JPRS ID: 8814 WEST EUROPE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030027-7
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 103
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 27
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JP~RS L/8814
12 December 1979
- West Euro e Re ort
p p
- CFOUO 69/79) -
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
JPRS publications contain information prima.rily from fareign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from new~ agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and -
other characte~istics retained.
- Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
- processed. t~]here no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
- enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the -
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthe~ical notes with in the body of an -
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- -
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
For further information an, report content
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JPRS L/8814
~2 December 1979
~ WE~T EUROPE REPORT _
(FOUO 69/79)
CONTENTS PAGE .
COUNTRY SECTION
_ FEDERAL KEPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Rising Violence From Foreign Political Groups in FRG -
(CAPITAL, Nov 79) 1
FDP Seeks To Preserve Identity as Election Drive Starts
` (CAPITAL, Nov 79)
7
FRANCE
- Serious Discord Affecting PS, PCF Mayors' Offices
(Michel Labro, Jacques Roure; L'EXPRESS, 20 Oct 79) 12
Ground Forces l~ir Support Reviewed
(Herve Mangin d'Ouince; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Oct 79). 18
_ General CannQt Discusses 1979~-80 Plans for ALAT
(Jean de Galard; AIR & COSMOS, 27 Oct 79) 23
Tactical Air Force Exercise Described
_ ~ (AIR & COSMOS, 27 Oct 79) 25
Nuclear Submarine Delays Arouse Controversy
- (AIR & COSMOS, 27 Oct 79) 26
'L'HUMANITE' Losing Readers as 'LIBERATION' Gains
(Christian Fauvet; L'EXPRESS, 20 Oct 79) 28
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
Briefs
SDECE Employees Benefited 30 -
Fuel Shortage Effects 30
Fuel Shortage Foreseen 30
Records Microfilming Planned 30
Defection From PCF 30
ITALY
_ Ventura's Report on Terrorism in Italy =
(PANORAMA, 8 Oct 79) 31
Modus Operandi of 'Front Line' Terrorist Group
(PANORAMA, 22 Oct 79) 38
Signorile Comments on PSI Relations With DC
(Claudio Signorile Interview; PANORAMA, 22 Oct 79) 41
Public Protest Against Military Maneuvers in Friuli
(Luciano Santin; PANORAMA, 5 Nov 79) 45
PCI's Pajetta on Relations With China
- (Gian Carlo Pajetta Interview; PANORAMA, 5 Nov 79) 47
Treasury Minister Interviewed on Combatting Inflation
(Filippo Maria Pandolfi Interview; IL CORRIERE DELLA
SERA, 1 Nov 79) 51
La Malfa of PRI Disciisses Inflation
(Georgio La Malfa Iuterview; PANORAMA, 27_ Oct 79) 58
Federconsorzi Denounced to EEC by Consumer Advocates _
(Nicola Pressburger; PANORAMA, 22 Oct 79) 60
Development of, Outlook f or Alternative Energy Resources
(Felice Ippolito; ENERGIA E MATERIE PRIME; May-Jun/
Jul-Aug 79) 62
- SPAIN -
Anarchist CNT To Hold Seventh Congress in Dec~mber
(CAI~IO 16, 25 Nov 79) 86
Arias Sa].gado Interviewed on Situation With UCD
(Rafael Arias Salgado Interview; CAMBIO 16, 4 Nov 79). 89
- Article Looks at Role of Women in UCD
~ (CAMBIO 16, 4 Nov 79) 93
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COUNTRY SECTION FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
RISING VIOLENCE FROM FOREiGN POLITICAL GROUPS IN FRG
Hamburg CAPITA,L in German Nov 79 pp 133-137 -
[Unattributed Article: "Foreign Legion"]
[Text] The secret civil wars in the rederal Republic--
The Office for the Protection of the Constitution [BFV] -
is issuing alarming reports: Violence among foreigners
is getting out of hand; their domestic political problems
are being transferred to the FRG.
Last Saturday in Ruesse~sheim, Mustafa M. was on his way to working the
overtime shift, even though some of his leftist radical compatriots had
announced that they would beat up anyone who would not stay away from the
plant. The hoodlums were waiting at the factory gate. Mustafa the Turk
tried to run, but he did not get far. When the police found him, he had
two broken ribs and a black eye. But he would not press charges for bodily
harms He said he had fallen down a flight of stairs.
At 0300, shots rang out in Frankfurt's Balkan Grill. There had been a
confrontation between exiled Croats and followers of Tito: one dead, two -
seriously wounded. One of the injured, probably an exiled Croat, had
disappeared before the palice arrived at the scene.
The dead person had no identity papers and has still not been identified--
an indication that he had been a special agent of the Yugoslav secret service.
West Berlin csiminal police arrested an Arab last June. He had been identified -
as the head oL a PLO group which had been apprehended 3 months earlier as
- it was about to make a bombing attempt upon the Jewish Community Center. -
The arrested individual was released immediately, since he had diplomatic
statusa Iie was a member of the PLO delegation in East Berlin, accredited
by the GDR.
J.
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r~x ~rrlt;t~u, US~ UNLY
The above are three examples of ~ungle warfare on German soil involving the
FRG security services since foreign activism has escalated to new levels.
_ Foreign national internal revolutionary controversies are being introduced
into Germany, and they are being conducted the same as in Iran, Palestine
or Turkey: with threats, beatings and murder.
These events in Bavaria, Hesse and also in North Rhine-Westphalia are mean-
while the sub~ect of thick top-secret reports regularly sent by the BFV to
the federal and Land governments. The trend of all these counterintelligence
_ reports shows that the FRG is importing an amount of violence of barely 1
imaginable proportions. In the opinion of the president of one BFV office:
"We are aw.are of only a small fraction of the problem."
, -
There are two primary reasons for this. On the one hand, Bonn is bothered ~
- by these counterintelligence reports from the standpoint of delicate foreign i
relations. Therefore, only tentative surveillance is permitted; contacts
with foreign security services, designed to gain an insight into political
movements, is considered undesirable. Contact with Turkish security services,
_ for instance, recently had to be severed. ~
- The other reason, complains the counterintelligence chief, is that the "social
~ isolation, frequentlq encouraged officially," between foreigners and Germans
- has progressed to such an extent that surveillance (who, with whom and where)
has become impossible: "They live in ghettos according to ghetta rules."
"It is almost impossible to put agents or informers in these places and if
and when it can be done, it occasi~nally means death for the informer. That
is a deterrent." ~
- That is why the BFV is forced to rely mostly on guesswork. According to its
" estimates, there are about 1,000 foreign organizations in the FRG, but only
a small number have been identified. Those known to counterintelligence--
for example, Iranian student clubs or Turkish workers' organizations--hardly
warrant official intervention in their activities: proper bylaws, peaceful
meetings and, in case of demonstrations, prior notification of police.
, The problem is, however, that they have some radical and even terrorist groups
- as hangers-on. They surface and then disappear just as suddenly. No one -
admi,~ts to ever having seen demonstrators within their own ranks who use
_ knuckle-dusters and tire irons on members of the opposition; victims of -
attacks almost always claim that their attackers were "unknown."
Permission for German counterintelligence even to place such foreigners
under surveillance, with whatever modest results, stems from an incrFase in -
its authority granted in 1972. At that time it was charged, by way of a
change in the BFV Law, with observing political movements within the guest
work~rs' group. There were quite specific reasons for this. Bonn was worried
that the increasingly power~ul West European communist parties could mobilize
their nationals working in the FRG for infiltration activities leading to
disturbances in factories and residential quaxters and to difficulties in
relationships with friendly governments.
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The prognosis was correct, but the fear groundless. In point of fact,
Spanish, Italian and French communiets conetitute the largest groups of
foreigners in the FRG today, but ae a whole they are peaceful and dieciplined.
