JPRS ID: 8931 VIETNAM REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020033-1
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 71
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 33
• Content Type: REPORTS

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' 1979 ~ hv. ~ ~ i ur i~

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- JPRS L/8772 _
- 20 Novemb~r 1979 -
- ~uk~-Se~haran Afr-ica -Re ort
p
FOUO No. 655 R
- ~BIS FOR~IGN BROADCRST INFORMATION SERVICE _
FO~ O~FICIAL USE O1~JLY
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NOTE F
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transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language =
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other characteristics ret~ained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets -
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] =
~ or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the _
= last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was -
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
_ Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are ~
enclosed in parentheses. Words or n.ames preceded by a ques- -
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the _
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
, Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an =
, item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government. ~
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JPRS L/8772
20 Noveml~,er 1979
~ SUB-SAIIARAN AFRICA REPORT _
FOUO No. 655
CONTENTS PAGE
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
_ Zambian Trade Delegation Visits Malawi _
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRAr:EENS, 5 Oct 79).... 1
CEAO Cooperati~n Intensified
(Roger Nikiema; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER-
- RANEENS, 12 Oct 79) . 2
Briefs
- South African Aid to Mala�~ai 9
- ~
- ANGOLti
Briefs
Jo~nt Oil Ventures * 10
~
BENIN ~
Details on First Development Plan Given
- (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANFENS, 12 Oct 79).., 11 ,
CAMEROON �
Economic. Agreements With France Signed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MFDITERRANEENS, 5 Oct 79) 14
New Offshore Oil Discovery Made
(,~Ei3NE AFRIQUE, 10 Oct 79) 16 c
Activities of Grain Office Reported
_ (MARCHES TROP_T,CAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 5 Oct 79) 17
Briefs _
Trade With France 19 -
_ - a - [III - NE & P. - 120 FOUO;
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rvx ~rrt~lAL U5~ UNLY
I
- CONTENTS (Continued) Page
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Operation 'Barracuda' Seen as Total. Poli~ical Fiasco
(Ginette Cot; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 15-28 Oct 79) 20
_ France Said To Have Used Colonial Methods ~
(Ginette Cot; AFRIQUE ASIE, 17-28 Oct 79) 22 -
France Said To Have Scoffed at Rights of Central Africans
_ (JEUNE AFR~QUE, 10 Oct 79) 25 -
~
French Paratroop Surveillance Deplored =
(Mariam Sysl~; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 15-18 Oct 79) 29 =
Drawing Up of 1981-1985 Plan Begins
~J (MARCHES_TROPICAUX ET M~DITERRANEENS, 21 Sep 79) 32
Briefs
Students to USSR 35
~HAD ,
Threat of Conflict's Resiimption, Nation's Breakup Continues
(AFRIQUE ASIE, 1-14 Oct 79) 36 _
J
_ EQUATGRIAL GUINEA
- Briefs
Refugees Asked To Return 38
GHANA
Brief s
_ Possible British Military Training 39
LIBERIA
- Briefs `
~ Government Promoting Private Industry 40
MADAGASCAR -
Aquaculture Plans Detailed
(MARCHES TROPIC[~UX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 12 Oct 79) 41
- Briefs _
Cooperation With Seychelles 4g ; ~
i -
. ' - b -
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- ; .
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CONTENTS (Continued) ~ Page
MALAWI
~ Briefs
Air Malawi Reduces Activities 44
~t~ General Electric Mission 44
_ Brazilian Loan 44
MOZAMBIOUE
Next Decade's Economic Outlook, Plans Detailed
- (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS, 12 Oct 79).. 45
Briefs
_ GDR Specialists Killed, Wounded q~ =
- NIGER -
; Briefs
_ OFEDES Contract 48 -
Frei~ch Scientific, Technical Cooperation qg
Gaya Area Floods 48
BOAD Loan 48
_ SAO TOME AND PRINCIP~ -
- Briefs
Former Prime Minister Arrested 49
SENEGAL -
~
Opposition Leader Threatens President, Proclaims Arab
= Affiliation
- (al-Shaykh Ahmad Nayyas Int~rview; AL-WATAN -
AL-'ARABI, 4-10 Oct 79) 50 -
Economy Benefiting From Better Harvesting Campaign
;M.'~RCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENSr 21 Sep 79).. ~ 55
ZAIRE ~
= Western Partners To Meet on Subject of Zairian Recovery _
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERkANEENS, 5 Oct 79j 60 '
Bank of Kinshasa Reports on 1978 Fiscal Year
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 5 Oct 79) 61
_ Emergency Aid From Belgium Recounted
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 5 Oct 79) 63
Briefs
- Trade With Brazil 65
- c -
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS _
ZAMBIAN TRADE DELEGATION VISITS MALAWI
Paris MARCH~S TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEEN3 in French 5 Oct 79 p 2715
[Text] A 12-man Zambian delegation headed by the minister of commerce
_ and industry traveled to Malawi last August on a study mission.
_ The purpose of this mission, which was brought about by regular price ~
increases for imported products by Lusaka and growin~ transpor~tation
= costs, is to determine what goods Zambia could purchase �rom Malawi -
_ ` and what merchandise it would be in a position to sell the latter, to
strengthen the commercial ties existing between the two neighboring
~ countries.
- The balance of trade between the two countries, which was favorable fio
_ Lusaka up to 1976, has changed to the benefit of Lilongwe with the
registering of a surplus of 3.2 million kwacha in 1978 in favor of Malawi
- (Zambian imports c~nsisting of tea, sugar and grains totaled 6.06 million
kwacha; i.e., 4 percent of all Malawi sales, while exports to Malawf were =
' only 2.85 million ltwacha, representing 1 percent ~~f this couutry~s total
_ purchases). -
- A~ter having visited several factories in Blantyre and Zomba and appraising
the economic situation of Malawi, the Zambian mission expressed its
= conviction that, abetted by the project to link the two railway networks,
commerc3al exchan~es between the two countries will experience an
appreciable expansion in *_h~ near future.
- COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
8143 =
CSO: 4400
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INTER�AFRICAN AFFAIRS -
- CEAO C06PERATION INTENSIFIID
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANNFENS in F`rench 12 Oct 79 Pp 27~7-27~9
~Article by Roger Nikiema: "On the Eve of the Conference of Heads of State
Nouakchott, 19-20 October 1979): Strenghtened Cooperation Within the
CEAO"] `
_ [Text] From 10 until 20 October 1979, the capital of Ma.uritania~ Nouakcinott,
- will host the fifth conference of the West African ~conomic Community [CEAO~.~
_ Having prepaxed it throughout the year through meetings of experts and
nwnerous contacts in Africa as well as outside tk~e continent~ the authori-
ties in Nouakchott want to reaffirm once again, as President Houphouet-Boigny
, emphasized, that "the CEAO is a precious link in the long chain of African
- solidasity."
One ma.y recall that in October 1978, in &timako, the heads of state of the
six member countries made historic decisions which put the options of endo-
genous development of the Communit~r in as concrete a.form as possible. In
_ addition to estahlishing the Solidasity and Intervention Fund for ~the Develop-
_ ment of the Community [FOSIDEC], they decided to create five community
centers and institutes for train~.ng the uppc~r cadres of th~s sta.tes of the
sub-region, specifically in the areas of management, fishing, textiles~
, solar energy and mining. In fulfilment of their mandate, the secretaxy _
general of the CEAO has already prepared the stud3es necessary for the
realization of these bodies studies which will be submitted in Nouakctiott.
The initial cost of the necessary investments is estimated at 21 bill.ion
_ CFA [African Financial Community (mor~etary unit~].~
_ ~ Following the meetings of expexts, the Council of Ministers will meet
~ on 16 arxd 17 October to prepaxe the conference of the heads of state, '
which will be held on 19 and 20 Octo3er.
~ 1�i:?�y are : the Higher School of ~eology and Mining, the Community School '
f:,~� Training of Te~tile Cadres ~ the A:F~ican Center for Higher Ma,n~gement
Studies, the Higher InStitute of Fishexyr Sciences and Techniques, the
Regianal Center for Solar F~ergy; a stuc~y has also been made of the
_ Community Company for Equipment and the Marketing of Fishery ~oducts,
which was also created in Bamako, in October 1978�
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The political commitment, which has always characterized the heads of state
with regard to everything touching "our Community," is a guarantee for the -
comple~tion of these projects. To this effect, the summit in Nouakchott
will also be an historic one to the extent that this summit will provide
the kick-off for these lasge ~ommunity achievements. FOSIDEC, a specialized
_ instrument intended for the financing of the development of the Community
- through the achievement of national pro~ects and community institutions
and whose capital amounts to more than 6.5 billion CFA will certainly
~ guarantee the financing of these bodies. As a ma.tter of fact, through
FOSIDEC which got off the ground last Ma.y~ following the appointment of
_ ~.ts director the Community authorities have put into concrete form their
desire to create "a common market of our financial resources," intended to
_ give form to an autonomous effort of the member states.
Toward Rea1 Common Market
~ The process toward a real common maxket is becoming more clear every day.
Integration already covers numerous sectors: trade, agriculture~ industry,
transportation, communication, etcetera.
Trade causes legitima,te pride in the Community and justifies the hope for
a real common maxket by 1986. The effects of the TCR, the regional cooper- ,
- ation tax~ are manifested in both an advantageous and a concrete manner.*
The compensation payments ensuing from the application of this unique system
of taxation in West Africa increase from year to year. The real deprecia-
tions which have been recorded have gone from 780 million CFA in 1976, when
_ the TCR was first applied, to 1~5.8 million CFA in 1977r to 1885.5 million
CFA in 1978 and more than 2 billion in 1979, or a progression of 98 perc~nt
and 22 percent and a jump of 160 percent between 1976 and i979~ According
to currently available data~ this figure will probably pass the 3.5 billion
CFA mark for the yeas 1980.
These figures ase indicative of the positive evolution of intra-cotnmunity
trade. When looked at from the angle of the actual value of the goods ex-
changed, t;iis evolution has in fact gone from 2.&I- billion in 19?6 to
5�52 billion in 1977 and to 6.4~9 billion in i978 or~ respectively~ up
81.29 percent (1976-77)~ up z1.29 percent (1977-7$) and up 119.89 percent
- ~1976-78).
_ TCR (Regional Cooperation Tax). The industrial prnducts~ which originate -
_ in the Community and which are the object of trade between member sta.tes,
_ are approved by the Council of Ministers of the CEAO for the TCR. They
also benefit from a variable preferential ta,x. Application of the TCR
produces depreciations. Another instrument of coo eration and solida-
rity for the CEAO, the Community Development Fund ~FCD], which acts as -
- a financial and economic compensation fund~ returns to the importing
member states two-thirds of the depreciations resulting from the appii- ~
cation of the TCR; the non-distributed third is a?.loca~ed to develop-
ment activities. _
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The current objective is to pass the advantages of the TCR, which was created -
to promote the development of industrial products, on to the consumer. A
study to this effect is in progress at the Secretariat General. Based on =
statements regaxding the availability �or consumption of the products
~ suitable for the TCR received by the Coramunity secretariat to make the eva-
luation of compensation payments possible, its ob~ective is to determine the
legal sale price on each national market by incorporating all additional
- costs and the profit margin into the invoice figures. It is then a question
- of noting, by checking the important 4ales points, whether the actual sale
price of the merchand.ise samples corresponds to the legal sale prices.
- Fundarnental Sta.ge
The main phases of customs and fiscal cooperation have now largely been
- initiated. If the countries continue to play the game as they axe doing ~
now, the customs and fiscal integration which is the foundation of any -
economic community and for which the treaty allows 12 years will become
- a reality within the time allotted. In any case, all the stages have been
started, and most of. them have alrea.dy be~n covered, such as the unified -
customs and statistics nomenclature, the establishment of a privileged rate
_ system. -
The onl y things left are the unhindered circulation of the industrial pro- -
ducts which are currently accepta.ble for TCR~ the harmoniza,tion of domestic
taxiffs~ and the common external tariff, which are a11 questions currently
being studied. Following the establishment and functioning of the ba.sic
mechanisms, they constitute ~he ultimate phase of the common maxket. Pre- _
_ cautions have beeri taken to prevent any slowdown or any failure of the pro- _
cess. A circulax mission, carried out by the experts of the 1979 secretariatt
made it possible to make a diagnosis of the fundamental questions which .
arise at the level of the tra,de relations of inember sta~es. It provided
. the opportunity to compila three files of major importance: the first one -
related to the project of haxmonization of the rates of import duties and
~ taxes; the secend one related to the conditions for implementa.tion of the
free circulation of products f`rom the Community; and finally, the third
- one xelat~d to the conditions for implementation of the decision concerning
the requirements of information exchange between the Secretariat General
and the national administrations. These files will be submitted for judge- -
ment to the heads of state in Nouakchott next week.
The fourth summit of Bamako (October 1978) had been characterized by the
adoption of an agreement on the free circulation of individuals and an
- agreement in principle concerning the fxeedom of payments and the free cir-
culation of capital between the member states. The objective was to complete
the free circulation of goods, which had already been agreed on. During the
- meeting of the ~ad hoc~ [printed in italics] committee on the second project
= of agreement in Dakar~ after having recalled the common trading past of tt.e
- states in the axea, Nfr Moussa Ngo~n, secretary general of the CEAO, stressed
that the abjective of the agreement on the f`reedom of current payments and
- the free circulation of capital w3thin the Community was to build a more -
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COMMUNITY DEVF~,OPI~NT FUND -
~ Available Funds of 1978 FCD as ~f 30 June 1979
(in millions of CFA francs) _
Projected Situation(1) Rea1 Situation(2~ -
- Share of Compensa- Compensa- -
Deprecia- Community tican Deprec ~a- tion Available ~
tions 0 erations Pa ents tit~z~s Pa~~nents Funds -
1 3P~ 2 3P
- Ivory Coast.. 578~8 192�9 385~9 165 * 110 * t275.2*
Upper Volta.. 569.4 189.8 379�6 710.2 473�~ - 93.a R
, (12 months~
- Ma1i....,.. z37 79 158 34~1.1 227.3 ~ 69.3 -
(12 months~.
Mauritania... 163.2 ~.4~ 108.8 181.5 121 - 12.1
(12 months~ -
Niger........ 182.8 60.9 121.9 24~2.9~' 161.9* - 40 * -
- ( 8 months) -
Senegal...... 56?.3 1~9.1 378.2 24~4.7 163.2 T 215 -
( 7 months)
Tota1....... z z98.7 766.2 1 532.5 1 8G5.5 1 256.9* ; 2?5.6* _
Frovisional figures.
- (1 The projected situa,tion is a yearly one.
