JPRS ID: 8955 USSR REPORT RESOURCES

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020057-5
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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~ JPRS L%8791 ~ _
30 November 1979
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V1/est E u ro e R e o rt
p p
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~
JPRS L/8791
30 November 1979
~
- WEST EUROPE REPO RT -
. (FOUO 67/79)
~ CONTENTS PAG~
COUNTRY SECTION
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Established Parties Lose Votes to Green Movement
(Emanuel Eckardt; STERN, 31 Oct 79a 1
CSU Leadership Divided on Strauss Campaign Strategy
~(Werner D'hein; STERN, 31 Oct) 5
~ FRANCE -
Pr?.;::e Minister Barre's Health Discussed
(LA LETTRE DE L'EXPAIVSYON, 22 Oct 79) 7
PCF Criticized for Position ori Czechoslovakia, CFDT's Maire
(Jean Elleinstein Interview; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, -
8-14 Oct 79) 8
Armed Forces Information, PR Service Duties Outlined
- (Pierre-Charles Guillemot; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Oct 79) 12 -
. `
_ 'Realistic' Naval Construction Policy Described
(Jean Schweitzer; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Oct 79)........ 19
~ Funding Considered for Successor to Mirage IV
' (AIR & COSMOS, 20 Oct 79) 21
- . Approach to Sciei~tific-Technical Budget Exai .?ed
(Jean-Pierre Chevenement, Jacques Descours-Desacre
Interview; LA RECHERCHE, Oct 79) 22
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
- ITALY
Commentary Complains Detente Losing Credibility
(Nino Milazzo; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 29 Oct 79)..0....... 26 ~
_ Mezzogiorno Minister Opposes 'Special Fund' for Calabria
- (Michele Di ~iesi Interview; CORRIERE DELLA SERA,
24 Oct 79) 28
Details on Navy's New Hydrofoil RHS 200
(DEFENSA, Aug-Sep 79) 31 -
SPAIN '
. Navarre Divided Over Integration With BasquP Region
~ (CAMBIO 16, 21 Oct 79) 32
. Briefs '
Missiles Ordered 37
Investment in CASA 37
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COi1NTRY SI:CTT.ON FRD~RAI. RP;PUBI,IC OF GF.RMANY
_ ESTABLISHED PARTIES LOSE VOTES TO GREEN MOVII~IEENT -
Hamburg STERN in German 31 Oct 79 pp 88-94
- ~Article by Emanuel Ec'~ardt: "A Greening in the Fall"]
[Text] Representatives of the Greens are moving into the
- parliaments. The environmentalists are getting ready for
an assault on Bonr.. STERN correspondent Emanuel Eckardt
reports on the reasons why more and more citizens are
turning away fxom the established parties and fighting
against destruction of the environment and unchecked
economic growth.
- Hans Koschnik, the SPD head of government in Germ3ny's smallest Land,
called it a"surprise for Bremen and for me." For the first time in an
election in a La:~d, ttie "Greens" had managed to hurdle the 5-percent
mark and to move in~.:o the parliament. They did so with 5.14 percent of
- the vote--that is, representing as many as 2a,911 inhabiCants of Bremen. ~
- The second surprise went almost unnoticed. More persczs entitled to vote
than. had done so in any Land at any time previously turned their backs,
one way or another, on the established parties in Bremen, either by
voting for small parties or by not going to the polls in the first place.
_ "As a party," says Frhard Eppler, SPD chairman in Baden-Wuerttemberg and -
the party's econological expert, "the Greens are not the kind of inter-
locutors that need to be taken serious'-~, but as an intellectual trend
they are of great significance." Green is no,t ~ust a fashionable polit-
ical color in the solid middle-class suburbs o.f Bremen. Eppler: "In my
estimation 30 percent of all young voters can be r~~tivated by questions
_ addressed by the Greens." `
_ Actually the suddenly strengthened Green movement has a long tradition.
~ The idea of flight germinated as early as at the turn of the century, ~
when citizens 1i~3.ng in somber rental barracks sought a way out of the
; gray city walls which they regarded as the root of all evil. Life
- Leaguers [Lebensbuendler], nature healers and nutri:tion reformers, nudists
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and hou~sing pioneers were all drawn to nature. The Wandervuegel [German
_ hiking association] fled civilization just as the hippies and flower
children did 60 years later. In many German towns suburban vegetable
garden developments were established--a sea of bowers as a contribution
to humanizing the residential environment intended to give workers a way
= of life that was closer to nature and more wholesome. _
Nevertheless, particularly in the years of develo~;ment after World War II,
economic growth remained the guideline of the consumer society. The price
for this in almost all industrialized countries was the same--growing en- -
croachment of the environment. The PRG balance sheet looks iike this:
~ --Since 197U, the European year of the protection of nature, 100,000 km
- of streets and industrial roads have been built in the countryside, and
" 400,000 hectares of nature izave been built over, never to be seen again.
--A total of 15,000 habitats ("biotopes") for animals and plants have '
- fallen victim to reallocation of arable land; irreplaceable valuable ~
_ areas of moisture, moors, meadows and ponds were drained and tur*_:ed
" into areas for operating big agricultural machines.
--In the past 9 years the number of chemical preparations in the FRG has ~
risen from 45,000 to 60,000, and 35 million_liters of waste oil have
vanished just as mysteriously as have medicaments to a value of DM 18
billion. ~ -
The chemist and former SPD deputy Dr Frank Haenschke draws up a sad balance
sheet of Bonn environmental policy: "A misPrable sewage tax Zaw. Insuffi-
: cient taking advantage of the opportunities presented by the food and waste
removal law. Protection of nature without plaintiffs and at the pleasure `
of the agriculturists. A traffic noise law for which the *ninister for the
environment refuses responsibility and in which the minister of finance
fixes the limits."
Ecologist Frank Haenschke resigned his Bundestag seat in 1978. He had been
part of a minority of SPC and FDP deputies in Bonn (not even zi dozen people) ~
that thought it was the task of environmental policy not only to eliminate -
any damage in whatever way possible but to see to it that such damage did
_ not occur in the first piace. As far as they axe concerned, protection of
the natural environmental living conditions is a"comprehensive (political)
criterion" which must not be subjected to the whins of econamic trends. ~
The overwhelming majorit~ of deputies in Bonn counters this by stating that
- protection of the environment costs money. And this money can be raised -
only if industry makes a profit, if it cames up with surpluses which can
yield funds for the px~otection of tYie envi.ronment. If there is no profit,
environmental protection ruins industry and destroys jobs. "According to
this philosophy," warns Social Democrai Haenschke, "protection of the en- -
vironment remains a political luxury which we can afford only if we have -
some money left for it."
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- The Counci'1 of Experts for Environmental Questions, an indeper~dent body
of professors certif~ing to the environmental state of affairs in periodic
reports on behalf of the federal government, deplores not only the inade-
quacy of laws (such as the watered-down environmental chemicals law) but,
above all, a"lag in execution," noticeable everywhere, which prevents
decisions tn favor of environmental protection. A shy~ng zway from 4c~~-
_ logical measures is noticeable above all in the offices of district ~dmin- -
istrators and all the lower level authorities who exercise an influence on
the shaping of the 11ndscape and on the handling of it. It is not in the _
Bundestag but on district and municipal boards that decisions are made on
such things as a district highway, deforestation of a small wood in a com-
munity, the draining of ineadows and supervision of munitions plants. -
But even decisions at the lowest level, as far as the affected citizen is
concerned, are decisions from above, not with him but withuut him and
against him. Not having shared in the decisionmaking, the affected people
banded together in citizen's initiatives. And these often went to the
- barricades with such force that the trade unions became frightened and
made common cause with business, being afraid *_hat the protection of the
environment being demanded everywhere in the countryside would operate
as a brake on growtli and as a stop against economic prosperity, threat-
- ening big business and thus also ~obs. After a survey by the federal
government, ob~ections by citizen's initiatives led to the freezing of
- investments of more than DM 26 billion in 1976.