Not even during last June's European elections were there any fights on
German soil between Eniico Berlinguer~s comrades and the members of the neo-
fascist social movement, wfio are usually at each others' throats back home.
So as not to incur Bunn's d?spleasure, regional headquarters of West European `
communist parcies residing in the FRG maintain contacts neither with the
German Communist Party nor the GDR~s SED. The only interesting thing is that
the Eurocommunists, who officially keep a certain distance from the CDSU,
are forever sending their high officials from Germany to Moscow for training.
The Spaniards are an exception: Santiago Carillo's comrades go to Madrid
for their training.
The communists who have for years created operational problems for counter-
intelligence are the ones from Belgrade. Bloody warfare is raging on German
~ soil between Tito's secret service and Yugoslav dissidents. This must not
become public knowledge, so as not to impair Bonn's relationship with the
_ ancient chief of state in Belgrade--unless this becomes inevitable. Just
recently, the public learned 'oy the way that a Yugoslav exile had been found
dead from bullet wounds" in a forest near the small Rhenish town of Horrem.
The bullet was in the back of the neck and came from a weapon exclusively -
used by the Belgrade secret service.
- Yugoslavs on Tito's hit list ,re mostly Croats, irrespective of whether they
are anticommunist nationalists or escaped communists who were victims of the -
Croat purge in 1972. There is no communication between the two groups, and
_ neither the nationalists nor the ex-communists look for protect~'~on to German
counterz.ntelligence, which could result in an end to the continuing murders.
Their reluctance is understandable: If the exiled Croats were to seek help
trom the BFV, they would of necessity have to make a clean breast of their
~ activities and thereby risk prosecution or even extradition. Instead, as -
counterintelligence experts note with resignation, they "engage in a hopeless
struggle with the Yugosla~ Secre~ Police, which solves its problems with
gun in hand." The incomplete casualty list for the last 2 years includes
eight dead, two of whom are probably secret service agents. _
Surveillance of the mostly illegal foreign organizations of Turks, Iranians,
Afghans and Palestinians in the FRG is similarly coa~plex, though operating
on many levels and therefore more obscure. As one investigating official
puts it: "It is like an ant heap; it is impossible to tell who belongs to
what." The balance sheet for the current year: ~he perpetrators of violent
crimes (more than 40 in a single Land): not identified; various acts of
factory sabotage: not solved; connections with fareign secret services:
not determined.
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It is, however, certain that three ma~or groups are involved with these
nationals: Moscow party-line communists, social revolutionary Maoiats and
Islamic nationalists. It is ~ust as certain that communists as well as
nationalists are being f inanced from outside the country, while the Maoiets
do not get one penny from Peking.
, It is certain finally that the Moscow party-liners' contacts are centered in
East Berlin. CP Turks are trained there; CP Palestinians find hideouts -
there. And the CP Iranians hold their conferences tfiere: The seat of the
communist Tudeh party, which is still illegal in Iran, was recentlv shifted '
from Soviet Tiflis to the GDR, probably to avoid any conf licts between the ~
USSR with Ayatollah Khomeyni. But beyond these insights the counterintel-
ligence efforts remain in the dark. As a result, the BFV, restricted to
. operating on FRG territory and made only dimly aware of internal politics
in foreign countries, bases its conjectures on those facts to which it has -
access.
It has, for instance, been noted that communist and Maoist students who
returned to Iran after the overthrow of Shah Reza Pahlavi are rather hastily
returning to the FRG, some of them even through underground channels. Within
their organizations they call for "regarding the ideological schism between
the opposition groups as being of secondary importance and giving priority
tu building a united front against the imperialists and their accomplices"--
among whom they also list the Ayatollah Khomeyni, whose firing squads are
no kinder to the anti-shah leftists than they are to the shah ribhtists.
There seems to be good reason for suspecting that the Islamic Republic of
Iran's new secret police has no trouble finding the answers it seeks. -
Khomeyni's agents recently proved their heavy-handedness while interrogating
an Iranian student to determine whether he had served as an informant for -
the shah's secret service. In seeking help from the German authorities, he
immediately fell victim to the formalities of a democratic constitutional
state. Inasmuch as it was impossible to prove the use of violence ~n the
part of his interrogators from home, they could not be prosecuted. Their
victim was the only individual to be the subject of legal action. The
charge: intelligence activities. He had admitted to occasionally having
furnished opinion reports on the mood of the university students to agents
_ of the shah.
_ Potentially dangerous political unrest is occurring also among students ir.
Iran's neighboring state of Afghanistan, where Moslem rebels are waging
guerilla warfare against the pro-Soviet regime. The majority of Afghan
part-time students in the FRG is in sympathy with the Rabul regime, while _
a minority, organized in secret clubs, declares itself ready "to combat
Soviet repression of the Afghan people."
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Occasionally, secret agents of another of Iran's neighboring states, Iraq,
leave their traces in the FRG. They are aearching for the lea~iers of the
orthodox Muslim fraternity which ia suepected by the eocialiet Baath regime
of Bagdad to be reaponaible for a maseacre of cadets in the Aleppo officer
1 training school. Vengeance againet the fugitives, for whom the aearch
continues in Syria and Western Europe, is yet to come. German counterintel-
~ ligence has a grea~ interest in Iraq: It suspects that this is the location
= of training camps for Palestinian pro-communists, while the training camps
f or followers of the official PLO head, Yasser Arafat, are obviously concen-
trated in Lebanon. One thing is certain: Since Arafat has aligned himaelf
with Khomeyni, pro-communist Iranians are no longer receiving weapons training
in Lebanon.
- Both Palestinian groups are active in the FRG. Their ob~ective: Jewish
- establishments. Ten members of three combat commandos are interned pending
trial in Bavaria and Berlin. They were arrested on arrival on 3 April,
carrying about 60 kg of explosives.
But until now it has been impossible to determine under whose orders they -
were--those of Iraq or Lebanon. Nor is it known from where they received
_ their orders within Europe. There is a choice of two possibilities: Paris -
and East Berlin. Says a high security official: "The only way to exercise
any control over events is to have detailed knowledge of Palestinian
- political movements. Since we do not have that knowledge, any successes
- we have are a matter of luck." -
The latest problem facing the BFV is a matter of both quality and quantity:
The approximately 1.2 million Turks in the FRG belong to a most diverse
number of political subgroups. Ju~t as in their homeland, where Prime
- Minister Bulent Ecevit declared martial law in 17 civil-war-torn provinces,
- members of the right and left are in deadly confrontation in Germany as well.
According to counterintelligence information, Moscow party-line communists
predominate among them. In contrast to their Spanish and Italian comrades,
. they are f irmly and militantly organized. They are in firm control of the
majority of guest workers, as can be seen by the astonishingly great number
of communist Turks in the workers' councils of German enterprises.
At the same time a new group is expanding which numbers among its followers
members of the Turkish Nationalist Movement Party. It is establishing
cultural centers everywhere in the FRG, ostensibly devoted to "instruction
_ in the Koran and promotion of the nationti~: language."
~ .
According to counterintelligence service estimates, "we are dealing here
with a neo-Islamic offensive which will have its consequences: withdrawal
of Muslim Turks from the German population and the establishment of new
ghettos, whence a relentless battle will be waged against the infidels,
the communists. We were prepared for almost anything, but not for the unrest
imported along with Islam."
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r~ux ur~r'1C1AL U5E UNLY
Problem Cases
The law requires the BFV to maintain surveillance over foreigners' activities
- in the FRG. This is no small task, merely considering the numbers involved.