- (2 The real situation corresponds ta the number of months indicated below ~
~ the name of the membe'r state.
(3) Available funds = projected compensation pa.yments - real compensation -
payments. -
- homogeneous trade asea; the latter should ta.ke into accoun+ the national
_ entities which make it up and ba based on the CEAO treaty. As a matter of -
= fact, one must face the evidence that the economies of the member states,
- , taken saparately, do not pro~ride the necessary conditions for development. _
The iuture belongs to ~he large economic bodies. "If the logic of any group
and moxe specifically, of ~development~ [printed in italics] groups,
such as the CEAO, whose chief concern is man with his various preoccupations, -
_ his needs is a dynamic which aims for a collective awaxeness of unity~ _
the establishment of an a,greement on the free circulation of capital and of
- goods does not at all a.im at discouraging fina.ncial contributions from out- _
side the economic space of the Community. It simply aims at strengthenin~ _
the feeling of complementaxity of partners bound together by the same
- harrowing problemsj who know tha.t they are vulnerahle, but who axe awaxe
that together they can be stronger and better respected at the time of
economic confronta,tion.
_ * Speech by Mr Moussa NgoAi. Ad Hoc Committee on the Freedom of Pa,yments and
the Fr.ee Circulation of Capital between the States. Da,kar, September 1979~ -
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Evolution of Imports of Products Approved
by the Countries of the CEAO
(Q a tons; V- million CFA)
~ 1~ ~ ~ -
~1 11 Q V g V
Ivory ~oast....... - - 264.? 1.36�9 585�~(1) 538.$(1)
Upper Volta....... 3?11.9 932�$ 39~1.6 1236.9 5234~.1 1987 t
Ma1i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3652. 8 813.8 6z7z . z i56z . 8 94~z4~ .8 2042. z
Mauritania........ 2302�9 395�3 5397�3 567�7 158E~5 392�6 -
Niger.........~... 1500.7 664~.4 3321.7 1720.9 2550.4(2)1165.9(2)
~ Seneg~,l........... 73.9 35.5 190.9 327.8 269 ~1) 3~~5~1)
Tota1..........,. 11242.4~ 2841.8 193~~6 5552.5 19650.5 6491.1 _
~ (1) In these progression rates, th,e value of imports of a~proved products
for the Ivory Goast and Senegal, which appeax in this table, is disre-
garded: those figures axe not significant because they are either in- -
' complete or even non-existent (Ivory Coast in 1.976)�
_ (2) As the real values and quantities for Niger in 1978 related to 8 months~
_ an extrapolation was mac?e to estimate the whole yeax i978�
Thus, thanks to these thsee instruments, products, individuals and goods
" will be able to circulate freely. In the interval between the two conferences,
- a serie~ of studies were conducted, which aim primarily at defining the
basic elements of a development poiicy of transportation and communications
within the Community. Let us recal.l that the studies on the maritime trans- -
- portation company, which are to be conducted by UNCTAD, and those on the
railroad car factory, which will be carried out by the African Railroad _
Union (an OAU bady) will start shortly. -
Dominant Interest: Rura1 Developmen.t
- One of the first contributions of the Community to t~~~ development of the -
. member states was the signing, on 21 September last, of a finaricing agree- ~
_ ment in the amount of 222 million CFA, ba.sed on 3nternaZ funds and in the
form of grants, for the achievement of projects 3.n Upper Volta, among which =
- were the repairing of dams and the training of upper cadres in agriculture. -
This is an example af the interest of the CEAO in rural develo~ment. Fara11e1 ~
to the bi.lateral agreements, the secretariat ha,s two substantial community
projects: the village and rural water project and the fight against ep3-
zootics. -
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_ With regard to the first com.munity project, over a period of 5 years and
largely with internal funds, the CEAO will build 3000 water supply points -
in the member states. With an estimated cost of 17 billion CFA, this pro~am ~
which is truly integrated will ma,ke a positive contribution to the
_ solution of one of the most crucial problems of the countries of the su~r -
- region: the right to water. At the present time~ nearly 25 percer_t of the
villa.ges do not have a reliable water supply at a11 and the real nceds of
_ the whole popula.tion are far from being met. -
The joint campaign against epizootics is spread over a period of 4~ years. .
I~ will require financial means on the order of 4 billion CFA. If one con-
siders the capital to be saved, the growing needs of the people in terms of
meat and the income which the peasants ma.y earn through the rational exploi-
tation of healthy livestack, the :Lnvestment is justified. A meeting of
livestock directors and of directors of veterinary laboratories of the Com- -
- mur.ity, which was held in Dakar at the beginning of July with the participa- _
tion of international sources of financing, "n~ted with satisfaction the
availability of the latter, notably the ~rcpean ?Jevelopment Fund, for imme- ~
die.te aid with the complementary studies in order to reach conclusions quickly -
which would effectively get this campaign for eradication of epizootics
- under way."
Reasons for Cor~fidence
As a result of a report on international cooperation~ the fourth conference -
- of heads of state in Bamako, which was held in Oci;ober 197~~ had given the =
Secretaxiat General a mandate to continue and expand efforts directed towarci.
sulrregional and international organizations, as well as those towaxd friendly -
countries. A methodical action which was started immediatel.y led to an
official sanctioning of the recognition of the CEAO at the international -
level thanks to the signing of framework agreements of ccoperation with an _
_ ever increasing number of financing organizations ~.nd institutions. This -
effort contributed~ a.mong other things, to "securing and dxa,wing toward the
Community and the member states, the maximum of technical skills and finan-
cial resources." ~
- In his repart on activities :~or the yeas 1978-1979~ Mr P'ioussa Ngom wrote
- that these ties of institutionalized cooperation make ~t possible to streng-
then the efforts which "our organization consents to for its development
= through assistance in terms of qualified experts and not inconsiderable
financial resources." The reason for this development l,ies in the firm
decision of the member states first to count on their own resources a =
- principle which ha.s furthered this movement of cooperation and assistance~
characterized by invaluable trust capital, uniquF in the framework of A~ican -
or~anizations. _
Two examp~es illustrate this trusi:. Following tarief visits to the head-
quaxters of the CEAO, European Commissioner C. Cheysson stated that he had
had the opportunity there "to express more strongly the hope which the
European Community has placed in its sister Community of Western Africa~
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and also to state that we are at the di~posal of this Africa.n sister"; as ~
- for Mr Mahtar M'23ow, at the end of his visit to the headquarters of the CEAO -
he declared that "UNESCO is pleased with the actions carried out by the CEAQ _
- to s~rengthen cooperation b~tween its member states; it will provide its
cooperation to the best of its abilities to an institution whose goals axe
similar to its own and whose success will open the way to greater solidarity -
for the African people." -
_ The Nouakchott conference which will be characterized by strengthened _
cooperation~ within the perspective of the decisive decade of 1980-1990 _
~ will maxk the completion of a real common market and will be able to take -
advantage of the already promissing thrust of this organization, of which
President Traore states that "a11 the condition~ ha,ve been met so that in =
- the yeaxs to come it will not orLl.y constitute a necessity, but also serve
as a point of reference."
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Pasis, 1979
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I
. INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BRIEF5 -
SOUTH AFRICAN AID TO MALAWI--Mr. Tembo, president of the Malawi Agricultural -
Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), re~ently headed a 6-man
delegation to South Africa to negotiate a loan of 9 million kwacha for the
construction of corn silos in Lilongwe. Initiatives undertaken at the
beginning of the year should be consummated and permit the construction
- of these storage units with a total capacity of 180,000 tons. The project -
whose execution will reportedly be handled by the Industrial Development
Corporation (IDC) will cost about 12 million kwacha. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Oct 79 p 2715] 8143
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ANGOLA
BPIEFS
JOINT OIL VENTURES Mr Jorge de Morais~ the Angolan oil minister~ has
stated that the discovery of new oil deposits, underground as well as under- "
sea~ is a priority item of Angolan policy. Mr de Morais~ who made this
_ statement ori 5 October in Vienna, during the last session of the OPEC seminax~
~ specified that Angola is in favor of the creation of nex "joint ventures" _
which would accel.erate the discovery and exp:loitation of new deposits. More-
over, Mr de Morais sta.ted that the oil potenti.al. of Angola has been widely
- '~underestimated." Finally, the Angolan mfnister recalled the fact that as -
soon as it became independent, Angola applied for membership in OPEC and -
that it is still waiting for a"positive decision" to be made. [Text]
[Paxis MARCHES TROF.ICAUX ET MEDITERRANNEENS in French 12 Oct 79 p 2781] -
- 8463
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BENIN
- DETAILS ON FIRST DEVELOPMENT PLAN GIVEN
Paris N1AF~CHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 12 Oct 79 p 2765
[Article: "First Benin State Plan (1978-1981)"J
- ~Text] In September 1977, the head of the Benin state signed a document
promulgating the first 3-year state plan, 1977-1980. Later on, because of
the delay in its implementation, the plan was to eover the years 1978-1981.
It Y~as also remained secret since only an international version has been _
published.
- The document published lists pro~ects or ideas for pro~ects~ "the realiza-
tion of which will co~ztibute to put Benin on the road to planned socialist
_ development."
" The authors of the plan, wfio have received the help of but a few United =
~ Nations' e~cperts, had tfie following ob~ectives in mind: -
--to increase the standards of living of t~e people;
--to insure participation at the regional le~el through an inter-regional ~
distribution of the production. ,
For the implementation of these ambitious ob~ectives, Benin officials relq,
under the present plan, on the industry which is expected to 3ncrease its
share in tbe GNP from 11 percent at tfie beginning of the plan to 17 percent ~
at the end, the purpose of agriculture, which is called here "a b~sis for �
development," being to finance industry. After this Choice fias been made, :
decreased contributions to tfie cammercial sector have been contemplated '
(this includes tTie administration~., wliicfi is wfiy a certain stagnation has ~
been noted in this sector. Almost no cfiange is e~pected in the primary "
- sector during theperiod c~overed, since the GNP varies betureen 37~38 percent. ,
The essential orien*_ation being toward industry, ma~or pro~ects are being �
contemplated, involving large capitul investments. The investments are as
- follows: ,
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J
Amounts -
Sector (b~11:Lon CFAFZ X
~ I. Industry 111.5 45.7 ~
--Save sugar mill 30.0 12.3
--Onigbolo cement plant � 17.4 7.1 -
--Oil refinery 45.0 18.5 .
" II. Transportation 54.~ 22..5
--Roads 22.7 9.3 =
- --Railroads 7,6 3.1
--Port 19.6 S.0
- III. Rural development 26.0 10.7
- IV. Public services 22.1 9.1 -
V. T:;uris~ 3.2 1.3
- VI. Commerce 3,5 1.4
VII. He.alth 6.8 2.8 -
VIII. Education 16.0 6.6
TOTAL 21+3.9 100.0 -
Transportation and industry amount zo almost 70 percent of all investmenta.
In industry, pro~ects such as cE~e sugar mill, the oil refinery and the cement
- plant account for 92 billion CFA francs, i.e., 38 percent of the total. On
the other hand, rural development (stock farming, fisherfes, etc.) accounts
_ for only 11 percent of the investmentev =
_ This dis.crepancy between industry, the mainspring of development as the -
_ goverr~ment sees it, and agriculture, the basis of that same development, is
_ surpr3sing since, at tfie present stage of preparation of ma~or projects,
Benin does not have the ~uman, capital and structural resources required for
their implementation. Also, the narrowness of t'he Benin market may be a
limiting factor in the production of commodities such as sugar and oil.
There are, of course, ezport markets such as Nigeria or Niger. But frill
these always remain open, in spite of tfie Econrnnic Community of West African
States.
Tranaportation takes up 22,5 percent of the investments. This proportion
is thought to be realistic in view of the interest shown by Benixi ftself
and its foreign partners. The main pro3ects adopted are: modernization of
railroad equipment, extension of the railroad from Parakou to Niamey, and
enlargement of the Cotonou port.
- In the health sector, structures in stages have been devised, starting at
: the base: health units in villages; Y,,ealtfi centers in the districts;
hospitals in the provinces.
_ In the education sec tor (which accounts for 6.6 percent of the ir.~t~2stwents),
- the construction of basic polyte~ct~nical school complexes is contempla;ed ta
provide ~ob training in order to.supply qualified labo~d~. .
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r~n urrll;ltiL UJ~, UNLY
; Both the program and the strategy adopted seem ambitious.
In fact, they do not appear to take into account the conditions resulting
_ from the lack of substructures able to receive the contemplated investments~ _
and from thQ problems connected witfi financing (it is uot certain that
foreign commitments will exceed 102 billion CFA francs~. -
- The balance for the 3 years, i.e., dbout 142 billion CFA francs, arill then
have to be found. All the national resources will not be enough. In -
addition, so:+:e pro~ects, su~ch as the oil refinery estimai:~d to cost
45 billion CFA francs, do tiot seem to be of primary importance for Benin
during the coming years, if one considers its pres~~nt consumption which is
~
- probably not mtvh in ezcess of 100,000 tons of oil produc*_Q,
These failures could be corrected since the plan is divided into three
annual installments. After completion of the first fnstallment, a conference
has been organized to present the results for that year; it has pe~itted
- (no information has been published on the sub~ect) to ad~ust certain data,
- to consider tfie priority given to certain pro~ects, to add ~r withdraw pro-
~ects. Preparation for the conference presenting the results for the second :
year are now said to be underway. Participants at these conferences, in -
addition to political authorities (party and government), are directors of _
studies and planning as well as directors of financial affairs and administra-
- tive directors from all ininistries. At the conference, they shall undertake _
= a critical examination of tfie implementation of the plan installment for the `
year in question.
- To make an overall ~udgment, a foreign observer fias to wait for the outcome
of these conferences which enable fiim to evaluate the progress which has
been made. Publication of the proceedings of such conferences is to be
wisiced . .
The state plan is the first plan of the military revolutionary gover~ent.
_ Designed, realized and implemented by Benin nationals, it might be a precious _
tool if it were to be tfie sub~ect of an exchange of views between Eeninese
technicians, international experts, and politicians and technicians from
other countries.
~ This may be what prompted the announcement, a few months ago, that Benin,
with assigtance from the United Nations Development Program, would organize
_ a me~ting of financing institutions to get them interested in its develop-
ment. We do not know yet when this meeting will be held. However, last
June in Cotonou, Mr poo Kingue, director of the United Nations Development
Fund, iYrvited same 20 amT~assadors accredited to Benin to advise tfiem on the
_ meeting. As a result of this initiative, the financing of certain pro~ects -
included in the 3-year state plan of Benin might be accelerated.