Actually there is not a single question in which there exists as great
agreement between social bodies--churches, parties, trade unions--and
their representatives on the one hand, and the citizens, on the other,
as in the case of "protection of the environment." Everyone is for it. -
In an Allensbach poll in 1977, 75 percent of all Germans supported the
_ need of protecting the envixonment. According to the poll, 45 percent
would even put up with the risk of becoming unemployed if a healthy en- _
vironment could not be attained otherwise.
~ In the meantime, an environmental attitude has also been adopted by
circles of people on whom protection of the environment had previously
been imposed. "We must not saw off the branch on which we are sitting,"
says Peter von Siemens, builder of power plants and Germany's biggest
employer. Having come to ponder the s~tuation on his walks al~ng the -
, Isar near i~Iunich, the industrial leader addresses a serious warning to
his fellow industrial tycoons, saying: "We must not impose a burden
~ on our environment with the argument that we wilJ -~ot be able to com-
' pete otherwise. I am definitely of the opinion t.ddt in the final anal-
ysis only whatever is ecologically defensible can be implemented econom-
ically."
I An out-and-out supporter of the ideas of anthroposophy, Siemens warns:
I "We must cease regarding our soil as a grain factory. We must not use
chemical fertilizers if there is a possibility of attaining yields through
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biological-dynamic cultivation." Only the builders ot power plants ~oi
whom he is one), Siemens thinks, need not be admonished by him. "We are
a clean industry~," he says.
It is true that the industry cleans the Rhine by building biological waste-
water purification plants ar_d cleans the air with filters and fume desul- -
furizers. It has come up with more than half of the DM 100 liillion being
spent on protection of the environment until 1980. . _
- The public relations offices of the large concerns keep pointing out what
a great contribution they are making to creating a new clean Germany--as
though it was not these very industries that produced the dirt polluting
the environment.
Conservative, liberal and social democratic politicians are as confident
as ever in the ability of the market economy to steer itself. They point
to the clean air law passed as early as in 1964, to the laws and regula-
tions which have gone into effect since and to the achievements of ecolog-
ical technology, which they say has been able to handle a great many prob-
- lems. They argue that by international standards the environmental policy
of the nation and the Laender has nothing to be ashamed o~f. And many of
them warn that even greater protection of the environment would mean even
more government, even more controls, even more liureaucracy.
But are the controls adequate? Can the market really control what it
institutes? Does it protect the citizens from radiation? Does it pre-
vent destructive exploitation of the earth's natural raw materials? '
Does the principle of supply and demand insure the basis of our existence
or not rather its sellout?
It is not only the Greens who demand a reorientation of the way we live, a ~
new environmental ethic; so do philosophers and biologists, behavioral
scientists and clerics, conservative environmentalists and Marxist profes-
- sors.
Almost all d.rafts for a better future on this planet, one making it worth
].iving on it, have one basic trend in common--the thesis "Sma11 is beauti- '
- ful" formulated by the Englishman Friedrich Schumacher. Better to proceed
small than to perish big. Is it not possible to make do with fewer giant i
airports, mammoth schools and highrises, with fewer super highways and big
department stores? Is it not better to ride a bicycle than to rush down a I
super highway in an air conditioned six-cylinder car on the weekend? In
fact, what is this type of forward motion which one survives only wearing
seat belts?
+ The fact that the Greens are not impressed by the material constraints of
realpolitik has not been shown better by anyone than by former CDU Bundestag
Deputy Herbert Gruhl, who last year founded the "Gruene Aktion Zukunft"
[Green Action for the FutureJ and demanded in his "Green Manifesto" that _
"everything must become simpler--man, government, technology, transport." -
Simply that.
- COPYRIGHT: 1979 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co
- 8790
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COUNTRY' SECTION FEDERAL ItEPUBLIC OF GERMA,NY -
~ CSU LEADERSHIP DIVIDED ON STRAUSS CAMPAIGN STRATEGY
Hamburg STERN in German 31 Oct 79 pp 141-142
[Article by Werner D'hein: "Wrong Advice From the Provinces--CSU Deputy
Chairman Friedrich Zimmermann and Secretary General Edmund Stoiber at Odds
_ About Proper Election Campaign Strategy for Franz Josef Strauss"]
[TextJ More than 3 months after Franz Josef Strauss was named candidate for
chancellor, things became too much even for the MUENCHNER MERKUR, an organ
loyal to the CSU. "What we see of the CSU chaixman," said editor-in-chief
_ Paul Pucher angrily, "has been improvised rather strenuously and poorly;
there is no noticeable strategic line."
In Bonn, CSU Deputy Chairman Friedrich Zimmermann en~oyed reading the charges
by Strauss fan Pucher. They coincide with his criticisms of the campa~gn _
tactics which he had offered his "dear Franz Josef" in a tete-a-tete a few
days earlier. The main point was that Strauss would have a chance in 1980
only if "at long last" he detached himself from the haze of his provincial
advisers in Munich and performed as a statesman on the stage in Bonn.
"Otherwise we can forget about the election," Zimmermann said.
The "people in Bonn" (that is, CSU Bundestag leader Zimmermann and his we11-
oiled machine) charge that the "people in Munich" in the Bavarian government
and party headquarters are amateurs. "The people in Munich have no proper
feel at all for what is at issue in Bonn," a CSU deputy complains. "They
do not feel the pulse and have no sense of nuance." ~
The main targ~t of criticism is CSU Secretary General Edmund Stoiber.
Zimmermann accuses him of the following:
,
--He is "dangerously oversimplifying by lumping S~..ial Democrats and Nazis
- together."
--He threatened with a split in the unitary trade union at an inopportune
time.
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--He gave his boss bad advice about Brezhenev's latest disarmament initia- _
tive. (~trauss was enthusiasti:c about tfie plan despite the fact that the
reaction of NATO and tfie ~RG goverument was one skeptical reservation.)
--He gave party spokesman Godel Rosenberg the green light to go after DGB
[German Labor Union Federation] head Heinz Vetter, although Strauss had
- embraced the union chief a few days earlier.
--He did not miss any opportunity to thrash the press, particularly of
radio and television, because of its allegedly untoward reporting about
the candidate for chancellor.
- Zimmermann demands that Stoiber be kept on a tight rein, but his problem
is that Strauss, while realizing that "Edmund occasionally overdoes things,"
actually does not really mind--because Strauss too occasionally exaggerates.
On the other hand, Zimmermann and Strauss agreed about a greater presence
in Bonn of the candidate for chancellor. In the future, Stra?~ss plans to j
cheer the Christian Dem~cratic Bundestag deputies every month with "topical
analyses of the situation and perspe~tives for the future." According to a
Strauss confidant in Bonn, "this is urgently needed, because the team feels
shaky; they want to know where they are going." ~
i
Every 4 weeks, the Bavarian minister-president also wants to use the stage
of the Bundesrat [FRG upper house] for performances pregnant with headlines.
In addition, he intends to put in an appearance at Bonn official receptions
rather than wait until official guests such as China's Hua Guofeng call on ~
him in Munich.
Strauss even let himself be convinced that attending the Bonn press ball in
mid-Nuvember would pay off better than visiting a people's fafr in Upper
Bavaria.
