JPRS ID: 8944 USSR REPORT INDUSTRIAL AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020046-7
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 46
• Content Type: REPORTS

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s
: JPRS L/8782 -
26 November 19~79
_
.
, ~ Ja ~n ~e ~rt
p
(FOUO 33/79)
r
Fg~~ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE -
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NOTE
JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign
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sources are translated; those from English-language sources -
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
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r are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Textj
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Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are _
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JPRS L/8782
' 26 November 1979
JAPAN REPORT
(FOUO 33/79)
CONTEN7S PAGE
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
'JPS': 'AKAHATA' Comments on U.S. Military Plan
(JPS, 2 Nov 79)..~ 1
'YOMIURI' Urges Japan To Provide Humanitarian Aid to
- Kampuchea
(Editorial; THE DAILY YOMIURI, 5 Nov 79) 2 -
'ASAHI' Poll: Ohira's Populari.ty Rate Down to 17 Percent
(ASAHI EVENIriG NEWS, 2 Nov 79).......... 4
JCP Issues Statement on Ohira Election
(JPS, 6 Nov 79) 6
'AKAHATA': Ohira Has Minority Support, May Form Coalition
(JPS, 7 Nov 79) 8 -
~ 'JPS': 'AKAHATA' Editorializes on LDP's 'Dying Symptoms'
(JPS, 3 Nov 79) 11
Komeito, DSP Reject JSP Proposal on Coalitioi~ Government _
(MAINICHI SHIMBUN, 3 Nov 79) 13
Briefs
- JCP Speech Tour 15
Distribution ofr. Diet Posrs 15
JCP, Opposition Parties` Talks 16
~ Nuclear Power Policy 16
Japan-ROK Ministerial Meeting 16
- a - [III - ASIA - 11.1 FOUO]
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
MILITARI . -
Soviet Military Forces Counter Japan-U.S.-China Military
Pressure
(Yoshitomo Nishijima; YOMIURI SHIMBUN, 3 Oct_ 79).... 18
ECONOMIC
'ASAHI': Ministries Divided Over U.S. Request on Credits
to PRC
- (ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 3 Nov 79) 21
- 'ASAHI' Supports Bank of Japan~s Aiscount Rate Hike
(Editorial; ASAHI E~IENING NEWS; 5 Nov 79)........... 23
Briefs
- Gulf Desalination Projec~ 25
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Nuclear Fusion Programs Outlined
(LE PROGRES SCIENTIFIQUE, Jan/Feb 79)..........~.... 26
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POI.ITICAL ANn SOCIOLOGICAL
'JPS': 'AKAHATA' COrIIKENTS ON U.S, MILITARY PLAN
~ OW021025 Tokyo JPS in English 0907 ~'~1T 2 Nov 79 OW
[Text] Tokyo Nov 2 JPS--U.S. Congressman Paul Findley in the plenary
session of Congress on October 31 proposed that a"Pacific patrol fleet"
should be set up, mainly to protect the sea lanes on the Pacific and
the Indian oceans.
In his proposal, the following countries are required to participate in
the fleet with the U.S. initiative: Japan, Australia and New Zealand,
. and the Southeast Asian countries affiliated with the ASEAN,
AKAHATA carried a comment on November 2 on the proposal for aetting up the
fleet, pointing out that the plan proves that the maritime self-defense .
forces` participation in the "joint military exercise of the Pacific basin
countries" (RIMPAC) to be held next spring, will be a serious step to ad-
vance the "collective security system of the Asian-Pacific countries".
Citing the Carter administration's strategy on the West Pacific region,
countering the socalled "Soviet-threat"--the elaboration of the joint
military action plan with Japan, in addition to the reinforcement of the
- U.S. 7th F1eet, and the freeze on the plan for the withdrawal of U.S. ~
troops from South Korea--the comment says the RIMPAC and the recent proposal
for setting up the "Pacific patrol fleet", indicate that the U.S. Asian-
Pacific strategy is steadily pushed ahead.
The comment, moreover, notes that the proposal for setting up a Pacific
' patrol fleet is made on the pretext of "the protection of the sea lanes, -
- which is a cousnon concern to a11". This, the co~nent says, lies on the
same line for expanding the sphere of action of the self-defense forces
outside of Japan's territorial air and territorial waters, which is raised
in the "guidelines for Japan-U.S. defense cooperation". "The plan of
'Janzus' military alliance, which connects Japan with the Anzus (Australia,
New Zealand and U.S.) is revealing a dangeroue development", says the
comment.
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
'YOMIURI' URGES JAPAN TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AID TO KAMPUCHEA
OW0712101 Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIIJRI in English 5 Nov 79 p 2 OW ~
, [Editorial: "Cambodian Tragedy"]
[Excerpts] International efforts to save the Cambodian people, who are
on the verge of "extinction as a race" from starvation and diaease, are
gsining momentum mainly in the L1.S. and West EuroFe. The UN has alao
called an emergency international conference for the relief of the~Cambo-
dians.
Reports say that the Cambodian population, which was earlier estimated at
7.8 million, has been reduced to half because of the tyranny of the Pol Pot
administration and the subsequent wa~ in that country following the inter-
vention of Vietnam. And about 90 percent of the Cambodian people are now
facing death. i
In addition, Cambodian children, estimated to number about 700,000, have
been dying in large numbers because of malnutrition and resultant diseases.
� According to the UN International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF),
there are very few children aged five or below left in Cambodia because of
the tragic situation in that country.
UNICEF and the International Red CrosP are planning joint relief activities,
including 165,000 tons of food, to save tha people of Cambodia. They have
= also sought the help of international community for more aid;
Intl Criticism of Japan
With the increase in international efforts for the relief of Cambodian
people, we feel concerned about the rekindled criticism of Japan in for-
= eign countries for its delay in joining the anti-Japanese criticism has
been smoldering since the Gerieva conference last July because of Japan's
unwil.lingness to accept Vietnamese refugees.
To *_nake matters worse, there is virtually no Japan.ese among those engaged
in international relief activities on the Thai-Cambodian border.
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The Japanese Government's diplomatic stand, which was criticized for
"political settlement" of the Kim Tae-chung kidnaping c~1se, is certain to
come under fire for its "lack of humanitaxianism" in coiinection with the
~ Cambodian situation.
The government is urged to quickly join in the international efforts to
save the starving Cambodians. The private sector should also without
delay join the humanitarian efforts by providing medical teams and volun-
teer groupa.
COPYRIGHT: THE DAILY YOMIURI 1979
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
'ASAHI' POLL: OHIRA'S POPULARITY RATE DOWN TO 17 PERCENT
- OW032020 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS ~n English 2 Nov 79 p 1 OW
[Text] Nearly fifty percent of the populace do not want the Ohira cabinet
to stay on, according to an ASAHI SHIMBUN opinion poll carried out on
Oct. 29 and 30.
