,
of befriending the poor and weak, of upholding morality and condemning -
- immorality, and of performing all of the duties of capability and the .
public interests. Furthennore, each of them will have the duty of paying
homage to the imam on his own behalf.
Article 35. The general plebiacite on lawsuits will be conducted through _
the show~ng of hands. The matter will be brought before the mosques after
a previous announcement in the manner which Che law determines, and every _
Moslem will express his opinion on the subject of the plebiscite or be
content with the vote of the administrators on it.
Article 36. The principles of Islam and the religious observances are
conununity social duties which may not be set aside.
Article 37. Religious heresies may not be foztned within the territory of
_ the state.
The imam will be informed of any hereay, and it is his duty to adopt all
means to conciliate, to discover the errors which led to ita formation,
and to correct ita errors. Those errors will be eradicated as soon as
they appear.
No one wi11 be pextnit~ed to exercise an opinion or perform an act which
violatea the Islamic creed [which prevails] in the country.
- Article 38. It is forbidden to form poliCical parties with a positivistic
_ policy.
Chauter Five
The Imam -
Article 39. The state will have an imam who must be obeyed, even though one ~
' should disagree with him in opinion.
Article 40. In any matter which has been determined to be in violation of
the Islamic religious law, no abedience will be rendered to any creature,
even the imam himaelf, in disobedience to the Creator.
Article 41. The tenure of the office of the imamate will last throughout
the lifetime of the imam except in case of separation for a reason which
~ is legally permiasible. ~
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_ Article 42. The same qualificatione which are stipulated in a judge
arp atipulated in a candidate for the imamate. -
The nanination for the office of the imamate is made from among those whom
- the supervisory council nominates, those who nominate themselves, or
those whom the imam nominates, provided that they are not from among
- his heirs.
A standing list of candidates for the imamate will be prepared after it has
been ascertained that they have fulfilled the conditions required for -
the office. This list will be entrusted to the higher constitutional "
- court, and, on the termination of the tenure of the imam, his successor
will be chosen from it.
Article 43. The [new] imam will be chosen within 2 weeks from among
- the candidates by a pledgQ of fealty by the principals on their own
behalf and that of those whom they represent and then by a pledge of fealty
by the generality of the Moslems, each on his own behalf, when the pledge
of fealty [by the principals] has resulted in the general consent for
his ass arnption of the imamate. The law prescribes the method and rules
for nomination and pledging fealty in accordance with the provisions of
Islamic law.
Article 44. No one will be called to account for expressing disagreement
with the pledge of fealty before it is made.
Article ~5. The imam will be subject to the judges and will have the
right to appear [before them] by proxy. -
Article 46. The imam will enjoy all of the rights that [any other] citizen
enjoys and will be under the same obligations as [any other] citizen. _
The financial regulations which the law defines will be in effect with
regard to him.
Article 47. The imam will be considered a delegate from the community
of Moslems in all that is considered legitimate policy for the country,
and he will delegate some of his functions to the ministers, governors,
subgovernors, and judges. The law sets forth the regulations which
perCain to his doing so. _
The imam will be responsible for leading the army to the jihad, safeguarding
the aeaports, and concluding major compromise treaties, The imam will
deliver the Friday sermon, lead the Friday prayer, and preside over
every assembly at which he is present.
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Chapter Six _
- The Judge
Article 48. The judge has the general authority in disputes which arise
_ out of commerce, compensatione, and everything that pertains to ownership
of property, usufruct, marriagea, family ties, and crimes, whether between
~ merchants and others or between the public authority and individuals.
Article 49. The people are equal bef ore the judge. No person or group
may be treaCed with preference in special courts and no special courts
may be created or any litigant be deprived of his conventional judges.
Article 50. Rulings will be issued and executed in the name of God the
- Merciful and Benevolent, and the judge in his court will be subject
to no law but Islamic religious law.
Article 51. The state will guarantee th e independence of the court,
and any infringement on its independence is a crime. _
Article 52. The maximum penalities under Islamic law will be applied
for the crimes of fornication, false accusation, theft, looting, drinking
- alcoholic beverages, and apostasy.
Article 53. A higher constitutional court will be created which, in
addition to what is specified in this constitution or the civil laws,
will concern itself with decidint to what extent the civil laws and
ordinances are consistent with the Is lamic rel.igious law and the provisions
of this constitutian.
- The civil law will define its other competences.
Article 54. The bureau of canplaints will concern itself with judging
cases of assault and battery, whether on the part of the public authority
or of individuals, and, in these cases, it will have full authority to
- impose approgriate penalties, to res tore the previously existing situation,
and to exact compensation. The bureau will also concern itself with -
the accounting and canpensation of the ministers, governors, subgovernors,
and agents, Its decisions and rulings will go into effect immediately
on their issuance. Its organization will be equipped with the means of
this execution, and it will have the right to make use of all means of
proof. It wi11 judge whatever complaints are brought bef o~e it as soon
as possible.
Chapter Seven .
Consultation, Legislation, and Supervision
Article 55. Whatever learned and legally skilled persons the imam selects
will engage in deliberations on debatable questions. The ministers, -
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governors, and subgovernors may be among those who engage in these
deliberationa. The imam is nat obli~ed to follow whnt the peraons
who engage in these deliberations recommend.
Article 56. A body of senior religious scholars, called the legislative
body, will undertake to enact laws, in accordance with the principles
of individual ~judgment in legal matters. The constitutional court will
select them, on the basis of the nomination of the principal scholastic
bodies in the land, in the manner which the law prescribes. The laws
and legislaCions which the legislative body enacts will be effective -
immediately on their issuance by that body.
The by- laws of the body will define the procedures of the issuance of the
law and in what it should familiarize itself with the opinions of the
appropriate learned and technical quarters and consultants.
The gate of independent judgment in accordance with Islamic religious
~ law is open to the legislative body and may not be closed.
Article 57. A council called the supervisory council, which will be chosen
from among those who pay homage Co the imam, will undertake to supervise
- his actions and those of the public authority. This council will consist
_ of one member from each city or metropolis, to be selected by the people .
of the principal mosque in it.
The constitutional court will base its selection of them on whatever
change occurs amongst them. Its meeting will be in the city. -
. The by-laws of the council will determine the times for the court to
convene, how it is to be called together, how it is to be closed, and ~
its inviolability. IL- will be entirely independent of the imam and the
public authority, and ,they may not intervene in any of its affairs. -
There may be no overlapping among this council, the deliberative body, and -
the public offices.
The imam and the supervisory council will obtain the opinion of the legisla-
tive body in affairs of Islamic religious law; if they do not do so, ~ -
his decision will be invalid.
He will also obtain the opinion of the quarters concerned in scientific
and technical questions. _
Article 58. The supervisory council will concern itself with the
establishment of the general policy of the state, the general plan of
social growth, the general budget of the state, and everything that
_ leads to the commit~nent of the public revenue, all in conformity with
Islamic religious law. The by-laws of the council will regulate the
' proced ures which should be followed in this connection and the veto
- af these decisions by the imam.
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~
_ Article 59. The members of the Islamic legislative body and the supervisory
council will exercise the supervision of Che compensation and allowances
which the law prescribes.
Article G0, No financial charges or dutiee may be impuaed unlese tt?e
sacred writings or the Sunnay approves, and within its limits, or unless
- the sects agree on them unanimously. When the supervisory counci.l has
expressed its opinior. of the appropriateness of these charges or duties,
they will be imposed by a law which the Islamic legislative body shall
iss~:e. It is the business of the imam to impose them when such events
as catastre;,hes, calamities, and famines occur. -
_ Article 61. The law will set forth the basic pri~iciples for the
collection of taxes and the disbursement of the revenues therefrocn.
Article 62, The draft of the budget will be submitted to the supervisory -
council on the dates and in the manner which the law specifies.
A law for the budget will be issued and will be in effect for the duration -
_ of the fiscal year.
Article 63. The final ac~;ounting of the budget wi11 be submitted to the =
supervisory council within not more than 1 year from the date of the end
of the fiscal year.
Furthextnore, the annual report of the office of a.ccounts, together with its
comments., will be submitted to the supervisory council. The council will
pass the report an to the bureau of complaints to verify whatever accusations -
are contained in it and to render a judgment concerning them.
- Article 64. The imam, Che ministers, the governors, and the sub-
- governors will be responsible to the supervisoxy council, and each of
the members of the supervieory council will have the r.ight to address
interrogations to the ministers, governors, and subgovernors.
= Article 65. If the supervisory council decides to withdraw confidence
from the prime minister, another cabinet member� a governor, or a subgovernor, -
- he will be obliged to leave his post. ~
The prime minister will submit his resignation to the imam if his re-
sponsibility to the supervisory council is established.
Chapter Eight
The Government `
Article 66. The government will be considered empowered in its actions
_ by tt.e imam. Its members will be considered members of his council. The .
government will not take recourse to the method of direct administration
- except by dint of necessity.
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The governmenti will consist of the imxcn and the cabinet. The prime _
minister, deputies for him, and deputies for the [rest of Che] cabinet
_ members may be appointed. Furthermore, the administrators of the regions,
the governors, and Che subgovernors will be considered [members] of
_ his government, and they will all be considered [members] of the council
of the imam. -
1.'he imam will supervise the a::tions of the government.
Article 67. It will be stipulated of anyone who is appointed minister
or deputy minister that he be (nationality menCioned) an adult Moslem...
Hijri year, of full competence.
Article 68. A minister will be considered authorized by the imam in the
affairs of the ministry. He will be reaponsible for outlining the
policy of the minisCry within the general. limits of the state and will
_ undertake to execute it. The [responsibility of] Che minister may
not be for execution only.
Article 69. The minister, during the tenure of his post, may not
pursue an independent profession or a commercial, financial, or
indus trial activity, or buy, rent, lease, se1Z, or claim any property
of the state.
Article 70. Any minister who has been indicted will cease his activity ~
til a decision has been reached in his case. The termination of his tenure _
will not prevenC the institution or continuation of action against him.
The trial of the prime minister, the cabinet, and their deputies will
be conducted before the competent courts, and these courts will expound
_ t~e law and the procedures and guarantees of the trial without infringing
on .the competence of the bureau of complaints.
, Article 71. The territory of the state will be divided by law into regions,
~ and the cities and metropolises will be designated. The imam will appoint _
a governor over each of the regions into which the country is divided
and a subgovernor over each of the cities or internal metropolises in
- each region. An agent may be appointed over a group of villages or -
y, disCricts belonging to the metropolis or city, and each of these agents
will. concern himself with carrying out the ordQrs of the Islamic law
poli.cy wh ich are not left to the individuals within the limits of his
juri.sdiction, and will supervise the individuals and comple them to -
look: after the interests o� the Islamic law.
_ The governor will be considered a deputy of the imam in all of his actions
and competences.
_ f
Article 72. 1fie governor will infoztn the imam of the conditions of the
- region at least once each month, and the subgovernor will inform the
amir of them ence each month. '?'hey will both refer urgent matters to
'i.
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the imam as soon.as they occur. The imam may abrogate any actions of the
- governor which are contrary to the Islamic religious law or which he
considers unsuitable. The governor may also do so wiCh regard to the
subgovernor. The governor ma~r also do so with regard to the subgovernor.
The governor and the aubgovernor will act immediately ~nd in complete
conf ormity with the Islamic religious law til an order and a ruling counter-
manding their actions are issued,
Article 73. The powers of the governors may vary according to the
_ distance from the capital and the varie~y of the people of the region and
- their particular ~ircumstances.
~ The law will designate the principal powers in each region for the
~ governors and subgovernors and the instruments of local government. Each
_ region will have a council for supervision and a body for legislation,
and the governor or subgovernor may select a local consultative body to
- assist him.
The supervisory council in the region will refer to the imam and the state
supervisory council whatever violations the governors and subgovernors
. may commit as they occur.
_ Cha~ter Nine
Geiieral and Transitional Regulations ~
Article 74. The city of....[two words unintelligible; perhaps a line
of text is missingJ from the date of its execution, and it is not permissible
to return in criminal questions and financial obligatiions.
Article 75. The laws will be published in the official newspaper and two
of the newspapers of general circulation within 2 weeks of the date of ~
their issuance, and will become effective after 1 month from the day
_ after their date of publication unless some other date of eff~~ct is ap-
- pointed for them. -
Article 76. The imam, the supervisory council, the body of religious
scholars, and the legislation will request the amendment of one or more
of the articles.of this constitution in accordance with the conditions
which the by-laws provide for the supervisory council..
_ Article 77, Al1 of the rules which the laws and regulations had
established before the issuance of this constitution will remain valid -
_ and in effect unless tney are repealed or amended in accordance with the
principles and procedures which have been established in this conetitution. -
Article 78. This constitution will be in effect from the date of the
announcement of the approval of it in the plebiscite.
CSO: 4802
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~GYPT
. U.S. SUPPORTS EGYPTIAN MILITARY STRATEGY
Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in. Hebrew 31 Oct 79 pg 9, 10
[Article by Ze'ev Schif: "Analysis of New Trends in the Egyptian Military
Strategy"]
[Text] A few weeks ago red lights flashed at the intelligence service
- after a trifling report appeaxed in one of the intelligence agencies. The
reporti described how commando troops stormed a police station in Cairo in _
order to free the wife of the troop's commander. She had been placed under
arrest. In addition to this, there are rumors of unrest in the Egyptian
Army and the discharge of many officers. While in Egypt I suggested that -
the tension between men in the commando unit and members of the State
Security Division (equivalent to our intelligence service), which is res-
ponsible to the Interior Department, is not confined to this solitary
incident. Neither are the army dismissals rare occurrences.