COPYRTGFIT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979
- 9294
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CAMEROO~T
r,
~
ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS WITH FRANCE SIGNED -
_ Paris MARCHES TROPICAt1X ET MEDITERRAN~IIVS in French 5 Oct 79 p 2709
~TextJ Mr Youssouia Daouda, Cameroonism minister of the economy and the
plan, Mr Hubert Dubois, ambassador of France to the United Cameroon Republic,
and Mr Guy Lecamus, interim director of the Central Fund for Economic Coop-
eration, signed 7 financing agreements, of which 3 were grant agreements of
- the Aid and Cooperation ~znd (FAC) and 4 loan agreements oi the Central F1ind
for Economic ~ooperation. _
- Under three agreements, the Fund f'or,Economic Cooperation grants Cameroon
subsidies in the total amount of 545 mi.liion CFA francs.
The first of these grants, totalling 270 million CFA francs, is earmarked
for the partial financing for telecom~unication engineering studies for a ~
_ period of 2 years. These studies, underway since 1972, have already
benefited from FAC grants on the order of 485 million CFA francs.
The second grant, totalling 270 million CFA francs, concerns the continuation ~
of th~ participation of the FAC in the operation of developir,g irrigated rice
growing in the framework of the SEMRY II project. -
The FAC grant, covering one year of the activities of staffi.ng and engineer- -
ing of the operation, completes actions conducted concomitantly by the World
Bank, the Central Fla.nd for Economic Cooperation, and the United Republic of
_ Cameroon.
Finally, the 3d grant, totalling 75 million CFA francs, contributes to the
financing of a proj~ct which will be launched by the National Electricity
Company of Cameroon (SONII,). This grant will make possible the financing
of an important study of the updating of the hydroelectric sites of Cameroon
and constitutes the first slice of a grant of 150 million CFA francs.
~ The Central Fund for Economic Cooperation is granting 4 loans to Cameroon
= totalling 2.75 billion CFA francs. ~
The first loan, amounting to 400 million CFA francs, reinforces the credit
placed at the disposal of SONEL for the completion of the updating of the ~
study of the hydroelectric sites of the country.
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The second loan, a~nounting to 2.16 billion CFA francs, will make possible
. the partial iinancing of a priority project of exploiting the region of
southeast Benoue, the comple~ion of which is placed under the sponsorship ~
of the SODECOTON [expansion unknownj. This loan witl enjoy favorable con-
ditions usuall,y granted to operations of rural development.
' The operation will involve the restoration and installation df road, social
(dispensaries, schools, wells, etc.) and agricultural infrastruetures, as
well as stren~thening the staffing of peasant enterpr.i~es on the one hand,
- and the creation of ne~a SODECOTON installations on the other. The whole -
project will be compieted in 3 years.
The third loan (100 million CFA francs) is destined for the financing of the _
. advance studies for the launching of the second phase of th2 S~uth-East
Benoue Project.
Finally, the fourth loan, totalling 100 million CFA francs, with favorable _
conditions, will be applied to the financing of the study of an irrigation
project of about 2000 hectares of banana plantations with the objectives
of increasing yields, improvement of qual~ty, and regularization of produc-
tion under the aegis of the Cameroonian Banana Organization (OCB).
FAC and Cameroon had already signed, on 23 May 19'79, 2 agreements totalling ~
100 million CFA francs, each to permit the partial financing of the develop-
ment of rice culture in the high valley of the Noun and the financing of
geologic study and mining prospecting in the southwest of the country. _
In addition, on 16 August 1g79, a third agreement granting a new participation
of 175 million CFA francs for the construction of the Douala-Edea section of
the Transcameroon Douala-Yaounde Railroad was signed. ~
The grants of the Fund for Aid and Cooperation to the Cameroon economy for
the present fiscal year amount to 920 million CFA francs, and with regard
to the Central Fund, the agreements signed to date bring to 24.815 billion
CFA francs the total of loans made to Cameroon by this financial organ since
the beginning of 1979.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979 �
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CAMEROON
NEW ~F'FSHORE OIL DISCOVERY MADE
_ Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in F~ench 10 Oct 79 p 61 ~
[Text] At the end of September a new petroleum deposit was discovered in
Cameroon in i;he offshore zone, called Falaga-Sud. according to the first
indications; it could turn out to be large. The American company Nbbil is
the operator in this deposit. The exploration permit is divided among `
- Mobil (54 percent), Total-CFP (18 percent) and two small American companies, _
Ocelot IND Ltd and Dansom Oil Company, who hold the rest (28 percent).
= This discovery, which confirms the importance of Cameroon in the new African
petroleum geography, follows the discovery in late August of another off-
shore deposit 80 km south of Victoria on the H 17 Permit. The French
Petroleum Company is the operator. The permit is held half by CFP and half
by Nbbil. -
~rthermore, according to the most xecent statistics, petroleum production
from the Kome Marine deposit reached 500,000 tons in the first half of 1979�
It can therefore be expected that Cameroonian production will exceed 1 mil-
lion tons for +he whole of 1979�
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979 �
6108 ~
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CAMEROON
,
ACTIVITIES OF GRt1IN OFFICE REPORTED
= Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEIIVS in French 5 Oct 79 p 2709
_ [Text) In J~zne 1975 the Cameroon Governmer_t rreated the Grain Office to
help the populations of northern Cameroon, vic'tims of the great drought
which raged over the Sahel zone of the continent from 1.96g to 1972. The _
drought not only killed ~500 Buffon waterbuck in the Waza National Park,
but also caused much harn~ to the local populations through a substantial
loss of grain production. Hence the necessity of setting up an organiza- ~
tion f.or collecting and distributing co~odities of primary necessity. s
~ The activity of the Grain Office has consisted mainly in the first year
_ of reconditioning 447 tons of sorgho deriving from the Special Ftitnd for ~
~ Urgent Help (FSSU) created just after the drought ancl the great flood �
which ravaged the province of the North in 1970-71. The harvest of ~976-
- 1977 saw the first intervention of the Office in the grain market with
the purchase of 860 tons of millet-sorgho. This volume rose to 1990 tons , -
in 1977-1978, reaching 4000 tons in 1978-~g79, or an increase of 198 per- .
cent.
Little by little the Grain Office added other ftiinctions such as reguiariz-
ing the prices of basic grains (millet-sorgho, corn) in order to fight '
against speculation in the tide-over period (July-October).
The subsidies of the Cameroan Government to the Grain Office rose, says
CAMEROON TRIBUNE, from 21.5 million CFA francs ir.i 1975-1976 to 30A million ~
for the present harvest (1.978-1979)� ~
Ftzrthermore, the office has been receiving since 1976-1977 a grant from
the FONADER [National Rural Development F~Zndj which enables it to fight
_ against the enemies of the seeds and the commodities (humidity, mold,
mice, rats, weevils etc.). This subsidy today has reached 35 million
CFA francs . ' ' ~
FinallY the World Food Program (PAM) is granting assis~ance to the bffice
in the framework of a plan of operation signed on 24 February 1973 with
the Cameroon Government for the supp].y of 6700 tons of grains. To date ~
the PAM has intervened to the extent of more than 200 millian CFA francs. ~
; . .
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, Over the lon term the Office envisa es the �
g g possibility of creating, jo~~ztly ;
with the SODEBLE (ex~ansion unknown] bakery units which will make local -
breads with a proportion of 30 percent millet-sorgho flour and 70 percent
wheat flour.
= In the next few ~ears the Grain Office could also open its own market t
- beyond the frontiers, particularly in Nigeria, Chad, and the Central �
African Eaipire. T~is opening would include the possibility o:f trade
agreements on grain prices in order tr~ reduce illegal exports.
Furthermore it has relations with trading enterprises like SOCOOPED (Sav-
ings and Development Cooperatives Companyj for the purpose of organizing,
extending, and making operational distribution and collection trade
channels.
3
- Finally, the Grain Office, which buys from the peasants only the quantity
of grains freed, does not use the administrative prices (in effect in the _
NffDEVIV [expansion unknown] and SOCOOPID stores). Its prices are much ~
lower and the difference is between 2000 and 3000 CFA francs per grain
- sack of 100 kilograms. -
COPYRIGHT: Rene Nbreux et Cie, Paris, 1979
-
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CAMEROON ~
BRIEFS ~ _
TRADE WITH FRANCE--Cameroon exported to France in the first half of 1979
465 million French francs worth of agricultural and fo~d products, compared
wich 509 million in the first half of 1978, or a drep of 8.6 percent. It -
is becoming the 13th supplier of France in this sector. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEII~TS in French 5 Oct 79 p~7091 6108
cso: 4400 -
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- CENTRAL .~'RTCAN 'REPUBLIC
OPERATION 'BARRACUDA' SEEN AS TOTAL POLITICAL FIASCO
- Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 15-28 Oct 79 p 25
[Article by Ginette Cot]
[Te~.t] A model military raid, operation "Barracuda" is a total political
- fiasco.
Never had the policy of Paris in Africa, even ~n France, evoked such violent
reactions and been Lhe subject of sucfi cr~tical and severe e~camination.
Socialists and communists, in pa~rticular, are asking for serious inquiries
and the resignation of the~ministers and officials most involved, including
- Messrs Journ.iac, counselor for African aFfairs at tbe Elysee; Francois-Poncet~
- minister of f~reign affairs; and Galley, minister of cooperation. The latter
will be recorded in fiistory as tfie man wfio Iiad dared to descri~e tbe massacre
of Bangui infants as a"pseudo-event," a massacre already known throughout
the world. Judging by the French press, it seems that a aharper look ehould
be taken at the Giscardian strategy in Africa and that the dangers involved
in this overtly interventionist and colonial policy and the afiame it reflects -
on France should be revealed,
With regard to the Central African mess~ tbs French.leaders are da~ly being
- placed increasingly on the defensive. We have seen th~s quite ~rell in the
National Assembly. Althnugh Prime Minister Barre espressed "the t4ta1
solidarity of the government with Mr Galley" and confirmed that the latter
"has the esteem and confidence of the presi�dent of the 7epublic~"
- Mr Francois-Poncet, to the boos of tfie opposition, engaged in a perilous
exercise of tightrope walking in an effort to ~ustify the un~ustifiable.
And he concluded: "The presence of ouE soliders in Central Africa wi11 be
- tightly l:imited tn time and ob~ectfve (and~. will end as soon as the Central
- African authorities ask tfiat this be done." That is pure hypocrisy, as
- Mr Dacko is evidently notiLing ~more tfian a puppet ~�inse strings are being
pulled by Paris. ~
However, the minister of foreign affairs also said, "Tbe repxesentatives of
tbe otfier parties in opposition to the Bokassa gonernment fiave all arrived _
- or are gbout to arrive in Bangut; and grance does not intend to~make a -
choice...."
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r~ux ur'r'1(:LAL USE UNLY
That rEmains to be seea-~-even though Ange Patasse, former Bokassa prime
- minister has indeed returned to Bangui. _
The French Goverrnnent ~uas never more brilliant before the Foreign Affairs
Coamittee of the Fren~n National Assembly. Mr Gal?ey, assailed by the flood _
of questions from the parlfamentarians; did not offer the slightest credible
reply. _
- As for the French president, Giscard d'Estaing, he was put on the spot in `
Bonn, Federal Republic of Ge~many, on 2 October, during a televised deba~e.
Six Gexman ~ournalists, less respectful than the customary interviewers of -
the president, asked him questions which annoyed fiim to the point that the
- ansarer--a not very convincing answer, moreover--to one of the questions at
best was given in a far from friendly tone: "Tfie idea that France is seek-
- ing economic advantages in Chad or the Central African Republic, wfiic~ are
' among the 24 poorest countriea in tfie world and whose people live exclusively
on French aid is offensi.ve and stupid." -
And it is certainly not by chance that, the day after this presiden*ial '
performance which was rather unfortunate for tfie public image of France, the -
� COGIIKA [Nuclear Materials General Company], a subsidiary of the Atotnic -
Energy Commission (AEC), a member of ;he URCA jexpansion unkno~vn), the Cen- -
tral African company responsible for tfie study and development of. the
- Bakouma uranium deposit, stated in a communique tfiat the extremely high
costs of exploitation did not permit contemplation of work on this deposit =
for the foreseeable future. Uranium9 therefore, and the other mining
resources have nothing to do with the French interventionl...In Bangui or ~
elsewhere!...Nothing more than the strategic poaition of the former empire
- in the heart of Africal... ~
Wtiat naive person would they still have believe that?
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
814 3
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
. FRANCE SAID TO HAVE USED COLONIAL METHODS
- Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 15-28 Oct 79 pp 23-25
[Article by Ginette Cot]
(Text] The methods used by tfie erstwhile metropolis to install a president
in Bangui recall "the cursed colonial days." ~
As concerns Fran.ce's African policy, it was already known that an impass- ~
able gulf sepa:ated words from acts; and that~ to take only one we11 known
example, the slogan: "Africa for the Africans," had only been tossed out
for show~
~ It was already known tfiat nothing, to judge by the realities expeYienced,
permitted tFie according of any belief in the desire oft proclaimed by Pari$ ~
of establ3.shing new ties with Africa, with no more stencfi of colonialism, .
opening a dialog leading "progress3vely" to an "active and radiant solidar-
_ ity" or providing "assistance which corresponds not to the remembxances of
the past but to the call of tfie future."* `
Finally, it was known, and one could sense tliis Qn many occasions, that,
on the banks of the Seine, very little attention is paid to public
opinion....However, one might fiave thought tfiat ~rith the military internen-
= tions in tfie SfiaTia, Cfiad and Western Sahara~ Giscardian France over the
last few years had reached the limits possible {n the ~ole that it had _
conferred upon itself as the chief gendarme of imperialism on the continent. -
One might also have thought that the efforts of direct colonial reconquest ~
= expended with the help of secret agents and mercenaries, after the outcry E
aroused by Bob Denard's 'bictory" in tfie Comoros and tfie bitter setback _
which took place on 16 January 1977 in Benin, would take the ~orm of such
offences. This was not the case.
- With operation "Barracuda" and its developments, they went even further, aa -
far as during the era wlien the Western powers indulged in the carving up of
- the African Continent.
_ *Valerie Gi~card d'Estaing: Speech at Rigali and Abid~an.
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Thus it was that David Dacko, preceded by tfie bayonets of the French army, ~
returned to Bangui during the night of 20-21 September and was elevated to -
tbe position of head of state, in replacement of his cousin, of whom he had
been the personal adviser, since August 1976 and up to the very last months
of the "empire."