Finally, the CDU/CSU candidate for chancellor plans to call more oft~n on
newspapers` offices and to get his chief at the Munich government offices, -
_ Wilhelm Knittel, out of the habit of �regarding "counterpresentations" as j
the sole effective means of handling the press. ~
Actually, the disturbed relations with the press were to have been smoothed
- out long ago by a friend of Strauss, CSU Deputy Hans (",7onny") Klein. But ~
far the former PR manager of the Munich Olympics has been unable to sell
Strauss because he has lacked the physical capacity to do so. He is still
waiting for a chair and desk for his new election campaign office in
Fritz-Schaeffer-Strasse in Bonn. There is a delay in delivery. The furni-
ture is coming from Munich.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co
~ 8790 _
CSO: 3103 6
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
PRIME MINISTER BARRE'S HEALTH DISCUSSED
Paris LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in French 22 Oct 79 p 2 "
[Text] As always, the prime minister's health problems are fostering
some rather fantastic rumors. Acc:ording to information we obtained from
a reliable source, the fallowing sequence of events took place. Raymond -
Barre has suffered from gout for a long time (which explains why he has
been seen limping on several occasions, in particular last Monday evening
" at the Elysee during the reception fcr Hua Guofeng). But he neglected
to take proper care of himself. "I look after myself in my own way,"
= he told friends. His reputation for having a huge appetite, his slight
interest in long walks (he scarcely ever goes out into the park at
Matignon), his taste for late conversations with friends and late-evening
television shows are well-known.
This unhealthy lifestyle added to the weight of his responsibilities, has
induced extreme fatigue. When he was getting up last Thursday murning,
Barre suddenly experienced a tightness in his chest. His family was.very
_ upset. The nearest doctor was called (since he doesn't seer~ to have a -
family doctor who cares f or him on ~ regular basis); after having found
that Mr Barre's blood pressure was very high, the doctor called in a
cardiologist who recommended that the patient be admitted to Val-de-Grace
for more extensive tests. By the end of the week, having received care
_ and rest, Barre felt better and wanted to resume his activities. He was
dissuaded from doing so in order that the tests could be completed. One
of his friends had this comment: "If he is put on a diet, he will be out
of sorts." However, by the end of the week, his family was convinced that,
he could soon resume his activities, o.i condition that he practise more
self-discipline, because the treatment which he must follow will inevitably
be tiring for him.
Nothing is more reassuring than truth and clarity. This seems to have been
forgotten by some over-zealous colleagues of the prime minister. Thus,
persons responsible for making decisions in the mass media werQ asked, as
early as Thursday morning, to prohibit the use of the word "hypertension"
in their newspapers and news bulletins. _
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Groupe Expansion S.A.
9174
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CdUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
PCF CRITICIZED FOR POSITION ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA, CFDT'S MAIRE
~ Paris LE NOUVEL O~SERVA'.PEUR in French 8-14 Oct 79 pp 51-52
~
[Interview with cammunist dissident Jean Elleinstein by George~ Mamy--
date and place not given]
- i
[Text] Last May, the couQnunist historian Jean Elleinstein I
approved of the conclusions reached at the 23d French
Cammunist Party congress.` Such an attitude could seem
like a rally or a sign of submission on the part of an
intellectual who had harshly denounced his party's
responsibilities for the left's failure is~ the March
1978 legislature. Furthermore, last month, Elleinstein
took part in one of the debates at the party for L'HUMANITE.
But today he feels the need ~o express his new fears, which
ar.e also those of other intellectuals (and militants) of the
PCF: the party is not applying, he says, the decisions of
the 23d congress, and what it "does practice" is opposed to
the achievement of "unity," wh~~h he sti11 sses as indispensable. '
[Question] Since 1976, you have often mentioned the "necessary historical
alliance between the Communist Party and the Socialist Party." But
it is just when the PCF is becoming most hostile toward the PS that you ~
are approaching the direction that you had kept your distance fr~m before.
Doesn't that bother you? Do you find that the case? ,
[Answer] First of all, I still hold that an historical alliance
between the PCF and the PS is necessary in order to brin~; about the changes
which our society demands and to face the crisis. There can be no
solution without that historical alliance. Of course, I have never felt
that such an alliance could only be brought about by an agreement at the
_ top; but it cannot get by without that agreement. tn fact, there are
two nistakes which must not be made: only to sei~ the unity at the top,
which was somewhat the case of the "common progran~;" and one of its
weaknesses: or else only to speak of unity "at base level." They both ~
have to be there at Che same time. As I see it, the concern of our party's
23d congress is in affirming the need to rebuild unity upon new bases, but ~
- a unity which wi11 utltimately require agreements at the top.
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[Questi.on~ I'or the manent, Pursui~ ot "unity at base level" is actually -
met: w1.Ch ,in ?~nl-.ensc 1?c~stility at tlie tc~p. -
[Anscaer] That is a real pro~,lem. Besides, it ~s not a one-way streeC.
The leaders of the ttao main ~arties of the left are engaged in a very
dangerous verbal assault. That the PCF criticizes the PS, that's legitimate
enough. I ~hare that criticism on many points because I still have more
reas~~n for being a communist than for not being one. But there is a
- certain way of doing things, and political debate must be carried on -
differently. You have to present the public with information on problems -
under discussion in a clear, sc~rious and responsible manner. The criticism
. must be made with a concern for serting up the conditions for a new -
agreement. That's nut being done when, for the socialist side, Jean Poperen--
- whom I respect as a person--decides to do his own criticizing and says _
that the PCF is a vassal of Moscow. That's not ~eing serious.... _
_ [Question] Is it ~n~re serious practically to call the PS a vassal of
Giscard?
[Ans~aer] I'd have to criticize both atti.tudes. And it will take a great
~ effor.t to avoid that web of mistrust. Not only on the part of the leaders,
but al.l those who make up the people of the left, who are very aware that
there can be no progress or changes in the country ti~ithout unity. The appeal
must be made to all of them, militants and nonmilitants alike, all those
who still hope for that unity. And in that sense I had an interest in t
the23d Congress. Yet I must admit that there are contradictions in my
~ party's practices. And these contradictions worry many communxsts, as they
have worried me. -
' [Question] Exactly: is it in keeping with the unity of what you call the
' people of the left to have such an i11-founded suspicion about Edmond Maire _
and the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation Labor]? Here, we're not
~alking about the political leaders, but abou*. coming to an. agreement
among the workers.
[~,nswer] Right. The way Edmond Maire was criticized in L'HUMANITE for
several days to me was unacceptable. It's possible for someone not to
~ agree with the CFDT, and I don't un every point. But you can't say in
~ a11 seriousness, expecting to be believecl, that Maire is an agent of Giscard,
' or that he is striving toward "consensi~_;," as L'HLTMADTITE did. That pertains
to a process of intention, which I criticize. Whether he was right or not
in going to the colloquium on information, Chat's onE thing. But to talk
about the problem of the joint production committ~ right to know and
control the use of the information in their undertaking like he did, that's
_ another thing. And if the president of the republic insists on making that
claim, I am led to believe it's a victory for the workers. Are there ulterior
motives in the head of state's behavior? Obviously. But these motives can
first of all be attributed to the real disunity in the left's political
organizations. Besides, in a more general sense, the laclc of a clear political
_ alternative has disastrous consequences for the social struggles themselves. _
And when the goverrunent adopts a position that you agree with, I don't see
_ shy you can't express that agreement. Personally, therefore, I don't
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think the government'~ Middle East policy is bad. Why can't you say so -
without being suspected of working for the "consensus" of the right?
Trying.to reach an agreement between Israel and the PLO aimed at creating
a Palestinian state is something to be desired. When you say that, it doesn't -
- mean you approve of all of Discard's diploma::y.
[Question] But that's the kind of behavior your party is always denouncing
in others.