The incident with the co~andos had a vague beginning, but it developed
into something quite threatening. It began when a member of the State -
Security Division stopped a car being driven by a woman who happened to be
the wife of the commando officer. At the time, the security officer had
no knowledge of this. He made advances toward her but she replied with a
stinging insult. In revenge he arrested her on a vagrancy charge. When
her husband learned of this he and some of his fellow officers went to
rescue her. They threatened to storm the police station if the woman was
not released. According to the report, there was some violence. What is _
- truly important, but not publicized, is the fact that the commando troops
~ planned to stage a demonstration with vehicles and tanks before the presi-
dential:palace as a protest to the lack of regard for the army. The matter -
reached the ears of the army leaders and thanks to explanations and per-
suasion the entire idea was abandoned.
Had this occurred in any other Arab state it would be fair to observe that
this is how a revolution develops. Actually, Egypt is different. However, .
there are observers who say that in spite of the sensirivity over a gratuitous
insult to the wife of a senior officer this is proof of a sentiment felt =
in various Egyptian army circles that the status of the army has been
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.
_ eroded. As a consequence, the Security Service Division, which is respon-
sible to the Interior Department, has gained a preferential status at the
army's expense. The net result is the creation of an atmosphere of ten-
sion and jealousy between these two groups.
Egyptian observers have told me that this state of affairs is in no way
due to Sadat's loss of confidence in the army. He is well aware that as n
- group the army supports him, especially the official staff. Since the
. onset of the peace process and the opposition it evoked in the Arab world,
it was decided to put stronger emphasis on internal security and the safe-
guarding of the regime. The fear of underground activity and of confronta-
tions instigated with the assistance of Libyan, Palestinian, Iraqi or
other agents, dictated the preference of the Security Service.
Even in the army, General Ali, who has a strong background in intelligence
work, has replaced General Gamassi, one of tine outstanding heroes of the
- October war. This is not all. It appears that during the past year scores -
of senior officers have been discharged from the Egyptian army. The senior
command is very alert to the slightest sign of opposition, and they react
immediately with preventive measures. Those in charge will not countenance
the slightest sign or hint of danger. Anyone who is suspected of opposi-
tion to the peace process and to Sadat`s conduct in the process is imme-
diately discharged from the army.
There is an account of a group of senior military personnel who during the -
month of Ramadan this year made the customary pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia
to observe their religious precepts. As is customary in a situation like
this, the Saudi defense minister presented them with various gifts. This
was enough to cast suspicion on them. Upon their return, they were all dis-
charged from the army.
In contrast to this, I heard of an occurrence which is exactly the reverse
of the incident with the Egyptian Army personnel. An Egyptian officer
was a candidate for the position of editor of a new Saudi Arnry periodical.
The first question asked by the Saudi minister of defense was whether the
candidate had at any time taken part in peace talks with Israel, beginning
with the talks at Km 101. He explained that anyone who had shaken hands
= with the Israelis was ineligible for the job. Another Egyptian general was -
discharged because an article h.e had written had been published in a Lebanese
newspaper which opposes the peace process. Knowledgeable observers say
it would be wrong to conclude from all this that an oppositional sentiment
is crystallizing in the Egyptian Ariuy vis-a-vis the peace process. Rather,
it indicates a readiness and vigilance to stamp out any deviations. Summing
up, the opinion today is that Sadat's control over the army is complete.
If there is any dissatisfaction in the Egyptian Ariuy with anything related `
to the peace process it is not in essence the concept of peace with Israel.
It is rather the keen disappointment that the process did not produce the
~ expected fruit which the Egyptian military had anticipated. After a
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protracted period of stagnation in large acquisition deals and putting up
with sporadic purchases from the West, many senior officers hoped that
salvation by the United States would come i~ediately after the peace. Now
many are complaining about the scanty supplies the Egyptian Army is receiving
Erom the United States and the slow rate in which even these are being
received. They hoped that Western weaponry would quickly replace the out-
moded Russian equipment. They dema.nded the same relationship and privileges
that are accorded to the IDF in the purchase of sophisticated weaponry in
the United States. Israel, of course, thinks just the opposite. The
feeling in Israel is that the sale of attack weapons to Egypt, such as _
Phantom planes and armored troop carriers, is proceeding too rapidly.
Whatever the case may be, the fact remains that the great expectations
were not f~lfilled with the desired rapidity. Egyptian generals admit that
in actuality speed was not essential in supplying all the needs af the large ~
Egyptian Army. Clearly, the complete replacement of Russian equipment with
American and Western weapons is not being considered. Such a plan would be
wasteful and cost staggering amounts. Furthermore, it would take years to
accomplish. The proposed American plan contains a practical concept appli-
cable to a major portion of the Russian weapons systems now in Egypt's
- possession. It is a giant plan of parts replacement and substitution wherever
- this is efficient and productive. The day after Ezer Weizman, our defense
minister, was honored in Egypt by a ceremony staged by the Egyptian general
- staff, an agreement was signed at that very same place by the Egyptian
defense minister and the American assistant secretary of defense to create
and develop a plan along these lines. Ai� AHRAM rightly considered it
sufficiently important to warrant a headline.
The concept to transfer and substitute parts is well-known in the IDF.
When it is no longer possible to acquire modern equipment in sufficient
- quantity to replace the present equipment which still retains a useful
life, a restoration process is begun. Vital parts are replaced with later
model units. This is exactly what we did with the Sherman, Centurion and
captured Russian tanks. The cannons were made mobile. The same procedure -
was app.lied to the planes, e.g. a Sky Hawk motor was substituted in a ~
French Mystere plane. This is what the Egyptians will do now, with Ameri-
can assistance, to some of their Russian weapons systems. We may assume -
that they will replace the Russian motors in their tanks with more modern
American ones. The cannons may also be replaced. In a similar manner they -
will try to replace the engines in the Russian Migs. This replacement and
substitution plan will result in significant employment in Egypt.
The American military assistance plan will not stop with the renovation of
_ old weapons systems. It appears that the creation of a wise range of wea- -
pons systems is b eing considered besides parts and armament. Other items
being considered are the manufacture of various types of electronic equip-
ment, new classes of armament and antitank weaponry. In Cairo, I was
- told that the American Government has already certified the Emerson Co. to _
ser. up an assembly plant for the Thor missile to be used by the Egyptian
Army, -
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The plans Eor equipping the army are but one facet of the search for a new "
Egyptian strategy in the face of the peace agreements with Israel. The
crystallization of this strategy will determine how the Egyptians will
rebuild their armed force and where the emphasis should be placed. The
_ formulation of this strategy is of great interest to Israel. We can
learn what the Egyptian intentions are and whether we should take their
word at face value. It appears to me that the Egyptian general staff has
erased the name of Israel from its list of.potential threats against Egy~t.
We must repeat ~nd em~phasize that this cannot be interpreted as sufficient
reason for I~~ael to erase Egypt from its list of future potential threats.
Egypt is convinced or inducing itself to believe that following the peace ~
agreement Israel will no longer initiate a threat against it. Israel has no
intention of doing so. The expectatiun that this nay happen in the fore-
seeable future is close to zero no matter haw the regime is constituted.
From Israel's standpoint, the situation is understandably different. There
- is the fear of a sudden turnabout in Egypt or as Butrus Ghali the foreign
minister has stated: Cairo will definitely decide that its defense treaties
with other Arab states supersede the peace agreement with Israel. ~
The potential threats that are presently apparent to Egypt will probably
crystallize from radical Russian elements in Lybia or the Sudan or an inter-
nal underground movement. At first glance it appears that the Libyan bor-
der presents the most serious threat. This because a ruler like Qadhdhafi -
is cooperating with the Russians and is amassing great quantities of arms ~
far beyond his needs. He has in his country military advisors and pilots
from all the extremist states.
Actually, the real threat to Egyptian interests will probably develop from .
an entirely different direction if and when the extremist segment gains
control of the Sudan. It is situated at the source of Egypt's water supply.
Any objectionable or inimical action in the Sudan brings an i~ediate and -
- vigorous reaction in Cairo, (we shall return to this subject in article
describing a visit to the Aswan Dam). -
- We have already discussed the internal danger. The answer obviously lies
_ in a greater emphasis on the efficiency of the state's internal security
organization. As for threats along its land borders, it is quite clear _
that it has no need for the large army that has been u~aintained previously,
provided we can believe it has no designs on the Israeli front. All pre-
sent signs in the area indicate it intends to decrease the forces in the
future. However, this is a slaw process and will take a few years. At -
present, its intention is expressed by zero growth in the army. Gaps are
being left unfilled. Another significant indication is the fact that
' hundreds of officers are permitted to take off their uniforms and enter
civilian life. Essentially, the difficulty lies in finding proper employ-
ment for these new entrants into civilian life. It appears that many have
benn discharged, and not only from the senior echelons. In summarizing,
the intent is clearly to decrease the number of soldiers in the army but not
_ the number o~ regiments. The plan is to modernize the army--to make it
mobile with a high degree of preparedness.
- ~+l
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Ac:cordingly, ln tl~e tramewor.k of the new atrtttegy ttie Cgygtiti~iy wlll aeek
to develop an ability to ir~tervene militarily in various spots in the
Arab world and at greater distances. The plan is not for massive inter-
vention but rather for the ability to deliver a rapid reply and to supply
- immediate help. For this reason, Egypt must build a long arm comprising
adequate air pawer= many efficient transport planes, the ability to air-
- lift specific weapons systems and the reinforcement of special forces units
in the Egyptian Army. Judging from the readiness of the United States to
sell Egypt quantities of Hercules planes we may infer that Washington is
aware of this Egyptian objective and does not oppose it. It xecognizes the
old Egyptian striving to become a significant military factor in the Arab
world.
8995 -
CSO: 4805
~+2 -
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EGYPT
EGYPTIAN, ARAB REACTION TO DIPLOMATIC TIES VIEWID
- Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 29 Oct 79 p 9
[Article by Ze.'ev Schif: "Tensions Heightening as the Moment for the
Ambassadorial Exchange Approaches"]
- [Teyt] In order to judge the changes Egypt is undergoing and the varying ~
atmosphere in that great and populous country, I can advise nothing better
than periodic visits every few months. One has the opportunity of renewing -
old friendships as well as meeting new p.eople. The visitor has a chance
to compare the present answers with views he has heard in the past. Today, -
- signif icant changes have surfaced in Egypt. They are immediately apparent.
- More so than in the past, there is evidences of new building construction. -
Many buildings are in various stages of construction. Some of them we
remember seeing in their initial stages. Clearly the progress is slow, but
the work is continuing apace. Near the airport, a new Sheraton hotel has
- been opened. In the city's center, finishing touches are being put on a _
_ new Hilton hotel, the Rameses. Nearby, a super highway has been built
- leading to the big October Bridge over the Nile. .
After years of a boycott (due to the establishment of a bottling works in
Israel) Coca Cola is again being sold in Cairo. Pepsi Cola no longer
enjoys an exclusive market. Month by month, the American presence is -
becoming increasingly felta Clearly, the American diplomats are setting the
tone for the city. They are more knowledgeable about the Egyptian Army than _
, anybody else. In addition to their active military attach~s, there is a
coordinator in the military miss_.on who is engaged in military assistance.
Whereas the military attache 3.~ ~airectly accountable to the intelligence
unit in the Pentagon, the coordinator for some strange reason is account- .
able to the U.S. military command in Europe.
The presence of American touri.sts has become more apparent in various
parts of the country. Different Western types have taken over the places
in the casinos and at the roulette tables that were formerly occupied by
- sheikhs from the Persian Gulf kingdoms. Among these Westerners it is
not unusual to find many whose pockets are overflaraing with $100 bills.
~ ~+3
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- The great American Embassq in Cairo has adapted to the Egyptian and Muslin -
reality. Some time ago, it was decided to keep the embassy off ices open
on Sunday; traditionally, the day of rest for all Western embassies. The -
embassies are closed on Friday, the Moslem day ~of rest. The weekend for
American diplomats has changed, and the embassy has adapted itself to
Egyptian Government activities.
The Egyptian press, as in the past, is extensively engaged in the subject -
of Egypt's relations with the rest o~ the Arab world, the IDF withdrawal
from the Sinai and the grandiose development plans of President Sadat.
The tragedy in Cambodia receives scant notice. Many important Middle
East issues do not receive adequate coverage in the Egyptian press. It
is evident that in the framework of its relations with the arab world,
Egypt is approaching a crucial moment similar in importance to the Camp
David agreements and the signing of a peace agreement. By that I mean
the day in Februaxy 1980 when an Israeli ambassador is scheduled to arrive
in Cairo and the first Egyptian ambassador will arrive in Tel Aviv. This
will mark a significan+: crossroad in Sadat's relations with the Arab
world. President Sadat has stated that he is inalterably determined to -
follow through with the diplomatic exchange.
