JPRS ID: 74767 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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I ~ 74767
i3 ~ECEMBER i9?9 N0. 2AS7 i OF 2
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- JP~iS 74767 -
13 December 1 ~7Q
3 Near Ec~st North A~rica Re ~rt -
p
N~o. 2057. _
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F~~$ FOREIGN BROADC~?~T INFORMATION SERVIGE
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soz-~ i =
REPORT DOCUMENTATION aEroa~r ra. t. a. a.~ic~.~e~. ~ccn.io~ No
~ PAGE JPRS 7 4 7 6 7
- i. Tltl� �nd Subtlq� J S. N~poR D~:.~.
- NEAR EAST/NORTH AF�tICA REPORT, No. 2057 13 December 1979
6.
7. AutAor(s) a. P~AOmfln~ Or~anl:slion R~pt. No. '
- 9. P~Aormin~ Or{~n~:~t~on N~m~ ~nd Addnss 10. Pro~~et/T~~k/Work Unit No.
Joint Publications Research Service
1000 North G1etQ Road ~i. co~t~.~ecc? o. c..~ctc~ r,o. -
Arlington, llirginia 22201 c~~
tc~
12. Sponforin~ Orpnl:~tlon N~m~ ~nd Addnfs 13. Typ~ o/ R~port d P~rlod Cowred
As above la.
ls. 9uppl~m~nt~ry Not~s
16. Ab~tr~^t (llmit: 2(?0 words)
This serial report contains information on socioe~onamic, government, political,
- and technical developments in the countries of the Near East and North Africa.
17. Docum~nt Analysl� D~~crlpton
, P~~lirical Science x Znter-Arab Affairs x Libya Sultanate
- Suciology North African Mauritania of Oman -
Economics Affaire Morocco Syria
Culture (Social x Afghaniatan People's Demo- x Tunisia
_ Sciencc~s) x Algeria cratic Republic x United Arab
Ethnology Bahrain of Yemen Emirates
Geography x Egypt Persian Gulf Western Sahara
- Techological x Iran Area Yemen Arab
Military Sciencea x Iraq Qatar Republic
x Israel Saudi Arabia .
- ~ Jordan Spanish North
x Kuwait Africa _
x Lebanon Sudan
v I b. Id~ntifl~n/OWn�Endod T~rr.;s
c. COSATI Fl~~d/Oroua SD, 5C, 5K, 15
1/. Av~ 1~ Ilit SfN~m nt 1!. S~eurity Cl~n (Thls R~port) 21. No. of Pa{~s '
I!n~~m~tea ~lvailabiliry UNCLASSIFIED 102
-
501 by NTI5 ~~urity Cius (Thls P~~~) 2Z. Priu
Sp:ingfield, Virginia 22161 JNCLASSIFIID
cs..~Na~-aaa.~et s.. ~~.etiee?en. a, Rw.... orr~on~~ Fo~w z~z a-�>
(iorm~rly NTIS-73)
O~p~Rm~~t of Comm~rc~
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JPRS 74767
13 December 1979
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
No. 2057
CONTEN7S ~ PAGE
INTER-ARAB AF'FAIRS
Falestinian Role in Iran Seen as Unclear by Arabs
(AL-DUSTUR, 8-14 Oct 79) .......e...��.�............ 1
PLO Relations With Irarl Examined ~
(THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY, 3 Nov 79~ 6
Khomeyni's Grandson Speaks Out on Arab Issues
(Hasseyn Khome~mi Interview; AL-DUSTUR, 5-11 Nov 79) 8
South Korean Workers in Gulf Seen as Enigmas
_ (AL-NAHAR AL-'~.RABI WA AL-DUWALI, 4 Nov 79) l~
Kuwait To Receive Drinking, Irrigation Water From Iraq
(Muhammad a1-Hakim; AL-RA'Y AL-'AN1Ni, 13 Sep 79) 15
Briefs -
Antiregime Publications 18 ~
AFGHANISTAN
Amin Comments on Brezhnev Froposal -
_ (Kabul Radio, 11 Nov 79) 19
Constitutional Committee Studying Citizens' Proposals
(Kabul Domestic Service, 10 Nov 79~ 21
Briefs
- Ministers Leave for Bulgaria 22
Economic Commission Meeting 22
Anti-Khomeyni Activities 22
Attacks on Japanese Tourist, Others 23
Ret urn of Commerce NLinister ~3
- a - [III - NE & A - 121]
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~
CONTENTS (Continued) ~~E
' ALGERIA
Algeria Under Bendjedid Reported On
(DEMAIlV L'AFRIQUE, 22 Oct 79) 24 -
Changes After First Nine Months, by Ba,chir Rezzoug
Profile of Chadli Bendjedid, by Roland Malet
Government Reported To Be Rethinking Hydrocarbons Policy
(AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, 12 Nov 79) 33
Briefs
Algerians Versus Romanians 35
EGYFI'
Prosecution Case Against Commun~sts Continues
- (AL-AI~LBAR, 23 oct 79) 36
Briefs
NPUG Pa.rty Members Arrested 38
ff~AN _
Attack on Embassy Seen as Blow Against U.S. Imperialism
(I~7HAN, 6 Nov 79) 39 _
Shari'atmadari Reiterates Demand for Return of Shah
(Shari'atmadari Interview; KE,'YfIAN, 13 Nov 79) 42
Governor Warns of Internal Counterrevolution
(KE7CHAN, 16 oct 79) 45
~Khomeyni's Son States Views on Government
- (KEYHAN, 15 oct 79) 47
Details of Afghan ?lo� To Kill Ayatollah Shari'atmadari Bared
(KEYHAN, 16 oct 79) 51 ~
Turkish Faper on Events in Islamic World
(Zafer Atay; TERCUMAN, 26 ~Vov 79) 54 _
Nli litary Men N,ay Retire After 20 Years
(KE'YIiAN, 15 oct 79) 55 -
- b -
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CONTENTS (,Continued) Page _
IRAR ,
Pre:~ id~~rit Hus~~yri, 'Arafa.t Discuss Arab Situation, Iraqi
A i c~
~ (AL-HAWADITH, 9 Nov 79) 57
ISRAEL
Arabs Urged To Use Experts To Influence U.S. Presidential -
Elections
(Editorial; AL-QUDS, 6 Nov 79) 61
Uproar Ove=� al-Shak'ah Statements Said Intentionally
Fabric~ .;ed
- (~:ditorial; AL-QUDS, 8 Nov 79) 63
Salfit Mayor Visits Amman
(AL-QUDS, 31 oct 79) 65
Editorial Believes Ending Occupation Will End Coun~,ry~s ~
Economic Problems
(Editorial; AL-QUDS, 5 Nov 79) 66
KUWAIT
'AL-TALI'AH' Deplores Iranian-Arab Misunderstanding
(Editorial; AL-TALI'AH, 10 Oct 79) ..e 6~ ~
Kuwait Offers Proposals To End Gulf Financial Crisis
(AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 18 Nov 79) 70
Editorial Comments on Egyptian Army Leadership
(Editorial, Fu'ad Matar; AL-WATAN, 10 Oct 79) 73
Property Allocations Expa,nded for ~979
(A.L-RA'Y AL-'A.MNi, 10 SeP 79) 75
Private Sector Necessary to Petrochemical Process
(AL-Q~BAS, 30 SeP 79) 77
Briefs
- Deportation Comment 80 _
- LEBANON
Leba,nese Troop Leader Interviewed
(Saad Haddad Interview; MONDAY MORNING, 19-25 Nov 79) 81
- c - _
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CONTPNTS ( C~~nL i nuc_~d) pe,ge _
LIBYA
' Libyaii :;;~cretary of Forei~,n Affai.rs Comments on World,
Arab Affairs
('Ali 'Abd-al-Salam al-Turayki Interview;
1~L-sABAx, 1.6 Nov 79) 93 _
2'UNISIA
Envoys Reported To Ask Europeans for Aid Against
Khomeyniism
_ (AL-DUSTUR, 11 Nov 79) 9?
iJNITED ARAB EI~RATES
UAE-CONOCO Deal Yields Great Profits for Duba~_ Ruler
(AL-HAWADITH, 2 Nov 79) 98
- d -
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
PALESTINIAN ROLE IN IRAN SEEN AS 'i1NCLEAR BY ARABS -
London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 8-14 ~)ct 79 pp 11-12
[Article: "Would Khomeyni Go to Mecca for Pilgrimage? Iran's Gulf
Politics: Is Iran Strategically Right and Tactically Wrong? Does the PI,O
Have Any Role in Iran and the Gulf Incidents?"]
[Text] If the Iranian revolution is petroleum related, then it must be
Arab and, particularly, Gulf related.
In the Gulf the battle began berween the Iranian revolutlon and the Gulf
and island's regimes. Ayatol.lah Ruhani keeps demanding that Bahrain be
part of Iran; Kuwait and Bahrain arrest and deport Khomeyni's representa- -
tives; the Sultanate of Oman offers its "program" for the protection of -
the Strait of Hormuz; and Saudi Arabia sends two o~ its army brigades to
Bahrain.
But what if Imam Khomeyni move5 his battle inside the region and to its
strongest ring, Saudi Arabis, where it is said he will conduct his pilgrimage
to the holy lands; and what if he gave some of his touching speeches to
the pilgrims, speeches which are against tiie policies of Saudi Arabis and ~
the Gulf shaykhdoms?
What is the Iranian situation like as seen from within the Gulf; how do
_ the progressive people of the region ~iew it; and what political and social
forces agree with it?
Many questions arise concerning the situation in the Gulf, which has become
shaky since the Iranian revolut;on's victory. Some of these questions -
are ar,swered by the following letter.
Our meeting in Beirut with a group of youths from the Gulf, mostly from
Kuwait, gave us a suitable opportunity to examine a group of issues and
problems discussed by some Arabic newspapers and magazines, especially
_ conr_erning the nature of Gulf-Ir.anian relations with the Islamic revolution.
Discussion ~f the subject branched out so much that it sometimes reached
back in history to the year 1776, "when the Persi.3ns took over Basrah," -
1
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thus making "Kuwait" the main point of sea commerce between the Near and
Far East. At the time the "East Indian Company," with its imperialist -
past, changed its sea mail route to Aleppo from Basrah to "Kuwait," thus
attracting many Arab and Persian merchants from Basrah to that area south
- of Iraq . ,
Discussions grew wider, but the current political situation was always the
focal poin~ that brought our conversation and us back to the starting
point: the i~ulf and Iran after the revolution.
We had the opportunity to hear many different things about the Gulf in
general and Kuwait in particular, ranging from anlytical to informational,
but all c~onversations centered around the dangerous situation in the Gulf "
and the Iranian revolution.
_ The story in Kuwait seems to begin with the incident involving Ahmad
, al-Mahri. After Ahmad al-Mahri, a relative of Khomeyni, gave a speech in
4ne of Kuwait's mosques and was put in jail by the ruling family, the
problems of Arab-Iranian relations and Sunni-Shi'ite relations began to
appear, especially since the Kuwaiti incidents paralleled those of Bahrain
and the Ayatollah Ruhani's statements.
During our sessions it seemed that some of the educated and progressive
Kuwaitis were constantly reaffirming that many issues are confused or
i.nflated. They said that there is a noticeable difference between Iranian
strategy in general ar~d some of its current tactics in relations to the Culf.
What is happening in the Gulf--according to the above analysis--is a
natural and inevitable outcome of the Iranian revolution. As the Arab
nati4ns were subjected to inevitable changes due to the E~yptian political _
situation and role, it is natural that the Gulf would be subjected to
inevitable changes as a result of the Iranian changes. The political
- situation :Ln the Gulf as originally established was based on the triangular
balance between Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran. This meant that any change
in any of these "central" Gulf countries would lead to changes involving
the entire Gulf region.
Iran's Strategic Limits ~
_ The problem goes beyond what happened or may happen in Bahrain and Kuwait.
Bahrain or Ruwait or other countries in the Gulf may become mere symbols
of a changing relationship. In the light of this change, it is said that
Iran~an strategy balances two major matters in the Gulf.
The first matter is the replacement of the scattered Gulf situation with
enough power to allow Iranian connections with the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The repeated American threats after the Iranian revolutian to take over
the oil wells, U.S. moves in Gulf waters and U.S. hints at regional
- projects show that the Gulf is one of the weakest links in the Iranian
chain. If we assumed that Khomeyni's leadership were to attempt more of
2
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its basic steps on the political, petroleum or military levels, it would
no doubt have its eyes set on the Gulf, since the Gulf presents an ideal
situati~n for Amer.ican penetration of Iran.
On the other hand, Iranian ambition, which the revolution uncovered early,
to eaercise a heavy central role in the conflict against Israel remains a
_ mere wish, with no actual tools to ~llow this conflict to reach the battle-
grounds. This will necessitate, according to the Iranians, transforming
the Gulf into a field for Iranian penetration of the Arab-Israeli scene
of conflict.
The second matter which Iranian strategy aims to matQrialize--accord~ng to
this analysis--is to make an actual connection between petroleum and the
fight against Israel in the region. It is known, for example, that the
most pro~inent lesson learned by Henry Kissinger from the October War and
the petroleum price increases that followed was the necessity of persistent .
work to separate petroleum from politics and to divert the centers of
conflict from the petroleum supply lines within the Gulf fields and betweEn
Western Eur.opean ports and the United States.
- It is also known that Saudi politics, especially through Minister of
Petroleum Ahmad Zaki al-Yamani, have always insisted on the application
of the above principle by exercising extreme conservatism against raising _
- [petroleum] prices based on political ~ustifications.
Negative Observations
The positive picture of Iranian strategy is paralleled by some negative
- observations of Iranian tactics, particularly as revealed by Ayatollah
al-Ruhani's declarations.
In the context of negat've observations, attention is directed to the
fact that the Iranian Constitution specifies that the al-Ja'fari sect is
the state sect in Iran; this conflicts with the currer.;. ~rab situation and
prevents the possibility of Iranian influence on the Arab situation. In
fact, it is basically in conflict with the general Islamic sentiments _
toward the Iranian revolution a3 expressed in the overall declarations,
actions and writings of Ayatollah Khomeyni and his associates, as well as
by informat.ion sources, including the latest decree enforcing the obligatory
teaching of Arabic in Iran because it is the language of the Koran. Some
people focus on the following three tactical errors:
That the revolution presents a reason to depict the new Iranian situation
as if it were a natural continuation of what it was during the Shah's
regime (which, until recently, c:ansidered Bahrain as the 14th stat~ in
Iran, and treats the Gulf as its vital extension).
That it offers arguments acceptable to man~ Emirates and shaykhdoms to
improve their relations with the other central Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia
and Iraq), thus forming a Gulf core of cores.
~
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That it help~ emphasize sectarianism (besides nationalism) among Gulf
,
Sunnis and Shi'itPS, especially since some agencies benefit from support- -
ing such sectarianism and loyalties to the Imam in order to build a
barrier in the face of Islamtc advancement of the Iranian revolution.
- 'I~wo Phases Merged _
There are those who explain what is called "Iranian tactical mistakes" as
one of the results of the mergers of two phases in Iran:
_ The phase of Iran cro~~ing its borders in defense of its political
liberation against imperialism; and
The phase of the prolonged struggle for authority in Iran, which has not
yet ended. It can therefore be said that "chaos," which is natural
_ situatioa facing every revolution at the outset, is the main reason behind
- disorganizedlranian tactics relative to foreign policy in general and the
Gulf area in particular.
_ The above commentators add that "Palestine" is the major corrective element
in Iranian tactics. For example, when Khomeyni declared "Jerusalem Day,"
the whole Gulf became a big political celebration in which fam~lies, social
~ forces and all sects joined in an atmosphere overwhelmingly sympathetic to
the Iranian revolution, to tr~e extent that no one mentioned the local
regulations and Gulf rulers. _
. Ia commenting on the above or discussing the same subject, informational
sources in the Gulf say that Ayatollah Khomeyni might go to Mecca for the
pilgrimage. If this report p,roves to be true and Khomeyni gave some of his
speeches in Saudi Arabia about Islamic unity on the issue of the Palestinian
- fight and what this means, what effect would such ar. incident have in the
Gulf and Saudi areas?
It can be deduced from the above that minor adjustments in the Iranian
tactics will definitely settle many of the matters that may be taking a -
negative and bad direction. Within the framework of "universal Islamic
unity" in the struggle against "imperialism and Zionism," one finds many
progressive Gulf people who demand better levels of relationship and -
coordination between the Iranian revolution and the political forces _
opposed to imperialism in the Gulf.
Siinnis--Arabs for the Revolur_ion
It is said--particularly in the case of Kuwait--that there is a wide
margin encircling the game of contradiction between Arab and Persian ~
nationalism and the sectarian Sunni-Shi'ite contradiction. In Kuwait
there are three forces (of a Sunr.i and Arab nature) that support the
Iranian revolution. There is the "al-Tali'ah Group," named after the
leftist AL-TALI'AH magazine that formed a progressive parliamentary group
led by Dr Ahmad al-Khatib, who began his political career in the "Arab '
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IJationalist Movement" and then declared his Tlarxism as paLt of the movement�s -
_ change t~ a Marxist-Leninist movement. T~day Dr al-Khatib is one of the
mosque speakers on Fridays calling for support for the Iranian revolution. �
There is also the "Social Reform Organization," which could almost be a
~ Kuwaiti version of the "P4oslem Brotherhood ;iovement," and it represents
the Sunni religious s ituation in Kuwait. It has been clashing lately with
the government, with the rise of youthful and more rooted elements to its
leadership. In this context, it should be mentioned that the two magazines
of this organization, AL-DA'WAH and AL-ISLAH, were suspended for one month
after the incident at the Aleppo military college in Syria.
Talking about political Islamic awareness in Kuwait, we must mention that
_ 5,000 copies of Khomeyni's book "The Islamic Government" were sold there,
an almost Iegendary number c~mpared w~th book consumption in Iran.
Tlie third group is the Palestin~an colony in I~uwait, which has its politi-
cal and cultural impac t on the country. Prior to Khomeyni's revolution,
it con.stituted the Arab emigrant group that equaled the Iranian gioup in
~:uwait. Today both co lor.ies have a political coalition that finds its ~
cohesion in the Iranian revolutionary stand in support of the Palestinian
resistance. It is known that the Palestinian colony had been exposed to
some problems in Kuwait, especially with the Lebanese war and the
Palestinian resistance struggle with Syria.
In addition to all the above, the Kuwaiti regime, with the rise of infla-
tion, was exposed to sharp social pressures directly reflected in the youth -
element of li~ted-income f amilies. This crisis ~dds to the general -
crisis, which is the overall Gulf situation after the Iranian revolution.
Ahmad al-Mahri's provoking was ba~ically centered around social matters.
The social crisis also caused a new vocabulary to develop, such as _
"al-Hawamir," which is the plural of Hamur, meaning the large fish that `
~ swallows small fish. It is a term equivalent to "fat cats" in Egypt,
"high-class kids" in Lebanon, etc.
- On the other hand, the big Iranian merchants in Kuwait do not take any
political stands. Their stand is clearly conser.vative. They are caught
between the anvil of b eing Iranian and the hammer of their businesses that
make them membersof the Kuwaiti business organization. If more stands
were declared and thes e merchants final?_y deciared their stand in support
of the Kuwaiti regime or, otherwise, of the Iranian rev~lution, this would
help dilute the nationalistic-sectarian character of wha~~ may become an _
open battle.
= Talks about some Gulf anticipation, "especially in ~3ahrain," related _
the role the PLO might have or be invited to ta~e, being the sole organiza-
tion that could establish, wi.th eve rybody else's approval, a joint Iranian
and Gulf conversational element, as one of the Gulf people puts it. -
Could this role be performed? In what direction? This is what the future
days and incidents will tell, especially since the PLO is the Arab politi-
cal power most sensitive to the dangers or any unsafe political situation
in that petroleum and strategic area.
It seems rhat those waiting to hear Palestine`s word are many. _
9455
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I
INTT;R-ARAB AFFAIRS
PLO RELATIONS WITH IRAN EXAMIr1ED
Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 3 Nov 79 pp 17-18
[Text] Relations between tt~.e new regime in Iran and the Palestine Libe-
ration Organization (PLO) are not what they were expected to be, oi� even
what they were at the downtall of the Shah and the reason of this change
is the new turn that relations between the Arab states and the new Iran-
ian regime have taken over the past few months.
- ThP PLQ, and the Palestinian resistance as a whole, which had won a
F~owerful ally in the new Iranian regime, is now concerned over the turn
_ Arab-Iranian relations have been taking, especially the G~iTf states. It -
now fears that because of the change in relat ions the Iran-PLO alliance
caill not bring about .tlie results ~t was expected to bring about in terms
of maral, political, econom~c, financial and military support.
The Gulf. There are two reasons for this concern. Or. the one hand, the
- FLO has recently f ound itself in an embarrass ing positi~n following the
th~eai.ening remarks madP by certain religious leaders in Iran against _
~ulf states, and especially Bahrain, which is in close relations of co-
operation with Saudi Arabia. The Palestinian resistance, which enjoys the
backing of both the Iranian regime and Arab r egimes found itself in the
difficult situation brought about by the fact that it was supporting a
regime which, in turn, was opposed to other regimes that support its _
cause.
~ A particularly diff icult situation which has b een further aggravated by _
- the current state of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. These ra-
lations are currently described by informed observers in Riyadh as being
"cold" and immobile. The coldness resulted f rom the first Iranian state-
ments indicating an intention to expand Iran's influence beyond the bor-
ders of Iran and al~o from anti-monarchist statements made by a number
= of Iranian religious leaders and which were s een as particularly directed
= against Arab monarchies. The strain was increased also by the fact that
= Saudi Arabia did not view with pleasure a competitive influence that might
_ challenge its own influence on politics and religion in the Gulf . Iran's -
calls for the restoration of~Jerusalem did no t improve the situation, as
~ Saudi Arabia considers itself the sponsor of the Jerusalem-retrieval
movement.
. J
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Divisions. As THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY had pointed out in a recent issue
(see A1JW No 535) that there were divisions within the Iranian leadership _
on the situation in SoutY? Lebanon and especially on the support that Iran _
shou.ld ~;ive to the population, on the one hand, and to the Palestinian re-
sistance in the South, on the other hand. The two Iranian officials who
_ v~sited the South lately represented two different trends within the Iran- ~
ian leadership. Foreign Minister Tabatabai came as the representative of
the government of Mr Mehdi Bazargan which believes that Iranian support _
should go to the Shiite population of the South rather than to the Pales-
' tinian resistance at a time the two sides are at odds with one another.
It is interesting to note that this view is shared by the Iranian Def ense
Minister, rir Mustafa Shamran. The religious leaders of Iran have called -
for achieving a compromise between the Shiite population and the Palestin- _
ians so as not to envenom relations between one and the other. In the
_ government, there is also a trend which calls for all-out support for the
~ Palestinian resistance and yet a third trend whose position is that Iran -
should not interLere at all with matters falling beyond the borders of
Iran.
The malaise which has been reported in Iran-PLO relatiolis was apparent,
observers said, in the recent talks that a high level :'LO delegation held
with Iranian officials in Tehran. The delegation scunded the Iranian
authorities on the reality of their pcsition concerning South Lebanon and
submitted a request for military and financial. assistance. Informed
observers said that Iran promised to help but the volume Qf this assis-
tance was not disclosed, nor perhaps discussed yet. _
The Kurds. In fact, one of the problems that the Palestinian resistance
faced was the charge that Iran made against the rejectionist Palestinian
- organizations, which were accused of extending help and support for the
Kurdish t'ebellion and the Iranian leaders expressed their unwillingness to
extend support to movements that might hand over part of this assistance
to Iran's opponents. Action has reportedly been taken on this aspect of
question and informed sources said that during Mr Tabatabai's visit to
Damascus, Syrian President Hafez Assad promised to ask Dr George Habash,
the leader~of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
to put an end to his support for the Kurds.
In fact, the Kurdish question is a thormy one in view of the fact that
no orie can yet pinpoint for sure the side which is backing the Kurds and
informed sources even said that the very same side may be simultaneously
helping the Kurdish rebellion and encouraging the Iranian regime to crack
- down on the Kurds.
~ One thing is sure at present, the Iranian regime supports tne Palestinian -
- but what is yet to be determined is the extent, or rather the limits, of
this support.
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~
INT~R-ARAB AP'P'AIRS
KHOMEYNI'S GRANDSON SPEAKS OUT ON ARAB ISSUES
_ London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 5-11 Nov 79 p 23
[Interview with Hasseyn Khomeyni by Walid Nuwayhad: "Rohani's Statements
Are Suspect and Commissioned; People of South Lebanon and Palestinians
= Have Same Question; Chamran Made Error; Those Responsible for Error Must
Be Removed"]
_ [Text] It was in the context of the interest which Iran demonstrated in
the Lebanese situation, in the situation of South Lebanon and in Shi'ite
Palestinian relations in South Lebanon that Iranian Deputy Prime Minister
Sadeq Tabataba`i (on the official side) and then Imam Kyomeyni's grandson,
an authority on Islam, Hasseyn Khomeyni (on the unofficial side) recently
visited Beirut.
