JPRS ID: 8790 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020055-7
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JPRS L/8750
~ 29 November 1979
- Near / ' ~
East North Afr~ca Re ort
p
cFOUO 47i7s~ ~
, ~BIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/8790
29 November 1979
- NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT ~
(FOUO 47/79)
CONTENTS PAGE
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Gulf Shaykhs Uneasy at Threat From Iran
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 20-26 Sep 79) 1
Dimensions of U.S.-Omani Military Arrangements Analyzed
(AL-WATAN AL-'AREIBI, 25-31 Oct 79) 5
Interview With PLO Official Ahmad Sidqi Dajani
(Ahmad Sidqi Dajani Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI,
11-17 Oct 79) 9
� NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Relative Strengths, Motives of Parties to Sahara War Evaluated
- (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 18-24 Oet 79) 17
EGYPT
Ghali Interviewed on Soviet Influence in Africa, Palestinian -
Autonomy
(Butrus Ghali Interview; L'EUROPEO, 15 Nov 79).......... 23
IRAN
Foreign Minister Sadr States Position on Shah's Extradition
(Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr Interview; LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR,
12-18 Nov 79) 27
- IRAQ .
Iraq Aspires To Play More Effective Role in Region
~AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 4-10 Oct 79) 29
- a- [III - NE & A- iai FOUOJ
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
MOROCCO
Moroccan Left Criticized for Attitude Towards King's Policies
(Ali Gharbi; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 15-28 Oct 79) 33
TUNISIA
Destourian Party Leader Discusses Nationa~,Arab Issues .
(Mohamed Sayah Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 18-24 -
_ act 79) 36
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INTER-A'RAB AFFAIRS
GULF SHAYKHS UNEASY AT THREAT FROM TRAN
~ Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 20-26 Sep 79 p 26 ~
[Article: "Have the People of the Gulf Reacfied the Point of Saying: 'The
~ Hell of tfie ~hafi and the Non-Heaven of Ayatollah?"'] ~
[Text] The Iranian dust which blows tfiese days over the Gulf clouds its
_ skies at a time when c~mplete clar~tq ts most needed along ~rtth tfie
estab3tshment of relations with Khomeyni's Iran wfiicfi are neigTi~otly and
fraternal, good an3 pure.
- A careful reading of Kuwaiti Crown PTince and Prime ~'Iinister Shaykh Sa'd
- al-'Abdalla~ al-Sabafi's statements concerning recent events confirms ~nst
_ how seriously tfie Arab regimes of tfie Gulf view any internal~movements -
wfiich are backed by outside~s and are aime3 at upsetting the ~relative
stability heretofore en~o~ed T~y the ~nlf, or at least ~ts western shore.
Shaykh Sa'd said: "The aut:fiorities are very carefully obserning the
irresponsible disturbances and disruptiona which fiave sougfit to soW di:.~ord
among tfie citizens and sha}:e their confidence in the government."
The Kuwaiti crown prince tlireatened that tfie government will not be laa in
the future and Will strike forcefully at anyone wfio attempts to tmpair the
~ security of Kuwait.
Meanwhile, an official Kuwaiti soirrce said that a rapid exchange of con-
tacts took place between :Yuwai: and Bahrain, ending in a call to the
foreign ministers of tfie Gulf states tfiat they hold a speci~l meeting
, before the end of the montb.to discuss new conditions which Will keep the
security of the 6u1~ states intact and upfiold tfieir prestige.
Bat ~at has occurred in Ruwait and Ba~rrain to strain oF~icial =~Elations
bet~reen the Arab states and Iran?
In his recent statements~ Iranian Foteign Minister Dr Ef~rahiin Yazdi
confireied Izan's neigfi~OOrly relations and sa~d tbat it has no intention
of using militarp force to spread its Zevolntion abroad. Iie Iias~etated:
"We do not Want to eaport anr ~revolnti~on, nor do we want to send�armed
men to figfit toreign regimes."
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~ But the minister qualified tfiis by adding: "However, we cannot prevent
the Islamic revolution from influencing other states, and we have a duty to =
take the initiative to spread tfie trne Islam and the true Islamic revolu-
tion through all parts of the world. No one, no matter who he ie, can
prevent us frrnn carrying out this course of action."
Yazdi referred to Article 11 of the new constitution, which states:
"Islamic politics is based on the alliance and unity of the Islamic states -
in accordance with the Roran. For tfie Moslems are one people, and tfiere-
fore the Islamic gover~ent in Iran must struggle to achieve political,
i:ultural and economic unity among tfie Islamic states."
Ebrahim Yazdi's statements arE clearer than all the others, including
both officials and private individuals, who raise their voices in tfie name _
� of the Iranian revolution these days. Still, his words convey some
inconsistencies wfiicfi cause the Arab regimes not to trust everything
emanating from Tehran and even to have doubts about what really does
emanate frrnn the Iranian capital.
- But this pertains to Yazdi's remarks. W63t about unofficial comments by
such individuals as Ayatollah Suseyn ;~tontazeri? He openly urges that .
Bahrain be annexed to Iran, and saysfl contrary to Yazdi's af~trmattons,
that Irans' revolution will eventually extend to all tfie Islamic states.
_ Why Did the Arabs Oppose the Shah?
- The Bahrainis say tfiat the Arabs opposed the sfiah not only because he was
fiZling tfie role of American policeman in tfie area, but also because he
was bent on aggression against Arab t~rritory. They co:isider it unaccept-
able merely to trade forms of aggression from a chauvi:nistic Peraian desire
to expand the empire's territory to interference unde.~r the mask of religion.
Bahrain's incidents began when Shaykh_Muhammad 'Alf 'Aqrt was arrested at i
al-Manamah airport at the beginning of 'Id al-Fitr as he retu~rned from ;
Tehran where he had met witb a number of officials, notably Ayatolla~ '
Montazeri, originator of the new appeal for the annexation Uf BaIirain to Iran. '
This incident led to a demonstratinn by a crowd of 500 people who marched ;
througfi the streets of al-Manamafi to the Ministry of Interior demanding '
Shaykh 'Aqri's release.
Following this, unidentified persons dared to set fire to the largest movie -
theater in al Manamah. No one was in~ured, however, because the Tiuilding
was empty.
On Monday, 10 September, after things had begun to calm down once again, j
another demonstratinn of 100 persons was organized. These demonstrators !
' wandered through. Shiite neighborfioods of al Ioianama~i holding up pictures
of Ayatollah Kh~meyni until police intervened, using tear gas to break up
the marchers. A numb~r of citizens were arrested;' ~
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What Happened in Kuwait?
Meanwhile, R similar incidents occurred in I:uwait~ during the course of
wtiich authorities dared to arrest Ha~~ Sayyid 'Abbas Mahri~ described as
_ ttie son of Khomeyni's sister~ along witfi his son, Ahmad Mahri. The father
and son are Kuwaities but are of Iranian origin.
Commenting on the arrest of the two men, Kuwaiti Minister of Interior Nawaf _
ai-Ahmad al-Sabah said that prior to fiis arrest Ha~~ Ahmad tAbbas Mahri -
was summoned to the Ministry of Interior wfiere officials told fiim that his
use of mosques and houses of worship to hold political seminars aimed at
sowing discord among the citizens was re~ected. In spite of th~s, he
- again violated his promise to obey the law by holding a political seminar
in one of these mosques.
- It is well-known that Mahri, who is Iranian-Uorn but holds Kuwaiti citizen-
ship, has been carrying out exten~ive political activities in Ru~ait since
the success of Khomeyni's revolution. Last winter fie headed a delegation
representing members of the Irainian community in Kuwait to greet KTiomeyni
immediately after his return to Tefiran from ~ile.
Mahri's arrest provoked a general outcry in Iranian religious circles,
causing Ayatollah Montazeri to intervene once again and voice the Iranians'
"concern" over the ha.rassments to which Shiite Moslems are being subjected
in the Persian Gulf states. Tfie impertinent cfiairman of the Council of
Constitutional Experts alleged: "The movements of Ayatollafi Khomeyni's
personal representative in Kuwait were restricted, and fiis son was arrested
and sub~ected to torture."
Kuwaiti and Gulf circles view current developments with apprehension and
- feel that tfie moves being~made under the banner of religion are occurring
in ccordination with Iran. The prcof of this is Montazeri's acknowledgment
that Mahri is Khomeyni's personal representative in Kuwait. The Kuwaitis
say tfiat the authorities fiave the rigfit to make the citizens submit to
the laws of the country, and that Mafiri is a Kuwaiti and must obey the law.
Some Kuwaiti officials point out tfiat the issue is not limited to the
imprisomnent of a few indivi:dnals. Tfiey say that the Peraian Gulf area
has taken a tough stand against Sadat's measures and Camp David and tts
decisions, and has been an effective force in the Baghdad scunmit and in
strengthening the confrontation states' resolne materially and morally.
Current actions, say these officials, are aimed at opening Tireaches in the
internal front in order to weaken tfie political positions of the ~ulf states.
Is what is occurring now in the Gulf a tempest in a teapot which wi11 soon -
subside through contacts,~mediations and the shared realization tfiat what
touches the Tranians toucfies the Arabs as well--especa.ally since the oil
wealth whicfi.all of them possess is tfie ob~ect of desire of tfie greedy?
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Or arc there those who really want to blow up the incompatibilities and
deepen the conflicts, one day pushing them further than the shah did? _
The Arabs of the Gulf do not believe tfiat one day th~y s~uddenly began to
oppose or r~rovoke Iran, whether the ruler in Tefiran was the shah ~r
Khomeyni. It ia apparent t'hat tfie iniCiative fox argument and provocation
has alzuays emanated from over there--from the other side of ~ulf.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAAT AL-'ARABI
. 8591
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS -
- DIM~NSIONS OF U.S.-OPIANI MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS ANALYZED .
. Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 25-31 Oct 79 p 27 -
[Article: 'The Sultanate of Oman--America's Trojan Horse in the Gulf"~
[Text~ AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI received from its Washington correspondent this im- -
portant report on the Sultanate of Oman's role in the Arab Gulf, xhereby it is
gradually changing into an American Trojan horse, threatening the Arabs, cloae
_ to the wells and pipelines of their most impoxtant national resourco--oil,
Behind a thick veil of secrecy, the American military mi.saion representing the
three xings--the Air Force~ the Navy and the Arlqy--completed its preliminary
3-xeek mission to the Sultana.te of Oman for the purpose of ascertaining the most
suitable sites to build txo American bases--one of them a naval-air base on
Ma.sirah Island~ and the other a land-air base near Salalah.
The mission discussed, ~ith a group of British advisors and experts xorking -
' for the Sultanaie's Defense Ministry on contract or on loan from the British
Defense Ministry~ ways of strengthening the means of sug~ervising oil comn?unica-
tion routes, especially through the Straits of Hormuz. Similar negotiations .
were also conducted with a number of Omani officia,ls, especially Foreign Min-
ister ?ays al-Zaxaxi, in order to evaluate the urgent needa of the Sultanate's
land, sea and ~,ir forces~ in order to fill the "strategic vacuum" until final
- agreement is reached on establishing the txo American bases and they are built
and enter actual service.
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI's information received from s ources closel,y folloxing the
Omani-American contacts indicate that the American mission~ which ended its
- visit to th~ Sultar?~te xith a lengthy meeting xith Sr~ltan Qabus and his advis-
ors, recommended the provision of urgent military aid consisting of aix armored
Cobra heli~opters for the ~~ir artillery battery~ a high-spaed coast guard ship,
three rocket-equipped patrol boats, and txo light raconr~aiasnce airplanes.
In viex of its expeditious nature~ this aid xill be ensured 'by the 3eventh
American Fleet operating in the Indian Ocean~ ina,smuch as it Hill not aeriou$-
ly a~fect its atrength~ while it xill.be able to effect a noticeable change
xith respect to security i~ the Hormuz Straite region, which American axperta
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consider a sensitive region exposed, even tod,ay, to the danger of fedayeen acts
aimed at the oil tankers xhich pass through the straits. �
In addition to that~ in its r~port to the American Defense Department the mis-
sion recommended a fixed yesrlanduthetaending ofna miss on~of /lmericanlinstruc8 _
artillery and infantry xing ~
tors and advisors to work in the ranks of the Omo.ni armed forces.
_ The legal expert~f the�dr~a~fteoftaebilateraldmutualsecurityutreatyabetxeen the
his government s _
United States snd the Sultanate.
The Sulta~ate's Obligations
According to this draft treaty, the Sultanate 8uuld an~iberthing atiMasis~enth
Fleet all facilities pertaining to anchorage~ PP~Y
- Island, xhere the American Corps of Engineers xauld build a modern naval-ai~ _
ba,se to ensure a concentrated American military presence for 4 months of the
year and an ordinary presence for the remaining 8 months~ the dates to be pro-
poaed by the American Defense Department�
As for the land base in the Sala.lah region, it xould have a double function.
It KAUld be similar to the American observation posts in the Sinai, and in ad-
di~ion it xould be a basic land. base for the permenent American a~ilitary pres-
ence iii ths Gulf re8lon~ cloae to tha oil xells and outlets.
xith a huge radar 8ta-
In that context, the baee xould eventual~}r be equipped
tion xith a range coge~ing ~ the oillwelliregions as far~as Kuxait~eni-Omani-
Saudi border area~ a
The base xould be supplied xith electronic reconnaisance planes~ including Fire
Eee planes xith automatic directional guid.ance. These a.re the i~el has three
the Sinai to observe EgYP'tian and Israeli mllitary movements. .
of them~ one of xhich xas shot dawn by the 3yrisn Air Foree 3 xeaks ago.
This station aould concentrate on supervising Soviet fleet movemerits in the _
= xaters of Aden and the Bab$sl-~Mai~tin~ta resumptionlofarevo u~ onax'Y activites _
movements and any movemerit
in Dhofar.
The'tlnited States xill get the tWO bases on a 5 to 10-year ~n~'~illionerent a
for US$b.5 million rent ee~ch year for the me.rine base ~ million a year Horth
year for tk~e land base in Salalah~ and in return for US$5 -
of American military and technical assistance to strengthen the 9ul~anate's de-
fense cape~bility.
The most distinguishing feature of the draft agreemer?t for renting the txo bases
is that it contains a clawse xhich makes it open to the introduction of "other
~parties." It is understood that the phrr~se "other pa ~oebT~fJ thec'
rst diplomatic efforts xhich ilashington is nox a~?kin8
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NAT 0 states into the arrangements for the joint defense treaty xith the Sul-
tanate of Oman.
That is, American planning aims at dealing Hith the sensitive feelinga xhich
this form of permar~ent American military presenca xill arouse by giving this
proaence the nature of a partner in a~oint intexnational arn~ngemdnt~ ~o that
it ie not conBiderod ,~uet a unilateral American initiative aimed st indirect
. intimidation in order to curb preliminary oil tendenciea ta increase the price
of petroleum.