It was under the protection of French paratroops that the "new" president~
- having been install.ed in office a sfiort time earlier, read ~ stat~ment over
~ the radio announcing tfie overtfirow of the "executioner" of Berengo and the
_ establishment of the republic. French military personnel, whose contingent -
- of 1,000 men at the end of September was forced to reinforce itself day
_ after day, were thenceforth to maintain order in central Africa. -
= As for the Central Africans, they w311 never have knowledge of the secrets
~ of the Bokassa reign, inside information or the compromising plots which
permitted this former protege of Paris and son of the ~'rench "colonial army"
to remain in power for 13 years: the occupants took pains to clean the
- Berengo "palace" and to remove all the files--rigbt down to the~most insignif-
_ icant record of accounts--to the embassy of France. And it is certain that -
- the household also began in this way elsewhere. Questione~ on this sub~ect ;
by a member of parliament, Mr Galley replied that he did not believe in tihe -
accuracy of the reports published on this sub~ect. Decidedly, tfiis mintster ,
does not know anything about wfiat is going on in Africa!
Does he at least know that, faithful to the tradition of the operations of .
= conquest of the past, the participants in the "Barracuda" raid, sensing the _
- discontent of tfie Central Africans, hastily distributed supplies of beer to
the popular quarters of Bangui? T+1hen people get intoxicated with alcohol
and music, tfiey forget to think, it is felt. Similarlp, when government
- workers are paid, tfie papularity of tfie regime is assured, it is thought.
Also the coffers of the state were quickly filled (.~ioes Mr Galley kno~r by
~ whom). And David Dacko was alile to announce to merc.hants tfiat tfiey would be
exempted from the payment of all taxes and assessmen~~s until the end of the
year. WI~o, tfien, Mr Gallery, is going to bail out the state budget? -
The bringing-into-line process, to avoid the term recolonization, ts all too
transparent. We see dozens of "technical advisers" d~planning daily at the
- Bangui airport. Every ministry, every bank, e~ery national company, every =
public enterprise will receive its share. As for the ~rench military per-
sonnel. and gendarmes, tfiey "will xeorganize" the army, police and the =
gendarmerie of tfie Central Afr~can Republic. The presidency, solidly
guarded by French paratroops and installed, as if by chance, close to tlie -
embassy of ~rance, has obviously not been forgotten. It is true that tfie
ambassador of France to Bangui, Robert Piquet, ~aas not up to Cbe task of
private tutor of thE new chief of staCe, whicfi proved to be a terribly
arduous undertaking. The latter talked too much. He said anything tfiat
came to hisinind. And the "gags" were a little fieavy~. Also David Dacko,
wk~o was "too tired," would not give any more interviews. Except to "sure"
newspapers. Thoughtfully, the 1~'f~nistry of Cooperation dispatched one of its ~
experts, Mr Charron, who w~11 perfoz~ tfie duties of "adviser" of ti~e new _
presi.dent. A good idea, in fact...but a little late~ Swallowing bis pride,
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- Dacko bas invited everyone to resume his position. The youth of Central
Africa should "stop mixing in policy." In Central Africa is not policy a
matter for the public safety government, whicfi was formed in haste and in
which, with few exceptions, the same tIiings are being done and we are
_ starting over again? Is it not rather, quite simply a matter for the Elysee?
For it is in Paris that everything is conceived, down to the details. Was -
- this not seen in the Ange Patasse affair? France is going so far as to
operate a triage among the opponenta contending for the succesaion and to
decide which of the Central African citizens can return to their country.
It is ~rue that the business sectors do not fiave short memories and have not _
forgo=~ten that former Pri~me Minister Bokassa in 1974 had granted tfie right
- to mining prospection of all of tfie Central African subsoils to the ALUSUISSE
[?SwiGC�; Aluminum Company]. That along Grtth the i~mplications for the French
interested in eve:ntual exploitation of the uranium which the Bakoun?a mines
- have in abundance. Bad feelings are tenacious in those sectors! Is not -
policy in Central Africa also a matter of the grench troops who are tiaere to
prevent any revolt and are already moving toward the northwestern part of
the country, with the strong temptation to reactivate the Bouar base?
Wtiat is certain is that "Bangui-la-Coquette" is no longer ~ust a Paris �
faubourg; it has become the veriCable capital of the Central African Republic.
_ COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
8143
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- CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
. ,
FRANCE SAID TO HAVE SCOF`F'ID AT RIGHTS OF CIIVTRAI, AFRICANS .
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 10 Oct 79 pp 26-27, 28 .
[Text) The Rights of Man Have Triumphed, By the Grace of France. But -
Democracy Has Suffered a Defeat.
Abidjan. In the clattuny heat of the Ivorian capital a man is relearning how ~
to live incognito. After having occupied the "front page" of the inter- ;
national press both for his pageantry and his crimes, Jean Bedel Bokassa of -
Berengo of Bobangui is adapting himself to exile.
Upon his arrival in Abidjan on 24 September, "picked up" by President Felix ~
- Houphouet-Boigny, whom he was pleased to call "his father," the former
emperor of C~ni~ral Africa was first lodged in the Little Palace.
After his return to Abidjan on 22 September the Ivorian chief of state had
convoked a meeting of the enlarged political bureau of the party. Political
leaders, religious leaders (guests) and trade unionists approved the welcome
to Bokassa. The latter could come.
Bokassa waited until a residence was prepared for him at Yamoussoukro, the
native village of the Ivorian chief of state. When the thing is done, the ;
matter will be closed.
"Dwviu Dacko demanded in vair~ tr~~ ex~raditioti of' Bokassa; Houphouet-Boigny .
_ will not give him up to him." The statement is tha,t of an African diplomat, -
who adds: "If Dacko continues to insist, it will be enough for Houphouet to
send him an emissary who will tell him: `That's enough!` and Dacko will be
quiet." There is an historical reason fbr this confidence: in the saga of
the first African chiefs of state, David Dacko was among the unconditional -
supporters of Felix Houphouet-Boigny, the uncontested leader, during the
fifties, of the RDA (African Democratic Rally) from which later emerged the
leaders of French-speaking Africa. This image of spiritual father has con-
ferred on "The Old Ma.n"--as they have always called President Houphouet-
Boigny--an authority which can be disputed only by the Senegalese Leopold
_ Singhor and the Camerooni~~.n Ahma.dou Ahidjo today. "In addition," an ivorian -
official told us, "The Ivory Coast did not refer to its tradition of hospi- -
tality by chance. If the crimes of Bokassa are unpard~onable, it must be ~
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remembered that Houphouet has always refused to surrender political refu- ~
gees. Therefore the Guinean oppositionists demanded by Sekou Toure have
never been sent to Guinea."
By "placing" Bokassa under the wings of Houphouet, the French president,
Mr Valery Giscard d'Estaing, therefore apparently saved the head of tlie _
- sin~ster emperor.
Thus everything was carried off as though the former emperor had:been
removed because he had become too much of a burden. But the team which
replaced him is more controllable than ever.
The new president? He is a former president. Former president of the
~ Central 4frican Republic, overthrown by Bokassa, whose personal adviser
he later became. The vice president? Also a former official. Former
prime minister of Bokassa, whos~ ur~conditional herald he was to the point
of denying right up to the end--that is to say, to the point of ridicule,
_ and up to the departure of the emperor--that there had ever been any mas-
sacres in Central Africa. To the point also that in Ba.ngui and in the
press they liked to call him "Nfr Denial."
BesidES these two "bosses," who today pass for the overthrowers of the .
tyrant, the former comrades of Bokassa are still there. General Maymokolo,
acknowledged to have been guilty of ~iaving killed with his own hands, in
January, a 13-year-old child in the streets of Ba,ngui, was worried only -
because on 29 September he was suspected of having desired to kill David
Dacko. Colone~ Inga, grand master of the killings in April, drives about
in coi;:plete freedom in Ba.ngui in a military jeep and in uniform. The
political face of Central Africa has thus been only a kaleidoscope in these
recent weeks. They shuffle the cards. But they deal the same hand.
The master of this game? It is F~ance and none but France, as clumsy as it
_ is indecent. The communique published on 26 September 1979 by the government
at Paris concerning the intervention in Central Africa speaks with unspeakable _
= elo~uence in this regard.
_ In the first place F~ance seems to congratulate itself that the dictatorship
was over~thrown "wii;hout spilling a drop of blood." To which the opposition,
in the voice of Francois Mitterand, first secretary of the Socialist Party,
ret~rts: "Blood has not been spilled? But it has been spilling for years _
_ in 'Bangui:" And they were aware of it in Paris`. The proof is that in N1a.y,
_ wb.en the scandal of the massacres of Central African children broke out, they
wanted to ignore it. Quite consistently, the minister of cooperation, Mr
Robert Galley--the expression will stick to him--at that time dared to call
. the killings "pseudo-events."
In the second place the French Government claims that, at the time of the
French-African summit meeting at Kigali (Rwanaa) on 21 and 22 May, it was
~ -
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"the president of the [Frenchl Republic [who] proposed the establishment -
of commission of confirmation composed exclusively of African ~udges," _
The comment of an African statesman who participated in the closed session ~
of this summit meeting: "It's false: The establishment of this commission
~aas decided in three stages. First.Nb~autu spent a whole night trying to _
convi:~ce Bokassa himself to ask for a commission of inquiry. Then Bokassa,
at the end of the su~nit meeting, yielded and himself designated the coun-
tries which he wanted to see ccmposi:~g this commission. He even proposed
Gabon, but Bongo refused. Finally, when the matter was decided, Giscard
congratulated them by saying that that handled it with regard to public =
opinion."
A third justification of the F~ench intervention: "To the anguished appeals
- which the former president of the Central African Republic, the acting prime
minister, and other Central A~rican officials to liberate their country from _
oppression the government replied that France was ready to satisf~r their ~
request for aid when it was expressed on the spot by those who had the right, _
besides the fallen sovereign, to represent Central Africa." Actually the
"Ce~ntral African authorities" did not exist. David Dacko? He was in France,
and to have him ~~express on the spot" a request of aid to France, it was
= necessary to transport him to Bangui in a French Transall during the ni~ht
of 20 September.
This underdeveloped scenario had already been tested in Gt~bon by the French
services (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 978). Overthrown by a coup d'etat while he was
in F~ance, Gabonese President Leon M'ba owed his staying power only to~the _
swiftness of the French troops. Intervening at the "written request" of the =
old Vice President Yhembit, whom the men of the F~ench secret services just
had time ta have sign a call for help composed in advancs.
The same maneuver was used this time in Central Africa. In a less hypocriti-
cal manner. That is tu say clumsier. Which caused one African ambassador in _
- France to say: "F~om the time of De Gaulle and Jacques Foccart [at that time
secretary general for African and Malagasy Affairsj the F`rench secret services
' have been artists. They bring rain and good weather in Africa, with as much
efficiency as discretion. With Giscard d'Estaing and Rene Journiac they still
intervene, but without flourish and with heavy feet." The proof? French _
troops are masters of Central Africa today as in the good old days of the
colony. The ambassador of France screens the visitors of President David '
- Dacko in the presidential palace. Installed--oh the irony--on Valery-Giscard-
d-Estaing S9uare in Bangui. But could France have done otherwise? Eighteen ~
months from the presidential elections the chief of state could not maintain
his doubtful friendship with a Bokassa without befouling himself. If the -
~ latter had only killed in 1982, the gr.umbling of ~ench opinion would not have
had electoral ~'allout. That is a good French motive. The Central Afriean -
motive is that painful confession of an adversary of the emperor: "Nothing
can ~be done in our country without France." And finally an African motive is
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_ that other confession, sincere, but dishonorable, of a statesman: "The
French intervention in Central Africa was possible only thanks to us, the
- Africans. It demonstrates that we are incapable of changing our fate wi~Lh- -
out an outside power."
- Under the empire, actually, Central Africa was a desert. An almost com-
~lete political void. The opposition? In voluntary exile, like Abel Goumba,
wrio has become the leader of the Ubangi Patriotic Front (FPO) based in the
Congo. In prisan, as was the case of Barthelen~y Yangongo, former mi.nister
of information who had tried to write that Bokassa was a dictator: The
others were not revealed until later.
_ The only real oppositionists, true to themselves, were the students. They
revolted in April to demand salaries for their parents. But in Central ~ -
Africa as elsewhere, the uprisings of youth or often retrieved by profes-
sionals in political opportunism. The only difference: France was sub-
stituted for the Central African demagogues, not so muc:~ to overthrow -
Bokassa as to regain power. In defense of the Central Africans: the
intellectual and moral slavery ~.nd the stupefaction organized by Bokassa
were such that all the slightest political desires evaporated.
Since then it has been sadly significant that David Dacko, placed in power
by France, was allowed to proclaim: "I thank that country which has been
protecting us for 66 years. I mean France." ~renty years after what they
persist in calling independence, such sincerity can inspire only the most -
humiliating concerns among the Centrai Africans who are today becoming aware
' that ever3rthing has to be redone in their country.
For Bokassa is gone, well and good. And no one regrets it. Some prefer to
forget, or even to make people forget that he existed. The rights of man
have triumphed. So let it be. Gesta dei per Francos ("the works of God
performed by the French"). But if by the grace of France this departure
is the victory of the rights of ma.n, it also sanctifies the defeat of
democracy.
By aspiring to substitute itself for the Central African people, whether or
not in the name of the rigtats of man, France has quite simply scoffed at the
- right of a people. By applauding the French intervention, the Africans have
resigned their respon~ibilities. A resignation which resembles a renuncia-
tion.
COPYRIGHT: ~~une Afrique GRUPJIEI 1~79
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
s
- ~
;
FRENCH PARATROOP SURVEILLANCE D~PLORED ~
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in Frencfi i5-18 Oct 79 pp 25-26
- [Article by Mariam Sysle]
[Text] Paris was able in time to keep the former emperor from tslking but
did not succzed in keeping the "new" president quiet as quickly.
In preparation for 2 months, tfie Bangui military operation was conducted r
expeditiousYy. t -
_ However, from thP political standpoint there were also some hitches.
The ~umble of events began at dawn on tfie very day of Bangui's "liberation"
by paratroops from the 3d and 8th Regiments of marine parachute infrantrymen -
when, arriving from Tripoli, tfie deposed emperor~s "Caravelle," instead of '
proceeding to Switz~rland and his numbered bank accounts, as it seems to have ;
_ been planned, appeared in tfie skies of France.
What was to be done with tfiis former French army captain wTio, not too long ~
ago, was receive~ with mucfi pomp and great hanors at the Elysee? WEiat was
to be done with this bemedaled member of tiie Free Frencli Forces all o� whose
caprices had 6een encouraged and covered up? Wfiat was to be done ~,rtth.tbie ~ '
French voter who had been tfie first chief of stat~ of ~ho African Continent _
_ to receive Presfdent Valery Giscard d'Estaing? Wliat was to be done witfi
this sometime infiabitant of Sologne and Normandy who~knew how to organize
safaris so ably ~or fiis "dear relative1�? Tfiis man who Y~ad made Giscard and
honorary citizen of Central Africa was notfiing moire today than a troublesome -
- and explosive package. _
- Sixty hours of quarantine on the Evreux military base, in Normandy, did not -
take caxe of tbe problem posed by tfiis spoi~.sport who.was taking advantage ~
of fiis dual nationalitq, of fiis past friends and fiis chateaus in Sologne
to take refuge in his second fatfierland.