AL-DUSTUR met with Hasseyn Khomeyni and interviewed him about the situation
, in Iran and in the Arab homeland. The assertions made by the young man of
religion were quite reminiscent of the positions taken by the late Imam
Ayatollah Mahmud Taleqani. -
(Question] What do you think of the visit that Tabataba'i, the Iranian
deputy prime minister made recenrly to Beirut and Damascus?
[Answer] There is a revolution and there is a government. The government
thinks and functions within the framework of Iran, but the Islamic Revolu-
tion goes beyond this framework to all the Islamic nations and also to all
the nations of the world. Therefore, we make a distinction between the
revolution and the government because the positions that Imam Khomeyni
takes call for assistance to the oppressed of the earth. In this sense
these positions are international. Mr Tabataba'i merely represents the
Iranian governmer.t, not the Iranian Revolution.
- Bahrain Is Arab and Islamic
[Question] What about Rohani's statements?
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[Answer] We in Iran cannot feel secure from Zionism. Zionism does exist
in Tran also. These words an~i statements that disturb Arab-Tranian rela-
li~~nti nr~~ yu;;~~~~et t~nd eommissioned even if they ~~c,mc~ from ritl r~y~~[c~lluli.
_ 'I'lif~ I;; h~~~~uu~;e~ i~(:~tury li,z5 tieen m~iny ayiitc~l.lcihs whc~ 5tood beyide uppre~-
5ors. We want ayatollatis who stand with the people and who look first,
- second, third and fourth to the masses. We want ayatollahs who believe in "
the masses. These statements are basicall~ retrogressive. We believe
that Bahrain is an Arab, Islamic state.
[Question] What are your impressions of Lebanon and South Lebanon which
you have visited? Does the revclution have a special role with regard to
Palestinian-South Lebanon relations? '
[AnswerJ There is no doubt that Iran does have an effect on the Lebanese -
. situation. But the question of South Lebanon is not merely a Lebanese
question or an Arab question; it is rather an international question. All
regional and internat~onal forces can be found in the South, and the
presence of the resistance gives the problem a special nature. If the
Lebanese army were dispatched [to South LebanonJ, three matters can happen: _
First, there would be sharp struggles between the resistance and the army.
Second, some of the people of South Lebanon will support the army.
Third, the liberation o:-ganization may oppose the army without seeking a
clash with the people of South Lebanon because it does not harbor them any
hostility. This may lead the organizarion to withdraw from there and to
turn from a military organization to a political organization, and that
would mean major success for Israel,
The people of South Lebanon have endured many hardships; they have allied -
themselves with the Palestinians, and they did protect them. But the
" increase in [the number of) difficulties and the slow pace in which the
revolution finds itself have psychologically disturbed the people of South
Lebanon and made them ready to accept the army. However, the charges that
the people of South Lebanon are against the revolution are false charges,
and we must work to f ind a common solution for the Palestinians and the
people of South Lebanon. In my opinion, the solution lies outside Lebanon
and especially with the Arab oil countries and with Iran who can use oil -
- to exert pressure on Washington.
Our delegation is a preparatory delegation that wants to see the situation
as it is, not as it is conveyed by the conflicting views of the numerous
delegations that visit Iran.
Tt~e Iranian people are loyal friends of the Palestinian Revolution.
The Islamic Revolution thinks that the positions others take on Palestine
are a standard for determining the position it takes on them.
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[Question] jJhat is the question ~f the al Ja'fari Doctrine in the new
Iraniar. Constitution?
(Answer~ The revolution is Islamic and its leader said; he sees no dif-
ferences between the doctrines. The doctrinal questions are made up by
_ colonialism to weaken us. ThP Islamic Revolution cannot grant others
total freedom to apply any one of the doctrines in the areas of the law,
_ prayer and civil status in accordance wich the numerical majority in any
' one of the areas. Discussion about the al Ja'fari Doctrine is due to the
fact that most of the Iranians are [followers of] al Ja'fari. But this
does not m~an any doctrinal coercion.
Relations With Egypt
Can the government--and government is one thing and the revolution another--
re-establish relations with Egypt?
[Answer] This cannot take place as long as the Imam is alive. If he were
to go, his plan will survive.
' [Question] What is the Islamic progosition for confronting separatist
movemen ts in Iran?
[Answer.] We oppose a military solution for Kordestan. Logic and a polit-
ical solution must be adopted. The military solution is the logic of the -
weak. Political solutions must at least be exhausted before military
solutions are resorted to. Minister of Defense Mostafa Chamran made an -
error by adopting a military solution. His action magnified the role of
the Kordestan Democratic Party, which is a weak party. The Iranian
Government, therefore, has to expel those officials who are responsible
for the error and isolate the leaders who are negligent.
[Question] What about the fact that the intellectuals are accusing the `
Revolution of being lacking in democracy?
[Answer] You can find out about that if you go to Iran. When Eric Roleau,
who works for the French Newspaper, LE MONDE, visited Iran, he said, "This
is not democracy; this is absolute freedom!" And even as far as music is
concerned, recorded tapes are sold everywhere, and the radio broadcasts
music to the public in spite of the fact that the time allotted to music
is less than the time that was allotted to ~t in the past. This is because
of the educational and cultural programs [that are broadcast nowJ on the
radio.
[Question] What has the revolution Accomplished on the economic field?
What solutions do you envision?
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[Answer] So far everything is being studied, and there are several indi-
vidual efforts that are interreacting with each other. There are disagree- -
ments about the theories that must be followed concerning economic
development. It is my belief that an Islamic economy w~.ll build the Iran
oE the future in spite of the fact that Iran did inherit numerous diPfi-
culties from the capitalist system.
8592
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�
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INPER-ARAB AFFAIRS
SOUrH KOREAN WOR'!(ERS IN GULF SEEN AS ENIGMAS
Paris AL-NAHAp AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI Sn Arahic Nov ?9 p 34
[Articles 'The Koreans Are Coming"] ~
[Text~ There is a great deal of talk about the South Koreans xorking in the
}:ingdom of Saud.i Arabia. As of today there are at least 100~ 000 of them, and
it is expected that by the early 1980's there xill be a quarter af a million!
It is commonly said in the Gulf that those Koreans are nothing more than sol- -
diers brought to the region in the guise of workers, to don their military uni-
forms and take up arms in case of any armed attack thz~eatening petroleum.
- ather contrary statements say that the Gulf's experience with the labor force
is behind this resort to yellow ~=~borers.
Whenever ar~y passenger plane Ia.rxis at Bahrain Airport or one of the region's
other airports, it is strange to see a num'ber of xorkers in clean xhitR clothes
_ hurxying to enter the plane. cleaning it up in less than 5 minutes!
When I asked. a Kuwaiti official about the "Korean invasion." he la,ughed and
. said, "You knox the such and such hotel, xhere you wsual],y stay?" ~
I said, "yes."
He said~ "Well~ haven't you noticed the change Hhich has come over this hotel?
The nex 350-room xing attached to it xas built b~r South Koreana in one year.
If it had been aasigned to Ir~dian~ Pakistani, Iranian or Baluchi (refe~rring
t o Baluchistan) xorkers, it xould not have been finished before 3 yeazs at
least."
Whcever lives in the Gulf has aeen those Koreanso and marvels at their vitality
- and organiZation. '
The South Korean company bids for a pro3ect at~ say~ $~00 million, a price at
least $100 million belox those of international (even Arab) comganies. In
_ other ~ords, the Koreans have been competitive, and have been successful.
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This company promises to complete the job 3 montha ahe;a,d of the deadline.
When the contract is signed, the importation of xorkers, engineers and super-
visors from Seoul begins. They get off the planes or ahips in single file,
and head for the special campe xhich their company has prepared for them.
They have thair clothing ~nd everyday items xith them, even their food. In
the camps they go to sleep at certain times and xake up at certain times. They
_ don't xaste a singl~ Working minute during work hours. They amoke and drink
tea or coffee only during the rest periods set aside for that, Which are very
few.
You don't hear them shout or laugh, and there is never a smile or scoxl on theZr -
lips. You hear the sound of the needle among the,,, a.nd you find that every job
- they complete is extraordina~y and unquestionable.
= Before the scheduled date, the pro,iect owner receives his pro~ect in silence~
not ha.�ring learned a thing about the workers. Who are they? Hox do they do
their xork? How do they eat and sleep? Nothing, nothing.
The Kuwaiti official said tha.t Kuwait was ar~d. still is a country xith hurfdreds
of thousands of Arabs and tens of thousands of Indians, Pa,kistanis, Iranians
and Baluchis.
Kuxait dces not have the problem of "Arabism" among the labor force~ but other
Gulf states do, because of political circwnstances in the region.
With respect to these countries the Kuxaiti official adds, 'Thv Arab worker
_ comes and after a xhile the host country discovers that he is an intelligence
agent, or a saboteur~ taking advanta,ge of the country's ciraumstances to dis- -
tribute secret publicatians or hold meetings--or attend demonstrations."
That was the problem, and it xas decided to stop Arab immigration.
There rema.ins the Indian-Pakistani-Baluchi-Iranian problem.
They are very numerous and not very productive. In a.ddition, they 3re natura~ly
lazy, xhich causes complaints among all who deal with them--in hotels, hospitals,
restaurants~ and official and non-official departments.
The question remainss Is it true that those workers are an"artr~y?"
The Kuwaiti official replies~ "South Korea practices compulsory conscription.
Every young man there goes through a period of military service Hhich "stamps
its mark" on him. We take advantage of this "stamp" to complete our pro,jects
and save our money ~ time~ which is ~~rasted by workers of other nationalities."
- [~uestion~ Is there any surveillance of the Koreans?
[Answer~ You should ask the concerned authorities about this.
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[Question~ Could they possibl~ be made t:se of tn block a Soviet inva.sion of
the region, for example?
LAnswer~ I can't answer this question because I dQn't ktioK. The higher auth-
orities~in the region know more about it. If at~yone Would ~ow, they woul,d.
_ And if not, then they ought to make inquiries so as to follow the course they
feel is suitable.
?~orkers? Soldiers? Spies? The ansxer remains un~o~rra~ especiall,y since the
United States Mas disturbed, rather than reassured, the '"disposition" of the
Gulf by announcing the establishmznt of the "110,000-man American strike force." ~
- $559 =
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
KUWAIT TO RECEIVE Dt~INKING, IRRIGATION WATER FROM IRAQ ~
- Kuwait ~'~L-RA'Y AL-'AMNI in Arabic 13 Sep 79 p 3
- [Article by Muhammad al-Hakim: "Agreement To Supp?y Kuwait With 3U0 Million
- Gallons of Water and To Resume Study To Complets Electrical Link Pro~ect"]
[Text] Kuwait and Iraq have agreed that Kuwait will obtain 200 mil~~:~n
gallons of drinking water and 100 million gallons of water for agriculture.
The necessary documents will be signed next wieek stipulating that the
project to transfer water from Iraq to Kuwait be submitted to bidding and
calling on the international advisory offices to study it and draw up the
~ necessary plans.
This was revealed at a press conference held yesterday morning by the
under secretary of the Ministry of Electricity and Water and head of the
Kuwaiti delegation to the negotiations which took place 3 days ago in -
Kuwaiti, Zayd al-Fahd, after he had signed the protocol pertaining to -
cooperation between Kuwait and IXaq in the field of electrical power and water.
At 11:30 the Kuwaitis and Iraqis held the final session of the talks
for the signing of the protocol between the two sister states. Under
Sacretary of the Ministry of Electricity and Water Zayd al-Fahd signed for
the Kuwaitis, and Under Secretary of the Minsitry of Industry and Minerals
Subhi Yasin signed for the Iraqis. After the heads of the two delegations
exchanged protocol documents, Zayd al-Fahd delivered the foZlowing speech;
"With the help of God, the signing took place at the third session of the
- meetings of the Iraqis-Kuwaiti Committee for Water and Electricity.
"As you know, these meetings came as a supplewent to the two previous
meetings held during the past year in Kuwait and Baghdad, during which it
was agreed that Iraq would supply Kuwait with drinking water in stages:
the first stage, 200 million gallons, to increase in the future according -
to studies conducted by the two parties during the period from 1985 to 1990.
"In the discussion by the two sides during this visit, the following points _
were agreed upon:
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~
"With regard to the first stage for drinking water, the Kuwaities have -
completed a draft of an invitation to the consulting houses to study and
design the project, and i t will be sent to the Iraqis next week for study ~
and approval. -
"As for irrigation water, it was agreed that Kuwait would receive water
for agricultural purposes, with the provision that the first stage would _
be 100 million gallons a day, to increase in the future subject to approval -
by both parties."
"As for electricity, I want to clear up some confusion on the part of some
members of the press. Some have explained that the object of the talks
between Kuwait and Iraq on water and electricity is an exchange operation
to supply Kuwait with wate r in return for supplying Iraq with electricity. -
This is a mistaken descrip tion or impression. The main purpose of the
electrical linkage project between the two countries is to increase the
operating flexibility of b oth networks and to make it possible to exchange
electricity power when ne cessary, according to the circumstances of each -
country.
"Consequently, I would like to assure you that the subject of supplying
_ water fram Iraq has no connection ~aith the subject of the electrical link.
~ As an indication of that, agreement was reached on all of the first steps
to implement the water project when the subject of the electrical link was
still in the stage of technical studies. Fin~lly, I would like to thank
Prof Subhi Yasin, head of the delegation, and the members of the delegation
for the postive spirit which prevailed during the talks of the last 2 days." -
Subhi Yasin then replied with a speech in which he said: "This is indeed
a happy occasion as we conriude the meetings of the subcommittee of the
Supre~ne Ministerial Commit ~ee for Iraqi-Kuwaiti Coogeration in the Fields
~ of Electricty and Water he re in Kuwait. I want to praise the atmosphere _
of true brotherhood and fruitful, constructive cooperation which prevailed
during the talks to comple te all of the steps necessary to xeach the protocol
which we signed a short time ago. In my opinion, this indicates the exis-
tence of a true desire for joint cooperation in the constructi~;e steps we
are tr}ing to achieve. It is my hope that in the near fut~sre we will
proceed in earnest with ac tivities to put the agreement into effect, so -
" that the citizen in Kuwait will feel the fruits of efforts exerted to
achieve Iraqi-Kuwaiti coop eration."
Yasin added: "I would like to thank the Kuwaiti Government and the officials ~
- of the Ministry of Electri city and Water for their kind reception and the -
welcome they extended us throughout our visit, which had made us feel that
we are at home with our families.
"I would like to pursue what Zayd al-Fahd said about the electrical tie
between the two countries. It is a separate subject and has no. direct
conneciton with the other subject, that is, supplying Kuwait with the
necessary water. The main purpose of cooperation in the field of electrical
lo ~
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power is to incraase cooperation and coordination between the two countries c
so that power can be exchanged between the two. The tie between Kuwait
_ and Iraq will lead to fewer of the customary difficulties and to the
- possibility of economic savings for both sides, and it wil.l facilitate .
programs to establish generating stations to take advantage of seasonal
disparities and electrical loads. I will state that the proposed pro~ect
to link Kuwait and Iraq is part of a complete, ambitious program linking
all of the Arab countries.
Zayd al-Fahd later held a press conference at which he discussed the
protocol. He said:
"At our last meeting we agreed on 200 mi.llion gallons of drinking water as
a first stage, and at our present meeting we agreed on 100 million gallons
of water for irrigation, for a total of 300 million gallons. From the cost
standpoint, Kuwait will benefit from the water drawn from Iraq, and
~ consequently we will bear the expense of this project. As for electricity,
both countries will benefit, and Kuwait and Iraq will share expenses. Next
weeK we will ask the consultants to conduct studies and prep are plans,
after sending them to Iraq for study and approval by the off icials there.
They will participate with us in selecting the necessary consultants, who
will choose the source and method for drawing the water from Iraq to insure
the quality and continuity of the flow of water to Kuwait. The invitation
_ will be extended to the consultants by the Ministry of Planning, after we
have obtained Iraq's approval of the draft of the invitation. _
"Actually, we feel that we are all set on the subject of water, and every-
thing is almost completed. As for the exchange of electrical power, we are
still at the stage of preliminary technical talks, and the committees
responsible for tl:at sector will meet in the first quarter of 1980. On
water, we will maintain constant contact between officials in the two
countries to complete the steps necessary and contact the consultants and
agree on the studies to be undertaken by the consulting companies. Note
that in our new talks in the past year and this year we have relied on
the previous agreement concluded between the two countries, in 1974, which
gave us 120 million gallons. In view of the development of consumption
since that time, we increased the quantity to 300 million gallons of water
as a first stage.
7587
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
ANTIREGIME PUBLICATIONS--It has recently been noticed that secret publi-
cations which are being distributed against some Arab regimes have been
increasing abroad and that the writings on the wall have also increased.
A special statement about the recent incidents in Aleppo was distributed
with the recent issue of AL-NADHIR, [The Herald] which is published by a
group that calls itself al-Muj ahidin fi Suriyah [The freedom fighters in
_ Syria]. Libyan dissidents saturated London with the recent issue of
AL-JIHAD [The Holy WarJ. AL-JIHAD is published by a group that calls it-
- self al-Harakah al-Wataniyah al-Libiyyah [the National Libyan Movement].
This group has adopted as its motto the noble words nf the prophet, "The
best holy war is a word of truth spoken in the presence of a tyrant."
_ The groups which oppose the Iraqi regime publish more than one bulletin;
those bulletins appe3r in diff erent f orms. I~ has also been noticed that _
all these publications are similar in form and in style so that it appears
that their source is one. [Text] [London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 16 Nov 79
p 12] 8592
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AFGHANISTAN
~ -
AMIN COi'AiEI`ITS ON BREZHNEV PROPOSAL
LD 120050 Kabul Radio in English to Europe GMP 11 Nov 79 LD
[T ext] Comrade Haf izollah Amin, general secretary of the Central
~ommittee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, presider~t of
th e Revolutiunary Council and prime minister, in an interview with
BAKHTAR correspondent said :
The capitalist countries of Western Europe, in particuiar members of NATO,
- by accepting the peaceful proposals of the Soviet Unian will safeguard
their soil as a target of the atomic weapons forever. [sentence as heard]
- Comrade Amin received for an interview the BAKHTAR correspondent in the
p eople's house. In relation to the Soviet initiative about peace and
s ecurity in Europe, BAKHTAR corre3pondent asked: Comrade Amin, as you
know Comrade Brezhnev, the general secretary of the Central Committee
o f the Communist Party and president of the Presidium of the Supreme
: Soviet, in an interview with PRAVDA daily has made a new proposal about
th e installation of atomic weapons in Western Europe.~ ?~ay we know your
- v iews about the foreign policy of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
- in this respect?
Answer: The creative initiative of Comrade Leonid Brezhnev, general
- secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and president
_ of the Pzesidium of the Supreme Soviet, about the unilateral decision of
th e Soviet Union pertaining to the evacuation of 20,000 soldiers, 1,000
t anks and a great number of other military equipment from the German
D emocratic Republic is a hopeful step toward the establishment oi peace '
in Europe and is an important step toward world disarmament which not only
co ncerns Europe but also all the peace-loving and progressive people who
w ill warmly welcome it and evaluate it as the best example of the Soviet
- desire for peace in the world.
Comrade Amin added: The statement of Comrade Brezhnev, made in his
- interview, is also the evidence of the Soviet Union's interest in peace,
which provides the best possib ility for the security of Western Europe.
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It is a commitment of philanthropy that the countries with no U.S. and
Western European atomic weapons will never be the target of the Soviet
' Unicn's atomic weapons. The great commander of the victorious sawr
revolution said: I am sure that the people of Western Europe will
real. ize the ~ood will of the Soviet Union in this respect and draw the
attention of their govern~ents to take advantage of this great opportun-
- ity and, with confidence in the assurance and commitment of the Soviet
Union in this regard, maintain the secure life of their countries against -
the attack of atomic weapons. It is also quite understandable that the
, (?greater) reduction of the weapons by the Soviet Union, provided that
the Western countries do not permit the installation of atomic weapons in
their countries, is a very important step and it confirms the Soviet
interest (?for) peace. Now it is for the Western Europe capitalist
countries, particularly members of NATO, to safeguard their countries
from the attacks by atomic weapons by refusing to allow the installation
~ of the atomic weapons in their countries (?en masse). If they are inter-
ested in the reduction (?of) nuclear and nonnuclear weapons in Europe -
- they will welcome this commitment and philantiiropic assurance of the _
Soviet Union. (?The NATO) should also [word indistinct] and show its
good will for peace, well being and reduce their atomic weapons in Europe. ~
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- AFGHANISTAN
~
CONSTITLTTIONAL CO~IlKITTEE STUDYINs CITIZENS' PROPOSALS
LD102118 Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto 1530 GMT 10 Nov 79 LD
[Text] The committee for the draft constitution of the Democratic
Republic of Afghanistan [DRA], in its meeting today considered the views,
demands and proposals of our noble and toiling compatriots in light of
the slogan immunity, legality and justice. The views, demands and propos-
als of thousands of our sensitive and noble compatriots, which have been
edited by the secretariat, were dietributed to the committee's members and _
were investigated, in accordance with the DRA's executive committee deci-
sion dated 3 November 1979.
Our noble arid toiling compatriots emphasize in their letters and proposals
that the DRA committee for the draft constitution--in view of the Khalqi
message of Comrade Amin dated 17 September 1979 and so that the Muslims
and workers of Afghanistan may accomplish the slogan immunity, legality
_ and justice--should draft a constitution which will prepare the grounds
- for the building of a pragressive society, lacking the exploitation of -
man by man. -
The letters of the compatriots, after being sorted and edited, were put
at the discretion of the work committee so that the hundreds of proposals ~
contained in them could be utilized in drafting and compiling the chapters
of the DRA's constitution. Our noble compatriots' letters cover the fallow-
ing topics: freedom of the observanc2 of religious ceremonies; proposals
- about equal rights of tribes and nationalities in Afghanistan; the accom-
plishment of the democratic rights of the citizens; equal rights for men
and women; the enhancing of the standard of living of workers, peasants, -
off icials and other toilers; the accomplishing of true training and edu-
cation; and proposals about our people's social, economic, political and
cultural aspects.
Our compatriots' letters and propositions are continuing to be sent to
the committee for the draft constitution and are being patiently and
carefully considered. In today's work committee ~r.eeting the new parts of
the draft constitut~.on, which were translated and distributed by the
committee's secretariat, were also discussed and investigated. In the
executive committee's meeting today, discussions were held on those topics
and materials which were prepared by some members of the work commi::tee ,
concerning the compilation of various chapters of the draft const'tution. _
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AFGHANISTAN
BRIEFS _
MINISTERS LEAVE FOR BULGARIA--At the invitation of the government of
= the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Public Health Piinister Dr Saleh
Mohammad Ziray and Communications Minister Zarif departed today for Sofia
for s friendly visit of that country. Some members of the council of
ministers, high-ranking offlcials from the ministries of public health
and comnunications, the chief of protocol of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and the ambassadors of the Soviet Union and Bulgaria were at
Kabul International Airport to bid them farewell. [Text] [GF100504
Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1600 GMT 8 Nov 79 GF]
_ ECONO1~fIC COMPiISSION MEETING--The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
Economic Commission met yesterday under the chairmanship of Dr Shah
Wali, deputy prime minister and foreign minister. The meeting lasted
from 1630-2200. The participants thoroughly discussed the trade activ-
ities of government trading organizations and private trading enterprises.
As a result, the Ministry of Commerce was instructed to further activate
and regularize the trading activities of the country. Utmust attention
should be paid so that the 1979 estimated plan can be put into action.