Thus, the gaal behind the military treaty Kith the Sultanate of Oms.n is to make
this treaty a nucleus and basis for a 3oint military presence by ma~or indus-
trial nations in the region~ under the cover of ensuring the safety of oil com-
munications and supplies in the Gulf region. Therefore~ this treaty is a step
linked Hith the plan to form a mobile American military force~ to intervene in -
the regions Khere vital American interests are exposed to constant danger.
= This is the plan outlined by Former American Secretary of State Hexiry Kissin-
_ ger, who recommended making it open t o participation by NATO states, Japan and
Canada, on the ba.s 3s tha.t these states' reservations and fears about the conse-
quences of such participation would lessen in light of escalating increases in
~ the price of oil and in light of the increasing political dangers threatening
the security of oil communications, Nhether because of local conditions in the
Middle East or because of Soviet movements in the region. This argument xas _
; based on studies saying that the Soviet bloc might enter into the competition
to purchase Middle East oil before 1985, because of shortcomirags in the plans
to expand o1I production to meet rising consumer needs in the Sovi~t bloc states.
Therefore, the ~oint military arrangement is aimed at placing a strong barrier
in the face of Soviet inclinations toxards Middle East oil.
On the regional level~ the American plan aimt; at bringing in Israel and xhat it
- calls the "cooperative Arab states," an expression applied til nox ta F.~ypt,
xhich expressed its xillingness to participate fully and extensively xhen al-
Sadat sent Vice President Husni Mubarak to the Sultanate 4 xeelas ago. At that
time ~ he proposed to Sultati Q~bus that a permaner~t Egyptian military miasion
and Egyptian aztillery �reinforcements be sent~ in addition to a group af former
officeas xho pract iced guerrila xarfare during their aervice in Yemen,
Sultan Qabus accepted this offer, but it h~a,s not yet bedn ful~y implemented~ -
~ in anticipation af an agreement betxeen Washingt on and Cairo on the permanent
financing of this F..gyptian 3oint venture.
The Egyptian Fleat in the Gulf
In anticipation of tha.t. an agreement xas concluded whereby three ships from
the Egyptian fleet xould make a friendl,y visit to Omani ~+aoter$. This xill be
the first time the Egyptian fleet has entered the r?atera of the Gulf under the
- auspices of a 3oirit arra.ngement xith the United States, .
A technical mission from the American Corps of Engineers xill go to Oman to .
draW up the technical datails for the bases' 3nstallatiorvs~ and to evaluste
construction cosi;s, xhich are estimated at betxeen $70 to 90 million at leaet.
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Mar~y informed observers doubt tha.t the European NATO states will agree to en-
ter into these joint arx�angements, in view of the fact that thia xould nega-
tively affect their tra~iitionally good relations xith the Gulf and Iraq. Iraq -
hae headed the prompt, strong Arab regional opposition to the Ome~ni pl~n to
establish a~oint regional alliance with the United States~ West Germaa~y, Jap-
an and Iran to protect petroleum communications~ oil xells and outleta~ atid
has also taken a decisive although unof`ficia~l atar~d. on the resu~rtption of Iran-
ian expansionist claims. ~
In addition, France, by virtue of its special rela,tionship r?ith the Arab oil
states and especial~yr Iraq, xhich suppliea it xith aboufc 25 percent of its oil
imports, car.not participate in this American arrangement. Neither can it turn
ar~y European Common Market state in the direction of 3oining the American ar-
rangement.
Observers fear that the political natura of any European symp~tt~y Kith Ameri-
_ ca,n p].a.n~ xill lead to the in~erment of the idea of holding the proposed con- -
ference of Gulf oil states ar~d European Common Market states for the purpose
of reaching a mutual understanding for ensuring the continuance of their oil
supplies in return for political and technical cooperation.
In this respect, the Arab motive for not rushing into such a conference lies
in the Arab states' desire that the European states take a political initia,tive
not tied to the Un.ited States. In this context, there has been a~ understand-
ing that the European initiative must in its first stage ful~jr r~cognize the
PIA and call for negotiations with it as an original party in ar~y arrarigeraents
for reaching a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and solving the Palestin-
ian probl~m. _
- In any case, ~ench President d'Estaing xill become more deep~jr acquainted
xith the viewpoints of the Gulf states azui their reactions to American military
movement which he visits Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar during a ;
, state tour early next year.
- COP'YRIGHT~ 19?9 AL-WA~AN AL-'ARABI
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
INTERVIEW WITH PLO OFFICIAL AHMAD SIDQI DA.TANI
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 11-17 Oct 79 pp 36-37
[Interview with Ahmad Sidqi Dajani, member of the Executive Committee of the -
Palestine Liberation Organization: "A Question to Ahmad Sidqi Da~ani: Have
You Met With Uri Avneri?"J
[Text] Dr Ahmad Sidqi Dajani, a member of the PLO Executive Committee and a
political adviser to Yasi 'Arafat, and who plays a prominent role~in Pales-
tinian diplomacy on the international scene, denies that he met aeparately
- with Israeli Knesset member Uri Avneri during the Rome symposium. He affirms
that the PLO decided to attend the symposium in the full knowledge that
Israeli and Jewish personalities would be participating in it. Following the -
meeting between Yasir 'Arafat and Kreisky and Willy Brandt in Vienna laet
~ July, AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI met with Dr Ahmad Sidqi De~ani, who had accompanied
the Palestinian leader to those talks. Today AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI meets ag~in
with Dr Dajani following his participation in the Rome European symposium,
held in the last weeks of last month. The symposium included, among others,
- Palestinian and Jewish participants. The symposium caused a big uproar be-
cause it was the first meeting of its kind in which Palestinians had met with
well-known Israeli personalities publicly and in the limelight of sensational
publicity. AL-WATAN-AL-'ARABI~asked Dr Da~ani about the Rome meeting and -
why it had caused all that clamor. It ~lso asked him about the Zatest de-
velopments on the Palestinian scene. We asked the member of the PLO Execu-
tive Counnittee, which is the higheat procedural committee in the PLO:
[Question] What was the~specific aim of the Rome uieeting? What did it
achieve for the Palestinian cause? �
[Answer] The aim of the Rome gathering, for us, was to continue our pene-
= tration of the West European arena in order to achieve recognition~o� the
PLO by West European nations. This aim was set forth by the PLO leaderahip
some time ago within the context of its strategy. The Rome meeting was one
_ of a series of symposiums held in Western Europe. I would like to point out
_ here that the PLO, in its move on the West European scene, has attached im-
. portance to symposium which embrace European political forces, as well as
establishing contacts with West European governments. The Vienna and Madrid
visits belong to the aecond category, while the Rome symposium and the
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Basel symposium, which was held in Switzerland last May, belong to the first
category.
_ [Question] Who sponsored the Rome gathering?
[Answer] The invitation was made by the Italian Aseociation for Friendship
and Solidarity With the Palestinian People, a society which was formed more
than a year ago and which ir.cludes representatives of all the party forces -
, in Italy, including the Christian Democratic Party, the Communisty Party,
the S~cialist Party and the Social Democratic Party. The association also
- includes other important personalities. Th~s association gave special im-
portance to the preparations for thia symposium F~.nd called it "the world r
_ congress in Rome in defense o~ the national rights of the Palestinian people
and the cause of peace in the Middle East." In so doing the association -
underlined the dialectical relationship between the two issues. That is to
say, there will be no peace in the Middle East without the .fulfillment of
the national rights of the Palestinian people. The association invited repre-
- sentatives of the political forces of the Helsinki Agreement on Cooperation _
and Security in Europe, as well as a number of progressive groups which
- acknowledge the national rights of the Palestinian people. The association
invited the PLO to open the debate on the firat day of the symposium, and it
3ssigned a period of time for the PLO during the morning to present its views
on the topics included on the agenda. There were three topics on the agenda:
1) The national rights of the Palestinian people and peace in the Middle
East; 2) the means to fulfill those rights; and 3) Israeli actions in the
occupied territories and the status and condition of the Palestinian people
under occupation. The PLO ac~epted the invitation, and my brother Far.iuq _
~ Quaddumi (head of the PLO's Political Department) was achedule~ to attend
the symposium, but his busy schedule at the United Nations prevented him from -
doing so. The PLO therefore formed a delegation and asked me to head it.
I Did Not Meet With Avneri '
[Question] Some news agencies have reported that you met wiCh Iaraeli ~
Knesset member Uri Avneri? '
[Answer] I must note here that Avnexi's latest statements were a tacit
acknowledgement that the news about a closed meeting between us was un-
founded. He talked about a meeting within the context of the symposium, ~
which included about 200 participants--including a number of Arab ambassa-
dors. He also said that he attended the news conference which I held and '
heard an answer which did not mention the question of Palestinian recogni-
tion of Israel. He made clear that the contradiction which seemed to exist _
in previous statements ia due to semantics. It is therefore now possible
for any obs~rver to know what the Crue facts are and to be safe from the
influence of the control.led media.
i
As for the presence of Avneri and other Jewish and Israeli personalities
- at the symposium, this is something we do not deny, but in fact acknowledge. ~
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The PLO Executive Committee decided to participate in the Rome gathering with
the full knowledge that those personalities had also been invited to attend.
In fact, the PLO's stand on such symposiums is an old one, taken aft~r the
Paleatine National Council's meeting in 1977, which endoraed the principle
- of dialog with progresaive Jews who recognize our righta. Accordingly, `
there were meetings with progressive Israelis, such as Felicia Langer, whose
efforts in defending our de~ainees we shall never forget. The PLO's decision
_ has borne some good fruits in terms of our international political struggle.
It has besieged and exposed Zionist lies, and it is now the Zionist elements
who evade our presence at international forums.
[Question] If the meeting [with Avneri] did not take place, why are news
agencies insisting that it did take place?
_ [Answer] This is due to a campaign which is targeted primarily against the -
Palestinian arena. The campaign has been so formulated as to arouse that
arena. We all feel uneasy and bothered, and rightly so, by talking about
recognition of an enemy which has usurped aur homeland. We all are bothered
and uneasy, and rightly so, by any use of closed meetings which we have not
announced in advance. The campaign was typically designed to sow confusion
- about those two issues. But I must note here that our arena has demonstrated
a level of consciousness which makes us proud, thereby thwarting the campaign.
The slight confusion felt by some people was cl~ared by the statement which ~
- set things straight. I was personally touched by the intercession of my
brethern in the Executive Committee as well as the Palestinfan leadership in
general. They all realized that the campaign, among other things, was aimed
- at our activities in Western Europe, including the Arab-European dialog in
_ which I partly participated. I would only like to add that while I was fol-
lowing the campaign I remembered the question of "ideological struggle'� which
was explained in detail by the late Algerian thinker Malek Ben Bani in his
book "The Ideological Struggle in the Colonized Countries." It made a21 the
more clear to me the role which news agencies play in formulating news and
slanting it in the direction they want. Anyway, the campaign measured up
to the importance of the Rome symposium, the importance of our participation
- in it, and the importance of the symposiu~m's outcome. I conclude by express-
ing our appreciation for the valuable reports which were presented at the
symposium and the discussions which took place there, including the presenta-
tion by Felicia Langer and the report by Michael Adams about Israeli practices
in the Arab territories. ~
The Question of Recognizing Israel
_ [Question] Is the aim of that insistence on "confirming" your alleged meeting
with Avneri and other Jewish and Israeli persons to ahow that the PLO is ready
- to recognize Israel? _
- [Answerj Our position on the question of recognizing Iarae~. is clear and _
based on our nati~nal covenant and the resolutions taken by the Palestine
National Council (PNC). Our poeition re~ects this premise and principle
because we are the victims, not the conquerors. You cannot put the cart
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before the horse. I made this clear in my statement at the opening session
of the Rome symposium, and this positi~n was further explained in all the
documents presented by the PLO and the arab side throughout the Arab-European =
dialog. Those documents appeared in a book which I published recently, en-
titled "The PLO and the Arab-European Dialog". I have called on Western
Europe to cease bringing up the issue of the PLO's recognition of Israel,
because it is improper for Western Europe to speak with a Zionist tongue on
this issue. ~
What is noteworthy in the media campaign is that no question was asked of ine _
- during the press conference on the issue of recognition, as I have made clear -
in my statements. Yet a news agency came out with a report in which this
issue was forcibly inserted in one of my answers. Thi.s is what the agency
reporter says and how he understood my statement.
[QuestionJ What is your evaluation of the outcome of the Rome symposium?
_ [Answer] The symposium achieved substantial success. The document it issued _
called for an initiative in Europe to be undertaken by forces which are pre-
pared to cooperate and work concertedly in this regard. It also called for
European acL-ion to urge the UN Security Council and the United Nations to -
amend RPSOlution 242 according to the proposals and recommendations adopted
by the UN General Assembly. The document also called for an initiative de-
signed r.o safeguard the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon and to help
the victims of the war. Furthermore, the document urged that pressure be
intensified against the Italian Government to recognize the PLO and to urge
it to invite brother Abu 'Ammar to visit Italy. The symposium also sent a _
cable to his holiness Pope John Paul II urging him to be a messenger for a
just, durable and comprehensive peace on his visit to the United Nations and
to take the Palestinian question into considexation in his speech (the Pope's
speech at the United Nations did include references to all those issues).
We have noticed that PLO endeavors with Italian and European forces have caused
a change in the position of those forces on the Camp David accords. There
is a vast difference between the poaition taken by those forces a yea~r ago ~
on the Camp David accords and the position they took at the Rome symposium.
_ European forces were represented on a high level at the symposium. I would
- like here to underline the importance of establishing contacts with those
= forces, because the decisionmaking process in Europe begins from the base
and goes up to the top.
Italy Restricted By European Ties
[Question] Wi11 those contacts result, for example, in Ttaly's recognition
of the PLO?
;
[Answer] We have conducted widescale contacts in this regard. It is clear
that Italy is restricted by its position among the states of the European
community. A number of political forces in Italy have urged the Italian '
Government to invite brother Yasir 'Arafat and underscored the need for Italy _
~ to recognize the PLO. I believe that those efforts will continue, and we -
are quite hopeful that they will go on.
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[Ques~ion] It has been reported that Kreisky and Brandt asked 'Arafat when ~
_ they met with him in Vienna to cease military operations against Iarael for
a given period of time in order to pave the way for a political solution of
the Palestine question.
[Answer] A lot has been said about what took place in the Vienna meeting.
I had talked earlier to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI on this issue in the light of my
own participation in the Vienna talks. I repeat that I said earlier, that
- there were no rEquests or preconditions in the talks. The aim, as Kreisky
said at the outset of the meeting, was "to inform the chairman of the PLO of
our point of view and to be acquaint~d with his own point of view on present
developments as he sees them." ~.'he talks took place within this context, and
no requests were made.