There is no way of identifying newly arriving individuals. Be they guest
workers or students, the FRG must admit them, partly becausP of the liberal
European Community rules, partly as a result of treaties with third states.
, The following figures show the numbers of foreigners living in Germany:
Turks 1,165,000 ~
Yugoslavs 610,000
Italians 572,500
~ Spaniards 188,900
Frenchmen 61,200
Iranians 19,500
[Others 1,364,000]
lOTAL; 3,981,100 .
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Gruner & Jahr AG & Co
9273
' CSO: 3103
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- -
COTJNTRY SECTION FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
FDP SEEKS TO PRESERVE IDENTITX AS ELECTION DRIVE STARTS
Hamburg CAPZ~I'AL in German Nov 79 pp 12-13
[Text] FDP between Schmidt and Strauss. Since Franz
Jos.ef Strauss assumed the leadership of the Union
[CDU/CSU], the liberals can no longer resort to a
plausible threat of a change in coalition. If they
nevertheless seek conflict, they do so in order not
� to be entirely disregarded in the upcoming heated
election battle of confrontations.
Once a year ago, the Free Democrats were still in good shape. Only with
difficulty had SPD Chancellor Helmut Schmidt succeeded in keeping the
small proud group of liberals under control when the resolution of the anti-
terrorist law was at issue~ FDP chief Hans-Dietrich Genscher had implored
the deputies of his party not to let the coalition break apart under any
circumstances.
In order to demonstrate this unpleasant prospect to the Social-Democratic ,
coalitian partner in graphic terms, Genscher had even taken pen in hand
and written a"confidential" letter to the officials of his party, which
immediately, as expected, became known to the Social Democrats as well.
SPD [Bundestag] Deputy Conrad Ahlers offered a sobe~c view of the future:
"We rate this as preparatory actions for a change in coalitions."
- In the meantime, a defection by the liberals to the: Union has become un-
thinkable. .4 poor showing in the elections to the European Parliament (6
- percent) and the municipal elections in North Rhin~e-Westphalia (6.5 percent), -
as well as a minus of 2.3 percent in the city eler~tions in Bremen, has not
exactly strengthened the RDP. Above all, however, it became unstuck by the
nomination o� Franz Josef Strauss as the Union's candidate for chancellor.
Already tne first appearances of the Union team captain in Essen and Cologne,
the reactiona to them with scenes in court (Strauss had pointed his finger at
SPD Federal Executive Director Egon Bahr as thE_ "initiator" of the riots
directed at him) and the subsequent propaganda. skirmishes showed what we are
in for next year; namely, confrontation all a:~ong the line.
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A Bundestag election campaign in that style--in which, in addition, two
political.superstars like Schmidt and Straues will engage each other in
battle--doea not leave much~room for the liberals anymore. Their hope
expressed on blue and yellow postera--that as "partners of the citizen"
they would be in even greater demand--has not been confirmed in the elections
thus far.
Their concern over being crushed between the two unwieldy millstones is
joined by the doubt about whether they will still be able to extricate
themselves on their own in the foreseeable future from their "Babylonian
captivity" (Strauss)--the alliance with the SPD. The fact that Genscher
- long ago recognized the necessity of changing horses at some point could be
heard as long as 2 years ago from his faithful paladin, FDP spokesman Josef -
Gerwald. "One of these days we will be finished with them," according to
Gerwald, "but we, of course, will determine the time." -
Today Genscher no longer is in a position to determine anything in this
respect. The golden times are over when CDU Chairman Helmut Kohl called
his f riend "Dieter" in the Foreign Affairs Ministry every other day to feed
his hopes a little with cordial and probably also sympathetic words.
For a very brief time this summer, to be sure, a gleam of hope appeared on
= the horizan: the nomination of Lower Saxony Minister Presid.ent Ernst
Albrecht as the CDU`s candidate for chancellor, which was undertaken
unilaterally by the CDU Presidium. (It became invalid after the nomination
of Strauss by the CDU/CSU Bundestag caucus).
In contrast to played-out opposition leader Kohl, it would have been possible
to make a show with Albrecht, who at least appears to be liberal: It would -
have been possible for the FDP to expect their voters to go along with a
- coalition with him as chancellor; possibly the FDP could even have entered
the 1980 Bundestag election campaign with appropriate "statements of fact" _
as a substitute for the hitherto customary "coalition statements." Such a
"statement of fact" would no longer have committed Genscher in a binding way
to continuing the present coalition with the SPD--without precluding it, -
however. .
Erns t Albrecht, moreover, offered the guarantee that in the future, too,
the liberals would be treated honorably--something which is no longer taken -
for granted in the by now stale coalition marriage with the Social Democrats.
The Lower Saxony liberals have never forgotten that, after his still
inexplicable election as minority minister president, the man from Hanover
solicited their confidence in a moving way for over a year, and when the
liberals f inally joined his cabinet he proved to be an extraordinarily loyal
senior partner. -
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Albrecht, without queation, would have been an alternative for Genscher
that could have been marketed in a credible way. Strauss, of courae, is
not that. Thus the Unian itself--through the nomination of auch an extremely
controveraial candidate for chancellor--forged the FDP and the SP~ together
for better ox for worse.
- Under such circumstanc,~,s it ie not very honest for t'4e Christian Democrats
to continue to depict the FDP as a"bloc party"-~qu~.te aside from the -
association with those pseudo-bourgeois "bloc parties" of the GDR, which
without any k3nd of independence have to whistle the ~une of th~ SED. On
_ the other hand, there is sooner a comical effect to the attempt on the part
of North Rhine-Westphalian Land Chairman Horst-Ludwig Riemer to malce it
appear that the FDP was "more of a bloc party" at the tim~ of its coalition
with Konrad Adenauer and Ludwig Erhard "th~n today." If it was, then it
has, in its time, detached ;:tself twice from a bloc. -
Precisely this appears to be more impossible today than ever. Because of
their small numbers, the liberals have always been strong ~n].y as a govern-
ment party~-in opposition they disappear into sheer invisibility. After
_ 1980, h~~~ever, they can govern--continue to govern--in any event only with
- their pr.esent partner, the SPD--unless the other side gives up Strauss.
The to such an extent insoluble marriage makes Genscher and his men stubborn
and arrogant at zhe same time. Already he has himaelf had rencontres in the -
cabinet with Hulmut Schmidt. Both sides declare today that this has been
overcome in a reasonable manner. Genscher adds: "Besides Josef Ertl and
Egon Franke, Schmidt and I are the most senior members of the cabinet. We
have been sitting at this table for 9-1/2 years. That means everybody ~
knows how the other reacts and how one must weigh the reactions of the
other."
But an irritation rarely comes alone. The dispute over security policy,
touched off by Herbert Wehuer's motto of the "defensively armed" Soviet
- Union and his attacks on the minister of foreign affairs, was followed by
the discord over the German contribution to development assistance. If one
would believe eyewitnesses, chancellor and vice-chancellor fell out over
- this matter with a degree of~sharpness unknown up to that point. _
- That the liberals in the meantime are taking the l~berty of criticizing
their coalition partner in public was shown by the speech of FDP Bundestag
Deputy Hans-Guenter Hoppe in the budget deliberations of the Bundestag
- during the summer. Hoppe, who already in connection with last year's budget
= had sneered at the deficit policy of the government, this time reaZly raved
and ranted in his criticism of the debt volume of the federal budget.
~
- Forced into an alliance with their senior partner, the right-wingers and
rank-and-file liberals in the FDP at least are~attempting to make the best
_ of it: They are cooking on the f ire of smoldering conflicts. No opportunity
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is missed to demonstrate that they themselves represent a different, and -
better, political conception. They no longer show any regard for their own
left wing, which feels extremely comfortable--to be sure, not with Schmidt--
_ but with social c:emocracy as a whole as a bed partner. In order not to be
relegated to complete oblivion in the confrontation election battle, their
motto is: "Attract attention at any price."