The same 2,574 persons who were polled in the last survey conducted in
late August were interviewed again to find out whether their attitudes
toward the Ohira government and the political parties had changed after
the Oct. 7 Lower House general election.
In the August survey, 30 percent supported the Ohira cabinet and 35 percent
did not support it. But the people have become more critical of the cabinet:
The non-support rate jumped to 49 percent in the latest po11 w~?ile the
support rate plunged to 17 percent.
Thirty-four percent declined to clarify their attitude.
In the past ASAHI polls, the support rating touched the record ~.ow of 12
percent in the final daya of the Kishi cabinet in May, 1960, and the Tanaka
cabinet in November, 1974. The lateat aurvey indicates that the Ohira
- government is rapidly loaing popular support.
Of those who supported the present cabinet in the August survey, only
slightly over 30 percent maintained their support in the present aurvey,
and slightly less than 40 percent withdrew their support. About 70 percent
of those who did not support the cabinet in the last poll did not support
~t this time.
Among the LDP backera, the Ohira cabinet enjoyed a 46-percent support rate
against a 21-percent non-support rate in August, but this time only 26
percent wanted it to coatinue in office and 39 percent were against its
continuance. Among supporters of opposition parties, between 50 percent
and 70 percent were against the cabinet.
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, The lateat aurvey shows that the cabinet is loeing popularit;~ faeter among
_ men than among women and, by age and occupation, the cabinet ie loeing
support across the board.
About 10 percent of the polleea who aupported the cabinet gave as rea~on
for their support the fact that it is an LDP cabinet; only between two and
three uercent cited Ohira's personal character and policies.
- About 20 percent of those who were against Ohira complained of his policies,
14 percent were against it because it is an LDP government and 13 percent
did not like Ohira himself. Personal dislike of Prime Minister Ohira in-
creased from the last survey.
- More than 70 percent of those who disapproved of Ohira's policies were
against the introduction of the general excise tax proposed to reconatruct
the deficit-ridden state finances, and seventy percent of all the pollees
disapproved of the new tax. Nine percent said that the new tax should be
instituted in the next fiscal year and 11 percent favored the postponement
of its introduction until after fiscal 1980.
Asked what should be done before trying to increase the gove.rnment's tax
revenues, 46 percent cited the correction of inequalities ir. the existing
tax system, 34 percent improper accounting practices in public corporations
and 13 percent large cuts in government spending.
Despite the increasing unpopularity of the Ohira cabinet, the LDP was
still favored by a high 49 percent of all the pollees, compared with 52
percent in August. The support rate for the Japan Socialist Party stood
; at 18 percent, the same as in August.
COPYRIGHT: ASAHI EVENING NEWS 1979
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_ POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
JCP ISSUES STATEMENT ON OHIRA ELECTION
OW060957 Tokyo JPS in English 0854 GMr 6 Nov 79 OW
[Text] Tokyo Nov 6 JPS--Tetsuzo Fuwa, chief of the Secretariat of the -
Central Committee af the Japanese Cou~unist Party, on the afternoon of
November 6 issued a statement entitled "On the Result of the Election
for Designation of the Prime Minister." The full text of the atatement
follows: -
1. As the result of the election today to designate a prime minister, "
Mr. Masayoshi Ohira was designated as prime minister. The ugly struggle
for power, the factional strife, which were carried on inside the LDP for
about one month since the general election, have revealed more clearly
before the eyes of the people, the irresponaibility of the party incapable
of dealing with the national crisis, as well as ita anti-people nature.
It leaves no room for doubt that the second Ohira cabinet which has taken
office through the power struggle, totally disregarding the interest of the
people, will be a cabinet to continue the mal-government serving the inter-
ests of big business and giving priority to the Japan-U.S. security treaty,
against the judgement handed down by the people. The .Tapanese Couanunist
Party will make full use of the increased vu~.ce in national ad:ainistration
as the result of the general election to thoroughly investigate and condemn
the mal-government of the Ohira cabinet and to realize the people's demanda.
1. ~Nu.*nber as received] The power struggle and the confusion in the polit-
ical sitLation has made it all the cl~earer that the only democratic way to
make a brE~akthrough--the formation of a progreasive united front--ia a
matter of ~urgent need. In the sequence of eventa, the Democratic Socialist
Party and, the New Liberal Club openly discussed the poesibility of forming
an alliattce with an LDP faction which was involved in the inner party
struggle. But this only confirmed that the right-leaning opposition parties
are atand-by forces of LDP politica. The Socialist Party called for nego- -
tiations on the problem of establiahing a go~ernment by opposition parties.
Influenced by the Komei and Democratic Socialist parties which refused to
accept this call from the poaition that the Communist Party should be ex-
cluded fr,om a negotiation table, the JSP has shown no will to come to
consultatilons with the JCP which accepted the call, but further inclined to
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seek a"So~ialist-Komei axis" line. This attitude of the JSP only served
the closing of the way to a progressive solution to the political situation.
The politics of the Liberal Democratic Party from now on through the 1980's
will be frequently visited by a crisis, but there is no other way of
realizing a change in politics to meet the expectations of the people than
formation of a progressive united front and its victory. The JCP is re-
~ solved to do its utmost to this end.
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
- 'AKAHATA': OHIRA HAS MINORITY SUPPORT, MAY FORM COALITION
OW071255 Tokyo JPS in English 0855 GMT 7 Nov 79 OW _
[Quotes as received]
[Text] Tokyo Nov 7 JPS--On November 7, one day after the House of Repre-
sentatives had designated Maaayoshi Ohira as prime minister with only 138
votes (27 percent) out of total 511 votes, AKAHATA carried an editorial
entitled v1 The PoZitical Power Backed by Only 27 Percent' and Its Future". _
The editorial said:
"The second Ohira cabinet ia going to take office, covered with wounds from
head to heel. Since its defeat in the general election, the Liberal Demo-
cratic Party was buaily engaged in the ugly power struggle for ~ full month,
until at last it ran two cand3dates for premierehip in the Diet elaction to -
designate a prime minister. This was an abnormal election of the prime
minister, unprecedented in the histor} of the Diet.
"The establiahment of the second Ohira cabinet does not mean that the LDP �
[has] overcome its crisis, though it means a'victory' for Mr. Ohira in the ~
intra-party power struggle.
_ "The people have already turned their back on LDP politics. This is proved
= by such objective facts as the recent opinion po11 showing only 17 percent
are for the Ohira cabin~t (ASAHI SAIl~UN, Nov. 2), as well as the recent
general election which resulted in the serious defeat of the party.