We Will Move America's Conscience
[Question] And what about the queation of dialog with the United States? _
- [Answer] We move with full awareness of the nature of the international =
arena. We have defined our goals in Europe, and we have a goal in the United
States, too. Specifically, our goal in the United States is to get through
~ to the popular forces there, and it must be said that we have achieved some
- success. The change in the position of Black Americans is an important one
which will lead to significant results. I expect to see a change among the
Hispanic Americans, as well as a change in the attitude of those people who
realize that the interests of the American people do not lie in supporting
Israeli aggression. We have to struggle to bring about a state of affairs
similar to that which developed during the Vietnam war--in other words, t~
- reach the conscience of the American people. We proceed with full awareness
of the position of the American Administratian--a position which is still hos- -
tile to the rights of our people and which still refuses to recognize our
existence. Once we manage to get through to the American conscience, we will
then be able to influence the political decisionmaking process in America. -
[Question] And when do you expect.America to officially recognize the PLO?
[Answer] It will take more struggle, sweat and anguish before we reach our
goal. I do not expect quick rQsults. But ultimately we will triumph, and we
- will impose our existence on all the forces which do not recognize us.
We will Establish Our Palestinian State
[Question] You believe, then, that the PLO will be able to win its poliCical
battle against Israel. Do you believe that this triumph will culminate in
the establishment of a Palestinian state?
- [Answer] This will certainly take place. We are on the way to eatablishing
our Palestinisn state, and we are moving along swiftly as the isolation of the
Zionist enemy becomeg more evident day after day. Recently I was following
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u number of studies which came from several ~uropean countries and the United _
Statea, and they all point to the political successes scored by the PLO. We
- always emphasize that those successes are due to the sacrifices of our people
and to their efforts on the level of armed struggle, as well as to the mobili-
_ zation of all our energies on the level of political struggle.
Our Interim Goal to Wrest Political Recognition _
[Question] But will political action require abandonment of military action?
[Answer] The present Palestinian actions are fully consistent with the re-
quirements of the phase through which the Palestinian revolution is now passing.
- This is the phase which we metaphorically call the third ~hase. In the first
phase the Palestinian revolution sought to establish its presence and exist-
ence, both on the Palestinian and pan-Arab levels. Now the entire world opin-
ion knows about the Palestinian revolution. In the second phase the Pales-
- tinian revolution had to establish its official existence in the Arab arena
~ and become the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian people,
thus embodying both the land and the entity in the absence of our own land
and until we liberate that land and regain our homeland. In the third phase,
which clearly began after the 1973 war and more specifically since 1974, the _
Palestinian revolution entered the international arena. This is a normal
evolution in the course of revolutions, and it means that we are closer to
our objective, because ultimately we will win the recognition of international
legitimacy.and take our place in the world. We are already proceeding swiftly
- along that course, as demonstrated by the trip made by my brother Abu 'Ammar
to the United Nations in 1974. We have also participated in the nonalined
conference and the Islamic conference and established bilateral contacts with
- many states. Our moves began in Western Europe, where we established contacts
with its governments. As far as the American arena is concerned, we began
to exert pressure on the American Government through efforts to influence
. grassroots sectors of the American people. We have really reached a deli- '
cate phase in which we have a specific goal we would like to attain, namely,
to get through to Europe. We have, after a11, fully accomplished the task ~
of gaining the recognition of the Third World. We are a part of the Third :
- World--indeed, its very heart. We are an integral part of it, and it is an ~
integral part of us. We have alao accomplished the task of establishing a ~
close relationship with the socialist camp states, led by the Soviet Union. ;
- As I have said, we have also begun our penetration of Europe, and it remains ~
for ub to attain Europe's recognition. When this happens, it will insure
the isolation of the United States if it fails to acknowledge our existence
and recognize us.
All these actions are designed to besiege Israel, because, in our analysis
of Israel's condition~, it will not come around unless it is forced to do
so. Our course, then, is to wage a political struggle which ia complemen-
tary to the armed struggle carried out by our people in the most magnificent ,
~ fashion that any people can display.
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And What After Recognitio:~?
- [Question] But will the Palestinians recognize Israel if they win inter-
national recognition of their right to establish a state?
[Answer] When this happens, the issue will be taken up by the PNC. The
- present position of the PNC is to establish an independent Palestinian state _
on any liberated part of our soil and to exercise the right of deterrence -
as well as apply Resolution 3236 of the UN General Assembly in all its as-
pects. Only then will the PNC be truly able to discuss the various issues
and to assess the situation. I have already explained my personal view on
this issue in my book "The Arabs in the Face of a Changing World" and in my
speech before the PNC. My position can be summed up as follows: Any formula
which we accept should not foreclose the future goal of a unified, democratic
Palestine which we aspire to attain. We maj~ not attain this goal in one step,
but we must attain the establishment or the emergence of that state which
would preserve the unity of Palestine, insure the establishment of democracy
in it, and grant all Palestiniaras the right to return to their motherland.
[The following is an insert entitled "Avneri: I Met Him...I Didn't Meet Him"]
Uri Avneri is a member of the Israeli Knesset, but he is a member who has made
trouble for the ruling Zionist establishment, both in the Kn~sset and in the
' press. He is one of the leaders whose campaign led to the conviction of
' Israeli Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan of connivance with the Israeli officer
who committed "war atrocities" during the Israeli forces' invasion of Lebanon
last year. Avneri was one of the participants in the Rome symposium. He
affirms in a news report carried by REUTERS from Tel Aviv that he has met
with Dr al-Dajani several times, and he says that the Palestinian official's
denial of the alleged meeting is "a matter of semantics." At no time, how- ~
ever, does Avneri say that he has met separately with Dajani. However,
Western news agenciea deliberately sought to create a fuss over this matter
for well-known purposes. Suffice it here to cite a reFart by AFP from Rome,
dated 24 September: "Addressing Avneri, al-Dajani said: 'Our mere presence '
together here in Rome, despite the criticism made by some factions in your
ranks and ours as well confirms that the time has come to cease acts of
violence and that actual negotiations are taking place."'
_ What does al-Dajani think? Let's try to quietly read again what he has told
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI.
.
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NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS
RELATIVE STRENGTHS, MOTIVES OF PARTIES TO SAHARA WAR EVALUATED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 18-24 Oct 79 pp 32-33 `
[Article: "The War Between the Gnat and the Elephant"]
= [Text] In Erich Maria Remarque's novel, "All Quite on the Western Front,"
~ a soldier huddled in a trench awaiting the unknown says: "This heavy,
tensian-filled silence, this calm, is a manster that sets one's nerves on
fire."
This phrase could describe the atmosphere that overshadows the Western
Sahara which constitutes a f luid fro~t with perimeters stretching over an
area of 250,000 square kilometers of burning sands which c anprise the
basic setting of a war of phantoms, the intermittent war between the
- Moroccan f orces and the Polisario batta~ions.
It is still a war of phantoms, because the Moroccan responses have not yet
- employed the right of hot pursuit against the Polisario attacks. However,
this war could assume a new and dangerous dimension were the Moroccan
~ Army to exercise this right and pursue the Polisario battalions while
they are withdrawing to their stronghold located 26 kilometers south of
Tindouf,.a dispute over the awnership of which was the cause of the first
war of Arab brothers between Algeria and Morocco in 1963.
_ The Polisario's attacks are launch from Tindouf with strengths varying
~ e3ch time fr an five to eight battalions. A battalion comprises from 60 to
80 men carried on 4 armored Landr w ers accompanied by trucks carrying
- "Stalin organs" and vehicles mounted with recoilless guns.
Recently these attacks have taken on a wider nature characterized by an
_ illogical amount of firep aaer. This has drawn attentian to successive
reports that Libyan supplies of modern weapons are pouring into Polisario
headquarters in Tindouf, ensuring the Polisario of that firepaaer coupled
with the essentials for rapid des~rt communications and, consequently,
� assuring it of a temporary initiative in the "hit and run" war.
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y 'll~e Polisar3.o have used the break~:p between Mauritznia and Morocco,
Mauritania's withdrawal from the western gavernorate of (Tirbis) and
Morocco's having had to redeploy its troops to launch successive strikes
deep in the Sahara and even in M orocco.
~ However, these were transient victories which were nullified by the ef�ects
of the battle of Smara where the intervention of the Moroccan Air Force .
had decisive effects. It has been established from reports by observers
- that the Polisario battalions that tried to attach Smara incurred deva-
stating losses. They were wiped aut by Moroccan Mirage aircraft which
in concentrated attacks pursued them over the desert hills and roads
where there was no hiding place and where the attackers' vehicles were
- turned into steel coffins.
This time surprise was on the side of the Mor occan f orces, and the expanded -
field use of the air force was a factor which turned the situatian around.
The Polisario, with their limited numbers and scanty sources of arms,
could n ot stand casualties such as those incurred in the Smara battle since,
if we can rely on M oroccan figures that the P olisario suff ered 800 casualties, -
we find that this figure represents at least 5 percent of the Polisario
- f or ces, as ~their f igures sh ow that they have 15 ,000 f ighters .
The War of the Gnat and the Elephant
A military observer described the open war against the Moroccan forces
in which the Polisario leadership became invo lved through its plan to
try to attack Smara as a war between a gnat and an elephant, and so there
- is no need to pound home the consequences of such a war.
Some 2 weeks after the Smara battle, a tense calm daminates the area, a
calm setting nerves an edge in a f lood of many pointed questions as to ;
whether the plan for open war that the Polisario i;s pursuing is a plan '
which, while violating the principles of guerrilla warfare, is designed ~
to drag Morocco into a clash with Algeria thr augh operations drawing ~
Moroccan responses close to the Algerian border. '
The fact is that the specter of such a possibility is weighing heavily on
many Arab and Western capitals since the results of the 1963 Tindouf war
between Morocco and Algeria ended, practically speaking, in 1970, with the ;
Ifrane agreement which sanctioned Algeria's ownership of the area. However, ~
theoretically, they are not over because the Moroccan Parliament has not
yet ratified that agreement and is not expected to do so as long as
Algeria is publicly embracing the Polisario.
- So Moroccan-Algerian re.lations are still caught in a vicious circle wer- ;
shadowed by Algerian fears that Morocco may not have given up its terri-
torial claim to Tindouf and Moroccan fears that Algeria is using the ;
Polisario as a spearhead f or a war against M orocco.
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- On 25 November 1975, King Hassan II voiced Moroccan f ears in this regard F
_ when he said: "I expect Algeria to fight me." Then after the bloody
- (Amguilla) clashes in February 1976, Hassan asked Algeria to choose between
a lon~, open war and a guaranteed international peace.
- The (Amguilla) clashes were an expression of the tension ~n both countries ~
which reached its peak when Algeria opposed the tripartite Madrid agreement
to restore the Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania and viewed it as
' a fait accompli and a partition in the obsolete colonial mode. ~
Those clashes were nipped in the bud, since reason prevailed an both sides,
but the indirect consequences could not be contained, mainly Algeria's
embrace of the P olisario, the Polisario's development and the improvement
of its strength with various capabilities.
Though in the eyes of the Moroccans the Polisario was nothing more than
an Algerian tool in a dispute the goal of which was the Western Sahara
and Algeria's reaching the Atlantic, tlne,dispute was not made public, at
least an Algeria's part, since Algeria demanded that the tribes of the
Western Sahara, comprising not more than 65,000 people, be given the right
to self-determination, that is, the right to establish an independent
~ state, and so it was backing the Polisario and trying to get international
recognitian of it.
The Moroccans, however, resp anded that the objective was to establish a
ready-made mini-state that would be tantamount to an Algerian governarate
and aimed at surrounding Morocco on the Atlantic.
The Moroccan Offer
Arising from the Moroccan's belief that Algeria's goal was to get to the
Atlantic, Moroccan dip lomats made a secret offer through French and African -
diplomatic middlemen to give Algeria two land corridors across the Western
Sahara to the Atlantic.
The offer was to have been the primary subject of a meeting scheduled to
be held in a neutral Eurapean capital between King Hassan and President
Boumediene, but the illness and then death of the late Algerian president
- prevented this meeting from coming about.
The new Algerian president reportedly saw little good in such a meeting
and such an offer on the basis of the developments which had convinced
Mauritania to cede its share of the Western Sahara and to sever its -
fateful tie with Morocco. He felt that these developmer.ts wouZd put
burdens on Morocco that it could not cantinue to bear for 1.ong, as the
peacekeeping operation in the Western Sahara was costing it at least
$1 million a day and, consequently, there was ~ustification to expect a
Polisario victcry from operations designed to scatter the Moroccan Army _
and drag it into a lang war of attrition. These factors may, to some
extent, explain the escalating scope, strength and reach of the Polisario
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operations. However, as one military observer said, what can a gnat do _
against an elephan~t?
The results of the Smara battle were decisive in principle. They brought
an effective truce in the field that afforded opportunities to multilateral
AraU and tnternational mediation efforts with tt~e sinqle fioal of preventing
developments from expanding and leading to a war between Morocco and
_ Algeria in a form that would set fire to the Greater Arab Maghreb and
bring international complications.
The understanding of informed circ les is that in a letter which King Khalid
sent to Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba, he proposed that the Tunisian
president make a new demarche between Morocco and Algeria based on holding
a meeting between the Moroccan monarch and the Algerian president.
Elsewhere, Paris' urgent contacts set in motion joint mediation eff orts
to be made by the president of the Ivory Coast, Houphouet-Boigny, and the
president of Senegal, Leopolh Senghor.
With regard to these mediation eff orts, the Moroccans say that everything
is negotiable but on conditian that this is not detrimental.to the Moroccan -
identify of the territory whi.ch the motherland has regained.
In this connection, observers point to the Moroccan popular and govertu?iental
unanimity, including various rightwing and leftwing parties, on the
principle of the restoration of the Western Sahara to Morocco as a fin~il.
restoration representing a realization of a national demand based on
historical and legal precedents, precedents which had been ratified by the
Internatianal Court of Justice in its 1978 decision, a decision which
reaffirmed that legislative ties and bonds of loyalty had existed between -
the Moroccan sultan and th e tribes of Western Sahara before they fell
into the clutches of Spanish imperialism. ~
- Are There Other Solutions?
Accordingly, any mediation infringing upon this principle would encounter '
powerful and sweeping Moroccan opposition. However, that does not mean
that there are no other solutions.
The earlier Saudi mediatian, for example, took into consideration underlying -
economic factors in the dispute and proposed a sort of Algerian-Moroccan
joint exploitation-with Saudi financing--of the mines in the (Bouqara)
area. At that time, Morocco agreed to the proposal which President
Boumediene rejected for mflral reasons because doing this would give Algeria
- the image of a country exploiting liberation movements to reap benefits.
Apparently one of the solutions put f orth for ~iiscussion is one that would
- provide for recognitian of Moroccan sovereignt~? over the Western Sahara in :
return f or permitting the return of the Polisa~:io elements, even though
they would be capable of dominating the autonaay system.