There are those in Cairo who say that another important event will precede -
the ambassadorial ex~hange; that is, the moment when Sadat arrives at Saint
Catihe;:ine's to lay the curnerstone at Mount Sinai for a mosque, a synagogue
and a church. The religious element is not too happy with the projected
' spectacle. It will be interpreted in Saudi Arabia as further proof of
the sco~n in which he holds it and the Arab world.
The religious fanatics say that Islam teaches tolerance for monotheistic
religions, Judaism and Christianity, but this can never be interpreted as
- meaning aid anci assistance to other religions. This is how they view
the spectacle of the erection of a syn~igogue and a church in conjunction
with a mosque. Tt?is explanation is not widely accep ted. Others say that
the sorp point with the Saudis is the return of Jerusalem to the bosom of
Islam. To them, everything else is marginal. Whatever the case may be,
it is already clear that the cer~mony planned by Sadat will not be a grandi-
ose as originally planned. It will be diminished in to a symbolic gesture.
There axe diff ering opinions about the wisdom of the conjunction of a
mosque, synagogue and church, but there is a unanimity about the gravity
of the day when the Israeli ambassador ar~rives in Cairo. Staff inembers
are convinced that new steps to punish Egypt will b e decided upon at the
upcoming Ar.ab summit meeting. They have already calculated the most -
likely hostile move--a number of the Arab states will expel a significant
n~raber of their Egyptian workers. This may entail s ome disruptions in
th~eir work force, but thay cannot afford to countenance the presence of an
- IsraeZi ambassador without a retaliatory move. The editor of an Egyptian
d~i1y t.old me that their aim will be not so much to punish President
Sadat as to hurt the E~}}?ptisn people as a whole.
m 44
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~veryone with whom I discussed this sub3~ct is convinced that Sadat will
not suffer this blow quietly. He will certainly resort to a new Egyptian
nationwide poll to support any steps he may be considering against the
- other Arab states. The Americans, of course, are the ones who will be -
- most concerned over this deterioration. They believe it was possible to
prevent a heightening of the antagoniams in the relations between Saudi ~
Arabia and Egypt. It is interesting that they blame President Sadat for
this deterioration. The Americans feel that Sadat lacked sensitivity and -
- was not properly deferential in his relations with Saudi royalty. He
- insulted them and only subsequently did they reply. The American diplo-
mats, first Eilits and now Atherton, have tried to persuade Sadat to be
more circumspect in his dealings with the ~audis.
Clearly in Sadat`s case, it is not merely a matter of proper deference and
respect. Some say that the Saudis angered him when they pressured King _
Hassan of Morocco to break off diplomatic relations with Egypt and to join
the rejectionist ~ront. At this point Sadat saw red in his relations with '
Saudi Arabia. The ~tory does not end here. The Egyptian Government con-
- tinues to be irritated. Egyptian intelligence is convinced that the Saudis
are attempting to influence Sudanese President Numayri to sever relations
with Sadat, and are using their money for this purpose. It appears that
they would like Numayri to stage an anti-Egyptian demonstration at the
moment the ambassadorial exchange takes place between Israel and Egypt. -
Ther.e is widespread speculation in the Egyptian capital as well as in -
Israel as to who will be the first Egyptian ambassador to Israel and also
as to where the Israeli Embassy will be located in Cairo. Ttao names are
being mentioned; Hassan Tohami, a presidential assistant who is currently
- a vice-premier. He is a religious mystic. He initiated the original
= meetings with Dayan in Morocco prior to Sadat's arrival in Jerusalem. The
other is Thah Magdov, a general on leave. Since 1974 he has coordinated
military contacts with Israel. He also acted as advisor to the Syrians in
the negotiations with Israel for a cease-fire. At present, he is an amb as-
sador at large and in the foreign off~ce he is the administrator of the -
- 'normalizatior.' project between Israel and Egypt. Others feel that the post
will go to a professional diplomat and that neither of the above-mentionEd
officials will be chosen.
Who the first ambassadors are is of small consequence. Clea~rly, the
- normalization process will not develop along the lines many Israelis `
expect. This coming February ambassadors will be exchanged, but the rela-
- tions between Israel and Egypt will not be as normal as one would expect
between two states who are common iieigt?bors. Form3ZZ5~, they will. c.on~duct
themselves according to the agreements. However, they will not waive their ~
trump card of 'normalization' in just a few months. I have no doubt they ~
will do all they can to slow the rapprochement. For example, I have been
- informed that E1 A1 planes will not immediately be permitted to land in
Cairo. The fact that diplomatic relations have been established between the
two states does not imply that they will iumiediately begin to develop air
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air connections. In this initial stage, the Egyptians would choose not
to see El A1 planes landing in Cairo. They would prefer charter or
similar arrangements. ~
_ The Egyptian slowdown in the normalization process stems from inter-Arab
causes and from svme tactical considerations vis-a-vis Israel. An Ameri-
can in Cairo who is privy to everything happening there explained that in -
thi;~ situation the Egyptians are very apprehensive. Tt is very much like
the yeting man who has dEClded to marry the ugly daughter of his wealthy
~ employer. The wedding ceremony has been arranged and the dawry has been
promised. The moment has arrived f or the groom to be 3oined to the ugly
daughter. This is the price and the Egyptians do not know how to adapt to
the situation. It is a picturesque illustration and not very flatterit?g
_ to israel. I have no doubt that many Egyptians feel this way.
- Whatever the case may be, from Israel's standpoint it would b e unwise for
us to appear overly anxious to embrace somebody who recoils from us. There
are more important things in the process of normalization--the exchange of
ambassadors and cultural relations. There are matters of lesser importance.
- It would be foolish for us to set an inflated figure on something whose real
value is insignificant. Most certainly, we must be careful not to allaw
Israeli tourists and sharp businessmen ~o engulf the Egyptians. Th;s can
be accomplished by limiting the licenses and exercising care to confine
trade matters to the respective governments.
8995
CSO: 4805 ~
~+6
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ISRAEL
CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE REVIEWS LEBANON, IRAN, ISLAMIC WORLD
TA071505 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 7 Dec 79 pp 1, 28 (Weekend
Supplement) TA
[Interview with Chief of Intelligence, Maj Gen Yehoshu'a Sagi, at his
office, by Eytan Haber--time not given]
[Text] Question: It has been reported in the media this week that 1,000
Iranian volunteers may arrive in southern Lebanon. Will such a thing
happen? "
Answer: In this per iod of instability wh3ch we are facing, even if I
cannot confirm such reports then I can say that radical developments may
take place, without any advance notice. We are in the midst of a process
in whicti new alliances are being created and joint interests are being
found between countries which could not see eye to eye in the past. On
the other hand, there is a freeze and even a decline in the relations
of coun~ries which we used to regard as allies.
Question: Do we have any e~idence of the imminent arrival of the Iranians? -
Answer: To the best of my knowledge, there is no evidence for this in the ~
field. However, I cannot rule out such a possibility. The Iranians maq
- indeed send 1,000 or 2,000 well-equipped believers to southern Lebanon
tomorrow.
Questio~i: Are the Syrians interested in such a development?
Answer: I do not think that at this point the Syrians will be happy to
see Iranian volunteers in Lebanon. The introduction of 1,000 Iranians
- means that a new element will arrive in Lebanon which will incite the -
southern area, since tteis area is inhabited by Shi'ites. I assume that
Khomeyni will not send his Sunnis to Lebanon. One must understand: 1,000
or more Iranians in Lebanon will constitute an element of force pressuring
the PLO t~ act. A conference was held in Tunis not very long ago. What
- was its main topic? Its main topic was the question of how to stop the
PLO activities in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese only and unambiguous -
demand of the conference was: stop the PLO's activities. It will be
possible to remove the Lebanese army to the south and gradually and slowly
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act~Ieve the reunification of Lebanon. An Iranian presence in Lebanon will
stir up the area. The significance of such a development is, in fact,
that the struggle does not favor President Sarkis today.
Question: Do PLO activities in southern Lebanon need the Syrian
President's approval?
Answer: I would say just the opposite. Had Al-Asad not been interested
_ in their activities, they would not be carried out.
- Question: Only in Lebanon?
Anawer: Certainly not. The same thing applies to the PLO in each and
_ every site in the Middle East and concerning its activities in Europe.
The PLO receives all its supplies and ammunition from Syria. Its training
bases are located in Syria. The headquarters of the terror organizations -
are in Beirut, which is under Syrian control. The PLO is not as flexible
and free in its activities as it used to be until not very long ago.
Question: Does it mean that the Syrians can also decide to massively -
step up terrorist activities against Israel? And if so, when is it ~;oing ~
to happen? ~
Answer: This could happen if the Syrians decide that the present situation
in thc arena is i~ncomfortable. Why? Because of hundreds of reasons. Do
you want a good reason? On 26 January two-thirds of the Sinai will be -
returned to Egypt. The Egyptians can then present this as an achievement
to the Arab world. However, what can the Syrians say? On 2.6 February
the Israeli ambassador will present his credentials to the Egyptian -
President. Is this a good enough reason? Egypt presents achievements
while Syria, in its own way, has not accomplished anything.
Questien: In his present condition, can A1-Asad allow himself to carry
- out massive activities against Israel? _
Answer: Here is another good reason: A1-Asad is facing difficult domestic
problems. He needs, perhaps, to show some action. Against whom? Against
Israel. Public figu.res an3 other people are killed in Syria. Syria's
prestige has recently declined first and foremost among the fighting
Arab front. Syria stands isolated.
Question: And who is replacing it?
- Answer: Iraq is striving to achieve a defense pact of the Persian Gulf -
states against Iran. If it succeeds, the inference on Syria is clear.
Question: At one time we used to say that, for example, the introduction
of a foreign element into Jordan would constitute a reason for war. In
your opinion what should Israel's military reaction to an Iranian presence
~ in Lebanon be?
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_ Answer: It depends on its composition. If 1,000 volunteers arrive
equipped with light weaponb, then we will have 16,000 terrorists in -
southern Lebanon instead of 15,000. Nowever, if an Iranian armored
brigAde or a mechanized brigade or a commando brigade and ita commandera
moves into Lebanon, then we will have a probleml
Question: And how can this problem be solved?
_ Answer: I do not think this will be the situation. I believe that an
organized group will not arrive. At the most, 1,000 Iranian volunteers
= will arrive. They will join the existing terrorist force in southern
Lebanon. And what about us? We better not delude ourselves. Activities
from Lebanbn have noC stopped, they have only grown more silent--not
_ only becau-se of Arab pressure but in the wake of our successes.
[TA071522] Question: Is it possible that we might see,YIranian troops
in the fro#~t in the next war? Will the next war be against the entire
Muslim world?
Answer: First of all, at the moment there is no Iranian regular army.
_ Out of the entire army existing during the shah's rule only the navy
can reasonab~.y be put into action. Today, there is hardly any general
in the Iranian Army who also served as a general during the shah's rule. -
The present generals are people who were expelled from Iran and who sat
in exile for 25 years, detached frorn any military activitieso The
qualifications currently demande.j of Iranian generals are: religious
devotion, loyalty to Khomeyn{. and nothing else.
Question: What about other Muslim countries? Will they participate in a -
war?
- Answer: Along with Syria, Jordan, the terrorists in Lebanon and Egypt--
which may have gotten out of the war circle--there are other countries
' in the region which we assume will participate in a war, such as Libya, _
- Algeria and Kuwait.
~ Question: What about those countries which did not fight against us in
the Yom Kippur War?
Answer: I� the Muslim wave gains strength other Muslim countries which
did not fight against us in the p~~st may join the war. However, I do
_ not think that this wave will ga3.n strength for the time being because
the Muslim-Shi'ite wave is alrealy encountering a restraining opposit ion
from the other faction of Islar.n, che Sunni Nuslims. -
Question: Where is the other kind of Islam awakened?
~ Answer: There is an awaket~ing in Saudi Arabia, Iraq has carried out
several operations, as well as certain countries in the Persian Gulf. -
- ~+9
R
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I think that something is also taking place in Syria despite their rap- -
prochement with Iran. One should remember that Syria is ruled by the
_ Aiawite minority of the Sunni majority, These operations and activities
- constitute a red light to the Shi'ite wave. Therefore, this is e F
: reason why I beYieve that the Syrians will not allow more th~.,. ~,000 -
Iranians into Lebanon.
Question: Is the Middle East on the threshold of a new era? Will
Khomeynism spread to other Arab countries?
Answer: The upheaval in Iran has created a new situation in the Middle �
East. First of all, the military-strategic balance which existed for many
years between the shah`s army and the Iraqi army has disappeared. The
~ balance of forces has disappeared and operational capabilities have been
_ reduced. The enormous influ~ence which a superpower such as the United
States enjoyed--with which Iran completely identified as an ally--has
disappeared. There were other countries in the Persian ^ulf �ahose
security policy entirely reli~d on t?~e U.S. forces, whatever happened
to the neighboring countries. This situation did not stand the test -
in the shah's case. The image of U,S, strength deteriorated. When such ~ '
a thing happens ~o a country =,a~ich relies on the United States, then it
has a traumatic impact on otY~~r countries as well.
Question: Where, then, will Khomeynism lead? Will the other countries
give in to him in a domino process?