[Answer] There are many French people, many workers for that matter, who ~
are now very critical of the left's political st~uctures; because they _
find that for one reason or another they aren't able to provide an answer -
to the real problems facing the French people. Thus, as our congress
stated, we need to struggle, besides the fact that the danger of a"consensus"
of the right is a real one, and there is always that temptation to settle �
- for s ane "national union" which, as a general rule, is a cover-up for the
politics of the right. And the French Communist Party has the capacity for
c omirg out against this danger and basing its policy on classes: you can't -
confuse Eurocommunism and social democracy. But by attacking Edmond Maire
the way he was just attacked, you're not advancing "unity at base level."
[Question] You'll admit then that the practices of the PCF counteracts
the optimistic vein in which you interpret the 23d Congress?
[Answer] That's the issue. There are some decisions of that Congress with ~
which I have shown my agreement, and there is their practical application.
And I must say in all honesty that there are misunderstandings between the
two. I would like to mention two recent examples with regard to the communist
- intellectuals. The first is the appeal made by some of them against the trial
in Czechoslovakia, against the lawyers and the ones responsible for
"Charter 77." That appeal was published in LE MONDE and elsewhere. The
lawyers have since that time received several hundred signatures. L'HUMANITE
- only made one mention of it.
[Question] Shouldn't the party itself have intervened?
[Answer] Of course. It's t�rue that Georges Marchais said that he had
intervened directly with the Czech Communist Party. But obviously that is
not enough. There should have been a public intervention. And not only
about Czechoslovakia, but also against the anti-Semitism in the SovieC
Union. There, the French Cammunist Party didn't intervene forcefully enough
either and condemn that country's anti~Semitism. On the other hand, very
typical is, unfortunately, the way that the PCF tried to forbid the communists
from signing the appeal on behalf of the participants of "Charter 77" who
were arrested and convicted in Czechoslovakia, and even to convince somP of
those who signed to retract their signatures.
[Question] It came to that?
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[Ansc~er] Sure. And those are the practices that are absolutely opposed
to the dec:isions of the 23d Congress and the Central Committee meeting
for the intellectuals which follinaed. And if I've approved of the congress,
as f~r as I'm concerned, it's iiiainly because of the decisions made regarding
the intellectuals: the congress's tribunal for prel.iminary discussion;
the special Central Committee meeting; the creation of a new, more open,
weekly newspaper; and the creation of an institute for free research. All ~
that was in keeping with my ~aishc~s. But with respect to Czechoslovakia,
what is being done contradicts ~ahat is being said. Just like the
- assassination of Pierre Goldman.
[Question] Is that the second "fact" that you want to give as an example?
[Answer] Yes, You know that there was no party clelegation to the -
Goldman funeral. There was one From the CGT. But there was no official
_ party position taken and no representative. And I can't understand
~ that. I can't see how such an attitude can be justified in light of the
23d congress. It's completely against....
,
[Question] Except if you were mistaken about tY~e real sense of those
- decisions.
- [Answer] I don't think so. 'L'he texts are all there. And it's because
this "law" of the party exists thar I'm trying to cooperate as a loyal
member m make it have a true bearing on reality. But it goes without
saying that this endeavor requires vigilance and a spirit of criticism.
And it seems that with the examples just mentioned--excessive criticisms ~
of Edmond Maire, trial in Czechoslovakia, Pierre Goldman's funeral, we're
biting the leash, we're getting away from the 23d congress. And that's
what causes confusion and anxiety among communists.
[Question] In your opinion, why didn't the PCF want to be present at
Goldman's funeral?
[Answer] That's the question that thousands of communists have asked and
_ are asking. Was it because of the victim's personality? Or was it due
to a refusal to take part in a public display with the socialist leaders?
- In any event, the absence is subject to criticism--no matter what you think
~.bout the Socialist Party, we really need to get back as soon as possible
to more unified practices. We can't b~ satisfied with practices which,
, if allowed to develop, would look like those of the German PCF in 1932 instead
of building a new unity. Likewise, the PS should not adopt a behavior
similar to the German SD party of the same period
COPYRIGHT: 1979 "le Nouvel Observateur" `
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
ARMED FORCES INFORMATION, PR SERVICE DUTIES OUTLINED _
Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD`HUI in French Oct 79 pp 7-9 ~
[Article by Pierre-Charles Guillemot: "The Armed Forces, Secrets and
Information"]
_ i
[Text] I got off at the small station of Diss near Norwich, in that part
of England called East Anglia, one evening in December 1944. A USAF car
was waiting for me to drive me to the base occupied by the 100th bomber
group, Eighth Air Force, consisting of B-17 Flying Fortresses, and I could
not have imagined the welcome that was given me.
i~
A proud and militant team spirit had earned the group the nickname of I
"Bloody 100th." Pilots, navigators and machine gunners were all deeply ,
convinced of the fact that their feats had gained them such a reputation
with the enemy that the German fighters made it a rule to go after them
especially among the bomber formations which were then attacking the Third
Reich on a daily basis.
With my green badge of war correspondent on my uniform, I was then doing ;
my first reportage. I was requested in a friendly way to contribute to
the legend of the 100tn and the PIO (Public Information Officer) did not
refuse me a thing. Even arid up to the two or three missions. in which I.
participated, I was able to discover the smallest details, both through
the group and the 8th Air Force, including the conception and the imple- ;
mentation of the air war against Germany.
Enthusiastically i made publicity for the Bloody 100th and contributed
generously to the "Press Book" which was lovingly kept by Captain Bowers, ,
in the form of press clippings. I was then too young to be able to analyze
the philosophy of public relations of the 8th Air Force. Since then, I
have written many other "papers." I have had contact with many other '
military persons and especially, of course, with French military personnel.
And I understood that the behavior of my American friends of 1944-45 was _
that of a"dominant and self-confident" army, which was not ~nly certain to ,
be walking on the road to victory but which was fired up by the uaanimous
and unstinted support of its people given to the crusade that it was leading.
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_ Inglorious Wars
Not all wars are like that which the armed forces are called on tc conduct
- in serving the government and the nation. Conflicts which engage the army
as a consequence of historical circumstances or political mistakes put the
army to hard tests. It must pay the price of blood while the political
class, the parties and public opinion tear one another to pieces on issues
at stake. Whi_le the civilians are negotiating, the army still must accept
its sacrifices in battle.
Is it then hard to understand that the army thus withdraws unto itself and
. that its members now search within their own family the same aims of de-
fending a common. ideal, armed with a clear suspicion of everything th~t
is not of itself?
Yet never more than in our time, the army has been the expression of the
people from which it comes and which insures its continued existence.
After the vast brewing process of the World War I, the army has been
opened throughout its hierarchy to all the classes in French society.
Coming out of the painful conflicts in Indochina and Algeria, it could ~
see itself now in a clearly defined philosophy of national independence
and a clearly expressed defense doctrine. It could finally dream now of
Ho Chi Minh's sentence which is much admired by the psychological action
specialists: "The army must be of the people like a fish in water."
To Do and To Inform
~t remains necessary, however, that the people know about and understand
what the army is doing. Nothing illustrates this idea better than the
creation in 1926 of the "Press Information" service in the navy, decreed =
by Georges Leygues, then minister of the navy, who had wished to obtain _
a more substantial budget.
Since then, for more than half a century, the extraordinar.y development
' of information ranges through the written press, radio and television, has
put public opinion directly and immediately in contact with events through
the printed word, sounds and images. Not only does the citizen of today _
who is bathing in a sea of information no longer admit that one can hide
this or that element of a national Cuestion, the internationalization of
communications would totally negate such an attempt. Would one wish for
a proof? Leaving aside the first experimental shots of our nuclear weapons
in the Sahara, the government and the Defense Ministry have always kept
secret the tests conducted since 1966 in the Pol~- _sian atolls of Fangatofa ~
and Mururoa. Nonetheless their dates and the nature of the tests are known
thanks to--or because of--the watchfulness of the Australians and the New
Zealanders who regularly announced them. The antinuclear campaigns which
- have developed in these two countries, in particular, have f~stered the
utilization of the subterranean shooting method.