, ;
If he was a Frenchman, was it not necessary to arzest him as a eriminal
- guilty notably of~massacring infants and to try fiim? Say then! And w~~at if ;
_ he started to tell wfin-know~s wfiat to who-knows wfioml
� ~ _
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c
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It took an entire weekend of searching at the Office of the Keeper of the
Seals to di~cover, contrary to all expectations and quite tardily~ that
- Bokassa, deapite being an announced voter of the Giscardian ma~ority, had ~
lost his French nationality for failing at the time of independence to take -
- an "oath of allegiance" [declaration recognitive].
_ However, if he were a foreigner, why was he not sent back to his country as
~ required by law instead of laboriously seeking a country of eaile Whicfi was
finally found in the Ivory Coast? The question will remain unanswered.
Like Gratien Pognon _
However, that une$pecte~i stopover was not to be the most serious matter. It
is necessary to recognize the fact that David Dacko, without wisbing to, was
to do a lot and quickly to dispel the mystery whicfi might bave surrounded
his return to power.
Tfie first 10 days of his "reign," under surveillance, however, were enough
- to show fiim for what he is...And tfie A~rican people know today better than -
yesterday what they can expect from tfiis chief of state wbn stepped out of
a "Transall."
Officially, the ~ustification for operation "Barracuda Was based--and is
still based--on two fundamental arguements. It was a question at one and
the same time of assuring tfie portection of the 3,000 grench in Central -
Africa and responding to urgent appeals for help from several Central
_ African leaders already engaged in tfie action. Forgetting perhpas that he
had presented himself as a great opponent of Bokassian tyranny and tfiat ~e
had claimed to bave secretly returned to Bangui-~from whence he F~ad 3eparted _
on the pretext of an illness in June 1979---several days before the French
~military intervention, David Dacko, during a press conference on 24 Sepbemter,
was to let the cat out of the bag jvendre a~ trois quarts la iaeche]. In
fact, be revealed that he bad ar~ived in Bangni in "an sircraft with all -
lights out," only a few minutes before readin~g fiis infamous statement over
the radio, that is, after the first French paratroops, who landed on
20 September at around 23U0 hours had sur~counded tfie principal strategic
~ points.
Curiously, this scenario brings another to mind: an 16 January~1977, -
Gratien Pognon, too, was waiting, with a statement in hi.s pocket, for the
"victory" of the mercenaries with wfiom be bad ~ust landed in Cotonou. The
only difference was that David Dacko iiad traveled from Lib~reville to Bangui
in the company of parat~oops from tfie very official French army~..And wfiat
had failed in Benin did no~ en~counter anp fiitcfias in Central Africa.
It was not surprising, therefore, that during tbis same press conferen~e the
- new Central African president, in an effort to outline the principal points
of h3s future foreign policy, stated in plain language that France would
= continne to be fiis principal backup and support. One would have suspected
- as much.
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On the other hand, the last thing one expected was that Dacko would dare to -
say out loud that the Frencfi army would remain in tfie country "10 years if
necessary." -
And what, on this occasion~ disconcerted eveT.ybody--including Pretoria which
- nonetfieless picked up the ball on the rebQ;~~~d--and left his French friende
themselves flabbergasted, was when BoY..assa'3 successor dared to say, before
the entire assembled foreign press, that fie was ready to cooperate with
South Afri.ca, to initiate diplomatic relations witfi the country of apartheid,
as it was a question "of putting an end to hypocritical attitudes on tfiia
sub~ect."
Duly admonished, no doubt, David Dacko on the day after attempted to retrace
his steps, saying that it had only lieen a"~oke...After 13 years of suffering,
we hav~ the right to work off our frustrations." A fine farce! Which was
to be followed by other farces of tfie same kind.
The condemning tc death of Bokassa which was announced over the radio was
another farce, this time by young ~ournalistsl As for the request far the ,
extradition of the former emperor, whicfi the Central African president arished
to address to the Ivorq Coast, it seemed to remain a dead ~etter. For "good
relations with Abid~an take preceder^p over everything else," the ineffable
Dacko remarked. And no doubt it was also a farce to boast of Iiaving met
bef�~rrehand with several African chiefs of state and informing them of what
was ~~lanned! For, at the beginning of October be denied that he had ever
seen a~:d told anybody about anytbing...
- Yet anothsr farce was the purging of the state apparatus of persons most -
closely a:isociated with the tyrann~cal and corrupt Bokassa regime: a balf ~
_ dozen peraons were arrested.
Tfiese tragicomic blunders are endless which, like bubbles~ rise from tbe
foul swamp in wfiich the ~rencfi leaders and their puppets ate bogged down.
However, it is better not to laugh about tfiese blunders too~much~ as they
illustrate a harsh reality: no sooner rid of their despot, a people gagged
up to then find itself again under surveillance. This time the surveill~nce ~
of the~French paratroops wbo reportedly fiave already begun to "break" the
Central African Republic into an ~sland in tfie U6angi. ~
,
COPYRIGAT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
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CII~TRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
DRAWING UP OF 1981-1985 PLAN BEGINS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX LT MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Sep 79 p 2581
[TextJ Last 4 August Prime Minister Henri Maidou of the Central African Re-
public formally opened the work of drawing up the fourth 5-year plan (1981-�
1985) .
The prime minister first spoke with dissati~faction of the way in which the
preceding development plans have been carried out. During the second 5-year _
- plan (1971-1975), public investments totaling 38 billion CFA francs were
completed. The third plan (1976-1980) called for 140 billion, but only 60
billion will be completed. Those 60 billion are distsibuted as follows: -
infrastructure, 55 percent; prc?~uctive sector, 30 percent= and social sec-
tors, 15 percent.
Maidou said that from 1967 to 1977 the GDP rose fraa 40 billion to 90 billion
CFA f rancs in current francs, for an i.ncrease of 8.5 percent-ror only 2.2 per-
cent in constant francs. Since population growth is estimated at 2.5 percent
per year, the per capita GDP has in fact declined over the past 10 years.
'I'he second and third 5-year plans have therefore not resulted in greater per
capita invome or, consequently, a general rise in the standard of living.
Maidou attributed this situation to the lack of adec;uate numbers..of skilled
cadres and the state's financial diffioulties. In oxder to correct the situ-
ation during the upcoming plan, the government is goii;a to make every effart
= to direct investiaents into the productive sectors so as to produce r~venues
yielding budgetary resources. -
7.'he prime minister then reviewed the various sectors of, the ecorromy, indi-
cating in each case the desis able orientations for the next plan. -
Rural sectar: The development of this sector over the past few years has
not met the expectations of Central African authorities. The drop in cotton
production, which fell from 60,000 tons in 1969-1970 to 32,000 tons in 1978-
1979, is causing particular concern.
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From now on the emphasis ~,~rill be pla.ced on integrated regiorial development
that will be supported by the existing structures: the F:Lrm Prices Stabili-
zation Fur.d, the UCCA [Central African Cotton Unior-;, ACADOP [expansion un- ~
known], ADECAF [expansion unknown], and so on. National and regional agencies
for integrated development will be given the responsibility for rural develop- -
ment and will be provided with increased funds for that purpose. The minis- -
tries involved will thus be relieved of management tasks and can devote them~
selves to their job of planning.
Food crops have been neglected for several years, but under this plan they
should be given new impetus in order to insure better supplies for consumer
centers.
Stockraising has developed f avorably, with cattle increasing by about 17 per-
cent annuall~y since 1971. Until now the state's efforts have been concen-
trated primarily on sanitary measures, a task that will be handled increas-
ingly by the stockraisers themselves. Government authorities will now direct
their activity toward the protection of pastureland, which in some places is
_ threatened by too great a concentration of livestock. The raising of -
trypanosomiasis-resistant breeds and farming with draft animals will also be
giv~n new impetus.
= Forests: The development of this sec~r is basically the responsibility of
private firms, and the state intervenes only in the area of research. For-
est production has returned to the level it had reached b~fore the crisis
- of 1975, but its deve,topment is still being held back by difficulties with _
remr~val of the product. The state's activity must be directed primarily to _
rebuilding the forest inventory. _
_ Mining: The state will continue its actian against illegal exports and will
make every effort to encourage exploration for deposits of ores and metals
having a high unitary price (such as copper).
- Industry: Overall, industrial produc tion has risen at an annual rate of 7
percent. From 1975 to 1978, investments totaling 7 billion CFA francs were ~
- completed, mainly by the private sector.
_ The main problems are in the state-owned fixms. The prime minister admitted
that their development has acted as a brake on economic growth. Some of
them, such as ICAT [Central African Textile Industry]; are operating far be-
low their financing capacity. The government will therefore try to involve _
the private sec~tor in its economic recovery policy and put certain firms
= F~z:rtially into private hands.
't'r.e goverrunent hopes that more jobs will be created in the private sector -
~than in government departments, something that has not been the case so far. =
lni~rastructure: As far aa domestic transportatian is concerned, the state ~ ~
is setting twro basic objectives: -
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�
1. To provide the necessary funds for road maintenance, since a huge�program -
- for repair and modernization is underway. -
2. Zb develop rural trails, in large part as ,a consequenc,: of the projects
, for integrated rural development.
River traffic has declined steadily since 1971, altlwugh 7 billion CFA francs
have been invested in that sector in order to increase its tsansportation
capacity. The poor management of the ACCF (Central African River Coimnunica-
tion Agency] is the main cause of this decline, and the government hopes to
' remedy the situation by bringin3 in a private partner and making the trans-
Equatorial artery once again the Central African Republic's preferred path
to the outside world.
Education: The educational system's efficiency is too low, especially in pri-
mary education. This situation is due in large part to the lack of class-
rooms and teachers as well as to the linguistic problems encountered by the
pupils. -
_ During the upcoming plan the objective will be to set in motion a reform of
_ the educational system. It will be adapted to the needs of economic and
- social development and in particular t~o the need to link eduoation to the
requixements of the labor market. The reform is to result in a better adapta-
- tion of syllabuses and the establishment of a detailed school map. It is to
- be accompanied by an increase in,the number of classrooms.
In conclusion, Maidou expressed the hope that the next plan will not be simply
= a catalog of projects--somethixig that t~as more or less the case with the pre-
ceding plans--but rather a tool for reflection on development. Develognent
will rt~t be effe~tive unless all the economic sec~rs are integrated as a
means of achieving a retal. :mprovgttent in living conditions.
The prime minister concluded his speech by saying that the situation "is not
- conducive to optiunism," and he asked the Central Africans to get dawn to work.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1379
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
BRI~ S
STTJDENTS TO USSR--By means of an order dated 30 August 1979~ the chief of
state has lifted a ban that since 25 May 1977 had prohibited Central African
students and pup,ils from studying in the USSR. [Text] [Paris MARCF~S
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Sep 79 g 2582J 11798
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CHAD
,
THREAT OF CONFLICT'S RESIJMPTION, NATION'S BREAKUP CONTINUES
Paris AFRIQUE ASIE in French 1-14 Oct 79 p 16
[Text] Less than a month after the conclusion, last 21 August at Lagos,
of the 9-point agreement on "national reconciliation" ratified by the 11 -
Chadian palitico-military factions, one has been pessimistic with regard
- to the ultimate evolution of the situation. Confusion actually continued
= to prevail in Ndjamena, and the implementation of the platform around
which the apparent unanimity was achieved--not without di:'ficulty moreover
--seems to be meeting many obstacles. Everything has bee:7 going as though
the differences painstakingly toned down at La~os were threatening to
resurface. _
Thus, for example, the "southern" faction, represented b Lieutenant- ~
Colonel Kamougue, chief of the Chadian Armed Forces (FAT~ and vice pres-
_ ident of the Transitional Natione.l Union Government (GUNT), had presented
a 5-point list of grievances after a tour of the southern regions. This -
faction asked in particular for the expulsion of Hissein Habre from the
_ government team, op~osed the creation of a Ministry of Religious Affairs
by insisting on the lay character of the Chadian state, anri again demanded
the posts of director of security and head of the general staff ~f the
future integrated nationa'. army. Finally it challenged the distribution -
_ of ministerial posts, particularly the key posts of defense ar~d interior, ~
- which have been entrusted to representatives of the northern factions.
= ~zrthermore, the problem of the withdrawal of some 2500 men of the F`rench
intervention force, provided in the Lagos agreemen.t, was itself the subject
_ of controversy. It is known that, ~.ccording to this agreement, all the -
parties "recognize unani~mously that the presence of the French troop~ con-
stitutes an obstacle to the search for a peacef~.il and significant reconcil-
iation and a solution of the Gradian problem," and that the GUNT should �
proceed with their evacuat:ion. Nevertheless, asserting that the Transi-
tional Na+,ional Union Government had not been installed, and that "for
obvious reasons no ane desires the complete departure of the French forces
_ before the effective establishment of the neutral force" (which will be
composed of the ~ongo, Benin, and Guinea), Mr Goukouni Oueddei, president _
of the GUNT, secured the interruption of the proceSS of evacuation begun
~,6
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at Ati and Moussoro. In this he was supported by Lieutenant-Colonel
Kamougue, who had expressed the desire that the French t.roops "stay a -
- little longer with the neutral force in order to aid the demilitariza- _
tion and disarmament of the capital." However the Chad Provisional '
Common Action Front (FACP) was surprised by the action of Goukouni _
Oueddei with the French Government, and asserted th.a� it reserved the
- right to review its representation within the interim committee....
_ This series of incidents and about-faces shows the extent of the complex-
- i~Ly of the situation. One may wander whether the team which emerged from
the Lagos negotiations properly reflects the Chadian geopolitical physiog- -
nomy, or whether, on the contrary, as some circles in Nd~amena fear, it is
a still-born solution, the precarious result of a compromise reached among -
certain powers outside Chad which have discreetly used the carrot and the
- stick temporarily to put a dangerously lethal crisis within parentheses.
By the same token one wonders whether the new team--which some people
rightly or wrongly compare with a"can of worms" in which ethnic concerns
would prevail--is capable of suppressing its personal ambitions in order
- to devote itself tu the huge tasks of restoring the economic, financial,
_ social, and defense s~tuation of a country bled white by 13 years of war.