- Answer: The rise of religious regimes has an influence on some of the
Persian Gulf countries, particularly on Iraq. Forty percent of the
Iraqi population is Shi'ite. The domino process can also work in Kuwait
and Bahrain where there are many Shi'ites. Thera are not many Shi'ites ~
in Saudi Arabia. However, there are many aliens (1 million Yemenites,
= 200, 000 Palestinians) who constitute a potential force for such acti-
- vities. The rule existing at the time of the Roman Empire "If Sulla
can, I can too" holds true in this case as well. If Khomeyni co~:id
make it in Teheran, why should I not do the same in Saudi Arabia and
get rid of the royal family? Now one r_an also notice the rapprochement
between Syria and Iran behind Iraq's back. I would not be surprised to
see Iranian delegations arriving in Syria and vice versa. I would not
_ be surprised if Iran gave economic aid to Syria. Why would Iran be
interested in it? So the Syrians keep the Iraqis occupied. The Iraqis
are the force hovering over Iran�s head.
Question: What are the relations betewen the PLO and Khomeyni?
Answer: There is a stock exchange of terrorist organizations whose head-
quarters is in Beirut, mainly because the PLO has an advantage over the
~ other groups. The PLO has physical bases in the field. Even before
the shah was deposed the PLO had trained several hundred Iranians. The
PLO provided them with arms even before the beginning of the dist~urbances
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which brought about the collapse of the shah. There are reports about
Palestinians who currently surround Khomeyni as his guards. 'Arafat
_ himself patted his back in the first moments after Khomeyni's rise to
power. As wil~ be recalled, `Arafat was allowed to have a representa-
- tion there. A carpet was layed down for him, the same huge carpet which
was woven for Hitler. That carpet made its way to Europe, was later
purchased by the Iranian Jewish community as a present to the Israeli -
Embassy.
Question: Is it possible that the Palestinians helped the Iranians take
over the U.S. Embassy?
Answer: In my opinion, the Palestinians are walking around the place, Who
invented the trick of taking over embassies? However, it will also be
true to say the PLO does not have a dominant influence on Khomeyni if
= their conceptions clash with those he holds. This influence did not
work when 'Arafat asks him to concede on the issue of the shah. Why?
Because we are not deali.ng here with a regime which recognizes world
customs, diplomacy, a regime which differentiates between good and evil.
[TA071541] Question: Can Khomeynism influenc~ the chances of peace with -
Egypt?
Answer: The phenomena accompanying Khomeynism could have an impact. The
Middle East could find itself in a chaos of rivalries, regional wars
and fighting arenas. Why? We may find ourselves in a chaotic situation
where the Iraqis could try and impose a reg3onal order, the Soviet Union
could interfere and perhaps, the United States woul.d have something to
' say. This state of affairs could create new siti:ations which would
affect Egypt. -
Question: And will Al-Sadat fall from power?
Answer: In my opinion, so long as Al-Sadat remains the same persons and
no new situations are created forcing him to make a choice bet~aeen having
- peace or the collapse of his regime or an economic collapse he, as the
Egyptian president, will continue to follow the same line 1: has taken -
so far--and he is not doing that badly! ~
~ Question: As chief of int~elligence, do you ever wake up in the middle ~
_ of' the night bathed in ~old sweat and think: To hell with it, perhaps
- all this is an unprecedented far-reaching camouflage plan?
Answer: I wake up in the middle of the night not necessarily covered by
cold sweat but usually when the telephone rings. ~
Question: You have vxsited Egypt. Is it the same Egypt you imagined -
from the intelligence papers and reports?
Answer: Yes, to a certain extent: We have left several bases [in the
- Sinai], that of Umm Khushayb being the largest and the most famous.
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ironically enough, those bases--and not others--we have recently given
away were the ones in whic.h we invested vast sums of money over the
years. How much money? Billions of Israeli pounds! And Israeli pounds
having the value of those days!
Question: Does the harm to our alert system add white hairs to your head?
- Answer: It does not make black hair grow. However, it is important
to note that immediately after A1-Sadat's visit, about 2 y2ars ago, -
we began to plan the infrastructure for a new alert system. Therefore,
today, we are in the midst of a process and not at its beginning.
Question: Is the eastern front considering war? _
Answer: In my opinion, in the present conditions of a Jordanian-Syrian, ~
Iraqi coalition the chances of war have decreased. However, this does
_ not mean that war is not possible, A credibility crisis exists between
_ Syria and Iraq. However, at the time, during their process of rapproche-
ment, an infrastructure was built which can be renewed in a very short
period of time.
- Question: Excuse me for the rude word. Is this not a"conception."
Answer: No! This is a factual description! I emphasized that the
- P_X15rlllg, inFrastructure makes it possible to act in a very short
_ period of tine.
_ Question: The military infrastructure?
- Answer: Both political and military. An infrastructure of roads, ports
and contacts. These elements have recently been undergoing a process ~
of disintegration. However, I repeat: This coalition can wake up again
in a very short period of ti~e. This does not look unreasonable in the
present circumstance,. However, one should ask what will happen if one ~
of the countries--Syria, for example--sets out to war on its own. What
will happen then? Will the other countries abandon it to its own fate?
Question: And what is your answer to your own question?
, Answer: I believe that the other countries will not abandon it. We must
take into consideration that in spite of all the hostility between Iraq
and S~ria, Iraq--and Jordan--will come to Syria's aid. -
Question: Will Syria set out to war with Israel on its owc~?
Answer: A limited war with short-term targets could be possible perhaps
with the intention of raising the problem, just as Egypt did in the
Yom Kippur War. ,
Question: And what will Egypt do in such a case?
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Answer: Egypt will then be faced with a problem since it has not revoked
its signature on the Arab mutual assistance agreement. Egypt will
certainly be asked to join the war. I assume that it will not participate
in practice and will rel~ictantly make do with statements and condemna-
tions. It will have to act in some way. This is the reason why I have
frequen~tly said that peace has to be put to the test of time and it
should not be accepted as Moses bible. One cannot say: From now on ~
this story is over.
Question: Is the eastern front prepared for war?
Answer: Indeed! Syria alone today has over 2,000 tanks compared to
1,500-1,600 tank~s it had in the Yom Kippur War--and I am not talking
about quality nnw. In 1973 the Syrians had two armored divisions, ~
today they have four. The Jordanian Army was a defensive one mainly
relying on infantry and armored units for counteroffensives. Today, it
is a full offensive army, with ~echanized and armored units and possessing
excellent U.S. arms. Just as the IDF, the Jordanian Army is assisted
by mobile artille~y and anti-aircraft equipment. All these under an
- umbrella of batteries of ground-to-air missiles which did not exist in
the past. Today they also have a small but very effective air force.
Question: And the Iraqis?
Answer: They had six divisions in the Yom Rippur War and today they have
2 divisions. Iraq has doubled its army and strength. The Iraqi Army has
_ a fleet of carriers making possible the strategic movement of armored -
forces from Iraq on a very short notice. Iraq would today threaten us _
at least to the same extent as Jordan.
[TA071559] Question: Can a war start on the eastern front by pushing a
button? -
Answer: I do not believe so, if the reference is to a war of the eastern
coalition--namely, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. If the reference is to Syria
alone then the answer is positive, on certain forms of war, such as aerial
fighting. =
Question: Is the Syrian Army the most dangerous one? -
Answer: The Syrian Army of the Yom Kippur War and that of today are two
different armies. For example: If I am not mistaken, in the Yom Kippur
- War they had 300-400 "T-62" tanks whereas today this tank is present in
all the armored divisions. They also have several dozens of tanks even
more sophisticated than the T-62's.
Question: Do a few dozens of T-62's have any significance in the battle
arena?
Answer: Yes. This is a sophisticated tank with a different quality of
_ c~nnon and bodv, I also want to draw your attention to the deal Jordan
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has made on receiving 275 Chieftain tanks, which means that an excellent
tank is introduced in the arena. Let us return to the Syrian Army: a
vast part of their armored divisions is equipped with "B.M.P." troop-
carriers which do not onZy carry personnel. This is a vehicle also
_ equipped with a cannon. They had only 100-200 vehicles of this kind in
the Yom Kippur War, not to mention the Syrian Air Force which is today -
_ formed by MIG-21's, Sukhoi-22's which did not exist then and MIG-25's -
as interceptors at high altitudes.
Quection: Will the terrorists appear as an army in an additional war?
Answer: I do not think so. In the internal arena, [sentence apparently
dropped] tercorists in other numbers. It is more dangerous to us if
they appear in small units. ~
- Question: Will it be true to say that there has been a signtficant
decline in terrorist activities?
= Answer: I do not think so. In the internal arena---both in the territories
and in Israel--the security forces have been more successful in averting
terrorists acts and thati is why it seems as if there is a decline in their
activity. There has been no decline in sabotage acts carried out from
the sea. On the contrary, there have already hePn four maritime opera-
tions since the terrorist act in Nahariya ir~ April 1979. One should
remember that in the past there were longei~ intervals between maritime
- operations. Several years have gone by since their landing at the
Tel Aviv beach in March 1975 until another unit landed in Tel Aviv's
marine and another gro~.ip reached the coastal road.
Question: What does the terrorists' navy look like?
Answer: Naval units train in Y~ebanon. They have boats, botti motherships
and rubber boats, kayaks and even air-filled mattresses. Anyth~ng that
floats serves them as a vehicle. They also learn their lessons and try
not to repeat the same errors. Their targets have also changed. Their
purpose is no longer to take hostages, but to kill and kidnap. -
Question: The fact that the PLO wants to put 'Isam Sirtawi on trial
because he accepted a co~non award with Arye Eli'av--does it indicate
the existence of a moderate PLO and of differences of opinion within the
PLO between doves and hawks?
. Answer: So far, I have not succeeded in locating a moderate PLO. On the
- other hand, I have spotted their intelligence in conveying their message
to the world. Please notice how they only talk about the establishment
of a democratic state without saying a word that it is tiieir intention
to set up such a state on the entire territory of Eretz Yisra'el. The
PLO has not softened its positions, it has only formulated them in a more =
sophisticated way. We conducted an analysis to check whether the PLO had
- undergone any changes and we did not find any appeasin~ tones. -
~
- ~
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- Question: There was a junior lieutenant Siman~tov in the Yom Kippur War '
who sounded the alarm. As chief of intelligence, could such a man make
his way to you today?
Answer: By the way, that famous lieutenant Siman-tov was reared by me.
I taught him when I served as intelligence officer in the southern command.
As for your question: when it comes to issues of assessment, every
officer can make his way to me. Whoever has any reservations as far as
- assessment is concerned reaches me. There have been cases where junior
officers reached me. This custam wa~ introduced when Shlomo Gazit served
as chief of intelligence.
Question: Does the image of a weak and unstable Israel provoke any ideas -
among our enemies?
Answer: The image of a weak and unstable state may indeed constitute
a bait and a consideratiott in the decision-making process of the Arab
countries.
- CSO: 4805 _
~
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ISRAEL
BRIEFS ~
UNEMPLOYMENT SITUATION--The demand for workers in November 1979 has
reached 27,000--1,000 less than in November 1978. The employment service
says that there is still a demand in Israel for more than 5,000 workers,
compared with a demand for 10,000 last year. Labor and Social Betterment
_ Minister Yisra'el Katz has told our correspondenf Yig'al Rom that this '
data does not merit talk about a wave of dismissals, and added that =
unemployment is distant. In November 1979, only 1,050 people received ~
unemployment payments. Minister Yisra'el Jatz made these statements
- during a tour of the Bet Shemesh Engine Company. [Text] [TA061723
Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1600 GMT 6 Dec 79 TA]
INCREASED INTEREST RATES--In 15 days, on 9 December, the bank interest will
be increased 15 percent. Then the interest for unapproved overdrafts "
wi1Z be 130 percent. The banks' decision to ra~se the interest rate has
been made in light of the recent steps taken by the cabinet. About 10 days
ago, on 15 November, the interest rate was increa:~ed 10 percent. The
basic commercial interest has now, after the increase, reached 80 percent,
" but one silould add 4 percent commission for allocatinR credit. All in
all, the basic interest will be 84 percent. The banks have also decided
_ to raise the interest rates for extraordinary overdrafts by a further
15 percent. Iti other words, in addition to the basic 84 percent, there
will be an additional 45 percent interest rate on unapproved overdrafts
instead of the 30 percent demanded currently, in total, 130 percent.
~ The banking system currently suffers a 6.5 billion pound liquidity
deficit. The fin~s which the banks current~y pay for exceeding the _
volume of credit given them by the Bank of Israel have in effect reached
250 pexcent, so that the banks are interested in moderat3ng the demand
for credit. [Excerpt] [TA231207 Beni Baraq, Te1 Aviv YEDI~OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 2.i Nov 79 p 3 TA]
_ NEW SETTLEMENT HOUSING--According to the Jewish Agency Settlement Depart-
ment there will be about 40,000 families in Judaea and Samaria at the
end of the 5-year autonomy period. I learned about this yesterday from _
the settlement department's chairman, Matityahu Drobles. About 5,000
apartments will be constructed in Judaea and Samaria this year. According
to Drobles' plan, the apartments will be built by private contractors who
will receive political guarantees from the government against the possibility
of a change in the status of the area. The government will also buy from the
contractors all the apartments that cannot be sold on the free market.
Drobles also proposes that the government give the contractors about 30 per-
cent of the cost of the project as an advance payment before be~inning work.