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For an Information Doctrine
- If the "informution" operation of Georges Leygues in 1926 had to do with
a concern for punctuality of sorts, it was the awareness of both the -
necessity and indispensable character of the information whi.ch brought
Michel Debre to create by ministerial decree on 7 October 1969 ttie SIRPA
[Armed Forces Information and Public Rel3tions Service], which this year
is celeUrating its lOth anniversary. SIRPA's objectives have to do with
the same search for national consensus which I had found in my American
~ friends in 1944:
- to make known and explain the defense and military policies of France;
- to present the activities and evolution of our armies under a~.l their
different aspects; ~
~ - to expand the relations between the various armies and the different
' social groups in the nation.
Like all military objectives, the realization of the above has involved ,
many a difficulty and contradiction. For if a geographically lo.:alized ~
conflict affects in dramatic fashion, no doubt but only in a limited
sense, one part of the national territory and of the population, when one ~
comes to the first objective assigned to SIRPA we are talking about the
fate of the entire nation. For one cannot conceive of a defense policy '
or elaborate a miiitary policy without bringing into play the future of
each one of our citizens.
The Idea of Independence
The obsession of the national independence idea which had marked the life
and work of General De Gaulle has in one stroke guided the major drawings
of our defense policy. Founded upon the constitution of a nuclear deter-
' rence force freed from all foreign subordination, it has implied our dis-
engagement from the integrated defense system of NATO. It was a questi~n
here of two fundamental and irreversible options which could only be taken
in the perspective, at least in middle range term, of agreement by almost
the total body of national opinion.
For at the beginning, the principle of a"force de frappe" was to say
~ the least controversial in spite of the fact that the Fourth Republic
had taken measures not to leave France outside of the great power dialogue
in terms of nuclear weaponry. -
From as early as 8 October 1945, the Atomic Energy Commission, created at
- the instigation of General De Gaulle, had among its functions the mission
of studying atomic energy for the purpose of national defense.
At the end of 1952, the Pinay administration decided to build the CEA
[Atomic Energy Commission] Center at Marcoule for the production of
plutonium so as to have the fissionable matter needed for the fabrication
of the atomic bomb.
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On 30 November 1956, the Mollet administration decided on a 4-year program
which assigned ~ -
- - to the CEA the preparatory studies for the explosion of experimental atomic
testings, plus the scientific part of the testings; and
- to the Armed Forces the preparations for and the support needed to
explode the nuclear devices.
On 15 July 1957, the construction of the Experimental Center of Reggane _
was decided upon and in January 1958 the Felix Gaillard administration
_ ordered that necessary dispositions be taken to realize a first series of
- experimental testings of military pupose atomic devices starting in the
first quarter of 1960. As a consequence, on 15 February 1969, under the
Fifth Republic, the first French nuc?ear explosion took place which had a
power of 60 to 70 kilotons, or three times the power of the Hiroshima bomb.
Three Censuring Motions
Middle term consensus... That was the objective to aim at. After three
censuring motions at the National Assembly on 24 October, 22 November
and 6 December 1960, the.Debree administration resorted to Article 44 of
_ the Constitution and to the blocked vote to get adopted the 1960-64
project and program-law which foresaw notably the realization of a first
operational nuclear weagonry system: a fission bomb to be launched by
Mirage IV's. '
I~
- Thus, the French deterrence force as it is found today in its three main -
components was underway: second program-law of 1965-70 with, on 29 March
_ 1967, the launching of the first nuclear submarine and the first explosions
in 1968 of uranium 235 experimental devices which came from the isotopic
separation plant of Pierrelatte. Third program-law of 1971-75 which the
_ putting into operation of 2 units of 9 SSBS missiles at the Albion plateau,
without taking into consideration the development and manufacturing of
middle range ballistic vectors for the Land Army (Pluton System) and of
tactical nuclear bombs for the Air Army.
A logical consequence of such a defense policy: on 1 March 1966 France
withdrew from the integrated command of NATO and gave notice to the 14
Atlantic Alliance partners that this decision would bring with it the
transfer outside of French territory of the command headquarters of Allied
forces in Europe. _
More than 20 years after the first program-law ha ~ublic opinion come -
to perceive the sense of a national independence policy which has been
followed in defense matters under three presidents of the republic? The
answers given to 12 questions submitted t~ the four great political formations
in France at tiie beginning of 1978, in view of legislative decisions, by
the National Committee of Liaison Defense-Army-Nation, can give us the
proof: on the two opinions dealt with above (deterrence force and re~ection
of dependence on an integrated military system) the Communist Party, the
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Socialist Party, the Republican Party and the Rally for th.e Republic were
unanimous, even if the Socialist Party which was fundamentally hostile to
nuclear weapons pronounced itself in favor of keeping the deterrence force
at its present level in the expectation of negotiations in view of general
disarmament.
The wished-for national consensus has thus been realized, at least in middle
term, on the fundamental questions wh~ch engage the destiny of the national
for several generations to come.
In Al1 Honesty
The mission cannot for that reason be considered completed. On the contrary,
defense and military policies and living realities which evolve together ,
with our technologies and demand constant explanations. This could be done
only through the media which are unavoidable intermediaries between the
respor.~ible parties at the Defense Ministry and its instrument, the military ,
establishment, on the one hand, and their various targets as they say in ,
publicity work, which one seeks to reach, on the other. And these targets, i
one is not always aware, are of an extraordinary variety. They go from the I
French grassroots taxpayer, whose cotisation will serve to feed a constantly I
increasing defense budget, to a television viewer of some Third World i
country, of the Atlantic Alliance, or of the Warsaw Pact. For information, i
whether one wishes it or not, is a consumption good thrown into the world '
market where each journalist would take according to the needs and concerns
of the human community which he serves.
It is here that the military person finds himself torn between two absolutely
contradictory conceptions, that of the military secret which historically
has guaranteed the effectiveness and success of his mission and the
- conception of information resulting from a necessity at once diplomatic,
pol:itical and technical: '
- diplomatic/ because the philosophy of French defense policies rests on
a deterrence force and because this force would be a deterrence factor only
to the degree that its main components are known; =
_ - political/ because as we have seen, the consensus of a highly developed
national opinion is indispensable;
-technical/ because one cannot hide anything in our days for very long,
especially when our armament industry is the object of a yearly salon
visited by buyers coming from all over the world. -
At any rate, the zone covered by the notion of "military secret" has been
considerably reduced during the last few years. The officers of the Albion
Plateau who organized guided tours or the sailors of Longue Island, who
were requested to put up a lciosk on their SNLE clearly know something about
this. To re"spond to this triple requirement there is only one solution:
_ to act in all honesty with the serenity of conviction.
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- Media Relations
The media, or more generally "the opinion relays," are in the language of -
Aesop the best anc.' the worst there is. One can deplore and curse them;
wisdom and comman ~ense would tell. us to cume to terms wiCh them. My
~ i 4~ersc~nai. experience of relations between the Armed Forces and the press
all along a lengthy career permits me to approach this problem with all -
the more frankness since their evolution in the last few years cannot but
satisfy me. _
~
The general information journalist is not by nature fired with hostile or
- perfidious intentions in regard to the military estabiishment (or any
- other state institution). He simply has the duty to inform as objectively
and also as rapidly--and this is the tragedy sometimes--as possbile.