_ What is certain, in any case, is that the threat of a resumption of the
conflict and a breakup of the country persists.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
BRIEFS
~ REFUGEE5 ASI~D TO RETURN--Equatorial Guinean refugees residing in Cameroon, -
es~imated to mnnber al~out 40,000, are being asked by their embassy in Yaounde -
to return to their country. In a communique made public on l2 Septeaiber, _
the embassy says that "pea.ee and respect for human rights are now obs~erved
throughout the nationai territory" and that "the government of Equatorial _
Guinea formally promises to guarantee the safety of all Equatorial G~iinean -
_ nationals." According to the comnunique, L-he Camerooni.an Governmerit has
agreed to contribute to their repatriation by placing all the available ma-
terial means and means of security at their disposal. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS in French 21 Sep 79 p 2582] 11798
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GHANA
BRIEFS
POSSIffi,E BRITISH NBLITARY TRAINING According to the ~itish weekly
- SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Great Britain might help Ghana restructure its army~
- train officers and soldiers and provide new arms. The weekly specified _
i;hat confidential discussions on this subject have been opened between the
_ London and Accra governments. [Text~ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDI-
TERRANNEENS in French 12 Oct 79 p 27 7] ~3
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- LIBERIA
~ BRIEFS
GOVERNMENT PRUMOTING PRIVATE INDUSTRY--The Liberian Governm~~nL is going to
propose to the private sector that the latter buy certain state-owned compa-
- nies or purchase an interest in th~m. This was announced by the NEW LIBERIAN,
the official organ of the Liberian Ministry of Information. In this cot~nec-
tion, the newspaper published an exclusive interview with Byron Tarr, the
Ministry of Finance's general controller of s~ate-owned co~nganies. Tazr
stated that such measures are justif:ed by the fact that sane of those com- -
panies "are emptying the state's coffers rather than helping to f ill them."
He added that "in a capita.list system, people irotivated by profit should work
- in a more sustained manner in a private company than in the public sector."
- While acknowledging that certain branches, "such as the port administration _
- or the Liberian Water Company, cannot be managed by the private sector be-
cause of theis special nature," Tarr feels that "the staterowned oompanies
will undoubtedly make ~ substantial contribution to the Liberian economy in
the near future" because of certain fundamental problems such as recruitment,
an inadequate ~narketing policy, or the indiscipline of the employees." He
made it clear in the intezview that President Zblbert has already approved -
the sale of tw~o state-owned companies. [Text~ [Paris MARCYiES T1i~PICAUX ET -
MEDIT'ERRANEENS in French 21 Sep 79 p 2577] 11798
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MADAGASCAR
AQUACUI,TURE PLANS DETAILID
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET NIEDITERRANEENS 12 Oct ~9 p L778 ~
[Article: "The Big Island At the Time of Aquaculture"]
[Text] ~ee stretches of water in Ma.dagascar represent a surface area of
approximately 550,000 hectares. Many varieties of fish axe found in the
rivers and in the various stretches of water (carps, trouts, black-bass,
' tilapias, etc., as well as eels of all sizes), the national information
Agency TARATRA reminds us in a note stressing the role played by rice-
padc~y aquaculture as a complementary source of protein-rich food for the
- Malagasy. As a rule, f:.sh is also very helpful in r~educing rice-borer _
infestation of rice st~~,lks, thus contributing to a slight increase in
rice-yields.
At the ~`orestry a.nd Water Resources Department of the A~inistry of Rural
D.evelopment and A,grarian ~teform, a spe~ial section is in charge of the _
development of aguaculture and continental fisheries. This development
activity is very important in view of the overall protein-deficiency in ;
the people's diet.
Accord.ing to an off~cial of this section, the :neat ~,nd fish shortage has ~
~ been established to be about 20,000 tons per year and is increasing at
the rate of 3 percent per year. ;
The role of the special section in the development of fishing and aqua-
culture can be summarized as follows:
--to popularize fishing and fish-breeding techniques; ,
--to insure technical and job training of fishermen and fish-breeding i
instructors; ;
_ --to promote the use of water stretchPS; ,
--to adapt fishing regulations to econamic, political and social realities;
--to use fishery research to select species suitable for food or which are ~
of economic interest, taking present regulations into account; , '
_ --to develop fish-breedin~-~~ rice paddies; ,
--to study the exploitatriori and development of sea-culture in mangrove and '
lagoon areas; ~
- --to ra.tionalize the maxketing of fish. ~
~ 41 ~
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Trie operatioii ccvers all of the territory. As far as aquaculture is con-
cerned, the production of royal carp alevins at the thr.ee main stations,
i.e. Analabe, 5isaon,y and Ambatofotsy-Ambatolampy, was 700,000 in ~976- ~
19'l'; and 900, 000 in 1977-1978 . The distribution of tYiese alevins 1;o rural
- communi.ties takes place from the end of October until mid-March. On 31 Decem-
beY� 1978, 210,000 alevins had been distributed under excellent conditions. -
In addition, research work and work on techniques of fish-breeding (asso-
ciated fish breeding, "pig-fish" iri Ambatolampy) and reproduction (induced
reproduction in royal carps) are also carried out. Final~y, new species
are being introduced ("acadja" and "trabaques" in the Pangalanes) and a
pilot breeding center for intensive breeding of "chanos" ("vango") in
Antsiranana.
- One of the main objectives of the "chanos" breeding pr~~ject involves pre-
paring for and deveioping coastal aquaculture. This is an entirely new
field which is of particular importance in view of the enormous fish-
- breeding potential of the mangrove zone and the adjnining lands, which _
represent a surface area of some 300,000 hectares extending over all of
- the west coast of Ma.dagascar, from Antsiranana at the northern tip to
Nlarombo (Mangoky River delta) and Tulear in the southwest.
The development of these low tidal salt lands, unsuitable for agriculture,
offers fish-breeding a wide field of expansion.
. In order to promote their development, the construction of two coastal
aquicultural centers, which would be dependent on the tides, is contem-
plated; they would be used to perfect breeding techniques for certain -
species of fish, and to gather economic data on the subject, prior to
= popularizing breeding of these fish. This type of fish-breeding differs -
considerably from traditional carp and tilapia breeding which involves,
among other means, intensive feeding, a prereguisite for growth and pro- -
duction; in sea-culture, on the other hand, the fish bred are essentially _
species feeding on micro-organisms, for which it is sufficient to provide
an environment favorable to the growth of algae in the breeding basins,
and to maintain its productivity by adequate water management.
_ As part of the aquaculture project, construction of a coastal aquicultural
_ center dependent on the tides is planned for ~978-1.98~ in the Antsiranana
_ area.
- COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie P~,ris 1979
929~+
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4
:
MADAGASCAR ~ .
BRIEFS
COOPERATION WITH SEYCHEZLES--A Malagasy delegation has just spent about 10 .
~
days in Seychelles where it had conversations with Seychelles port authori-
ties, following the signature, last July, of a maritime agreement between
Seychelles and Madagascar. At the time, conversations had taken place in '
Antananarivo between the head of the state-owned company Secren and a ~
Seychellois delegation headed by the minister of transport~,tion and tourism,
Mr Ma.thew Servina. The conversations which have just taken place bore on '
the construction of a dry dock in Seychelles, on technical assistance and ~
the tr~.ining of Seychellois technicians, and on the procedure for the over-
haul of Seychellois ships until the time when the dry dock is reac~y. [Text] ~
_ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERR~,NEIIVS 12 Oct 79 p 2778] 9294
3 ,
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MALAWI
- BRIEFS
~ AIR MAI,AWI REDUCES ACTIVITIES--As the result of financial difficulties, -
the national airline company, Air Malawi, has made the decision to get
rid of its VC 10 CL and snspend its flights to the island of Mauritius.
Flights to Europe (London and Amsterdam) in Vickers aircraft will cease
on 30 October 1979, while the weekly Blantyre-Plaisance flight, serviced
by a BAC 1-11 was to end on 30 September. Henceforth, only British
Airways will service Lusaka and Malawi, departing from London on Thursday,
_ with a return flight on the following day. With the sale of its only
_ mai~ plane, Air Malawi's air fleet is reduced to one BAC ].-11 which will
now make only the flights to Lusaka, Nairobi and Johannesbur~; one
Vickers Viscount to Lusaka and Nairobi; one Hawl~er Siddeley 748 for
flights to Lusaka, Beira and for domestic flights to Lilongwe and '
Mzuzu; and two Britton Normar~ Islanders which will service ~ilongwe, ~
Mzuzu and Karon a, t
g [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS j
' in French 5 Oct 79 p 2715] 8143 ,
GENERAL ELECTRIC MISSION--Following the visit in May 1979 by a mis~ion ~
from the South African company, General Electric (GEC), two repreaenta~ .
- tives from the company visited Blantyre at the end of ~lugust to finalize ~
- the initiatives undertaken 3 months earlier. One of the repreaentatives, ~
_ Mr Herran, from the energy division, proposed during his talks with the
appropriate authorities to begin a program for the training of Malawi$n -
technicians in Johannesburg in th~e sectors of manufacture,,repair and
maintenance of transfarmers and assembly of cables, while the second, -
Mr Penaluna, studied the possibilities of the local market for products
in the GEC line and attempted to find 10 agents and distributors for his ~
electric motors. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS ~
in French 5 Oct 79 p 2735] 8143 ,
BRAZILIAN LOAId--After a short visit by Mr Eberhar-3t, the consul of Brazif
to Malawi, he returned to his countiry. President of the company, Max ~
Eberhardt Industry and Commerce, the first firm to engage in commercial
activities with Malawi in 1975, tha diplomat had arrived with a
$1.~ million loan in his luggage, destined to encourage the import of ~
_ Brazilian goods and services to stren~then the ties existing between the -
two countries. [Tzxt] [Paris rfARQHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French 5 Oct 79 p 2715] 8143
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MOZAMBIQUE
- NE'xT DECADE' S ECOi`TOMIC OUTLOOK, PLANS DETAII~ID
~
Paxis MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDI'PERRANNEEN5 in French 12 Oct 79 p 2781
[Article: "The Economic Perspectives for the 1980-1990 Decade"; passages
enclosed in slantlines, printed in italics]
[Text] Next year should mark a turn.ing point in the economic historr ~f -
Mozambique. As a ma.tter of fact, a laxge number of objectives set by the
- directives of the FRII,IMO will then be met, and the authorities will have
~~o plan those to be achieved during the decade ending in 1990~ based on
current realities specifical.ly, the fact that, not including production
for domestic consumption, the gross national product is on the order of
70 million contos.
The authorities believe tha.t the next decade will have to be a decade of
radical transformation of the country in a11 areas: agriculture, energy~
~ mining, industry, fishing~ transportation~ e~ucation~ health and na.tional.
def ense .
Agriculture The agricultural development of Mozambique is based on
- both sma11 and large prujects. To quote President Samora, Machel's own
words in a recent speech, the next decade will see "the completion of the
- ~cooperativiza.tion~ of the family sector~ urbaxiiza.tion, sociallzation, and '
a relative mechaniza.tion of agriculture." This decade should b~ing an end
to the process of communal villages~ based on socialist property and pro-
duction. When applied to ~cotton~~ cooperativiza~ion should, according ~
- to the pla,nners in Ma.puto, make it possi'ble for the yield to go up from ~
100 - 200 kilograms per hectare to more than 1000 kilograms par hectare,
improving the standard of living of growers in the same proportions. ~ub-
stantial progress is also expected in the sector of ~~ruits~ (citxus _
- fruits, pineapples, ba,na,n~,~, avocados, mangos) intended for local consump-
- tion as well as for export and in the sector of by-products of raising
_ livestock (meat, milk, butter, cheese, poul.try, eggs).
~Farming by irrigation~ is to be developed. Some progress has already
been made in the valleys of the Limpopo and thb Tncomati. The next decada
will see the completion of the Angonia pra3ec:t, not to speak of the pro3ects
- in the valleys of' the Sa.ve, the Lurio, the Zugenda, the Montepuez and~ espe-
cially, the Zambezi, which will ha.ve repercussions in the industrial sector. .
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- F~ergy and Industry Irrigation and energy go hand in hand. The '
~electrification~ of the North Central region and Southern region of
Mozambiqus will result in an industrial development which in turn xl.l.l ha.ve
an impact on agriculture, in tha,t it will make possible the estat~liahtnent
- of a chemical industry centered on fertilizers.
The 1980-1990 decade will also be cha.racterized by the development of organic
chemistry and petrochemistry. Resources of coal and hydrocaxbons will be
inventoried and made profitable; they constitute in addition to the
gua.no deposits a basic source of foreign currency necessaxy for financing
the development of Mozambique. -
The first projects in this area involve a thorough study of the ~coal~
deposits in the provinces of Tete and Nyasa., as well as a study of the
deposits of ~hydrocarbons~. Governmental expectations also include a
ba,sic ~iron and steel industry~ and the development of the metallurgical
engineering industry.
The energy surplus will also produce very favorable conditions for the
~non-ferrous metal industry~. With regard to the latter, it is understood
that studies wi11 be conducted to determine the exact size of the deposits
of tin, zinc and ba,uxite. Similar operati,ons will be carried out to make
an inventory of precious and semi-precious stones.
A caxtographic study will ha.ve to be ma.de in order to determine the optimel
dimensions to be given to the production units, to map the communications
network and to determine the establiahment of new agglomerations. Inter-
- rupted in i975, at the time�of independence, the aerial mapping should be
resumed shortly by the specialized South African firm ~Aircraft Operating ~
= Company~. ~
The production,volume of the ~building ma.terials industry~ specifically 1
cement will have to be adapted to the needs of irrigation plans as well
_ as to those of the other industries and to those of housing. All this ,
preliminary work will make it possible to determine the methods for the E.
necessary financing, as well as the capacity for recourse to foreign finan- ~
cial marke~cs.
- Tn one of the next issues, we will continue an analysis of what should :
constitute the framework of the next development plan for Mozaanbique. -
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979
$~3 ~
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MOZAMBIC~UE
- BRIEFS -
GDR SPECIALISTS KILLED, WOUNDID--Four East German "specialists" were killed
and two were wounded on 12 October in Mozambique, in the vicinity of
Manica, by the explosion of a misplaced hand grenade. This was announced -
- by the GDR official news agency, known as ADN. According to this source, -
the explosion occurred while a damaged truck was being repaired. The
news agency, which did not provide any further details, noted that the
GDR minister of geology expressed h3s condolences to the victims' familiea.