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Observers feel that this solution could lead, with no complications, to
' Algerian-Moroccan cooperation in joint exploitation of the mineral wealth
in the Sahara and to realization of a plan to give Algeria two corridors
across t?~e Sahara to the Atlantic, considering them free corridors. Every-
thing is negotiable but everything is explodable. The inevitable coming
clashes between the Moroccan forces and the Polisario will determine the
practical developments in a field where the drums of war echo, a war that -
cannot go on as a cantained dispute between brothers because international _
strategic cacisideratians, which imposed a sort of relative neutrality
upon the parties directly and indirectly involved in this phase, will
intervane to end this neutrality and transform it into alignment with one
of the sides.
In this regard, it might be appropriate to take a quick look at some specifics
concerning military strength in the theater of events according to an
excellent report from the Institute of Strategic Studies in London which
provided the f ollowing details:
Moroccan Military Forces -
Developments required an expansion in strengthening the Moroccan f orces,
and the Moroccan Army now comprises more than 90,000 troops in addition to
30,000 militia troops.
The land army comprises around 80,000 troops and includes about 100 -
Soviet-built T-54 tanks, 50 MX-30 tanks, and 120 French-built MX-12 tanks,
in addition to m ore than 8~ American-built M-48 tanks. It recently obtained
_ additional quantities of these tanks and of armored personnel carriers.
In addition to traditi anal field artillery, Morocco has 250 anti-aircraft
guns, 210 anti-tan~c guns and 250 armored personnel carriers.
The air force consists of 5,000 troops and comFrises 60 F-5 and ]Fouga
Magister fighters, as well as 50 Mirage F-1 interceptor aircraft (noting ~
- that Morocco now only has 18 F-5 aircraft), 8 Hercules C-130 transport
air~~raft and 40 helicopters.
The navy totals 3,000 troops, some of whom are deplayed in ground battalions
and launchers, and employs a destroyer, five cruisers and two coast guard
vessels. This service was recently reinforced with a number of torpedo
boats.
Mauritania
Prior to Mauritania's departure fram the arena of the�Saharan dispute, its
ground forces had reached a total of about 12,000 troops, this increase -
having been accomplished with Moroccan and Arab aid.
The French Military Presence
France has a p~esence close to the area of conf lict, but it is still a token _
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one and is limited to a total of 65 military instructors and advisors who -
were released by Mauritania.
France maintains a strong staging point close to the area in Cap Vert near
Dakar; and this staging point is considered one of the most imgortant army
military bases maintained by France on the African continent. Stationed
at this base and the f our other bases (the D~ibouti base, the Abid~an base
in the Ivory Coast, the Libreville base in Gabon and the Ndjamena base in
Chad) are squadrons of Jaguar and long range Transall aircraft. In
additian to these aircraft, there is a Fren~h force permanently stationed
at the Cap Vert base comprising more than 1,200 troops and the command of
which comes directly under the orders of the French army chief of staff.
The Polisario Forces
There are no reliable statistics on the Polisario forces and, therefore,
estimates vary from 5,000 to 15,000 Croops using the Tindouf area as their
primary base. Most of their weapons are limited to French-made MAS-36
rifles, but they have recently received significant supplies, reportedly
fram Libya, most importantly Soviet-made mortars and anti-tank missiles. -
The Polisario have used these arms extensively in their recent operations,
_ which indicates that they are canfident of continued supplies. -
The Algerian Military Forces ~
, The Algerian land, sea and air forces comprise 69,300 troops permanently
under arms, 100,000 reserve troops and 10,000 gendarmerie.
The ground forces, which comprises 61,000 troops, has 400 tanks of various
, types, including 100 Soviet-made T--34s plus 50 French-made light MX-12s.
The missile battalions in the ground forces have significant numbers of '
SAGGER and FROG-4 missiles ~upplying firepawer to the artillery battalions, ~
which have recently been reinforced with additional batteries. -
The air force has 3,500 troops and 182 combat aircraft, including 100
MIG-15, 17 and 21 fighter aircraft, 40 IL-28 and Sukhoi bombers.
The navy numbers 2,800 troops and has 6 sub-chasers, 6 STYX missile launching
shilps and 12 torpedo launching vessels, in addition to a number of coast
= guard vessels.
_ The Ministry of Defense's budget was increased by 20 percent in 1976.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 al-Watan al-'Arabf ~
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EGYPT
- GHALI INTERVIEWED ON SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AFRICA, PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY
J LD151539 Milan L'EUROPEO in Italian 15 Nov 79 pp 39-40 LD
_ [Interview with Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Butrus
Ghali by Aleasandro Silj in Cairo: "Africa Is Being Divided"--date not
specified]
[Text] Cairo--Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Butrus Ghali was the -
principal Egyptian negotiator in the agreements with Israel. He has a
university education, is president and driving force of the a1-Ahram
International Study Center and only entered politics recently. He ia a
Coptic Christian and in addition has a Jewish wife and did not start from
a position of strength in politics. Nonetheless his personality soon stood
out and Ghali even managed to win the respect of his adversaries by the -
strength and consistency with which he led negotiations with Israel. In _
this interview given to L'EUROPEO just before a long tour of African capi- -
tals Butrus Ghali asaesses Soviet policy in A~rica and the issue of autonomy
for the Palestinians. -
. [Question] You have denounced the danger of the Soviet preaence in Africa
_ on many occasiona. What led you to adopt auch a clear position on that
problem? ,
[Answer] I am particularly worried by the lack of awareness of the Soviet
threat not only among those directly involved--the African countries--but ~
also in Europe and the United Statea.
[Queation) Nonetheless in a recent statement to the Congressional Committee
for African Affairs U.S. Under Secretary of State Newaon, referring to the
presence of 41,000 Soviet and Cuban soldiere on African aoil, clearly de-
' nounced the threat they represent ~:o peace.
[AnswerJ Newson's statement doea not alter my view. Saying that you know
a fact does not necessarily mean that you are aware of ita conaequences.
It is one thing to know that a given situation exists and another to want
to and know ho~a to react. I am simply saying that if the current Crend
continues we wi11 move toward Africa's division into two camps, the Marxiat
- camp and the anti-Marxist camp, with harmful consequencea for all.
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[Question] You also mentioned the Africana' lack of awarenesa of the
Soviet threat. Perhapa it was the example of Egypt, which in 1972 exp~lled
the Ruseian "advisers" liCtle more than 1 year after the 1971 Soviet- ~
I:~yptian agreements, which convinced the other African countries that the
Soviets are nor, after all, eo very dangeroue eince, in your caee, they
- agreed to leave.
[Answer] I would point out that not all African countries could afford to
- follow the example of Egypt--a country, do not forget, which has 5,000
~ years of history.... The fact is that the Russiana learned the appropriate -
- leasons from their past experience. They have refined their strategy.
Today, as soon as they set foot in a country they take care to eet up
~ political parties and act on the basis of the political structures of the
host country. It is no longer possible to talk merely of a Russian "pre-
sence" but rather of "penetration" in all directions....
[Question] Is there any possibility of an African country fulfilling a -
military role in Africa similar to that of Cuba but on the opposite side?
[Answer] No African country would agree to play such a role becauae it
would mean becoming the mercenaries of a great power. Africa should be
able to run its own affairs autonomously, with its own forces and without
external interference. For example, look at Nigeria's military interven-
= tion at Chad's request....
[Question] However, there wae also Tanzania's military intervention to
Uganda's detriment. Are you in favor of that type of unilateral interven-
tion?
[Answer] Certainly not. We condemn it. However, it remains a local con-
flict and as such is less aerious than and preferable to an international ;
- conflict. ~
I
[Question] Experience shows that a conflict between African countries i
rarely succeeds in remaining a local affair and that African regimes often I
accept or seek foreign interventions. Hitherto Soviet interventions have ~
_ proved more effective than Western interventions. Do you thiuk that that i
is a factor in the spread of Russian influence in Africa? ~
i
. [Anawer] That is not the problem. It has to be admitted that when we are
faced with an intervention by a Western co~~ntry, everybody in Africa pro- ~
tests. However, if the Soviets or Cubans intervene nobody really dares
to condemn it.... Perhaps that is because the West, especially Europe,
has a colonialist past to be forgiven and any intervention on its part is
automatically suspect. '
;
[Question] The last decolonization battle is being fought in southern ;
Africa. If one of the great powers were to succeed in having a deciaive
say in solving that problem it would probably secure a lasting influence ~
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over the whole continent. Do you think the West has a role to play or do
you think that in thie case too it is preferable for the conflict to remain
"1oca1" without foreign interventiona?
[AnswerJ Let us address the facts. There are outside intervent,ions in
the case of southern Africa and we should take them into account. Mozam-
bique and Angola are already communist. If the Weat continues to simply
observe and if the communists establish themselves in southern African
coun~rries too, we must seriously consider the possibility of the "whole"
of Africa becoming couanunist.
[LD151541] [QuestionJ You are preparing to visit many African capitals.
Will you diacuss those mattere? -
[Answer] The main aim of the meetings I will have in those countries is
to explain Egypt's policy in the Middle East conflict.
[Question] Do you believe the Camp David agreementa are still valid?
[Answer] We intend to honor them and are confident that the others will
honor them.
[Question] What can you tell u~ about the problem of the Weat Bank and
the Gaza Strip and of autonomy for the Palestinians?
[Answ~er] Many inaccurate things have been published about that question. -
In our view the autonomy which Egypt is proposing is not a final solution.
_ It is a atarting point. It is a framework agre~:ent which would be offered
to the PalesCinians. It would then be up to them to use it to negotiate
the subsequent stages. In other worde we are talking about a"minor"
autonomy--an initial step.
[Question] With or without the PLO's participation? ~
~ [Answer) The PLO's agreement is esaential. However, first the-Palestinians,
- the Paleatinian people must be convinced that it ia in their intere~te to
support that attempt. .
[Question] How do you think you can succeed?
- [Answerl They must be convinced that it ig a gradual and alow process but
that it should nonetheless be undertakea becauae there i8 no alternative.
For the Palestinians to be convinced that auch a proceas ahould be aupport~d,
certain con~itions are neceseary. Iarael must abandon the establiehment of
new settlements, decree an amnesty and release political prieonere and re-
move military garrisons from the citiea: In shor~, it must create an atmos-
phere of trust which does not exiet at the moment.
[Question] Therefore the success of this attempt depends on Israel?
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[Answer] Yes.
[Question] Do you think that Israel might be prepared to take the ateps
you have mentioned? -
[Answex] Europe can help us in this matter. Israel is sensitive to
international gublic opinion. The EEC resolution is a constructive contri-
bution. If necessary we will even take the matter to the United Nations.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Rizzoli Editore
CSO: 3104
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IRAN ~
FOREIGN MINISTER SADR STATES POSITION ON SHAH'S EXTRADITION
LD141609 Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 12-18 Nov 79 p 58 LD
[Telephone intezview with Iranian Foreign Minister Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr from
b}rY~erre Blanche from Paris on 7 November: "Bani-Sadr: We Will Not Keep
the Hostages"]
[Text] LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR: What does the occupation of the U.S. Embassy
mean to you ? Do you really believe that the Americans are going to extra-
dite the shah?
Bani-Sadr: I will repeat to you what Imam Rhomeyni has ~ust ~aid: He will
not receive any U.S. delegation until the United States agress to extra- _
dite the shah.
LENOWEL OBSERVATEIIR: You are not serious?
Bani-Sadr: The Americans were in the habit of extraditing Iranian opponents
in the shah's days. I s~Q no reason why a government which claims to uphold
human rights would welcome a criminal.
LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: But you know quite well that he is ill.
- Bani-Sadr: Well, he will be given treatment. Or let the Americans treat
him.... We will give them time if they give us an official promise to ex-
tradite him. Of course, we could not wait for years.
LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: What do you intend to do with the hostages? ~urely
y ouu are not going to kill them? ,
: Bani-Sadr: The hostages are not a meana of exerting pressure. I do not
think we will keep them. I personally am not in favor of that sort of action.
We have other possible methods of exerting pressure. Furthermore, we are -
_ examining that question at this very moment.
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LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Are you considering an oil embargo?
~ Bani-Sadr: I cannot rule out that possibility. However, above all we can
also make revelationa on U.S. interference in Iranian affairs. We have a
great deal to say on that subject. Why not create a new Watergate in the
United States on the subject of Iran?
LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR: You are referring to the documents which you found
in the U.S. Embassy?
Bani-Sadr: To that and to other information we have.
LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR: Do you realize that you are cutting yourselves off
from Western public opinion which cannot acept either the seizure of hostages
or the extradition of a dying man?
Bani-Sadr: It is not a group or a commando unit which has seized hostages.
It is a whole people who, by occuping the U.S. Embassy, are showing inter-
national public opinion that they wish to control their future and have t~eir -
independence. As for the shah, what weuld you have said if Hitler had gone
- to Switzerland for treatment after the way? The shah is Hitler. He ie worse
than Hitler. You were in Iran. Remember how many people were killed every
- day last year.
LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: What do you think of Bazargan's resignation?
Bani-Sadr: Things are cleat~e~ now. The goverrunent's prestige had been di-
minished. The former government's policy was a refarmist one both at home
" and abroad. Today the people are no longer passive, as they were before.
The occupation of the U.S. Embassy shows that if the government does not do ~
its duty the people take action themselves. ~
LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Do you not fear that Bazargan's elimination might ,
encourage Che concentration of power in the hands of the clergy alone? ~
Bani-Sadr: I do not believe that that is a danger. Quite the reverse. Con-
ditions are now right for cooperation between the progressive mullaha and
the intellectuals.
LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR: Does that mean there are reactionary mullahs?
~ Bani-Sadr: There are progressivea and reactionaries in all spheres.
LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Let us return to the U.S. Embassy....
Bani-Sadr: The United States refuses to understand that a new chapter has
opened. It must understand it. As for the hostages, I repeat that we are -
trying to settle the question as quickly as possible.
COPYRIGHT: Le Nouvel'Observateur, Paris, 1979
CSO: 4900
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IRA2
IRAQ ASPIRES TO PLAY MORE EFFECTIVE ROLE IN REGION
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 4-10 Oct 79 pp 2~+-25
[Article by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI's correspondent in Baghdad: "Baghdad Pre-
pares to Play a More Effective Role in the Arab Arena"]
[Text] What does Iraq look like today, having reached the threshold of the
80's? To any neutral observer, the picture from inside Iraq looks bright
and radiant, and promises this country an effective role in the Arab arena.
- Iraq is fit to play such a role because of its huge industrial base, enor-
mous wealth, and young leaders who possess an ambition equa.lled only by
their boundless self-confidence and deep-seated belief that the Arabs mttst
finish building the edifice of their national unity--they being a large
nation and perhaps the only such [large nation] that still has not reached _
this sacred goal. , _
Ba.ghdad--From AI~-WATAN AL-'ARABI's Correspondent
The educated, or cultured, Iraqi is a reader. An avid reader. Evidence of
this is shawn by the high rate of sales of books of intellectual and cul-
. tural content that are published here or come from foreign countries. The
high rate of sales of local and other Arab newspapers and magazines also
testifies to this fact.