Confrontation Pressur~
- The FDP has always lost votes when confrontation took the big wind out of
its sails. The consequence of the Adenauer-Schumacher row caused it to '
decrease in 1953 from 11.9 to 9.5 percent. During the time of the weak SPD '
lead~r Erich Ollenhauer it recovered to 12.8 percent; a strengthened SPD
under Willy Brandt against weak CDU Chancellor Ludwig Erhard again lowered
it to 9.5 percent; ~hen--with the Brandt-Kiesinger situation--it dropped to
5.8 percent. The still stronger confrontation between Schmidt and Strauss
could do it a similar bad turn in 1980.
- FDP chief Franz Bluecher FDP chief Erich Mende FDP ~~hief Walter Scheel
, 9.5% 12.8% 5.8%
1953 1961 1969
Thus, the SPD propagandists for a speed limit on the expressways failed,
- with Minister for Research and Technology Volker Hauff in the lead, owing
to the rightist liberal phalanx. The same Hauff received a brush-off from
the FDP in his attem~t to demand savings of 5 perc~:nt next winter from the
owners of oil-furnaces and to prohibit swimming in heated pools. -
In the question of nuclear energy, Genscher even seeks to outdo the "atomic
- chancellor" (slang used by the Young Socialists) and, on the basis of the
nuclear energy compromise reached by the Bremen Party Congress, to portray
. his party as the only absolute advocate of atomic energy among the established
parties--of course, in a nice, non-committal form.. Genscher's general
secretary, Guenter Verheugen, explained in DER SPIEGEL the not-only-but-also
line: "I believe that at the moment, if we want to make available as much
energy as up to now, we cannot do with~ut nuclear power. However, since
we have recognized the quite unusual potential for danger of this energy,
we must pursue a policy which enables us to give up nuclear energy as soon
as possible." .
Verheugen's first sentence plainly testifies to the political intention;
the second--in order to mollify--covers up a little that which must not be
advertised at the moment. Genscher does not contemplate for a moment being ~
- delicate with the left at a time when he cannot free him~elf from the Social
Democrats anyhow. �
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The only consideration which might have beex~ abla~ to keep tht ~aheeler-dealer, -
the supertactician and interloper from presenting�himself so exposed to the
voter would be the respect for skQptical minorities which must be kept in
line. In actual fact, however, the people at FDP headquartere, the Thomaa
Dehler Hause in Bonn, believe that those who oppoae g;-owth and proeperity
- have long since taken off in the "Green" direction any~aay.
_ The election result in Bremen, where previously surveys rumored that the
FDP clientele had been cut in half, nroved he was right: The liberals ~
remained relatively stable there--though they lost their sensatinnal increase
from the preceding Landtag election. The "Greens," howe~er, entered
parliament chiefly at the expense of the CDU.
And image-making continues: The taxpayers, according to a resolution of
the Bremen Party Congress adopted in the summer of thi~ year, are to be
given relief to the extent of 3.6 billion. The state father fi~ure is to
refund the citizen the higher prices for gasoline and heating oil through _
wage and income tax reductions. Increases in contributions to pension
insurance, as planned by the SPD, are rigorously rejected by the FDP.
This is how a person in normal times would resolutely catapult himself out
_ of a government coalition. Howeve_r., Hans-Dietrich Genscher, wi~~ would ~.ike
to have left the coalition--but only if it appeared that he was being driven
out--knows that he may now, openly and undisturbed, go fishing for the voters
of the oth~r side.
Thus the FDP fares like a marriage partner who no longer likes the other
one, but yet remains with him because a divorce would be too expensive.
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, it appears, is preparing himself for a long marriage -
of convenience with the SPD.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Gruner & Jahr AG & Co �
8970
- CSO: 3103
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[~UR UFI~ 1C l~L U51~, l)NLY
COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
- SERIOUS DISCORD AFFECTING PS, PCF MAYORS' OFFICES
Paris L'EXPRESS in Fr~nch 20 Oct 79 pp 114-116
[Article by Michel Labro and Jacques Rot!re]
[Text] 1977: The united left wins the municipal elections. 19i9: The -
situation is changed. From Angers to Lilla, from Reims to Rennes, there is
a battle in 20 mayors' offices between the PCF and the PS. The surprising ' -
thing is that there are not more battles.
Angers, Thursday, 11 October. The outmoded decor of the marriage chamber
where in March 1977 the united left had drunk the champagne of an unexpected
victory. A~bit on the solemn side, the socialist mayor reads a brief
_ statem~nt: He has relieved his communist deputy mayors of their.
_ responsibilities.
The event.went far beyond th~ city setting.~ The municipalities continued =
to be the only place where the left succeeded in having its divisions kept
- q~uiet. This considerable [political] capital--155 cities of over 300,000 _
inhabitants administered jointly, including 72 by a communist mayor--neither .
- the PCF nor the PS wanted to lose. And there in Angers everything came
apart. Next, in Paris, in the PCF's glass building, place du Colonel-Fabien,
as well as in the PS headquarters, place Palais-Bourbon, there was alarm.
What if this were contagious? _
The mayors' offices are the last existing link between the two parties.
ThesP are the only places where the unitary spirit continues to draw breath,
however haltingly. In some mayor's offices, relations are still goad.
"Here, we get along fine," says one socialist deputy mayur from Beziers, the
_ fourth largest Proven:al city administered by a communist mayor, Paul
- Balmigere, ~ge 71. He is an almost historical figure of the party. He
speaks of his gast as an activist, rolling his "r's" like the streams of his
native Corbieres roll pebbles. Ah! He was a hard one, "Balmi" [Balmigere).
- Before the war, he did strong-arm work for his party in a region where, since
1920, communists and socialists have never spared one another. However,
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tcday, he is considered by his socialist parzners or radicals of the left
to be a"liberal." There is not a 3ingle muni.cipal agenda that is not
~issected and discussed until unanimity is reached. The only friendly
reproach: the interminable length of the discussions, the inevitable price
paid for democracy a la Beziers.
What is the recipe for this miraculous equilibrium? A well-~balanced municipal
council which gives the majority t~~ no one. "It is not possible to decide
a11 alone," the ma.yor says with a half smile. "Beziers mayonnaise has its
_ limitations; it can still turn," a socialist confesses. "The interchanges
between us are as lively today as they were a year ago."
- In several cities, the idyll is said to have lasted only a single summer. .
- After the shattering of the unity of the left in September 1977, communists -
and socialists are discovering that tfiey are not in agreement on the great
- principles nor on the small details. Here, they refuse to call a plaza
"Leon-Blum." There, they want nothing to do with a"Maurice-Thorez"
bouelevard. They quarrel about minicipal democracy or local taxes. The
PCF wants to vote for expenditures which are popular, but it finds the
burden too heavy to bear when it comes to i.ncreasing revenues. That is,
taxes. The si~uation is becoming bitter in several municipalities. In
Reims, since October 1977, the socialists have been in conflict with the
communist mayor, Claude Lamblin~. The situation is deteriorating in Nantes
also. In the north, irritations are increasing. In short order, Georges
Marchias called a halt to prevent contagion. "Tn my opinion," he said, "the
differences existtng at the tup should not call into question the municipal
accomplishments [acquis]." The watchword is to preserve the municipalities
= at all costs. A line of conduct to which the party has adhered no matter
what...up to now. For things are in the process of changing. -
"No Blood for the Dying"
Relations between our two parties are as bad as they can be," Pierre Mauroy
- admitted in Lille on 17 September 1979. "However, in the municipalities
things are all right," Crash! One week later, the communists of Lille
displayed an administrative note recommending that doctors avoid the practice
of giving blood transfusions to patients whom they know to be terminal. In
a shattering article entitled: "No Blood for the Dying," they attack
indiscriminately Giscard, Barre and...the mayor of Lille. As for the -
president of the Regional Hospital Center, "He covered the government with
his silence." Three days later, Mauroy was once again on the carpet, ~-.rr,~
publicly accused this time of too often being "on the government's side" in
his mayor's office. One of his co~unist deputy mayors impassively
_ witnessed his ordeal. Another attack, finally, at the beginning of the month.