"In this election of a prime miniater, Mr. Ohira won only 138 votes, 27
percent, of confidence, out of all the House of Representatives members.
He has managed to maintain the post of the prime minister by a slighteat -
majority in the LDP, pZus support from independent 'black high officials' _
including Kakuei Tanaka, and Dietmembers of the New Liberal Club.
- "The Liberal Democratic Party narrowly dodged the crisis of a complete aplit
of the party by a new political party being formed by the anti-main currents.
The anti-main currenta, however, declared that "the second round of the
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atruggle ras begun" (Mr. Fukuda). It is expected that the LDP will con-
tin~ie its dying power struggle in another form. This means that, as the
~~al:ir.ical t~lank for the pasC one month has shown, factional death etruggle
= i.nside tl?e T.1)P wi.ll come to the front, while many probleme~ the ealution
~f wtiich tlie people keenly desire, will be put aside.
_ It is a well-known fact that former Premier Kakuei Tanaka has been the
"boss behind the scene" of the leadership faction ba~king up Masayoahi
Ohira...~ The deep-rooted corruption an-1 crieis in the LDP administration
is typically ahown in the fact that a man, who controlled the Japanese
administration by the strength of money and is now a criminal defendant,
still affects politics and that the new Ohira government will have to rely
upon him.
[OW071335] Because Premier Ohira has adhered to the power, saying "by
- fulfillir.g my public promises, I will bear my responsibility", it ;aill be
certain that his government will make allout efforts to put into practice
such mal-politics as a massive tax increase, cover-up o.f bribery scandals,
~ and an increased aggressiveness of the Japan-U.S. military alliance, under
the pretext of implementing the "public promises".
In the midst of the power struggle, indeed, a plan for the Japaneae Self-
Defense rorces to participate in the pan-Pacific military m~neuvers wae
- made public to pave the way for an overseas aending of the SDF, and a
massive people exPloitation policy, involving a new tax increase program
replacing the planned general consumer tax, as well as a series of inereases
in public utility charges, has been formulated hurriedly.
What we must watch carefully ia that, because of the fragile power hasis
of the second Ohira government, there is a danger that the LDP may ~ttrengthen
its outrageous attacks on the people and democracy, b;~ winning over anti-
communist right-wing opposition parties to its side and a.triving to intro-
duce a small constituency system to maintain its single-party dictatorahip,
or to establiah a fascist system involving a wartime emergency legislation.
In one of their public promises in the general election, the Ohira cabinet _
and the LDP made clear that they would present an "election system reform" _
proposal after the election. It must not be overlooked that among opposi-
tion party leaders,. those of the Democratic Socialist Party are saying
publicly that the DSP will "positively consider" such a proposal on the
introduction of a.small constituency system.
Therefore, we must continue to strengthen further popular denunciation of
_ the LDP until a final end mark is put to the LDP administration.
- "The New Liberal Club has thrown. into relief its true identity before the
_ Japanese people that it is nothing more than a mere faction of the LDP,
as it had cast its votes for Masayoshi Ohira in the first round of balloting
to elect the prime minister, We must say that the NLC has completely lost
its reason of existence, though it ostenaibly calls for 'destroying money-
power and corrupt politics', because it is the first to extend its helping
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hand to the formation of the literally money-power and corrupt cabinet
- baclced by ' Kakuei Tanaka' .
'I'he right leaning oppoaition parties, such as the Democrat~c Socialist
Party and the Komei Party, cannot deny the fact that theae parties cast
blank votes in the second round of premiership election, their leaders
had openly spoken about the possibility of the coalition with the LDP,
if it should have deciaively split, and that they tacitly suggested the
possible coalition with the LDP. The Japan Socialist Party was dragged
into a right leanjng political li.:~e giving top priority to a'~oint strug-
gle with the DSP and the Komei i~arty' by the forces aiming at prolonging
the fate of the LDP, thus we can say that the JSP is sunk into the depth
of confusion compatible to that of the LDP, which is in a state of sign of
impending decaying of the party.
"While appealing to Che Japanese people the need to establish the genuine
progressive unity the JCP is determined to endeavor to bring into reality
the genuine progressive unity in and out of the Diet".
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL _
'JPS': 'AKAHATA' EDITORIALIZES ON LDP'S 'DYING SYMPTOMS'
OW031201 Tokyo JPS in English 0915 GMT 3 Nov 79 OW
[Text] Tokyo, Nov 3, JPS--AKAHATA on November 3 carried an editorial
entitled "Dying Symptoms of the LDP and Perspective for Progress." The
editorial said;
_ "It is for the first time since the i:nauguration of the Liberal Democratic
Party if two candidates from the LDP .ztand in the Houae election for -
premiership, though it is too early to predict what will come finally, as -
there have been contradictory struggles and operations, one to unite the '
LDP to run one single candidate, which are waged by Hirokichi Nadao, House
speaker and others, and the other to win a majority, which are being vigor-
ously waged by both campa, This ugly strife is now being played on stage
with the background of the aerious defeat of the LDP in the recent general
election, as the result of which the LDP managed to maintain a ma3ority
by enlisting some independent winners, and which came after the party's
long historical downward trend. We can safely call this dying symptoma of
i:he LDP.
"Whatever may happen, the LDP can never escape from the responsibility for
having created political vacuum for 23 days since the general election,
simply due to its own internal strife, and made the special seasion of the
Diet, which has been convened at last, pass days in vain in confusion.
- "This internal strife of the LDP is a aheer struggle for power, between
the claim that 'you should resign' and the other that 'I never resign'.
- This internal strife, lacking a slightest review on the policies and con-
stitutional defects in the LDP, makes most aupporters to the LDP disap-
pointed.
"In this situation, what is serious is not the actual loss of the govern-
ability on the side of the LDP does not directly lead to the establiahmen~
of a progressive coalition government. [SenCence as received]
"What must be looked at straightly in this context is that among opposition '
parties, there are the forces represented by the Komei and Democratic
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Socialist parties which 'stakes their life' in preventing a progreaeive
coalition government involving the Communist Party from being formed -
(Yoshikatsu Takeirz, chairman of the Komei Party), and is thirsty for
joining in a coalition goverrunent with the LDP. -
"It is regrettable to the progreasive forcea that, in this critical moment,
the Socialist Party doea not embaxk on the formation of a progressive
coalition. On the contrary, the Socialist Party has approached these
right-leaning opposition parties, especially the Komei Party, and openly -
announced the policy giving priority to the 'Socialist-Komei joint strug-
_ gle' which leads to an alliance with the LDP.