[TA281214 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 28 Nov 79 p 1 TA]
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~ ,
KUFIAIT
U13ITED S'~ATES WILL EXPLOIT IRAN CRISIS FOR ITS OWN INTERESTS
Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMri in Arabic 9 Nov 79 pp 1, 19
- [Editorial: "U.S. Embassy and Gulf"]
[Text] It is certain that the potentials projected by the new Iranian- -
U.S, crisis bear within their folds dimensions ~hat are difficult to deter-
mine now and that do not seem confined to the framework of an embassy and
the release of hostages but that will go beyond this framework to affect
" the situation in the Gulf area generally.
The Iranians know definitely that the d~mand for handing over the shah in
return for evacuating the embassy cannot and will not be met for several
considerations, the first being the fact that a country like the United
States will not permit its prestige to be trampled in this manner even
though it knows that many condemn its foreign poli~cy altogether, and
particularly in the Middle East.
Therefore, it must be that this Iranian demonstration is seeking to achieve
realistic goals behind the occupation of the embassy. Perhaps these goals
are connected with the domestic Tranian cond3tions and need such a bif;
stone [sic]. It is most likely that the Tranian leadership's fears
intensified after the shah's trans#er to a New York hospi.tal for treatment
and that the Iranian memory recalled the possibility of restoring the
shah to the peacock crown, as happened in 1953~
The appeal which Imam Khomeyni has addressed to his people in a live broad~ -
- cast and in which he told them "do not fear" :~s interesting. This indicates
- that there ;s concern over mysterious events that will take place as a
consequence of the embassy seizure.
_ Naturally, the United States will not let this issue pass without trying -
to exploit it in its interest at the level of the entire Gulf because
this issue may provide it with the pretext to claim that matters in the
Gulf, which is considered ona of its m~st vital interests~ as it always
says, are not as well as they should be and that, therefore, arrangements
must bP made to enable the U~S. fist to move and to strike more swiftly
and precisely.
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~
It is mo~t iikE~y ~hat th~ U.So ears are fully attentive to the Israeli
advice in this regard. Perhaps the film "Entebbe Operation" wi11 be shown
_ anew and other similar stories will be repeated. However, those who find
it unlikely that the United States will embark on direct military action
concerning the embassy issue do not find it unlikely, and even ~ssume,
that as a result of this operation [embassy seizure], the Washington
administration will push the Gulf situation to the brink. Many believe
that Washington has been waiting for an occasion--perhaps like this one--
to embark on such an effort.
This is why some say that Washington "has permitted" the shah to get sick
in New York so that events may follow one another in quick succession and
so that the door to the crisis may be opened,
This is fundamentally Kissinger's way of leading crises toward the explosion
point and of then moving to make new arrangements.
Perhaps all the current moves concerning this issue and revolving around it
bear in their folds the features of a crossing toward a new situation which
= is still ambiguous.
At best, it is inevitable that what has happened~-in the light of the
development of events and of the future consequences--will project equations
, and wi11 produce convictions and visualizations connected with the calcu-
lati.ons of all the forces in the area.
_ The Americans, especially in cases like this one, never ask anybody about -
carrying out their dec isions. In this regard, Kissinger says in his
memoirs that when the 1970 events in Jordan and the Syrian military
intervention were discussed, it had been decided that an Israeli military
move wou13 be staged to counter the Syrians. When some people said that
King Husayn's opinion had to be explored, Kissinger's opinion was: "We
should not risk King Husayn's position by asking him a question he cannot
answer. He may approve that which he can never ask for~" -
- This means that the U.S, policy planners make assumptions that serve their
_ interests and carry out these assumptions on the basis of fait accompli
on the one hand and the basis that the other side approves these assumptions,
without asking for them, on the other hand. In the light of this theory,
the U.S. policy can be understood and then anything can be expected.
84 94
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KUWAIT
AMERICAN LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF MIDDLE EAST DECRIED
Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMHI in Arabic 8 Nov 79 pp 1, 19 -
[Editorial: "Occupied United States and Palestine"]
~ [Text] If there is a benefit in occupying the U.S. Embassy in Teheran and _
threaterting the life of its workers, then this benefit is summed up, at
least, in having the Americans taste occupation, even if it is only the
occupation of their embassy, and fee1, both as rulers and citizens, the
- ' gravity ~of having the life of some of their citizens threatened. They may -
= thus understand the meaning of the occupation of a homeland, evicting its -
people and threatening the lives of thousands of its citizens, i.e., �
understa~nd th~ meaning of the occupation of Palestine, of denying its -
_ people the ir right to iheir homeland and tl~eir sovereignty over it and of =
~ denying its citizens a guarantee against threats, terrorization and murder. '
It is nothing more than an embassy and several dozen Americans. However,
the matter constitute~ in its deep sense some kind of occupation of
U.S. territory. This calls on Washington to understand truly, or at least =
lo~ically, the rejection by peoples, including the Palestinian people, of
the aggression committed against them. It is an opportunity for the ~
United States to learn how to deal with and how to reach people through
mutual res pect and through recognit3on of peoples' rights and not through
plotting, oppression and the backing of oppression. Nobody is by nature -
an enemy of the United States. The United States itself creates against
~ itself all these enemies who are justified in their hostility because they
possess nothing other than this hostility with which to defend themselves,
their rights and their homelands.
Perhaps the strangest U.S. theoryt despite all the facts to the contrary,
is the lud icrous statement made by Harold Sounders, one of the top U.S.
officials, on the ~oals of the U.S. policy in the Middle East. He has
sa~d: "The goal of our presence in the arQa is,~verbatim~-to help its
states to preserve their independence against any foreign intervention,"
Who can be lieve such words when he sees quite the opposite and when he sees
that the "foreign interver~tion" that threatens the independence of the
area states emanates more from the United States-~and with its Israel, _
- its spearhead--than from any other country?
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- How can we believe such a claim when we have been witnessing daily through-
out the past 30 years that the usurpation of Palestine took place under the
_ U.S. patronage and that this usurpation is still growing and escalating
under this patronage and through the U.S. weapons delivered t o Israel?
Moreover, what are these "independences" that are "protected" by the
United States and how can they continue to be "independences" as long as
they need the U.S. "help?"
If Washington were truly worliing to provide this help, it would have
prevented Israel from occupying territories, it would have stopped support-
ing and ad~pting the Israeli expansion and would have withheld from Israel
- weapons that cannot be countered and that can shoot down Arab aircraft from
a distance of 10 kilometers.
De~pite all the potentials of danger, we cannot but support whoever reminds
the United States that a certain tree could not reach its God so that this
_ American tree may perhaps remember and learn that Palestine is under no -
condition less important than its embassy in Teheran and that the American -
� hostages held there are not more important than the Palestinian people who
want nothing more than their homeland and their right to life, sovereignty
- and freedom--nothing more.
But dPSFite this, we do not believe that the United States will remember, -
noC even if it is true--and we hope that it is true~-that the PLO will
= mediate with the Teheran authorities to release the U.S. citizer~s. This
- is because we are certain that even if the PLO lights its 10 fingers
and covers its face with all the cosmetics in the world, the United States
would still not want it unless the PLO agrees with the. wishes of the
- States, i.e., none of Palestine jfor the.Palestinian stateJ.. Ultimately,
the issue is connected with two antitheses: The United State s, for
countless reasons, cannot be with us and with right. Therefore, it is
against Palestiue, the PLO and the Ara~s.
Therefore, dealings with the United States ara no longer subj ect to
multiple choices. It seems that those who have taken the only choice,
though being the desperate choice, are the ones who have succeeded and
triumphed.
- 8494
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KUWAIT
'AL-SIYASAH' WARNS OF IRANIAN CRISIS' POTENTIAL FOR DISASTER
. Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 11 Nov 79 p 1
[Editorial by Ahmad al-Jarallah: "Exorbitant Price That World May Pay
for Head of Man Who Is About To Die"]
[Text] Znternationally, what has happened in Iran cannot be accepted
. because it constitutes a violation of international traditions and usage,
- especially since the official Iranian administration blesses what has
happened, namely occupation of the U.S. Embassy. It has been customary
for such a violat ion of diplomatic traditions to come from irresponsible
circles and for the crisis to be then settled through cooperation between
' the local autho`rities and the victimized party.
The issue here is not one of testing the Iranian strength against the
- U.S, strength. The comparison is not valid and has no foundation because
the circumstances are different. Iran on its part continues to be
capable of moving in any direction it deems fit, even if it violates inter-
national traditions and usage and the logic of international relations
whereas the United States cannot, on its part, move except through the -
rules of. the sequence of authority through the Congress, the intelligence,
the army class jestablishment] or the White House experts.
= It is true that Teheran's and Washington's conditions are different insofar
as the degree of flexibility of each of them is concerned but there is no
doubt that the ultimate loser i,s world confidence in the Iranian policy which -
will not realize, regardless of what it does, i~s demand of having the
shah handed over,--not even if a th3rd world war erupts. Handing over the
shah by a democra~ic country~ and by a countxy 13.ke the United States in
particular, is sameth3ng that goes through channels which everybody knows ~
are complicated channels. Any simple political thinker understands before
hand that the end will not be this simple. Those occupying the U.S. Embassy
have n~t demanded the handing over of the shah from an Atrican state or f xom
one of those states whose dictionaries contiain a thousand and one hundred
meanings and ~ustifications ~or th2 phrase "public interest." In the
United States, there is no such a thing as public interest as long as the
law is clear and its controls are apparent. Therefore, Iran will be the
losing side in the dangerous game. Carter. has already initiated his plans
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la Inrll~ thc U.S, public~ opinion against Iran and to put the Congress under
a national pressure that allows him to act flexibly and in freedom from
the legislative authority's pressure. The shah's issue may turn :~nto
a challenge under which Carter finds himself facing local U.S, pres~ure to
keep the shah in the United States, having conducted a campaiRn to arouse
~ sympathy in the shah's interes~t. It is enough now that there are demonstra-
tions in the United States against the current Iranian regim2. These
demonstrations are different from the ones staged a few months ago in support
of what had happened in Iran and demanding that the shah be refused asylum
in the United States. The situation has now changed in favor of the shah. -
On the other hand, there may be other arrangements which involve the elements
of a challenge between the U.S. strength and the Iranian strength and which
may move matters toward the dangerous phase. This is what. the Iranian
regime should realize so that the world may [not] find itself compelled
to pay an exorbitant price for the head of a man who is about to die.
The issue is ultimately on~ of principles. In years past, Al~eria was
destroyed because the French ambassador had been insulted at a meeting _
- with the ruler of Algeria. Yes, the situation is dangerous Insofar as all
the potentials are concerned. The Iranian regime is supposed to reconsider ~
, its calculations not to push danger away from itself but to maintain the
trust it enjoys as a state in the international community.
8494
CSO: 4802
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KUWATT
IDITORIAL SPECULATES ON KHOMEYNI' S ROLE
Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 12 Nov 79 p 1
[Editorial by Ahmad a1~Jarallah :"What If Khomeyni Disappears Now")
(Text] It is evident from the interview given by outgoing Iranian Prime
Minister Bazargan to the Italian paper (ORIANA FILACCI) that the situation
in Iran is governed by a general feeling among all those who helped the
revoluti,on or those who danced and cheered for it that any one of them has .
the right to hold the reins in iran. This is a feeling that even the =
revol~:tion leader finds diffi~cult to restrain.
Before coming into existence, the Iranian revolution needed alternative
cadres to take control of affairs so that pow~r may not be divided among
numerous blocs, each of which believes that its theories ar~ the best and
that it is the bloc close to Khomeyni, the revoluti.on leader. Even though
the Iranian leadership feels that all are important, getting matters under
control will continue to need a position that clashes with extremely
delicate senti.ments and feelings~ Getting ma.tters under control will have
to inevitably be at the expense of some factions that have found in the
revoluti:,on a gain that may nat be material but an emotional one-~a gain =
whereby .some people are content to be able to raise their voice ^.alling for
the shah's death or perhaps for dragging Carter and confronting the United
States . -
Insofar as the domestic Traniar~ situation is concerned, Bazargan~s interview
~ concains a succinct summary of what all, including the leadership itself,
are suffering. Thsre is no doubt that the Iranian leadership truly desires
, to set matters aright. But the ecstasy of the situation whose events have
_ blown on Iran swiftly cor.tinues to intoxicate many people who cling to their
weat~ons and find pleasure 3.n shouting against the shah~-even though he is
_ no longer an issue~~and against Carter, the United States and imperialism!
These are people who have been whispering their sentiments for 3Q years
- and who have now gotten a sudden opportunity to raise their voices . These -
people cannot be guided easily now. The situation will be critical if
' Khomeyni disappears from the stage of the country whose people are still
intoxicated by what has happened . _
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_
LEBANON
BRIEFS
SARKIS TO VISIT MOSCOW, WASHINGTON--Lebanese front information sources have -
said that President Ilyas Sarkis will visit the United States, the Soviet ~
Union and some European capitals to expl_ain th~ situation in Lebanon and
the need to preserve its safety and independence, because any failure to ~
d~ so would constitute a danger to the security of the area and the world.