The average educated Iragi has a high level of awareness and a high degree
of perception, a fact which is indicated by his literary taste and his
special passior~ for poetry. _
~ Nevertheless, there is a high rate of illiteracy in Iraq, perhaps above
6C percent. This illiteracy--besides being, in itself, one of the glaring
. features of backwardness which has forced tHe illiterate people~ to live
outside the mainstream of the nation's life--has been a source of irritati~on
and a constant problem for the Ba'th Party regime since it came to prnver ~.n
this Arab country 11 years ago.
This situation, during the last few ysars, has brought the authorities to
: the point of admitting that this high rate of illiteracy has begun to`be
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:i.ncompatible with the countr,y's ambitious goals for its plans of develop-
mc~ri~L, and with the rapid economa.c and industrial progress that Iraq has
acli.i evcci utidc.r tYic~ administx~~,~t:Iort o!' t,hE~ Da ` th Party. Al~o i t is iricom-
pa~;ible wi-L-h Iraq's status and the role it is required to play, especia:lly
on the national level.
Conse~uently the energies of the [Ba'th] Party and the government's educa-
- tional and administrative apparatus have been mobilized to quickly elimi-
nate illiteracy. It is not the anti-illiteracy law, which was promulg~,ted
last N1a.y, that has been the decisive factor in promoting this change. ?'t
is a confirmed fact that it has been a well thought out, practical plan of
- action that has enabled this law to be carried out so that it has become
an existing reality and not merely a law on the books.
Stirring Up the Citizens' Fervor ?
The anti-illiteracy campaign has directed its appeal toward the emotions of
the Iraqi citizens in order to stir up their fervor and ability to excel,
and it has made clear to them the great step forward which learning to read
- and write will give to them.
In addition to all that is the role of punishment as a deterrent and also
as an incentive. The penalties for those who refuse to participate are
fines and imprisonment. Even the imprisonment does not exonerate a person
from the crime. Even when behind bars he has to learn to read and write.
Today there are 2 million Iraqis between the ages of 15 and 45 who have
begun learning to read and write for the first time in their lives. And
they are being taught by 75,000 male and female teachers. They all go ~o -
more than 28,000 schools which are located high up in the mountains, in tne
desert, and a].ong the banks of rivers. Television also helps the campaign.
And the government offers all the necessary instructional materials includ- i
ing books, notebooks, and visual aids.
Today the Iraqi authorities can be proud of the fact that Iraq is in the _
front ranks of the countries which have achieved brilliant success in com- :
batting illiteracy. This year Iraq received the UNESCO prize for its _
successful campaign. The law is severe. Persons who refuse to participate
are imprisoned for a week and are fined 10 Iragi dinars (about 30 dollars). ,
, And whoever claims that he has learned to read and write, and is still '
illiterate, receives a penalty three times as stiff. And~whoever exploits
the program for his own private gain is fined 10 times as much and his term
of imprisonment goes up to 2 months. ~
~
The educational program is practical to a large degree, in addition to
_ being a source of guidance. The beginner not only has to learn reading ;
and writing. He also must learn basic facts about the history and geog-
raphy of his homeland, the Arab world, and about his Arab nation's hopes, ~
aspirations, and suffering. ~
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'1'tie implementa~;ion of the anti-illiteracy program is overseen b,y a higher
(:OUIIC:L1 WY11Ch includes representatives from the party, the armed forces,
= uricl vr~.rious ~overnment agencies .
wnat, .t.;, Lhe Me~.nin~ of' This Determination to Eliminate Illi~:eracy?
This stubborn insistence on getting rid of illiteracy in Iraq at such a
rapid pace--what does it reflect?
Actually this insistence on eliminating this chronic phenomenon of dreadful
backwardness is the embodiment of a very deep desire on the part of higher _
Iraqi authorities, in particular the Iragi president, Saddam Husayn, to see
Iraq make great progress in its development, in just a few years, utilizing
- the revenues from its enormous oil Vrealth.
This acceleration in eliminating one of the painful signs of backwardness
is to a great extent harmonious with the young Iraqi president's fervent
desire to create a society which is strong, firm, coherent, which possesses
awareness, and which will serve as the foundation on which [Iraq] can under-
take to play a stronger, mQre effective, and more vital role in pan-Arab
affairs.
Iraq, according to Saddam Husayn's view, is a strong country. It is strong
because of its tremendous resources, and strong because of its human poten-
tial.
Under Lhe leadersr.ip of its two presidents, al-Ba.kr and Saddam Husayn,
during the past 10 years, Iraa has been able to put an end to the factors
of political unrest which were dissipating its tremendous potential and
limiting its capability to play its role both nationally and in the Arab
world. The political stability which Iraq has begun to feel very notice-
ably since 1973 or 1974 has helped the country greatly in its efforts to
~ renounce many of the methods which it was forced to employ in order to
settle its political and social conflicts.
Sa,ddam Husayn' s Leadership
His active and flexible role materialized in prominent fashion in the mini
summit meeting in Baghdad last year. The regime is no longer a prisoner
of slogans. Saddam Husayn's leadership--which is fundamentally based on
his self-confidence on the one hand, his deep-seated faith in his people
on the other hand, and his absolute commitment to the principles and regime
_ of the [Ba'thj Party--has freed his youthful will from many of the abstract '
- and theoretical barriers which perhaps have become a burden, accumulating
daily, and merely a shackle, limiting his capability to act, rather than
being an incentive, food for thought, and a source of inspiration.
. Today Iraq, due to this prag~na.tic policy of flexibility, and without stray-
ing from its basic, fundamental principles, is playing a prominent role in _
, the Arab arena--a role which it has never played before in its modern history.
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Saddam Husayn today deals with various Arab regimes without any problem
and irrespec~:ive of the differences in economic and social outlook from -
orie z�egime to another. Perhaps a clear indicatioti of tlie ef~ectiveness
of tYii~ role would be to point out the role of 'Abd-al-Karim Qasim's Iraq
in the [Persian] Gulf and [compare it with] the role of Saddam Husayn's
Iraq, 20 years later, in the same area.
Iraq is no longer the reckless, frivolous, and primitive threat that
characterized it under the regime of Qasim. Today Iraq represents strength,
support, and a factor of stability and stabilization. And it is a fierce
shield for the Arab character of the area, prot~cting it fr~m those who
would threaten it or stir it up.
Also Saddam Husayn's leadership--in its refusal to bargain over Sadat's
Camp David policy because that would then mean accepting the fact of bar-
gaining over its principles and convictions--is at the same time self-
confident and strong enough to enable it to overcome all the secondary
complications that usually dominate the interwoven, interlocking relation-
ships between the Arab countries.
The Characteristics of Genuine Leadership
_ Une important quality of leadership is that which places the higher national
interest and strategy on a much higher plane than the level of egotistical
self-interest.
Thus it is not unlikely, as a result of keeping this strict rein on emotions,
that Iraq and Syria will once again resume their joint path which, they
agreed upon at the end of last year. This is because the Ba'th Party, in the
final analysis, is a party of [Arab] unity, and, as an authentic party which ,
is true to its principles, it cannot allow unity to remain [just] a slogan, ~
unable to penetrate barriers and borders. ~
What does Iraq look like on the threshold of the 80's? As a neutral observ- ;
er, I can only say that Iraq today is a strong and rich nation, and has '
acquired a young, experienced leadership that has forged its way via bril-
liant party experience. And this leadership is looking forward, in the 80's, ,
to playing its national role with the same capability with which it has built ;
its economic and industrial base in the 70's. .
~ Perhaps Saddam Husayn today feels that he has the power, youth, experience, ~
and confidence to qualify him to assume the role that is appropriate for
Iraq and its party to play in the Arab world, in order to serve a large
nation [the Arab world] which unfortunately is still fragmented and has
not yet completed its national unity. ;
COPYRIGHT: 1979 A1-Watan al-'Arabi
g468
cso: 4802 ~
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MOROCCO
MOROCCAN LEFT CRITICIZED FOR ATTITUDE TOWARDS KING'S POLICIES
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 15-28 Oct 79 p 54
[Article by Ali Gharbi; passages enclosed in slantlines published in
boldface]
- [Text] In the Kingdom of Morocco, at the level of discussion, public state-
ment and other motions, unanimity about "the defense of territorial integ-
rity" has become a slogan which is more than ever the order of the day. It
can even be said that the nationalist overbid is increasing at the same rate
_ - as the accumulation of diplomatic failures and mtlitary defeats.
However, as time goes on, that unanimity ha~ been emptying itself of its
contents and looks more and more like a whitened sepulchre. ~'he "recovery
of the Sahara," that magic formula which, for some, concealed a11 problems,
and for others, worked them out m:raculously, appears to be aggravating
them to the point of becomtng unbearable.
Today ttie Moroccans find themselves again face to face with their reality.
It is the old reality of a government and its choices. It is this situa-
tion in which the fronts of the struggle are being formed, in which the
militants are appearing again, liut also in which conflicts among divergent _
interests are springing up, dismissing the proclaimed unanimity somewhere
else, very far to the south.
/Antinational Economy/
On the economic scene, the weight of the war is certainly considerable.
But that loes not constitute the essence o~ the problem which goes back
~ to the government's choice of an antinational economy, an economy depen-
dent on imperialism and which will be paying for the world crisis from
now on in all its aspects. First of all, with the galloping inflation
which has been adding to the misery and dangerously reducing an already
weak internal consumer level; the unemployment raCe, intensified this
year by poor itrvestments and a decrease in exports to the EEC countries
in crisis; the prob~ble if not cerCa~n return of some 30,000 Moroccan
workers whom France no longer wants; the serious food sttuation, product
- of a very unpopular farm poltcy. �
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- Thus, this year Morocco, which used to export wheat, will have to import
30 million hundredweights--half of its consumption--and pay the stiff
price for them imposed by the United States.
On the political side, the reality of the rifts is likewise shattering the
belligerent unanimity proclaimed regard~ng "Great Morocco." Rifts between
Istiqlal and all the other political structures concerning problems of ed-
ucation. In June, there was tfie scandal of the baccalaureate (which was
finally guaranteed).
In September, the issue was the return to class where 2,120,000 children -
were excluded from their schools. There were also conflicts between _
Istiqlal and USFP [Socialist Union of People's Forces), with respect to
the government's Arab policy, and its collusion with President Sadat; be-
tween the USFP and the PPS [Party of Progress and Socialism] regarding the
labor union struggles, where the two central powers came into conflict:
the CDT [Democratic Labor Confederation] supported by the USFP and the
UMT [Moroccan Labor FederaCion] aided by the PPS (Ali Yata's communists).
These rifts even appear within the main opposition structure, the USFP.
- Everything that separates that party's main currents is so obvious today
� that one might easily wonder what could possibly bring them together.
For what is there in common between the leader Abderrahim Bouabid who,
according to the dedicated formula, "knows nothing about Morocco except
- the main highways"; the intellectuals who are linked to the socialist in- _
ternational--but mainly to Shimon Perez whom they met in Lisbon--and to
~ Bourguiba; the members of the administration who, it is said, are very
close to the government and to Minister of Interior Driss Basri; and,
finally, the base level militants, the delcared enemies of the government
and its choices?
These base level militants run a great risk of being deceived when they
understand Abderrahim Bouabid's real objectives. In fact, the latter is ~
undertaking a campaign throughout the country, and when he proclaims that
the king must be relieved of the Sahara affair which, according to him,
is the people's business, isn't the director of the USFP looking enviously
to the prime minister's chair, which might very we1Z become vacant? The
- real prime minister, Maati Bouabid, could be entrusted with a subordinate
administrative post, while Abderrahim's reign unfolds in great ceremony--
at least so the rumors insist--with the liberation of political prisoners.
As for M'hamed Boucetta, minister of foreign affairs, who has up to now
shone for his incompetence, he would also be shelved.
That would all be part of the plan dreamed up by Hassan, which is to saddle
his opposition wit~.the re:,ponsibility for combats lost in advance. And
for Mr Abderrahim Bouabid to rush to meet that divisive dreaml
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/What about those "who have disappeared?"/
Finally, with respect to repression, the atmosphere is dismal. Definite
threats hover around a new ruling on the right of public employees to
strike. Sanctations taken against the teachers and health personnel dur-
ing last winter's conflicts have not always been levied. The trial of.
Omar ben Jelloun's assassins has, 4 years af ter the murder, always been
postponed to a later time. Maknes' trial is still at a deadlock, and
those accused are beginning their third year of preventive custody. Be-
sides this, there has been no news about all those "who have disappeared,"
- --the military from two coups, those hundreds of Sahraouis who were halted -
on Moroccan territory, the militart Hussein E1-Manouzi -
In return, the councils of war ar~ proceeding at a good pace (Major Azelmat
has been executed) and so are the secret assassinations within the army of
Sahara. The prisons are full. Besides the "official" prisoners, condemned
at various political trials to the harshest penalties, there are all those
people whom the government rounds up, hauls in, detains, and who, after
being so often ignored, stagnate--for how long?--in different prisons of
the kingdom.
_ Will all this suffering and injustice--death, starvation, torture, imprison-
ment, illiteracy--result in rallying in their struggles the militants whom
the government had deliberately wanted to divide, blind and paralyze on the
Sahara question? That is the main question for this 1979 return.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie -
9475
- CSO: 4400
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TUNISIA
- DESTOURIAN PARTY LEADER DISCUSSES NATIONAL, ARAB ISSUES
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 18-24 Oct 79 pp 19-23
[Interview with Mohamed Sayah, Director of the Destourian Socialist Party
in Tunisia by Nabi1 Maghrabi: "Mohamed Sayah Says, 'Military To Have No
Political Role in Our Country
[Text] This lengthy interview with Mr Mohamed Sayah the director of the
ruling Destourian Socialist Party [PSD] in Tunisia lasted for 5 continuous
hours during which different questions that are pending inside the country
and in the Arab world were discussed.
Sayah speaks here for the first time with such candor and such inclusiveness
. since the Tenth Party Conference last September came to an end.
Not only does the interview-discussion contain an evaluation of the experi-
ment of the regime as a whole, but it is also an attempt to dot the i's and
" cross the t's with regard to the high-tension issues of democracy, the mul-
tiplicity of parties, the succession, the role of the military in the
regime, the legislative elections next November, the possible dialogue with
the opposition, the future of the regime, and political prisoners, etc. -
_ The experiment of the regime is facing these issues today more than any
other timQ in the past.
The director of the party also defined Tunisia's position on Arab queatione
[such as] the problem of unity, relations with neighbors and specifically,
Libya, Camp David and the Arab League in its new formation, etc.
Mr Mohamed Sayah needs no identification. The world press describea him as
Bourguiba's "strong man" and sometimes as "the regime's stern man."