Specific proposals in this respect should be prepared and submitted to =
next Monday's meeting. [TextJ [LD152219 Kabul Domestic Service in
Pashto 1530 GMT 15 Nov 79 LD]
- ANTI-KHOMEYNI ACTIVITIES--In Iran anti-Khomeyni forces continue their
. struggle in Khuzestan and Kordestan at a time when in Tehran itself ~
_ thousands of unemployed people have held demonstrations in front of the
offices of Iran's Labor Ministry. According to another report, those who
were demonstrating were fired on by the Khomeyni supporters and as a
result several people were killed. In Khuzestan patriots have extended _
- anti-Khomeyni struggles and the situation is similarly confused in Kordes-
tan. The occupation of the American Embassy and holding of hostages which
include more than 40 Indian and Italian diplomats entered its llth day
_ today. Observers believe that the Khomeyni government has completely lost
its standing in the international arena. [Text] [LD1521.13 Kabul Radio in _
Pashto to Europe 1730 GMT 13 Nov 79 LDJ
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AT1'ACKS ON JAPNVt:SE T~URIST, OTHERS--Tokyo Nov 14 KYODO--A young Japanese
to~irist was attacked and robbed by ancigovernment bandits in Afglianistan
earlier this month, the Foreign Ministry revealed Wednesday. A report re-
ceived from the Japanese consulate general in Karachi identified the
traveler as Takeshi Terajima, 21, a resident of the town of Ryuo, Shiga
_ Prefecture. Terajima entered Afghanistan by way of Iran on November 1,
- and took one of the five buses going to Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan,
at Kandahar, near the Pakistani border, on November 3. On the way to
' Kabul, the five buses were attacked by Islamic bandits, and all of the
some 300 passengers were captured, in spite of resistance offered by about ,
10 soldiers who were aboard the buses to guard the passengers. The Afghan
passengers were released next day, but about 40 Pakistani passengers, the
_ soldiers and Terajima were marched into Pakistani territory across a
desert region. According to the report, the bandits treated the captives
harshly, and two Pakistanis were shot for "walking too slowly." Of the
captives who arrived in Pakistani territory, Terajima alone ~~as released
' on November 4, deprived of a camera and other personal effects. He then
mar~aged to arrive in karachi, and reported the incident to the Japanese
consulate general. Terajima had resigned from a building company in Ibaraki
Prerecture this spring, and went on a three-month overseas trip in the
middle of June. In Afghanistan, Islamic antigovernment bandits have~been
increasingly active in the mountainous regions. [Text] [OW141151 Tokyo
KYODO in English 1135 GMT 14 Nov 79 OW] -
REZ'URN OF COMMERCE t4INISTER--(Mohammad) Hakim Maliyar, the deputy minis-
ter of commerce, who had gone to participate at the head of an Afghan
delegation at the congress of the consumers' goods cooperatives in the
Soviet Union, returned home yesterday. The deputy minister of cAmmerce
signed a protocol for technical, scientific and equipment assistance
between the Central Union of Cooperatives of the Soviet Union and the
Ministry of Commerce of the Democratic Fepublic of Afghanistan. [Text]
[LD160446 Kabul Radio in English to Europe 1900 GNfI' 15 Nov 79 LD7
CSO: 4Q20 -
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ALGERIA
ALGERIA UNDER ~3ENDJ~DID REPORTED ON
Changes After First Nine Months
Paris DEMAIN L'AFRIQUE in French 22 Oct 79 pp 43, 45, 47-48
[Article by Bachir Rezzoug: "The Nine Months of Chadli"]
[Text] It is 1980, and Algeria is beginning a new change.
Nearly nine months ago Chadli mobilized political leaders
and economic experts to review past development experience
in detail. All records were open. A five-year plan sets
new priorities and gives the social a key position. All
in a new frame of mind.
Ten months; this was the modest and perilous period set by the Algerian leaders
_ for emergrng from an acute "social crisis," taking stock of a frenzied indus-
trialization, drawing up a new hydrocarbons strategy, putting agriculture back
in the saddle, and, finally, "reviving" a party that little by little is re-
gaining its own. A huge program. A change of course, too.
But, for ~11 that, socialist Algeria is not repudiating what it has done. It
is a matter of rearranging, not of challenging. Chadli has therefore built .
his theory on a political reality (the country's basic choices), economic re-
~ ality (two four-year plans and their effects) and social reality (greatly dis-
rupted). At the point of departure for his thinking is the drama of the land -
and the "life sickness" of the great majority of the Algerians. One things
seems quite clear to the Algerian leaders: it is not easy to "bring along" -
those who are ill housed, sometimes ill fed, and who above all are bored. To
"explore" Algeria, then, was to discover that it appeared to be an encoded enig-
ma: how could a country that was enjoying good economic health overall, Ue
sinking ir~to a"social swamp?" This colossal vessel, then must be directed
outside the dangerous waters of discontent toward which it was drifting. The
_ cascade of events sweeping through the country in recent months gives meaning
to what can already be perceived as a"change of style."
First, it is being acknowledged--and this is new--that all was not for the best
in the best of Algerian socialist worlds. The tone has changed. "A solid
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- revolution is one that is not afraid of self-criticism, silence is the source
of evil," the FLN coordinator, Mr Yahiaoui, stated recently. A Party that
seems to be having a rebirth from its ashes and from which a few miracles are
still expected. Mr Yahiaoui did not fail to state, "We are going through a ~
decisive phase." Another member of the Palitical Bureau, Affane Djillali, let -
it be known that the next elections--party, communal assemblies and regional
assemblies--were to take place at a"decisive turning point." He said, "In
most cases the political authorities have not played their true role."
"Decisive pliase," "historic turning point," "inadequacies" are words heavy
_ with meaning that speak volumes for the Algerian leaders' intentions. Is '
. this excessive language from those who are charged with "driving from the field" -
a political apparatus which gets credit for existing, but which was showing
_ serious signs of fatigue? Or is it the resolutely offensive attitude of a po-
litical leadership that really intends to take the bull by the horns? We
must lean toward the second hypothesis, and there is no lack of signs attest-
ing to the fact that what is being played is very certainly one episode of a
history that has been abruptly accelerated in the last ten months.
There are really two Algerian miracles. The first, as will be seen, is allied
with a fine economic success. It is largely acknowledged. The second is
stranger, more troubling. Despite the deficiencies that have come to light,
the weariness, despite "disorders" of a different kind, despite the Algerians
themselves, who have sometimes ended up by despairing, Algeria, the country
of "social ills," is beginning to resurface.
Some have continued to be on the lookout for signs that might reveal the in-
tentions c~f the present team. To work with whom and for what? Every succes-
~ sion begins with this double question. All the more so in the case of Algeria
because after 17 years of independence it has become socially "complicated."
And the political unity necessary to any undertaking involving rearranging and
"restarting" requires that the most contradictory aspirations of different so- -
cial strata (or classes) be satisfied: the modernist technocrats, carried
away by an accelerated industrialization; the peasants, manhandled between a _
sky that is not very clement and a stifling bureaucracy; the bourgeois con-
sumers, afflicted by a curious desire to take all the credit; the middle
classes, afflicted with a frantic hunger; the freelance-religious in their
thinking, who are dangerous because they are above suspicion, while they want-
ed to go smoothly from moral doctrine to political activism; and finally, the
main body of the troops, the youth and the workers, attentive, organized,
their eye on all the indicators. -
In the face of that scene, which was not well suited to reviving the old vir-
tues of "solidarity" or "unity," the Algerian leaders take credit for not
giving a false impression of "unanimity." The reality is what it is, forged
by 17 years of social changes. At one time one could stigmatize the sheeplike
behavior of the Algerians, the "aid recipients," they said, without getting to
the bottom of things, without denouncing its socio-economic origins. Some -
people wanted to mark that rearrangement with the ineffable need for moralism,
fed, as was suspected, by the sources of religion. The temptation to take a
virtuous tough line, as it were. They exalted, with no attention to order,
_ the family, honor, hygiene, freedom, thinking ethics would be strengthened as
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clifficulties appeared. To let it be known, at last, perniciously, that those
difficulties sprang directly from the country's political choices. Moreover,
the difficulties often took on the appearance of a separate crisis that upset _
habits and drove people crazy. ~veryone worried, looked for a way, and many
obviously lent an ear to the slightest murmur. Talk consisted of well-being
or the solution to the problems. Then, some were sure to mount their favorite
battle horse, liberalization, which they said was "ineluctable, because this _
is an impasse."
It is futile to speak a lot of hot air; liberalism, as it is spoken of in
Algiers or elsewhere, has never been deeply rooted in this country. But to-
day one hardly lingers over all these ups and downs. One does not believe
. any longer in the hasty syntlieses between religion and revolution, between
- ethics and religion. Separation of types is desired. Lovers of clarity,
and they are many, will not complain. Everyone wants to get to the bottom of
the problem: an exact dia~nosis before 1980. -
In truth, the whole political edifice rests on an economic expansion that
must be maintained, but also controlled, and on as broad a consensus as possible. -
The establis}ied program has the merit--in addition to existing--of dedramatiz- _
ing relations, since all the political, technical and administrative author-
~ ities have been called upon to establish the diagnosis. "But it would be a
mistake," they say in Algiers, "to think this pause can last long, and to
think that the expansion of recent yeaxs can be maintained if nothing is done
to further that end." A member of the Political Bureau recently admitted,
"The situation we find ourselves in is entirely our own responsibility." A
_ discreet veil is then pulled over the past. And no one dreams any longer of
throwing former sins at anyone's head. It is suspected in Algiers that the
mechanics of the dissension would be in danger of fouling the enthusiasm so
necessary to this "revival" undertaking.
Another phenomenon: there is no more competition for the economic or admin-
istrative "powers," no one has any illusions about that any more. Communal
- and regional assemblies, the National Assembly, grassroots organizations of
the FLN, the Central Committee and the Political Bureau; the political edi-
fice covered by an ideologic text, the National Charter, is finally in place, ~
w}iich really shows that the country~s fate is in its people's har~ds. Or in
the hands of those who best represent its people. '
However, certain observations reveal a party (basic texts give it a first-
- rank position) much less monolithic than a certain political mythology claims.
- If we really look at them we see, for example, that many Algerians, even
leaders, were manifesting a certain suspicion in this respect, a suspicion
that has been gradually eased, during weeks that saw meetings of the Political
- Bureau or national commissions, true centers of reflection, opening the hot-
test files: economic, social, education, etc. Trat is the main thing, in the
eyes of the Algerian leaders. And the directing team was really counting on -
using these nine months to inventory the nee~s, the means of satisfying them, -
to propose a schedule and objectives to be introduced gradually, to rough out
a new way of producing and consuming, to learn and to relax, to be housed and
to live. All this is a united effort to transform the economy and society.
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Without, however, minimizing the social "bad humor" in certain cases, it
may be stated that the great majority of Algerians are cautious about this -
policy of reordering affairs. Many of them, often in difficult straits, are
openly pleased with the soft pedal applied to an economic policy which they
found was beginning to cost them dearly. This attitude does not come from a
sharply felt progress or a sudden "detente." It is dictated by the feeling
that one is going to begin with the essentials. It is also in the name of
this realism that the country is going to begin a significant change: the
first Algerian Five Year Plan (1980-1984), after two Four Year Plans (1969-
1977) and two years of "pa~se:" 1978-1979.
For nine months balance sheets, reports, analyses and proposals have been ar-
riving in great numbers on the desk of the president of the Republic. They
are rough. But they are not embarrassing. They emanate from interministerial
committees put in place to study sector-based problems, from long meetings of
special committees of the Political Bureau, tours of the terrain by the gov-
ernment members most concerned. Thus they take the measure of the "social"
- peril in overpopulated cities, they feel the pulse of rural areas deserted
by the peasants, they minutely examine the sometimes extravagant figures of
the industrialization, in short they are taking a bearing on everything and
for everything. To be divided up in 1980. When one observes the evolution of -
the Algerian situation over the nine months just past, one sees above all that
= the directing team has never stopped occupying the terrain. The economic com-
missions have mobilized their experts. With an expiration date: an overall
document is to be established between now and the end of the year, to b~ sub-
mitted at the third meeting of the Central Committee. It will also be discuss-
ed by the National Assembly.
Its broad outlines are known. It will first propose cyclical remedies, while
offering a"global strategy." It aims at the long term, but in a different
spirit. It also adds that to revive the country's economy, economic agents
(everyone who works and produces) must believe in the ability of ~hose who
lead the country to establish well-being permanently. Better still, they are
going to be partners in the most important discussions. The calendar is then
going to shed at a swift pace the reports and riders that are accumulating as
the debates go forward.
, The reports advise a relaxation of the industrial investment policy. The de- -
velopment is considerable: in 1973 Algieria's imports amounted to
8,800,000,000 dinars* and her exp~rts to 7,400,000,000 dinars. In 1977, at
the end of the second Four Year Plan, these figures were, respectively,
29,500,000,000 and 24,100,000,000 dinars. And the effort did not let up in
1978, even though it was a"planless" year: credits were increased 70 percent
in the budget and imports reached 34,OQ0,000,000 dina.rs. If this effort -
has not yielded all th~ expected results, it is because adjustments need to be
made and industrial development needs to be better organized. 1t is this re-
flection on_the validity and the rate of investment that will determine the
- new directions of the Fi-ve Year Plan. It will be necessary at the same time
to make up for time lost from realization and to review the earlier plans.
Here and there, too, are pointed out "phenomena that constitute genuine
*One Algerian dinar equals 1.12 French francs.
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dangers to economic liberation and development: three or four years' time
lost from realization of projects, if not more, cost overruns, disruptions of
all kin~ls." "'T}ie consequences are all t}ie more serious," another document
points out, "because the development policy was conceived in such a way as to
_ form a link between sector-based activities and to assure the highest inte-
gration rate in each branch and sector." In fact, the Algerian development
pattern gives absolute priority to the heavy industrial sector. Which was
supposed to have driving effects on the economy as a whole. That choice is
dictated by a guiding principle: economic independence. The investment pro-
cess was to lead to putting in place industries that would furnish agriculture
with tlie means to increa~e its production level. Which was not always the
case. At the same time the development of the metallurgic and steel industries
was to create an industrial tissue capable of emerging into production of
consumer goods .
Another debate is often revived: the natural gas development program. The
cost of this program, beside the fact that it is going to lead to increased
indebtedness (a situation not at all alarming to Algeria, which continues to
enjoy the confidence of the international financiers), risks leading Algeria
to "structure" its economy on exportation of gas, to the disadvantage of the
other sectors.
Chadli ~vanted an open, lucid znd calm debate on this question. His Energy
biinister, Nabi Belkacem, prepared a voluminous report in which he tries,
among other things, to answer the question "Should we export more or apply a
strategy of reserve?" "This source of revenue," it was then indicated,
"should be developed according to the indicators most responsive to the nat-
ional interest." A formidable b~ne of contention.
~ The industrial apparatus has often pitted a heavy inertia against the various
stimulating measures recommended. The effects of that industrialization,
which generated distortions, inequities, frustrations and waste, were more-
over "poisoned" by one of the most detestable social environments. If the
last Four Year Plan experienced significant delays in realization
(1,800,000 dinars, 50 percent for industry and hydrocarbons), we are told we
need not blame those who inspired it, but tha nature of the evil that is gnaw-
- ing away at the productive apparatus--disorder, complacency. Someone inter-
ver~ed in the blow-by-blow when the pressure was such that it became impossible
to evade it, while making state aid a systematic means of bailing out firms
in trouble. And there was no lack of appeal. Often, too, one got the wrong
remedy. An economy is driven with two pedals, the brake and the accelerator. -
The "managers" of Algerian industry are often blamed for having, by means of
facility and/or intoxicated by the overall success, briskly carried out pro-
jects that required greater moderation and greater calm.
All the reports are instructive in that regard. What comes out of them is ~
that investment growth has clearly been faster than production growth. The
nearly general use of sophisticated equipment has not always complied with ef-
ficiency criteria. Great size was often a goal in itself, for reasons of nat-
ional economic strategy. Also, Algerian leaders are seeking to set up new,
- more modest, more competitive and more profitable entities, hence structural
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reforms. This involves not only reviving the activity of the existing pro-
_ ductive apparatus, but also transforn:ing it. It will also be necessary to
bring off a"skimming" of the industrial fabric and eliminate the "lame ducks."
The counterattack was swift and impressive. It was announced clearly: "To
allocate resources in accordance with a better investment-consumption equilib-
rium." And, as a priority, strengthening the housing and agriculture sectors.
The planner has foreseen for the next decade construction of 100,000 housir.g
units per year. A significant share of the national income will be devoted to
this. Also provided for is the "catching up" of the food industry by setting
a dual objective: self-sufficiency and full employment. But the fact remains
that agriculture is taking on a character of urgency. One is persuaded that
if nothing is done in that direction the most energetic and daring measures
taken otherwise will have littile impact.
~ "We must make agriculture one of the essential priorities," President Chadli _
indicated recently. He also stated that "it was of primary importance to
go ahead with a revaluation of the existing structures." "It is important
for us," Chadli added, "to better exploit oil and gas to protect the permanent
wealth on which Algeria must depend for the present and the future--the land -
and its agricultural products." There, too, restructuring is in sight. The
- minister of Agriculture, Salim Saadi, for his part has perfected short-term
measures to deal with those who are most squeezed, and also a long-term pro-
gram.
~ For the third consecutive year Algeria has recorded a bad ~rain harvest, but
it is acknowledged that this situation is imputable not only to weather con-
ditions, but also to "technical weaknesses." The peasants, who are unjustly
condemned for all the ills, have often called the heavens to witness, but ~
their resentment also says it all. When spare parts were supplied after the
- agriculture seasons, the limited financial credits, the greedy marketing ser-
vices--"The peasant feels alone," one or two of them recently declared to the
minister who came to listen to them. More autonomy, then, for agricultural
developments? Dismemberment of the large developments into several small pro-
duction farms? If they were adopted these two measures would constitute the -
essential axis of the agriculturai restructuring in progress. For now, a
number of decisions have been taken: to set up regional nuclei that r~ill re-
present the agricultural bodies as a whole; to support developments permanently
and effectively; to assign technical staff to the field with precise instruc-
tions; to establish a rigorous work schedule; to extend rural housing to solve
the problem of the distax~ce and instability of the peasants.
"The peasants have deserted the land; the manpower is made up o~ women and
- children...the peasants have left for remunerative jobs in industry:" this
was the cry of alarm, or at least tre alert, sounded the other day by a"pres-
ident" of an Oranie agricultural development. Will he be heard? This is one -
of those natural and implacable laws that escape the stranglehold. A fright-
ening whirlwind, the sa.ze of which may be measured by some figures. ~3etween
- 1958 and 1978 ~.he Algerian population doubled, going from 9,~00,000 to
18,000,000, and projections .i.ndicate that it will have doub~e~ again in 25
years from now: 36,000,000 persons. However Algeria, with 2,,389,741 square km,
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has no lack of space. But although the average der.sity is 7.32 inhabitants
per square km, in the north, mainly around the cities, it reaches 300 and
sometimes more. Children from 0 to 17 years represent 52.8 percent. Three -
million households have been counted, but Algeria is a"many farr.ily" country.
More than half have more than six persons. The urbanization rate exceeds
40 percent and 7,000,000 "city dwellers" are packed togethcr; the average is
7.20 persons per housing unit. Although on the other hand the active popula-
tion is estimated at 4,000,000 "hands" (2,309,000 in the nonagricultural sec-
tors), this represents only 23.2 percent of the total population. Thus it
is very obvious that to contribute to the nationai production the country has -
availab le only a quarter of its population.
"Wouid Algeria be too heavy for its own people to carry?" researchers wonder.
_ It is ag ainst this backdrop that pictures are very often superimposed. The
first of them recall this surprising country's victories: recover~~ of the -
national wealth, courageous agrarian reform among others. The second arise
in a muted and tenacious interrogation: for what effects on everyday life?
Everyday l~fe--this is what is most embarrassing to thase who are attempting
~ a serious and overall approach to Algeria. Exigence has often given way to
impatience. Surprised and vaguely worried, Algerians have observed their coun-
try. And they saw their cities and their rural areas change over a period of
months into a parade ground for a revolution that went on forever stirring up -
hopes and fears at the same time. And paradoxically, this "social crisis"
situation that no one today dreaTr~s of either concealing or denying has never
lit the powder keg. Because everyone felt the danger and no one had a miracle
solution.
To deal the final blow the Algerian leaders of course chose the social battle-
field. They could not maneuver on a better field. All the country's resent-
ments were accumulated there. A policy conducted with gusto and on the attack.
- And now here again is Algeria in one of those feverish conditions, which is
exciting or worrying and which reveals the finality of all the "readjustments"
_ that are going to be performed--to make everyday life sweeter and more support-
able. For although the tidying up is clearly perceived and appears to have
got off to a good start, it is being prepared on a social terrain in motion.
And the difficulties, because they have not heen cooled, take weeks to resolve.
~ The slig htest rumor made a racket that confused desires, illusions and reality.
The expected offPnsive is going to be supported by reality, and one never loses
sight of the fact that discontent over the crisis in "daily life" has incr�eased.
One is on the one hand persuaded that the Algerians will not acce~t for very
long liv ing in both austerity and inequality. An inequality that has itself
experienced a"growth." After 12 years of considerable investment that for
all that is not keeping Algeria from "food blackmail," if one takes into ac-
count the foreign exchange structure, has the time not come to begin to get
back on its feet again?
That is what is clearly emerging today. A new level is being reached. Not an
abrupt turn backwards, btit a better equilibrium between several requirements:
- to maint ain development while correcting the firing. All while determining
whether months of "social tension" have not too seriously weakened Algerians'
energy. That tension, increased by the production deficit, has been at the
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gates fcr several years. It has reached its culminating point in the last
few months. In an ambience of pleasant shambles everyone rega ined a keen
sense of scheming and swindling. In a decomposing social univ erse.
To guarantee effectiveness for everything that was going to b e undertaken,
no one forgot to trigger the psychologic al mechanism necessary to any enter- _
prise of this kind. The Algerian leader s made their choice: debate, where
it is possible and necessary to do so, all the questions that engage the
country for the coming decade; confront points of view, even the most di-
vergent; examine the arguments closely, even when they involve questions as
fundamental as hydrocarbons; and "unite" the workers in a genuine political ~
pact.
That is what the future will be made of. Chadli, who has been at the head
of the country for nine mc~nths, could-- at the same time that he announced his
economic and social program--snatch from the void a whole epoch, trembling
with life, that one might have believed buried forever in ~he folds of his-
tory: Novembe~ 1954. For all its meaning is still to be giv en back to the
most devalued--wrongly devalued--of words: political commitment.
Profile of Chadl i Bendjedid
Paris DEMr'1IN L'AFRIQUE in French 22 Oct 79 p 44
[Article by Roland Malet: "Loyalty and Light"]
"To govern is to see clearly, in order to give oneself the means to direct
progress." That could be the motto of Chadli Bendjedid, the third president
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria. He was ele~ted to that
office last 7 February. From that date to the 25th anniversary next 1 Novem-
ber of the start of the war of liberation, just 260 days, less than nine months,
have gone by. In this short time the new chief of state has already succeeded
- in making his mark on Algerian policy. Careful as he is to b e watchful of
continuity in taking over the legacy left by Houari Boumediene, he has never-
theless assumed a different image.
Manifestly, Chadli Bendjedid intends to do nothing uncertainly or equivocally.
- First, no one will be in a position to reproach him one ~ay for having sought
" power because of personal ambition. At the end of last January the fourth
- congress of the National Liberation Front (FLN) was on the lookout for the -
candidate most likely to conduct the country's policy in the path drawn by
the revolution, even while protecting and consolidating national unity.
That is when the congress dared to turn to the commander of the second mili-
tary region, Oran. Chadli Bendjedid enj oys great esteem in the whole army
and among Party authorities. Born on 14 April 1929 in Bouteldja, he is near-
ing 50. Since his adolescence, in a confused political world where, under the
influence of the ideology and machinations of the colonial apparatus, parti-
sans of "assimilation" take pride of place, he shows no sign of doubt: to
take its fate in its own hands, his people has no other choice but to fight -
for its independence. In any case, that is the objective he argues for.
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Chadli does not decline the very high responsibility it is pr~~po~~ed that he
assume. He does not ask for them, but neither does he turn them down, But,
if the clioice of the 3,290 people who attend the congress falls upon his per- -
sori, tie intencls that no ambiguit~~ s}iall mar the mandate that will be entrusted
in him. .
He has given constant proof that he is a man of his word, and a loyal man.
Since 19 June 1965 he has been a:nember of the Council of the Revolution. He
- stood without flinching beside President Boumediene for 13 ysars. But he is
- also regarded as an organizer. In thP ~ilitary region he commanded, he ran
public affairs with talent, he expressed vaiuable ideas on reconverting and
modernizing the army. He also, according to those who knew him then, knew
how to judge the competence and moral quality of inen.
Wlien on 31 January 1979 the congress elected him secretary general of the -
_ FLN and made him the single candidate for the presidency of the Republic,
Chadli Bendjedid publicly laid his cards on the table. He will remain loyal
to socialism, his people's option; he will apply the National Charter in the
spirit and the letter; he will ensure independence without accepting "any
pressure or bargaining with regard to the principles we believe in;" he will
_ see to it that we confirm "our authenticity,...our membership in the Arab ~
Muslim world and our openness to the world that surrounds us." So much for
continuity. _
But Chadli Bendjedid also states that he is resolved to reorganize all the
political, economic and social structures. That is the only way the Algerian
revolution will be assured o� accomplishin,g progress, of putting down deeper
roots in the country and of setting itself up as a solid citadel. He openl.y
- exposes his intentions, so everyone will know where he stands. He spreads
everything out for everyone to see.
As for him, the "cornerstone" of the revolution fits into the "choice of inen."
He has put this plan into operation: integrity, competence, devotion to the
people's cause are from now on the principal criteria for recruiting militants
and cadres for the Party, for recruiting leaders for policy and the economy.
Precisely, economic and financial independence is one of the principal founda-
tions of "an independence that is not devoid of ineaning." A series of watch-
words follows from that: to draw up the inventory of the production apparatus;
to establish the balance sheet of financial management; to revise the struc- ~
tures and t~e direction of certain branches of the industrial sector in order
to provide better profitability; to improve the distribution channels and put
agricultural development at the top of the list of priorities. To reach these
abjectives many measures have been taken that have disturbed routine and com-
fort. But it was also advisable to improve the cities, to preach to the citi-
zens concerning their conduct, to fight corruption, without faltering. In a -
few weeks a thousand sentences were pronounced in the city of Algiers alone.