Ttais may mean that Che victims were not military advisors. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Oct 79 p 2910]
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NIGER
1
BRIEFS
- OFIDES CONTRACT--A call for tenders based on E~ropean financing was issued
in 1973 for the construction of 80 water po ints in Damergou in Niger. The
call for tenders having lapsed, the w~ork has been let out under private con-
tract tA OFEDES (Office of Subsoil Water) in Niamey for 500.8 million CFA
francs. [Text] [Paris MARCI~S TROPICAU:~ ET MEDITERRP,N~NS in French
21 Sep 79 p 2572) 11798
FRENCH SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL COOPERATION--Under the heading o~ the Mi.nistry
of Foreign Affairs, the JOURNAL OFFICIEL of the French Republi~, for 16 Sep~
tember 1979 (pp 2234-2235) has published Decree No 79-793 daten 6 Septesnber
1979. It ooncerns publication of the general agreement relative to coopera-
tion in the field of scientific and technical research between the French
Republic and the Republic of Niger. The agreesnent was signed in Niamey on
15 March 1975. [Text] [Paris N~,RCI~S TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS ir. French
21 Sep 79 p 2572] 11798
GAYA AREA FIAODS--A sudden rise in the Niger River in the Gaya area, located
in southwestern Niger between Benin and Nigeria, has flooded some 1,950 hec-
_ tares of land in the river valley, 802 hectares of which was under cultiva-
tion. About a thousand peasant families have been affected by the floods,
and the loss in cereals is estiatated at 1,200 ~Gons of corn, rice, and sor-
ghum. Such floods have n,ot occurred in that part of Niger since 1959, long
before the great drought in the Sahel. [Text] [Paris MAR~CHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Sep 79 p 2572] 11798
BOAD LOAN--On 4 September the BOAD (West African Development Banlc) granted
a loan of 370 million CFA francs to Niger. The loan is to finance a project
for 100 pump-equipped wells in the Liptako area. [Teact] [Paris MARiCHE5
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERttPiNEENS in French 21 Sep 79 p 2572] 11798
CSO: 4400
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SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
BRIEFS -
FORMER PRIME MINISTER ARRESTED Mr Miguel Trovoada, f~rmer prime minister
of Sa.o Tome and Principe, who had asked for political asylum from the United .
Nations delegation (UNDP) in Sao Tome, was arrested on 5 October by Sao Tome
soldiers. They broke down the door of the premises where Mr Trovoada and
his family had taken refuge. The United Nations representative 1n Sao Tome, ,
~ Mr Diaw, who ha.d been called to Libreville for a meeting~ was not on the
island at the time of these events. His presence ha.s since been declared
undesirahla by tr~e Sao Tome government. The former prime ministeros family,
which was expelled from the United Nations premises at the same time he xas,
was not arrested. It should be noted tha.t the death penalty was restored
in Sa.o Tome on 12 July last. On the occasion of ceremonies on the annitrer-
- sary of independence, the government issued a law restoring the death penal.ty
for ~'mercenaries." This law could be applicable to na.tionals in cases of
~~economic sabotage" and of "collusion with imperialism." It would not be
impossible for Mr Trovoada, if he were to be tried~ to find himself charged
with one of these crimes. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET 1~DITERRANI~T5
in French 12 Oct 79 P 277Z] ~3
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- SENEGAL
OPPOSITION LEADER THRE:~TENS PRESIDENT, PROCLAIMS ARAB AFFILIATION
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 4-10 Oct 79 p42
Llnterview with al-Shaykh Ahmad Nayyas by F~ru4 Abu Zahar: "Senegal's -
- Khomeyni Gives Senghor 90 Days Time Limi~; Ahmad Khali~ah Nayyas, an
Important Islamic Leader in Senegal Says He Granted Pxesident Senghor
90 Days To Renounce His French Citizenship...or Else"/
,LText7 "I gave Leopold Senghor 90 days tr.o make up his mind. I� he doea -
not renounce his French citizenship, I will oust him from the government." �
- This was what al-Shaykh Ahmad Khalifah Nayyas (33 years) the young leader _
of the new Islamic Senegalese Party~ saida Then he looked at me to note my
- reaction to the�seriousness of his statiement, and then he went on to add,
"I will officially invite you in 3 months to visit the liberated lands."
If what al-Shaykh Nayyas said is true, Senghor will become the 16th president
- ro leave the scene of African poli~ics this year.
= President Leopold Senghor, who is a poet, is considered today one of ~
Africa's oldest leaders. He came to power 20 years ago. He is a devo~t
Christian, and he rules a couatry whose population--over 95 percent of
5 million--is M,oslem.
A1-Sha~rkh Ahmad Khalifan Nayyas belongs to an o].d Islamic Ara'~u family in
the Senegal. This family has led the Islamic Movement for a long time.
N$yyas studfed in Arabic schools in the Senegal, and he continued his studies -
in Tunis ia and then in France~where he acquired his graduate degrees in
- law.
/Question/ Why did you choose France, the country that has close tiea with ;
- President Senghor, to proclaim this positi.on against him? -
~ -
jAnswer/ We chose France in part~cular to proclaim the birtl~ of the
Senegal Libera~ion Front so that our voice would be heard, because of France's
location and because there is a large 3en~egaleae community Lhere/.
_ ~ �
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The Koran Is Our Constitutiou
/Question/ What are the principlea of the party that you have established?
- /Answer/ We began party activity 5 years ago by building and organizing
the popvlar base. During the laet month of Ramadan we made the official ~ -
announcement of the birth of tfie Ielamic Party which has more than 300,000
- ~embers.
The paity is fundamentally based on Islamic law. The Noble Koran is dur ~
constitution. It ia on the basis of these principles that we are calling
fvr aupport of Arab cau~es. In fact, we ar~e calling for the admiasion of
the Seneg~l into the Arab League because of its location on the southern _
borders of Mauritania and because 95 percent of the population are Mpslems
of Arab descent.
~ When we come to power, we will impose a tax that we will call the Jerusalem _
dinar, and we will send the proceeda that we collect to the PLO. _
~Question/ What specifically is your position on President Senghor's regic~e?
A1-Shaykh Ahmad adjusted the turban on his head and said:
/Answer/ We are an opposition party. Three days ago a governmental decree
was issued requiring that we be prohibited from open political activity on
the pretext that the existing four parties were enough. This led us Lo
proclaim the Senegal Liberation Front after we were ~oined by other opposition
forces that have hitherto been unrecognized.
LQuestion/ What specifically are your demands? _
~ i
-/Answer/ We�.are first of all asking that President Senghor renounce the
- French citizenship that he acquired as a result of his marriage to a French
woman. We gave him a period of 90 days to do this. Otherwise, I will
- order the people to overthrow him. -
- Senghor Destroyed the Economy
/Question/ Will the problem be solved if he renounces the Fren~h nationality?
/Answer/ Not at all! This demand is the first step, We want to tell t}.e -
world that the people of Senegal are being governed by a foreigner and that _
we have a right to rebel against him and to overthrow him. -
Senghor destroyed the economy of the country and he borrowed heavily from
- abroad. Most of these funds were earmrked for the benefit of projects owned
by Zionists. The ~nterest rate on loans rose in a frightening manner. Today
" the interest t~at we pay on these loans every month is what we used to pay
in, a year. That is, the volume of loans has increased 12 times during ~he
last 4}~ears. At the present time Senegal is a bankrupt state that is ~
_ incapable of ineeting its due debts.
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LQuestion/ Where then is Senegal's wealth?
L,Answer/ We are betting on the future. In 5 years we will become an oil
ea:porting country and the extraction of uranium will begin. Uranium will
be the fuel of tomorrow. We want this wealth to be for the people and not ,
for foreigners. At present the wealth that ex~sts in Senegal is exploited
- by three Zionist families with whom Senghor sharea the profita.
LQuestion/ But how will Senghor remain in power throughout thie long period
of time in spite of the fact that the majority of the people, as you say,
,
re~ect him?
~Anawer/ Senghor relies on two principal powers. /He reliea o*~/ the
French Arury--and the largest French base outsid~e pf France is in ~he Senegal--
which has the capability of confronting any rebellion. The second power
Lhe relies on/ is that of the corporations that monopolize the economy.
- fQuestion/ What about the Senegalese Army? What is its position?
~ - ~
_ /Answer/ It is not tca be depended upon. There are 10,000 soldiers in the
_ Senegalese Army, but so far it has played no role. Even its ammunition
is in the French barracks.
LQuestion/ Are you against Senghor for politi~al reasons or because he is
a devout Christian?
/Answer/ There is no distiaction here. We do not make a distinction -
- between religion and politics, but th~ question is basically a political
one. In the past the president used to rely on a truce between him and
the Moslem scholars. But now the truce has come to an end, and those people
have gone back to fighting him under the banner of overthrowing him hecause
_ of the positions he has taken against�the Arabs and Moslems. He forbids,
for example, the writing of the Senegalese language in Arabic letters, and
- he does not allow the people to volunteer in the ranks of the PLO.
_ /Question/ It is being said that compared wi.th what is happening elsewhere _
_ tn Third World countries, there is a semi-democracy in the Senegal. '
- 1 jAnswen/ Thi:i democracy is artificial. All the party chairmen who are
permitted by Senghar to work are married to French women and have French
citizenship. They all vie among each other to please the French. The
Senegalese minister of the interior is a French man by the name of
- Jean Collin. Senghor brought him 15 years ago to take care of security
affairs and granted him Senegalese citizenship. -
- LQuestion/ What about Moslem regresentation in parliament? -
- lAnswer/ Of a total membership of 100, there are 53 Moslem members in
spite of the fact that we are a vast majortty.
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LQuestion/ How do you evaluate the regime~s relations with France?
j,Answer/ The Senegal is still a French colony. All the features of
- colonialiam are etill there. There ie political, economic and cultural
presaure. k'2 do not have Lour own/ currency in the Senegal becauae the
French franc is used. We do not have an army because there is the French
Army. Senegal does not have a specific policy because the French policy
ia the one that is followed.
LQuestion/ What about the citizens of the country?
,LAnswer/ They are poor. They have nothing. They are always being subjected -
to the harshest pressures.
/Question/ What about the relationship of the Senegalese people to the Arabs?
,~Answer/ We look upon Arab issues as through they were our own common
- issues. Jerusalem concerns us as Moslems just as much as it concerns the ~
Arabs. Our destiny is historically and religiously tied with that of the _
Arab countries.
/Question/ Is there an attitude of hatred for the Arab community?
,LAnswer/ Not at all. Senghor tried to ~create this hatred by means of
_ psoposing in literature snd in culture the notion of the negro. He used
to say that it was the Arabs who enslaved the blacks, but the people forced
- the president to abandon this notion. ~
Today in Senegal there are 40,000 Arabs who are also suffering from the _
monopolistic corporations. Half of them are Sen~galese citizens.
Smoke Released by Senghor
jQuestion/ There has been talk about separatist attempts in South Mauritania,
and it is said that these attempts are coming from the Senegal. -
/Answer/ Everything that happened was merely smoke that was spread in _
- the atmosphere by Senghor. It is known that the borders ~hat were drawn
up by colonialism were artificial borders and that they only express .
the interests of colonialism. .
In the past, Senegal and Mauritania were part of one nation. European -
_ colonialism did take over our country that used to occupy a significant
- part of the Moslem empires o� Mali and Sunghali. They remained Islamic
lands. The Marabouts emerged from:that land ans spread out westward as -
- far as Spain and France. ~
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During the colonial age Senegal and Mauritania had one capital that was
called Dar al-Islam. But the colonial power changed its name to Sai~t
Louis. To this day the north of the Senegal is inhabited by puraly Arab =
tribea like a11~Uluf and al-Fa~atah. Accordingly, there are negro
communities in ~outh Mauritania. but they are Arab in origin. _
/Question/ How did tslam come to ~he Senegal?
/Answer/ Islam came to the ~enegal by two meana. tt csme by means of the
Atab tri~es that lived in Moracco and traveled southward to Mauritania
croesiag the Senegal Ri~r~r. The other road Lthat Islam traveled/ was an
~aetern road t~hat began in Egypt and then the Sudan, Chad, the Niger and
- Mali. This took place 900 y~ars ago. _
/Question/ Will you return to the Senegal?
LAnswer/ Of course I wil.l return in spite of the fact that Senghor has
a~ked that I be put oa trial because I oppose h~s regime. This will not
= prevent me from returning to Senegal. He daes not frighten me. As I said,
I gave ni~ a period of 90 days. If he does not get out, I will most
certainly for~e him out.
~ LQuestion/ What will you do if France interfered on his behalf?
/Answer/ I have warn~d the French Government against the conaequences of
that because we will be compelled in return to ask for the asaistance of _
forces that are allied with us. .
COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
8592
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SENEGAI,
ECONOMY BENEFITING FROM BETTER FL~RVESTING CANIP?1IGN
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRADIEENS in French 21 Sep 79 pp 2565-2568
[Taxt] The economy was hard hit in 1978 by the very poor peanut harvest of
1977-1978, during which 460,000 tons were marketed, compared to 1.07 million
= during the preceding season.
- Rural incomes, on whiah mc~re than two-thirds of the population depends, were
drastically reduced, the trade balance was seriously worsened, and industrial
production suffered from the shrinkage of the domestic market due to lower
purchasing power.
But a predic;~ced harvest on the order of 900,000 tons for the 1978-1979 season
and an increase in food production mean that 1979 will slww improvement over
the preceding year.
The aftereffects of lower exports of peanut products will still be felt, Yu~w- -
ever, in the foreign trade deficit for 1979, a deficit that could aznount to
between 60 and 70 billion CFA francs. ' -
- Much effort will be necessar.~ both in the way of diversifying farm production
and in the area of industr:.al development if the foreign trade predictions
in the fifth plan (1977-1981), whiah were adjusted at the start of 1979, are
to be approached. Tl~ose figures are as follows (in millions af CFA francs) s '
1979 1980 1981
Imports 240 294 336 : -
- Exports 182.6 217.4 253
Predicted deficit -57.4 -76.6 -83 .
In 1978 the oil mills used 310,000 tons of peanuts (compared to 820,000 tons '
in 1977), worki.nc~ at only 35 percent of their capacity. Exports came to
~ 61,200 tons of oil (down 159,500 tons) at a value of 15.6 billion CFA francs
(down 31.8 billion) an~l 131,000 tons of cake (down 261,000 tons) at a value _
of 5.6 billion CFA francs (down 9.8 billion).
~
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With the exaeption of the oil mills, the industrial sector remained ~tationary
in 1978 .
- After a good 1977, the extractive industr_y experienced a setback. Extraction
by the Senegalese Taiba Phosphate Company totaled 1.46 million tons in 1978
(c3~own 4.5 percent), while the Thies Phosphate Company mined 354,500 tons -
(down 15 percent). Including all products, the Senegalese mining industry
delivered 1.82 million t,~ns of ore (down 6 percent from 1977). The outlook
for 1979 seems average: difficulties in Taiba due to the nature of the de-
posit and progress at Thies.