"When looking at this reality, what is most important at this moment for
- the practising of progressive politics is to raise full-fledged public
opinion and movement at a national level for the formation of a progressive
coalition; that the Conanunist Party, which has fundamentally criticized
the policy and constitution of the LDP and made all-out efforta in aearch
for the progressive unity, has made a remarkable advance in the recent gen-
eral election and advanced in the Diet as a force which no one can neglect,
gives a precious ground to development of this movement."
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGIC.4L -
KOMEITO, DSP REJECT JSP PROPOSAL ON COAI~ITION GOVERNMENT
OW040638 Tokyo MAINICHI SH Il~IBUN in Japanese 3 Nov 79 riorning Edition p 1 OW
_ [Text] All opposition parties--the Socialist, Komeito, Communist, Demo-
cratic Socialist parties and the New Liberal Club and the United Socialist
Party--held a meeting of secretaries general on 2 November in the Diet
_ building. At the meeting the Socialist Party put forward a five-point pro- "
posal calling for an all-oppasition temporary coalition government. However,
because the Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party rejected the proposl
on the grounds that "we cannot discuss a coalition government plan in which -
the Couununist Party participates," the JSP proposal for "building a Cabinet
for the people to r~place the Liberal Democratic Party" fell to piecea less
than an hour after it was introduced.
The all-opposition meeting was held at the proposal of the United Socialist
Party, which was seconded by the Socialist Party. In the beginning, the
' Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party were reluctant to attend the
meeting, but the Socialist Party persuaded them to attend it to "censure
the LDP's intraparty power struggle." _
At the meeting, which opened at 2140, JSP Secretary General Tagaya put
forward a five-point temporary coalition government proposal calling for
purification of politics, financial reconstruction arid administrative
reforms, stabilization of the people's livelihood, the aecuring of energy
resources and the consolidation of peace.
The Communist Party indicated its readiness to accepi: the proposal. However,
Komeito Secretary General Yano rejected it, saying, "The Socialist Party
should first choose between the Communist Party and other opposition parties
in planning to form a coalition government." Democratic~Socialiat Party
Secretary General Tsukamoto also rejected the proposal, saying, "We want
~ the Socialist Party to retract its proposal because ir is against our party
principle to discuss a coalition government plan together with the Communiat
Party."
However, Tagaya insisted on his party's propc:~al, and the meeting ended in
about 40 minutes with no agreement being reacned.
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Emer.ging from the secretaries' meet9.ng, Komeito Secretary General Yano
told reporters, "When the Socialist Party wants to propose a coalition
government, it had better choose either the Komeito and the Democratic
- Soc3.alist Party or the Communist Party before appealing to us to accept
their proposal." Communist Party Secretariat Chief Fuwa also criticized
the Socialist Party and said, "If Che socialists are not willing to discusa
the matter with parties to participate in the proposed coalition government,
their proposal is no more than an observation bal."oon."
COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Shimbunsha 1979
CSO: 4105
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
BRIEFS
JCP SPEECH TOUR--Tokyo, Nov 1, JPS--The Japanese Co~nunist E'arty [JCP] _
has begun a national speech tour visiting all 646 cities in the nation.
An initial speech meeting was held in Tokyo on October 31, with some 700
people attending. The following party leaders gave speeches on the polit-
ical situation following the general election, the pr~spect for the 1980's,
and the ~ole of t~ie JCP: Koichiro Ueda, vice presidium chairman and member
of the House of Councillors; Isao Naito, member of the House of Councillors;
and Zenmei Matsumoto, chairman of the JCP Diet Policy Co~nittee. During
_ the period of the "months for fulfilling the election pledges, disseminating
JCP policies, and expanding the party force", which are set up for a suc-
cessful 15th party congress to be convened on January 15 next year, ali JCP
district co~nittees will each conduct a speech meeting at least once, in
- their districts, amounting to 300 places. Speakers include Secretariat -
Chief Tetsuzo Fuwa, party leaders, 41 communists newly returned to the
House of Representatives, and scheduled candidates for the House of Coun-
cillors election to be held in June next year, in the national constituency
and local constituencies. Speech meetings will be held on the following
four themes: (1) The political situation following the general election,
and the prospect of the progrzssive movement; (2) The public pledgea of the
JCP-independent joint progressives; (3) What kind of a party is the JCP?;
(4) Policies for development of each district and strata of the people.
[Text] [OW010947 Tokyo JPS in English 0855 GMT 1 Nov 79 OW]
DISTRIBUTION OF DIET POSTS--Tokyo Nov 2 JPS--The House of Representatives -
Steering Co~nittee on November 1 decided on the distribution to each party
of chairmanship of 16 standing committees. The Japanese Communist Party
was assigned to chair the Disciplinary Con~nittee. However, on the distribu-
tion of chairmanship of nine special committees, including the apecial com-
mittee on aircraft import scandals, the Liberal Democratic, Socialiat and
the Komei parties objected distribution of chairmanship to the JCP, and
th~ decision was postponed. Zenmei Matsumoto, chairman of the JCP Diet
_ Policy Committee, held a press conference on the same day, and announced
again the JCP claim that chairmanship under consideratiori in the directors
meeting of the Steering Committee should be distributed in proportion to
each party's Diet seats. Matsumoto strongly criticized that the claim of
the LDP, JSP and Komei, saying that posts that should be assigned to the JCP
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must be re.3uced to one, has not logic nor reason, and thia is nothing but
_ partisan activities. [Excerpt) [OW021021 Tokyo JPS in English 0920 GMT
2 Nov 79 OW]
~
JCP, OPPOST9'ION PARTIES' TALKS--Tokyo, Nov 3, JPS--Secretariea general and
secretariat chief of the six opposition partiea met at night, on November 2,
in response to the call by the Socialist Party. Shinnen Tagaya, secretary
_ general of the JSP, tnen proposed to hold a conference to conclude a policy
agreement to form a gover~ent replacing the LDP government. Tetsuz~ Fuwa,
Secretariat chief af the Japanese Cammunist Party, expressed the party's
view, saying: "The Communist Party is ready to take part in a conference
on policy problem, if the Socialist Party sincerely proposes to run a joint
canciidate for premiership based on a reached policy agreement. But, th~
- Socialist Party should firat take a clear-cut attitude to carry on consul-
tations with the party which responds to the socialist cr~ll. The Socialiat ~
Party, however, has so far taken the attitude of turning aside consultationa
with the Co~nnunist Party on the pretext that other parties did not join in
the consultation. If the JSP repeats such an attitude, it will inevitably
end in the repetition of the sterile trial." The Komei and Democratic
Socialist parties claimed once more that tr~ey will never sit around a table
with the Japanese Communist Party to consult a political power question.