- On the first Sunday in October, in Quesnoy, about 50 lan from Lille, with
great pomp, the name of the former socialist minister, Eugene Thomas, was
given to the city's secondary school. The mayor of Lille was present, as
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well as the minister of education. As for the communists, they demonstrated
in front of the school. The next day they wrote: "Mauroy received Beullac.
That tells how far the search for a consensus has gone." The accusation
was carried directly to the Lille mayor's office this time by one of Mauroy's _
assistants.
' Why these skirmishes? Because the party's position has changed. The change
was obvious during the two meetings held recently by the mayors and the
elected communists, one on 25 June, in Pantin, and the other on 26 September,
- in Saint-Denis. The focus of the discussions: relations with the socialists.
In both cases, the same diagnosis: the differences between the two parties
is penetrating the mayors' offices. It is time to show that the socialists
are turning their backs on their municipal commitments. That they are ready
to take over power to engage in a policy of austerity. For example, by
accepting transfers of responsibilities or tax increases. From this came =
the change in communist strategy: we must, said the PCF, be present in the
streets, demonstrate against the increase in assessments, taxes, etc.
Translation in plain language: maintain external pressure on the socialists.
That is the municipal version of unity at the grass roots.
Transcendental Meditation
The external pressure tactic at times gives the socialists a headache. On
Tuesday, 25 September, at 1630 hours, in the Place de la Mairie, in Rennes,
the socialist mayor, Edmond Herve, recieved a delegation of demonstrating
textile workers. Their company, a bankrupt raincoat plant, is at the point
of being bought up. The buyer, a Swiss holding company with a sect of Indian
origin behind it, placed an incredible condition on the purchase: the
_ employees will have to devote 20 minutes in the morning and afternoon to
transcendental meditation. The indignant mayor promised to intervene. On
this point, he was in full agreement with his communist deputy mayors who
were also present at the demonstration. Were they not once again
- living in full unified harmony in Rennes? In the opinion of both camps,
their clashes could be counted on the fingers of one hand. The mayor was
stupefied when he read a pamphlet distributed by the communist federation:
"Herve will parade at the head of the demonstration. He is deceiving you."
And the pamphlet explains: "In Brussels the socialists approved the
liquidation of the French textile industry."
The followi.ng Mondayt the mayor demanded explanations from the municipal
- council. The communists refused: "We have agreed not to introduce our party
_ differences here." In an aside, a deputy mayor confided: "As an elected
_ official, I have solidarity with the municipal council in this matter. As
a communist, I have nothing to retract from what was written." AnotYier
pamphlet was nevertheless distributed. This time without a personal attack
on the mayor. The attitude of the Rennes communists derives naturally from `
the party's new strategy. It was up to the federation to make life difficult
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~
for the socialists. It was up to the elected officials to round off the
sharp points so as not to pass the point of no return. But how far is it
before the point of no return?
~
There have been clashes between the socialists and communists for the last
2 and 1/2 years in Angers, since rhe public transportation affair. The
contract was granted by the old municipality to a private company, as in many
other ~ities of France.
_ Everything went normally at the outset. And then, all of a sudden, the
mayor discovered that the company's charge was exhorbitant and that
hiring had taken plac~ in an ill-considered manner. The affair was so big
that there was even talk of a sabotage attempt ~gainst th~ union of the left
municipality. The buses are in the process of cutting a gaping hole in the
city's finances: more than 2 billion centimes. A completely rotten dossier.
The mayor examined the problem from this side and that side: there was no
- way out withaut dismissals. A harsh blow for this former leader of the CFDT
[French Democratic Confederation of� Labor]. Fifty years of age and greying, -
a fast and direct speaker, Jean Monnier is ha~e and hearty [de la gueule et ~
- de la poigne]. May 1968: he was the only one in Angers who had weight with
the chief of police. March 1977: Angers remained a moderate city, with
tortuous and peaceful streets which surround the cathedral and the chateau.
The church had lost its influence in the region; but penple continued to _
pray there and to have more children than anywhere else. No one here thinks
_ much of the victory of the left. Only one man believes in it: Monnier.
He has another conviction, almost an obsession: the left to which he belongs
viscerally must be credible in the economic sector. It will be unable to
come to power until it has demonstrated its capability of managing.
There he is taken at his word with respect to an agenda which is a real head- _
_ ache for all municipalities; reconciliation of public transportation, public
services and the necessarily limited budgetary resources of the municipalities.
Is not the same problem posed in Valence where the CGT [General Confederation
of Labor] and the elected socialists are confronting one another over the
management of the bus network? The mayor of Angers does not wish to finance
an alarming deficit by taking money from the pockets of the people of Angers.
_ And the former trade unionist, who had taken the habit of using the same
language in the office of the police chief and during a meeting, announced
dismissals. Then came a tough strike. The demonstrators sat on the hood of
his car, laid siege to the mayor's office. The mayor did not budge. He told ~
the unionists: "You are doirig your thing; I am doing mine."
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For him, the real confrontation is elsewhere, inside the mayor's office with
- the communists. They know him well, Jean Monnier. They know that he is
not suspected of being a man of the right. They cut loose against this
Rocardian, however, who behaves like a tough boss [patron de choc]. Angere
is the turn to the right of the PS, Plus the movement back to the center of
the CFDT.
In the Streets or in the Mayor's Office?
, "He did not consult us," charges Marcel Paquereau, a former communist teacher, _
municipal councilor. "We refuse to approve the dismissals." Another solu~ion -
was possible f or the co~unists. The state had threatened to withdraw its
aid if the city did not clear up the situation. It was necessary to mobilize
the people, instead of making humiliating concessions [passer sous les
Fourches Caudines] to the government. And the communists demonstrated in ~
the streets beside the bus workers.
In the streets or in the mayor's office? "We must choose," said the mayor.
He had practiced unity with the PCF for 20 years in union action. For him,
the union of the left was not a principle, as it was for many socialists.
It was a balance of power. Were the communists bringing back into question
by their attitude the cohesiveness of the municipal council? He took away
their delegations.
= The technique was not new. It had already been used by other socialist
mayors in Dreux and Besancon. And even in Saint-Priest Rhone, on two
occasions, 1 month af ter the March 1977 elections. The communist group refused
to approve the budget. The mayor's immediate reaction: withdrawal of the
communist deputy mayors' delegations. They would be restored when they
approved the budget. Then withdrawn when they again refused.
Angers is something else. The winning of the city was one of the biggest
surprises o.~ the last elections. More than an example, a symbol of the
thrust of the left in the country. _
With the union of the left buried, did not the crack up in Angers threaten
to become another symbol? The first reaction of the elected socialists was
to think that the mayor, over there, had been too quick and too far. A few
days later, the municipal council of Nantes, with PS leadership, experienced
- the need to say that it was formed of a knit-together team [equipe soudee]. -
There is no lack of problems in Nantes, however, as elsewhere.
Should we be surprised today by the serious differences observed in the
united municipalities--a total of 20?
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On the contrary, the surprising thing is that there are so few of them:
that the communists are still able to manage the cities with allies accused
daily of veering to the right; that the socialists can still work with
partners suspected publicly of having premeditated the left�s setback in
1978. For how long?
COPYRIGHT: S.A. Groupe Express, Paris, 1979
8143
- CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANC~ .