Thus, the Algerians are gathering their energies, developing new capacities,
deploying forced atrophied by an organization that left something to be de-
sired. Chadli Bendjedid is doing a good job ar the helm at the risk of
- setting against himself the united interests of a national bourgeoisie that
_ had really dug its hole in the revolution, and was busy for years f~.riously
conducting economic development: A new stage has begun for Algerir.
~364 0 32 _
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ALCERIA
GOVERNMENT REPORTED TO BE RETHINKING HYDROCARBONS POLICY
- Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 12 Nov 79 pp 4, 5 ~
[Text] A number of straws in the wind indicate that Algeria is rethinking
- its policy of mortgaging a major portion of its oil revenues to develop
its natural gas resources. The policy, known as Valhyd (valorisation des
hydrocarbures--development of hydrocarbons) was drawn up in 1976 with the
- assistance of American experts. It envisages expenditure of $33.4 billion
between now and the year 2005 to earn gross revenues of some $222 billion
at current prices. With oil exports likely to cease aroui~d 1995, Algeria
has been staking its future on gas, with strong emphasis on LNG.
One indication of a forthcoming switch in policy was given last week by the
Dutch Economics Ministry in a confidential report to Parliament which was _
leaked to the press. It said Sonatrach, the Algerian state oil and gas ~
company, would prefar to make future deliveries of gas by pipeline across
the Mediterranean because of the high cost of building as liquefaction
plants. The Netherlands is currently building an LNG terminal at
_ Eemshaven and extending port facilitie~ there to process 80 billion cubic
metres a year of Algerian LNG: Dut~h and West German gas companies agreed
last March, to buy the gas and Gasunie, which distributes gas in the Netherlands,
said last week that it expected Sonatrach to honour its 20-year contract w~.th
them. Deliveries are due to begin in 1983.
The Dutch report said delivery by pipeline was likely to be written into -
future sales contracts and that Algeria was "reconsidering" its hydrocarbons
~ investment policy. Reports from Algeria indicate that Sonatrach's heavy
borrowing was acting as a brake upon the ability of other sectors of the
economy to negotiate development loans. Sonatrach, meanwhile, is undergoing
a reorganisation, which is expected to lead to the creation of a separate
oil refining and distribution company.
These developments stem from the new look at Algeria being undertaken by
President Chadli Bendjedid. The changes he is making are not revolutionary
in themselves, but the shift in emphasis is nonetheless clearly visible. ,
In his f irst official interview since he took over the Presidency following
the death of Houari Boumedienne in February, President Bendjedid listed
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I
his priarities. "Must one deduce that we are going to slow down growth in
certain sectors or even neglect them in favour of other forms of activity?
Are we, to speak in specific terms, going to sacrifice industry? This
hypothesis does not conform with the truth," he told French correspondent
Daniel Junqua.
"Our strategy and our plans for industry remain unchanged. But greater means
will be allocated to other sectors. This is especially true for agriculture,
- water resources and housing. Education and vocational training will also =
continue to enjoy the priority that has been given to them for a long time,"
President Bendjedid declared.
_ "We are going to concentrate on developing agriculture and water resources
because oil does not represent the future for Algeria. AftEr a while, we
will not have it any longer. We must learn to ciistinguish between permanent -
- riches and those which are not renewable. Oil, a temporary resource, must
serve to develop productive equipment for industry and agriculture. That =
is what we ought to bequeath to future generations. As far as this is
possible, they should be able to feed themselves from our own land. These
are the broad lines for debate at the next meeting of the Central ~ommittee,"
the Al~erian leader stated. _
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ALGERIA
BRIEFS
ALG~RIANS VERSUS ROMANIANS--Algeria has just complained to Moscow about
what it calls "Romanian duplicity." According to Algeria, Romania is
secretly armir.g those opposed to Algeria's policies in the Maghreb. They
are said to be supplying military materiel of Soviet origin to the Moraccans ~
in large qua~?tities, including portable missiles and light weapons. This
- materiel is said to be passing through Egypt. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in
French 26 Nov 79 p 59]
- CSO : 4400 _
a
r r
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_ EGYPT
PROSECUTION CASE AGAINST COMMUNISTS CONTINUES _
Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 23 Oct 79 p 8 -
[Article: "The Government's Case Against �he Communists"]
[Text] The Supreme State Security Court yesterday continued to hear the
attorney general's case against 176 def.endants implicated in the largest -
- communist conspiracy. Mr Yusif Darraz, chief attorney of the Supreme State
Security Office presented new evidence pointin~ to the defendants'
- guilt. He said that the Egyptian people refu~e to follow the political
" system of any foreign government, and are opposed to any imported politi-
cal philosophy that is foreign to Egyptian thinking, such as the one
espoused by the c~efendants. He added that the defendants had attempted
to popularize communism and the communist system of government. He said
further tha~ prosecution witnesses, internal security intelligence reports, -
= tape recordings, photographs and emblems found in the possession of the
defendarits will confirm that the accused were well organized and united -
~ under one leadership in the commission of their suspicious activities.
The chiEf prosecutor described the Egyptian people as proud of their
- traditions and values, having been the first to believe in the existenc~
of a divine power, to accept the idea of a single God, to reject atheism,
and to be the recipients of a divine message which is the basis of their
- faith to this day. He added that the communist philosophy espoused by the .
defendants was an affront to Egypt's religious heritage. He described the
communist system as being socially and economically at odds with Egypt's
heritage, and castigated it as dictatorial government. Mr Darraz then
presented specific evidence against 84 of the defendants.
The crimes attributed to the defendants include: creating an Egyptian
communist organization, whose principal aim is the forceful overthrow of
Egypt's econouiic, political and social system, und popularizing communist
thought as evidence~ by possession of pro-communist pamphlets and other
- printed matter.
_ Some of the defendants ;~.*ere accused of encouraging, cooperating with,
- offering financial support to, sheltering and aiding the communists to
- evade the authorities.
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- There is much objective evidence to substantiate the charges. Egyptian
security agencies have been ~athering information on the communist activ-
_ ity for 2 months prior to the actual incidents. The communists exploited
every opportunity to instigate the public against the government. One
example was the 25 November 1976 demonstration by university students, -
� which was led by some of the defendants to spread communist ideas. The
defendants were also responsible for spreading a variety of communist wall
~ posters and pamphlets directed mainly at the working class. The inflamma- -
tory propaganda was intended to foment disorder and ultimately lead to a
violent overthrow of the government. The defendants were charged with
having instigated the January 1977 incidents. They reportedly encouraged
the crowds to demonstrate, resist authcrity, and create anarchy. Many
� of the defendants were in possession of secret publications calling for
revolution. Information gathered by the security agencies was corrobo-
rated by eyewitnesses.
= The incidents were similar in many respects: the manner in which the crowds
were aroused and directed against particular government policies, the
banners and signs carried by the demonstrators, the slogans employed to
~ fan anger, etc., suggest that the disturbances were centrally led and -
organized. The prosecutor placed in evidence before the court a large
number of pamphlets calling for rebellion.
_ Prosecution witnesses also corroborated the charges. Their testimony left
no doubt that the defendants did belong to the secret organization, that
they were bent on fomenting revolution and that their ultimate goal was
the violent overthrow of the government. -
The testimony shows that the communists had planned a series of demonstra-
tions and other disturbances to coincide with the government's announcement -
of new economic policies in November 1976. The communists' aim was to
strike against the country's constitutional institutions and overthrow
the existing government. The court today will continue to hear the pro-
aecutor's case.
The trial proceedings were presided over by Justice Hakim Munir Salib with
' Justices 'Ali 'Abd al-Hakam and Ahmad Bakkar serving as members. Present
at the proceedings were Chief Prosecutor Yusif Darraz, assisted by Ibrahim
al-Hunaydi and riohsin Mabruk. Acting as secretaries were Ahmad Muhammad
Ramadan and Ramadan Nassar.
9063
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ErYrT
BRIEFS -
. NPUG PARTY MEr~ERS ARRESTED--The al-Duqqi district attorney ordered the
arrest of four NPUG party members on a charge of distributing inflamma-
tory pamphlets. All four are candidates for election to the al-Duggi
municipal council. They are: Muhammad Sayyid 'Ali, 'Omran Ahmad 'Omran,
Muhammad 'Abd al-Mun'im Khalil, and Nadir al-~'Annani. All four are
members of the NPUG party. They were arrested by internal security
- officers, and charged with distributing infl~3tory publications.
~ Mr Yusif 'Abd al-Halim, al-Duggi district attarney, ordered that they
be jailed without bail until their case is turned over to the Supreme -
State Security-Court. [Text] [Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 30 Oct 79 p 12]
9063
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- IRAN
ATTACK ON EMBASSY SEEN AS BLOW AGAINST U.S. IMPERIALISM
Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 6 Nov 79 p 5
[Text] The clear and anti-imperialist policy of Iran's revolution, is
- once again sparked by occupying the United States' espdonage nest. There-
~ fore, the policy which was about to weaken after the 21 and 22 Bahman -
_ [10, 11 February] last year or at least was losing its color once again
became a revolutionary topic and from the beginning, the revolution moved
by identifying the main enemy, that is; the United States. Nothing could
have stopped the motor of motivating the revolution which derived its
power from several decades of the United States and imperialism in Iran.
It was for this reason that [the revolution] achieved victory sooner than
it had been expected, despite the conspiracies and plots made by ~mperial-
ism which are still continued<
- We owe all this to the Emam. We owe it to the Emam's direct and clear -
policy which from the years of his exile in Turkey, Iraq and then his
departure to Paris and his return to his nation and up to this day and
forever, everywhere and in any statement, he has introduced imperialism,
and especially the United States, as the main enemy of the Iranian nation -
and our revolution. From the days that Khomeyni directl.y addressed the
shah saying, "you have submitte~i the documentation of the nation's slavery
to the parliament and brought dawn the value of the highest position in
the country lower than an American cook." To the statements that he made
in Tofel Chateau in presence of reporters in order that the world would
hear his words, the reporters broadcast that the "ayatollah has refused
- the request of Jimmy Carter, the President of thE United States for peace,"
pointing out that the superpowers should avoid interfering in Iran's inter-
- nal affairs. Ayatollah Khomeyni said: It is not up to Carter to determine
if Bakhtiar's government is legal or illegal. In an interview held by
"Monday Mor?Zing" Khomeyni said: "The President of the United States is
considered one of the enemies of Iran for his continued unconditional
support for the shah of Iran and for insulting the Iranian nation."
After his return to his nation on the 12 Bahman [1 February] last year, he
announced clearly in Behsht-e Zahra cemetery to millions of eager people: -
39
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- "As long as we are alive, we w'll not allow America to swallow our
gossessions." The Emam has repeatedly emphasized that the United States
, is the head of the international world eaters. This statement which will
remain forever is now the slogan of the students--f ollowers of the Emam's
policy--who have occupied the U.S. Embassy. "All the prob lems of the
East are caused by foreigners, from this West, from the United States.
All of the problems of the Moslems are caused by the United States. It
is the United States that has strengthened Zionism in such a way that
- they kill our brothers in groups."
And we see that the Emam's irreconcilable position toward imperialism,
especially the United States, has become tougher every day. ~
And then by looking deeply into the roots of Iran's revolution and the
- people's movements we feel r_he presence of imperialism and U.S. mercenaries
in the roots and veins of our life. We see that for several decades we
have been swallowed gradually by imperialism. We see that with the help
of the government it had set up and its domestic and foreign mercenaries,
and with the help of its greatest element in the Middle East, that is, the
deposed shah, the United States has made us so dependent on it and meta-
_ morphosed and destroyed everything so that we could not stand on our own
feet for even a few days. In order to cut off the tongue of the opposers
and fill the mouth of the truthful with lead and gunpawder, the damn~d SAVAK :
' was set up, with the help of the CIA, after the people's life~ Suffocation
and killings reached a point that brought the nation's anger to an exFlo-
sive point. The flood of revolution crushed the shore and the strongest
and the ~5est equipped m~_litary forces could not coutrol it.
Iran's poor people have known their main enemy and have moved by knvwing
who their enemy is. It is in repayment for years that it has struck a
- blaw on the arms of imperialism in Iran whenever it has been able to do
so and it has tried to cut off some parts of this cancerous tumor which -
is growing rapidly. We see that during the first days of the revolution,
with the slogans of "Death to America," "Death to Imperialism' and "Yankee
Go Home" written on the doors and walls of the city and villages, anti-
imperialism slogans. So many times the U.S. Embassy--the base of American
CIA conspiracies--was attacked and even a part of its building was set on
fire and there had been involvements with American guards at the embassy.
rlost of the Americans who had seen the nation's anger and knew that there
was no place for them in this country packed and left. Some of them even
_ fled. The American employees of most organizations were discharged by
Iranian employees. The nation's complete unity blocked the way for any
~ conspiracy that F,~nerica was preparing to deflect the course of the revolu-
tion. And, until victory the revolution moved in its main direction.
- For this reason, when the shah left the country the people went to the
streets with slogans such as "'The final victory is tc send out the Ameri-
~ cans." "This American shah should be executed by the nation's court,"
"After the shah, it is America's turn," "American mercenaries should be
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fired." After that, in every demonstration and parade, gathering, and in
short, at every opportuni ty, the conspiracies and plots of American mer-
cc~naries were condemned and anti-imperialiat slogans were given. The
:;logans say: "The Revolution Is Victorious," "Death ro Zionism,"
"America and Israel are our bloodthirsty enemies," "Palestine, our brother
and our friend."
~ Finally, several million anti-American people marched in Tehran and through-
out the country. Because imperialist conspiracies against Iran's Islamic
= revolution still continues and America who apparently talks of friendship
with Iran, has admitted the nation's biggest enemy, who for years had
sucked the nation's blood, to their soil. Therefore, the United States `
- has insulted the Iranian nation in the worst way. For this reason, anti-
America demonstrations wi th the participation of millions of people will
be held Lhroughout the country. In Tehran, demonstrations were supposed
ta end in front of the U.S. Embassy where the resolution would be read. -
However, Shush Circle will be the destination and anti-American slogans will
be exploded in the air like bombs.
- Finally with the Emam's guidance and advice the U.S. Embassy whose doors
were cldsed to Iranians f or years--this nest of corruption, espionage,
imperialist conspiracies against the Iranian nation and their bloody revolu-
- tion--was occupied by Mos lem students who follow the Ema~'s policy. The -
American employees except the charge'd'affaires who was out of the eirbassy,
~ were held hostage by students. Many documents on conspiracy against Iran's
revolution w2re found. Most of these documents were destroyed by embassy -
employees. _
In this way the revolution once again returned to its main direction. The ~
. big enemy who was going to hide itself ~aas pulled out of its nest. The
nation, united, supported this brave and revolutionary action. Because
if the strokes are not con tinuous and effective the enemy would not collapse.
However, imperialism should know that the more it struggles in the nation's
whirlpool of anger, the closer it will get to death.
9044
- CSO: 490b
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IRAN -
SHARI'ATMADARI REITERATES DEMAND FOR REI'URN OF SHAH
_ Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 13 Nov 79 p 2
/Interview with Ayatollah Shar:L'atmadari: "Whenever America Gives in to
the Law, the Matter Will Be Resolved
~ /ExcerptsT Eric Rouleau, LE MONDE's well known reporter and politicial commen- -
- tator, held an interview, along with the Washington POST correspondent,
- with Ayatollaholozma Shari'atmadari whose text is as follows:
- Question: '~That is your eminence's view on the occupation of the American
embassy in Tehran and the taking of workers and employees in this embassy
_ hostage?
Answer: For many years, our people have sustained great pressure and mis-
ery from international imperialism, and today they feel great edgine ss to- ~
ward imperi~lists. Our people's general belief is that America, throughout
the history of its relations with Iran, has always helped the governments
of Iran and rhat it was among the obstinate defenders of the corrupt, tyran-
nical regime in Iran in the past 30 years. This exCensive, unstinting
American supporC of the previous regime, and its support and reinfor cement
of his acts, occurred mostly at a time when America considered itself to
be the greatest proCector of human rights protested on the surface about
_ any corner of the world where there were excesses and transgressions. How-
ever, in spite of the full knowledge and certitude it had of the innumer- -
able transgressfons and persecutions which occurred in this country in this
era, it still protected the first and second Pahlavi, and, what is even
stranger, Mr. Carter himaelf, at the time when he was engaged in the elec-
tions for the presidency, engaged in holding meetings and apeeches i n the
various states of America, one day protested tu r'~rd, America's former
president, in a television interview ~r in far.t t??e�vision debate, "You are
protecting four corrupt, inhuman countries i.n the world, and one of them ts
the corrupt, despotic government o.f Iran." Mr Carter did nat accept any
response Ford gave in this regard, but we have aeen,that once he himself
- was elected president, he protected the deposed Shah more than Ford did,
and this is why our people today are well aware what the international
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imperiatists have done and are well aware that America has never paid heed -
to the oppressed, despotically ruled people of Iran but have alway~ sup-
ported corrupt governments and backed corrupt regimes. ~
(~uestion: What you have said is completely correct, and there is no doubt
about it, but you have not answered the question on whether occupation of
the American embassy in Tehran is a proper act.
Answer: First, this action was not taken by the Iranian government. Rath-
er, a number of students ca~rried it out and the government has supported
_ them. 5econd, four diplomats from the Syrian, Algerian, Swedish and French
embassies arP to go to the American embassy, by the invitation of the stu-
dents, to see the condition of the hostages, to see that they have not been
_ harmed or bother~d, and to see that their being hostages in their own em-
bassy, unharmed and undisturbed, has only a palitical meaning. Third, if
you say that this action is unlawful, this is nothing in comparison with
the illegal acts against eur people in the course of the past 30 years
which the American government has considered lawful.
i
Question: In your eminen~e's view, is this action proper from the religi-
ous standpoint?
Answer: This action has a political more than a religious asPect but from
the standpoint of Islam I must say that the provisions of Islam are linked
_ and connected to one another and that one cannot examine and judge an
Islamic act in isolatior without taking its connection with other Islamic
provisions and commands into consideration. ~
Islam is a comFlete system and structure and one must examine and respond `
to this matter in connection with other Islamic provisions, commands and
laws, because the matter is interconnected. This act is a palitical pro-
cess and one must seek its manifestation in its ceusative elements and
factors.
Question: At the present time Iran xs engaged in a test of strength with
the biggest world power. In your opinion how maq this matter be resolved?
Answer: We are not making caar with America but we have a series of demands
which a~re not only not outside the limits of the co~nands and laws of Islam
but also conform with international laws and z~ights. Whenever America
- yields in the face of logic and the Iaw, the matter will be resolved. Fur-
thermore, to yi.eld before right and to sanctLan reality never diminishes a
person and is not proof o.f failure--rather, it is proof of humanity, great-
ness ~nd :nagnanimity of spirit, and on the other hand imparts greater con-
_ fi~$nce and ch~racter. After the resolution of this matter, America will
cerCair.l.y be given consid~ration by Iran in the same measure as it respects
i~,dependence of 7ran and is diaposed to establish good relations.
(~ue~tion: The situation which has come arout at the present time has turned
the ~merican people against Iran.
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Answer: We have no differences or quarrels with the people of America--
rather, our criticisms and diffexences are with the American government
becaus e of its previous acts in Iran.
Queation: Excellence, you have often stated in your interviews that Islam-
ic provisions have not yet been put into practice in Iran, whereas the
people outside Iran believe that an Islamic system has. `
Answer: Of course the governmental system in Ixan is an Islamic republic
and, i n this system, conduct and action must be totally Islamic. Unfor-
tunate ly, so far /only/ a small percentage of Islam has been implemented;
most of tne commands and provisions of Islam have not yet been implemented.
Now our situation is such that a building has been destroyed and a new
building has not yet been built on top of it, and we are situated on the
ruins of the past, while there are numer~us problems and inadequacies and
po~er is in the hands of numerous groups. We do not have a powerful,
stror~g government which can dominate conditions and oversee the construc-
tion of Iran in the precise context of the laws of Islam. All right, all
this is because of the transitional stage and God willing it will gradually
be rectified. Moreover, when the French revolutian occurred did the condi-
tion of the French nation quickly improve and were affairs rapidly set in -
order?
Question: t�]hen da you think affairs will be set in order'.
- tinswer: When a powerful Islamic government comes to power reforms will be _
possib le and affairs will fall into order. The meaning of reform is that
all affairs must fall into the channel of social justice, but I do not
know when such a government will come to power--I just can give an example
for you in this sphere, namely that when Iran came under the occupation of
- three f oreign governments, the question was raised in a newspaper as to
when Ir an's situation would be rectified, and the answer was "Wt~en the oc- ~
cupati on is over." The question was then asked "when will the occupation
be over" and the answer was "When Iran's situation is rectified."
(~uesti an: In the course of the past 18 months, I have visited your emin-
ence s everal times and this is the first time I see you in despair.
Answer: We are not in despair; with the grace of God, the problems will
be solved. Of course, there have been problems following the revolution
and I hope we will soon emerge from them.
Questi on: You know that more than two thirds of the constitution has been
rectif i ed; in your eminence's view, are there no contradictions or incon~
sistencies in that?
Answer: People aze stiZl engaged in the investigation and it has not been -
completely ratified so that one can judge it; however, of course, if there
are inconaistencies and contradictions, they must be corrected.
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IRAN
GOVERNOR WARNS OF INTERNAL COUNTER.REVOLUTION
Tehran KAYHAN in Persian 16 Oct 79 p 11
[Text] Kermanshah--Hojjatoleslam Haj Sheykh Hosseyn Kermani, Eman Khomeyni's ~
representative in the west, accompanied by Ahmad Sepehri-Pur, governor of
_ Kermanshah. regional chief of Qasr-e Shirin and other officials met with
thousands of people from Qasr-e Shirin in the Mehdieh mosque. At this
gathering Sheyr.h Mohammad Aziz Hosseyn declared on behalf of the people of
Qasr-e Shirin the adherence of the people to t~ie Islamic repub lic. Accord-
ing to the PARS NEWS AGENCY, a group of youths entered the mosque and shouted
the slogan "show ceremonies must go, announce the wages of the underprivi- -
leged." Oc~e of them enumerated the needs of the people of Qasr-e Shirin.
The governor of Kermanshah said in this regard: "The problems you have
stated are out of hundreds that are not expressed. By forming a city coun-
cil and development starf we can, going hand-in-hand, remove these diffi-
culties. In commenting on the Islamic revolution and the efforts of
counterrevolutionaries and foreign and domestic plotters he said: they
' want to take the weapon of unity from us and by sowing enmity and discord
make differences between religious and political groups. We might think
that they threaten us from over the border but I mus"t say that this sowing
~ of discord is from within the country like termites eating at the founda-
tions of our unity."
The governor asked that the people tell him their neede so that they could
be met.
Hojjatoleslam Kermani, representative of Eman Khomeyni in the west, remarked ~
on the need for unity and said, tYEe revolution is a model home which is
easy to spoil. Living in it is difficult and to live in it we must have
plans and cooperation to meet our needs.
He added: "Our Islamic revolution astonished the world because we threw
out 50,000 American workers and all other foreign workers. We asked for
liberty and we must protect it because aur revolution is a revolution of
the underprivileged of the world. The land grabbers wi?o see us liberate
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- the underprivileged of the world are determined to smash our revolution.
You people, and especially the tribes, must not be deceived by this intrigue."
According to a repor.t from PARS NEWS AGENCY the Emam's representative with
the governor, commanders of district gendarmerie units of Kermanshah, com-
manders of gendarmerie regiments and border guards of Qasr-e Shirin, the
district governors of Sarpol Zahab in Bazmirabad located in the mountainous .
area, and Suq al-Jayshi, assembled in the presence of thousands of Qolkhani
tribesmen. The tribesmen pro~laimed their adherence to the Islamic Republic.
- Bahram Soltan Asperi, head of the Qolkhani, announced seven requests of the
tribe. These requests relate tc tranquillity of the tribe, aid to agricul-
ture and animal husbandry, improving health facilities and the number of
doctors, building schools, removal of weapons and compensation for those _
taken from the tribe and building roads throughout rural areas. It was
said that these requests would be presented to Eman Khomeyni by Seyyed
- Naseldin Hosseyni leader of the Ahl-e-Haq mosque.
The governor of Kerma.zshah said to the tribe: "We are in a state of war
and you must be patient un~il, God willing, security will be restored and
your requests can be met and some of the tribe who have left the border area
can return." The Emam's representative also said to the tribesmen: "The
Emam has assured that anyone who has repented his past sins and has taken
the road of defending the revolution and the land will be forgiven and will
- have mercy. You must also guard the Iranian border and be friends with -
your bro thers of the army, gendarmerie and guards."
The Emam's representative w~th his companions then went by helicopter to
the area of Gardeh No. There Mohammad Khonsari, district governor of
Sarpol Zahab said that the tribesmen of the area had assembled to announce
_ their adheren~e to the Islamic revolut~on. Clergymen of the area also spoke. _
The Emam's spokesman praised their feelings and said: "We expect you to
defend the western area of the country because ufficer Shirazi or guard
Isfahan i cannot defend the area." The Emam's representative, the governor _
of Kermanshah and officials of the area wen.*_ to the mosque at Sarpol Zahab. -
_ The governor said in the mosque: "We have reached this conclusion in our
- journey, that in s;~ite of the suffering of the peopl~ and tribes of the
area, they must defend the area bp the3r awn efforts.
