JPRS ID: 74787 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
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• Document Page Count: 112
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 38
• Content Type: REPORTS

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i8 DECEMBER i9T9 N0. 2859 i OF 2
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~ JPRS 7.4~87
1~8 December 1~979
Y / �
~I~ar East North Afr~ca Re ort
p
- No. 2059
FB~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE .
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- s~z~~-,oi
' REF'ORT DOCUMENT~il01v I 1. REPORT NO. 2. 3. Recipient's Accetsion Nn.
Tnnc~ 7 A ^f0'7
PA~~ ~ J a AJ I'k I V. _
4. Title snd �,ubtitle 5. Report Date
- NEAR T:AST/NORT~i AFRICA REPORT, No. 2059 18 December 1979
6.
- 7. Author(s) 8. Perlorming Organi:ation Rept. Wu. -
9. PeAorming Organixalion Name and Addresz 10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.
Joint Publ.ications kesearch Service
1000 North Glebe Road i~. ca~?~~~uc> o~ Grant(G) No
A~lington, Virginia 22201 cc~
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12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address 13. Type ot Report 6 Period CovercA
As above
i~. -
15. Supplementary Notes
16. Abstract (Limit: 200 words)
This serial report contains information on socioeconomic, government, poli.tical,
and technical developments it~ the countries of the Near East and North Africa.
17. Oocument Analysis a. Descriptors
Political Science x Inter-Arab Affairs x Libya Sultanate
Sociology North African x Maiiritania of Oman
Economics Affairs r. Morocco Syria
Culture (Social x Afgl?anistan People's Demo- x Tunisia
Sciences) Algeria cratic Republic United Arab
Et-hnology Bahrain of Yemen Emirates
Geography x Egypt Persian Gulf x Western Sahara
Techological x Iran Area Yemen Arab
Military Sciences Ir.aq Qatar Republic
x Israel Saudi Arabia
Jordan Spanish North
Kuwait Africa -
~ Lebanon x Sudan
b. Id~ntifie~s/Open�Endod Terms
c. COSATI ~ield/Group 5D, 5C, 5K, ~.5
19. ~v:+ilrbility Statcment 19. Security Class (This ReDOR) 21. No. of Pages ~
UIlI.7.i111 CC'cl Availabi.lity ~
UNCLt~ S S I F I~ll 10 7_..
- SO~.c] ~)y NTIS 20. Secw~ty C~ass fThis PaReI 22. Pr+ce
= Sprin~;field, Vi.rginia 22161 UNCLASSIFIED ~
(Seel.NSI-Z39.18) See Inctructions on Ravc:se OPTIONA! FORM 272 (4-77i
(Formrrly NTiS-~5)
Dep. Rmmt of Co~oinr.rce
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- JPRS 74787
18 DPCember 1979
- NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
No. 2059 -
- CONTENTS PAGE
INTER-ARAB AF'FAIRS _
Islamic Congress Secretary Interviewed on Iran, Islamic -
Issues
(Habib Chatti In;erview; AL-SARQ AL-AWSAT, 6 Dec 79) 1 -
Kuwaiti Faper Cites FLO's Abu Iyad on Mideast Developments,
Issues
(Michel al-Nimri; AL-WATAN, Dec 79) 4 _
Timetable for Implementing Tunis Summit Resolutions
- Adopted
(AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, 3 Dec 79) 8
Klibi Comments on FLO Mediation of Iranian Crisis -
_ (Tunis Domestic Service, 6 Dec 79~ y
PLO's Aili-~ad 'Azari Grar~ts Interview to UK Paper
(Ahmad 'Azari Interview; MORNING STAR, 7 Dec 79) 11
~ Briefs
Arab Communist Pa,rties' Annual Conference 14
Libya Pa.ys Cypriot Press 14
Al-Sadat, Iran, Mecca Events 14
- AFGHANISTAN
Representative of Afghan Dissident Group Interviewed
(AL-DUSTUR, 12-18 Nov 79) 15
EGYFr
_ Features of New Press Bi11 Examine d
(Mahmud al-Maraghi; ROSE AL-YUSUF, 12 Nov 79) ?_2 -
- a - [III - NE & A - ].21]
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CONTENTS ( Continued) ~~e
- Supr~tne Consti.tutional Court Chairman Explains Coiirt.
Str~ic~;ure, Jurisdictiori
~ (Ahmad Mamduh 'Atiyah Interview; ROSE AL-YUSUF,
12 Nov 79) 29
Liberal Fa,rty Official Resigns
(AL-~7UNIEIURIYAH, 13 Nov 79 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
University Students To Elect Unions This Month
(Labib Siba'i; AL-AHEiAM, 9 Nov 79) 35
Lab or Unions E1ect Executive Councils
(AL-~UNINIAL, 12 Nov 79) 37
. Characteristics , Po+ential of al-Sadat's Possible
Successors Analyzed
(AL-DUSTUR, 15-21 Oct 79) 43
IRAN
Nati anal Guidance Minister Bares American Fspionage Secre~cs
(KEYf1AN, 24 Nov 79) 60
- Iraqi Government Begins Expelling Iranians
(KEYAAN, 22 Nov 7g) 65
Shei kh Montazeri Discusses His Political Views
(ENQELAB-E ESLAMI, 10 Oct 79) 67
Briefs
Opposition to Bases Against Iran 70
ISRAEL
:VRP Role in Government Coalition Viewed
(Editorial; HAZOFiH, lg Oct 79) 71
Inte rpretation of Autonomy Program To Be Clarified
(Editorial; HAZOFEH, 19 Oct 79) 73
Effect of Escalation in I,eba.non Analyzed
(Yhoshuat Tadmor; DAVAR, 21 Aug 79) 75
LEBANON
Iranian Takeover of American IInbassy in Beirut Described
(Sadeq Musavi Interview; KEYHAN, 19 Nov 79)������� 79
- b -
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CONTENTS (Continued) ~ge
Major Haddad Commeiits on Iranian Volunteers
(Various sources, 6, 7 Dec 79) ~'~3
Request for Israeli Intervention
Arrival of Iranian Troops Uncertain, by
Ba.t-'ami Hamizrahi
CP Secretary General Hawi Views Political Situation
( L' HIJMANITI'E, 20 Nov 79 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . f34
LIBYA
Construction of 'Great Wall' on Border With Egypt Reported
(AL-HAwADITH, 30 Nov 79) 88
MAURI~ANI'A
FRG Financial Cooperation Agreement Signed
(~HAAB, 13-14 oct 79) 8g
French Language Education Retained Temporarily
(LE MONDE, 25 oct 79) yo
MOROCCO
Madrid Pa.per Interviews Bouabid on Sahara, Ties With Spain
(Maati Bouabid Interview; LE MATIN, 30 Nov 79) 91
Briefs
French Loan Agreement 93
Grair_ Production Drop 93
SUDAN
Possibilities of Change in Country Explored
(AL-NP,HAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 5-11 Nov 79) 94
Maltreatment of Political Prisoners Cited, Rio~;s Discussed
(AL-HURRIYAH, 12 Nov 79) g8
Briefs
Recommendation for Islamic Republic 101
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CONTFIVTS ( Continued ) ' ~~e
TUNISIA
Briefs
Earth Tremor Registered 102
WESTERN S.'~HARA
POLISARIO Leader Reports on OAU Committee Resolutions
(Algiers Domestic Service, 8 Dec 79) ...e.......... 103
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
ISLAMIC CONGRESS SECRETARY INTERVIEWED ON IRAN, ISLAI~IIC ISSUES
~ LD101o03 London AL-SHARQ AL~AWSAT in Arabic 6 Dec 79 pp l, 2 LD
[Interview with Habib Chatti, general secretary of the Islamic Corgress
Organization, by 'Irfan Nizam al~-Din and Diyab Wafa'i in London--date not _
- given]
: [Excerpts] [Question] What action plan has the Islamic Congress Organiza-
tion laid down for the caming srage in the light of the present critical
conditions in the area?
[Answer] In fact I took up my post in the organization only a week ago,
and I am now busy studying the organization's files and position from all
aspects. I cannot at the moment define the plan that I have drawn up
to manage its affairs, but I am fully aware of ttie role the organization
is expected to play in serving Islam and the Arabs, particularly in the
present conditions. I hope to be able to achieve results that will
satisfy everybody.
[Question] What are the first steps that you will take in this regard?
a [AnswerJ The f irst step in my opinion is to make Islamic solidarity a _
reality. We are now in constant contact with tYie Islamic countries in
- order to coordinate their policies toward world problems, such as the
problem of Islamic minorities in scme outside countries and the race issue
in black Africa. This is in addition to hel.ping to consolidate the
- nonalined movemertt, which is considered the Third World power standing -
between the two other blocs,
[Question] What role have you played with regard to the situati..on in Iran?
[Answer] We have played a role in this regard. I personally contacted .
the Iranian authorities during the first week of the present crisis. I -
told the Iranian officials that, as head of an organization of which Iran
is a leading member, I place myself at their service for anything they
want me to do. During the Arab summit conference in Tunis an Iranian
- delegation visited us, and I repeated the same offer. -
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~Ques~ion] Do you mean by this: playing the role of a mediator?