- In the food industry, fish canning recorded satisfactory activity (up 42 per-
cent). The 1979 fishing season began under good conditions: the tuna catch
increased by 11 percent. There are some areas of concern, however: a m?rked
= preference by transoceanic tuna boats for supplying American canneries, a
delay in organizing the outfitting of Senegalese ships, the delay in starting
up the cold-storage plant in the port of Dakar, and very lively competition
from Ivory O~ast.
There was good activity in the grain and flour sector, with 106,000 tons of
crushed wheat (compared to ~38,000 tons in 1977), an increase that takes into `
account the setback in secondary cereals (down 15 percent). Rules wer~e re-
cently laid down for ~prouwting the use of millet fl.our in manufacturing.
Despite tt~.e high cost cf sugar (three times the w~rld price), the biseuit
trade showed good results. Confectionery is still suffering (down 8.6 per- _
cent from 1977), and cnmpetition from Ivory Coast i,s particularly severe.
- Following a drop in the cons~ption of beer and soft drinks during the early
m~nths of the year, sales picked up and the brewing industry's overall turn-
over increased by 2.8 percent.
= The tobacco industry has continued to show sustained growth of about 10 per-
_ cent.
- In 1978 the textile industry encauntered big probl ~ns: low domestic demand
and massive low-priced imports, especially in t1~?e case of secondhand goods,
_ stocks of which were built up before the import quotas were imposed and which -
remain high. The hosiery trade showed a drop of 13.4 percent, spinning and
weaving showed a production drop of 38 percent, and printing decreased by
25 percent.
The leather industry was also affec~ed (down 43 percent), but a recovery is
expected in 1979 following reorganization of the Bata prod.uction unit.
Furniture manufacturing was held back by the limitations set on itaports of
~aw:
~wvod .
Overall, the paper industry progressed thanks to the demand for cardboard
_ packaging. _
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The curtailed purchasing ~ower of the farmers was reflected in lower produc-
tion figures for the machinery and equipment industry.
On the national market, sales of fertilizer by the national production unit -
rose by 28 percent on the domestic market and by S percent in the case of -
exports. The pesticide industry showed a 30-percent drop in plant health
= products, and the production of aerosols was stopped because of technical
problems. -
Soagmaking showed a production increase of 7 percent, and the autlook for -
1979 is good. On the other hand, sales of cosmetics and beauty products
were lower than in 1977.
The manufacture of plastic articles benefited from a 25-percent rise in
sales cf inexp ensive bags and shoes.
In 1979 [as published] the African Refining Company processed 754,000 tons
of imported crude oil and supplied 577,000 tons of manufactured products
~ (up 5.6 percpnt over 1977). Its capacity is proving to be inadequate, and
imports are necessary in order to meet market demand.
Cement production rose by 8 percent, and a growth rate of from 10 to 15 per-
cent is expected in 1979. On the other hand, manufactures of asbestos ce-
ment fell considerably (down 25 percent).
The situation in printing worsened even further, with a drop in activity and
a steadily declining prof it margin.
There was no improvement in the construction and public works sector. The ~
low-cost housing program, which was begun in 1976-1977 at a cos�~ of 2.2 bil-
lion CFA francs, has been completed. A new program comprising 4,000 dwell- ~
- ing units has been decided on, but the financinq has not yet been obtained.
Another program for providing 5,000 dwelling units over a period of 5 years -
was the object of an international call for tenders. Major construction's
share of the outfitting budgets is becoming smaller and smaller.
The year 1978 was a good one for touri~m, with 215,000 visitors (up 16 per-
cent). The average stay was 4.3 days. Senegal was estimated to have a
lodging capacity of 6,230 beds at the end of 1978, and the a~~~erage occurancy
rate came to 48.5 percent for the year. A mixed-economy company will build
a large tourist complex on the Petite Cote. Among the proj~cts underway are
the Hilton Hotel in Dakar-Cap Manuel (600 beds) and a Novotel Hotel (270
- rooms) in Dakar on the site originally intended for the Banachoit hotel,
construction of which was abandoned. The hotel industry experienced satis- -
factory activity in 1978 despite the higher turnover tax and the regulation
of room prices.
Zne electricity and water sector continued to show steady progress (up 6 per- ~
cent in 1978). ;
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After 4 years, Dakar's industrial frae zone is still in its takeoff stage.
- Two fixms are operatinq: the Cou~pany for the Production of Tires for Cycles,
~ Mopeds, and Accessories and the Technical and Comnercial Union (cigarette
liqht~rs, gas bottles, and leather clothing). Z'hree na~re projec~s have been
approved; they concern the manufacture.�of rattan furniture, rea~dymade garments,
and spor~s clothing. Studies now underway could result in the processirg
and packaging of rice~ meat and vegetable canning, and spinning and garment-
_ making. ?he promoters are Brazilian, Argentine, Canadian, and German.
Despite its fluctuating activity, the industrial sector has managed to keep
employment up. The cutbacks in personnel--especially ticeable in the _
~ clothing and fine leather industries--~were offset by hiring in the c~nning
and brewing industries.
- A general 10-percent wage hike occurred at the beginning of: 1979 in recognition -
of the upward trend in consumer prices in African circles (down [as published]
7.1 percent in 1978).
_ It wil~. be easier to acquire property thanks to the recent establishment of _
the Housing Bank, which will have access to 80 percent of the funds available
to the Housi.ng Improvement Fund and to low-interest loans for socially
' oriented building projects.
Training problems remain very topical, and industrial employers, aware of
the importance of real advancement, are willing to cooperate effectively
- with the authorities.
The tax reform decided on by the government includes.in particular a simpli- 4
_ fication of the customs tariff (an import custocns duty at a fl~t rate of 5
- p~rcent on merchandise of any origin, an import revenue duty amounting to
10, 35, 45, or 70 percent depending on the kind of inerch~~ndise and goods be- _
ing imported, and an export duty of 20 percent on oils aa~d of 10 percent on
oilcake).
As part of the policy for ~leregulating prices, the systen in effect since
_ 1968 was made more flexible: it applied to 21 products.
Aftex 2 years of operation, the Fifth Economic and Social Development Plan
(1977-1981) was adjusted downvrard in January 1979. Its overall volume was
decreased from 416 to 398 billion CFA francs (down 4 pPSCent). With a ful-
~illment rate of 36 percent during the first 2 years, the forecas~s involve
from 75 to 80 percent of the programs included. ~
The follov~zing initially scheduled activities have been revised:
1. Iron ore at Faleme: postponement until the end of 2979 of the general
' feasi.bility study.
2. Zbbene phosphates: postpon~aent of the prQgram and its replacement by
.gradual expansion at Taiba. -
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3. Petroleum prospecting: extension of the present permits to cover ~he entire
offshore area an~d a portion of Senegal's onshore zone.
4. Maka Diama Da~m: maintaining the construction timetable, with work expected =
to start at the end of 1979. -
5. Oil mills: completion of the Diourbel oil mill and abandonment of the
= planned oQ*t~on oil mill in Tambacounda, with expansion instead of the plants
in Lyndiane and Ziguinchor. :
1
6. Sugarmills and ricemills: postponement of the pilot projects. ; _
7. Fertilizer: continuation of the Senegal Chemical Industries project for
~ producing phosphoric acid and phosphate fertilizers. 'I"he cost of completing ~
the project has been increased from 12 t~o 48 billion CFA francs. ~
8. Cement plant in Pout: an additional decision--the cost is now estimated
at 20 billian CFA francs instead of the initial 5 billion.
9. Dakar-Marine: wnrk began in April 1979 and should be canpleted by 198?~.
The cost is estimated at between 16 and 17 billion CFA francs.
- 10. Thies foundry: expansion has been p~stponed.
11. Textile industry: continuation of the integrated complex at Kaolack for
_ exports (f inancing has not yet been obtained) and abandonment of the other
_ projects for new units to supply the domestic market. -
- COPYRIC~iT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
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ZAIRE
WESTERN PARTNERS TO MEET ON SUB;JECT OF ZAIRIAN RECOVERY
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Oct 79 p 2712
[Text) Representatives of Zaire's Western partners in the implementation
- of its economic recovery plan will meet in Brussels, London, Paris and
Washington in November and December 1979.
The purpose of the meeting in the Belgian capital will be to examine the
finalizing of the financial cammitments of each of the partnera. The
Loadon meeting will deal with the payment schedule of the commerc~al debt;
the Paris meeting will be devoted to the public debt; and the Washington =
meeting will attempt to set the level of the investment budget.
General Mobutu h3mself announced on 26 September, to the Political Bureau
of the MPI3 (Popular Movement of the Revolution) Che results of the numerous
contacts he had made.over a period of more than 5 weeks both in Europe
and in the United States. fle called upon his colleagues to explain to
the population that "foreign aid is certainly necessary to the cour~try;
however, it can only play a supplementary role and catinot in any fashion
replace the serious and meticulous work of every Zairian man and woman."
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
F
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ZAIRE
BANK OF KINSHASA REPORTS ON 1978 FISCAL YEAR I
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Oct 79 p 2713
- [Text] The Bank of Kinshasa's report for the 1978 fiscal year a_m~hasizes
that the past year was character.ized by the bank management copma~ittee's
efforts to continue the task of liquidating the after effects of radicali-
zation. That fiscal year is said to have given bank officials "the
opportunity to rethir.k and redefine the methods most likely to guarantee
- that there will be no return to management practices such as those of
radicalization which left a burdensome heritage."
"Although that fiscal year requires--and for that matter even though it
requires--a supplementar~ effort of imagination and thought to maint~in '
the tool of product3on and prevent stagnatio'n," the report continues,
"the back up of the level of activity, such as has continued to result
from the persist~nt shortage of the means of foreign payments and the
policy for the fram3ng of credits, continues to favor the redefinition
of work methods and objectives to be attained."
Moreover, particular importance was to be placed on the recovery of
accounts receivable. This resultied in an improvement in the treasury
of national. money which increased from 28~9 to 46.9 million zaires and
also a rise in sight deposits due to the efforts to preserve the liquidity
of the public's money holdings ~customer deposits increased from 10Q';95
million to 162 million zaires).
As for interbank affairs, the commitments of the Bank of Kinshasa were
reduced 34 percent, account taken of the payment by the Bank of Zaire '
of arrears on nonconfirmed paper credits. In this regard, the tr$nsfer
to the Issuing Institute of commercial arrears and their provision
of 30 million zaires was effected wtth less catastrophic resulxs for the
bank's treasury than in 1977 on the occasion of a similar operation.
The Bank of Kinshasa's holdings in correspondent banks increased from ~
41.95 millioa to 48.7 million zaires. The Battk of Kinshasa has continued
to play an active role in coffee operatiot~s.
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Pursuant to a decree dated 16 February 1978, the'Bank of KinsY.asa, in ~
accord with the Bank of Zaire, has reevaluated its fixed assete, which
- permitted it to writeoff an appreciation of 5.4 million zaires.
The financial statement balance and the volume of business increased
' considerably during the 1978 fiscal year. The balance increased fxom ~
181.2 million to 236.25 million zaires; i.e., an increase of 30.3 percent.
Due to the increase in the volume cf busir~ess and an appreciable rise in
- profits, total profits rose from 572,537 zaires in 1977 to 3,265,065 zair~s. -
The decieive factor in the positive evolution in 1978 was the fact that the
expansion of the volume of credits was also reflected in the surplus of
- interests which increased from 12 million to 18.4 million. In these
credits, it is necessary to cuunt the extension for debt payments of
- about 34 million zaires for exporters~who ran into problems of shipping -
their coffee.
As regai�ds expansion of the bank, the Management Committee took the stops
- required for i.mplementation of the decision to open branches in Bunia -
in the Upper Zaire region in March 1978, and in Boma and Matadi, in the _
- Lower Zaire region in 1979.
The main office of the Bank of Kinshasa is in the capital of Zaire. Its
chairman is Dokalo Sanu.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
8143
CSO: 4400
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ZAIRF
EMERGENCY AID FROM BELGIUM RECOUNTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Oct 79 p 2713
[Text] A recent bulletin from the CEUIOM [European Center for Qverseas
Industrialization and Development] recalls that during the period June 1978
to January 1979 the amount of emergency economic aid from Belgium to Zaire
totaled 831 million Belgian francs.
- This total is broken down as follows: food aid, 120 million; spare parts ,
and raw materials, 301 million; agricultural implements, 60 million and
- state-to-state loans, 350 million.
Emergency aid ~o Zaire is under the control of a 3oint ar~d autonomous
central committee made up of representatives of the donors and all the
Zairian departments involved. ~ao specialized subcommittees have been
established: one for food aid, the other for spare parts and raw materials.
_ Revenues from the emergency Belgian aid in food and spare parts and raw
- materialg are placed in a reemployment fund. Part of the revenues from ~
the sale of Belgian food aid (850,000 zaires) was used to finance five
- actions: _
l. Purchase of 284 tons of corii, peanut and soybean seeds for the
farn?ers in the Lower Zaire. .
2. Loan of 500,000 zaires to the Cotton Stabilization Fund. -
3. Loan of 100,000 zaires to the National Office to the Piomotion of
- Food Products (ONPPV) for the financing of a food program in the -
Bandundu region.
4. Loan of 86,000 zaires to th~ PNPPV for the financing�of a soybean
program in the region of the equator,
S. Loan of 100,000 zaires for the financing of a rice program in the
Bumba region. ~
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- As regards the "spare parts and raw materials," reemployment fund, a loan
of 90,000 zaires had already been granted iri March 1979 to groups of
~ cooperatives in Northern Kivu for the purchase of secondhand trucks. -
This fund was expecting other loan requests, including onP for the con-
- struction of bridges, installation of a service center, development of
cottage industries, purchase of transportation equipment, electrification
of the Boma-Tshela axis, etc. _
- (Let us recall tnat in our 25 May 1979 issue, p 1319, we published an
article describing Belgian-Zairian cooperation.)
- COgYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
= 814 3
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- ZAIRE
BRIEFS ~
TRADE WITH BRAZIL--According to figures published by the Brazilian Embassy
in Kinshasa, between 1973 and 1978, Zaire exported over $81 million worth
- of products to Brazil; i.e., an average of more than $16 million per year. ~
Durin~ the same period, Zaire imported more than $128 million worth of =
products from Brazil; i.e., an annual average of more than $25 million.
Zairian exports to Brazil consist principally of ores destined for the ~
light industries of that country. Imports from Brazil include mainly .
vehicles and food products. On both sides, there is also an exchange ,
- of manufactured products, which is accompanied by a desire to increase _
the volume of trade by diversifying commercial cooperation whose
potentialities continue to be enormouse [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX _
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Oct 79 p 2713] 8143
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