Hojjatoleslam Kermani commented in regard to the programs of the fallen ~
regime that they did not know the social maturity of our people and said:
"They made their plans behind closed doors and gave away oil and gas and
bought weapons and gave nothing to the people." He asked the people to
compare the unity of word and deed with neighboring countries.
Hojjatoleslam Kermani, the governor, and his companions inspected the
Abuzar 3rd armored brigade of Sarpol Zahab.
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IRAN
KHOMEYNI'S SON STATES VIEWS ON GOVEEZNMENT
Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 15 Oct 79 p 2
_ [Text~ Hojjatoleslam Haj Seyyed Ahmad Khomeyni, son of the Emam, explained
- his views at a radio television press conference on various problems, such
as the au~hority of Islamic ~urists and th e council of experts.
- He recognized the importance to Islam and religion of the religious
jurists as they affect a number of other problems, political, educational,
social, military, economic and so forth. He said~ "If a person supposes
that he is an expert in political problems, that is, in the traffic of -
judgments and orders, and on the subject of Islamic police and does not -
have spe~ialization in other studies, he has no right to interfere in -
those affairs ~n which others have specialized. The opposite is also
true that 'analysis' in holy writ is by those people said to be 'analysts' _
but they are only imitation 'analysts."'
Khome~mi said during an explana~ion Rf various specializations and degrees
of religious commentary: "An Islamic jurist can only say in regard to
military problems that if America or another pagan country attacks Iran
it would l~e necessary th at in all confines of the Islamic nation that
_ moslems appear to be armed (it is possible there would be no arms). We
would give the enemy leave, come on, so that we could better get at them.
, If there are weapons we would have to defend ourselves and those that are -
killed would merit the title of martyr.
"But in c.Hoice of weapons and method of defense for the good of the people
the iurist is all one with a grocer. A military man or a politician would
want to look into ~his jurist or that problem. The jurist would say that
military men and politicians must not be traitors, is Nasseri a traitor or
not, is Hoveyda a traitor or not. Experts know this. This is not related
to jurists. That the jurist h~mself may knaw still has no relation to the -
interpretation itself. The jurist, based on the laws of God, must choose
_ the most expert people and relfgious people because they can better suffer
for oth~r moslems. If other than this is done, guardianship will fail
and the people rebel. One of the best politicians is picked for political
~ problems. One of the besC social scientists is picked for social problems
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and so forth. The condition for leading this assembly, whicii has in its
hands the governing of the nation, would be a person who would cast aside
any member of. the assembly who turned traitorous and American. This is
another problem that is not difficult. Being American and doing its
treachery is also not for the ~urist but for those experts, specialists
and the millions of others who understand, to ask, is this treason or
not? Tf~?e jurist only says trea~on must not be. Americanism must not
be. If the leader of this assembly would be a person who is a real ~
, leader would it not be better if a condition pertained such as I will _
explain. Would it be better for this person to run the nation or have it
done in the same old intolerant way? Was the shah only removed to have
his place taken by a president? The same prime minister's palace, the
- same mechanism, the same show of operating ministries, the same old cliques
in the midst of the Islamic Repub~ic a~d ruled by every American dollar?
We want a consultative nation and an Islamic jurist whose qualifications _
= God r~as determined to head it. What are American dol?ars? If this jurist :
lies then his stewardship will be taken from him. When his stewardship
. is taken away he will acknowledge his own deviation. We do not want a
jurist othenaise. Another jurist who is not a liar could come to replace
him but if he also lies he too would be put aside. If you do not do this,
then what fundamer_tal difference have you made? Economic rule as before,
military government also as before, all the military as before so that
we are eternally under the shahinshah. Until yesterday the shah's chief
of police held sway, today the chief of police of the Islamic Republic holds
sway. 'Itao other things should be said, one about the guards and the
other about tl-~e committee. Father, p~,;,~le have became sinful recently.
You must make a change.
- "The best specialist from Islamic jur~sts must b e appoint~d. The best
jurist is not for his own appointment bu*_ ::~ould accept it. The jurist
does not put himself in and does not elect himself because he is not an -
_ expert. After appointing experts one of them will emerge as the jurist
~ and will accept it if he ~s the most expert.
And what should we do af terward to determine if this is the best expert
or not? This is also not the concern of the jurist either because we =
must ask experts in all fields. I said this is not the job of the jurist,
- but the jcb of the experts. A jurist says only that the most expert in
political affairs be found, not that he be Hosseyn or Hassan. This is
not the job of the jurist. The jurist is one among the rest of the people -
in that situation and i~ is up ta the exp~rts. They must sit down and
select the best of them and give ~hem leadership in economic, social, edu-
_ cational and military problems and put the entire job in their hands. The
jurist has no right to select anyone else. A good jurist has no right to
select anyone but the best, most expert and responsible people in all
fields. This is better than an Fmerican lackey who is not responsible
- to God. Naw you want to hear the name of the president or the prime min-
ister. This does not matter. It is true that if we keep the same system
that now exists and do not change it, a division of power will emerge. That
- is if we have no assemb ly things will remain as at p resent. But in the _
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same way, the authority of the jurist will emerge and that of the prime
= minister and president will be nullified. Why? Because a jurist cannot -
be chosen except from the purest people. If he is not, his stewardship
_ will be taken away.
"Now the president. If the best people are to be selected ir ;~~n the
way that the jurist has. The jurist did not select himself, the expe:ts ~
selected him. If they also do not choose the best man, '.he most expert
and responsible man, it is the right of the jurist to nullify it. Another
problem is the right of jurist in subjects that the people have not settled.
If I have settled that this subject about which the jurist speaks is an
offense, f or example, Mirzai Shirazi has forbidden tobacco, and I have _
settled that this opir.ion is void, then the jurist has the right to settle
it. The authority of the jurist is in regard to subjects that common
- people and experts have not settled. If the exFarts in the leadership
decide that an opinion of the jurist is not correct then it is the right
of the jurist to decide his awn qualifications in the matter."
Aff airs not Connected to the Jurist -
"Another problem is one that I have already mentioned. For exampley a -
religious authority gives his opinion in the political field regarding
the conditions of a treaty. He has no right to interfere in these matters.
The experts must sit dawn, look into the matter and decide. Recognizing -
obstruction and intrigue and neutralizing them is also in the hands of the
- experts. This again is not the affair of the jurist. A jurist has no
right to amend the right of selection. That is, if a person has n~ore
expertise in a subject, for example, he is the greatest economist, or
another is the greatest in social problems, or anotl~er in military, then
the jurist has no right to select another with less qualifications and
stretch his o~an competence."
Hojjatoleslam Khomeyni said at another point: "W~ must arrange things
so that a president does not get involved. An assemb ly should be created -
to run the country. That assembly will be an Islamic one and a jurist
will be involved so that we can judge its qualificatior~s. Its qualifica-
tions should be directed by the Emam Sadeq. What I mean is that we do not
want to carry the burden of a prime mi.nister and president who are parti-
sans of Prmerica and are not of Islamic principles. Islam says that a -
jurist must accept the most expert in all fields, not select them.
- "After the experts have selected the best in all f ields those that are _
not "Amer~icans," not thieves, are experts, the best, the jurist will
accept them. Should the jurist tell a single lie he must step aside. In
- summary, brothers, do not carry the burden of a president, but come and
talk about the nation. The assembly must rule. Gather an assembly of
- experts to lead, that is the best economist, the best social scientist,
the best politician, the best who know the aducational problems of our -
country, one that knaws military problems, those who do not have America
on their backs. After that we will pick one to lead who will not lie.
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America waats to create the same president, same prime minister, the same
ul.cl ti~rtup in the Tslamic Republic. We cnnnot carry the burden. We chooae
- tlie assembly of experts with an lslamic ~uri3t to lead wlio, I say again,
if he does not have the qualifications that Emam Sadeq ordered, is sin-
- ful and will be put aside. The Assembly of Experts will correct the
deviations of the nation. We must all rise up and say that we do not
want a president or prime minister. We wanr an assemb ly of experts. The
assembly must run the country. This is the .?nly Islamic way of govern-
ment."
Khomeyni th~n described the qualifications of a jurist: "The Emam said -
in one of his speeches that if a scholar does not tell the truth his -
authoriLy will be taken and will be told to leave, just for one lie. Such -
attributes are not possessed by many. N~t many ordinary people have them.
We must look for a man who is not corrupt, one who does not give one's
rights to another, a person who does not play politics, one who has many
good qualities and a sound foundation. We must imitate those that have
no unworthy traits."
Another part of Hojjatoleslam`s press conference will be printed in sub-
sequent issues.
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IRAN
DF.TAILS OF AF~AAN pLOT TO KILZ A�ATOLL4~j SHARI'ATMADARI BARED _
Tehran PCE3~iAN in Persian 16 Oct 79 pp l, 2
~
- ~F.kcerpt,~ The Foreign 1�;inistry, Gendarmerie, and police of the Islamic
Republic informed Ayatollah Shariatmadari about the incident.
3evera3 of the Afghan agents ~aho had come to Iran to carry out tho assasai-
nation plan have been arrested.
Mohammed Taraki drafted, the plot to assassinate Ayatollah Shariatmadari one
mohth ago in h:ab~u]., and his successor Pollowed through with this plot.
Ayatollah Shariatmadari saidt "Martprdom for jnstice and truth is the grea~-
est honor for all Moslems~ a,nd we do not fear this affair."
Those arrested confessed that they had a special assignment f~om the leader~
of the Afghan regime to e.saassinate Ayatollah Shariatmadari.
One of the assa.ssination agents fell into a trap several days ago in Qom.
Ths A.f~han r'oslem people's snpport of Aya.tollah Shariatmadari~s maaifeat,o
was dieclosed to be the motive for the agents o~ that country~s regime~s
' decision to assassinate him.
After the conspiracy was uncovered, strict securitq m~easures were taken to
protect Ayatollah SheriatmadariTs life.
. One of the biggeat conspiracies by a foreign country for Qarr3ring out a
treacherous plot in the world of Tslam~ especiall~ Iran, i.e.~ the assassi-
nation of His ~n3,nence Ayatollah Shariatmad.s~i~ xas uncovered.
Thia conspiracy wa,s planned in the nei hbor `
g ing country of Afghanistan and
. uas planned by its 19aders. The origf~, planner of that conspiracy Was ~
_ Mohananed Taraki, the �irat prasident ~P the Republic of' Afghaxiistan Polloving _
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the establishment of the I~'~ist ragime in that oountry. Last night, KEYHAN
_ correspondents succeeded in obtaining this news P`rom very reliable sourcea, '
and, in t~e contact that was made i~nediately with Ayatollalz Shariatmadari's
, office, this news was confirrned by fiis F~ninence.
His F~ninence Ayatollah Shariatma,dari~s spokesman, who is also ~ne of his close
relatives, reported the details af thia unislamic aud inhumane conspiracy to
REYH9N reporters as follo~rs; "The conapiracy to assassinate His Pininence
Ayatollah Shariatmadari had been planned since about one month ago in Kabul~
- the capital of A�ghanistan~ e,nd, later, it was learned that rfohatmned Tarakiy
a fe~ days before his overt~row and the coming to pouer of Hafizollah Amin~ -
had planned the plot to ~ssassinate His ~ninence Ayatollah Shariatmadari,
and he despatched several Afghan citizens to Iran to carry out his treacherous `
a~ n
_ Apatollah Shariatmadari~s spoke3man added, "Several of ~hose people who had -
been sent to Iran by leaders of the Afghan regime to carry out ~his unislamic
an.d inhumsne assignment uere arrested an the Iran
Afghan border, arid one of
thoae who, bq some means~ had been able to get to Qom along with several of
his cohorts 3n order to carry out his devilish plan at a suitable opporttmity =
was trapped bp secvrity agents a Pew days ago. The man, who had been arrested
_ in Qom, confessed during the preliminary interrogationa that he had ~een
assigned bp the Afghan regi.m~e to assassinate His E~uinence Ayatollah
Shariatmadari."
d;,~atollah Shariatmadari's spokesman continued, "A little while ago, the Foreign
riinistry, the National Police, and the National Gendarmerie o� the Islamic ~
Republic of Iran had been informed abrnzt tho pla.n of this treachero~as
conspiracy by the agents of the Afghan regime; therefore, thep made lyatollah
_ Shariatmadax~i completely su courant. In the report submitted to Ayatollah
Shariatmadari by the Foreign 2~[inistry of the Islamic Republic and the national -
police and gendarmerie, it was stressed that several Afghans who had been
arrested in connection with this matter cori�essed to Iranian agents that they
had a special assignment f~om the leaders of the Af'ghan regime to assassinate
_ His F.~ninence Ayatollsh Shariatmadari."
_ Ayatollah Sh~iatmadari's spokesman also said, "Eber since the question of a
conspiracy to assassinate His IIn3.nence Ayatollah Shariatmadari wa.s reported
to us by the ~'oreign rlinistxy, gendarmerie and police af the Islamic Rspublic,
the necessary precautionary and securit~ measures have been taken to protect
the life of Ayatollah Shariatmadari although the Ayatollah Shariatmadari~
himself, belipved that such a matter should not bring about ar~y kind of change
in his situation and he is even ready for martyrdom for the sake of 3nstice -
and truth and does not fear this matter at a11."
Ayatollah Shariatmadari~s spokesman added~ "The ateps taken by the APghan
rsgime to plan the conspiracy to assassinate His E4ninence the Ayatollah are
not unrelated to the manifestos he has issued and the interviews he has given
9-n support of the people of Afghenistan, especially sinae he has many follo~ere ~
- in the Moslem country of Afghanistan, and he also has representativee in that
_ cotitntry who are engaged in spreadin~ and teaching the holy goals of the true
roligion of Is1am."
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- Contact With Ayatollah Shariatmadari
Considering the importance of the matter, last night, REY~iAN reporters made
contact w3th Aqatollah Shariatmadari himself and asked his opinion regarding
� the cowardly, unislamic, and inhumane conspiracy of the agents oP the Afghe.n
regime. His ~ninence Ayatollah Shariatmada.ri confirmed uhat had bean said
to REYHAN reporters by his spokesmaa, saying, "We completely endorae the
_ atatements of our spokesman on thia matter."
After the 2~[arx.ist regime of Moha~ed Taraki came to power in Afghanistan,
which encountered the strong opposition of the Moslem people of that country
and led to the martyrdom of thousands of them, Ais E~inence Ayatollah
Shariatmadari frequently, by issuing manifestos, condetnnod the slaughter of
the Moslem peaple of Afghanistan and demanded og the leaciers of that country
that they heed the legitim,ate, Islamic, and huma.ne deme.nds of our Moslemn
brothers and sistera in that countryr.
The signifieant point in this matter is that, in spite of the remon~l. of
Nlohamned Taraki in Afgha.nistan and the coming to power of Hafizolla.h Amin,
no change occurred in the basic policp of that coun~try, i.e., the conspiracy
to assassinate His gninence Apatollah Shariatmada.ri had been planned during
the term of power of 2~~ohammed Taraki and, although Tar~.ki was removed and
repo1?tedly killed, the implementation of this plan was not halted and thoae
people who had been assigned to carry out this conspiracy continueu their
work. A reliable report statea that one of those people who had been assigned
to carry out this conspiracy xas arrested a few daya ago in Qom.
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IRAN
TURKISH PAPER ON EVENTS IN ISLAMIC WORLD
NC270959 Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 26 Nov 79 p 5 NC
[Article by Zafer Atay: "Preposterous Happenings"J -
[ExcerptsJ The events in Tehran have proved that a handful of irresponsible, ~
ignorant and undignified people will not hesitate to set the whole world
aflame out of their own personal spite.
No one is obliged to love the United States. t4illions of people hate the -
ousted shah as well. It is even possible to declare war on imperialism.
No one ~aould object to the expression of loue or hatred in street demon-
strations. ~
But detaining people and tying their hands in their own embassy--which,
according to international tradition and rule of law, is considered to be
their own property-~such an act can only be termed "barbaric." It is _
unfortunate that Khomeyni has allowed the Iranians, who possess a
2,500-year-old state tradition and are one of the fundamental guardians
of eastern art and culture, to be branded as "barbarians."
Undoubtedly spying is an offense. Even in the most primitive states a
diplomat accused of spying is deported within 24 hours. But atteinpting
to try a diplomat because he is a spy, and announcing this to the world as _
if you were doing someth3ng clever, pou will soon discover that no one
- supports you. Khomeyni is now in this predicament, Even Syria and Libya,
- known to be the most extreme in the Tslamic world, want the hostages to
be released. When it was suggested during the preparations for the Arab
swmnit in Tunis to support Iran, even 'Arafat--Khomeyni's closest friend--
could not say "yes~" _
The release of the hostages who have been imprisoned within the four walls
of the impressive American Embassy and who are by now in a psychologically
terrible state can resolve the issue.
We still believe that neither Khomeyni nor Carter have lost their common
- sense to the extent of hurling all of mankind into a disastrous war. For _
the place of the warmongering leaders in history~~is the bottom of the
garbage heap. Both Hitler and Mussolini are still remembered with detest. ~
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~
_ I RAN
MILITAR~ MEN MAY RETIRE AFTER 20 YEARS
Tehran KEYHAI~ in Persian 15 Oct 79 p 5
[Text] Sadeq Tabatabai, government spokesman and deputy prime minister,
announced that a new law was under consideration by the Council of ~Sin isters
concerning the armed forces of the Islamic Republic, retirement of per sonnel,
_ compensation for service, hiring of 100 veterinarians, and 117 diplomaed
- veterinary technicians. Also, the law would build houses for the mar tyrs
of the armed forces and revolutionary guards killed in the latest figh ting.
On the basis of a clause in the law about reorganization of the Islami c
Republic's armed forces and retirement and compensation of personnel, the
ministries of defense and interior can, with a view toward reorganizing
the armed forces, gendarmerie and ~olice, study these organizations and
at their discretion can retire officers, technicians, NCOs, workers and
other personnel who have at least 20 years' service. Those with less than
20 years can be given severance pay.
Note 1--In comp;iting retirement pay those resp~nsible for the law will use
in each case 5-year periods without fractions and will add these up ~for
retirement pay ba~ed on total length of service. This will come from the
retirement fund and any amount needed to make the total will be paid into
the budgets of the Ministry of Defense, gendarmerie and police.
Note 2--Those responsible for administering the law will decidP the amount
to be paid in lieu of length-of-service pay. In regard to every leve 1 of _
personnel the amount will be fixed and paid based on prior approval.
Hiring in the Ministry of Agriculture
_ The Provisional Council of Ministers of the Islamic Republic have agreed
to a suggestion by the minister of agriculture and rural affairs that the
ministry be authorized to hire 100 doctors of veterimary medicine and 117
diplomaed technicians in veterinary medicine to meet the needs of the
ministry in rural areas. The hiring contract will take the form of
purchase of personal services of doctors to work in the provinces rath er -
than Tehran and for technicians in rural areas.
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,
Based on a proposal from the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs the
Council of Ministers agreed to provide the necessary funds to plan con-
struction by the Ministry of Housing of a house for the family of every
member of the armed forces and revolutionary guards martyred in the recent
fighting. The houses will have four rooms and cost at most 2 million rials.
Fifty houses will be built in the provinces and given to the families free
- of charge.
The Council of Ministers also accepted the proposal of the Ministry of
Agriculture and Rural Aff airs and the Ministry of Co~erce that the crop
protection agency of the Ministry of Agr.iculture be authorized to permit
importation of 603,847 apple, pear, nectarine and peach tree seedlings for
the cultivation and vegetable companies.
The government spokesman said the Council of Minis*_ers accepted a proposal -
of the Plan and Budget Organization that 2.6 billion rials be paid to the
organization to make up the balance of the dccount to compensate for hard- -
ship service in the armed forces and guarantee special expenses of opera-
tional units in the account of the organization so that hardship pay for
the armed forces can be made in the current year.
9448 -
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5~
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~
A ~ ,
^ . � ~ .
IRAQ
- PRESIDENT HUSAYN, ~ARAFAT DISCUSS ARAB SIT[JATION, IRAQI AID
London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 9 Nov 79 p 22
_ [Article: "Saddam Husayn Promjses Abu-'Ammar to Improve Relations with
Syria"]
[TextJ Yasir 'Arafat's latest visit to Iraq was not an ordinary vis~t but
a prominent one. The Palestinian-Iraqi relations were conservative pre-
viously but are now harmonious. This is largely due to the flexibility
demonstrated by Iraqi President Saddam Husayn and to the psychological
enthusiasm displayed by the PLC chairman. Previously, Abu-'Ammar opened
his mind to the Iraqi leadership. But this time he has opened his heart to
the Iraqi $resident and has touched a sensitive vein in him, thus opening
the doors wide for f irm relations between the two sides and the two men.
After assuming power last July, President Saddam Husayn invited Yasir 'Arafat
. to visit Iraq. At the end of last month, Abu-'Ammar ['Arafat's aliasj
responded to the invitation and found the Iraqi President very friendly,
having poszponed some important official meetings,not having let his guest -
go through preliminary meetings and having received him on the same evening
of his arrival. They held a meeting which lasted from 2000 until 0400 after
midnight.
At the outset of the meeting, 'Arafat reviewed that "political penetration
operation" which he had conducted in a number ~f West European countries,
including Austria, Spain and Turkey, and which constituted a guerrilla-type
siege of a number of Europe's cities and parts of its rural areas. But it -
was a political siege this time. 'Arafat also reviewed the PLO movement in
the United States in the wake of the resignation of Andrew Young, the former
U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, and of the outcome of the visit of
_ Jessie Jackson, the bla~ck U.S. leader, to the area. In this regard, 'Arafat
said that the last President 'Abd-al-Nasir had tried to win *_he support of
the U.S. blacks. 'Arafat also expressed the belief that the official U.S.
position toward the [Palestinian] issue remains unchanged.
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On his part, President Saddam Husayn reviewed Iraq's movements in Africa
and Latin America in the wake of the Havana nonalignment conference held
last month and in the light of their b ilateral meeta_ng during that conf erence--
a meeting in which Abu-'Ammar urged Abu-'Adi [Husayn] to reward the African
and Latin American countries which supported the Palestinian and Arab cause
_ during the conference. The Iraqi President said that in the wake of the
conference, Baghdad sent messages and invitations to the heads of state in
the two continents and that an economic delegation led by Hikmat Ibrahim, _
the Revolution Command Council member, toured the East African countries, _
- concluding a number of economic agreements and advancing aid to Mozamb ique,
~ Malagasi [sic], Tanzania and Zambia. The delegation concluded with these
countries loans at a symbolic interest rate of two percent, agreements to -
implement a number of projects which entail providing Iraqi technicians and
trade exchange agreements. The Iraqi President said that his country will
continue to advance such aid to the third world countries that support the
Palestinian and Arab cause, adding that his country has also advanced aid
to the world's national liberation movements.
'Arafat expressed his satisfaction with this Iraqi role and noted that his
visit coincided with the visit of the Jam2.ican prime minister.
The two sides expiessed the hope that the other Arab oil producing countries _
will perform a role similar to Iraq's in this regard. _
~ The two delegations, which included Na'im Haddad on the Iraqi side and
'Abd-al-Rahim Ahmad, the secretary general of the ALF [Arab Liberation Front],
- and Muhammad Abu-Mayzar, the official in charge of Fatah's foreign relations
department, [on the Palestinian side], then discussed the two following main =
questions: What do we want from Europe and how do we employ our capab ilities
' to wrench ~etter positions from it in the interest of our cause?
Here, Europe's position and stance were reviewed. It was noticed that the
West European countries are trying to achieve a formula that reduces :.he
damage they have incurred as a result of their support for the Camp David
accords and tv serve their interests in the Arab countries by recognizing
the PLO. ~he degree to which the position of these countries is distinctive
from that of the United States was also discussed.
Speaking on the issue, the Iraqi President supported the Palestinian move-
ment in West ~urope and underlined Iraq's readiness to employ its political
_ and oil capabilities to support the organization in getting the recognition
of the Western European states. He said that Baghdad is exerting its efforts
to bolster the Palestinian movement in France at present, as it has exerted
similar efforts in Spain in the recent past. He expressed the hope that in
return, the organization will f amiliarize Iraq step by step with its move- _
ment in the "old world."
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Even though ~addam Husayn supported the efforts to push the Western European
- states toward positions more distinctly different irom their convenrional
_ ones, he did not attach hopes in this regard to regaining the Palestinian
rights. He ~onsidered the Palestinian movement in this sphere a part of the
- movement required of the Palestinian action and required for keeping the
PLO under the spotlights. -
In this regard, the Iraqi President embarked on an jmportant step by agreeing
- to the Palestinian leader's request to supply Spain with an oil ship~:ent
valued at 18 million dollars, provided that Baghdad notify Madrid that the
deal was approved in return for Madrid's position vis-a-vis recognition of
the PLO. The Iraqi President also approved a request by 'Arafat to supply
an oil shipment valued at nearly 10 million dollars to Mozambique and smaller
_ shipments to other African countries. The importance of this development
lies in underlining the Palestinian issue's connection with oil, something
to k�hich 'Arafat refers when he po ints out that all the initials of the
liberation organizati~n, namely P.L.O., are found in the Latin word petroleum
[prin ted Petroluim in the Arabic text) (oil). ~
The issue of southern L~banon was also on the agenda and the two sides
agreed on the need to avoid division between the Lebanese and Palestinian
Arabs on this issue so that it may not turn into a loophole for penetration
by the two Camp David accords. Th ey also agreed that this issue should be
~ discussed by the next Arab summit in Tunis as part of the Arab situation
generally and of the comprehensive situation in the area and that no pre- -
texts ~hould be provided for this issue to move within other frameworks.