The Socialist Party then arbitrarily announced that the socialiat proposal
ended in failure as a11 opposition parties did not always agree on the JSP
_ proposal. The Socialist Party did not show even the slighteat effort to
carry on consultations with the Communist Party. [Text] [OW031207 Tokyo
JPS in rnglish 0945 GMT 3 Nov 79 OW]
NUCLEAR POWER POLICY--The U.S. Government's continued moratorium on issuing
construction and operating licenses for new nuclear power planta is likely
~ to encourage popular movements against nuclear power plants in Japan. A
leader of the Fukui prefectural residents conference against nuclear power
plants voiced distrust in the Japanese Government for sticking to atomic
power despite recent accidents at nuclear plants in the prefecture. Citing
the American policy of safety first, a group Seeking a moratorium on nuclear
pawer plants also criticized the Japanese Government for reswning operation
of nuclear power plants before ~>ompleting thorougl~ inveatigations into the
accidents. However, Japan's Nuclear Safety Commission intends not to emu-
late the U.S. policy in Japan for the time being. The Japanese co~ission, -
now studying a U.S. report on points to check for the safety of nuclear
plants, says domestic reactors underwent similar checks immediately after
the Three Mile Island accident. [Text] [OW081151 Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY
NEWS in English 7 Nov 79 p 5 OW]
JAPAN-ROK MINISTERIAL MEETING--A top Foreign Ministry official said yester-
day evening it will be very difficult to hold the annual ROK-Japan minister-
ia1 meeting before the end of the year. The main reason is the audden death
of Korean President Pak Chong-hui. As for the Japanese side, reasons include
_ the considerable time taken to settle the political crisis, the tiglxt ached-
ule for government activity till the end of the year, with the prime minis-
ter scheduled to visit China in early December, and the new budget that has
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to be compiled. In addition, the Diet will be in aession. Japaneae and
ROK Cabinet members meet alternately in Seoul and Tokyo each year. The
Japanese Government was preparing to host it in Tokyo this year. [Text]
[OW080957 Tokyo MAINICHI SHLMBUN in J~panese 7 Nov 79 Morning Edition p 4
= OW]
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- MII,ITARY
- SOVIET MILITARY FORCES COUNTER JAPAN-U.S.-CHINA MILITARY PRESSURE
Tokyo YOMIURI SHIMBUN in Japanese 3 Oct 79 p 2
[Commentary by Yoshitomo Nishijima, reporter: "Soviet Military Forces on
Three Northern Islands, Political Strategy Involving Territory"]
[Text] Militarily it is a trifling matter, while its main purpose is to
pursue political strategy, involving the problem of~the territory." So
says a majority of opinions expressed by government-related organizations,
~uch as the Foreign Ministry and the JDA etc., concerning the deployment
of Soviet military forces on three islands in the northern-territory--
Kunashird, Etorofu, and Shikotan--over which the government protested to
the Soviet Union on the 2nd [October]. However, the "northern threat
_ theory" seems to arise in relation to the JDA`s judgment that "the troops
are of division level equipped with sophisticated weapons."
The assessment of the equipment of Soviet military forces stationed on the
three islands in the northern territory includes such.awesome weapuns as
"ground-to-air missiles," "helicopter gunships," etc. However, anti-air
missiles are "defensive arms" which Soviet mechanized divisions have in
order to protect themselves from attack by enemy planes. They are not
equipped with nuclear warheads to attack our mainland or Hokkaido. Also
the 'Hind, MI-24 helicopter gunship plays dual role of anti-tank copter
and transportation. It will not fly over the sea, but is exclusively aimed
at an attack on Hokkaido or the main island.
Generally speaking, arms and military forces can be defensive or offensive,
depending upon the way of use. At the Cabinet meeting held on the 2d, the
JDA held its view that "at the moment, the JDA does not view the matter
[Soviet forces in the northern territory] a"threat." Perhaps the JDA's
view reflects an analysis of the government on the intention of the Soviet
- Union after reviewing the multilateral aspects including the diplomatic
situation. However, militarily speaking, it is necessary to be cautious
~ about the presence of "military power capable of invading our nation" as
a factor for a"real threat." In this sense, the question of whether the
deployment of Soviet military forces in the northern territory can signify
an increased threat--compared with a situation without such deployment--
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will become a probl~m. Interpretation of this very problem should be a
key to our search for "the intention of the Soviet military forces in the -
northern territory since last year. _
Until the summer of 1960, a corps of Soviet ground troops was stationed on
- Kunashiri and Etorofu islands (a brigads on Kunashiri and a division on
Etorofu). These ground troops returned to the Maritime Province of
Siberia, but the function of military bases was kept by leaving a MIG-17
squadron (20 fighters). Eventually, armed forces of the division level
was deployed, and also helicopter gunships were included in the force.
Thus, we come to the question of "whether the threat has increased or not."
This will depend on our assessment of whether the Soviet Union intends to
construct a base in the northern territory 1,300 kilometers away from the
Maritime Province of Siber.ia in an attempt to invade Japan, or not.
According to the JDA survey, two divisions are always stationed in Karafuto,
which is 40 kilometers away from Dohoku in Hokkaido. In the Maritime
Province of Siberia, a marin e, air mobile brigade and an airborne division
are stationed. In other words, quite a few troops, capable of invading
Japan, are located in places where access to supply is much easier than -
the northern territory.
The GSDF Staff Office says that "an attack by f ive divisions is possible
during the period of a month." Also, because the Soviet Far East Air
Force deploys the most advanced fighter bombers such as the MIG-23 and
SUKHOI-19 in the Maritime Province of Siberia, its range of action ranges
as far as central Japan, not to mention Hokkaido. Consequently, there is
no reason to believe that Soviet forces cannot wield their power directly
toward Japan without helicopters deployed in the northern territory.
If Soviet military forces are deployed in the northern territory in
order to attack Japan, it is simply like "covering the roof with a roof"
[the Soviets are wasting their efforts.], and also an offensive base
located on small islands as far as 1,300 kilometers away from the Maritime -
Province of Siber.ia, on the contrary, turns into an "extremely vulnerable
presence" when it is attacked.
If we venture to seek a military significance, we may take the view that -
"the Soviet Union is either transforming the sea of Okhotsk into an in-
land sea in view of its nuclear strategy to counter U.S., or it is strengthen-
ing the seaborne transpor.tat ion route to Petropavlovsk. This policy can be
important to the Soviet Union, but is that a task urgent enough for the
Soviet Union to carry on construction all through one whole winter?