Between the agencies and the radio stations, television and the newspapers,
the competition is stimulating but implacable. Leaving aside the happy
specialist who can afford to di.g at his own pace into a question and to
refine his article as a consequence, the information journalist is a little
the foot soldier of the profession, the one who fights everday on the
battlefield and must confront the immediate requirements. And the immediate
requirements are the newspaper's windup time and, worse still, the hourly
~ bulletin of a radio station.
He is besieged with news coming from various and not always disinterested
sources. They come from correspondents who sometimes have only a local
perspective, fragmentary or passionate, on this or that question. It
happens also that they come from rumors or simply some `-ide circulation
tidbits. In every case one must verify them, and quick, before the
competition would come out with the news. Expel~ence has told me that it
is infinitely more simple to spread an information than it is to retain it -
until one has found irrefutable confirmation.
As far as military affairs are concerned, it is relatively simple to give
to the journalists the means to verify them. First of all through an
immediate telephone call to a service and a known correspondent from whom
one can expect a frank and prec~se answer to the question put to him.
Then, in a larger perspective, through documentation notes, press conferences, ~
visits and information trips, which will give him the necessary understanding
j , of the topic; and from there he will know how to place this or that infor-
i mation in context, give it a sense whicti is correct or to reject it knowingly
if it happens to be false.
"To make known and explain the defense and militr policies of France,"
it is in fact in that way that the mission of SIR.PA is defined. In each
information bureau, the journalist in charge ~f this rubric has taken to
~ the habit of calling his correspondents party SIRPA, at the national or
, regional level, each time that he needs to check back on a piece of. news
or each time that objectivity makes it necessary to make known the viewpoint
of the military establishment.
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On tts p~:rt, thc miJ.itary establishment can expect from the ~ournalist that ~
he utilize the information given him with prudence and clearheadedness. .
The Anglo-Americans have an expression for designating the information that
one provides to a journalist for his comprehension of the event. Such infor-
mation are "off the record." It is extremely rare that thi5 rule of the
game, freely accepted by all, would be overstepped. '
The national consensus on our defense policy, the place occupied by the
Armed Forces in the nation's life, and the unanimity acquired in regard to
the national service as well as concenring our deterrence force have =
resulted in large measure from the new climate whcih has been established
in the last few years between the Armed Forces and the opinion relays.
It is a climate that needs to be developed through direct, confident and
~ friendly human relations, even at the executive level. More than one `
officer put in the Information and Public Relations Service has had to
. fight hard to win over the prejudices and preconceived ideas in order to i
go to the discovery of the complex and sometimes worrisome world of the media. ~
I know of few cases in which experience has disappointed them. i
I believe that one can; say the same thing about the immense majority of ~
journalists. All things counted, both sides have one essential thing in ~
common: both in their way are at the service of France and of the French '
people.
Pierre-Charles Guillemot, chief editox' of the CENTRAL PRESS AGENCY (ACP),
was born in 1920 in Paris where he cornpleted his primary and secondary
studies. He has made his debut in juurnalism right after the Liberation -
of Paris and has been war correspondent for LIBE-SOIR. In 1948 he went to
= work for MAROC-PRESSE in Casablanca, then became bureau chief of the Maroc
bureau of ACP in Rabat. From 1960 to 1963 he represented his agency in
Brussels, accredited to the European Communities, before coming back to -
Paris as secretary general of the editing board. He has also been
- correspondent for TIME AND LIFE, of the DAILY EXPRESS and of several radio
and television statians.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 - Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui"
1751
CSO: 3100 ~
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- COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
'REALISTIC` NAVAI, CONSTRUCTION POLICY DESCRIBED
Paris ARNEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Oct 79 pp 40, 45
[Article by Vice Admiral Jean Schweitzer: "A Realistic Naval Construction
Policy" ]
[Textj To project and build the navy of tomorrow consists first of all
to make a judicious choice and put into operation combat vessels which are
in step with the country's ambitions and resources. This is ,a long-haul
~ task and it has always been that way. The life of a vessel, from its
'birth to its retirement, of ten comes to and may even go beyond 30 years.
This should tell us about the need for a long-term conception.
For that reason the naval policq is decided at the highest levels of the
government. The guidelines for the formation of our fleet in about the
_ year 2000 have been approved last year by the president of the; republic.
In application of the policy which is thus defined and of a g%2^eral program
of action submitted to parliament, the minister of defense h�ss ~taken the -
decisions needed to launch the programs of construction.
To bring in to bear on these choices which are function of our budget _
~ capabilities our evolving operational needs and the potential threat of
the enemy as well as the changing possibiiities of our technology and
industry inplies that we must m~ke compromises which are sometimes difficult.
A big combat vc~ssel is a big complex of several weapon systems. In the -
debate, ever so `resh, between quality and quantity, between polyvalence F
specialization, one must guard against the tendency to perfectionism, The
temptation is great for operational people as well as for the engineers
- to conceive of marvelous ships equipped with the latest technical innova-
tions. But in doing so, the escalation of costs �'sks strongly to end up
in a sample navy in the fa~e of budget constraints. There are some examples
from the past which, one must say, are still there to tell us.
It is for this reason that starting from a realistic standpoint--made
necessary both by the economic situation and by a reasonable strategic
ambition which first of all stresses the number of units--the navy has _
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deliberately commi~ted itself to a policy of building series of ships `
whose sophistication is voluntarily kept limited. Such is to this day
the presiding idea which in particular relates to the construction of the
A69 sloops, of C70 corvettes and of nuclear attack submarines. The pro- _
gresses necessary for operational effectiveness are introduced by stages
starting with the hi.gh priority areas. Nuclear propuls~on, for instance,
- which at the beginning was developed for the nuclear subs launchers of
nuclear devices, will from now on be installed in the attack submarines -
and is scheduled to be placed in the future in the large surface vessels,
first o~ all on the aircraft-carriers.
The complexity of the choices that are linked to the conception and to the
_ construction of ships calls for a sound concert of efforts between the naval
command and the building service which in the case of the Navy is the
Technical Direction for Naval Construction, itself an organization located
~aithin the General Delegation for Armaments. Each organ has its own
responsibilities such as the elaboration of the operational needs and of
the military programme of the Navy headquarters, the determination of ~
technical and building solutions for the DTCN [Technical Direction for
Naval Construction]. However, a close dialog must be established from the
very conception phase between the "customer" and "supplier." This must
continue all through the construction period and intensify at the moment ~
of trial runs conducted together before the operational phase. The dialog ~
is kept on also during the lifetime of tlie vessel on the occasion of moder- ~
nizations and rebuilds which allow for the renewal of weaponry and equipment
the evolution of which is faster than that of the hulls and of ship pro-
' pulsion. ,
Vice Admiral Jean Schweitzer was born on 20 January 1~?20 in Strasbourg.
Enrolled in the Naval School in 1938, he had participated in the Norwegian
and Mediterranean operations on board the Montclan. After diverse tours
and commands on ships, he was admitted in 1955 to the Ecole superieure of
Naval Warfare. He then commanded the Casablanca, then the De Gra~se.
Named in 1973 to trie co~and of sea forces in the Indian Ocean, he took
in 1975 the functions of under chief of staff for operations, Naval Head-
- quarters, before being named navy major general on 1 September 1976. Since
1 January 1979 Admiral Schweitzer has been squadron vice admiral.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 - Revnue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Au~ourd'hui"
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
FUNDING CONSIDERED FOR SUCCESSOR TO MIRAGE IV
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 20 Oct 79 p 9
[TextJ The Defense Ministry's draft budget for 1980 contains an important
innovation: credits are provided for the adaptation of 15 Mirage IV's -
and giving them new armament that would permit them to carry out long-
range penetration missions at low altitude.