[Answer] No, not mediation. As a Muslim and member of the Islamic
congress which includes Iran I have the duty to work for this cause.
I belong to the same family to which Iran belongs and I am prepared to
help it overcome this crxsis in a manner satisfactory to the other Islamic =
countries. I believe that the Iranian authorities made a mistake on the
issue of holding the hostages, but the blame mainly falls on the Zionist
lobby which brought the shah back to the United States at a time when
U.S.-Iranian relations were showing clear improvement. I would recall -
that adviser Brzezinski twice met with former prime minister Mehdi Bazargan,
and both agreed on most of the points of common inter~st to both countries.
But the Zionist lobby came in to play its game and sabotaged these rela-
- tions. It was able to bring the shah to the United States and to disturb
relations between the two countries. I believe that there was foul play
_ in the matter and that the shah was not iil, as was claimed, because his
' house in Mexico was closed up before his departure for New York.
[Question] Hostility to Islam in the West has been on the inc:ease. What
- is the organization's role in replying to such campaigns?
- [Answer] That is true. I am very pained by the reaction in the West, and
I am following events closely. I was recently in ~rance, where I made
important contacts. The West's attitude toward Islam is wrong and un-
justifiable. The question of Iran is one thing and Islam is another. -
With regard to Iran there is a crisis of relations with the United States.
It is an acute, ramified and major crisis but it is a political, not an
- Islamic crisis. Before anyone defines his stand on the embassy incident
he must define his stand on the events that preceded it, because if someone =
understands a problem from its roots, then he can solve it. If we say
that this was a violation of international law and the innnunity of
embassies and are satisfied with that, we will not achieve a practical
- result. Another point is that some people describe the Iranian revolution
as an Islamic revolution, thus giving it tl~is purely religi~us character.
But in fact it is a political revolution inspired by the Islamic religion.
' We now see many similar examples in Europe and many associations that call
themselves Christian Democrats. Those people too are inspired by
Christinity in their political methods. As I said-, the Iranian Revolution _
is a political revolution based on the re3ection of a certain political,
economic and social system, which the Iranian people expressed in a manner
' aimed at creating a new regime based on principles inspired by Islam.
[LD101605] [Question] Jerusalem, as everybody agrees~ is an Islamic
responsibility. What have we offered on this issue so far, and what is
the organization's role in it?
(Answer] I believe that the resolution adopted on this subject at previous
[Islamic] conferences had positive effects. Had it not been for these
resolutions and the clear Islami,c stand on this problem~ Israel would
have committed greater acts of destruction against Islamic landmarks.
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This is a positive result which may not be perceptible but does deter Israel
from doing what it wants. We succeeded in preventing the Canadian Embassy
in Tel Aviv from moving to Jerusalem thanks to Islamic solidarity. The
question of liberating Jerusalem requires further planning and falls within
the Middle East problem. The Palestinian problem and the problem of
Jerusalem are one. The Arabs have their own strategy in this re~ard. What
is important is that we stick to our demand for the return of Jerusalem
and continue to express our dissatisfaction with any action that does not
help to restore the Holy City to Islamic legality. Eventually we must
restore Jerusalem either by war or by any other means. I am not calling
for war, but we must move when conditions:arise for war or peace. The
Camp David agreements will never bring peace. However, I would not be
_ surprised to see significant changes occurring in the world which could
- bring a peaceful solution. Until that time comes we must adhere to our
stand and continuously seek to achieve our objectives.
[Question~ Does this mean that in your view peace will be coming shortly?
[Answer] I do not believe that it will happen shortly. As I said, th~
Camp David agreement harmed the Arab cause, changed its course and divided
the Arabs into two camps, which has given the Israeli side the strength
it was seeking. But everybody must understand that this agreement will
never bring peace. Whoever really wants peace must understand that it
comes only through negotiations between all the partie~, particularly
the PLO, and through a comprehensive solution satisfactory to all the
Arabs.
The decision to reject Camp David is a utiified Islamic decision. It is
also a universal rejection by the West. The Americans have now begun to
reconsider their stand and to wonder whether they have made a mistake.
The Camp David policy is bankrupt, and I challenge anybody except for
the few parties involved to say that he is with the Camp David policy.
- CSO: 4802
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- INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS -
- KUWAITI PAPER CITES PLO'S ABU IYAD ON MIDEAST DEVELOPMENTS, ISSUES
LD061601 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 4 Dec 79 p 13 LD
[Dispatch by Michel al-Nimri: "Abu Iyad at a Closed Session: Kreisky Is
- Wise; We Summoned al -Sartawi To Try Him"]
[Text] Beirut--When Abu Iyad [Salah Khalaf] talks to the press, he tells
one-tenth of the truth. When he talks at a general meeting, he tells
one-fifth of the truth, but when he finds someone to debate his statements
with him, he will either te11 the truth or remain silent.
A few days ago, Abu Iyad met with a group of Jordanian students in a quasi-
closed meeting. He wanted to tell all but retreated when he observed that
- ~ome journalists were present. When he was asked to speak frankly, he -
feared tha t his statements would leak to the press. Therefore, he could
tell but half of the truth. However, he asked the journalists to forget -
their profession and consider themselves listeners only. But can a
journalist be a mere listener? Personally, T do not think so. I do not
be].ieve that Abu Iyad would be upset if a journalist was true to himself .
_ For this reason, we decided to publish some of Abu Iyad's statements~-
- because not everything Salah Khalaf says is publishable.
The Summit and Lebanon
- Commenting on the Arab summit conference, Abu Iyad said that the results
of the Tunis summit were more advanced that the results of the Baghdad
summit, because this is the first time such clear resolutions against
U.S. imper ialism have been adopted, Abu Iyad regards the [Tunis] summit
results as tantamount to a victory far the Palestinian revolution because
the plot to hie the Palestinian revolution by having the Arab leaders _
issue a resolution calling on the Palestinian fighters to withdraw from
south Lebanon was completely defeated.
Abu Iyad revealed that [LebaneseJ President Sarkis came jto the Tunis
- summit] with a 100~percent "isolationist" working paper---the same working
- paper which was drawn up by U.S. envoy Philip Habib and which provides
for clearing the south of Palestinian fighters and cramming them in the
area north of Al--Litani River. -
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- Abu Iyad cited [PLO Executive Committee Chairman I'asir] 'Arafat as ha~ing
said at the conference that he refuses to give up through political
~ maneuvers what "Israel" has failed to achieve militarily in over 10 years
of war. He added: "The adamant Palestinian stand at the summit frustrated
the suspicious plot to hit and liquidate the Palestinian revolution."
The Steadfastness and Confrontation Front
Regard ing the front of steadfastness and confrontation, Abu Iyad said:
We are aware of the reality and size of the steadfastness front but we
are faced with two choices only: We either accept this "front" with its
weaknesses and limited effectiveness and work from then on at developing
and strengthening it, or wash our hands of it. I do not believe that the
latter step would serve the cause of the national struggle.
Abu Iyad disclosed how this front materialized at the Tripoli conference
when the Palestinian revolution leaders entered the conference--after the
participants had agreed on the famous Tripoli document on Palestine--and =
demanded that the front leaders reach a mutual agreement. Abu Iyad said
that, were it not for this step and the moral pressure it generated, the
front would not have materialized.
We Are Not a Salaried Revolutiotl
Abu Iyad attacked the [Libyan] Jamahiriyah and said: "'We are not a
salaried revolution." While the Jamahiriyah gives aid to this or that
Palestinian organization, it refrains from giving support to the liberation
organization. Abu Iyad added: "We refuse to turn ourselves into a salaried ~
revolution. We refuse to be tamed by the monthly salary they want to pay _
us."
Iran and the Palestinian Revolution
Qn the Iranian Revolution, Abu Iyad expressed his astonishment at the
attitude of some Arab states which are adopting a stand hostile to Iran.
He said: "'rhis is a questionable matter indeed~ The Arabs appear to
have become aware of Lesser Tunb and Greater Tunb only now whereas during
the shah's era none of them uttered a word."
Abu Iyad strongly denied what has been said about Palestinian mediation _
between Iran and the United States, He said that Brigadier Sa~d Sayil's
visit to Teheran was to see what was happening on the spot and to convey
- the Palestinian revolution's solidarity with the Iranian Revolution.
Abu Iyad expressed his conviction that the United States will not risk
launching a military aggression against Iran. He said that if the
United States embarks on such a desperata adventure, then "we in the
Palestinian revolution would not hesitate to participate in the battle
- and woulc3 commit all our military and political capabilities alongside
it" [Iran]. -
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Abu Iyad regards the Iranian-American confrontation as the most serious .
confrontation since the nationalization of the Suez Canal. He disclosed _
how the Iraniari delegation to the Tunis summit was not received properly
and how the Palestin ian delegation received it in its own quarters and
- arranged for it a series of ineetings with some Arab delegations to the
summit, thus enabling it to meet with the Arab League ~ecretary general
~ and tne Syriun and PDRY delegations.
[LD061603] The Jordanian-Palestinian Dialog
Commenting on the Jordanian-Palestinian dial~g, Abu Iyad defended the wark
- ;,i the joint commit*~e but protested at some loophoies. He said that this
dialog is bound by its objective circumstances to confront A1-Sadat's _
capitulation and the Camp David conference [as published] and to consoli~
date the Palestinian people's struggle in the occupied territories.