When one asks him his opinion about such designations, he smilea with hia
_ usual charm and replies, "This is the opinton of the press. But I do not
- hide the fact that I am one of the advocates of the Bourguiba mode as a -
~ course of government and as a political attitude that would push Tuniaia _
forward in the march towards development and prosperity. There are nwaer-
ous examples along these lines."
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The interview with the director of the part}r is quite enjoyable. He is a
consummate politician; he knows how to tackle an embarrassing question with
the same ski11 with which he avoids "the blows" of his polttical opponents
secretly and in publtc. _
Some people were counting on the emergence of Sayah as g weak figure from
the Tenth Party Conference. Actually, the outcome of the conference was
not completely in his favor. When one asks liim about the reason foa this,
_ he replies with his well-known diplomacy and with this smile, whicfi he
_ rare~.y hides from his interlocutor, "This ts politics., and politics con- -
sists of battles and rounds."
He is a skillfu~ politician. His "opponents" censure him for his intransi-
gence and for the fact that he does not make things easy. Some of them even
accusa him of "controlling" others and of imposin.g a kind of dictatorship �
wi*hin the party. But he denies this charge and affirms his commitment to -
democracy and to the importance of the mulCiplicity of views within one _
party.
One may differ with the director of the party in the way he looks at several i~~
matters, b~it as one listens to him, one feels that he respects the other
person's opinion and that he does accept dialogue ana discussion. "But
when the majority makes a decision, destructive opposition, and especially
- that which targets the institutions and the future of the republic, becomes ,
impermissible."
This deep-rooted desire for dialogue that he has may be the result of c~ul-
tural convictions that the director of the party and the minister delegate
attached to the prime minister--this is his full official title--derived
from his extensive readings and from his tireless fondness for keeping up
closely with different cultural and political movements and currents. Is ~
he not a man of letters and a historian? He is in fact one of the most
prominent historians, especially in view of the fact that he devoted sev- i
eral volumes and, accordingly, many of his interests to fiistory. ~
uestian] Your Excellenc ou know that the art an art has to de- ~
[ Q Y~ Y P Y� Y P Y--
velop in a developing world. Is it possible to determine the courses along ~
which the Destourian Socialist Party has developed in recent years? Then ~
how do you see this development in the future? ~
,
[Answer] You were right when you said that the Destourian Socialist Party,
~ which was previously the Tunisian Destourian Farty, is a developing party. ;
~
My affirmation of this lies in the fact that the characteristics of the ;
Bourguiba.philosopfiy or the Bouxguiba ideology, upon which the party is I
_ based, is what is known as an interim poltcy. !
� ~
~
~ � ~
. i
- ,
f
~
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~n i.nteXim pol.icy in my viera. ~s the higpest indication o~ our party~s ad-
_ herence to the necessityand the utili.ty~ of development.. This is because
- the interim policysigni~ies devotion to a constant goa1; tt requi:res that
steps be taken towards tfiat ~oa1 in accordance with intervals tfiat are con- _
sistent with tfie current capat5ility~ of our movements and our country. It
is a policy~ whi~h believes that e~very stage must inevitably make prepara-
- tions for another. This policy paves the way for the part}* and for the
people in general to make them capable oP confronting and overcoming the
new stage and then moving from it to another. This is the theoretical
aspect of the situation.
' There is proven evidence in the history of our party, in the activities it ~
undertakes and in the responsibilities it assumes that it was capable of
pushing the wheel of development forward and of keeping in step with this
development. Our party is almost one of the few parties in the Third
World countries. At any rate, it is the only party in the Arab countries
which came into being almost half a century ago. It devoted half of this
period to the struggle to liberate Tunisia from French colonialism.
In the second half of its life--almost 23 years--the party proceeded to
build a new system after independence and to deal with the basic question
of breaking away from backwardness.
_ The Destourian Socialist Party then was the only party that was able to
make independence.
Unlike many previous liberation movements the Destourian Socialist Party
was able to go beyond this victory that it achieved and to face up to the ~
new issues that were thrust upon the country.
This is in general.
But if we wanted to talk in detail abouC the new period of our struggle--
~ that is, the period that followed the struggle for liberation--we have
, much evidence about the party's ability to push the wheel of progress, to
remain in step with this development, and to adjust to it. Let me mention
among this evidence in particular the party's ability to embrace new gen-
erations.
It is known that ever sinc~~ its inception and as the days went by the party
- was able to attract the vast ma~ority of Tunisians to its ranks. But we
are the ones who know that ever since independence and until now more than
~ half of the young people [in the country] make up a generation that did not
experience the struggle f~r liberation and did not expertence the period of
colonialism. This new generaCion is now in the party and in greater numbers -
than those of the generations that lived through the struggle for libera-
tion. This indicates the ability of the party to develop by taking in new
- generattons.
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Our party was able to attract these young peopie only because, first, it
was able to re:lew its interim goals continuously and, [second, because it
� was able] to make those goals acceptalile and conformable in a manner that
~ would create harmony between it and the new generations. The party was
able to take in those young people or this new generation only because it
was able to renew, in addition to the interim goals, its methods of oper-
ation. From among these methods I can mention another indication of the ~
party's ability to renew itself and to develop. This ts what we now call
--specifically for 5 or 6 years--the contractual pol~cy. In the confer-
ence that preceded the last one--the ninth conference--which was convened
in 1974, the party was correctly guided to a policy that would enable
Tunisian society to achieve the ability to work in a spfiere of cooperation
and unity and to bring about economic growth and also to become capable of
distributing the fruits of this growth in a milieu af mutual understanding
and consultation.
This contractual policy which we took from others and derived from the
experiences of nations in the area--and I mean specifically the indus-
trialized nations in Western Europe and in North America--makes the social
parties, that is, the workers and their representatives; the businessmen
and their representatives; and the farmers and their representatives re-
sponsible parties. They have their roles in determining the interim goals
" of the expansion plans--the 5-Year Plan that we are in the process of im- _
plementing at the present time.
These social parties are responsible for playing a firm role and for con-
_ trolling and consolidating the expansion plan. They play an effective
role in the distribution of the fruits of growth on a national scale.
I want to make it clear here that everything that has to do with wages,
everything that has to do with organization or work inside the economic
and the social institutions, as well as everything that has to do with
the promotion ~of workers and with the social security benefits that are
prepared for them cannot be carried out without the approval and the par-
_ ticipai:ion of the unions. The approval of the unions [is secureci] on the
basis of a dialogue that takes place between these labor unions, their
representatives, businessmen and the state itself. This is because the
state is also an employer in Tunisia.
I must also mention to you that two-thirds of the investments that are made
in Tunisia are financed by the state. It is known in some circles that
Tunisia is a country that pursues a liberal course and places value on in-
dividual financing and on the private sector. This is true. We do place
value on the private sector by guaranteeing tfie right to own property and
by offering ma~or incentives to the private sector. But in fact, the ma-
- ~ority of the financing--no less than two-thirds--is public financing.
Because it is t~ie largest employer, the state negotiates with the labor
unions ancl makes agreements with them in everything that pertains to the i_
regulation of wages and labor. Tliis policy is derived from the experi-
ences of advanced nations that our party was able to adapt, to adopt and
to work in conformity with.
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I personally find in this an indication that our party is capable o~ push-
ing the wheel of deyelo~ment and o� keepin,g i.n step with this development. _
This took place only~because of the consciousness,ratsing effort that the -
party is carr}ring out in Tunisian society~. It is tliis effort tfiat renders
the part}r capable of taking in th.e absolute ma~or~t}r of the Tunisian
people, and chief among them is the new generation tfiat came after inde-
pendence. We consider this new generation onr broad and our positive
foundation. This is what fias taken place at the present time.
This Is How We See the Future
What we want to achieve in the future is the continuation of this covenant
and the reinforcement of this contractual policy. We want to do this by
convincing more people in Tunisian circles that this policy is necessary
and useful. We know from our experience and from the experience of others
tha~ convincing people about the utility of this policy is no easy matter.
There are customs and traditions that make it difficult for a capitalist -
to imagine himself sitting at the same table and negotiating with his em-
- ployee, arguing that "the employee who accepted the conditions of work in _
my organization has to work within these conditions. Otherwise, he has to
look for another employer." We also kn~w that the worker or the member of
a labor union does not accept this policy and cannot easily be made to be-
lieve in its necessity and its utility. Because of ideological movements _
and whims--and these can be found in the human race--the worker is moti-
vated in many instances to consider the employer and the proprietor of a
business, even if it were the state, as an enemy and an adversary. Thie _
view is derived from alien communist and imported ideologies. They do not
apply in any case to our Tunisian society or to our Arab society because
our society did not go through the stages that European societies went
through. Besides, these communist ideologies failed in Europe itself
where, in the sphere of struggle and contention among ideologies, we now
find that the workers themselves in ~urope are staying away from these
ideologies. At the same time, however, we find that such theories continue
' to have a major influence in the developing countries which did not experi-
ence these experiments or which are still going through these experiments.
On our part we are aware of these difficulties with workers that cross our _
path, and we are also aware of the difficulties that we encounter with
financiers. As far as the near future is concerned, we are trying to win
the wager and to persuade producers, whether they lie financi:era or workers, -
that this policy is necessary and useful.
I am firmly convinced that we will win this wager and that we will enable
our society to take the road that will enable it to win the wager of de- _
_ velopment and evolution. [We will enable it to] distribute the resources
of the country in a manner that would guarantee every Tunisian his right
� to a free and honorable ltfe. In the future, this is the activity to
which we will devote our efforts.
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This ~s How We Undexstand ~'7.urali:sm
This palicy~has another goal also; this goal is what is called pluralism,
and our p~rty~ has a position on it.
- This position is not the ~child of the circumstances and of the moment; it _
is rather the result of the conCact our party fias liad with western move-
ments. We consider pluralism as iieing manifested not only in the multi-
- plicity of parties. Our party spent many years of its life coexisting
with other parties in Tunisia. The party itself which was established
- by President Habib Bourguiba was the product of a split tfiat occuxred in
. another party by the same name. Our old party has been in existence for
a long time. And there were oCher communist, socialist and nationalist
parties. We lived for a long ti.me with these parties, but for almost 20
years there were no parties to speak of in Tunis.ia excepC for Bourguiba's
party, that is, the Tunisian Neo-Destourian Liberal Party, which became
the Destourian Socialist Party aftex 1964.
Accordingly, as a result of experiences, our party was able to reach the
conviction that pluralism can be achieved without multiple parties.
What is important is to ensure that social interests be defended. The con-
tractual policy that I spoke of is one of the guarantees that must be made ,
available in our society so that pluralism can be achieved. This guarantee
is a social guarantee. �
Pluralism, then, includes several phenomena. Among the most important of
~ these phenomena is that pluralistic social phenomenon. ;
What we want from a11 this ia to build ~ system that provides pluralism
~ without leading society into the piCfalls and the decadence that plural- ~
ism led to when it was confined to multiple parties. (
~ This is our concern, if this expression is correct. Our objective is to I
build a regime that guarantees pluralism and, at the same time, spares I~
society the divisions, the False steps and the relapses that distract so-
ciety from the battle of gr~wth that we consider our battle.
[Question] Among these given factors, what are the indicators that attracted ~
_ or caught your attention, especially with regard to the resoluttons and the ~
business of the party's recent conference? !
[Answer] Tn my opinion the most important occurrence at the recent confer- i-
ence was the approval of the policy whose features I have iaeen trying to ~
explain. Tt is a policy that Che last conference--the nintfi conference-~-
began thinking about. We iiegan working on it in the 1r~st 5 yeaxs. ~
This polic}r was occasionally tfie aub~ect of violent attacks and challenges. ;
You now understand tfie events that happened in 1977 and ~n January 1978. ~
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These events and these violent campaigns that we were sub~ected to were to
a large exCent directed against this policy. The contractual policy,
through which we wanted to build our spstem and our society on a pluralis-
tic bas~s was tfie center of these events. We wanted to close the doors to
all the dangers that can destroy~ Tunis~a in its entirety. The most impor-
tant thing in this conference was the fact that we presented this policy
again for approval by the fiigfiest authority i:n the party, the National
Congress, and the approval was unanimous. Not one voice was fieard in op-
position to thts policy. T constder this a ma~or v~ctory.
This Charge Is Rejected
I want to take advantage of this opportunity to respond to a charge that
was made against our party. It is being said that we do noC accept
diversity of opinions or diversity of suggestions within the party. We
do not at a11 refuse dialogue and diversity of opinion within the party.
_ We rather make an effort so that the different questions that are of in-
terest to our country and our people become the subject of debate and
dialogue within the party.
The party has never permitted itself to call a person to task because of
an opinion he expressed within the party.
The most that the party asks of its members and of everyone who attends
its meetings and expresses his opinions---the most that the party asks--
after a dialogue is held and a decision is made is that they rally -
around the decision and that the person in question wilo gave an opinion
that differed from that of the majority not engage in activities that
- contradict the course that was approved by the majority. I believe that
there was an important opportunity at the last conference. Some members
of the Central Committee in the party had expressed reservations in 1977
and 1978 about the policy that the party had been trying to implement -
since its ninth conference in 1974. Those members expressed their opin-
ions and their reservat~ons, but they conCinued to be members in the
Central Committee. The ma~ority did not censure them, that is, the
leadership of the party did not take a hostile position towarda them such
as removing them from this committee. But they were clear in their poai-
tions: they did not engage in any activities that contradicted the
ma~ority decision; and they attende~ the recent conference where this
policy was presented again. The thing that pleased me very much is the
fact that they endorsed this policy, and we were able to win over those
_ who at one time were reticent ministers. They continued to be in the
Central Committee, and they are now in fu11 agreement with this policy.
� This is my view was the most important matter that was presented to the
conference. It is wfiat has been acfiieved.
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Unanimity on the Question o~ the Succession
What the party is working for is the achievement of accord on the basic
problems upon which the sy~stem and society~ are estahlished. Among the
achievements that the party ts proad of is tts succeas in reaching agree-
ment that is almost universal on some of the social changes and reforms
that were introduced to Tunisian society, such as, wamen's liberation and
the reform view that was adopted Fiy the founder of the state nnd the
founder of the party, President Habib Bourguiba. It was th3:s reform view
from which President Bourguiba derived many~of the social laws that pre- -
vail now over our relations inside Tunisian society. All these soctal
reforms have lieen unanimously approved.
Among the important achievements that we are proud of is this very major _
agreement on the model of development in the country or what we call
Tunisian Constitutional Socialism which is based on the coexistence of
the three sectors: the public sector; the sector of guaranteed mutual
assistance and cooperation; and the private sector. Except for very few
who have odd mentalities, ther~ is no longer anyone who debates or re- -
jects this [notion]. -
The agreement was completed early in the 1970s, and especially in the last _
5 years, on an important matter of our republican system: the relation-
ship between the executive authority and the amendment that took place in
the presidential (republican) regime. We had to introduce an amendment to
_ the presidential system by promoting the government as the structure that
reports to the National Assembly--the parliament--and also to the head of
- state and the president of the republic who is elected directly by the _
people. But the government is also sub~ect to supervision by parliament.