_ [Excerpt] [LD071625 London AL-S~IARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 4 Dec 79 p 1 LD]
CS~: 4802
_ '
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SAUDI ARABIA
KING REAFFiRMS SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIANS
Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 10 Nov 79 pp 15-16
[Article: "King Khalid and the ~ao Palestinian Positions"]
[TextJ In the course of 10 days, King Khalid ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz placed
on record two positions which mean a great deal for the Palestinian
cause. The two positions originate from the same conviction. -
Th.e first position came in some remarks which the Saudi monarch made to r
pilgrims on 27 October. He said: "The Islamic nation is firmly resolved
to regain our occupied lands, especially the exalted city of Jerusalem,
and obtain the return of the legitimate rights to our Palestinian bretheran,
'and we will use all possible means to achieve these goals."
The second position appeared in a telegram which King Khalid ibn 'Abd-al-
- Aziz sent to the "World Conference of Solidarity With the Arab People and
and Its Central Cause, Palestine." In this telegram, the king reiterated -
Saudi Arabia's support for the Palestinian people's struggle to regain
their homeland and their rights--especially Jerusalem--and indicatec~ that
the resources of his country will continue to be dedicated to the service
of the causes of Arab destiny.
It is interesting that King Khalid's telegram to the conference, which was
held in Lisbon, was read along with similar telegrams of support from
Brezhnew, Tito, King Husayn, King Hassan II, President Habib Bour.guiba
and the leaders of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Greece.
It is also interesting that King Khalid assigned the Saudi ambassador in
Madrid to go to Lisbon and read the *_elegram in person, rather than al-
lowing it to be read by proxy.
In the context of Saudi concern for the Palestinians, the PALESTINE NEWS
AGENCY (WAFA) stated that Saudi Arabia has decided to give the PLO a dona- -
tion of $2 million to complete the final phase of construction of a home
for children of Palestinian martyrs and activists in Syria.
This home, which will be named after. the Kingdom of Saudia Arabia, will cost
_ a total of $5 million. The kingdom paid $1 million when construction on the -
- home began and will pay the additional $2 million soon.
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J
SAUDI ARABIA
CONTi2ACT FOR LARGE FERTILIZER PROJECT SIGNED ~
Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 8 Nov 79 p 2
- [Article by Sultan al-Bazi'i: "Signing of $300-Million Contract for
Fertilizer Project; Methanol Project Contract To Be Signed Within 3 -
Weeks With Construction To Begin in Early 1980"]
[Text] During the first week of December, a contract will be signed between ~
the Saudi Basic Industries Company (SABIC) and the Chinese Fertilizer Com-
pany for a joint fertilizer pro~ect which will be established in al-Jubayl �
and will produce 500,000 tons of urea annually. Construction on the pro~-
ect is expected to begin during 1980. AL-RIYAD has learned that the proj-
~ct wi~L~ cost $3U0 million. � -
_ This information came in a statement to AL-RIYAD by Engineer 'Abd-al-'Aziz
al-Zamil, vice chairman and appointed member of SABIC's board of directors.
The.entire output of the project will be for export, and the Taiwanese
partner has gledged to buy 60 percent of the project's production for use
in Taiwan.
tn addition, Engineer al-Zamil told AL-RIYAD that tlie contract for methanol
production project approved between SABIC and a Japanese group w:ill ~a ~
signed within 3 weeks, with construction to begin in early 1980.. Eight
Saudi engineers have completed training periods in Japan ranging from 1 to
2 years. They will participate in the work of the project from the begin-
ning. It is worth mentioning that the project will employ a maximum of
180 workers. According to Engineer al-Zamil, this will facilitate the
_ process of placing Saudis in these jobs after they have undergone training. -
The project will have a production capac~ty of 2,000 tons of synthetic
methanol per day. 1'he cost of the project is estimated at 900 million
Saudi riyals. Construction is expected to take 3 years with production ~
beginning early in 1983.
The substance methanol is used in many manufacturing industries. It is
converted into methyl chloride, which is used in the production of synthetic
rubber and substances used in the cosmetics and drug industxies to prevent
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water absorption. It is also used as a substitute for starch and in paint .
products and adhesives, and is converted into acetic acid which is used in -
the manufacture of plastics and adhesives. Ia addition, methanol is con-
verted into formaldehyde which is used as a glycerine substitute, in the
manufacture of synthetic sponges, in the manufacture of adhesives for the
construction and wood products industries , in the manufacture of plastics
used in the electric industries and in household utensils and paints,
and in the soil improvement industry.
Nieanwhile, AL-RIYAD has learned that a meeting will be held in December
between SABIC and Shell Oil Company off icials to deal with some details of
an agreement whereby Shell Oil Company wi 11 participate with SABIC in the
construction of a petrochemical complex to produce ethylene, styrene,
ethylene dichloride, crude synthetic ethanol and caustic soda..
8591
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SAUDI ARABIA
BRIEFS
AIRPORT CONSTRUCTION--Some 316 million riyals will be spent for the con-
struction of new buildings and lounges at the Jiddah, Dhahran and Riyadh
_ airports. These facilities are needed to improve services at the air-
ports in view of the constant increase in the number of travellers to ttee
kingdom. Meanwhile, the General Administration for Civil Aviation is ex-
pected to complete the first phase of the new Jiddah International Airport
sometime next year, in addition to constructing international airports '
~ in Riyadh and Dhahran. Contracts for the preparation of studies and plans
for the latter two airports have already been awarded. In the same field,
small airports have been constructed at Ha'il, Badanah and Abha~at a total
cost of 628 million riyals, and the development of the al-Qasim airport
- is expected to be completed soon at a cost of 113 million riyals. ~n
= addition, construction has been completed on new buildings and passenger
lounges at the al-Ta'if and Tabuk airports at a cost of 87 million riyals,
and the necessary studies are now in progress for the construction of new
airports at al-Ta'if, Tarif, al-Khafaji and al-Qaryat. [Text] [Jiddah
'UKAZ in Arabic 13 Oct 79 g 4] 8591 ~
SOUTH KOREAN TROOPS--The number of South Korean "workers" in Saudi Arabia -
has topped 100,000, and this figure is expected to reach 250,000 as the
1980's begin. These South Koreans live in special camps and are not
allowed to mix with citizens. Their companies provide them with private
means of transportation. Some sources say that these South Koreans are _
merely substitutes for the hundreds of thousands of Arab workers who con-
_ stitute an "ideological threat to the regime." Other sources assert that
these Koreans have connections with security and are none other than
trained troops ready to intervene and protect imperialist interests in .
_ Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf. Their activity has apparently been
on the increase recently. Some high-ranking offi~ers and military advisors
have been attached to t~e troops, and the South Kor.ean company Shin Han ~
International has recently received a$178.4 million contract to oversee
_ the construction of buildings for the King 'Abd-al-'Aziz Military Academy, -
which will be located hundreds of kilometers nothwest of Riyadh. The con-
tract was signed with the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Avaiation. [Text]
_ [Beirut AL-HADAF in Arabic 10 Nov 79 p 31] 8591
CSO: 4802
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sunari
' OUSTID FIRST VICE PF.ESIDENT WORKS AGA.INST REGIME
London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 4-10 Nov 79 p 19
[Article: "Power Struggle in Sudan"]
[TextJ Before his dismissal from office, Abu al-Qasim struggled with
several different sides, from al-Sadiq al-Mahdi on the one hand to
al-Turabi on the other, and imagined that as first vice president he was
in a position to play a larger role in the Arab sphere. He was constantly
launching attacks against one or the other of these two individuals in
order to destroy the points of contact among Numayri, al-Turabi and al-
Sadiq al-Mahdi. ~
The struggle grew to the point that Abu al-Qasim felt the regime was on
= the verge of collapse, and so he chose to step up the pace in order to -
escalate these struggles and settle them in his favor. He exploited the
- issue of civil service reform and wage increases to get the workers and
civil servants on his side, irrespective of his ability to fulfill his
commitments, which ran as high as 50 percent. He knew that the regime
could not afford such an increase, but he was seeking to adopt a position
which was more political than economic. Numayri undoubtedly refused to
put this reform into effect.
Another struggle took place between the first vice president and the old
May Revolutionists, Khalid Hasan 'Abbas and Ma'm~tn 'Awad Abu Zayd, in
addition to a struggle with 'Umar al-Tayyib and 'Abd-al-Majid Hamid
- Khalil. Through all these stages, Numayri was unable to control the
fighting. He was plagued by vacillation in his position caused by his
personal weakness and the ease with which he could be influenced by any
side. .
- While this struggle was escalating in this manner, another struggle was
going on in the streets among the masses. They bypassed the organizations -
which traditionally supported the regime, such as the Teachers Union, and
submitted their problems to the regime. In its general assembly, the
- Doctors Union hPaded by Harith Hamad, a Numayri supporter, adopted a _
position which opposed the regime on union and political issues. Similar-
ly, the Federation of Farmers in Sudan bypassed the official cadres
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friendly to the regime, while in the labor cadre, movements arose which
_ were remote from the official representatives. These examples indicate
that the masses have bypassed the obstacles of the official unions and
have raised problems and issues directly. ~
As a resulr of these pressures, Numayri attempted to offer sacrifices and
- victims. He made a direct attack on the Socialist Union in one of his
speeches, and then removed Abu al-Qasim from power in order to make the
people believe that, as secretary general of the Socialist Union, Abu -
al-Qasim was responsible for everythin~.
Shift of the Struggle
The struggle shifted into a more practical phase when Abu al-Qasim began
fighting with Rashi al-Tahir, Yahya 'Abd-al-Majid, and the successor to
- Kawjali Hasan 'Abidin, Amal 'Abbas--prominent personalities whom Abu al-
Qasim had used as extensions of himself within the Socialist Union. Thus,
Rashid al-Tahir joined 'Umar al-Tayyib and Hasan al-Turabi in an alliance
against Abu al-Qasi.m, in spite of the existence of mutual conflicts among
the three men. The practical nature of the struggle manifested itself
_ in the canfrontation between the Federation of Sudanese Labor Unions and
the regime following 6 years of silence and complete disregard of labor
- issues as a result of the federation's former blind loyalty to the ousted
first vlce president. -
However, this move is interpreted as an attempt to adopt a heroic position
~ and brandish the strike weapon so that the opposition labor lenders would ~
- embrace it and be ousted politically or arrested, and the federation could
enter the elections without competition. The other obvious goal is to -
express Abu al-Qasim's feelings toward the regime in ordEr to weaken and
slander it. However, Numayri was able to abort the strike action by
directly threatening those responsible for it. He threatened to expose
the leaders, who had amassed excessive wealth and used public funds for =
their own personal interests, before th.eir base of support and the people.
The federation responded to this sort of pressure and lifted the strike
- unconditionally.
We can say that Rashi al-Tahir, the foreign minister and secretary of the _
organizations, is in a position to strike at the labor leadership which
supports Abu al-Qasim. A1-Sadiq al Mahdi, on the other hand, is unable to
exploit this opportunity. He was surprised by the dismissal of the first
vice president without his having found the means to influence subsequent
decisions of Nwuayri and win him over to his side--despite the fact that
al-Sadiq is constantly being proposed by himself and others as a potential
_ replacement for president of the republic, compelled by his personal
ambitions as well as his foreign connections. But al-Sadiq lacks a firm
foothold both at the popular level and within the regime because of his
dissociation of himself from his base of support. Now that the regime
has dismissed him from the Political Office, al-Sadiq wants to reestablish
close ties with the Ansars in an effort to reconsider his old political
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position. In Jazirah Aba, the spiritual capital of the Ansars, al-Sadiq
attempted to bring the Ansars together with their principal leaders in -
order to offer himself as their imam, however, the death of the mother of ~
Ahmad al-Mahdi, al Sadiq's uncle, as well as the basic opposition to such -
- a step on the part of the Ansars themselves, forced him to change his
plans.
- The Opposition
_ The opposition movement is represented by the recent series of strikes,
which bore the stamp of coordination in their raising of nationalist
issues that were far removed from such narrow class issueS as the lowering
of prices and civil service reform. There is a trend for the opposition
forces to meet a.n coordinating committees, as was done recently at Khartoum
University, and propose a formula for an alliauce joining all the forces
into a single front against the regime and the Moslem Brotherhood. This
alliance has assumed practical forms, and its first result was the begin-
- ning of a loosening of the Brotherhood's control over the university in
Khartoum. . ~
There is also an alliance within the ranks of professionals and civil
_ servants, as weil as in the workers cadre. The aim of this is to join
opposition forces into a single front to strike at the regime forcefully -
in one thrust as opposed to scattered actions. At the political level,
rapid efforts are being made to join opposition forces into one central -
' leadership domestically and abroad, and work is underway to make this
leadership successful. and bring it into the practical realm in ~iew of
the int~rnational struggles which are enveloping Sudan from all sides.
~
8591
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_
SULTANATE OF OMAN -
FIRST 3 YEARS OF 5-YEAR PLAN SHOW GOOD RESULTS
Oman 'UMAN ~n Arabic 18 Nov 79 pp 22 and 23 -
[Test] After the development council was established in 1974 under sul-
tanic decree no. 41 of 1974, one of its first acts was to adopt a resolu-
tion, on 9 February 1975, designating the goals and policy of development
in the sultanate, that is to say, the long-term strategy. The authoriza-
tion of this decree and the issuance of its full text were done in the
d~cument of the first S-year development plan. .