- GROUND FORCES AIR SUPPORT REVIEWED _
Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Oct 79 pp 18-19 _
[Article by Lt-Col Herve Mangin d'OuincQ: "Conventional Firepower Air
Support"]
[TextJ In the eventuality of a mid-Europe conflict, our
maneuver ground forces will need an important amount of
air support. The following article will discuss the
possibilities and mechanisms of such a support.
For 2 years as the head of the 13th fighter squadron -
based at Colmar, I have been led through a good number
of exercises and drills to assess the main mission of
~ my two tactical squadrons of Mirage VF's, in other words -
the conventional firepower air support of our divisions.
_ In case of a conventional air and ground conflict, air support will come
under many forms. It can, for instance, translate itself into attack
missions meant to harass, neutralize or destroy the enemy ground forces
or into cover missions over the battlefield in order to obtain a local and
temporary air superiority. I will deal here only with the air support
realized through attack missions by spelling out the difficulties that come
with the execution of such missions, then the improvements that one can
- brinR to their implementation.
� An Indispensable Dialog
There are two kinds of support: indirect and direct air support.
Indirect support is given beyond the line of fire between the two armies,
in the depth of the enemy territory; its implementation does not present
any special difficulties witn the exception, of. course, of the ground-to-air
artillery and the figh~ter planes of the enemy. In this zone every target
is an enemy target and our fighter squadrons can attack everything that
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~
rvc~ vrrit,ieu, UJr. V1YLL
justifiably invites their fire; thes~ include the enemy's supply centers,
the main lines of communication, hi.s means of transmission, his radar and
_ his ground and air infrastructure, Moreover, such missions only rar.ely
are of immediate urgency, which gererally allows for timely planning.
Direct support is an altogether different and delicate matter. It is
done within the lines of fire of the two armies to protect armored or
mechanized units. In this zone the air units intervene upon the request
_ and agreement of the ground forces, they hit designated and easily identifiable
targets. An example is a classic target like a concentration of some ten
tanks which a large-size fighter patrol unit is expected to neutralize in -
the space of some hours.
The ~iaison here is indispensable between the friendly forces in cantact
with the enemy and the formations in flight; guiding must be provided by a
forward air controller or a ground guidance officer in order to preserve the
security of the friendly troops on the one hand and to facilitate the ~
reassessment of the assigned target's geographical location. ~ _
In the course of this mission, the task of the one-seater pilot is extremely
important because the enemy ground-to-air artillery is particularly dense
and active; our pilots must therefore approach at very low altitude and at
very great speed, get the target into sight as soon as possible and finally -
_ to pass to the firing.
- In such a context where the limits become very clear as to the combined
maneuver of ground and air, it is indispensable to have fu113~ experienced
forward air control or ground guidance personnel in order to succeed. This
very specialized personnel has two very specific missions: to des'ignate
_ the target to the pilots, which entails very serious problems in this area
of overlapping forces where well-characterized points are sometimes hard to
find and cehere smoke spotting signals could be confused with any vehicle
in fire; to give the go-ahead signal to the flight leader to shoot.
Finally near the line of contact between the two armies, the enemy also
puts into massive utilization its electronic war means, which in a r~al
situation would strongly impede the indispensable dialog between the pilots
and the controllers. ~
Towards Greater Effectiveness .
The analysis of the mechanisms of air support has allowed us to discern the
difficulties of implementation of these tactical missions.
However, several steps have been taken recently in order to improve the
- effectiveness of our air support; these concern the personnel and t}~e
material.
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As regards the personnel a serious effort has been agreed upon and is
expected to be enlarged upon. In addition to the ground guidance officer
training programs, the army corps and divisions now require numerous
training missions at the Tactical Air Command; thus the guidance officers
have the opportunity to perfect themselves through relatively frequent drills.
The land army liaison officers who are placed in the fighter squadrons
organize short information sessions where the ground guidance officers of
the coupled division caz visit the combat squadrons during 48 hours, make
contact with the pilots and appreciate perfectly the difficulties of target
_ identification while in flight, whether in one or several flights, in two-
seaters of the type Fouga or T33.
Inversely, the pilots are invited to participate in the maneuvers of the
divisions in camp or on free terrain and thus acquire a better knowledge
- of the material of the ground army; finally, in the course of "air drill" -
days in camp, they advise the ground guidance officers in the guiding of
air patrols.
The coupling of fighter squadron and division, the men's will to learn and
to understand each other's problems are essential points needed to increase
the success and effectiveness of the close air support missions.
~ As regard the material the Tactical Air Command essentially has at its
disposal the tactical fighter Jaguar which can carry up to 3.5 tons of
_ bombs and the Mirage VF which, equipped with its 2 RPK external reserve
drums, *can carry a total of ten 250-kilogram bombs.
- These two planes constitute the essential material of the forces designed
for air support. With their adapted weaponry (30-mm cannon, 68-mm rockets, -
and braked or smooth rolling bombs) these planes are very operational
- shooting platforms.
Nonetheless, since t~he battlefield targets are getting to be tougher and
tougher targets, a special effort has been ma~3e in order to define and
develop new weaponry: anti-silo bombs; anti-personnel or antitanlc bombs;
100-mm rockets.
The use of these new weapons which are recently perfected is expected to
increase significantly the effectiveness of the tactical air support.
The Mirage 2000 and the Aladin Radar
During the next decade, the addition of the "support and penetration"
version of the Mirage 2000 to the tactical squadrons is expected to increase
even more the effectiveness of our air support.
* RPK drums: outside reserve drums to which bombs could be attached.
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The fighter pilots of about 1985 will be able to use the tactical veraion
= of this new and polyvalent fighter plane, with the best chances of success.
To wit: in independent mission: all-weather nuclear penetration; in
secondary mission: direct or indirect conventional fire support. ~
In effect this f ighter plane will be on the one hand very maniable and
maneuverable thanks to its electrical fight command and its brilliant
performances and on the other hand very formidable because of its ~ew
weapons system. Moreover, it will be very well-equipped in electronic
self-protecting counteracting means; it will thus be less wlnerable to
the anti-aircraf t artillery or to the enemy ground-to-air rockets.
Thanks to the possibilities ot his new weapons system, the pilot in conventional
firepower support mission will: have an automatic firing adjustment system
which will permit the continuous calculation of the impacting point, thus
allowing for a very precise shooting run; have the possibility of designating
and illuminating targets by laser and then by shooting the appropriate weaponry
as guided by laser or television (1000-kilogram bombs or a;r-to-ground devices
of the type AS 30). The present tests of the Pod Atlis and of the Arriei
- self-directing head are extremely promising.
At the present time, in the course of their tactical missions, the planes
are often guided by mobile radar systems which follow the movement of the -
_ ground troops and allow for close control of the planes in flight up to r
the time that they get into the purview of the forward air controllers or
the ground guidance officers. The performance of this material is no doubt
satisfactory, but it will be even better yet when the Aladin low-altitude
detection radar becomes operational.
As we conclude this brief study where we have underlined the difficulties
of implementation of the air suppor~ missions, it becomes apparent that the
squadrons of the Tactical Air Command are particularly fitted for fulfilling
this delicate mission.
To render these missions more effective, important efforts have been made
and will be taken: on the personnel plan to intensify the training of pilots
_ for flying in heavy equipment, to develop the coupling of divisions and -
fighter squadrons, and to raise the importance of the "air drill" days for -
the benefit of troops maneuvering in camp; on the material plan to define
and build better adap~ed weaponry. ~
Finally, the coming production of the Mirage 2000 in its tactical v.ersion
and the setting in operation of the new low-altitude detection Aladin
radars are the best middle-term guarantees of the effectiveness, ever
improved upon, of the air support missions.