Thus some balance between the executive authority and the legislative au- '
thority has been achieved.
~
In this context also there was agreement about a very important matter: the ~
question of succession. When the position of the head of state becomes ,
~ vacant, how can such a vacancy be filled? This is a very important matter
- for a country like Tunisia where a republic is being established for the
first time throughout our long history. The history of Tunisia is a very
. long history. Agreement on this question has also been very broad, and
it may be said that it was unanimous. ' _
We Are Trying To Strengthen the Dialogue _
Regarding all these questions it may be said that our party achieved total
agreement that was almost unanimous. Such an achievement gives 'this regime
real strength and enables the society to confrant the problems of life and -
the problems of growth in particular with the necessary stability. It
mobilizes all the vital energies for the purpose of winning this battle and
confronting the challenges of the age. What we will have to do in the
future is to strengthen dtalogue within tfie party and reinforce democracy
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[ins~de the ~artY a].so], Thi.s too wa,s one o~ the questions that was -
- xaised at the confexence, and unanimity was achieved in that regard.
We have always had dialogue. Tlie party has been careful about providing
everyone with guarantees so that all members can express their opinions
and thoughCs without fear or apprehension. What we are now working for is
the reinforcement of this dialogue so that we can attain the participation
[of all members].
Return to the January~ Events _
[Question] You have touched upon the events of January 1978. Do you be-
- lieve that such events will not be repeated after taday? Have different
- arrangements or measures been made to prevent the recurrence of such
events? How has this been done?
. [Answer] I want to respond by focusing on what I said a while ago. Our
party is proud of what it achieved. Among its important achievements is
the fact that it succeeded in achieving an agreement or a consensus on
the basic questions upon which the regime and society are based.
~ Whdt I want to clarify is that our efforts to achieve this agreement and
this consensus have been long and arduous. The consensus of the people,
or at least, the majority Qf the people, on one of the choices does not
_ come about automatically; it comes about from practice and from life ex-
periences by means of setting up a dialogue with life and with events.
The problem is not one of theories. It is not a controversial problem in
which elite intellectuals take an interest. Nol The problem is one of
creating [a sense of] moderation among the ranks of the people. It is a
problem of creating a movement that would include the majority of the people
who would believe that it would be more useful, more feasible and inevitable
that they work together and achieve coexistence among themselves on bases -
that are well-known and with which they are satisfied. This is how we
sought to guarantee this agreemenC and this consensus.
- Ignorance and the Destruction of Organizations
In other words this agreement can only come about through these events.
What I want to say briefly is that the events that I have referred to--
_ the 1978 events--were centered around the development model and the .
model for the society we want to build.
In clearer terms, this is the contractual policy that I have previously
referred to. This palicy was tfie sub~ect of give and take and the sub-
, ject of dispute. There were those who wanted to oppose it, to attribute
ignorance to the workers and to mislead public opinion into belie~ving that .
_ tlie contractual policy had not been met with approvaS and that it had not
_ been acceptalile to the workers. Behind this contractual policy and the
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model for development and for society ~s the exis,tence of Tunisia itself.
Tunisian exi.stence ~.tse~,~ ~aas the. sub~ect of ~~ve and take through this
kind of conduct. I~ th~.s.wexe not so, then who permitted some followers
to take to the streets, to go to ~he ~nstitutions�, to demollsh them and
to start fires in squares? Tfierefore, we see in these and in other events
which we can talk about at lengtfi, througliaut our h~stor}* and throughout
this struggle, one of the stages for achieving agreement about the choices
on whose bases a sy~stem can be bui:lt. Such a sy~stem would guarantee that ~
Tunisians face a development battle and that harmonious relat~ons be
. established among them as a modern nation to enatale them to hutld a
national state that would provide them witfi the means of working with
dignity and with the necessary guarantees. Such a system would also -
open the door to development, not to mention the growt~ that would turn
Tunisians into individuals c.apatile of living i:n this age and coexisting
with it.
[Question] What remains concerning all this is the question of democracy.
_ How do you view this problem from which the majority of Third World coun-
tries suffer?
[Answer] Democracy has been one of the dreams of the human race ever
since the dawn of history. Contemporary societies have been rightly
guided, ever since the 18th century, and especially in the 19th century
and in this century, to a mode and a model for regulating the practice
of this democracy. I personally believe that the mode I referred to--and -
that is the mode to which European societies and nations that were able
to experience, create and live through the industrial revolution were led
- --is an advanced mode. It is the best mode that the hursan race has come
up with in its long history.
But this mode is now experiencing a crisis, or more correctly, this mode :
is being questioned for two reasons. The first reasc~n is that there are ;
those who believe that it is possible to apply this mode to Third Wor1d
_ Nations that did not take part in the European societies' IndusCrial
Revolution.
- It has been observed that whenever there have been attempts to export this
system and to put it into practice in Third World countries, difficulties
emerged that in many cases led to the statement that this sysCem was un-
suitable. We in Tunisia are not saying that the system is not uaeful or
that it is absolutely not useful. We are rather saying that it requires
a certain degree of maturity or development that is to be achieved in
� these societies. The question is a relative one and is dependent upon
the ob~ective circumstances that were available in some countries and
not available in others. It is Chts reason that made this system the sub- ;
- 3ect of a question. . ~ . !
There is another reason in my opinion, and that ts that the countries in ~
which this system fias appeared have gone inCo and are now going into a
new stage of growth and development. -
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Another revolution was generated by the Industrial Revolution: this is
the technolo~ical and electxonic revolution which jeopardized the mode or
the system tliat ~zas ~ound and followed ever sl~nce the 19th century and
clearly at tfie tieg~nning of this century. That s}*stem was no longer quite
suitable to tfie ever-changing, developing reality in tfiese countries them-
selves, and this matter placed tfie democratic organization itself, which
these countr~es fiave been exper~encing, in a state of revision where amend-
ments were tie~ng sought.
I personally believe and think that Tunisia can be sheltered from this.
Tunisia may be more concerned about looking into this subject than some
of the other countries because, as a growing country, it belongs to the
~ group of Arab countries, the group of African countries and the group of -
nations that did not experience the industrial revolution and did not
stay abreast of the social, economic and political organizations that re- _
sulted from this revolution. Tunisia is concerned about this subject be-
cause of the clash that took place with Europe in the form of colonialism;
because of Tunisia's proximity to Europe; because of what was achieved in
this regard in Tunisia during the colonial period; because of the social
and economic changes that followed independence; and because of the rapid
growth we are seeing now. What we are insisting upon is that there be a
~ , search for a solution to the subject of democracy and that this solution
be suitable to our conditions and our characteristics. Among our charac-
teristics is the fact that there is a party like ours. It is not a con-
ventional party in the sense that it acquired [its system] from the polit-
ical parties that created this outstanding democratic system in Europe.
Bt!t it does have other characteristics that are consistent with Tunisia's
situation as a country that, like the Arab countries, the Islamic countries
and the countries of the Third World, has experienced a long period of
pressures.
Tunisia is a country that has su~fered from the colonialism that controlled
and impoverished it. 'Phe spontaneous resistance [mechanisms] in this coun-
try have at times been denied. The party adopted a method and procedures
of operation and organization that distinguish it from other parties. We
are proceeding on a course that would enable us to build a mode of democ-
racy that is suitable to the aspirations our people and our youth have at
the present time.
What About Parliamentary Elections?
[Questj.on] The country is attributing much importance to the parliamentary
electioas that will be lield next montfi. In your view what new [conditions]
will result from this experiment on the scene of democratic practice?
[Answer] These are not the first legislative elections in Tunisia. Ever -
since the dawn of independence in 1956, the first action tfiat was undertaken
by the party was that of organizing the elections for the Constitutent
Assembl}r that tt reverted to and whose principal role was to enact the
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constitution of the country . This ha pened ~~ter ~ndependence was achieved
~ accoxding to the pl.an and the.~ethod ~hat ~iexe pursued in the process of
_ the stxuggle jfox' xndependence]. Our constitution then is written b}r ex-
perts and ~t was put to a re~exendum~ Tfie matter was cfiarged to represen-
tatives who were elected dixectly by~tfie people. Tfiey were charged w~th
the matter oP enacting tfiis const~tution tfiat proclai'med tfie republic and
- organtzed tfie government as ~t is organizecl now ~n Tun~sia.
Ever since that time we have had legislative elections every 5 years. What
is important in our opinion is that we continue as a people, as a nation
and as a state to hold these elections regularly. What we pledge as a party
is that when it is time for these elections, we will not postpone our
encounter with the electorate and with the people by influencing events
or by doing something or another. This is what we pledge to tfie people.
It is an important date in our opinion at this level. But what makes -
this date more valuable is the facz that we, and, specifically, President
Bourguiba, took the initiative. In the past few months President Bourguiba
took the initiative of introducing improvements to the Elections Code. In
accordance with these improvements the parCy promises to submit lists [of
candidates] in every electoral district. A list will contain [the names
of] candidates whose numbers will be twice that of the seats that the can-
didates are competing f~r. If the number of seats in an electoral district
were five, the party will nominate 10 of its members. Male and female
Tunisian voters who are over 20 years old will have the freedom to choose
five of the 10 candidates.
This is a new initiative that we undertook to strengthen the participation
[of party members]. (I spoke previously on the occasion of the conference
about the importance of strengthening participation; we are trying and we
will try in the future to strengthen the participation of party members in
party life and in the practice of responsibility.) As far as our relations
with the people are concerned, we wan~ to have more participation from male
and female citizens not only in controlling trends and choices, but also in ~
selecting their representatives and their deputies who will work on their
behalf and in their stead to carry out these choices and to monitor the ~
government that gives these choices concrete form and derives from them
programs for regulating the affairs of the country.
;
Yes, it is a new step on the road to participation. The party considers
itself responsible for the success of this step; it is depending on its
- fighters and j.ts broad base with regard ta guaranteeing success for this '
~ new experiment.
Masmoudi aad Our Neighbor Al-Qadhdha~i
[Question] Let us go back tQ the question of democrac}r inside the party.
What are the guarantees that can lie given to tfie minortt}r in tTie parCp?
- How does the ~m3:nority express itself ? ~
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[AnswerJ ~s far as the law is concerned, tfiere are guarantees in our
bylauts; and as ~ar as practice is. concerned, there are guarantees ~n
the provis~ons jof the 1ac~]~
Except for the electoral meetings, most of the meetings of the party are
open meetings. Tliey are open to a11 citizens. The party never reproached
a person for an opinion he presented at these meetings. If someone were
reproached in accordance w~th party law stipulations, that person was re-
- proached for expressing an opi:nion and then carrying out activtties that
were inconsistent with a decision that had been adopted by a ma3ority.
[Question] Does this znean that a citizen who opposes a deciston can ex-
press liis opinion in newspapers and in party Tiulletins?
[Answer] If no specific resolution has been taken regarding an opinion
that is being discussed, opposition is permissible. We often try by
means of the party's press to raise some issues and to ask party members
to express their opinions on them. In fact, we encourage difference of
opinion, but there are basic rules that must be adhered to. The problems
always exist concerning the basic questions. The party conference that
preceded the last one, for example, adopted a resolution to turn down
[the membership] of Mohamed Ma.smoudi because the question was not that of
an opinion, but it was rather the problem~and the question of the existence
of Tunisia. Tunisia is either in existence or it isn't. The man did not
confine himself to expressing his views in a clean fashion, but he resorted
instead to the well-known actions with our friend and our neighbor Mu'ammar -
_ al-Qadhdhafi. The question of the [Continental] shelf that he proposed for
discussion was presented to the party, and the leadership of the party took
the position that it adopted by a majority, even if that ma~ority were by
one vote. During the meeting that took place on 15 January 1974 Masmoudi
himself did endorse the statement that was issued.
_ But after such conduct he left Tunisia and went to Libya. He stayed there, ~
throwing himself in the embrace of foreigners. No modern nation in a re-
sponsible state can accept such conduct from any person. We want to -
achieve a Tunisian accord; opinions may vary within and outeide the party.
Opposition and the Required Dialogue
[Question] Let us also return to the problem of democracy. Are citizena
allowed to publish newspapers without belonging to a party?
[Answer] There is no doubt about this, and this is according Co law. The
number of newspapers that are publisfied by people who are not members of
the Des~ouri:an Party outnumbers that of the newspapers that are published
. by the party.
[Question~ Pluralism within the party signifies that opportunities must be
opened to everybody on the basis of the fact that there is no comprehensive
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theory, but rather a program. There must be a commitment to th~e program
and not to theories. Can party~ membexs subscribe to different ideologies?
to what extent can there he in the party~right3st and leftist members or _
- those who believe in the traditional capitalist theory, in the Marxist
theory or in the Tslamic theory~?
[Answer] A person who joins the party is asked not to join another party
and to make a commitment that he not do so. But what distinguishes us
. [from others], and what we are careful of is that the principles which
we call experimental, that is, those that are the sub~ect of discussion
and experience are found on a broad scale. This is notwithstanding the
fact tfiat the most important principles of the party are, first, the
commitment to work for Tunisia; [the commit-~nent] to place the interests
of the homeland aliove every other consideration; and [the commitment]
to adhere to ethical values and to the slogan that was proposed by
President Bourguiba, "True statements and sincere efforts."
[Question] It is evident according to the realistic map, and your excel-
lency has clarified this point, that there are opposition forces, regard-
less of their size, inside the country and abroad. Does the party actually '
- invite these forces to engage in a dialogue to achieve what we call the
historical accord for Tunisia? What are the measures that have been taken
in this area on the part of the party because it is the party in power?
jAnswer] What we have been advncating continuously is the effort to have
faith in the usefulness of dialogue. We do take advantage of opportunities
to shed light on the bases upon which this dialogue may be moved forward
since it is not possible for me to engage in a dialogue with a person who _
- does not believe in the system. I want to call your attention to the re-
cent speech with which President Bourguiba inaugurated the recent confer-
ence. He presented in that speech the bases that could bind the Destourians i
within the party together and also the bases that could bind together the ;
Tunisians inside the country in general. To establish this dialogue with ~
others, all that we want is that they have faith in Tunisia, in its inde- ~
pendence and in its sovereignty and that they not deal with foreign coun- ;
tries so that foreign intervention can be avoided. What is also being re- '
quested of them is that they respect the constitution of the country. In '
responding to a previous question about parliamentary elections, I mentioned j
that the party will promise to submit lists that will have twice the number j-
of candidates as seats that are to be filled. But the door is also open to ~
lists other than those which the party will offer. This is always possible.