This initiative comes at a time when we Zearn that the Strategic Air ~
Co~and of the U:S. Air For ce has~decided to assign some 80 B-52D bombers
for NATO support. It is known that part of the B-52 fleet is now going
to be modified to permit them to transport cruise missiles. ~
But whereas these modifications hav~ scarcely begun, the U.S. experts are
uneasy about the future. There are those who favor the modernization of
the F-111, but more and more we note a trend in favor of designing a
modern aircraft capable of long-range penetration at low altitude, one
that could profit from the experience attained with the B-1's.
The modified Mirage IVs will have a useful life of only a few years. These
aircraft were actually built in the late 1950's and should not be con-
,`i~ , sidered operational for more than 7-8 years in a new mission sub3ecting
' their structure to a harsh test.
The~mission of enga~,�ement in a theatre or tactical action at long range _
will cdntinue beyond the new lease on life of the modified Mirage IV's,
~ whose replacement must now be contemplated. In any event, it is not a
question of using for this inission an aircraft like the Mirage 2000 whose
capacity is very inadequate to accomm~odate the equ~ ~~ent and missiles ~
required to pe.rform the long-range, low-altitude mission.
~Certain aeronautical experts and parliamentarians believe that the Mirage
4000, whose aeronautical qua.lities have now been largely demonstrated,
would ~.e the best solution, permitting the development of a auccessor to
' th~ mod;tfied M3rage IV's within a reasonable time, and this prospect will
~ probably be raised at the~upcoming budgetarq del3.berations.
i ~ COPYRI~HT: Air & Cosmos, Paris, 1979
i 5346
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- COUNTRY SECTION
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APPROACH TO SCI~idTIFIC-TECHNICAL BUDGET EXAMINED -
Paris LA RECHERCHE in French Oct 79 pp 1030-1031 !
i
[Interview with Parliament members Jean-Pierre Chevenement and J'acques I
Descours-Desacre, by Martine Borrelq: "Parliament and Science"--date and
place not given] _
[Text] As Parliament is now preparing to approve the 1980 r~search budget,
it seemed of interest to question the two~special budget reporters about
the meffibers' approach to scientific and technical problems.
Forty-year-old Jea~-Pierre Chevenement, socialist deputy from Belfort, is '
the National Assembly's special reporter to the Finance Commission. '
;
Sixty-five-year-old Jacques Descours-Desacre, UREI (Union of Republicans -
and Independents) senator from Calvados, does the same 3ob for the Senate.
;
[Question] In the area of research, is the role of Parliament restricted ;
1~ to approving the.budget? !
[Chevenement] At~present, yes. That is why the first resolution written ~
into the Finance ~ommission's report laet year was that during the firat
1979 session t~heze'be organized a.public debate on research policy. Un- i
fortunately, this:~~ebate did not take place, for the European elections ~
slowed our work too much.
Concerning that subject, in princ~ple the reporters have very extensive ~
powers, because they exercise con~plete control over registratian and posi-
t3on of all administrative and.public documents. Moreover, T had the in-
tention of putting myself "on the spot" by insist3ag that the inspector
general of finances send a report about the distribution of pub lic aid '
to businesses, if I had not received this transmission, requested since i~
last May. But in real3ty reporters have very few powers; while in the
United States, for example, the commissions have many civil servant as-
sistants, I have one administrative assistant who must deal with sev~eral ~
budgets. -
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.
[Descours-Desacre] Parliament's role is never limited to approving a bud-
get, whichever it is, because the voting is the occasion for a debate in
which every member can take part. As for the research budget, the senators
are not deficient. However, it is true that the conditions under which
the budget is examined leave limited time to study each item. Thus a few
- colleagues requested a research policy debate last year, which was to have
taken place at the last session, if we had not been occupied with text _
examinations.
[Question] Doesn't Parliament have any means to influence the ma~or orien- t -
- tations of research? Will you discuss the options of the secretary of
sta~e's 10-year plan? .
[Chevenement] In my last annual questionnaire to the government, Z ask
precisely what is the 10-year plan's significance, and on what prospective
research is it based. I can meet with Mr Aigrain and the heads of the
y large organizations, but I do not claim that T influence them through of- -
- ficial channels. My role is to keep myself informed and to inform the _
country through Parliament, and to control the use of public funds. In
this capacity I can ask the Commission and the Assembly to refuse to ap-
i prove money for research, which may or may not be respected by ury col-
~ leagues. As for the recoumnendations approved by the Commission and written
' into the annual report, they may influence the orientation, provided of -
course that the government applies th~m; in addition, an evaluation with
discussion could be done after one year.
[Descours-Desacre] Parliament's role is rather difficult, because the
iniative for expenses belongs to the government. We can only urge the
review of its choices to obtain funding for this or that action from the
total funding in the next budget, as seen in the amended finances bill.
We can also rearrange the order in some sectors where there is underutili-
zation of funds, and even ask for decreases when there is a glaring dis-
crepancy between an approved budget and its application. -
[QuestionJ If one judges by the small number of their written and oral
questions, the members are not very interested in scientific and technical
questions. Is this apparent lack of interest real?
[Chevenement] Yes and no. I 3.magine that there are enough deput~.es who
are interested in these problems, whatever their pos~tions, to act3.vate
a core group to a reflection on research. Tn effect, I bel3eve that the
scientific and technical stakes are poorly perceivp' in our country and
it's up to Parliament, but also the scienti,fic communfity and the political _
' parties, to measure thetn and make the publ-?.c aware of them.
When lack of interest is present, it doubtless represents a large area of -
public opinion; which seems to me to portend great dangex for the futuxe.
After havi.ng expected everything from science, op~nion distrests 3t and
dxsplays a kind of opposition to progress by challengi~g all research
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rva vrril,icu, u~~ U1VL1
efforts. The crisis o~ver the worth of reason is certa3.nly one of our civili-
zation's basic problems. ,
[Descours-Desacre] Certainly the members show more enthusiasm in the in-
dustrial budget discuesion, fox example, than in that for research. In the
firat case each one has very concrete facts in mind, auch as a factory in
difficulty or a family concerned. In the other case the sub3ect primarily
concerns the spirit. However, I think that we all feel that research is a
factor in the country's progress. It's only that the area is so vast and
so diverse that each one is interested in a particular sector, so a problem
- ~ust be especially acute to gain the concern of several speakers.
[Question] Don't you think that it is incumbent upon Parliament to propose
laws on all problems concerning scientific ethics?
[Chevenement] There is a scientific responsibility probletn and it should
_ be the subject of a demacratic debate. Tt's not a question of controlling
scientific activity down to the least detail, which would cause inertia. ~
But posing the problem publicly appears to me the prerequisite for reaching _
a new positive for the long term scientific stakes.
[Descours-Deacre] It's a serious question. Should morals be intimate to
the individual, or can law replace morals? I'm afraid that law can't replace
morals, but I believe that the law is desirat~le when morals are being de- j
graded. However, I think that i~ is very difficult for a parliament member ~
to legislate very technical problems, and when not all the implications are '
known. The time when the regulatory power can intervene more quickly and ,
efficaciously is, for example, when it authorizes drugs to be placed on the
market. ~
[Question] What communication do you have ~rith the scientific community? ~
- [Chevenement] Communication does not come from it. It's necessary to
know the people who aze doing the r.esearch. I know some of them and I '
devote 2 or 3 days a month to visiting laboratories and organizations, ,
which allows me to establish contacts. However., some scientists still .
have a tendency to believe that their specialty's problems interest only
_ themselves. In my opinion this attitude is excessive and dangerous, for it ~
hinders an awareness of the great possibilities for the future, such as
the development of new energy sources, genetic engineering, etc.