Abu Iyad also defended the role of the Palestinian side in the joint
Jordanian-Palestinian committee, particularly the role of Abu Mazin,
Fatah Central Committee member an.d head of the Palestinian side.
Abu Iyad, however, strongly attacked Jordanian intelligence, which, he
said, is indirectly working to explode Jordanian-Palestinian relations
by continuing to harass the Palestinians. Abu Iyad revealed how Jordanian
intelligence lets no opportunity slip for attacking Palestinian off icials
- in the ugliest words. He said: "We do not know what this double
dealing means."
The Situation in Syria
Regarding the situation in Syria, Abu Iyad strongly attacked the subversive -
groups which *_ry to distract Syria from its national battle against the
Zionist enemy and A1-Sadat's regime.
Abu Iyad said: I can understand it when political opponents of A1--Asad's
government assassinate Ba'thist elements and per sonalities, but when a
_ person is killed merely because he belongs to a particular creed, it is
the depths of political and moral degradation.
- He accused the American Central Intelligence [Agency] and Egyptian intel- ~
; I.igence of organizing sabotag~, operations against Syria from Turkey and
from across Syria's northerr border. Abu Iyad said: Trrespective of _
whether it is the "Muslim Brotherhood" or others who carry out these
operations, we believe that their aim is to distract Syria from its
national battle.
Relations With America
Abu Iyad again strongly denied the existence of avert or covert contacts
with the United States. He said: "We would be very happy if we could
- secure U.S. recognition of the liberation organization as the sole
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Y
- legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, but this, however,
. would not prevent us from continuing to confront U.S. imperialism as the -
archenemy of our Palestinian people ar.d the Arab nation."
Kreisky Is Wise and We Will Try A1-Sartawi
Abu Iyad welcomed the Palestinian-European dialog. He said: "'Arafat's
_ meeting with Kreisky is considered a victory for the revolution." But
- he warned of Kreisky's intentions, "without this meaning that we a~ree -
with him" [as published]. He said: "Kreisky is a wise Zionist but Begin
is a hypocrite and an extremist Zionist. Despite our complete awareness
of what Kreisky represents, we used to meet with him and debate with him
on clear grounds. We know exactly what we want from him, without relin-
quishing our objectives." Abu Iyad expressed his respect for Kreisky
because of his clear stands, even "those with which we do not agree."
_ Abu Iyad disclosed that the resistance command has summoned Isam al-Sartawi
and decided to put him on trial because he had agreed to share an Austrian
medal with an Israeli personality.
The Lebanese Army Is 23,000 Strong
Discussing the Lebanese situation, Abu Iyad said that he will meet with ~
President Ilyas Sarkis in the near future. He emphasized the strong
alliance with the Lebanese national and patriotic movement.
- Replying to a question on the condition of thP Lebanese Army, Abu Iyad
said that it now musters about 23,000 soldiers and that two-thirds of
them directly belong to the isolationist Lebanese front, He expressed _
doubt about the possibility of a cohesive Lebanese Army ever emerging
in view of the nature of the divisions in Lebanon.
Abu Iyad revealed that it is Israel which is objecting to the Lebanese
Army's deployment in the south because of the truce agreement signed
between the two countries, which does not permit tt?e presence of more than =
2,000 soldiers in the border areas. He added: "We do not know if now there
are new agreements with Israel that permit an increase in the size of
the Lebanese Axmy in [the] south." _
Abu Iyad concluded his talk by emphasizing that the Palestinian revolution
- wi11 strongly continue its struggle, stressing the i.mportance of national
unity among the revolution groups*
CSO: 4802
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
TIMETABLE FOR IMPLEMENTING TUNIS SiJI~(IT RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED
LD060933 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 3 Dec 79 p 1 LD
[Excerpt] London, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT--Arab diplomatic sources emphasized
to AL-SHARQ AL--AWSAT yesterday that the contacts which took place among
Arab capitals last week have resulted in the adoption of a timetable
for the implementation of the secret resolutions adopted at the tenth
= Arab summit conference convened in Tunis last month.
The sources said that these steps co~sist of strengthening the eastern
- front, achieving Jordariian-Palestinian understanding on various current _
issues and starting to find a solu~ion to the problem of south Lebanon
in the light of the resolutions issued by the summit.
It has been learned that Arab League Secretary General Chedli Klibi will
personally supervise the implementation of these steps on the authoriza- .
tion of the Arab leaders. It has also been learned that Klibi's upcoming
visit to Beirut is aimed at reviving the Arab followup committee and at
bringing the Lebanese and Palestinian sides into line with the inter- '
- Arab agreement.
Meanwhile, an official Jordanian source yesterday confirmed the report _
AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT puUlished on Saturday to the effect that PLO Executive -
Committee Chairman Yasir 'Arafat will arrive in Amman on Wednesday on a
brief official visit to Jordan during which he will meet with King Husayn.
It has been learned that King Husayn's discussions with 'Arafat will deal
in particular with PLO~Jordanian relatiorts and the strengthening of the
- steadfastness of the Arab inhabitants in the occupied territories.
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
KLIBI COMMENTS ON PLO MEDIATION OF ]LRANIAN CRISIS
LD062215 Tunis Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 6 Dec 79 LD
[Excerpt] Arab League Secretary General Chedli Klibi answered journalists -
questions at a luncheon organized in Paris today by the French society
for the diplomatic press, His answers dealt with the Arab perspective .
following the lOth suIImiit conference. In this context he said: The
latest Arab summit was a very important event for two reasons. First,
there were some fears resulting from rumors about splits in the Arab .
ranks. The Tunis suIIUnit proved that the Arab countries represented at _
the highest level did not leave the ranks of the united front formed at
the Baghdad meeting. Second, for th~ first time an Arab summit has agreed
on a unified action plan and not merely on general measures. This plan
takes into consideration the political and economic reality of the Arab
world.
The Tunis summit also recommended the opening up of Arab action to informa�-
tion. The matter concerns a coordinated action toward friendly countries,
toward Europe and America in par~ticular, especially now that Europe has an
iunportan~ role to play in influencing world opinion. Ours is to be a _
- decisive information action,
As regards southern Lebanon, Klibi said the lOth Arab summit conference
reached positive results, although they did not fully satisfy the two
parties to the problem. He described the steps achieved along the road
_ of reconciling requirements of the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese
state as important steps. Klibi spoke about the Arab--European dialog and
said in particular that he studied with the head of the French state
and with the foreign minister during his visit [words indistinct] the
possibility of resuming the dialog between the EEC and the Arab League
countries. He added that Arab countries hope to resume this dialog in
a comprehensive way, without separating political and economic matters.
He said that if we looked at our attitude in a comprehensive way, our
~ interests could lie in the same direction,
Answering a question on the Western Sahara, Klibi said: Each time tension
is created among Arab countries the Arab League moves quickly and this is
_ what happened when Mauritania called for a-meeting of the league's council
to discuss the withdrawal of the Moroccan forces from Mauritania. The
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Arab League sent a special envoy to Rabat and Nouakchott. The consultations
carried out by this envoy led to Mauritania revoking its request. Morocco _
presented Mauritania with written outlines of arrangenents for withdrawing
its forces. The problem is thus on its way to solution. As to the
possibility of the league's mediation in the conflict, Klibi said we did
not receive any request for intervention with the parties to the dispute. _
The league, however, is making great efforts to avoid tensions and to
countenance all possibilities. The situation seema quiet, and with the
passage of time attitudes will mature.
Klibi was asked his opinion on the American hostages in Teheran. He said:
We hope that this regrettable matter is solved thanks to the mediation
of the PLO. Had the PLO's first mediation attempt been successful, its
results would have been positive in relation to all parties and Iran would
have come out of this predicament and the American diplomats would have
been freed and the Iranian revolutior? would have rendered an important
service to the Palestinian cause, which is that the PLO would become,in
_ the eyes of Washington, a capable speaker. I hope that ti~is solution
will enjoy the support of Iran.
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
PLO'S AHMAD 'AZARI GRANTS INTERVIEW TO UK PAPER
LD071525 London MORNING STAR in English 7 Dec 79 p 4 LD
_ [Interview with Ahmad 'Azari of the PLO by Pater Avis in London--no date
given]
[Text] Palestine's liberation movement cannot compete e qually on the
battlefield with the armadas mounted by American imperial ism and its allies
= in the Middle East "but on the political field we hav~ mad e many gains
in the last two years," says Ahmad 'Azari of the Palestine Liberation
Organisation.
Mr. 'Azari, judicial adviser to PLO Chairman Yasir 'Araf at, was in London
_ to attend the 36th congress of the British Communist Part y as a fraternal
delegate. He is an optimist for the future of his people. _
"I couid not be a revolutionary if I was not optimistic t hat our just
cause will triumph," he says.
Mr. 'Azari recognises that the Camp David accords and the Egyptian~Israeli
treaty represents a blow to Arab unity by taking Egypt ou t of the struggle
for the liberation of all Middle East lands from imperial ist domination.