On numerous occasions persons who were not affiliated witfi the party nomi-
nated themselves. Unfortunately, they were not elected because the ma~~rity .
was always supporting the [candidates in the] lists that were submitted by
the pL-ty. ~
~ The last time jthis happened] was in 1978 when partial elections were held ~
to elect one representative to the National Assembly. At that time the j
party presented its candidates. A young prof essor fiad nrnninated himself j
i
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as an independent, and he conducted his election campaign. He did not -
get enough votes to be electedt but the yotes that he did get should have
encouraged him because,he got 5 percent o~ the vote~
- There Are No Political Pr~soners in Tunisia
[Question] Are there political prisoners and detainees in Tunista? [:[f
there are], how man}r of them are there precisely?
[AnswerJ There are deta~nees, liut we do not consider them polit~cal. This
is hecause they~were not taken to court because of the~r politi:cal beliefs,
- but rather because of concrete acCi:ons [tfiey co~nitted] . At an}r rate there
are not many of them. -
[Question] Newspaper news states that the number of detainees is in the
hundreds.
[Answer] This is slander. The fact is that there are only 12 or 13 de-
~ tainees in prison of those who had participated in the events of January. -
The supreme fighter pardoned [all the rest] with regard to [the case of]
Habib Achour. There is another ~roup--about 15 or 20--from arganizations ~
which claim to be Marxist, Leninist and revolutionary, etc. Those people .
. were tried in recent years by ordinary courts, and only 20 persons remain
in ~ail after Che rest were included in the presidential pardon. _
Habib Achour and Others
- [Question] Wi11 the case of those people ue considered?
[Answer] It is known that President Bourguiba takes advantage of all op-
portunities to gardon prisoners whether they are prisoners of the public
right, who committed civil crimes, or prisoners wfio were put on trial be- -
cause they engaged in activities they claimed defended specific ideological
or political actions. None of those served the determined sentence. Habib
Achour, for example, was sentenced by the courC to 10 years, but he spent
only about 10 months [in ~ail].
The Army Is Removed from tfie Polttical Scene
[Question] What is the role of the army's posture on the pol~tical and _
social map in Tunis~a?
~ [Answer] In the organization we selected for the state, the army cannot ~
play a political role at a11. Its funcCion is conf~ned to defendiag the
inviolability of the homeland.
In the law of the state, the goverrnne~t must be civtltan and it should _
- emanate from popular elections tfiat take place in the m~nner stipulated
by the consCitution of the country. The president of the nation is
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directly elected by the ~e.op].e: and the Nationa7~ Assembly is also elected
di.rectl.~ hy~ the ~e.rap7.e~ The zqi,li~t~xy a~uth.ox~ty cannot at all have a role
in politics because political ~~f~ixs fa11 w3thi:n the ~Lrisdiction of the
elected authorit~es~.
[Question] But has the army made attempts to play a political role?
[Answer] There were attempts i:n 1962 to overthrow the regime, and a number
of arm}* officers had participated in this attempt. This attempt failed, _
and it was one of the hardships tfiat afflicted the country. We are taking :
advantage of these misfortunes so tfiat tfie ma~ority of Tunisians would -
learn a lesson from tliem.
Tunisia, the Arab League and Unity
[Question] Tunisia has become the home of the Arab League. This did not =
happen by chance, but rather the Arab countries agreed to it unanimously. -
Consequently, Tunisia is now responsible for part of the burdens of the
Arab course. What specifically is that role in you.r opinion? ~
[Answer] With regard to Tunisia, allow me to say before anything elae that
, Tunisia never sought to become the seat of the Arab League. It undertook
- no initiative and no action that would make it a candidate for this posi-
tion. It was rather, like all the Arab countries, considering the seat of
the league to be in the location where it was embraced and formed, that is,
in Egypt. Moving the offices of the league was the result of events that
do not concern us here and in which we did not participate. It was the re-
sult of one of the misfortunes with which nations are afflicted. As Arabs
we are concerned about such misfortunes. When we saw that there was
unanimity or semi-unanimity about moving the seat of the league as an ex- ,
pression of, the Arab countries' dissatisfaction with the Camp David Accords, ;
we saw that it was our duty to respond to this resolution. We saw in it a '
tribute that the East was paying to the Arab Maghreb; it is an expression i
that we cherish and truly appreciate. '
It is my wish to construe this consensus that was achieved in the selecti.on
- af Tunisia as the seat for the league during this period as the result of -
Tunisia's conduct with the Arali brothers since independence and even before
independence. This conduct has always been [the result of] the effort made ~
by Tunisia and by its political and ideological Zeaders. ~
Among all the things that we are concerned about is that we be in agreement ~
_ with our Arab brothers i:n the effort.for unity. Tunisia has never taken a
hostile position or one tliat re~ects un3:ty, but it was a?ways stating that
unity must be viewed as a goal because it is a remote goal Chat we must j
- strive to attain. Yes, we cannot view unity as thougfi it were a v~ital and i
a tangible reality. It is a goal and not a premise. In this regard we
have already found ourselves in some situations to be at vartance with some ~
Arab countries who w~re proposing unity as though ~t did e~ist, whereas we _
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thQu~ht that unity~ wa,s a$oal tha,t no one cqu7.d tuxn dv~n~ but that no one
also cou7.d considez an ex~,st~ng fac~~
At the present time the v~s~t ma~ority~ of Axabs believe ~n our not~on of
unity~ In its relations w3th its Arab sis~ers and even ~n the s~?arpest
diflferences it had w3th some of its Arab brothers, Tun~sia did not con-
sider this dispute to lie sutistanti~ve.. It never resorted to a total es-
trangement from rfie Arab countrtes. Tt did not a11ow itself througfiout -
- these critical periods to carry out any hostile action against the Arab
countries that were not in agreement witfi it. It did not allow itself
to influence the substance of relations it had with the Arab countries, _
add it tried to have the dispute seen as a political dispute. It tried,
as General De Gaulle said, "not to insult the future." President Bourguiba
has always tried to prepare for the future and to take this future into
- account even when the severest crises and disputes took place. He tried
to confine such disputes to a political framework and to Che framework of
the question that was being disputed, and he tried to maintain other rela-
~ tions and other communications in all the fields.
We want this tribute to Tunisia of transferring the league to it to be seen
as a reward for this style that Tunisia pursued in its relations with
countries of the Arab East. We hope Tunisia will not disappoint the Arab
countries that set great hopes on it.
We and the Neighbors
[Question] What is the standard and the nature of relations and disputes -
with Tunisia's neighbors?
[Answer] We are careful about having good relations w3th different coun.-
. tries and especially with the neighboring countries.
We can say that there is nothing to t~rnish our relations with our direct
neighbors like Algeria and Libya except the very simple matter that per-
- tains to our relations with Litiya. We explain this matter on its theo
retical and political level, that is, in the outlook towards unity and in
the road to it.
" We do not refuse unity as a goa1; we rather consider ourselves enlisted in -
its service. -
We are saying, however, that unity cannot be achieved at once. It may be -
achieved in the remote future provided that we work now in a~framework of
sinceret}r and solidarity to achieve cooperation that is dil~gent and use- -
ful in all fields. What we are comfortable aBout now is the fact that
- thts cooperatton does exist. The dispute about this poltttcal theory and
problem dtd not prevent the ~xistence of relations. We thtnk that the~se
relations could liave been better, and [we :.hink] this cooperation could
have been greater and Tnore beneficial. What we find to be poaitive is the
_ fact that good, neigfiborly relations do exist.
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- President Bourguiba Is the Principal Reason _
[QuestionJ What is your explanation for the phenomenon of the stability =
of ttie Tunisian experiment in spite of the hostility that it faced?
[Answer] Yuu ~sked about the reason, and I reply that the principal reason
is the man who brought this movement to life and who founded it, President
Habib Bourguiba. But what is important about this man is that he was able
to continue; he was able to survive; and he was able to last. This was
attentiveness [on his part]. He used to advise party members during the
days of the struggle for liberation by saying, Continue the struggle as
long as you can." He used to make this recommendation, and he himsei~
applied it by persevering in the struggle, in the action and in the eff'urt.
There is another reason, and that is that the president is a t.hinking man
and that he refused to tie his thoughts to abstract choices, but that he =
tied them instead tq the reality of the country and to the life and events
- that the country was experiencing in his administration. In other words
. he tied his thoughts to the age and to its consciousness. Among the com-
mitments he made was that by which he would never permit himself to be out
of touch with the people even though his people may find flaws in his posi- ,
tions and inclinations because he is an intellectual with an idea and a
mis~ion. Yes, he never allowed himself to be out of touch with this nation.
~ He tried to form a strong relationship with the people, and he tried to
_ strengthen this relationship and to walk with the people to achieve the
goals. -
I am repeating that the rea~on that made this regime withstand [adversity] ~
and survive ~hardship] was the conduct of this man and the course he
selected and pursued.
As a result of this Bourguiba provided another reason [for the survival of
the regime]. The vast majority of the people rallied around this man and ~
around the course that he taught them not as theory, bu~ rather in practi-
cal life along with the events, the disturbances, and the misfortunes. ~
Bourguiba tried to experience all the misfortunes with the people, and he ~
tried to make the people draw lessons from every misfortune. Bourguiba
did not confine his thinking to the ~znisian people only; his thoughts i
comprised the problems of the age. ~
My research into the life, the works and the thoughts of this man leads me
to believe that he benefited a great deal frotr. the period during which he
lived in the East. He spent almost 5 years in Egypt, and he moved to dif- _
ferent countries of the East and even to Palestine before the occupation. ,
He drew many lessons and morals from the events that he experienced in the
East during this period in the forties.
~
To complete the discussion about the army, [I will mention] one of the
events that Bourguiba pondered at length and from which he derived a les- ;
son. We must refer to the first military coup in Syria that was organized ,
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b,y [lusni al-Za'im. What President Bourguiba saw in this period while he
was living in the East was one of the reasons that moved him to return +o
Tunisia anci to alter the plan of action. The plan of action duririg tha,t
- peri.od was that he remain in the East ~,tid rely on his comrades to take
action. HE: would direct them and be their advocate, having spent more
than 10 ye~.rs in French prisons. Bourguiba thought that action could be
taken in this manner, that is, by finding support in the East to reinforce
the struggle inside Tunisia. But when Husni al-Za'im's coup took place
and he derived from that coup the lessons that he did, Bourguiba himself
made the decision to return to Tunisia and to alter the plan of action.
He directed the struggle in another way--the way that he pursued and that ~
1ed to negatiations with France and to the attainment of internal inde-
pendence, i;hen full independence and what we have now. Bourguiba said
this a.fter the coup: "A door has now been opened in the East that will
be difficult to close.~~ This is what made us choose a civilian government
and an army that was to have no role except that of defending the borders _
of the homeland. The arrny was to have no other role in domestic political
life.
Camp David and the Adulterated Solution
[Question] Let us move on to the second part of this discussion which
deals with Tunisia's position on Camp David. Some people expected Tunisia
to assume a position that was less hostile to Camp David; but then we saw
Tunisia take a clear and an open position based on a theory about "the
adulterated solution and the inadequate solution." Is there further
- explanation for this position?
[Answer] I mentioned to you in our previous conversation what the supreme
fighter said in explaining the progression tha~ he was always calling for.
' He considered it to be the necessary and the modern course of political
action. Progression requires a person to seek the goal [to which he aspires].
Bourguiba said that not all the steps were acceptable. He said that we would
- accept a step that made preparations for another and that brought us closer
and as fast as possible to the goal. He said that we would not accept the
steps that were portrayed as steps but did in fact close the doors to devel-
opment and did not make preparations for steps that would bring us closer to
the goal.
As a result of this President Bourguiba did accept inadequate solutions
during his struggle to liberate Tunisia. These solutions did not respond
to the demands of the National Movement and did not respond to all the
nationalistic demands. Bourguiba, however, never accepted an adulterated
solution. There is some difference between an inadeguate solution and an
adulterated solution. .
On the basis of this mental attitude we took triis position on Camp David.
Some people mistakenly expected Tunisia to support the Camp David Accords.
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This was a mistake because whoever expected that did not lcnow the diWith
ence [between an inadequate solution and an adulterated solution].
regard to Camp David, it became evident to the president of the state, to
1;he government and to the policy of the entire state after much scrutiny
anri thought i.n the light of the resolutions that we examined that these
accord~ could not be considered a step that would bring us closer to the
- goal we are hoping for. We cannot accept the method by which these ac-
cords were established, nor can we accept the exclusion of those who are
concerned about the matter--the Palestinians and Syria, which as a state
is also concerned with these accords or with their general framework. We
cannot accept these accords because we know that a solution that would
guarantee peace cannot be reached if those concerned do not take part in
the accords that concern them. The fact that Syria and the PLO did not
participate is one of the most important reasons that made us assume this
position on Camp David also.
In addition, we do not consider these accords capable oi' ensuri.ng Arab
r~i.~~hi,c . Thi ~ is based on our examina~Lion of these accords . Tfle,y ~re iri
rac~; incapable of bringing the Palestinian people closer to their legit-
ima~;e goal of achieving a sovereign, independent state. We view the
Palestinian people as having a legitimate and a natural right to determine
~;heir own destiny and to have their own state. A nation that has no state
d.oes not exist. ~
Therefore, denying ~ nation its independence and its sovereignty is a crime.
This is a natural r'~ght, and it is a right that is reco~nized by inter-
_ national law .
Tunis~.a, therefore, will continue to view this question from this perspec-
tive. Presenting a solution that implies recognition of this right and _
makes preparations for it is a positive action in our view. But Tunisia ;
also requires something else, and that is, that those concerned--that is, ~
the Palestinians, the liberation organization which repr.esents them and
which is accepted as the representative of the Palestinians by all the
Arab countries and by the United Nations--accept this solution. This is
the stipulation that we make to accept this solution.
[Question] There is some talk in the Arab world, especially after Camp
David, about the need for looking for basic grounds upon which the Arab
countries can stand to form a common national Arab strategy that would
take into consideration confronting Zionism and confronting backwardness
with a collective effort in which all human energies and all the oil an3 ,
financial [resources] would be utilized, not to mention the exchange of
experiences and expertise after a 25-year stage of disputes. What is
Tunisia's position on this question?
[Answer] What I can say to define wha~ this strategy should be and how '
the efforts of the Tunisian people should be channeled in the context of
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this goal [is this]: Zionism, imperialism or Camp David is not the impetus
for the efforts we are making to attain this strategic goal or to establish
this strategy. Imperialism or Zionism and their subordinates are assuming
this position as a result of the weakness that has been our heritage for
lorlg centuries.
Rour~;u.a hu ha;; ~.1_rcad,y denounced Z~ionism and advoc~,ted. that the Jew^ mu ;t
be lit~erated From the Zionis~; attitude just as the Germa.ns were liUerated
from the Nazi attitude. He made this statement in a speech he delivered
in ig46 in Cairo to the Anglo-American Committee that was charged at that
- time with investigating the Middle Ea~t question and the Palestinian ques-
tioi~, this was before the well-known 1947 UN Resolution. At that time
Bourguiba was a refugee in Cairo and the leader of our party.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 AI,-WATAN AL-'ARABI
8592
cso: 4402 -
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