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Entering the Air Academy in 1958 (Bleriot promotion), Lt-Col Herve Mangin
d'Ouince wae licenaed fighter ~ilot on 15 July 1960. After starting his
career in the "Mousquetaire" squadron 212 in Algeria, he commanded a wing
of Mirage III E of th~ Artois squadron 1/13. Licenaed test pilot on 20
July 1969, he was during five years responsible for the perfecting of the -
Anglo-French "Jaguar" prototype. After having commanded the 13th squadron
_ of fighter planes at Colmar (1976-1978), he is at the present time undergoing
training at the Air War General Officer School.
COPYRIGHT: 1979, Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Au~ourd'hui"
1751
- CSO: 3100 -
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COUN~~Y' S~CTION' ~?RANCE
G~N~RAL CANN~T DTS~USS$S 1979~80 ~'LANS ~'OR ALAT _
~ari~ A~R & COS~OS 3n Fr~r~ch 27 Oet 79 pp 39, 56
[Article ~y J~an d~ ~alard: "Ground Foxces Li,ght Av~.a+~ion 3,n 1979-1980~~] ~
[T~xtJ As tt~~ gu~sfi of honor o~ the Aviation and Space ~ub1~,~ Re7.at~.ons
C1ub, Brig G~n Maur~,c~ ~anr~~t, CG, AT,AT [Gxound Foxces T,3ght Av~.ation] ,
present~d a very~ irttere~~3r~g br~;~~ing on tRat ~ outE3,t, in t~rms o~ p~x~
sonnel and ~qua;p~~nt. He otttlin~d th~ organizat3,ona1 struetuxe resulting
from a reorgan~~ation oxde~ ~.n 1976 and impl~mented zn 1977; he also de-
scxiDed tRe ~volut~,on o~ ~quipm~nt employu~ent doctxin~s.
Today, ALAT cor~s3,sts of som~ 6,000 men, including 2,800 regu7.ars (500
o�'~~,cers and 2,300 NCOs); thsy~ ar~ ~he p~,~,ats, tA~ mschan3cs, th~ rraEff,c -
cor~troll~rs, and tP~~ weath~r sp~cial3sts; logist~c~ ar~ handl~d by about -
3,000 draft~ea. The oxgart~zation has 700 afircra~t, o~ which 600 are pex-
man~ntly ava~.lab~e; 625 ar~ SA~318 A1.ouette TT, SA~37,6 Alouette IIT,
SA~341, Gaz~l~.e, and SA~330~ ~ua h~~icopter~; 75 are light 7.3aison ox
~ x~co3.nna3,~sance a~,rcra~t (20 i~~1521 Broussard and 55 Cessna L19) .
Calculating th~ manpow~er~equipment ratio, we flind that the ALAT has 4.5
- r~gulars per craft, in othsr words, 1.85 pilots, 1.60 sn~ehanics, and 1.05
support p~rsonn~l; in overall terms, this 3s one of th~ 1ow~st ratios.fat
any armed forc~s anyw&.~re i,n th~ wo~ld. On fihe ottl~r~ h~nd, i� we look at
the "ptlot xa~~,o," tR~,s is undoubted7.y on~ of th~ A~gh~~t ratios.
Aft~r re~v3,~wiz~g the Droad ouC13,n~a o~ the reorganization ordered in 1~76
(estat~~,i~~n~nt of 7.ia~son h~l~copt~x grou~s, w~.tt~ sevQn su~h groups in
~ pea~ett~te and n3,ne in w~7~ti;n~; as we17. as attack h~l~copter~ x~g3men~s, _
_ w~ith t3,v~ in ~eaeet3~n~ ~nd ~~x ~.ta, w'axtitu~) ~ General Cazn~t~ ctnderscored
- th~ $if f~rence between th~ C~o ma~ ox types of m3,ss~tons hereaf t~r caxried
out D}~ ~h~ ~T,A~ h~,1,~copfiera~; Assis~ance to tha command and combaC branches
(~iso~,atad a~rera~t sa~~sions} and participation ~,n cons~at, emphazizing th~ _
~act tRat on~ and tAe ~ame ~tn3,t eannot hand7.e di~~erent typ~s~ of md.ssion~s.
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- A~,~T is at~ out�~,t th.at i,a compl~~e,~y avai~,abl~ a~ any mom~nt (SO~hour
wvxk w~~ks ~x~ almost standaxd); ~t ~.e c$pabl~ o~ caxry~ing out a1,1 of
it$ ~qisstmr~~ wi~hout outs~de~ 7,ogist~c euppo~+t. ~t t~tc~s car~ of the
cp~~1~t~ ~raining o~ fi,+ts p~1,o~,e ae ~11 as other pi~ota ~cmdng Proa~
~he~ m~ta~~d~; the proportfion o~ the latter however xQm,ains l~ited ~a
2S pe~~Qe~n~. Th~ total monthly~ f~,y~3,ng hours 3s on tt~~ order of 2S
tto4rs ~or ~.60 C~azel~,e ~ra~t and 421, hours flor the Y.3Q Puma cra~t. _
Topal an~yal op~rat~or~a com~ tv around Z60,OQ0 i~ours, ~,r~th a 7.ow
_ ac~c~dc;n~ rat~, ~n ott~~x woxds, or~~ accident Por every 50,000 hours
v~p Q.2 p~x l0,OQ0 Aours~. Acaord~r~g to th~ AT,~x commaander, th~,s is
ay~,~qos.fi t~al.i2 0~ t~~ aeC~der~~ rafi~ ~.n the a~.r~gxound ou~~its fi,n foxeign
2txt~~~s~, 'J,'t~~ ALA~' p~~,ots ~7.y about 10 hot~~s pex tqon~t~ and the F~ma
p~~ofi~ put ir~ aDmufi 20 hours� ir~ th~ f'light eimulata~ ~rith SO hours of -
~ly~n~ .
A~'fi~r oufil~n~~ng thQ operat~arta7. sp~ci~i~ations oi' th~ Gaze~,le-~Tot heli~
~ eopt~r ~ whial~ w~',].1 ite i;ssu~d ~,n st~i;~~c~,~nt ~,utr~b~r�s to the ALAT units,
- ~ene,~aX Ca,n~e.~ ~:~d~cated the ~haraetQr3,stica~ o~ th,~ ~hi~+d~gen~ration
A~ he,].~aoptq~+; I~t w~i7,1 ~2~~e~ fio b~ P~r~~t17,y~ a~ed and it w~:7.1 hav'e
~a~ ezn~t c}uant~ty~ o� calor3es le~ss tha~ th@. s~ne3.t~v~t}r thrQSho~,d o~
~he Ii~c,gu~d~d saiss.~le~~ o~' tAe ~-utur~, which wi7,1 work on Dand II; ifi
w~7.J. ?~ave~ to p~ ~le~i;gn~d ~r~th a vietrr to th~ p~r~ex~manees� of tomorrow's
a,~c~cnored ~~x~e~s~ wh~ch. eould ~asi~,y~ op~~^ate at n~;ght and wRich. w~,7,1 be -
� a~a�m~pan~~d ttr a~~d R~7.~aopt~xs eq~t~,pped ~r~.th 30-~mn autom~~:~c canr~on.
9.'ttq I~I,icopt~r alwa~ys disp9,aywd a~t ~xc~17.e,nt ~ap~Bilitg ~or w3.thstand~
- ir~$ ~~n~~plos~,~~ w~apons� ~~r~. ~ut th~s~ are not ~he~ t~el~;cop~~rs that
w~;'l,l sto~ t?~q taniC~, G~n~ra~ Cann~t cor~c7.ud~d; ~.nstea~d, a we~7.l~handl~d
a4~r~amb~1,~ ~y~sts~ ~17, ~e aA1~ to stop an arcaor~d uni;t, .