Those agreements have emboldened the leaders of Israel, armed with the most
sophisticated U.S. weapons, to increase their attacks on Palestinian
refugee camps and bases in south~rn Lebanon in the hope o ~ killing off
the liberation movement. -
But, says Ahmad 'Azari, contittued ~'alestinian resistance has made it more _
clear to the world that it is an absurdity to believe there can be a Middle _
East solution without recognition of Palestinian national rights.
Even the U,S, now has to take into account the Palestinian reality--~while
seeking to impose a phoney autonomy on the Palestinian pe ople that would
leave them bereft of sovereign rights over their own country.
Mr. 'Azari maintains that internatiottal solidarity with the Palestinian
cause has increased in the last two years~~as witness the recent meeting
- in Lisbon which gathered 1,000 representatives from over 300 countries and
organisations.
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He points also to the evolution of thinking within the socialist inter-
national. When Harold Wilson in Britain and Golda Meir in Israel were
in power all social democratic parties supported Israel's position up
to the hilt.
~ Now, social democratic leaders like Willy Brandt in West Germany,
- Bruno Kreisky in Austria and Bulent Ecevit in Turkey have indicated the
growing acceptance within the socialist international of the PLO's case
for a free and independent Palestinian state~
The recent reception of Yasir 'Arafat by Premier Suarez of Spain is
another sign of the PLO's increased presti~e.
"We can also say that the fall of th~ shah of Iran is a political victory
for the Palestinian revolution," says Mr. 'Azari.
- "Israel and the U.S, have lost a fortress in the Middle East, and the
imperialists have been obliged to withdraw in silence from the Cento
- Pact."
Mr. 'Azari said it would be [a] mistake to write off Egypt---historically,
the main force in advancing Arab liberation--~as a definite loss to the
national liberation movement.
"We must not forget that the Egyptian people have already made revolu--
tionary gains in their struggle for progress," he says. "Such a tradition
_ cannot be cancelled in 24 hours just because President Sadat has done a
separate deal with Israel."
Mr. 'Azari is confident that the developmant of the progressive forces in
Egypt will sooner or later lead to a clash between tl~e masses and the
present reactionary regime.
"They can deceive the people for some of the time, but not for all time,"
he said.
"Economic crisis and inflation are now suffocating the Egyptian people~
The trade unions have found that the working class is not ready to go
on living under these conditions, and the student movements and the
peasants are being organized.
- "The unified progressive party led by Khaled Moheiddin is gaining more
members and the Egyptian Communist Party-~which is illegal---has doubled
its membership in six months~
"When you think that those who join the communist party are liable to be
sacked from their work or put in prison, you can see how important that
- increase is."
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Mr. `Azari said Britain ha.~i a special responsibility to work for a solution
of the Palestinian question.
_ "British forces were in India and they left, and India is an independent
_ country," he says; "they were in Egypt and they left, and Egypt is
independent.
"The only country that was ender British mandate and is not independent
is Palestine.
"I am sure that the British people understand the realities, but they must
influence more those who speak in the name of their country. I am sure
that, if there is a continuous campaign, the British Government can at
least be made to recognise the PLO as ~he French Government has done."
Mr 'Azari said that relations between a future Palestinian state and
Israel must depend on the attitude of Israel toward Palestinian rights
- now.
"We cannot talk of recognition of Israel before the Palestinian state
exists. At present the Israeli leaders are continuing to ignore, not only
Palestinian rights, but the mere Palestinian existence,"
Mr. 'Azari said nobody at this stage could decree what type of gover~~ent
and social system the Palestinian people would choose when they estab-
lished their state--"anywhere on Palestinian land,"
"But I am an optimist," he say~. "I am sure it will be a democratic
and progressive state, with good relations with at least all those
who have stood with us in our long fight."
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS -
BRIEFS
ARAB CONII~IiJNIST PARTIES' ANNUAL CONFERENCE--The Arab cotmmunist parties
are to hold their annual conference next month but the precise venue
of the meeting is not yet known, while some sources say that it will be
held in Beirut, other sources assert that it will be held in Europe.
Communist sources say that the conference will issue a political state-
ment on the present Arab situation. A similar statement was issued by
: the previous conference which contained the first attack on the ruling
Iraqi Ba'th Party. [Unattributed report] [Text] [LD301605 London
AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 30 Nov 79 p 8]
LIBYA ~AYS CYPRIOT PRESS--Cairo, 6 Dec--The weekly magazine AL-MUSAWWAR
publishes photostat copies of six checks which Libyan President Mu'ammar
al-Qadhdhafi gave to the Cypriot Socialist Party wr.ich is led by
Lyssaridis. In its Friday issL.n, AL-MUSAWWAR says that Lyssaridis and
his party played a disgraceful role in the assassination of Yusuf
al-Siba'i. The magazine further reports that the checks were given to -
the TA NEA newspaper, the organ of the Lyssarid~is party to be spent on
attac:ks against Egypt and the United States which do not approve of
al-Qadhdhafi's theories. [Text] [NC060950 Cairo MENA in Arabic 0900 GMT
6 Dec 79 NC]
AL-SADA.T, IRA.N, MECCA EVENTS--In reply to questions asked by members ot the
_ Frenc~~ Diplomatic Press Association Thursday, 6 December, Arab League
Secretary General Klibi welcomed some of "President A1-Sadat's courageous
gestures" and expressed the view that "the reproach which can be leveled =
at him is that he has persisted in following a path which leads nowhere."
According to Klibi "the Arab League can operate without Egypt" although
it is suffering from the absence of this "great country," while "Egypt -
is nothing without the Arab world." The Arab League secretarv general,
who is making his first visit to France, said he thinks what is happening _
in Iran is not in keeping with Islamic reason." [quotation marks as
pubiished] He expressed the hope that PLO mediation will be accepted in
_ the hostages affair. It would be "a good thing" fcr everybody, he said.
Finally he said he thinks the events in Mecca "are far removed from what
is happening in Iran. This is a local irritation which must be stopped
quickly, but it does not have deep popular roots." [Text] [LD110907
_ Paris LE MONDE in French 8 Dec 79 p 3 LD)
l~
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AFGHANISTAN
REPRESENTATIVE OF AFGHAN DISSIDENT GROUP INTERVIEWED
London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 12-18 Nov 79 pp 31-33
[Interview with Representative of Afghanistan IslaMic Society: "Representative
of Afghanistan Islamic Society Tells AL-DUSTUR: 'Iran Is Not Helping Us and
Government Is Harassing Us; Islam Is Guarantee for Independence from East and
West"']
_ [Text] When one arrives to Iran coming from the Arab countries, one feels
that one's proximity to Afghanistan is not only geographical. Although there -
is a news blackout or at least a lack of interest in the Arab countries on the
question of Afghanistan, one hears discussion about Afghanistan everywhere in
Iran: in the press, on the radio, on television, in public meetings and in -
- people's conversations.
The coup that Hafizullah Amin.carried out in Afghanistan aroused broan interest
in Iran. But this interest declined after it was clearly affirnied that there
_ would be no significant change in Afghan policy and specifically in the Afghan
position on the Islamic Movement there.
The Iranians are praying for the victory of Islamic Afghanistan in their Friday
prayers. They consider participation in the IslaMic rlovement in Afghanistan
to be participation in a holy war. Thousands of people have actually signed
their names [to express] their willingness to volunteer. None of this, -
ho~aever, means that there is official support for the Afghan insurgents. -
AL-DUSTUR took advantage of the opportunity of the presence in Tehran of the
repersentative of the Afghanistan Islamic Society. It interviewed him about
the most recent developments in the Afghan question, and the following inter-
view took place:
r
ide began our interview with a question about the history of the Afghanistan -
Islamic Society and the beginning of the armed struggle. -
[Answer] The history of Islamic Afghanistan is an ancient history. Buddhism
and Zoroastrianism were widespread in Afghanistan before Is)sm. After the
victory of Islam and the liberation of our country Afghanistan became strongly
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I
attached to the Islamic religion and to the Arabic Islamic culture. Some
htoslem Arabs lost their lives in the battles that took place to liberate Af-
ghanistan. The people of Afghanistan are still keeping up the tombs of those
martyrs and are upholding their dear memory, whereas they have forgotten their
ancestors who had fought against the Moslem Arabs. After that our country
became the point from which Islam was spread to India, to (Turkumanistan) and
to other countries as well, The Afghans contributed to building the Islamic _
ci~~ilization, and there is a large number of scientists and writers whose
origins are Afghan. Everybody remembers Jamal al Din al-Afghani who played
a prominent role in the awakening of Egypt and of other Islamic countries -
during the latter of the last century. -
In spite of the barriers that British colonialism tried to build between
Afghanistan and the Arab countries, the Afghans remained careful of maintaining
their relations with the Arabs and the Moslems. A1-Azhar continued to be an
important center for Afghan students. From there, [knowledge] was radiated to
us again. During the fifties strong ties developed between some Moslem Afghans -
who were studying at al-Azhar and the Islamic Movement in Egypt. The most
~ prominent of those Afghans were Muhammad Niyazi, Burhan al-Din Rabani and _
Sayyid Muhammad Musa Tawana. After completing their studies in al-Azhar,
they returned to Afghanistan to teach in the University of Kabul, and there
they established in 1~57 the Afghanistan Islamic Society under the leader-
ship of Muhammad Niyazi, who is still a prisoner.