The two sides discussed the call for the convocation of an Arab summit in -
Tunis on the 20th of this month. They noted that 6 days separate the con- _
ference of the ministers of foreign affairs from the Arab kings and presidents
= conference and expressed the fear that this time difference may torpedo the
summit conference if so~ forces fail to include what they want in the
conf erence agenda.
- The two sides stressed the importance c~f entrenching the Baghdad ~ummit
resolutions which were adopted a year ago and the importance of.vigilance
in the face of attempts that may b e made by some Arab states to abandon the ~
minimal limit for the Arab position [set by the Baghdad summit]. It was
decided that the two sides will f ormulate a joint visualization to prevent
backing down on the Baghdad summit resolutions and to encourage the Arab
states to rally behind the basis on which it [the minimal limit] was
established. It was therefore decided that the two sides will. exert efforts
- in the Arab states before convocation of the coming summit to prepare the
climate for this summit to secure its success and to guarantee preservation
of the Palestinian resistance and of its freedom of action. Contrary to the
expecrations of some media circles, the Iraqi President affirmed that he is
ready to attend the meetings of the forthcoming Arab summit conference.
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'Arafat called for the preservation of distinctive relations between Iraq
and Syria and said that the deterioration of their relations will lead to
- th~ collapse of the Arab situation. Saddam Husayn replied that Iraq will
take no step toward negative intensification vis~a-vis Syria and that it
will exert efforts to keep the relationship between the two countries under =
control out of appreciation for the general Arab situation. He said that
the Iraqi-Syrian coordination was fruitful in the Havana conference and that
he is ready to establish coordination with the Syrian leadership on matters
that the PLO deems fit. He said that the cooler the issue of ~the latest
plot in Iraq becomes, the more opportune the time becomes for improving and -
developing the relations with Syria. _
~n the other hand, 'Arafat hinted critically at the firm relations between
Iraq and Jordan. Even though he supported the Iraqi aid for the Jordanian -
army, he requested that this aid be employed to serve the PLO's demands
from the Jordanian authorities.
Insofar as aid is concerned, the Traqi President agreed to supply a new _
weapon shipment to the PLO, to receive Palestinian militarists for training
in Iraq and to provide additional aid to Fatah on top of the 5 million.
dollars that Hayil 'Abd-al-Hamid, the member of Fatah Central Committee,
received during his latest visit to Baghdad last month in the wake of two
messages exchanged by the Iraqi President and the Palestinian leader. The
Iraqi President also said that Baghdad is prepared to meet all of 'Arafat's
- military and financial aid requests without any conditions or restrictions =
as long as the organization maintains its national and pan-Arab strategy.
rhis Iraqi position pleased Abu-'Ammar who recently said in a moment of
serer~ity: The Palestinian revolution needs the compailsion of the Arab states
before their financial and military aid.
i
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~ ~
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i
. j. ~
ISRAEL
= ARABS URGID TO USE EXPERTS TO INFLUENCE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Jersalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 6 Nov ~9 p 1
- [EditoriaZ: "We and U.S. Elections"]
- [Tex*] The message of support and commitment to backing Israel and its
= demands serit by Senator Edward Kennedy to Menahem Begin, the Israeli Prime -
Mi~ister, is nothing new in the U.S. elections. This tias rather become a
_ tradition followed by those aspiring for ttie presidenc~, as if the way to
the White House passes first bq the Israeli prime minister`s office. -
- Even thougH several U.S. presidents got to the White House despite the
= Jewish opposition to their election, the strong gos~tion enjoyed by the
Zionist organizations in the United States makes e~~ery presidential candidate
- avoid confronting those organizations. Any candidate who cann~t benefit -
from the backing of these organizations ~sti11 wins something by not having ~
the~ oppase him) at least. In botY~. cases, the candidate feels that he has
to take the Jewish influence into consideration. !
The Jewish organizations, which control the information centers and which
influence the nomination and the elections for the gresidsncy, are aware of
their role and exploit it to the maximwn. They 5pare no means to reach their
- goals, beg3nning with personal messages anc3 parties and ending with digging =
_ up the paGt history of any- candidate and trying to destroy a candidate [that
they do not like] with the inf~rmation power that they posses and with *_he -
psychological war that they launch "coast to coast," i.e. throug~out the =
- United States. =
What is new in the U.S. election campaign is that a seeker of the presidency,
= such as Senator John Connolly, declares at the outset of his campaign a �
comprehensive plan to settle the Arab-Isra.eli conflict in which he calls for -
= Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories, thus opposing and even
chailenging the Israeli and Jewish positions. Connolly may have *.o pay dea~Zy d_
for this daring. However, this daring indicates that tha U.S. public opinion -
- has begun to change and has become more prepared to understand the hrab
_ positions.
~ 61 -
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So what have we done to exploit the situation and to employ our capabilities
and resources in the U.S. election campaign in order to serve our interests
and rights and to aupport those who support our causes, such as Senator
Connolly?
- The U.S. election campaign is at its beginning and our capabilities to
_ exert influence are large. The only thing we lack is to form a team of
"experts and specialists" to perform the Arab role in these elections. Let
us try to imagine how positive the results will be if the Saudi oil enters
the U.S. campaign with the intelligence and finesse of the experts and the
specialists. Oil is only one of the Arab aspects of influence. We wonder,
will we be conte~:t with the role ~f spectator, as we have been so far?
- 8494 -
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~
62
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ISRAEL
UPROAR OVER AL-SHAK'.AH ~TATEMENTS SAID INTENTIONALLY FABRICATID -
Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arab3c 8 Nov 79 p 1 -
[Editorial: "Fabricated Uproar")
[Text] The endeavor of some Tsraeli radicals to distort and to twist a
stateffi~nt attributed to Bassam al-Shak'ah, the mayor of Nabulus, and to
= ex p~c; t:~t~is statement to incite agains~t al-Shak' ah and to dema*~d his
deportatian or trial is something that makes us say that such action is
unacceptable, especially that it emanates f.rom those who are filling the
occupied territories with provocations, law violations and aggressions with
words, deeds and intentions against the Arab rights and the Arab citizens.
The issue is a general issue of principle that affects every citiaen in the
occupied rerritories and that reflects one aspect of the ceaseless radical
Israeli campaign against the citizens. The concerned statement attributed
to al-Shak'ah was not made secretly or stealthily. A1-Shak'ah addressed
it to the Israeli militarists and to Dani Matt, *he coordinatar of the
occupied territories affairs who is the highest military official in the
Bank and the Strip. -
Therefore, the distortion, twisti::g, exaggeration and omission made regarding
the statement and the attempt to exploit this statement do not really
reflect a r~eaction to the statement as much as they reflect radical provocative
intentioris that have been hidden in the hearts of those who have created this
uproar and who have found in the distorted statements an outlet to express
their hatred ~~nd their intentions.
The inhabitants of the occupied territories have suffered for long years and
continue to suffer from the provocations of the Israeli radicals who legalize
_ confiscating Arab lands and settling in them, who consider the owners of
these lands strangers in their own humeland and who proceed to the Arab
cities, especially Nabulus, demanding that the Arab citizens be denied
theiL rights, deprived of L�heir prope~ti ~s and deported. ~
03 =
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~ We have not heard throughout these long years anybody demanding that these
radicals be deterred or tried. The sole "hobby" of these radicals has
become that of harassing the Arab citizens and of fabricating incidents
- to gain their ends. Therefore, the fabricated uproar concerning al-Shak'ah's
statements must be brought to an end quickly because al-Shak'ah is first
and foremost a citizen in his own land and country and nobody is entitled
to threaten his right or to tr~ to undermine this right. _
8494
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ISRAEL -
SALFIT MAYOR VISITS AMMAN
Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 31 Oct 79 p 2 �
- [Article: "Salfit Mayor Returns After Talks in Amman"J
[Text] Salfit--Hasan al-Zir, the town mayor, returned here yesterday from
Amman after a several-day visit during which he held talks with the :lordanian
_ officials on aiding the development of Salfit.
The [development] pro3ects inclu~e the electricity and water project, the
construction of a water reservoir with a capacity of 500 cubic meters,
building additional classroom~, asphalt~ng ehe roads opened recently, dis-
carding the old cEmetery and buildin~g a new one, beginning implementation of -
the public sewers project and building housing units for civil servants with -
a limited income.
These pro~ects will be studied in the light of the presented plans.
- The Jordanian government has decided to disburse 29,000 dinars to supply
' the village of Farkhah with electric power from the Salfit Electricity Pro3ect.
This sum is designated to cover the expenses of extending the high-tension
- powerline and of installing the transformers. The Jordanian g~vernment has
also decided to disburse 13,000 dinars to pave the road leading from the .
village of Qays to Salfit.
8494
CSO: 4802
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ISRAEL
= EDITORIAL BELIEVES ENDING OCCUPATION WILL END COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 5 Nov 79 p 1 _
[Editorial: "Economic Bankruptcy and Real Solution"]
[Text] When Simha Ehrlich, the Israeli minister of finance, assumed his post,
he promised the Israelis to improve the economic situation and to wipe out
inflation. He criticized the economic policy of the previous government,
promising good to all. In his time, he tried to float the [Israeli~ pound
which was in the phase of (progressive) devaluation, thus sinking it. The _
current value of the pound is equal to 10 Jordanian fils. Inflation inten-
sif ied and its indicator rose madly. The inflation rate exceeded 100 percent
and the interval separating one inflationary leap from another did not exceed
a few hours at times. Abnormal economic chaos dominated the markets and
further escalated the hardships of the middle and poor classes.
- Horow~tz, Ehrlich's successor, has come reluctantly. He has before him a
- legacy filled with problems. He has also made it a condition that painful
austerity be imposed to deal with the economic catastrophe. He has had
what he wants and he has indirectly declared the government's bankruptcy, -
acknowledging that this government does not have what the Israeli people
are asking it for, that a.ll it possesses is several billion banknotes pro- .
duced by the mints and that these notes have lost their value. He has also
underlined his resolution to reduce government spending and min~sterial
budgets, to get rid of large numbers of civil servants and to levy more
taxes. '?'he new minister of finance beiieves that these measures will con-
tribute toward improving the economic situation. But in fact, the measures
are no more than an artificial breather that will not help the Israeli
- economy to get rid of its stifling crisis because the causes that have led
to tr.is crisis are still extant. Military spending consumes most of the -
production and of the foreign aid given to Israel. Moreover, Horowitz' -
measures will multiple the number of domestic problems. Strikes will escalate
and spread at a larger scale as soon as the decision not to raise the wages
- is implemented and this will lead to a tense confrontation between the
go~,~ernment, led by the Likud, and the His~adrut which supports the Labor
Party. Abolition of the system of subsidizing the essential commodities
JJ
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~ will enrage the poor class. Raising the taxes, especially the added value
ta.c, will turn the stagnation in the market into total paralysis and, who
knows, the ailing economy may perhaps die on the hands of the new "surgeon." -
As for us the inhabitants of the occupied territories, our hardships and _
suffering will double. Our economy is tied, despite our will, and doomed
- to full subservience to Israel's economy and we have been forced to endure
this situation, its consequences and its ramifications.
- The U.S. Department of State has told Israel frankly that the only solution
to all its problems lies in ending its mill.tary occupation of all the Arab
territories. A spokesman of the Department of State in Washington has
expressed his dissatisfaction with the U.S. participation in shouldering
the burden of the enormous military spending in Israel. Will they understand
this fact in Israel and do they know what "fed up" means and what it entails?
8494
CSO: 4802
r
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- KUWAIT
~
'tiI,-TALI'AH' DEPLORES IRANIAN-ARAB MISUNDERSTANDING
Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic 10 Oct 79 p 3
[Editorial: "What should Relations with Iran Be Like?"]
[Text] An important and worthwhile observation is that the Iranian revolu- "
tion, while building to its climax and later defeating the shah, created a
_ cheerful and relaxed atmosphere among the people or the Gulf region, and
their hearts were for the Iranian people's revolution against the oldest
pro-American regime in the region.
= This cheerfulness was based on the new Iranian political trend, anticipated
by everybody, in Iran's relations with both the Arabs and the wcrld in
' general; a trend that would erase the picture of the shah, the protector of _
American interests, the cause of racial conflicts and the most enthusiastic
pro-Israel petroleum producer, and replace it with the picture of the
Iranian revolution, whose policy is based on serving the peoples' interests,
especially in thE Gulf region, where Iranian-Arab reltioans were characterized
= by antagonism because of the shah's greed.
However, after the defeat of the shah of Iran some anti-Arab declarations
were made in Iran, especially by Ruhani, declarations that reiterated the
Shah government's views. These declarations and their repercussions
created a psychologically disturbed atmosphere that overwhelmed our region
until recently. Iran's unclear official stand, dubious ~iews agency reports,
and several antirevolution and anti-Gulf people and elements helped
_ aggravate this disturbed situation.
The situation thus required a firm reply and clear stands in the face of
this media and official muddle. The tour of *_he deputy prime minister of
Iran helped get things back to normal. The mysterious and uneasy
atmosphere of the [Iranian] declarations was beginning to clear.
~ When the prime minister of Iran, Engineer Mahdi Bazarghan, gave assurances
that Iran had no interest in lands of its neighbors, he also said that -
there was a conspiracy aimed at causing disputes between Iran and these -
countries.
-
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- At the same time, Mr 'Abdul-AZiz Husayn, minister of state for cabinet
affairs in Kuwait, praised the Iranina Government and denied the existence
of any problems between Kuwait and Iran.
It could then be deduced from this Iranian gesture to remove the animosity
fabricated by unofficial declarations and some convulsive repercussiona
that the for.eign policy clari.fications of all s~des and continuous
communications at all levels are a positive and required step in a sensitive
region such as ours. -
It is also necessary, however, that Iranian-Arab relations, both at the
Gulf level and at the level of the entire Arab region, should be taken
very sPriously by the Iranian Government.
9455
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KUWAI'!'
-
_ KUWAIT OFFERS PROP06AIS TO ~ND GUL~k' FINANCIAL CRISIS
Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 18 Nov 79 P 37
[Article by J. D.s "Money Ma.rket Chaos Threatens Economic Unity"~ ~
~Text] In the past fex weeks there ha.s been an important change in the policy
of financial cooperation among Gulf states, xhich started with a Kuwaiti fin-
ancial crisis xhen fluidity in the banks dried up and the state intervened~
through the Central Bank~ to finance them. The c~atter ended xith KuWaiti pro-
posals calling on the Gulf states to put a limit to the chaos in the Gulf money
markets.
For the first time, it has become impossible for any state to continue a policy
of economic liberalism without there being a aingle governmental supervisor~
agency for all the Gulf countries~ regulating their money marketa.
The crlsis began xith the flight of large a~nounts af money abroad~ to the am-
ount of 500 million Kuxaiti dinars over a period of 6 months. It is said that .
this figure was much less than thQ actnal volume of fugitive moneyi during the
past 3 months, such money has amounte~l to between 500 and 700 million dina.rs. -
The money sm+~ggling has taken tHO forms. In the first one, txo Kuxaitis proceed
to take out a short-term loan in dinars and then convert it into dollars~ en-
_ couraged to do so by the difference in interest rates between the dinar and the
dollar. i~hile the interest rate for tha dina.r has remained at 8.5 percent, the
interest rate for the dollar has risen continually t o 14 percent.
_ The second form is for Gulf companies to circulate shares in the secondary
- Kuxaiti money market--a. market which is outside the government control xhich
is ordinarily applied to the stock exchange, and xhicYi absorbs the greater part
of Kuxaiti investments. These exchange operations xere aimed at withdrawing -
- the Kuxa.iti dinar and converting it into dollars, for the purpose of inve$ting
them in short-term deposits. _
_ -Kuwaiti officials h~ve eatimated the nwnber of Kuwaiti shaxeholders in Gulf
companies to be 80~000 a figure r?hich far surpassea the number of shareholders
in local companies~ xhich indicates the increasing seriowsness of the volume
of money smuggled out for the purpose of apeculation.
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The first result of this situa.tion is the dxindling of fluidit;~~ xhich has =
f orced the Central Bank to step in to finance commercial banks.
The second reault is the xeakening of dealings in Kuxaiti bonds valued in di-
na,rs~ the value of such bonds~ in 18 denominations, is no more than 154 million -
KuWaiti dinars.
Th~ third result is that the drop in fluidity has led to ma~or changes in in-
_ terest rates. While they rose 50 percent ~n January~ after txo months they
dropped, wi~h respect to th~mselves~ and the rate stabilized at 8 percent.
This made bands v.alued in dinars unprofitable for subscribers~ Kho preferred
to invest their money by converting it to dollars, the interest rate for xhich -
has risen ragidl~r.
Here the psychological element has played its p~rt in the Kuxaitis' conversion
of their money into dollars, for they are convinced that the Kuxaiti govern-
- ment xill not act to raise the dinar's interest rate.
But the situation has begun to decline~ and the Kuxaiti government has been
forced to prohibit the circulation of Gulf compaqy shares on the Kuxaiti stock
exchange and in the secondary money market.
- Government measures have not stopped here, but are affecting Kuxait's financial
position, and are causing a loss in its Gulf and internatinnal importance.
Tlrerefore, Kuwait has gone to other Gulf countries and asked them to take unan-
imows measures~ including the establishment of a Gulf common money market. Ac- .
cording to the statements of its officials ~ Kuxait is not opposed in principle
- to the Gulf peoples' exchanging Gulf company shares~ but has st~.pulated tha,t
this be done xithin the franleWOrk of a general agreement among the states con- -
- c~rned.
Kurrait is proposing tha principal of reciprocity~ along ?rith maintaining gov~
ernment methods currently in effect in all the countries rrith respect to oxn-
ership~ and xhich pertain to membership in corporate boards. Also, Kuwait has
propo~ed that the shareholders retain the right to convert their capital and
profits into any currency they chooae and invest them in any country they xish.
Ku~rait has requested that a limit be put to the excesses of ~che Gulf companies~
' b~~ applying the principle of registering Kurraiti and Gulf companies on the
stock exchange if 3 years have passed since their establishment and if they
were established 3y decree of the head af state, and that their registre.tion
be in accorda.nce With the laRS and regulations, and that the reaeons for their
establishment be made clear.
In addition~ so that the companies may be permitted to deal on the stock ex-
change, their capital must be at least 50 million Kuxaiti dina.rs~ and their
~ profits must exceed 5 percen+~. The fina.l nex condition is that the main hea.d-
quartera of the company be in a Gulf country~ and tha.t they have a branch in ~
Kuioait license3 by the foreign ministers~ ~o that they can be accredited by
the securities commission.
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~ I
' After these prc~osals were acknoxledged, and Gulf compa.r~y shares ~ere prohib-
ited from circulating in the Kuxaiti money markets~ a delegation from the com-
panies rra.s formed xhich requested the Kuwait~. minister of coaunerce and industry
to explain the closing of their offices; these companies were not licensed to
perform Gulf share conversion operations, After consultation, these companiea
decided to adhere to the nex measures.
Practically speaking~ there ia a strong fear that these measures Will have neg-
_ ative repercwssions on economic unit;~ among the Gulf states. They ~ri;l doubt-
less delay the establishment of the Culf common market.
So far the other Gulf countri6?~ have not responded to the Kuwaiti memorandum
containing the proposals.
This in itself indicates that there is no loss of ha,rmony on the Gulf level. -
~ Appa.rently the competition among Gulf money markets is the onl,y lax regulating
dealtngs among them.
$559
~50: 48GQ
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_ KUWAIT
EDITORIAL COt'IMENTS ON EGYPTIAN ARMY LEADERSHIP
Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 10 Oct 79 p 1
[Editorial by Fu'ad Matar: "The Trial of the Egyptian Army") _
[Text] Had President Anwar Sadat allowed the broadcasting and publication
in Egypt of Sa'd al-Din al-Shadhili's speeches, the situation [in Egypt]
would have been different from what it is now. President Sadat withheld -
from the 1'gyptians their right to read what their chief of general staff,
who achieved glittering victories during the October 1973 war, had to say.
- In addition to this, ~he president decided to hold a trial of al-Shadhili
in absentia, accusing him of disclc,sing secrets, and it all seemed as
though President Sadat was dealing with a normal matter.
- it is certain that President Sadat would not have held al-Shadhili's trial
in absentia had al-Shadhili's declarations and writings not influenced
public opinion in Egypt. These declaration and writings, reaching Egypt
via radio stations and through word of mouth, were beginning to affect
both military and civilian groups in Egypt. Faced with this, President
Sadat liad to either disprove al-Shadhili's arguments, a thing he was
unable to do because there was an operations room observing and recordings
confirming, as well as general staff surviving whose military honor would
allowthem to say nothing but the truth; or he had to divert attention -
[fron al-Shadhili's words]. He diverted attention by announcing that
al-Shadhili's trial would be held in absentia, and tee sought that through
legal authority and not rightfully and logically.
A question arises: Had al-Shadhili already said what he said before
President Sadat`s treaty with Israel, or did that occur after the treaty?
A1-Shadhili exercised control to the last moment. It is certain that he
would not have written and made such statements had President Sadat not
proceeded with his plan to sign a treaty with Israel. He preferred to keep
quiet after President Sadat sent hims away on the grounds that Egypt's -
battle was not over and that it was his duty to accept any measures.
At the same time, he was preparing all Egyptian officers who visited -
- London while he was ambassador there. This was one of the reasons he was
~ assigned as ambassador to Lisbon, since there was no reason for Egyptian
officers to visit that area except for medical treatment ahd special
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assignments. His preparation of the army officers in the direction of ~
Egyp~'s military honor was the solution for maintaining the army's morale
and protecting Egypt's Arab and international roles.
After President Sadat signed the treaty with Israel, it was natural for
al-Shadhili to bring out certain facts, the most irnportant of which was
that President Sadat had forbidden Egyptian forces from attacking Is~aeli
fortifications and Ras al-Harbah, which ~~as erected by the Israelis west
of the Suez Canal during the October War, "and thus he spared the Iraelis
a definite defeat". _
- The above incident, which President Sadat cannot deny because his orders
are registered and known by several persons, is becoming a growing burden
to the Egyptian officers and a subject of discussion for a broad part of
the public sector.
The burden and the discussion will not be eased by President Sadat's
trial of al-Shadhili in absentia. _
One more word remains to be said: A1-Shadhili's trial is, in fact, a
- trial ot the Egyptian army that achieved great victories during the 1973
October War. But these victories were directed toward a treaty that would
never be really implemented in the area.
9455
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- KUWAIT -
PROPERTY ALLOGATIONS EXPA.~IDED FOR 1979 -
~ Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 10 Sep 79 p 3 -
~ [Article: "Property Allacaticns Raised to 73 Million D?nars, Covering
164 Trans actions in al-Salimiyah, Khaytan and al-Firwaniyah"] _
[Text] The Expropriation Conmittee in the municipality of Kuwait held its
meeting under the chairmanship of *Rayor 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-'Adsani, with the
director of the Expropristion Administration, Turki al-'Ali, present. At
this mee ting the committee discussed distributing the new acquisi~tion budget
among the various areas of the country and set a group of new conditions .
for expropriation in three particular areas. -
_
^fter the end of the meeting, Turki al-'Ali announced that he had agreed ~
~u the phases in which the sums allocated for expropriation wi11 be distrib- -
Lted. The formulas for expropriation and payment of the necessary sums
- will be determined on the principle of sequence. Also, several conditions -
for this approval w~re set for three areas only: al-Salimiyah, al-rirwaniyah
and Khay can. The most importance of these conditions is that the acreage =
of expropriated real estate is not to exceed 2,500 square meters. The
- Expropri ation Committee must approve if this acreage is exceeded slightly,
by no mo re than 100 square meters; that is, the sr~a of the entire piece
of prope rty may not exceed 2,600 square meters.
Turki al-'Ali added: "The sec:ond important condition is that the appraisal
- operation is not conducted more than once for one gerson or one organization
~ in these three areas. The reason is that the committee wili try this time
- to cover the greatest possible number of forms of expropriation originating
- in al-Salimiyah, al-Firwaniyah and Khaytan by appraising small properties
only. Thus, a persoa will obtain ari appraisal of only one property, and
. this time the apprai~al operation will include as many citizens as possible."
Turki al-'Ali added: "We have set aside about 30 millio:~ dinars for the
al-Salimiyah region to cover its allotment of expr.opriations. Al-Firwaniyah's
share is about 5 mill~on dinars, and nhaytan has about 8 million."