Ultimately we may accept the view of the Foreign M~nister who says due to
the diplomatic circumstances including the signing of the Japan-China
Peace and Friendship Treaty and the normalization of U.S.-China diplomatic
relations, the Soviet Uniorc felt "Japan-U.S.-China military pressure," and
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intended to place Japan's inherent northern territory under iieavier and
effective control. In other words, it's an offensive strategy toward
Japan, in that the Soviet Union is trying to cause the Japanese people
t~ ~;ive ~ip reversion of the northern territory, by military means whicl~
t:~kr~ tt?c~ I~~~rm u( cl~~~~lciyt?1}, of Sc~vtet m1l lt+lry fc~rc~~H."
Of course, we need to take measures in order to keep strict watch on
- Soviet military forces stationed on the three islands in the northern .
territory. However, if we are to be upset about a"threat," it is hard
to say, but we may be trapped in a psychological war directed by the
Soviet Union.
COPYR:[GHT: Yomiuri Shimbunsha 1979
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ECONOMIC
- 'ASAHI': MINISTRIES DIVIDED OVER U.S. REQUEST ON CREDITS TO PRC
OW050840 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 3 Nov 79 p 1 OW
[Text] The government is divided on how Japan should reapond to a U.S.
request to unite credits to China in principle.
- Washington has made the request on the grounds that the continuation of
the present practice may give.Japan a monopoly of the Chinese market. The ~
request is expected to be made again in the third Japan-U.S. sub-cabinet
level meeting to be held in Tokyo on Nov 8 and 9.
A ranking off ic3a1 of the Ministry of International Trade and Induatry
d escribed the request as unjustified and said compliance with it is diffi-
cult, considering the preaent condition of the Japanese economy and the
state finances.
He expressed the belief that since no discussion in general terms at the -
coming meeting will be conclusive, the question should be taken up when `
the Chinese pro~ects for which credits are to be supplied have been de- C
cided upon.
China has asked Japan to extend about $3.5 billion in credits to finance
eight projects. -
The Japanese response ta the U.S. request in the Tokyo meeting is to be
worked out in interdepartmental consultations. The Foreign Ministry ia in ~
favor of complying with the request.
Even within the MITI, there is the opinion that compliance is desirable
when thQ purposes for which economic aid is given and the future of the -
world economy are taken into account.
The Chinese request is sti11 under study. Japar proposes to move in atep
with the Western countries as the requested credits are too large for it
alone to supply.
The government feels that consideration should be given to Southeast Asia .
in studying the request. It also wanta Co make clear that Japan wi11 not .
help any Chinese military project.
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Japan has asked Washington to approve these prin~.iples. It also wants
credits to China to be counted as part of the c~untry's economic aid to
developing nations,
- Japan has been accused of being miserly in helping the poor countries
despite its wealth.
COPYRIGHT: ASAHI EVENING NEWS 1979
CSO: 4120
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ECONOMIC
'ASAHI' SUPPORTS BANK OF JAPAN'S DISCOUNT RATE HIKE
OW070438 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 5 Nov 79 p 5 OW
[Editorial: "Hiking of Discount Rate"]
[TextJ The Bank of Japa:, decided to increase the official discount rate
by onf: percent and make it 6.25 percent per annum.
The d~cision to bring a~out the third hike this year, following the in-
creas~s in April and July, was reached during a time of political confusion.
Although the Bank of Japan gave up on waiting until a new cabinet was
formed, some people believe that the decision came too late.
In the foreign exchange market and the atiock market, a higher official dis-
count rate had been expected for quite some time. So, when the decision
finally came, a normally dramatic effect of such a step did not occur. _
This latest hike was a sensible reaponae to the economic climate. The
_ current accounts in the first half of fiacal 1979 (April-September ].979)
recorded an unprecedentedly large deficit, mainly because of the big in-
crease in payments for oil i.mports. The foreign exchange market for the
yen is even weaker than that for the ailing dollar. The situation is com-
pletely different from last year when there was so much demand for the _
"strong yen."
When the supply-demand situation was tight as a result of the economic re-
covery, the steep rise in crude oil prices coincided with the depreciation
of the yen. As a result of this, wholesale prices recorded a two-digit
increase rate compared to last year. So, the red danger signal was lit
for consumer prices.
In West Germany,despite the fact that wholesale prices and the foreign ex-
~ change market for the German mark are more stable than in Japan, the offi- _
cial discount rate has been hiked again. Rightfully, Japan should have
taken the step before West Germany. Recently Anthony M. Solomon, U.S.
: Undersecretary of Treasury in charge of monetary affairs, said, "The drop
in the value of the yen is exceasive. If the yen continues to deteriorate,
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Japanese exports will increase and perhaps disrupt international trade."
'Chere is no reason to delay measures to prevent the depreciation of the
yc~n.
Whnt nn~sr be noted licre is ~hat, as a result of the gap between interest -
rates in the United States and Jagan having become so big, the trend for
sho�rt-term capital to flow out of the country has become stronger. The
Bank of Japan, while calling on the United States and other countriea to =
do their part, should intervene to a greater extent in the foreign ex-
change market. A higher discount rate is needed to prevent the yen from
_ declining even more.
Some businessmen were opposed to a bigger discount rate because they did
not want to carry a heavier interest burden. But as pointed out in the
annual report of the International Monetary Fund, the common problem now
facing the advanced countries is to prevent the start of the vicious
circle of inflation and wage hikes. In Japan a1so, if prices continue
rising, it would be difficult to get wage hikea set at low levels next
spring. It is is logical to first exert all-out efforts to prevent prices
~ from rising.
~ The economy is presently expanding smoothly due to increased individual
consumption and brisk investment in industrial facilities. But the out-
look for fiscal 1980 is very unclear. If the enthusiasm for investment
in such facilities, which has finally become strong, is cooled too much ~
through a clampdown on credit, this will weaken production capacity,
threatening the country with higher prices.
From the standpoint of not damaging civilian production activities, it is
odd that control measures have emphasized only the credit side and that
no substantial,steps have been taken in the compilation of_ the budget for
fiscal 1979. Public utility project funds are a large part of the budget, _
but because there is a strong sense of a financial crisis, even if the
economy turns upward in fiscal 1980, there appears to be little surplus -
for propping up finances.
If so, at this ti.me when tre economy is expanding independent of government
help, it would be wise to restrict expenditures with the intention of carry-
ing over into fiscal 1980 some o~ the public utility projects planned for
- fiscal 1979. The government decision to make the contract rate for public
utility projects as of Dec. 31, 1979 about the same as that for the year
before is insufficient.