� The society's activity was secret because of the dictatorship of King Muhammad -
Zahir Shah. But the society stepped up its activities in the sixties, and
especially since 1963 when there was openness in the political climate and the
activities of the opposition were stepped up in general. This opposition was
Islamic and leftist, and it was opposed to the government of King Zahir Shah.
These activities weakened the government and prepared the climate for Daud
Khan's coup in 1973.
Independence First
_ [Question] What is you judgment of Daud Khan's coup?
[Answer] In the latter days of King Zahir Shah there were two forces vying
for control of the mainstream. There was the leftist movement, on the one
hand, and the Islamic forces, on the other. The Russians sensed the danger
of the Islamic Movement, so they planned a military coup that was supported
by the two leftist parties that had always been vying with each other in their _
loyalty to the Russians: The Khalaq Party (the People) and the Barjam Party
(al-Rayah [the Flag]). Except for one minister, the first cabinet that -
" Daud formed ~aas made up of inembers of these two parties. But in the end,
Daud did not accept playing the part of a puppet. While he continued striking
at the Islamic forces, he also hegan liquidating the positions of the leftists. _
This was an attempt to es~ablish autocracy, so the Russians took action again -
and engineered the coup which brought the Khalaq Party to power.
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A few days went by, and it became evident that the principal target of Taraki's ~
government was to liquidate the Isla~?ic forces. Therefore, we had no alter.na- _
- tive but to begin organizing the armed resistance. ?
[Questionj You are always talking about the Russians and about Russian in- -
fluence. Can you define this Russian influence for us in specific terms? _
[Answer] The army is the most important seat for Russian influence.
Most of the army officers received their training in Russia. You can see
that all the coups and the changes are brought about by this subordinate
institution. It was also for this reason that our only alternative was to
turn to the people and to begin the armed struggle because the upper echelons
of the army have become hopeless. They take no action unless such action
- is part of a foreign plan.
There are more than 10,000 Russian experts and advisers in the armed forces.
Three thousand of them are working in the air force. In general, the number
o.f Russians working in the economic and educational institutions in our
" country exceeds 150,000. Russian adivsers are distinguished in the 19 minis-
tries which make up the government, in all the public departments and in all
the responsible agencies. In the city of Mazar Sharif alone there are
- approximately 120,000 Russian experts and technicians working in the ex-
traction of oil and gas.
_ If you wanted an example of the economic exploitation that our people are
- subjected to, there is the example of the oil and the gas which the Russians
are plundering in the form of raw materials. For every cubic meter of natural
gas they pay 75 Afghani (less than half a French franc), and then the}~ sell
us the refined oil and gas at world prices.
In addition, they take the gold and the emeralds that are mined out of our
country at trifling prices. They also take cotton, our most important agri-
cultural prociuct. They get it at a price that is much lower than the world
, price. To a certain extent, they also monopolize grain imports from Afghan-
istan.
The other aspect--and perhaps the most important one--in the Russian interest _
in Afghanistan is its strategic location and its proximity to China, Iran and
Pakistan as well as Russia itslef. Therefore, the advent of any independent
government in Afghanistan would be considered a threat to Soviet security
in the judgment of the Russians who want Afghanistan to be a bridge they can
use to cross to the other countries where they can achieve the Kaiser's old
dream of reaching warm waters.
[Question] What is your basic goal, and what policy ~aill you adopt if the
Islamic Movement came to power?
; [Answer] Islam itself is the armor that protects independence. Our goal is
to achieve the independence of Afghanistan from the superpowers and to
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establish strong relations with the Islamic world. We are certain that these
relations will give our country the strong bases for preserving its indepen-
dence. Islamic Afghanistan will become part of the Third World and of the
Non-aligned Movement in the world.
tde want our country--just as Khomeyni wants Iran--to be neither eastern nor ~
western. The application of Islam will n.ot be a step backwards for Afghan-
istan. We have no plans to impede progress, but we rather want Islam to be
a tool of awareness and awakening for the people and an incentive for progress.
We know that Islam has certain applications, just as is the case in some sub-
ordina t e countries, but we are as far as we can be from such Islam. _
[Question] What is your relationship to the other political forces? How do
you re gulate life in the areas that you control?
[Answer] There are other Islamic organizations besides ours. The most im-
portant of them are the Islamic Revolutionary Movement, the Afghan Islamic
Party and the National Front for the Liberation of Afghanistan. At the pre- -
sent t ime the Afghan Islamic Party is suffering from a split. -
Our eff orts so far have yielded the unification of the efforts of these basic
organizations into the Islamic Alliance which is a framework for coordinating ~
- activit ies in the liberated areas and for planning operations. We hope that
this w ill develop into full unity among the organizations.
There are efforts to bring together other organizations such as al-Ra'd [Thun- -
der], al-Nasr [Victory] and the Islamic Afghan Movement. These organizations
were o riginally formed in Iran, under the influence of the Iranian Revolution
which is working basically among the Shi'ite minority in Afghanistan.
[Question] Are the other basic organizations Sunni organizations?
[Answe r] They do not have a sectarian character, but the majority of the
- Afghan people belong to the Sunni sect. Out of 15 million, which is the
nur~ber of Afghanistan's population, for examp]..e, there are a number of
Shi`ites.
The Isl amic Alliance, which represents the basic fighting organizations,
_ directs the struggle and regulates public life in the liberated areas. Local
authori ties and courts have been formed to look into disputes and to regulate
_ the different aspects of life. These committees and authorities are guided -
in their activities by the charter of the Islamic E111iance which all parties
signed.
[Question] Are there non-Islamic parties that are participating in the
Revolut ion?
[Answe rJ There were other parties, but they were swept away by the tide of
the Isl amic Movement. The New Democracy Party, for example, which is known
as the Jawid Flame-the Eternal Flame, was active in the struggle that preceded
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I
: Taraki's coup. But its members ~aere subjected to severe oppression afterwards,
and they were weakened considerably. There were other organizations that caere
formed on a national or on a patriQtic bas:is. The most important of these
organizations is the Af~han Malat Party. It had socialist, democratic ten- _
. dencies, and it was tied to Western Europe. But this trend tias also heen
weakened. The infrastructure of these organizations rallied around the
banner of the Islamic Ptovement cahich became the movement of the entire nation.
� On the other hand, there are at present forces that have been left over from
the regime of King Zahir Shah (he himself is now living in Italy), an1 there
are western efforts to revive these for.ces. However, the effect they have is -
not worth mentioning.
The Rescue Coup -
[Question] What is your judgment of the recent coup, and who is liafizullah -
Amin? It is being said that the f act that he belongs to the Pushtu tribes
may give him a popullr base. Is th is true?
~
[Answer] Hafizullah Amin is the son of one of the major feiidal Pusto famil.ies.
His family lives in a luxurious mansion near Kabul.. -
He began his political life cooperating wittl Daud Khan, and he l~ad a strong
relationship with the Shahi family. He benefited from this relationship,
and he had an opp~rtunity to complete his studies in the United States. He
was known at that time to be influenced by U.S. culture. When the U.S.
president visited Afghanistan, Haf izullah organized a major demonstration
- to welcome him. Then he joined the Khalaq Party, and after a while became
the second man after Taraki, or rather his competitor.
The fact that he is a mer.iber of a certain tribe does not mean that he has its �
support. His family has removed i tself from the tribal environment and has
no influence on the tribe.
But in my judgment the recent coup was an attempt to play the last hand and
to salvage whatever can be salvaged from the deposed regime. It was exactly
like [the coup ~ohich] removed the Shah and brought Shahpur Bakhtiar. In other
words, it was an attempt to keep the same merchandise under a different facade,
~aith the knowledge that the facade here (Hafiz) had been used up from the very
" beginning. However, he was considered stronger and firmer than Taraki.
No Assistance from Iran or from Ch ina
[QuestionJ Let us get to a discussion about Iran, the Iranian Revolution and -
_ about what is being said about Iranian support for you or what is called
, Iranian interference.
[Answer~ The prospects of our being affected by the Iranian Revolution are
broader than the discussion about interference and support. They are even
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hr.oaclc~r than the relationship with rhe Iranian government. Regardlc~ss of the
format of tlie rc~lationship, *he Iranian Revolution remains a ma~jor event in
our area; in fact, it is a major event in the world. It gave the struggle
- of the Afghan people a new thrust. We learned that by depending on the powers
of our own people, it was possible to achieve victory over a regime that is
_ supported by a major power. The Iranian peo~le were also able to annihilate
the Shah's regime which was supported by the United States.
Tt is in our interest that the I.~anian Revolution remain strong and invincible.
We ~vould consider this a victory for us even though Iran has not offered us
any assistance.
Regarding assistance, we have not been receiving any financial support from
the government so far. The people here are collecting contributions for us _
and are helping us. liut we did not receive anything from the government.
. Ayatollah Khomeyni has expressed his support for us more than once, and
_ this is great moral and political support.
Thousands of persons have expressed their willingness to volunteer with us,
~.~;.~t we do not need manpower; we do need. weapons, ammunition, and financial
assistance. The liberated areas are suffering from economic difficulties
since we have to make plans for the f~od and the livelihoods of the population
~ in the shadow of an economic blockade that was set up by the government of
Kabul.