- He added: "The rest of the money in the expropriation budget is distributed
- as follows: al-Balaj No 7 and al-Balaj No 8, which contain 9 pieces of
real e:;tate, for which the sum of about 9.25 million dinars has been set aside.
~ 75 -
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,
"A group of developed properties of which the state had taken possession
without is~uing expropriati_on forms. The sum of 9.?5 milliou dinars has
- been ailocated.
"A group of expropriated properties from the budget of Lhe Public Housing
Authority located in two areas: fir~t, the suburb of Sabah al-Sa1im
(al-Masilah), and second, part of a property within the city. About -
5.5 million dinars have been allocated for these p roperties. .
- "A group from the organizational sectors distributed through four areas: _
al-Manqif, the Seventh Commercial District, al-Jabariyah and Khaytan.
~ 'rhere are 26b properties in thfs group, for which about 5.25 million dinars
have been allocated." -
The director of the Expropriations Administration said: "Thus, the sums
- allocated for the expropriations budget this year amount to about 73 million
dinars. It should be n.oted that it had been decided to spend only 45 mil-
~ lion dinars in this field. The increase occurred in order to have the
- expropriations this year include the greatest possible number of citizens. -
The number of expri.priaticn transactions which will be inclu~ied in the
appraisal of real estate in the three areas we mentioned are as follows:
- 84 in al-Salimiyah, 45 in Khaytan and 35 in al-Firwaniyah."
He added: "The Appraisal Committee will meet late r after the Expropriztions -
A3ministration has made the necessary adjustments in the names of the owners
of the expropriated properties, because it will trace certificates of
' ownerahip for all of these properties until it reaches the final document
and the financial owner for each property, in coc~peration with the Land -
Registry Administration."
- 75~37
~ CSO: 4502
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KUWAIT
PRIVATE SECTOR NECESSARY TO PETROCHEMICAL PROCESS
, ~
_ Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 30 Sep 79 p 15
[Article: "Two Stages in Petrochemical Industry Require Private Sector
- Participation"]
- [Text] The assistant under secretary for industrial affairs of the -
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Mu'ayyid al-Rashid, told AL-QABAS
~ yesterday that the intermediate and final stage of the petrochemical _
industry must let the private sector invest in it.
In an inte rview with AL-QABAS, al-Rashid stressed that a policy must be
established calling for lowering the price of fuel granted to the industries,
so that we may obtain the required balance between the negative factors =
surrounding Kuwaiti industry, such as the labor shortage and the hi~h cost
of importing technology, and the positive factors.
New Ideas
A1-Ra~hid discussed new trends in Kuwaiti industry and said that we are _
- willing to enter new industrial sectors, such as the plastics industry, _
_ which is growing in many semi-industrial states. We are considering
supporting the trend toward manufacturing a number of products which can
' replace some imports, in addition to encouraging the trend toward unconven-
- tional products, such as the plastics and PVC industries, by importing the
, raw materials from abroad, either in the form of sheets or plastics,
- provided that we produce them according to our local needs.
A1-Rashid revealed that thought is being given to building a plant to
produce a specific quantity of PVC in keeping with our economy an~i the
needs of the country for semirnanufactured materials. He said that this
project will be implemented in the future. -
Development of Industries
Al-Rashid said that we are also studying the development of so~ue industries
to produce some traditional products which do not require a great deal of
extradordinary experience and technology. These industries include the _
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manufacture of water meters, which is under development, the manufacture
of locks for doors, and development of the fiberglass industry to manufacture -
the large industrial lockers which Kuwaiti industry requires.
Support of Industrial Exports
A1-Rashid q~entioned that capital directed toward industry has recorded an
increase in the past few years; this has caused us to form a co�,~ittee to
_ support industrial exports of Kuwaiti origin. The Ministry of C~mmerce is ~
now studying trends of capital and the role of local banks in strengthening it.
Industrial Bank
He said th~t during the past 5 years the industrial bank has loaned 100 mil-
lion Kuwaiti dinars for industrial projects, in addition to 300 million
dinars in capital burden which the holders of this capital invested. _
- Labor
A1-Rashid discussed the subject of labor. He said that the percentage of
Kuwaiti labor in the public sector ranges from 30 to 50 percent. In the
petrochemical sector it is about 30 percent. We have submitted our proposals
concerning the labor required in Kuwaiti industry until the year 2000 as
part of th� complete report which was submitted to the Council of Ministers.
He expressed his belief that Kuwaiti labor will fill the administrative, `
technical and semitechaical positions in industrial projects, provided that
imported l~bor fills the remaining positions. The minimum for Kuwaiti
- labor in the year 2000 i~ expected to be 25 percent.
Proposals
_ The assistant under secretary of the Ministry of Commerce reviewed the
report submitted to the Council of Ministers, which includes specific
proposals concerning the fields of industry available to the private,
common and public sectors. He said that we have defined the industries
which suit each group. _
In this regard, he mentioned that the state will take over strategic ~
J industries, such as the extraction and refining of ~etroleum and the manufac-
- ture of petroleum products, but there are fields which the private sector
. can enter, such as the manufacture ~f the plastic products and intermediate
products, and other similar products which the state must leave to the
private sector.
- Common Projects
, A1-Rashid confirmed the importance of the private sector in setting up
common projects on the Gul� level. He mentioned that there is an advanced -
project which is being implemented on the Gulf leve., the "Darfilah
78 =
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Aluminum" project to manufacture aluminum sheets. These sheets will be
used for ro~fs, for doors, to cover offices, and in the furniture industry.
A1-Rashid said that the Gulf Organization for Industrial Investment ir~
- which all of the Arab Gulf states are participating has studied the p;-oject.
The organization's council approved the pro~ect last May. In accor.dance
' with that, we call.ed upon the Kuwaiti private sector to participate in
_ this project, and we found it ready and willing.
Development of Apparatus and Difficulties of Implementation
Al-Rashif discussed the difficulties of implementing projects and said -
that they concern investors, since most of them are not familiar with
industry, i?z addition to the problem of a shortage of technicians and
. industrial administrators. All of these factors play a role in delaying
. implementation of the projects.
He added that local experience is limited, and apparatus concerned with
indsutry requires development. He said that he has submitted proposals
to develop apparatus on a strategic level in stages. He confirmed that
development of the apparatus alone will not solve the problem, and industry
will remain in need of some foreign expertise. -
7587
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KUWAIT
BRIEFS
DEPORTATION COMMENT--A responsible official source assured AL-QABAS that
"Kuwait will remain open to all brothers, friends and all who want a
respectable life on our land within the limits of the law." The source
sai~: "The recei~t steps taken against a number of people came after
conclusive proof that they were not loyal to the nation." The source
added: "The state will restrain anyone who lets himself be seduced into
destructive activities, kills the good spirit of security and tries to
= fragment the spirit of one family, because Kuwait since its founding has
lived and still lives in the spirit of unity of its people as one family
devoted to the interests of this beloved nation.'~ [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS
in Arabic 28 Sep 79 p 1] 7587
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LEBANOi1
LEBANESE TROOP LEADER INTERVIEWED
Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 19-25 Nov 79 pp 18-28
[Report on interview with Saad Haddad, no date or place given] _
[Text] ~ryyhen Leba~on returns to the Lebanese," says Sasd Haddad,
the Southern border strip will return to Lebanon.
When the Syrians and tha Palestinians leave the country, he
adds, "we wo~'t think of luael a,r anyone else" anymore.
And "when ~ Lebanon becomes independent again," he will be
rsady to stand tri~l on charges of desertion and hostile actian
egainst the Lebsnese Army.
Saad Haddad is the major in whose ~rame the Lebanese Army ~ -
has iswed an arrest warrant, and whose men, backed by Israel, are
refusing to allow the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to
deploy in a strip of Lebanese territnry borderiny the Jewish state.
He made those statements to me when, after months of trying,
I succeeded in visitin~ him in Marjeyoun, thu major town in the
border strip, which ~ sometimes known as "Haddadlar9d,"
~ometimes as "~sraeli-o~cupied Lebanon" and wmetimes as "Free
- Lebanon."
'~o Haddsd and his men, there's no doubt as tio what thst
territory should be called.
"You cen keep thet expression -'border strip,' " the fugitive
_ officer told me. "Here we have only two expresaions: Free
Leb~non and Occupied Lebanon. Over here, it's ~ree Lebanon;
where you come from, it': Occupied Lebanon."
The fsct tha4 "Free Lebanon" depend: on laael for i~ defense
end paK of its livelihood doesn't make it any leu free, Haddsd
_ informed me.
� Yes, around 1,000 border strip residents work in Israel
re~ula~ly.
� Yes, the border strip exporta some of ita agricultural products
to luael.
� Yes, the border strip buys what it doesn't have from luael. _
� Yes, the border strip gets "all kinds of auistance, military or
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advisory," from luael. "Whatever we ask for we get. Carie
b/anche, as they say. There are no more secreta, darling."
_ But:
�"INe depend on no one b~t God and the homeland."
� "We are our own masten."
�"We`re cooperating with Israel as equals."
�"If we wanted to, we could cut our relations with lu~el in
five minutes."
�"We're not tied to anything. We can go with China."
~ As for his resistance to the return of Lebanese governme~t
authority to "Free Lebanon," Haddad pointed out that only last
month, he had talks with the Lebanese Army and agreed to the -
deployment of some of its units in and around Marjeyoun on
November 5.
Army Commander General Victor Khoury denied the talks and
- the agreement initially, Haddad conceded, but he fell silent when -
Haddad produced a television film strip showing his meeting with
a Lebanese Army officer in the Marjeyoun barracks.
The film strip, which was shown on Israeli television, is backed
_ by a series of photographs which Haddad saya he took on the
occasion - just as a precaution against denials f~om Beirut.
The Army officer who appeared in the film strip, Haddad toid
- me, has been jailed. "This is not likely to encourage other officers
and soldiers to obey official orders in future... What kind of
_ wperior is this who can't protect his men, he's so frightened ' of
this and that7 "
The Lebanese Army changed its mind about deploying in the
- border strip because it came under preswre from the Palestine
Liberation Organization and the Lebanese leftists, Haddad
~ charged.
Sti~s, whenever the Army decides to deploy in the border strip,
"I'm still ready, despite everything. Whenever they want to come,
- ahlan wa sah/an."
- � On what terms?
"Certain things were agreed upon."
- � Would hs and his men lay dov~n their arms when the Army
came in?
'`The answer to that would have come at the appropriate
time, when the agreement was impleme~ted... If (my men) were
soldiers, they're still soldiera. No discharge decision has been taken .
against them... As for me, there's no problem involved... When I
= find that Lebanon is all right, Saad Haddad will no longer be a
problem. He can st~y or leave - it doesn't matter."
~ Would he close the "Good Fenee" on the Lebanese-luaeli
- bord ersT
~2
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'That question is premstu~e."
As we talked, we were sur~oun~ded by a group of Haddad's
militiamen, who offered their views on the various subjects
discu:sed when they felt the occasion demended it, and often
applauded their leader'~ answers.
Among their I~der's answen, I would mention the following:
He has hsd meetin~s with American officials - not in the
U.S., "maybe in Cypru:," -"and they understood our point of _
view. We and they are moving along the same lines, thank God." -
He wpports any American initiative in L~banon, "because the
- Ameri;;~n: are against communism, and so sr~ we."
- Western Europe is under the thumb of the Arab oil�producing
countries, and "no yood can come from them."
The West ~ould help the Lebanese people and not worry
~about Arab oil. "Let them stop their wheat supplies to the Arabs
and tell t?~e Arabs to drink their oil."
The Arab wmmit confe~ence, which is expecte~ to deal with
the South Lebanese prob0em this vveek, �'i: uselaas." President
Elia: Sarki:, P~emier Selim Hou and Foreign Minister Fuad Butros
"will return from it as they went to it."
- UNIFIL's information policy "is terrorist-oriented." This
may be because "the terrorists are paying (U.N. Secretary General
~
Kurt) Waldheim."
So "tenorist-oriented" is UN IF I L, in fact, that Haddad f~els
that if he gives it "one mora centimeter" of Lebanese territory, he
will be "giving it to the terrorists."
He adds, "Our confidence in UNIFIL~ ii being reduced by the
passage of time." '
This, however, has done nothing to reduce the man's special
brand of humor.
When he saw the Monday Morning photographer, he put o~ a
- fierce face and snapped: "No! There'sa new law in'Free Leba~on
now. No photographs of ine."
This was fotlowed by a belly laugh and 2he aswranse that we
could take as many photo~raphs as our little hearts desired.
"You want me to pose like a cowboyT " he asked, springing up
and holdinq his arms away from his body, fingers ~igid, ready for a
_ c~uick draw.
The interview was oonduct~i outside Hadd~d's home, in
somewhat rickety armch~irs overlooking the road, and it was
, f~equeMly inteRUpted by the jovial greetings Haddad threw at
passers-by.
"Sorry to receive you in the street," he grinned, "but this is
where I receive all my guests. I'm a simple man."
' When he had answered the last question, !~e grabbed hia hat and
drove off in his old Merc~des, explaining that h~ had to attend the
tuneral of one of his men.
The militiamen who had driv~n us to Haddad's home from the -
edge of th~ UNIFIL zone drove us back to "Occupied lebanon."
~3
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On the way, they gave us a tour of Marjeyoun. As in the rest of
the border strip, tanks were visible everywhQre al~ with cedars
painted on them.
_ Wlle stopped at a smail house peeking out at us from behind e
mountain of sandbags. T~e family that greeted us there told us
that their "rea!" house had been destroyed.
As they serred us coffee, I noticed that every member of the
family was wearing a cross. Come to think of it, there were crosses
all over the border strip, including the cars.
"What do they say about us in Beirutt " the husband asked me.
- "Do 3hey say we're savages, inhuman people7 Believe me, it's not
easy to live here. We're being shelled constantly. My son and my
wife have been injured. But we're with the Major: He's more than
_ a military man; he's a man with feelings; he feels for his people;
he's ~lose to them. And at least we're in a free Lebanon here."
We also dropped in on "The Voice of Hope," the radio station
which a U.S.�C~nadian mission has started in Marjeyoun, to the
delight of Haddad, who has been using it to make his various
pronou ncem ents.
The two Canadians and one American who run the station are
_ in Tel Aviv, we were told. It's their day off.
As we drove by the Israeli border, Haddad's men waved at the
drivers of the luaeli trucks a~d jeeps coming into Lebanon and
_ leaving it.
"This one," one militiaman explained, pointing at an luaeli
t~uck, "is bringing in sand to pave our ~oads."
I saw the famous "Good Fence" gate. It was closed at the t~me,
but Israeli soldiers were chatting with Lebanese villagers.
"We can take you to Jerusalem if you want," said one
rnilitiaman. .
But we headed north instead.
Sunset was a few minutes away, and the countryside was
- flushing e pretty pink.
A beautiful sight, I thought, an exhilarating sight.
So why was I so depressa*J7
Never mind. My interview with Saad Haddad went like this:
You have ~nnounced that you ha~e had shown recently on Israeli television). I alw
talks with the Lebanese Army and have a lot of photographs on the meeting in
agreed to the deployment of an Army the barracks. I'll bring them nut and show
unit in and around Marjeyoun. General them to you, if you want.
Victor Khoury has denied that any of It's unfortunate to see the level they've
this has happened. Who are we to sunk to: they don't dare tell thE truth.
believe? First they raise a big fuss about Major
You can believe the television film strip Haddad being the obstacle which is
(about the meeting between Haddad and a blocking the deployment of the Army, and
Lebanese Army officer i~ Marjeyoun, then...
~4
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It wasn't out of love for them or out of Then Abu lyad and Abu al-Walid and -
weakness on my part. I wanted to take a Klailat and all that watermellon crowd ~x-
step which might bring peace to Lebanon, erted pressure on them. -We had nothing to
because my goal is peace in Lebanon and do with it. It's regrettable that we have
people living in peace of mind. So I told come to this - that a man can't say what he
them to come. wants, or rather, what he's doing.
If they had gone on talking (denying the If the officials realfy want to rebuild
me~tin~), I was going to reveal the names Lebanon, I wisii they would be frank and
of the officers who have come here. But ~y What they want, what they're planning,
- they atopped talking, so I didn't expose What they want to do: "We want to take
them. They know themselves - from wch and such a step." If I want to get to
Victor Khoury down. They know who that house, I should say I want to get to
talked to us and contacted us and that house. But no = everything has to be
- c:ontacted Israel. We have documents done in hiding; we're afraid so and so will
proving everything. They can't play any do such and such. What is this7 At any
games ~rvith us. rate, I believe this question is done with.
They all stopped talking when they saw the -
television film. I'm sorry about Captain Bou
You don't want to reveal any namesT Hammin (who app~ared in the filmJ. They
No. As I said, if they had gone on that tell me they took him to Sarba and slapped
way, I would have exposed them. But they him in jail and so on. This is not likely to
sensed that I H+as going to, and they encourage other officers and soldiers to
stopped talking. Then, of course, there was obey official orders in future because
irrefut~ble proof: I'm sorry t had to use that they know now that the authorities are so
TV film strip, but I had le~rned my lesson ~ak that they can't defend them. What
from past experience. kind of authorities are these~ What kind cf ~
Everyone knows that our forces were all superior is this who car~'t protect his mer~,
legitimate, and our dealings were with the ~'s so frightened of this and that?
legitimate authorities. I came here on
official orders. Our relations with them At any rate, since we're on the subject, I
(the authoritiesl rernained normal until the woufd like to address an invitation to all
~ Syrians came and grabbed them by the the officers who consider themselves free
tbroat. That's when they started denying men, 1 say to them: don't pin too many
everything. They started saying: "No, no, hopes on that area; if you want to live in
we didn't tell Major Haddad tci do this; we dignity, come over here; you'll ~II be
didn't send Major Had~ad." welcome.
I'm sorry 1 took photographs, but I did
it to dot the i's and cross the t's. You will You say you agreed with the Army to
notice that I didn't use the TV film to have the deployment take ~lace in this
begin with. We just announced on the radio area on November 5?
~ that such and such had happened. But one That's what I said. !t didn't happen. -
. just can't... I mean, a step that would have Nevertheless, I made a statement on the
changed the course of events - one radio; I told them if they want to come in,
- couldn't have kept it a secret. The Army I'm still ready, despite everything. When-
was supposed to ~~me here on November ever they want to come, ahlan wa sah/an,
5. We had to anno~nce it. even tliough the first attempt has failed.
f35
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~
You were once against the deployment U.N. lnterim Force in Lebanon - UN/FlL
af the Army in the border strip; now -~rlier this yearl. The militias couid have
you say you're all for it... set up (unt~ans/atab/el ambushes for them.
I answered that in my answer to your They had them in a mortar and they could
first question. My aim is to bring peace have easily been the pestle; they could have
back to Lebanon - if this step will bring pounded them in that mortar and there
peace, which it won't. Developments have w~ouldn't have been one man left to tell the
established that the terrorists are very tale.
attached ta the land which is under their But we didn't want a massacre. That's
control now, and they're not going to let it why we warned them. We told them in
go. All the rest is blah blah. They're trying advance: "Listen guys, dan't come." We -
to pull the wool over people's eyes. "We had talks with Adib Saad and others. We
want th~ Army," they say. "We want to held several meetings with Adib Saad and
strengther~ the Lebanese authorities." No- an intelligence officer that followed him -
- body wants to strengthen the Lebanese Ahmad I-don't-know-what. We told them:
authorities. They're all liars and sons of "Listen guys, watch out." But they
liars. - wouldn't listen. The Army commander -
So anyway, it's only my love for insisted that "everyone must bear his
Lebanon that made me chan~~e my responsibilities." But we still have human-
position. itarian feelings which won't allow us to '
undertake a massacre or to let anyone else -
And does this change mean that you undertake one. That's the only thing that -
have changed your attitude toward the stopped us from... Otherwise, it would have
- Lebanese Army - th~ Army which you been the biggest blow ever. Not one of the
opened fire on on several occasions, to 600 soldiers would have lived to tell the
block its deployment in the areas under tale. Nothing could have been easier.
. your oontrol? If so, what's behind this ~ You have been quoted as saying that it
change of attitude?
I was Iuaeli pressure that made you
I told you what's behind the change. change your position against your wifl.
Furthermore, we never pointed our guns at What that newspaper published was a lie.
the Army. We gave them a warning, and ~'m disappointed in the reporter, who
when we fired - yes, we did fire - we fired ~me here and interviewed me and then dis-
around them. We had warned them. They torted my statements. I'm not accustomed -
~ knew ahead of time. ',o her distorting m~i statements. Why did
They should thank us for this, actually, she do it? I don't know.
first because all the officers who were there She wrote, quoting me, that America ex-
got medals and promotions - all because of erted pressure on israel and Israel exerted
- the shells we dropped around them. They p~essure on me. Let's assume I'n~ ; child;
should send us a letter of thanks, all these even if I were, I wouldn't declare that. It
officers. Had it not been for us, they ~s so stupid of them to put out such a
wouldn't have gotten anything, thing in my name. .
Secondly, we spared them a huge I'm really sorry she attributed that
massacre in that operation. Maybe on your s~atement to me, because I didn't make it.
way here you saw the hills overlooking that She asked me just about the same
area (where the Lebanese batralion passed question you did. She put it this way: 'The
when it was dep/oye+d in the zone of the people don't understand why you've -
Y
V~1 -
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�
changed you~ position." I said to her: The answer to that would have come
"Why, since when have the people at the appropriate time, when the agree-
understood anything7 " I said to her: "Had ment reached was implemented.
the Lebanese Feople been capable of "You and your men I Who are my
understanding, all this wouldn't have hap- men7 If they were soldiers, they're still
pened to Lebanon. Unfortunately, the soldiers. No discharge decision has been
Lebanese people, for all their learning and taken against them. They are still legiti-
culture, lack a great deal of awareness, and macy, and no one can discharge them.
that is what has destroyed our country." As for me, there's no problem invol~;ed.
So Israel has nothing to do with this My only concern is Lebanon - nothing
matter. We are our own masters. It is true e~~. When I find thet Lebanon is all right,
that we are cooperating with Israel -$aaci Haddad will no longer be a problem.
there's no doubt about that - but we're ,ye can stay or leave - it doesn't matter.
cooperating as equals. If we wanted to, we If the Army were to come in, would you
could cut our relations with Israel in five and yo~r men take your orders from iiT
minutes. No problem. The choice is ours. If the Army corrects its course, we will
We're not tied to anything. We can go with be ready to take o~ders from it. But as long
China. as it remains under the terrorists' domina- -
!s at possible that the ciiange in your tion, let it handle its affairs with the
position meens that the Army had terrorists.
= changed ita attitude ~toward you ard was If the Army were to deploy in the -
going to deploy in this area on your border scrip, woufd you sever your
terms~ If so, what were those terms? relatio~s with Israel and close the "Good
Certain things were agreed upon, but Fence"?
unfortunately, everything fell apart. That question is premature. Okay?
If qhey (the authoritiesl really wanted a There is an arrest warrant out in your
solution, they wouldn't care about Yaser name on cha~ges of desertion and hostile
= Arafat or anyone else. Imagine the foreign action ~~ainst the Army. In what
ministry justifying itself to Yaser Arafat ~;ircumsttrnces, if any, would you be
� ,
and saying, No v~ didn t send a cable, no ready to stand trial on th~sg charges? -
we ~idn't se~d a cable to Waldheim"! (The ~'ve ~aid it before, and I'll say it again:
reference is to a sta[ement issuer/ by the yyhen Lebanon becomes independent again,
Lebanese f~reign ministry two weeks ago when it returns to the Lebanese, I will be
denying a siarement atiributed to Arafat co ready to stand trial. We w.itl then see who
rhe effect that the Cebanese authorieies ~s right a~d who wasn't.
presented a memorandum to U.N. Secretary
General Kurt I~Valdheim in 1978 recognrz- The general impression is that since you
ing the ' legitimacy" of Haddad and his depend on Israel for your ~rveapons, your
milit~as.l s~{ary and the salaries of your men, you ~
are under total Is~aeli control. Do you !
So the deployment of the Army in this challenge this view7 If so, or~ what
area has been called off. What nextT grounds?
It's going to be a long stary, a Ic~-~g story As I told you, we are free men, and -
yet. we're dealing with lsrael as equals. The
I~f the Army is deployed in the border (Lebanese) authorities knew this a long
strip, are you snd your men ~eady to time ago. Wtiy didn't they sa~ ~n�/thing
lay down your arms7 about this cooperation before ti:z expan~~;
it?
l
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At on~e point, when we were in trouble, agriculturat production if we don't have
in danger of annihilation, we asked them anywhere else to export it to. Whatever we -
to send us the Army. They said, "Have find difficulty exporting to other places we
pity! We can't! We have no road to seil to Israel, and our products are mostly
use! " and so on. ~s this the first time agricultural.
they've noticed Israel? May they all be It has often be~n said that there a~e ~
gored! Israeli military "advisars" in the border
We are under no one's control. We are strip. May we have your comments on
, free rnen, and we are fighting not only for thes~a reports?
ourselves but also for Lebanon. You alt _
- know it. Ha~ it not been fior this area here To begin with, you can keep that
no one would havebeen left in Lebanon ~ expression -"border szrip." We're neither
no Christ;ans and no Moslems. The a border strip nor a wat~rmellon strip.