COPYRIGHT: ASAHI EVENING NEWS 1979
~ CSO: 4120
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ECONOMIC
BRIEFS
GULF DESALINATION PROJECT--The government will dispatch an expert team
to three Gulf states around this year-end to study the feasibility of a -
joint sea water desalination plant using the solar energy. The Ministry
� of International Trade and Industry (MITI) said that the planned plants
in Kuwait, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates will be part of various tech-
nical cooperation schemes with the oil rich nations. Proven technologies
to utilize solar heat, now a pet program among MITI's long-term innovative
- energy sources projects, will be available for the plants' conatruction,
it said. Present blueprints show that the first desalination plant will be
tested for operational capabilities next year in one of the three nations.
Full commercialization will start five years later to produce 200 tons of
fresh water per day. MITI expects that such technical aid by Japan to the
Middle East is a pius factor in deep~ning mutual relations, and conaequently
may favorably affect future bargaining for oil. [Text] [OW221149 Tokyo
MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 20 Oct 79 p 5 OW]
CSO: 4120
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY _
, _
NUCLEAR FUSION PFOGRAMS OUTLINED
Paris LE PROGRES SCIF.NTIFIQUE in French Jan/Feb 79 pp 44-50
- [Study conducted by the Scientific Services of the French Embassy in
Japan)
[Text]--Japan now depends on foreign sources for more than 85 percent of
- its energy supplies. Since it was late in starting to develop the use of
energy from nuclear fission, and resorted very widely to foreign technolo- _
gies in this sector, the Japanese officials see in nuclear fusion one of
the possible means for reduction on a long-term basis of their energy .
dependence, by implementing national technologies. That is why the
government supports in this sector a considerable research effort, which
is analyzed in this article.
General Organization
The research and development activities in the area of nu~clear fusion are
implemented by the Agency for Sciences and Technologies (AST), by the
Ministry for National Education (MEN), and to a much lesser extent, by
the Ministry for Industry and Foreign Trade (MITI) (Table 1).
- The general policy is placed under the direct responsibility of the prime
minister. It is prepared substantially by the Nuclear Fusion Council (CFN)
- of the Japanese Atomic Energy C~~~~~~~is~i~�, a u.~it answerable to the prime
minister. Created in 1975, this council now includes 13 members, of
which 3 are representatives of the ministries concerned (AST, MEN and MITI),
1 a representative of the Atomic Energy Commission, 1 a representative of
the Atomic Energy Safety Commission, and 8 university professors acting as
experts. Practically, the CFN controls and defines directly only the
orientations of the AST; but the other ministerial departments establish
their own policy, particularly at the budget level, taking into considera-
_ tion these orientations. A management committee and five specialized sub- -
committees asstst the CFN: superconductive coils, J.T.60 , tritium, equip-
ment, biological effects of tritium. Its secretariat is assured by the
Technology Division for Atomic Energy.of the AST.
~ 26
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'1'he MEN policy is defined by the Nuclear Fusion Committee of the Science
Council, a consultative organ attached to the minister. This committee
has 11 members, all professors, of which 4 also belong to the CFN of the
- Atomic Energy Commission. The secretariat of this committee is assured
hy the Bureau for Sciences and International Affairs of the MEN.
The prime minister is assisted furthermore in his decisions, by the
National Science Council which also created a committee specialized in
this area of nuclear fusion. This committee has no direct influence on
the policy of the ministries.
Practically the coordination of the programs is rendered possible by the
simultaneous participation of four professors in the CFN of the Atomic
Energy Commission and the specialized committee of the MEN Science Council.
_ Research Budget
Nuclear fusion has a very large and progressively increasing budget. The
equipment budget, which was 17,376 million yen in 1978 (347 million francs),
should reach about 31.5 billion yen in 1979 (630 million francs)1 (Table 2).
These funds, deriving totally from the public sector, are devoted mainly
to fusion by magnetic confinement (FCM) (about 85 percent of the funds
allocated to fusion in 1978).
In terms of budget, the AST, which directs all its efforts to the TOKAMAK
method, assumes a predominant position. Actually, it is responsible for _
the implementation of the TOKAMAK J.T.60, whose total cost may reach 200
billion yen (4 billion francs). In 1979, the construction costs will
represent about 90 percent of the fusion budget of the AST.
In reality, the overall budget devoted to nuclear fusion is much higher
than the one presented in Table 2, since the indicated figures should be
inc-teased by personnel costs (which may be estimated at about 1600 million
yen, 32 million francs, in 1978), the related research funds of the MEN
(about 150 million yen, 3 million francs in 1978 in the sectors of equip-
. ments, tritium and superconductive magnets), the current operation costs
(about 1000 million yen, 20 million francs, in 1978) and the cost of the
specific MEN buildings, that is, about 1000 million yen, 20 million francs
per year between 1976 and 1980.
On this basis, the overall expenses in the nuclear fusion sector may
therefore be estimated as about 21000 million yen (420 million francs) in
1978, that is 2.2 percent of the public funds allocated to research and
development that same year. The figures given in Table 2 reveal the
- extremely rapid growth of the share allocated to nuclear fusion in the
public funds for research and development.
1 Average conversion rate of 2 francs per 100 yen.
28
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Research Centers
- About 450 persons are engaged in researches concerning directly nuclear
fusion. All these persons are employed in the public sector.
But industry contributes directly to the studies by supplying the main
~ equipment needed. The large companies of electrical equipment (Hitachi,
Toshiba, Mitsubishi Electric, Sumitomo Electric, Fuji Electric) have
specialized high-level teams capable of working in direct collaboration
with the researchers of government and university researchers. This col-
laboration is facilitated by deputing engineers of the private companies to
long training stages with research groups. The government and university
institutions most often call upon industry to build their experimental
devices. The Hitachi company, which received in 1978 an order covering more
than 38 billion yen, will be the principal supplier of the equipment for
the J.T.60.
Government Institutions
The government institutions are engaged almost totally in the programs of
fusion by magnetic confinement. ~
National Institute for Nuclear Energy Research
The National Institute for Nuclear Energy Research (JAERI) devotes all its _
efforts to r_he TOKAMAK method. Attached to the AST, it has about 150 per-
sons employed full time, working in the Tokai-mura Center, and divided into
two divisions. The TOKAMAK Development Division (50 persons) is assigned
to the building of the TOKAMAK J.T. 60. The Research Division (100 persons)
includes seven laboratories:
Theory of plasmas; Experimental Plasma Physics (J.F.T.2 and J.F.T.2a
reactors); Plasma Engineering (Physics of Surfaces); Superconductive
Magnets; Heating of Plasmas (Neutral Injection and Microwave Heating);
Systems;and Tritium.