The long-term strat egy maq be described as a collection of goals with a -
general character which defines the directions toward which it is desired
that the movement of economic development should progress a:.u which can
be arrived at through successive short-term plans, or S-year plans, which
- will be, as it Were, a detailed translation of the long-term goals and in
_ keeping with the temporary circumstances of each of these plans.
NoW that 3 years, 1976, 1977, and 1978, have passed since the authoriza-
tion of the first 5-year development plan and the fourth year, 1979, is
coming to an end, work has begun in earnest on the preparation of the
the second 5-year development plan, for the years 1981 ta 1985, axad, as
is the case with the first 5-year development plan, the goals and policy
of the second will be derived from the long-term goals and devoted to them
in such a manner as to be in accord with the ~xisting possibilities or
those possibilities which can be found during that period and with the
priorities Which are appropriate to it.
_ The Principal Goals and Accomplishments -
The first 5-year pl an included ways and means by which it is possible to
, achiev2 the goals which were set forth in it as a step toward achieving
the long-term goals. From the reports of the follow-up of the executinn
of the first 3 years, 1976 to 1978, it can be said that the results which
have been achieved have been satisfactory and that the movement of devel-
opment is following the desired direction and making successful strides
toward the achievement of the long-term goals.
. The follo~ing text is a brief review of the accomplishments which have
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been made during the first three years toward the at'tainment of those
goals.
The first goal is to work on the development of new sources of national
income besides the petroleum revenues, with Which to replace them in the
future. In fact, the proportion of the petroleum sector dropped to about
6 percent of the gross national product in 1978, as compared with about 7
percent in 1975, whereas the relative importance of the rest of the eco-
nomic sectors increased to about 44 percent in 1978, as compared With
about 33 percent in 1975.
The second goal is to increase the proportion of developments which yield
rewenue, especially in the fields of industry, mining, agriculture, and '
fishing. In fact, this goal is considered bound up entirely with the pre- .
ceding goal, and indeed it may be said that it is not possible to achieve
the first goal without achieving this one.
The third goal of the plan is to distribute the developments geographically
_ in a manner which will be advantageous to the several regions of the coun-
try and to all of the people in them and so that it will eliminate the -
disparity in the standard of living of these areas, Kith the elimination
of special priorities for the least advanced regions at the present time.
The fou-th goal of tre plan is to support and develop the existing centers
of population, preserving them fro~ the danger of mass migrations to the
_ dense centers of concentration of population, and to preserve the envir-
onmeMt.
The fifth goal is to devate attention to water resources by considering ;
them a vital element in the continuation and course of economic activity.
This goal is confined to two principal elementss providing water for the ~
inhabitants in all regions of the sultanate. ~
The sixth goal is to devote attention to the development of domestic man-
power so that the people can undertake their roles fully in the national
economy.
The seventh goal is to complete the form of the basic structure. In this -
field, during the first 3 years of the plan, the government has undertaken
to carry out developments totaling 260 million Omani riyals. The effects
of these developments have been reflected in the following fields: -
Roads: The length of the first-class asphalt roads was 1,587 kilometers
in 1978, as coa;pared with 708 kilometers in 1975, and the length of the
second-class graded roads was 12,151 kilometers in 1978 as compared Kith -
5,495 kilometers in 1975.
Harborss During the period of 1976 to 1978, the sum of 26 million riyals
was spent on widening and deepening the existing harbors, especially Qabus
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= and Raysut harbors. Work is in progress to improve Raysut harbor by dred- `
ging deep anchorages, and the completion of it is expected in 1980. The ~
- capacity of Qabus harbor is 1.5 million tons per year at the present time, 4
and that of Raysut harbor is expected to be 600,000 tons per year when
work is completed on it.
Air fields: During the period from 1976 to 1978, the sum of 12.1 riyals
was spent to enlarge the sir fields of al-Sib and al-Salalah and provide -
- them with the most modern equipment. A1-Sib international airport began -
to accommodate 27,300 flights in 1978, as compared With 15,000 in 1975.
Electricityt The production capacity of the electrical power stations
throughout the several parts of the sultanate increased from 91 megaWatts
_ in 1975 to 206 [negaWatts in 1978. Work is in progress on the village
electrification project, and 26 electricity stations have been built in
the various towns and villages of the sultanate, as have also the distri-
bution systems in them. The Oman National Electricity Company has been
formed to administer and operate a nnmber of these stations. _
Waters The production of water in the region af the capital and Salalah -
was about 1,744 million gallons in 1978, as compared with 359 million
gallons in 1975.
Posts and telephoness The number of post offices and substations was 46
- in 1978, as compared with 27 in 1975.
The eighth goal is to support domestic mercantile activity and to elimi-
nate the difficulties of transportation and storage and the various obsta-
cles that curtail the adequacy of the markets. Many accomplishments have
been made in this field. The expansion of the road nettaork has resulted
in the elimination of difficulties in internal transportation, and the
enlargement of the harbors and air fields has led to the elimination of
obstacles in the way of the movement of foreign trade. The gross imports
- registered increased from 264 million riyals in 1975 to 327 million -
riyals in 1978, whereas the exports other than petroleum increased during
the same period from 1.1 million to 3.3 million riyals.
The organization of the banking system in the sultanate and the increase
in the number of active banks also helped to support the domestic trading -
activity. The quantity uf bank credit for internal mercantile operations
amounted to 9.7 million riyals in 1978, as compared with 8.5 million riyals
in 1975, and the credit for export operations amounted to 92.4 million
riqals in 1978, as compared with 40.0 million riyals in 1975.
_ There were 3,161 companies and establishments registered in the sultanate
- of Oman and operating in mercantile activitq from 1976 to 1978, and,
according to the statements of the mercantile register, the capitsl of
- these companies amounts to 49.4 million riyals.
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The seventh goal is to complete the requisites of a free national economy
centered on the activity of the private sector, on the basis of a free -
competition rather tham m~nopoly, by Way of establishi~ng appropriate tax
incentives and exemptions, offering loans to productian projects on rea-
sonable conditions, and investing in the capital of vital companies in
a reasonable proportion of the revenues which are available to the state.
- In this field, the following accomplishments have been made:
1. The gross developments of the private sector during the 3 years of
the plan from 1976 to 1978 amounted to about 222 million riyals. -
2. The investment of the government in the projects of the private sector
amounted to about 16 million riyals during the same period.
3. The Development Bank of Oman began to pursue its activity in 1978, and _
is expected to become a principal support of the development of the private
sector in Oman.
4. Moreover, the government is offering many incentives for domestic pro-
. duction, including tax and customs exemptions, if the case warrants the~n.
The ninth and last goal is to raise the competence of the administrative _
apparatus of the state. In this field, the following steps have been
taken:
1. On 28 June 1975, sultanic decree no. 27/75 was issued pertaining to -
the issuance of the law for the organization of the administrative appara-
tus of the state. The law was then amended by sultanic edict no. 13/76,
issued on 11 April 1976.
2. The introduction of a number of regulations which led to the develop-
ment of the national financial administration regulations was done, and
the financial supervision became more stable. Furthermore, a new system _
was followed for the stabilization and accounts, resulting in raising the
efficiency of these apparatuses.
3. The procurements council was formed, and projects began to be put ~o ~
public a~iction. This resulted in opening the field wider to compQtition
and afforded the government the opportunity to get better offers.
_ 4. The institute of public administration was created, which undertakes
- to organize training courses and classes for state officials on all
levels, with the goal of raisiag the efficiency of administration in the. ~
various government apparatuses.
The Gross National Product
The gross national product, reckoned in current prices, amounted to about
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892.8 million riyals in 1978, as compared with 724.2 million riyals in -
1975, which was the preceding base year for the beginning of the execution -
of the development plan. That is to say, the gross national product =
increased by about 168.8 million riyals at the end of the third year, or
at the rate of 23.3 percent.
The national product of the agricultural and fishing sector amounted to
27.1 million riyals in 1978, as compared with 20.2 million riyals in 1975,
, an increase of 6.9 million riyals at the end of the 3 ye~ars, or 34.2
_ percent.
The natianal product for the petroleum and minerals sector amounted to ~
498.4 million riyal s in 1978, as compared with 486.6 million riyals in
1975, an increase of 11.6 million riyals, or 2.4 percent.
The national product of the industrial sec~or amounted to 11.2 million
riyals in 1978, as compared With 2.1 million riyals in 1975, an increase
of 9.1 millic*n riyals, or 33.3 percent.
The national prodLCt for the building and housing seator amounted to 85.3
million riyals in 1978, as compared With 80.8 million riyals in 1975, an
increa~e of 14.5 million riyals, or 20.5 percent.
The domestic product of the transportation and communications sector
amounted to 33.2 million riyals in 19?8, as compared with 23.5 million
- riyals in 1975, an inesease of 9.7 riyals, or 41.3 percent.
- 'The natianal product of the electricty acid water sector amounted to 8
million riyals in 1978, as compared with 1.8 million riyals in 1975, an
increase of 6.2 million riyals, or 344.4 percent.
The national product in the domestic trade sector amounted to 72.2 million
riyal~ in 1978, as compared uith 38.5 million riyals in 1975, an increase
_ of 33.7 r~yals, or 78.5 percent.
= The national product in the banking seotor am~unted to 14.5 million riyals
in 1978, as compared with 9.8 riyals in 1975, an increase of 4.7 million
riyals, or 48 percent.
The national produc~ in housing rentals aiaounted to 21.8 million riyals
- in 1978, as compared with 9.3 million riyals in 1975, an increase of 12.5
- million riqals, or 134.4 percent.
_ The national product in services and other sectors amounted to 10.2 million
_ riyals in 1978, as compared with 8.4 million riyals i~n 1975, an increase
of 6.8 million riyals, or 81 pereQnt.
_ Developmentss The value of the development projects wbich the goverrunent
carried out during the 3 years from 1976 to 1978 amounted ~o about 68.8
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million riyals, and the developments of the rrrivate sector during the same
period ame~~~ted to about 2~2.2 million riyals. That is to say, the total. -
of ~he develqpments which were carried out by both the government and the `
private sector amounted to 913 million riyals.
The gross developments carried out during each of the 3 years represented
- a rise in the gross national product amounting to 31.5 percent in 1978,
?5.3 percent in 1977, 38.8 percenf in 1976, and 35.6 percent in 1975, a ~
level Which is considered satisfactory. This reflects an effort in eco-
nomic development which is cor~sidered to be artwng the highest of the -
levels exerted in the developing countries.
~ The distribution of the government developments among the various sectors
_ developed in such a manner that the goods sectors began to assume a more
_ adequate share of these developments. This is a healthy phenomenon, which
is in keeping with the economic development goals. Furthermore, the eco-
nomic sector st ill claims the largest share of the total of the government
develop;nents, for the need still exists for the completion of the pro jects
in it.
Finally, it will be observed that t�he private sector has begun to turn
toward developments in indusirial projects, and this is a good sign.
CSO: 4802
~
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WESTERN SAHARA -
POLISARIO'S ABDELAZIZ REVIFWS STRUGGLE AGAINST MOROCCO
LD071433 Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 4 Dec 79 p 6 LD _
[Interview with General Mohamed Abdelaziz, Polisario Front secretary
general, by APS: "On the Eve of the OAU Ad Hoc Committee Meeting": "The
- Moroccan General Staff Is Run by Foreign Experts"--in the Saharan Demo-
- cratic Arab Republic (SDAR)--no date given] "
[Text] SDAR--On the eve of the OAU ad hoc committee meeting on the West _
- Sahara question in Monrovia (Liberia), Polisario Front Secretary General
Mohamed Abdelaziz granted an interview to APS in which he explained the
- Polisario Front's victories, denounced U.S. aid to Hassan II's regiiae,
launched an appeal to the Moroccan people to rise up against the injustice
_ to which the Saharan people are subjected and condemned the monarch's dis-
- astrous policy.
[Question] The Saharan People's Liberation Army [SPLA] is sweeping away
all the monarchist garriso*~s in its path. To what can the resounding
victories at Tan-Tan, Lebouirate and Mahbes be attributed?
[AnswerJ The SPLA has indeed liberated the whole of Saguiet al Hamra and
is now operating in the Moroccan anti-Atlas mountains. To understand the
major victories won by the SPLA you just have to consider the vast quan- -
tities of weapons and equipment capt~ired from the Moroccan occupiers after
each battle. For example on 17 January we captured 63 trucks loaded with
weapons and munitions from the enemy at Limseyed. We did likewise at Len-
_ guab where we captured 167 trucks and other venicles. We immediately use
all these vehicles, heavy weapons and munitions against the monarchist
colonial forces. Consequently it is only natural that the volume of SPLA
actions is becoming impressive and the results much better than before.
[Question] Therefore the SPLA owes its victories to the equipment it uses?
[Answer] Only in part, since the weapons do not explain everything.
Account must also be taken of the low morale of the monarchist soldier, -
worn by defeat; isolation and the violence of war. These soldiers do not
put up any resistance against our units when they attack.