Moslems would have still been there, it's Leave those expressions for domestic
trus, but they would have been there under ~nsumption in occupied Lebanon. Here, ~
alien boots. And the Christians? They were We have only two expressions: Free ~
supposed to eiiher emigrate or live here Lebanon and Occupied Lebanon. Over -
like dogs. They would not have been entitl- here, it s Free Lebanon; where you come
ed to the Presidency. There would have f~om, it's Occ~pied Lebanon.
been no Sarkis, no Victor Khoury, no As fo~ the advisors, we get them when
we need them. In times of need, we can get
- Selim Hnss, nobody. all kinds of assistance - military or
advisory. Whatever we ask for we get. Carte
We un~erstand that ~ a large number of b/anche, as they say. There are no more
Lebanese in this ar~ are earning tfieir secrets, darling. '
livelihood in Israel. How many of the Many politicians, including Premier Selim
border strip's r$sidents are working in Hoss, believe that ~srael's ultimate aim is
' Israel right now? to ann~x tRe ~~outh if it can, and that you
Aroun~ a thousand people are working ~ are making'that goal more accessible to
in Israel novv. But the rest are all working ' the Israelis by cooperating with them.
_ here - farming, constructian, commerce. Your comments?
_ There are a lot of work npportunities in y~hat prevented Israel from occupying
our area now. If you have anyorie, send South Lebanon in 1967? Was it the
_ him over. We need workers. artillery of Rashid Karami or the army of
We also understand that Isragl is keeping Rashid Karami that prevented it? Had it
you wpplied with your needs - food Wanted to, it would have occupied the
and other consumer preducts -~nd ~uth a long time ago. lt doesn't nea.d Saad
buying much of your production. Could Haddad or anyone else to help it. Let Selim -
you gnre us any figures about what Hoss save Lebanon from the Syrians, and he
you'ra getting from Israel, and whet W~~I have our thanks. But what does he
Israel is getting f~om you? control over there? He controls his under-
We have expenses like any other people. pants.
- We haven't changed. Our needs are You have been quoted as saying that
anyone's needs. What we don't find here your goal is the unity, independence and
we buy from I;;rael, and what we do have ~~~ei~nty of L~banon. How doe~ your
here we don't need to buy from Israe(: As
for Israel, it may get some of our
- 8~~
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total dependence on tuael serve the them to wear military unif~rms in Syria,
independence and sovereignty of Leba- when here they're considered sacred? Why _
non? And how does your declaratian of must Lebanon bear their burden?
"Free Lebanon" serve Labanon's ~~nity? We ha~e all ied o~rselves Mr~th Israel to
These questions are really sharne~ul. t'm drive out the Palestinians, the Syrians and -
really disappointed that you are asking every other alien. Is that a sacrilege? Hre
such questicns. Or maybe you haven't we married to them? Do we and the
understood the situation yet. Palestinians have a Maronite marriagel No
7o begin with, Free Lebanon is not divarce possibl~? We want a divorce. Or do
secessianist, but unfortunately - and you you want them here forever?
know it, since you're living it - the rest of You want the Syrians out. If they da go
Lebanon is under the occupation af the o,~t, are you ready to sever your .
Syrians o~ the terrorists. Di~ you see any relations with luael - keeping in mind
_ checkpoints in this arEa on your way here? _ that those relations are one of the major
Not one. But wherever there are alien obstacles blocking national accard?
- forces, there are occupation forces. This is First get the Syrians out of Lebanon.
the onty part of Lebanon that remains tree Then `
- - in the hope that we will liberate the rest You 11 see Ibrahim Klailat come
or see it liberated. When all of Lebanon is to us - to Camille Chamoun and
- liberated, t~at's it: we'll be finished; we'll Pierre Gemayel. The same goes for Walid
return :o the or~e l.ebanon. We have said .lunblatt. There'd be no problem then. _
When Lebanon returns to the Lebanese,
and we still say that our capital is Beirut; there will be no problem. We won't think
we will not let our capital go. -
Our dependence on Israel? We depend of Israel or anyane else then. Let them get
- on no one but God and the homeland. out and the Lebanese will be fine; we'If get
We're working for the independence and ~ck together. Ther~ won't be any national -
sovereignty of Lebanon. No one else is. accord as long as the Syrians remain in the
_ Everyone else is working to sell Lebanon. country, because the others don't have
We're working to put Lebanon on its feet free~iom of opinion. When they get that
- again. In return for what? Money? There's freeciom, we can start talking about
no money here. This is a poor area, and national accord and any other accard. _
none of us is after money: there's no theft, Could you tell us why y~u closed all
no looting, We're fiighting the others roads in this area to l~N1FIL trafS`ic iast
because we have faith in this country. w~k?
Unfortunately, few are willing to wo~k for What happens between us and ti~em -
nothing. w~ consider it cuisine int~rieure; an internal
- You have said that you want the P~'oblem, in other words. We sometimes
Palestinians out ot Lebanon, and yet you have differences of view, and we settle
hav~ allied yourselves with Israel, which them immediately, internally. We had a _
is blocking the Palestinians' efforts to Problem, and we settled it. In my last
retu~n to their own homes. How do you meeting with them, they made a commit-
explain thisl ment to fight with us in the event of an
If Lebanon alone must bear the b+~r�~en attack on us by infiltrators inside the
of the Palestinians, forget it. Why cioesn't UNIFIL lines. They promised to open fire
beloveci, fraternal Syria, which supports the on the terrorists ~n the event of such an _
Palestinians, aflow them to go to the Golan attack, So far, they haven t been opening _
and work from there. Why doesn't it allow fire; from now on, they will. -
UNIFIL spokesmen have been talking ~
-
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1 ~ ,

i3 OECEMBER i979 N0. 2AS7 2 OF 2
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- about an escalation in your men's out of the area north of the Litani, those -
mi~itary operations against l;.N. posi- who are south of it will get out
tions in your area and the UNIFlL zone. immediately.
- Could you tell us why you're attacking You have accused UNIFIL of cooperet-
those positions? ing wi4h the Palestinians end the leftists.
Two days ago, o~e Dutch soldier was The leftists are. meanwhile accusing
= killed and another wounded in a mine UNIFIL of cooperating with you. Don't =
_ explosion. That mine was planted by the you see in this.evidence ~f UNIFIL's
terrorists south of Tyre. So far, 37 neu:ralit~?
(UNIFIL troopsl have died - or maybe 33; ~o. Because whenever an incident -
I don't know exactly. They were all killed
- by the terrorists. occurs, the first statement that is made by
= There's your answer as to who's the UN IF IL spokesman~ over there blames
responsible for the violations and who's us for it. Later, when we prot~st, he
_ blocl:ing the efforts. It's not enough for recognizes the facts and apologizes. But his
Yaser Arafat to say, "We're cooperating with first reaction, his instinctive reaction, is to
the U.N. forces" for the world to believe blame us _
him. ~ This may be because the terrorists are -
paying W~Idheim. The terrorists pay out a
Around 20 months have passed since the ~ot of money. They have it. They're paying
deployment of UNIFIL in So~th Leba- Waldheim. Here, they (UNIFIL) tell us thot
they re acting or~ orders from New York.
- non. Are you more prepared today to ~'ll give you a small example: I've~
consid~r the possibility ofaUNIFIL forbidden UNIFIL helicapter overflights,
take-cver of tha border strip, as a#irst Whenever they ask me, I t~!I them to fly
_ step 7oward the return of government ~er the terrorists' positions. They say they
- authofity to the area? don't trust the terrorists. "So why do you
There are now 40 terrorist bases inside ~yant to fly over my territory? " I ask, and
- UNIFIL lines. If wegive U~JIFIL ona more they say, "Because we ;ust you." So I tell
centimeter, we'll be giving it to the ~ern: "Go tell that to Waldheim ancs have
- terrorists. So you see, our confe~ence in him declare it before the Security Council.
UN I F I L. is being reduced with the passage ,
of time. In other words, nothing can Then I II give you~~ much more , than
overflight permission. But they won tt say
scratch our itch like ou; own fingernails. it. They have the fact~, but they won't =
What is your attitude toward tfie reveal them. Their information policy is
U.N.-U.S. peace plan, which is supuorted terrorist-oriented.
_ by ttie Lebanese government and which A few weeks ago, you demanded talks
calls , for the withdrawal of all armed W~~ the PLO and Syria. Does this mean -
elements - including your men, the that you're ready to reach an under-
Lebanese Arab Army, the National ~ar~ding with them? If so, on what
Movement and the Palestiniar~ guerillas - 4erma? ~
_ from the area south of the Litani and the ~ have the door open to negotiations
deployment of UNIFIL and the Leba� With anyone. I am ready, witho~t prior '
_ nese Army in that areal conditions, to enter into negotiations with
We have invited the L~banese Army to anyone ~n+ho says: "I want to work for
come in, but it hasn't comz. Furthermore, peace in Lebanon and would like to see
~ they must clear the area north of the peace restored in Lebanon." Because our
_ Litani, not south of it. When they get them goal is clear: Lebanon for the Lebanese. On
~ that b~sis, we will talk to any~ne.
go -
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~
Raymond Edde has :uygested the Yes, we're with the American initiative. -
- deployment of non-Syrian Arab troops
with U~VIFIL in tfie South. Would you whY7
accept thatT Because the Americans are against ~
- Arab troops were de~ployed with the communism, and so are we. America is not
Syrians once, and what did they accom- going to give us a homeland ruled by leftis;s,
_ plish7 If it was going to rain, we would and we are fighting those (leftistl currents.
have seen some clouds. Raymond Edde -
let him s*~y in Paris. He doesn't know Did you meet with Philip Habib whe~ he~
what's going on anymore. Maybe he's senile ~~Sited this region last mdnth?
now. I wonder how old he is. God help No
h~m. There was a tima when he had some
, understanding, but now he's lost it. We're we hear you've visited ths United States.
trying to get ri~ of the A~abs' dirt; so he Is it true? If so, what was the purpose of
wants to get us more Arabs? the visit, and did you meet with any U.S.
Thz Arab summit conference which will officials7
- discuss the South Lebanese problem is No, it isn't true. We have met with U.S.
scheduled to be held on November 20. officials, but not in the United States.
_ You've heard what the Lebanese govern- ~?ere then7
ment hopes to achieve at that confer- What do you care~ Not in the United
ence: support for the implementation of ~ States. Maybe in Cyprus. -
Security Council resolutions in all parta What h~ppened at the meeting?
of the South and help in the regulation They understood our point of view. We
_ af Palestinian armed presence arxl and they are moving along the same line, -
military activities in and from this ar~. thank God.
Do you approve of these goals? How do you evaluate the West European
To begin with, the summit is useless; position on the Lebaneu~ problem in
they'll return from it as they went to it. , general and the Southern problem in
- They've had a hundred thousand summits, - particular?
and they're not ever going to achieve The West European countries are under
anything. Watch them disagree tomorrow. the influence of Arab oil. No good can -
It's all a waste of time. They're trying to come from them. They wo~'t adopt
get people's minds off tr~e real problem. anything b~� the position of the terrorisxs
Every once in a while, thQy come up with and the Arabs. ~
something like this. What do you want the U.S. and Western
_ And also, they (the Lebanese govern- Europe to do to help Lebanon solve its
mentJ say they want to go to the summit in problem~
total agreement (with the PLO and ;Syria). They must help the people who are with
If the Lebanese, the Syrians and the them and not be afraid of�petroleum. Let
Palestinians reach an agreement, there _
won't be any oroblems left, so why should them stop their wheat suppiies to the Arabs
- they go to the s~mmitl and tell the Arabs to drink their oil. Then =
~ow do yo~ e~raluate your present You'll see how all problems will be solved.
At any rate, 1 see this coming. The day will
attitude 4oward the United States? Do come when this will hapRen, no doubt
you s~pport th~ so-called "American about it.
n initiative in South Lebanon?
r~ Do you have any contacts with the -
- 91
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- Phalangist Party and the National Liberal .Directorl Johnny Abdo. But Johnny Abdo
Party in Beirut7 has forgotten himself. He was chief of the
- Yes. Phalangist Deuxieme Bureau at the time.
Do you coordinate your actions with Right? But he promoted himself and stc~od
them? against the others. The least he could have
Nc,t always, but the contacts are there. done would have been to equate himself
with that guy.
- Do you expect an early solution of the ~
Leba~~ese problem? ~o you have any messages to ~elay to _
the Lebane:e people?
No. There are no Lebanese people, but I will
_ What is the solution that you envisage? ~nd a message to the people of East
The withdrawal of all aliens from Beirut, the free people:
Lebanon and the re~turn of Lebanon to the My advice to them is to agree among
each other and stop fighting over who s the
- Lebanes~. za'im (boss) while they're sitting on the
There's one more thing I'd like to say: shaft. The Lebanese ioves to be the ra'im
I hear that eight (Lebanese Army) even when he's sitting on the shaft. This is
officers have filed suit in protest against the not the time to fight over za'imship. This is -
re~ent F~rmy promotions - including Elias the time for them a(I to agree so that we
Khalil and Hanna Jaara and I don't know ~n get ~~ut of this mess . When we get out
who. They ve filed, suit - hear this - of it, they can play za'im all they want.
. because they weren t promoted. It s okay ~yhcever wants ?o can be a za'im then, but
to file suit with the Advisory Council, but not now. I appeal to shem to forget their
they knnw that there are no courts and no rivalries, put their za'imsh~'ps in the fridge
authorities. It would have been more for now, and fish them out later. All the
appropriate for them to complain to the in-fighting that's going on is over who's the
Zahrani court, which recently sentenced
two people to death. That court can give za im.
them their rights, maybe, but the L~banese ~ond: I advise them to watch out for
State? Let them go to the Zahrani court. the shafts which the Deuxieme Bureau and
At any rate, they're all my fri~nds and I the Syrians are preparing for them, because ~
value them. these too are behind the differences that
Another thing: I can tell Elias Khalil are occurring between them. . Certain ele-
why he w9sn't promoted, althouQh he's an ments are infiltrating their ranks to get
excellent officer. He wasn't promoted them fig~ting among each other and bring
because he worked with the Phalar.gists at ~eir houses down over their heads.
Socomex (a building in Saifi, East Beirut, Tell them that the Lebanese have no one
wh~re the Phalan~ist Party had offices to depend on but the L.ebanese. Tell them
during the two-year wari and there's a hot to run after money, because you can't
witness against him: (Arrrr~� Mrelligence take it with you.
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_
LIBYA
LISYAN SECR~TARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS COrfi4ENTS ON WORLD, ARAB AFFAIRS
Tunis AL-SAB~AH in Arabic 16 I~iov 79 pp 6, 7
[Interview wirh '~~li 'Abd-al-Salam al-Turayki by 'Abd al Hamid al Qasibi and _
Muhammad ibn Salih: "It is an Error to Say That Palestinian Presence in -
Lebanon is Reason for Lebanese Crisis; There Are No Problems Between al
Jamahiriyah and Tunisia; Question of Continental Shelf is Proceeding Normally;
Carter's Aecision to Freeze all Iranian Funds Sets Dangerous Precedent in -
International Relation~; Summit May Take New Measures to Strengthen Arab
Boycott Against Egyptian Regime"]
[Text] We met yesterday morning ~efore the opening of the Conference of -
Arab Ministers of Foreign Affairs with Dr 'Ali 'Abd-al-Salam al-Turayki,
the secretary of fore~gn affairs of the I_oyan Arab Jamahiriyah. It was a
coincidence that 2 pears ago to the day we had conducted a similar interview
with him, and he had indicated to us at that time that it was necessary to
_ isolate the Egyptian regime from the rest of the Arabs. (This came about
less than half a year later).
- At the outset of his interview with us Dr al-Turayki was careful to praise
and to commend the positions that AL-SABAH Newspaper had taken in the past
~ 2 years vis a vis differen~ Arab questions. He offered special praise for
yesterday's editorial which dealt witd~ the question of the Iranian funds
that were frozen by the U.S. government. _
Commenting on what is happening in Iran, Dr ul-Turayki said in this regard.
"The Islamic Revolution that has broken out in Chis country must be considered
a historical event throughout the Islamic and the Arab world. Iran had been
a threat to the safety of the Arab nation, and the shah's r~gime had dealt
with the Israeli enemy and with South Africa; but the situation has changed
overnighc. Iran has become an inseparable part of the Arab and Islamic
struggle against Zionism and imperialism, and the Iranian Revolution has
turned into a genuine [source of] support for the Arab nation. It was
natural that Iran pay dearly for this change. There is nothing curious about
the hostilities we are e~cperiencing these days. These hostilities are
directed against the Iranian people by imperialist forces. These hostilities
include infamous attemFts to create problems for this revolution inside the
country and abroad in an effort to liquidate it."
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- Dr al-Turayki added, "The fact that the United States has admitted the shah '
into the United States as a guest is only one link in a series of conspiracies
against the Iranian Revolution. We must consider the measure that Carter
_ took in this regard a dangerous precedent in international relations. We
can still remember what ti?e U.S. government did against Dr Musaddaq in 1953
when he tried to nationalize [Iran's] oil. What the United States did then
postponed the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution.
"The measure rec~uiring that Iranian funds be frozen in U.S. banks may fall
~ under the category of international terrorism that is carried out by a ma~or
state against a fraternal nation whose only guilt is the fact that it got
rid of dictatorship and imperialist hegemony. We must draw the attention -
of weak nations, and especially Arab nations, to this matter because the
subject in fact is not that of ha~tages, but it is rather an integrated plan
to starve the Iranian people and plunder their wealth. Z_.s Arabs have to -
declare full solidarity with Tran. They must also not increase oil pro-
duction so as :iot to become victims of such terror, on the one hand, and
not to betray the Arab and the Islamic nation, on thP other."
[Question] Do you expect the Arab Summit Conference to produce concrete
_ results that would be advantageous to the Arab cause?
[Answer] This is a regular meeting. The notion that the Arabs meet regularly
to study their concerns and their issues is in itself good. This meeting
is taking place at the end of a full year of integrated political activity
which followed the Baghdad Conference. The Arabs were able during this year
- eo achieve concrete results in foiling the alarming imparialist Zionist plot
_ which is exemplified specifically in the Camp David Treaty. _
Throughout this year the Arabs did in fact rise to the level of responsibility,
and a serious change did take place [in their midst]. This change led to
the departure of the largest Arab state from the Arab line following its
alignment with the enemy. I believe that the expulsion of Egypt from the
Arab League and from the Islamic Conference; the condemnation of the outcome
of Camp David exp~esse~ at the Monrovia P4eeting and at the Havana Meeting,
w'r?ere a committee was formed to look into suspending Egypt's membership in
the Organization of Non-Aligned Countries; and the bilateral actions taken
by the Arab countries in this regard in particular constitute a firm response -
to the positions of the Egyptian regime.
[Question] Will thP Tunis Summit confirm the penalL=es that were imposed .
against Egypt by the Bsghdad Summit Conf erence so that the penalties can
actually be carried oL~t? Will new measures to that effect be taken?
[Answer] I believe that the Tunis Summit will evaluate the penalties that
have so far been accomplished. It may devote itself to studying a new formula
~ for strengthening the Arab boycott against the Egyptian regime and for takir~g
new measures towards that boycott, such as, for example, blocking any Arab
investment in Egypt, even if it were an individual investment, and also
closing Arab air space to Egyptian aircraft.
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It is truly regrettable that Egypt should become a tool which Israel is
using to break the economic blockade that has been imposed on South Africa.
This is a very serious matter about which we car.not be silent. We have
- recently learned that Israel has persiiaded Egypt to sell part of the Sinai
oil to South Africa which, it is also being said, will be able to sail its
commer.cial ships through the Su~z Canal.
[Question] 'The Egyptian regime has been saying for some time that the Arab
- boycott has not and will not affect it regardless of the measures that are
- to be taken to strengthen it. What do you think about this?
[Answer] Thi~ is not true. The Egyptian regime is assuming that Egyptian
and Arab public opinion is stupid. If this boycott continues, the Egyptian
regime will collapse. At any rate the vital historical point that we must
make a note of is that for the first time the Arab ~eague is playi~ig its
- national role in the best way. In the past it had been a center for
- bureaucracy and for impeding Arab action. Thank God th~t it is now performing
significant actions in its new position and situatioix. But we are noticing
that some Arab countries are not adhering fully to the boycott measures and
have not yet clarified their positions, not to mention the fact that they
somet~mes attend [the meetings of] rr~shammad Riyad's League and sometimes
those of the Arab League in Tunisia. I believe that the Tunis Summit has
~ to settle this matter and to ask these countries to explain their positioizs
once and for all.
[Question] Will the problem of South Lebanon be a basic item [on the agenda]
of the suunait?
- [Answer] The Lebanese problem is nc~t actually, as is being said in some
circles, a Lebanese-Palestinian problem. We must not read into this matter
more than what does in fact exist. The basis of this problem lies in the
existing social struggle in Lebanon whirh began in 1958 when the Palestinians
were not there. The matter, then, does not go beyond being a dispute among
the Lebanese people themselves. Consequently, it is the Lebanese people
= themselves who have to settle this dispute. The organized Palestinian
presence in Lebanon cannot be the subject of debate. On the contrary, the
Palestinians mu3t be everywhere and on all fronts. There is no doubt that
Lebanon is carrying a major responsibiZity in thls re~ard, but it must not
carry this responsibility alone because the problem is ultimately an Arab-
Israeli problem. If Lebanon were to submit any proposal to the summit
requesting material and military support, al-Jamahiriyah will be quite willing
to offer th3s support. I do not think that the remaining Arab countries will
lag behind in fulfilling this duty. To put it b.riefly at this point, the
problem is not that of the presence of Palestinians in South Lebanon; the
matter rather pertains to an alarming plot which resulted from the Camp David
Accords and is ultimatPly being manifested in the creation of problens for
- Syria in view of the fact that it is a confrontation country. It has been
noticed that these problems have increase~ after Egypt and Israal signed the
recent Sinai Agreement.
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[Question] Can you tell us somethir.g on this occasion about the latest in
Tunisian-Libyan relations and about the problem of the Continental Shelf?
(The actual time for opening the meeting had gone by, and we were sti11
with him).
[Answer] There is no problem pending with regard to the question of the
Continental Shelf because an agreement has b~en reached to turn the matter
over to the International Court. The matter has actually been turned over
to the International Court, and it is now proceeding normally, and the
cou*t will look into it in due course when it completes its measures.
In general, our relations with the fraternal country of Tunisia have also
been proceeding normally. We are always trying to develop these relations
because of the historic~l ties that bind us to the Tunisian people and in
spite oL what is being done against us by hostile, outs~de forces. In my
opinion it is an exaggeration to say that these relations are now the b~st
that they can te. But we would like for them to improve from good to
better. I believe, therefore, that our relations must be ideal relations
that wou13 be a model for others to follow.
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TUNISIA
ENVOYS REPORTED TO ASK EUROPEANS FOR AID AGAINST KHOMEYNIISM
London AL-DUSTUI2 in Arabic 11 Nov 79 p 6
~Text7 Informed source~ have reported that some Tunisian government and _
party officials have ~zcently made a number of visits to the countries ,
of Western Europe, the purpose of which was to persuade them to increase
their assistance to Tunisia.
' These sources said that the tenor of what was said between the Tunisian
envoys and the representatives of the Western European countries can
be summarized as follows: "Help us to protect you from a Khomeyniite
Tunisi.a." -
These sources point out that these words are inspired by the anxiety
felt by the regime in Tunisia towards the growth, in recent months, of
the politicized religious surge.
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_ ~
UNITID ARAB EMIRATES
UAE-CONOCO DEAL YIELDS GREAT PROFITS F~ DUBAI RULER -
~ London AL-HAWl?DITH in Arabic 2 Nov 79 p 11 =
[Article: "Fantastic Deal Concluded by Mahdi al Ta~iz�for the Ruler of Dubai"~
[Text~ UAE Ambassador to London Muhamma,d Mahdi al-Ta3ir~ xho still holds the
post of special advisor to Ruler of Dubai Shaykh Rashid ibn Sa'id~ has succeed-
_ ed in making a dsal, considered the deal of the year, with the Aaaerican Conti-
= nen~al Oil Compar~y, ~hich is exploiting the offshore oil fields of Du?~si. He -
_ negotiated with the company--in the na.me of the ruler, naturally--for the emir-
ate of Dubai to ob~ain 100,000 barrel3 of oil a day, out of the 400~000 barrels
which the compa.r~y prod.uces, in order to sell it to some Third World countries
_ at reduced prices. After the negotiations were finished~ al Tajir sold the ~
same amount ~f oil to the compar~y at ~the Rotterciam free market price. The ~
profits from the operation xere estimated at US$17 per barrel, and the oi~ �
might be resold at a higher price. Thus Shaykh Hashid ha~s increa.sed his income
by $1.7 million a day, or a'nout $650 million each year.
Some persons with long tongwes affirm that Ambassador Muhammad Mahdi al-Ta~ir .
might sell the amounts set aside for the emira.te direct ~y on the free market
in Rotterda.m. If so, the profits might double= ;
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