Other Government InStitutions (About 50 Persons)
Two institutions, attached to the AST, are engaged in research aimed at -
direct support of the JAERI effort:
--The National Metallurgical Research Institute (NRIM), which studies
the materials used for the confinement vessel and for the construction of
superconductor magnets;
--The Institute for Physical and Chemical Research (IP(:R), which studies
the microwave heating of the plasma, the measurement methods applied to the
plasma, vacuum and ion source technologies.
The Laboratory for Electrotechnology (ETL), attached to the MITI, is er.gaged
in the study of the high beta confinement devices (Theta Pinch) and the
development of high power solid lasers.
30
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' University Institutions
The u niversity, which is very active in the area of fusion by inertial
confinement (FCI) accomplishes an effort supplementing that of the govern-
mental institutes in the area of the FCM. The research teams, comprising
near.ly 250 persons, are distributed mainly in 3 institutions:
--The Institute for Plasma Physics (IPP) of the Nagoya University, created
in 1961, and representing the largest group (20 research units, UR, and
140 persons). Its activities relate to the FCM (TOKAMAK, Stellarator,
Bumpy Torus, open configuration system of the cusp type) and FCI (beams of
relativistic electrons);
--The Laborat-ory for Plasma Physics (LPP) of the Kyoto lJniversity (4 UR
anci 21 persons), created in 1966, and er.gaged in the study of the iieliotron
device, an FCM apparatus derived from the stellarators;
--The Laser Institute of the Osaka University (4 UR and 22 persons), estab-
lisiled in 1972, which develops higti�. power lasers and studies the FCI with
laser b eams and relativistic electron beams.
Besides these institutions, we should mention in particular the Institute
for the Theory of Fusion of the Hir~shima University, r_reated recently (2 UR),
the Universities uf Osaka. (FCM with a linear compression device), of Tsukuba
(FCPi by means of an apparatus with multiple mirrors), of Tokyo (FCM: Pinch/
TOKAMAI~, neutral injectors; FCI: production of plasma totally ionized by
laser, plasma theory), of Tohoku (FCM: nonplane confinement), and of
- Kyushu (FCM: Ultra Fast Theta Pinch). Nearly 35 universities altogether
in research relating directly to nuclear fusion.
Research Prog~�ams
As ind icated by the budgets and the nature of the teams d~~scribed so f.ar,
the principal effor�~ is now aimed at the FC'~I, particularly by the TOKArIAK
_ method. However, the other main FCM techniques and the FCI techniques are
the obje~t of extensive studies permitting ~apan to assure an averall
technological continuity in the nuclear fusion field.
Fusion by Magnetic Confinement (FCM)
After more than 10 years of fundamental research in the universities, the
Atomic Energy Commission launched in 1969 a vast national pr.ogram of
research conducted in a coordinated manner by the government institutions
(JAERI, IPCR, and ETL). After a first exploratory phase (1969-1974), a `
special effort was directed to the TOKAMAK method, then considered the most
promising. Supplemented by a considerable effort on the university level,
the present program retains nevertheless a widely diversified nature,
(Table 3) and particularly interesting results were obtained recently with ~
_ the multiple mirror equipment of the Tsukuba University (increase by one
31
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o rder. of magnitude of the confinement period as compared with simp].c~ mirror
units) and with the stellarator/TOKAMAK JIPP II of the Institute for Ylasma
Physics of the Nagoya University (simultaneous reheating of the plasma by _
neutral. and radiofrequency beam).
_ The TOKr1MAIC development program, begun in 1973, was assigned to the JAERI.
It should permit by 1983 the use of the JT.60 reactor (Table 4). Tl~e _
characteristics of this reactor are similar to those of the ~uropean (JET),
American (TFTR) and Soviet (T-lOM) reactors, but unlike the latter, the
JT.60 is not intended for deuterium-tritium fusion. The objectives pursued ~
' are the production of plasmas close to critical ones and the study of their
physical qualities and associated technological problems. The studies in
progress are described in the Appendix.
After the construction of the JT.60 reactor, the principal stages of the
TOKAMAK program are the construction of a reactor for ll-T fusion, the build-
~ ing of an experimental reactor permitting controlled fusion and the produc-
tion of energy over long periods, meant for the study of materials, and -
tritium technology, the construction of a prototype re~?ctor integrated with ~
a mini power station, and finally, a demonstration reactor (Table 4). It
will be possible to modify the nature and chronology of this program
according to the course of the work and international cooperation. It is
already likely that the construction of a reactor of noncircular section
(JT-4) foreseen initially, may be abandoned in view of Japan's participa-
tion in the Doublet III project within the framework of the agreements -
recently discussed with the U.S.
Fusion by Inertial Confinement (FCI)
Receiving a very rapidly increasing annual budget allocation, close to
2000 million Yen, 40 million fran.cs, in 1978, the fusion by inertial con-
finement is chiefly studied in the Universities of Nagoya and Osaka.
The Laser Institute of the Osaka University has been studying since 1972
the laser devices meant for nuclear fusion. After building in 1977 the
GEKKO IV device furnishing a power of 2 kJ from 4 beams (neodymium glass
laser) the Institute is developing for 1980 the LEKKO III apparatus (10 kJ ,
carbon dioxide laser) and the neodymium glass laser module of the GEKKO XII
device. The KONGO program (1980-1990) provides for 1984 the construction
of the GEKKO XII device (20 kJ, 12 beams, neodymium glass laser) and for
1990, that of a 100 kJ device. During the period 1976-1980, nearly 4800 -
million yen (96 million francs), excluding salaries, were devoted to these
developments. The equipm ent costs provided for the KONGO pro~ect (1980-
1989) are 63000 million yen (1260 million francs). Various university
_ teams, including that of the Tokyo University, collaborate in this area
with the Laser Institute. Moreover, the Electrotechnical Laboratory of
the MITI is studying laser-plasma interaction and is developing high-power
solid lasers. Meanwhile, the Laser Institute of the Osaka University, the
Iristitute for Plasma Physics of the Nagoya University, and the Kanazawa
34
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University are pursui.ng researches in the area of fusion by relativistic
electron beams.
Conclusion
The Japanese program Eor Research and Development in the area of nuclear
- fusion is characterized both by the extent of the effort invested, as
compared with that in Europe, and the diversity of the means involved;
indeed, the principal methods are objects of studies of significant extent,
although the TOKAMAK method receives the largest funds.
Japan is engaged actively, both in multilatera~ international cooperation
within the framework of the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Inter-
naCional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and in bilateral cooperation, chiefly
with the United States and the Soviet Union.
Nevertheless it is still very desirous of developing its exchanges with -
other countries, as shown by the rontacts recently made with C'ninese
~ specialists.
COPYRIGHT: D.G.R.S.T., Paris, 1979
- 9018
CSO: 4200 END
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