Officials in the Iranian government have stated that the borders with Afghan-
istan must be checked. They did actually place restrictions on activities -
across the borders, and these measures impede.our work.
_ Ar any rate, the historical ties between Iran and Afghanistan are too deep
to be separated. There is no doubt that a major change, such as what hap-
~ pened in Iran, will affect Afghanistan. This effect is ongoing and I am af-
firming that there is no Iranian interference. In fact, the support that we _
- are seeking does not exist; were it to materialize, we would not consider it
J interference. _
[Question] What about what is being said about Chinese support?
[Answer] This is what the regime in Kabul is trying to connect to us. In ~
order for the regime to conceal its subordination to foreigners, it is trying
to portray the opposition movement as the handwork of foreigners. The Kabul
regime is saying that we are being Crained in China and that we are utilizing
Cninese territory as a background base. The fact is that we are not receivi~ng
material support from China. China took a strong position against the coup
that was planned by the Soviets, and this was beneficial to the Afghan Revol-
~ ution, but tl~is does not signify that we benefited directly from this posi-
tion.
20
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[dc SupPor~ in~e~~ndent Pioventent5
_ [Question] How are your relations ~aith the liheration mov~-~ment.s in the
caorl~l, and especially the Palestinia~z Revolucion?
[tlnswer] We tiavc~ ~;ood relat~ons ~�~i.th all L-he Islamic ~Iovement.s ir~ Chc~ ~aorld.
Some of [hese movements offered ~ls material and moral ~upport. -..�1 thc~y
- offered to send us volunteers, bt~t: as I said ~,re cla not need manpo~aer. _
We si.~pport a11 liberation movemeiits wtiose origi.ns are indcpF ndetit arid thcis~~
cahich seelc .liberati.~n Eroni colonia.lism and Earei~n c.ontrol, f3u[ il ; i 115
our hearts with grieE to see that some of these movements ~~re not ~~w~~re of
the danger of the Russians; nor are th~y aware of the lm}~or.Cance of ~~reser-
ving the indepenclence of their moven~ents and their countries. The r.e:,~~:L~_,
therefore, i.s that they b~come liberated from one foreign counlry rigadier general in October 1973, and he was
chief of staff for the entire armed forces in 1978. He succeeded hi~ -
oFficial commander, riaj Gen 'Abd-al-Mun'im Wasil, to the command of the R
Third Army that was surrounded in Sinai and Suez. A1-Sadat promote3 -
Badawi's command role during the siege. Maj Gen Badawi is known for his
combat capability and for his military firmness. He is also know for r
~ moral courage. This made Minister of War al-Jamasi tell him in 1976 during
a~~eeting of the officers of the T~iird Army at the Cultural House in Suez,
"Badawi, are you going to create an opposition in the army similar to that
in the People's Assembly?" He also demonstrated severe cruelty and prompt
- 48 -
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_ decisiveness in confronting the uprising in the Governorate of Suez where
the masses were the most violent during the 1977 riots of January 18 ar'
19. Dressed in battle fatigues, he personally led his troops where :,~y
surrounded the workers in the fertilizer plants in 'Ataqah and in t~e
oil refineries in al-Zaytiyah. He prevented the workers from j~ining the
rioting masses in the city.
He continued to climb above the members of his class an.d above those who
were his military superiors. Fu'ad 'Aziz Ghali, commander of the Second
Army; rfaj Gen Fu'ad Zikri, com~ander of the navy; Maj Gen Muhanunad 'Ali
Fahmi, commandre of the air force; Maj Gen Sa'd al-Din Ma`mun, the curren.L
governor of Cairo; and scores of others were removed from their positions
while he continued to climb upwards. Badawi is the one whom al-Sadat per-
sonally trust the most. His wife, who is a graduate student at the Girls'
College at 'Ayn Shams [University], had a close .relationship wi_h Egypt's
First Lady, Jihan al-Sadat.
t4oreover, it is Ahmad Badawi who remains the army's first man because
Kamal Hasan 'Ali, the current minister of defense is a military intelligence
_ man and, ultimately, a gentleman when compared with the militant army man,
tihmad Badawi.
- The Stern Mustafa Khalil
Dr Mustafa Khalil, the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs
is forever all.uding to the American card that he holds. He is the Middle
East representative of the well-known telephone company, ITT. Before _
that he was a graduate of the well-known American MIT University which is
- known for its contributions to the aevelopment of the U.S. arms industry
and for having a strong relarionship with the Pentagon and with the
Central Intelligence Agency. The university maintains a permanent relation- _
ship with its graduates.
During a television interview in Cairo former U.S. Ambassador Herman Eilts
~ praised Mustafa Khalil in particular and said that he was certain of the _
continued growth and development of U.S.-Egyptian relations as long as
"our friend, Khalil in whom we have much confidence, is at the head of the
Egyptian goverament." This pressure [from the United States] preceded
al-Sadat's [decision] to charge ?~halil with the task of presiding over the
, cabinet again.
i But the secret benind Khalil's political sternness and indisposition during
_ Begin`s visit was to avoid meeting Begin. It was, on the one hand, part
of his clever tactics to leave al-Sadat uncovered and, an the other hand,
to present himself as an Egyptian figure that would be acceptable to the
Arabs. But despite its strong appearance the card that Khalil holds in
- his hand is the weakest of cards. He is a civilian, and the army does
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not support him. H:is re i.ationshi,~ wi~h. the American ~ is a~ odds with his
supp~secl personal loya.l_ty t.~r r_h~~ president. l~urthermore, E~ypt`s economic
_ problems and the crisis ot auronomy are ~reater than he Is and ~;reater.
than the card that :~e holcis.
The Prime Miilister of th~ F'uture ~Jafd CabineL
The [dafd Party is the party that is ~~osest to power; ir is the party
thaC is aslcing For power most earnestly. Tn 1954 the revoluClon disbanded
the Wafd ParCy and confiscateci its Funds, its motto and tts nec,rspaper, etc.
- In 1965 all of Cairo was mov~~d Uy tile iunera:l. oL- P~iusi:afa aI-~~?~ahh~s; i=tie
fiuteral turned 111.~0 a wafd dernonstra.tion with ~~eople chant:ing, "'ihere is
no leader after you, Na}~h~is!" Tl~:~s was wi~en 'Abd-al--Nasir ~aas ~ Zive, ~ras -
strong and was presi.din~; ove.r the gover~ime~it which did at tha~_ t_ime u.rrest
- the leaders of the damonstrat~ic~n. _
The Wafd ParLy has resi~nieci i~s political acti.vity in public. IUrahim
Tal' at published tii.s ~nEmoirs iz~ Lhe magazine, ROSE AL-YUSIIF wherein he
expres:~ed a poli~icul defei~se of the liistory of the Wafd Party G;zd its
leaders. Durin;; the days o1 its former. ~resident, the late MusL-afa al-
Baradi'i, the Law;ers' 1!ni.on. had been the starting point For the return of
- the Wafd. The union had tiosted the S~c~etary oL- the Wafd, ru'ad Siraj
- al-Din who deliverecl_ a lengCl~y address that was la*,er printed in a book.
The Wafd Party was able "ta take away" 36 membe,:s of the People's Assembly,
most of ~ahom were m~mbers ~~f- the government's party, so as t:o ensute the
7.ega1 provision~- for uracticing its poli_tical rights. Thc:re were scores
of uther representatives who tried to join the Wafd Part~ JLIY were turned
- aw~y. Wafd snt~rces spoke al~out broad Egyptian memLershi_p in the t~arty
that amounted Co 1 year to 1 million members. The ~~lafd Party was careful
to make its retu}-~1 to polit:ical life surrounded with manifestations of -
the fact that it llad struggled for that right, that it ~oas independent of
the government, thafi its r.epresentation o:E the nation was broad and that
_ it was in principle defendzng democrati_c freedoms. From his palace ~ncate:i
on 7 al-Birjas Street in Garden City, Fu'ad Siraj al-Din used to matr4g~ ~
the plans oF the Wafd to penetrate the heart of the organiza~ions and
institutions [of government].
The Wafd tiaas pr~paring a democraLic plan whose purpose was to bring about -
a siient coup in the malceup of government. The Wafd Party advacated a =
parliament>ancial
- aid protocol in Paris Thursday afternoon whereb~ treasury loans and
_ guaranteed private credits will be placed at the disposal of the Kingdom
of Morocco, according to an official Frenci~ source. These public and
private funds will be used to buy durables from Prance ~ai.th a view to
carrying out the Moroccan development plan, The main projects c�hosen -
concern the phosphorus and cement industries, the merchant navy sect-or
and the oils, lubricants and telecommunications industries. [Excerpt]
_ [LD1071027 Casablanca LE MATIN in French 1 Dec 79 pp l, 4 LD]
GRAIN PRODUCTION DROP--Casablanca, 27 November~~According to AFRTQUE
_ AGRICULTURE, a monthly magazine on agricultural matLers, Morocco's grain
production for 1978-1979 amounted to 36 million quintals. Citing the
_ statistics provided by the Agriculture P'Iiriistry, [words indistinct] that
this represents a 21~percent drop compared with the amount harvested in
the previous year and compri~es: 12 million quintals of durum wheat
5 million quintals of soft ivheat, 16 million quintals of barley and -
3 million quintals of corn. Unfavorable weather conditions have been -
responsible for this drop in production. In addition, troublesome birds
have caused damage amounting to 10-15 percent of output. The ministry ~
estimated that the country needs 60 million quintals grain a nd this means '
that we are 24 million quintals short. Furthermor~, any importation
of grain to cover the country's needs will be carried out under conditions
prevailing on the world market and, as a result, we will probably have
= to pay120 billion,150 billion centimes for them. [Text] [LD101017
Casablanca LE MATIN in French 27 Nov 79 p 1 LD]
- CSO: 4400 ~
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SUDAN
_
POSSIBILITIES OF CHANGE IN COUNTRY EXPLORED
Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic .7-11 Nov 79 p 30
[Article: "Either Reconciliation or the rfilitary"]
[Text] Khartoum--For years, Sudan has been going from crisis to crisis,
the opposition has been growing stronger and all the .future possibilities
are revolving around change.