_ [Descours-Desacre] I am accosted more frequently by researchers in adtninis- ~
- trative, material, credit, and law problems than in sclentific problems.
- This is quite normal, as I am Fi.nance Commission reporter. I bring an
apprec;.ation of the financial aspect of research, but I have not taken
a position on the occasiox~ of this or that proposal. In addition, I
. mai,ntain constant and close friendly contacts with several research scien- _
tists, and I~must say that it's easier for me to form an opinion by talking
with them than by reading reports,.which, for those who receive them,have
an anonymous character. '
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[Question] Don't you think that Parl3ament members, who are rarely re-
searchers or engineers, would be better intellectually "armed" to discuss -
scientific and technical problems, if they were aseisted by experts?
[ChevenementJ I agree so thoroughly that I recently obtained from the presi-
_ dent of the Finance Commiasion a full time research aide, who I am going to
recruit. I al;;o want a mixed com~.ssion to be created, made up of scien-
tists and Parliament members; a ~cience a~d technology evaluation committee,
comparable ta that in the United States, would be very useful. For the
moment howevery it is a matter of only setting up groups to evaluate the
government's ~echnical options on the energy policy issue, and these groups
will include mnly Parliament members.
[Descours-Desacre] We have Che freedom to consult whomever we want, but
the experts often have conflicting opinions, and sometimes one has to feel
that they are prejudiced to this or that school of thought. There is cer-
~ tainly not a tenth, or perhaps even a hundredth of the senators who are =
familiar with all the subjects touched upon in the annual report on re-
search. But I think that the politician should combine his personal reac-
tions with the information which he receives here and there; and using -
' common sense, a sort of intuition which may or may not be useful to him,
finally determine his posit:ion.
' COPYRIGHT: 1979 Societe d'editions scientifiques
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COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
COI~fENTARY COMPLAINS DETENTE LOSING CREDIBILITY
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 29 Oct 79, p 5
[Article by Nino Milazzo: "Detente? A Lost Code"]
[Text] About a year ago, we were already asking if the second cold war had
not broken out. Today, that same question, in light of new facts and atti-
tudes, is posed with even more emphasis. But today, as then, there is in us
a sort of superstitious reluctance in recognizing that wfiich Macchiavelli
defined as the "effective reality of events": like refusing to examine tY?~
~ last phase of an analysis in order to negate the validity of the results thus
- far attained. And yet, this "unmentionable" synthesis is no longer hidden to
anyone; nor is it possible to rely any more on certain exorcisms to hide the
factual evidence. -
_ No matter how bitter, even painful, it is to admit, the world no longer follows
the code of detente. Everything changes or threatens to change beyond any
control mechanism and against every rule of solidarity. And by that we do not
- imply that detente be a rigid instrument of conservation, capable only of main-
taining the status quo. On the contrary, it had been conceived of and used
in a dynamic sense, in such a way, that is, that the forward movement of the
international scene, if not totally in agreement, at least was compatible with
its general interests. Or, better said, in agreement with the interests of
the main protagonists, those which definitely hold the keys to peace.
In oi.her words, detente did not signify justice, but it did guarantee security.
It was not the best of choices. It was, however, the best possible in a
reality characterized by divisions between capitalist and socialist.societies,
between North and South, industrialized countries and less developed countries.
~
Now, those same security safeguards have been found to be lacking. Unilateral
_ acts occur more and more frequently. And the mutat~,,ns no longer respect
equilibriums, for the simple reason that they come in contact with conflict
situations and produce destabilizing effecrs.
~ This tendency began to manifest ifself following~ the American defeat in Viet Nam.
It has become even more noticeable as it paraileled the foundering of western -
economies. Examining these general data, tw~ fundamental questions come to the
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~ -
foreground. First: the inadequacy of American leadership. Second: the will, ,
on the part of the Soviet leadership, to utilize to their benefit the un-
favorable economic condition of their adversaries and their capacity to take
- advantage of a situation with a promptness of reflexe~ characteristic of very
centralized power systems. All of the events in recent times, in fact, are
characterized by this double, constant trademark: Soviet expansionism, and the
American inability to put a halt to it.
Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, South Yemen are many such milestones in �
Moscow's drfve toward the acquisition of new positions of strength. These in
turn are followed, in time as in lagic, by the Euromissile affair and the
- encircling maneuver attempted against the whole of the Third World. -
Between blandishments and threats, the Kremlin's strategy reveals an ambitious
as well as dangerous objective: that of politically subjugating (Finlandizing) ~
Europe, capitalizing on its fears, uncertainties and divisions. In this design, ,
the warheads of the SS-20's and the generic promises of a far-off German re- ~
unification are sides of the same coin.
' Even more widespread is the operation the Soviets are conducting aimed at en-
- gulfing the Third World and organically incorporating it in the socialist
bloc while availing themselves of Cuba's good offices. The first attack, as
is known, took place at the Non-Aligned Conference in Havana, where Castro ~
attempted to impose his line but was rebuffed by Tito in no uncertain terms. ~
However, the endeavor did not stop there. Moscow will continue in its attempts
at penetration: no one can doubt that. On this front, in fact, the SovieCs
can bring back into play a weapon which, with the diminishing role of ideology, :
had gotten rusty. If their socialism, in fact, has lost its appeal to industria-
societies, by now resistant to mvths and influences of "foreign" marxism,
the situation in the Third World is rather different. There, amid the delays
of an ever more difficuLt development, or the despair of an underdevelopment ~
without outlets, the authoritarian ''real socialism" model could bring about ;
that seduction which was lost to those socially and economically developed !
countries. [All this] despite the last example of Prague. ~
I-
Therefore, why insist on a theatrical fiction of a detente lacking in credi- ~
bility? The international scenario is one of conflict, East against West,
- North against South. And communists against cotmnunist`s: from Sinkiang to
Vladivostok, from Kampuchea to Viet Nam. In these conditions, even events
that are in themselves positive such as the fall of the regimes of the Shah
and Somoza run the risk of iegenerating, becoming opportunities for conflicts.
- No end-of-the-world sermons. Only the awareness of a danger that can still be
avoided: u on condition that faith in international legality be reestablished.
P
Fear never was a giver of good advice. This is also shown by the South ;
African atomic bomb which, if it does not really~exist, then it almost does: '
which is par for the times. ,
COPYRIGHT: ]979 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
` 9209 ~
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COUNTRY SCCTION ITALY
MEZZOGIORNO MINISTER OPPOSES 'SPECIAL FUND' FOR CALABRIA
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 24 Oct 79 p 16
[Interview of Michele Di Giesi, minister for the Mezzogiorno, by Demetrio De -
Stefano: "Di Giesi Does Not Agree With Lombardini; No to a'Special Fund' for -
Calabria"; in Rome, date not given]
. (TextJ A hundred billion in superincentives; a"fundlet for the South"
that would supersede normal legislation.
The problem of Gioia Tauro.
Participation planned by EFIM [Manufacturing Industry Holding
and Financial Company] should increase jobs.
Rome--Mezzogiorno Minister Michele Di Giesi considers "useless duplication"
- the establishment of a 100-billion lire special fund for the industrialization
of Calabria. The fund was proposed by Siro Lombardini, minister of government
participation. Lombardini also suggested to Council President Cossiga the
constitution of a mixed company of government participation and private capital
(with the participation of the Fund for Regional Assistance) to promote industry
and tourism in Calabria. Di Giesi is also perplexed at this initiative. Why?
We asked whether it might be due to a political difference between the Social
Democratic minister for the Mezzogiorno and the minister for government parti-
cipation. The latter is a"technician" but nonetheless a former Christian
Democratic senator.
[Answer] Party politics doesn't enter into it: I don't think the Calabria
special fund is useful because it is an administrative outgrowth to grant
superincentives