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The seizure of major Moroccan bases invaded by our fighters has had a pro- -
found effect on the Moroccan soldier's morale. Furthermore he no longer .
has to face rifle fire but the same weapons that he uses, which we~have
captured from his compatriots. Another factor which deserves consideration
[9 t}~e fact that the Saharan fighters know they are fighting for a~juRt
~
cause--to liberate theLr country and save their people from colonialism -
and genocide. The monarchist soldier on the other hand has had confirma-
- tion that he is waging a war which is bound to be lost and that his death
will not benefit his country ar his family. That inevitably produces his
_ behavior and his refusal to fight.
[Question] Could the new weapons which President Carter's ac~y ~nistration
has promised the Rabat manarchist regime change the ~ourse of the war?
[Answer] The United States has never stopped supplying weapons to Hassan II's
_ regime. Ever since our revolution was launched, we have been capturing
_ American weapons in all the enemy garrisons we invade. However, whatcon-
cerns us is the U.S. political decision to support a totally isolated
regime--a monarchy condemned by all international bodies, by the United
~Iations, the OAU and the nonalined movement. ~ -
- [Question] Morocco frequently speaks of the internationalization of the
Saharan problem. Is this a real possibility? -
[AnswerJ The possibility of the West Sahara question being international-
- ized is raised only by the Moroccan press. The Saharan people have enough
weapons and determination to liberate their country themselves. They have
no need of military support in the field and will never ask for such sup-
port. On the other hand you can see how Morocco, without initially admitting
it, internationalized the decolonization of the West Sahara by accepting
military aid from Spain and then from France and the iinited States. So who
is internationalizing the problem if not ~4orocco? ~
The United States and other countries are not content to supply tons of
impressive weapons to the monarchist regime. They are supplying radar,
guns, vehicles and aircraf~, which we capture or destroy every day--not to
mention the military technical aid provided in the field. Cuperior officers
from several foreign countries frequently inspect al Ayoun and Semara. The
Moroccan general staff itself is run by foreign er_perts. For 2 months now
= there have been signs of the systematic replacement of Moroccan cadres by
foreign cadres in Plorocco. This is probably being done to "save" what can
_ still be saved of their sick ally.
[Question] In what framework of international relations can the ties between
_ Morocco and the countries providing it with military aid in the West Sahara
~ war be placed? '
[Answer] The ties are clear. They are the ties which link werld imperial-
- ism with Israel's interests. Hassan II knew of tre link between Begin and
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and al-Sadat as early as 1974; hence the aid and support given to riorocco
by both Israel and al-Sadat's Egypt. These two countries themselves repre-
sent U.S, interests and since the consequences can be seen in the field, the
circle is complete. Hassan II would like nothing better than to see the ~
three countries take complete control of Morocco. In any case their
~ technicians are already doing so.
[Question] The Saharan people are preparing to start their 5th year of _
national liberation struggle. What is a word for the Saharan people
[apparent line drop in original]?
[Answer] Our revolution is stronger than ever. We have human reserves to
- continue the struggle for a long time. The equipment which the Saharan _
fighters have is completely satisfactory. We have already liberated Saquiet
31 Hamra completely. Our rearguard units are dealing with Semara, Bou Craa
and al Ayoun. The bulk of our forces are operating in Morocco itself and
~ they will continue to push forward right into enemy territory until our peo-
ple's rights are restored and until Morocco heeds the voice of reason dic-
tated by all international organizations and our continent's organization
in particular.
[LD071435] (Question] Before your departure for Monrovia do you have any-
thing to say to the Moroccan people?
[AnswerJ We have constantly appealed to the political courage of the
Moroccans, at least those who are still outside the mor_:~zchist prisons.
We still hope that they will pull themselves together and oppose the dis-
astrous policy of the "shah" of Morocco and struggle openly against injus- `
- tice and against obscurantism and that they will heed the appeal for the
freedom of peoples.
We still hope that they might take this opportunity to anticipate peace for
they know that the Saharan people are determined in their mission to regain
their independence. If the Moroccan people remain passive they will inevit-
ably bear some of the responsibility for the disaster, chaos and world
imperialism's control over Morocco.
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,
WESTERN SAHARA .
SAHARAN 'PRIME MINISTER' LAMINE GIVES INTERVIEW TO ALGIERS PAPER
LD300809 Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 12 Nov 79 p 5 LD
- (Tayes Belghiche interview with Saharan Demo cratic Arab Republic Prime Minis-
ter Mohamed Lamine Ould Ahmed: "A POLISARIO Front Delegation Will Go To -
Monrovia"--date and place not specified] -
[Text] EL MOUDJAHID: Mr Prime Minister, you have ~ust left Mali where you
met with President Moussa Traore, who, as everybody knows, is a member of
the OAU ad hoc co~ittee on the West Sshara. The committee is due to meet
in Monrovia soon. W~s your trip to Mali conriected with that meeting? Will
you go to the Liberian capital and what do you expect from the committees ?
Mohamed Lamine: Mali is a country friendly to the Saharan people and might
itself become a victim of Morocco's territorial demands. Our relations with
this fraternal country existed before the monarchist forces invaded our terri- -
N tory. Mali is a member of the ad hoc committ ee and we visited that country
for two reasons. Our visit took place in the context of efforts, first, to
strengthen relations between our two peoples and, second, to inform Mali
officials of the situation in the West Sahara on the eve of the ad hoc com-
mittee meeting. That committee has a duty to uphold OAU decisions and in-
_ sure that they are implemented. President Traore assured us that Mali will
take action and enter discu~sions to help ~he Saharan people recover their
usurped rights. That is the hope of the Saharan people as an Afxican people. _
, I believe that the days in which the future of p~oples was discussed in their
- absence are now over. That is why a POLISARIO front delegation will go to
Monrovia to express the Saharan people's viewpoint. ~Ie think that unless the
Ot~U acts more quickly to find a solution to the West Saharan problem it is
, likEly to find that it has been bypassed, esp ecially now that King Hassan II
is trying to internat~.onalize the problem, which will .form a dangerous prece-
= dent for the African continent as has already been the case wiCh regard to
. the invasion and division of our territory. The OAU has never been an accom-
plice of colonialism nor of expansionism and the sub3ugation of peoples.
- Ot~erwise [if the OAU does not act more quicklyJ we would witness a radical
change in Africa's geopolitical map.
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EL MOUDJAHID: According to OAU Chairman William Tolbert King Hassan II wil].
go to the ad hoc committee meeting whereas he did not go to the Monrovia "sum- .
mit" despite announcing his participation. How do you interpret this new
maneuver by Rabat?
.
Mohamed Lamine: The I{,ing lied to 48 African heads of state when he announced
his intention to take part in the last OAU "summit" in Monrovia. He has now
promised to go to the Liberian capital to attend the ad hoc committee meeting
just when his foreign minister ia making statements reaffirming that Morocco
will never abandon its expansionist policy thereby re~ecting the OAU resolu-
tions on the West Sahara� Almost all the African heads of state think differ-
ently from King Hassan II. The African heads of state have to choose between `
their line, which is that of ~ustice, and the King's line, which ~s based on
expansionism and aggression.
EL MOUDJAHID: King Hassan II has proposed a conference of countries bordering
the Sahara. What do you think of that proposal?
Mohamed Lamine: First, Morocco does not border the Sahara. The countries
which do (Algeria, Lib}�a, Ni~er and Mali) have already held meetings in Ouarla,
Algeria, and Niamey, Niger, and they are holding another meeting soon in -
_ Bamako--a meeting which the POLISARIO front has asked to attend for the simple
reason that the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic is also a country bordering =
the Sahara. The Moroccan government's proposal is an attempt to find other
_ ways of gaining support for the annexation of our country. The ~Ioroccan
_ government has always tried to legitimize its occupation of the West Sahara
= but those ~.ttempts have always been rejected by the United Nations, the OAL'
and the nanalined countries. The Mauritanian-Saharan peace agreement totally
- destroyed the monarchist claims. That is why the King is now trying to gain '
support for~ his claims by pernicious maneuvers.
EL MOUDJAHID: Were you not surprised by Spain's abstention during the vote
on the West Sahara resolution at the UN political commission meeting? And
were you silrprised by Saudi Arabia's negative vote?
Mohamed Lamine: The Madrid authorities have a historical responsibility to
defend the right to existence and freedom of a people against whom Spain com-
mitted an unforgiveable crime. Its abstention is an unfriendly gesture.
We hope that the Spanish government will be capable of effacing Spain`s be-
_ trayal of the Saharan people--a betrayal written in history. The Union of
the Democratic ~enter, which is the party in power [in Spain], officially
recognizes the P07~ISARIO front and the Saharan people's right to self-de-
termination, it also recognizes that the West Saharan problem is a problem
of incomplete decolonization. The Saharan people do not understand the
flagrant contradiction of this abstention, which merely encourages Moroccan
expattsionism.
As for Saudi Arabia, which is a Muslim country housing Islam's holy places
and whose fundamental role is to defend the life of Muslims, i.t is supplying _
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~
Morocco with money and weapons intended to sxterminate a Muslim people. The
Saharan people ask a simple question: Why did Saudi Arabian kings receive
Satiaran pilgrima as independent delegations from 1884 to 1975? Today that
country refuses to accept Saharan pilgrims. Furthermore Saudi Arabia, while
clearly alining with Morocco, pretends to be mediating in the conflict--a
mediation which is distorted from the start since it disregards the Saharan -
people, the fundamental element in the problem. In addition we can only
strongly regret that in this affair Saudi Arabia is siding with A1-Sadat and
the Zionists. ~
[LD300811] EL MOUDJAAID; What is the present position on the Madrid Tri-
partite Agreement after the peace agreement between Mauritania and the
POLISARIO Front?
Mohamed Lamine: For the Saharan people the Madrid agreement was null and
void right from the start and was nullified in practice not only after the
Mauritanian-Saharan Peace Agreement but also after Spain's re~egnition of
_ the POLISARIO Front as the Saharan people's sole legitimate representative.
EL MOUDJAHID: Do you think that the supply of U.S. weapons to King Hassan II
promisea by the Carter administration could influence the course of the war? -
Mohamed Lamine: The Carter administration's decision to strengthen the mon-
archist regime with weapons is based on subjective arguments. The military
ieinforcement of Morocco is an attempt to boost the Moroccan army's morale
which is impossible since that army is waging a colonial war. What is strange
is that the Carter administration says that in supplying arms it is trying to
- help Morocco to negotiate. However the vital question is negotiations between
which parties? The King has responded by threatening to use one of "his
rights" which he is constantly asserting. Therefore what is the U.S. posi-
- tion on the Saharan people's right to self-determination? The Americans them-
selves fought for many years to obtain that right. Does the Carter adminis-
tration not see a contradiction between the American people's national ideals
and the supply of arms to a regime which denies a people's right to exist.
Furthermore the Moroccan army does not lack arms but motivation, which it
canr.ot have because it is involved in a colonial war. As always those weapons
- will certainly fall inta the hands of the Saharan fighters.
- EL KOUDJAHID: Morocco has given great publicity to the launching of a "
"mopping-up operation" in the West Sahara after which King Hassan II has
- stated that 'calm will be restored in the Sahara in a few months." What is
- the real truth about this operation?
riohamed Lamine: A regime which is incapable of insuring security in its own
territory cannot be in a position to insure it outside its borders. More-
- over when Morocco says that it is going to "mop up" the POLISARIO Front's
bases in the West Sahara it is denying its own allegations that those bases
are to be found in Algeria. In a few months time the Moroccan army will
question its King about this "mopping up" operation.
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EL MOUDJAHYD: ~e Parisian weekly LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR has revealed that -
a delegation of Israeli military experts visited Morocco. Have you any in-
formation on this sub3ect?
- Mohamed Lamine: King Hassan II clearly maintains excellent relations with `
the Zionist leaders. We are not surprised that they are sending him mili-
tary experts. It would be a historic meeting~between Zionist, Egyptian and
Moroccan experts.
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- WESTERN SAHARA
- BRIEFS
ATTACK ON MOROCCAN BASE--Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (liberated terri-
tories), APS--The Moroccan military base of Zag, south of Uad Draa, was
attacked by Saharan fighters on Friday, according to sources close to the
Ministry of Defense of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic [SDAR] as
quoted by the Saharan Information Ministry. The attack launched against
the (Rouss al-Ouj) approach to Zaq resulted in substantial losses to the
Moroccan troops of aggression which were forced to withdraw from several
advance points such as (Rouss al-Ou~) ~d'.(M'zeiriga). The communique of
the SDAR Information Ministry points out that 25 soldiers of the Royal Armed _
Forces were killed and 30 wounded, are two armored vehicles and two 106
cannon were destroyed. It says that Zaq is still under se~ge. [Text]
[LD090007 Algiers APS in French 2030 GMT 8 Dec 79 LD] _
VILLAGE ATTACK REPULSED--A communique fmm the Ministry of Information: A
detachment of Algeria's mercenaries yesterday morning, 6 December 1979,
attacked the village of Zaq from two directions in the east and southeast -
- of Zaq. The village was bombarded by the mercenaries from 1845 until 1030 `
[times as heard] in the morning. Our Royalist Armed Forces confronted the
attack with their known bravery and drove away the aggressors, destroying
several enemy military jeeps. The enemy left 40 dead in ~he battlefield.
- The Royalist Armed Forces captured a quantity of arms and munitions. They
lost 2 martyrs, and 11 soldiers were wounded. [Ter.t] [LD072134 Rabat ~
Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 7 Dec 79 LD]
CSO: 4402 ~D
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