The opponents within the Sudanese regime expect changes t'at have been ~
described as "necessary" to establish stability in Sudan. -
_ These opposition sources believe that there are three possibilities of change
in the near future:
The first possibility lies in having President Ja'far Numayri accept the
- formula presented by the opposition at ho~e and abroad. This for.mula focuses
= on reducing the individual powers, on reorganizing the Socialist Union on
democratic bases and on re-examining the economic policy. -
The opposition saurces say that what i~ required in this case is a national
' rea~nciliation government that includes the various inclinations and that
rerluces, moreover, the religious exaggeration that is beginning to emerge,
- keeping in mind that Sudan is well-known for its moderation in this regard.
~ The second possibility lies in the occurrence of a military coup within the
- regime, especially since President Ntin:ayri has, according to what the
opponents say, played a dangerous game when he involved the army in politics
= and appointed [Army] Commander 'Abd-al-Majid Hamid Khalil as his first
deputy. _
The third possibility, and this is what the opposit3on is trying to avert,
is the possibility of the occurrence of a military movement similar to the
- Ethopian or Ghanian movement, i.e., the staging of a coup by junior officers ~
with no known and definite affiliations. ~
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The opponents within the regime ascribe the fears they express to the con-
- tinued deterioration of the economic and political conditions in the past
2 years, especially in the wake of the disappointment caused by the failure
of the open-door policy started 2 years ago when al-Sadiq al-Mahdi agreed to
deal with the regime on the basis of the creation of a national unity govern-
ment that would solve the problems of the south and that would exclude
nobody from within its ranks, not even the communists--as made evident by
the amnesty decisions that were issued and that included the communists.
However, the situation remained unchanged and al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, despite
returning to Sudan and becoming a member of the [Socialist Union] Political
Bureau, started his opposition anew after 6 months. The signs of division
_ in the south also began to appear after the appointment of a uumber of minis-
ters, the dismissal of others and the outster of certain southern elements
from the Political Bureau.
- The opponents complain that President Numayri tried at a joint meeting of -
the political and executive leadershig:~ a monti ago to place the blame on his
aides, thus ousting his first deputy, l~bu-al-Qasim Muhammad Ibrahi~?, from
power and making him the sacrificial lamb whereas they believe that the crisis
is bigger and deeper than to be solved with a sacrificial lamb, keeping in
mind that a number of the political sectors are convinced that Numayri is _
responsible nersonally.
The opponents also say that the written agreement with al-Sharif al-Hindi
stipulated that the constitution be re-examined so that all the provisions
restricting public liberties may be eliminated and so that absolute powers _
may be eliminated to make the executive apparatus more democratic. They
point out that nothing of the sort has happened and that the principle of
adopting decisions through consultation, discussions and voting underwent the
test of the Camp David accords during which President Numayri adopted an
individualistic position without consulting with any of the political leaders.
This is what motivated a1-Sadiq al-Mahdi to submit his resignation. `
The opponents add that the same thing was repeated insofar as southern Sudan
is concerned where, the agreement stipulates, the regional authorii~~= ~hould
have their autonomy. But Numayri, according to the opponents, supported
Joseph Lago, the chairman of the south, even in measures conflicting with
the constitution, thus compelling a number of southern ministers, including
some who participated in the Addis Ababa agreement, to quit the government.
It seems that there are two schools in the Socialist Union. The first is
prepared to support the regime and the steps taken by President Numayri,
even if they violate or overstep the constitution. The second school believes
that it is necessary to bolster the concept of national unity, to entrench
~ democracy and, consequently, to curtail the president's powers and to put an -
, end to some violations. The elements of this school have been compelled to
resign and some of them have even left the country.
The opposition circles point out the phenomenon of the Muslim Brotherhood's
support for President Numayri--support given on the grounds that President
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Numayri has begun to follow Is~amic directi~~ns and that he talces serong
positions against the cor~munists. But these circles focus on the danger of -
cooperation between Numayri and tne Muslim Brotherhoc~d and h:~-~eve that -
the Brotherhood has exploited hin to take radical re.li~iuus positions tl;at
have caused reactions among the southern Sudanese because they are in r_on-
flict with the Addis Ababa agreement and with the provision5 of the constitu-
tion. '
As a result, the opponents say, social riots started and the strikes of
workers, professionals, doctors, accountants and bank employees foll.owed one
- another in succession. Even the farmers in al-Jazirah Agricul_tural Froject
went on strike. The opponents here say that there is no truth in Numayri's
charge that the communists are behind thE troubles because most of the
- organizations that sta~ed strikes are organizations that fo]_low the guvern-
ment. _
. Economically, the opponents point out the deteriorating conditions. 'The
- World Bank has assessed Sudan~s clebts at 2.7 bi7.lion dol.lars. Thev bel.ieve
that the main causes of the deterioration are not due to the fact that the
plans are not sour.d but are rather due t~ the emergence of the corruption
that has exceeded all limits in the past 2 years ancl has led ta the emer.gence
of international middlemen. A.11 th=i_s has caused the f;overnment to adopt
harsh economic decisions compatible ~~~zth the IMF resolutir~ns wliir_l~ cal J. for.
_ det~aluing the currency, levying high taxes and reducing government spendjng.
These measures have had a heavy impact on the development prn~~r_ts, r_he
services and the availability of consumer connnod-ities.
The opponents believe t}lat the current issue in Sudan is not su much Lhe _
issue of "protecting the regime" as it is that of "saving the homelan.d." -
- They believe that it is no 'longer possible for one individua.l o.r. one political
organization to save the homeland. This is why they stress the need to
achieve the national reconciliation and to restore the regime's cr.edibility.
Perhaps the opponents' more important object~ion concerning President Numayri
is his extreme reliance on Egypt--a reliance which they attribute to
"security reasons more than anything else." They accuse ~gypt of scaring
Numayri with information on dangers coming from Ethiopia, South Yemen and
Iraq *o push him toward stronger and stronger reliance on Egypt. Analyzing
the positions of the Arab states toward Numayri~s regime, the opponents -
- say that tnese positions are aiienating Sudan currently. They believe that
Saudi Arabia could have rescued Sudan economically because Saudi Arabia
knows that a part of the Sudanese problems i,s due to mismanagement, corruptian
and the lack of desire on Numayri's part to cooperate with the patriotic
elements, such as al-Mahdi and a1-Hindi. The opponents also believe that
- Iraq's position is hostile. Despite Libya's lack of trust in Numayri, it
adopts an outwardly neutral position toward him. But what explains the -
- truth of the Libyan position is the presence of followers of :Ldi Amin,
. the ex-Ugandan president, in southern Sudan [sic].
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midst this turbulent picture of the political and economic conditions in
Sudan, no change seems to be itmminent, even though the three possibilities
that the opponeuts take into their account are not far from the reality.
No possibility c an be given precedence, considering that Numayri has -
succeeded so far in keeping Sudan out of the heat of the inter-Arab con- -
flicts. _
8494
CSO: 4802
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SUDAN
rfALTREATMENT OF POLITICAL PRISONERS CITED, RIOTS DISCUSSED
Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 12 Nov 79 p 32
[Article: "What Is Happening in Numayri~s Prisons; 500 Political De~ai.nees
_ in Sudan"]
[TextJ "...The regime of the second dictatorship in Sudan is tryi~ig to
prolong its life through more oppression, torture and persecution of the
Sudanese nationalists and progressives, relying on the imperizli.st r..ountries
and on the parties to Camp David. This regime, headed by Numayri, forget:s
that Emperor Haile Selassie who used to live next door has ended iii liistory':~ -
garbage dump, that the shah of Iran has followed him and that the beacls of
the reactionary string of beads are falling one after the other.
"Sudan, which Numayri has turned into a country o.f starvation, financial
deficits and of political and economic subservience, is stil.l rj.sing caiCli
its democratic forces to overthrow the dictatorship and to build ~tie
- autnority of the popular democracy. From Khartoum, the capital, we have the
details of the torture in a report we have received from there--details that~,
show that the life of the dictatorship is about to end." [Quotation marks
as published]
Khartoum--Exclusive Dispatch to AL-HURRIYAH--In one of the jails, colleague
Qasim Amin (one of the founders of the Communi.st Party and of the Sudanese
unionist movement and chairman of the World Textile Workers Federation) -
suffered a heart attack which caused at the outset a coa,plete paralysis
which then developed to semi-paralysis. The heart attack occurred on
1 September [1979] but the prison authorities did not transfer the colleague ~
to the hospital until 3 September on the pretext that they have neither
orders nor powers insofar as the prisoners are concerned. The authorities
did not move until the colleague developed complete paralysis. Only then
was he taken to the armed forces hospital. In view of the wave of anger
and grief that developed as a result of what the colleague suffered, the
government withdrew the guard watching the colleague (even when completely -
paralyzed). The colleague has been now transferred to the Khartoum Hospital
Clinic.