_ CO~Y~T(~Ii~: ~~r & ~osmos; Paris, 1979
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COUNTRY SECTTON F'RANCE
TACTICAL AIR FORCE EXERCISE DESCRIBED
Paris AI~R & COSMOS in ~'rench 27 Oct 79 p 39
_ � [Text] Each year, a very specia~, exercise, dubbed "CenZaure" bombing
strike, provides for high-spirited competiCion among the nuclear-
mission squadrons of the Tactical Air Force. Exercis~ "Cen~aure" which
always tatc.~s place under as realistic conditions as possible enaDles
the couQnand to measure the overall effectiveness of weapons systems.
~ So Par, there have been four squadrons participating ia this exerc-i~e:
- Ztao squadrons of Mirage TII-E, from the 4th Fighfier Wi.ng, based at
I,uxeuil, and two squadrons of Jaguars from the 7th Fighter Wing, based �
at Sainfi-Dizier.
Soon thexe wi11 be five of theut since the establishtaent of the 5th squa-
- dron has been scheduled i'or 1980. The two nuclear squadrons of the 7th
- WYng w311 be ~oined by a third one to be based at Istres. Like the llth
~'ighter W~ng at Tou1, the 7th thus will have four squadroas and, like
the 11th, that fourth squadron will be outside the territory of� the First
Air Regioa. Like 4/11 [4th squadron, 11th wing], based at Bordeaux--
which is under the command o� FATAC [Tactical Air Force�], in termE of
employment but which is under the authority of HQ, Third RA [Air Region]
co~xcerning everything involving questions of a territorial nature--4/7,
based a~ Istres, ~,ril1 be under FATAC for operafiional employment and under
HQ, Fourth RA for questions of a territorial nature. The range of FATAC
missions how~ver wi11 be broadened as the operational flexibility of its
unit is incrQased.
- It appeared that stationing four fighter squadrons at one base was not a
wise thing to do and that it would be better to seek a certain degree of -
deconcentration. As for the selection of Istres in the Southeast region,
= it ~.s explained by the fact that the base currently has a DAMS (Special -
_ Munitions Work~h,op and Depot) for the EAS [Stiategic Air Forces].
1 ;
COPYRIGHT: Air & Cosmos, Paris, 19~9 =
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
NUCT,EAR SUBMARINE AELAYS AROUSE CON~'ROVERSY
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 27 Oct 79 p 39
[Text] Mr Jacques Cressard presented the special report on the 1980
- de~ense budget for the Nat3,oaa1 Assembly's Finance, General Economy, and
P1.anning Committee; in h3s r~poxt (page 35 [of original]), he introduced -
the following remarks reviewing the effort over the pasfi three years. -
Physical oh3ectives -
(1) A11 programa, which were to be carried o~it under the planning law
during an initial interval, spring from decisions preceding thoae pro-
grams, although there was no followup action after those decisions were
made. (2) The operational eommissioning of France's nuclear submarines
was accom~lished at a rate which became increasin.gly slower: 13 months
- pass~d between the "Terrible" and the "Redoutable"; 17 months passed
between the "Foudroyant" and the "Terrible"; 31 months separated Che
- "Tndomptsb~.e" from the "Foudroyant"; 42 months elapsed between the
"Tonnant" and Che "Irtdomptable"; about 60 months passed between the
"Tnf1~x~.ble" and the "Tonnant" (review of commiasioning dates: "Re-
doutable," 1 December 1971; "Terrible," 1 January 1975; "Foudroyant,"
6 Jun~ 1974; "Tndomptable", 31 December 1976; "Tonnant," June 1980;
"Tn~lexihle," 1985). (3) The paarer of France's strategic force will be _
doubled, not in three years, as ind4.cated in thc d.,~a~.~:..ar~~ ~cport, but
in four years (from the start of 1977 until the end of 1980). In the
meantime, it is not so much the unit-power of payloads involved (to the
_ extent that the effect grows about four or five fiimes less than the
power) but rafiher fiheir number, in other words, this explains the impor-
tance of mi~siles w3,th multiple warheads and a relatively large fleet of
nuclear submarines.
In responding to these excerpts from the repart by Mr Cressard, the de-
fense ministry noted the �ollowing points: In order not to allow the
idea to spr~ad that the effort made in terms of modernization and thus
in terms of the credibility of France's nuclear deterrent forces~has
been slowed down."
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"(1) There has been no delay in the construction of the nuclear submarine
which, in the case a~ a11 of them, including "Inflexible," is going for-
ward as scheduled;
"(2) The commiesioning schedule for "Inflexible" ie aeaentially determined
- by the production of the M-4 waapone (booster and nuclear miseile). This
ia a deciaive etep in progress in French strategic weapons and ataying with-
in the schedule--delivery of 16 operational missiles in 1985--is already a
remarkahle achievemen~;
- "(3) The titqe int~rval thus determined is being used in order profounclly
- to modify the cha~acteristics of "Infexible't which will be a new-type
nuclear submarine. The fact that it will ha~ve increased performance (more
accurate navigafi3en sy~stems, firing from great~r de~ths, less noise, t~et-
ter detection, response capability, more reliable communications) would
thus ~ustify a comparison with the development intervals required foY a
prototype, rather than with the units of a series launched 15 years ago;
"(4) The cotrunissioning of nuclear submarines, converp~ to the M-4 w~apons,
has been scheduled at the rate of one every 18 months over the next decade."
COPYRTGHT: Air & Cosmos, ~aris, 1979 ~
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
- ~L~HUMANITE' LOSING READERS AS 'LIBERATION' GAINS
_ Paris L'EXPRESS in French 20 Oct 79 p 116
[Article by Christian Fauvet]
[Text] ~,~hen a church confuses its faithful, the parish bulletin no longer
_ - sells. That is what is happening to the Communist Party. For the first time .
since its establishment--and for the fifth consecutive week--the daily news- -
paper, LIBERATION, is outselling L'HUMANITE in surface Paris (that is, the
- city of Paris without the metro and railway station kiosks): Z6,371 copies
on the average compared to 15,888.
It is L'HUMA, the beacon of leftists newspapers, which is continuing to
_ lose readers. As for LIBERATION, its sales continue to increase: more
than 4,000 copies in 1 year. ~'or its part, LE MATIN has taken off: every
day in Paris its circulation pushes 30,000 copies. For Roland Leroy, the
editor of the communist daily newspaper, this is a h~3rsh blow. Georges
Marchais who was waiting for the opportunity did not miss his chance. At
the end o.f September, in the Assetnbly, during a meeting of the communist
group, he deplored even the inability of his former rival to disseminate the
~deas of the 23d Congress in the Party's daiiy newsparer.
Strange dia gnosis: if sales drop (2,000 copies in 1 year) it is precisely
because these ideas are poorly understood by the activists. "It is true that
. they no longer follow us," a journalist of L'HUMANITE confides. "It is even
probable that throu~h all of France we have fallen below 100,000 copies." _
The co~nunist weekly press is not doir~g any better. The activist sales of
L'HUMANITE-DIMANCHE have drepped considerably. And publications designed
for inte?lectuals, which had become sounding boards, have been forced to
close their doors. LA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE and FRANCE NOUVELLE will be -
replaced by another weekly, headed by Guy Hermier, a member of the Politburo.
"This wi1Z be an open, combative newspaper," he expla~ins, "destined to make
its mark on French political and cultural life with its or~,ginality."
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The daily newspaper, L'HUMANITE, will not change its form