There is a large number of sick colleagues among the detainees and their
ailments have gotten worse as a result of the long periods of detention.
'7
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It is well-known that colleagues Qasim Amin, Sulayman Hamid, Sala:i Madhiri,
Dr Muhammad Sulayman, al- Sirr Na~ib, Khalil Ilyas, Sabri Jasur, 'Abd-al-Qadir
al-Rifa'i, al-Sirr Shabbu, Taha Sa'udi Darraj, 'Ali Idris, Bakhit Musa'id
and others have been arrested repeatedly and kept in detention for long
years without any trial s ince the July 1971 retrogression.
'rhe number of detainees amounts to nearly 500 currently: 120 in Khartoum,
more than 100 in (Malaga) al-Jadidah, more than 60 in Port Sudan, nearly
- 50 in Karimah/(Harwa), 25 in ('Atbarah) and around it, 20 in Sannar, 21 in
al-Abyad and Kaduqli, 18 in Sabkhah, 16 in al-Qadarif, 17 in Kusti, 5 in
al-Duwaym, 7 in Juba and 30 in Kasala. The overwhelming majorit} of the
detainees are communists, including a number of unionists, workersq teachers
and employees. There is also a number of democrats, including a member of
the Regional People's Ass embly in Juba. The detainees also include a number
of Ba'thists from Kharto um, Nadani and al-Abyad. On 8 September, the families
of the detainees (their mothers, wives, sisters and children) marched in a
procession which included nearly 200 w~ ~en and a number of children. The
procession presented a plea to the head of the judiciary. The governmen.:
corifronted the procession with more than 600 policemen who used tear gas to
disperse the procession and the crowds gathered around it. The police beat
the women painfully, tearing their clothes and injuring a number of them.
The police then arrested Samirah al-Bahr, Fa'izah Abu-Bakr and 'Alawiyah Thabir.
A total of 45 women and a number of children were kept under detention for
a time and then released at 2400 on bail. The police took statements from
each of the women separately and refused to sue them collectively. The
barbaric treatment of the procession aroused the anger and threats of the
(crowds). In all these cities, the governors and the security officials
_ coere making contacts and saying that the orders came from Khartoum directly,
accompanied by names [sentence as published].
The students staged big demonstrations which included the three cities
~ (Khartoum, Omdurman and Khartoum North) in the wake of the announcement of
- the latest increases in gasoline prices. The demonstrations were staged
- mainly by higr. school students and were characterized by violent clashes
~etween the security men and the students. The demonstrations demanded:
1. Democratic freedom f or the masses.
- 2. ImprovPment of the e conomic conditions.
3. The downfall of the murderer's regime.
As a result of the violence and of the ferocious attack [presumably by the
_ security men], a number of students were martyred and others were injured.
They are:
_ 1. Kamal Faruq Khiraj, 15 years: Martyred as a result of fractured skull
bones and brain hemmorrhage.
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2. Yasir Hasan, 15 years: Martyred as a result of a skull fracture aud
brain hemorrhage.
3. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Ghani Harith: Killed as a result of a broken neck.
4. Ttoo other students were run over by an army car,
S. One homeless person [Eritrean refugeeJ was shot to death.
In the wake of the recent riots and of the union strikes, especia_lly the
Doctors Union strike, the [authorities] :etired a number of doctors witi~out
explaining the reasons. The number reached 20 doctors recently (50 are
expected to be retired). riost of the retired doctors are members of ttie
administrative councils of the unions [sic] who supported the doctors'
demands firmly. The disMissals were concentrated on the communi.st and
democratic doctors. We expect further measures against the other uni.ons.
The retired doctors include:
l. Ahmad al-Tijani, general surgeon.
- 2. Kamal 'Arabi, bone surgeon.
3. A1-Shaykh Kunaysh, internal medicine.
4. 'Uthman ~:asan Surakni, dermatologist.
5. 'Umar Hasan Amin, internal medicine.
6. Ja'far Muhammad Salih, neurologist.
7. Hummudah Fatah-al-Rahman, general practitioner.
8. 'Umar Muhammad 'Abbas, general practitioner.
9. Ahmad Zakariya, general practitioner.
10. 'Adli Ahmad Sa'd, general practitioner.
11. 'Adli Ya'qub Iskandar, general practitioner.
12. Shaddad [no other name given], dentist.
13. Yasin P1~kki, dentist.
14. Ba'hara [no other name given], dentist.
15. Sayyid Ahmad al-Sitanni, eye specialist.
16. Hamid al-Na'im, gynecologist.
It is well-known that the Doctors Union staged an open strike until rein-
statement of the doctors dismissed from their positians, In view of the
broad support from the workers, teachers and prQfessional unions and from
_ the popular movement generally, the government backed down and reinstated
the dismissed doctors. Thus, the unionist and popular movement has taught
the government of the bloody retrogression another lesson in how it defends
its democratic rights despite all the government's oppression agencies and
all its fascist laws.
8494
CSO: 4802
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SUDAN -
BRIEFS -
RECOMMENDATION FOR ISLAMIC REPUBLIC--Dr Hasan al-Turabi, the Sudanese -
minister of justice and leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan, is
exerting efforts for re-examination of the Sudanese laws to make them
compatible with the dictates of Islam. It is said in Khartoum that he is -
doing this in accordance with a high-level recommendation for the declaration
of an Islamic republi c in Sudan. President Ja'far Numayri had earlier
dispatched al-Turabi to Tehran to meet Ayatollah Khomeini and to familiarize
himself closely with the progress of affairs in the Islamic Republic of
Iran. Sudanese sources have said that this proposal has not received the -
support of southern Sudan, considering that Sudan is a state that includes
both Muslims and Christians and is founded on respecting the freedom of
religion. The critic ism levelled at this attempt is not confined to the
southern Christian leaders but also comes from Islamic groups in the north
that are not happy with this inclination, especially the Islamic Republicans
" Group which is led by Mahum Muhammad Taha. The final word on the issue
remains with President Ja'far Numayri who is trying to find a formula that
will be acceptable to all and will preserve his alliance with the Muslim
Brotherhood. [Text] [London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 12 Oct 79 p 8] 8494
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TiJNISIA
BRIEFS
- EARTH TREMOR REGISTERED--The seismographic center at Sidi Bou Sai.d at
0507 today recorded an earth tremor. A preliminary analysis indicates
that the epicenter of the tremor was in the sea at a distance of t8 km
north of Sidi Said. It is estimated to have had a force of 3.5 degrees -
on the Richter Scale. It is noted that there were 10 tremors in Italy -
- during the past 24 hours. The strongest tremor was on the western coast
of Sicily, but it did not cause any real damage, because according to the _
seismogXaphic center in Italy, its epicenter was 40 km under the cru st
of the earth. The tremors continued until this morning. [TextJ
[Tunis Domestic Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 8 Dec 79 LD]
CSO: 4402 -
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WESTERN SAHARA
POLISARIO LEADER REPORTS ON OAU COMMITTEE RESOLUTIONS
LD081032 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 0001 GMT 8 Dec 79 LD
[Excerpts] Polisario Front Secretary General Mohamec' Abdelaziz, at the
end of the work of the OAU Reconciliation Committee, held a press conference
in which he explained the Saharan viewpoint on the resolutions adopted by
the committee.
The committee's achievements represent an advanced stage of African _
_ contribution and efforts to restore rights to the Western Sahara's
rightful owner, the Saharan people. This contribution is appreciated
and makes clear that Africa understands the real nature of the [destern
Saharan problem, the most important of which is the problem of decoloniza-
tion, which is connected with the expulsion of foreign forces occupying ~
the Western Sahara and the efforts to prevent its people from exercising "
their right to self-determination and independence enjoyed by the rest
of the peo~le of the world.
The Polisario secretary general said that the special African committee
fully understands that one of the basic conditions which gives the Saharan
people the right to self-determination is the withdrawal of foreign forces
from the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic. He said that the Saharan people
appeal to the states which actually encourage Morocco to pursue its policy
- of intransigence and expansion which in turn encourages Morocco to be a
source of tension and instab ility in northwest Africa and to reject inter-
national resolutions, primarily the OAiJ and UN resolutions. The Saharan
people appeal. to these states to heed the call of Africa via the special =
committee, which represents all of Africa, that the decision of Af rica
be implemented and that rights be restored to the rightful owner, the
Saharan people. The Saharan people appeal. to these states to end their
support for Morocco. He added that the Saharan Democratir_ Arab Republic
is convinced that Afr ica~-via the special committee---will continue efforts
to implement the African decision on respecting the right of the Saharan ~
- people to self~determination, independence and sovereignty over all
their soil.
_ CSO: 4402 E1VD
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