JPRS ID: 8921 WORLDWIDE REPORT TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020023-2
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 126
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 23
• Content Type: REPORTS

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i4 NOVEM6ER i9T9 N0. 2844 i OF 2
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_ JPRS 74572 -
- 14 November ~ 979 -
~ / rth e~fr~ca R~ ort -
~e~~' Ea~t B~~ e
p
No. 2044 _
~ Fg~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SEFiVICE ~ -
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NOTE
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soz~z -io,
REPORT DOCUMENTATION ~ 1. REPORT NO. 2, 3. Recipient�. a�..:+o~ Na.
PAGE ~ JPRS 74572
_ TIN~ ~nd SubUfle _
5. Raport Oat~
~j NEAR L'AS'1'/NOR'1'll AFRICA REPOttT, No. 2044 14 November 1979
6.
7. Author(s)
8. P~rforminQ Or~ani:at~on p~p~, No.
- 9. P~AorminQ Ora~nli~Uo~ N~mo ~nd Addna 10. pro~~ct/Tnk/Work Unll No.
Joint Publications Research Service
1000 North Glebe Raad 11. Contract(C) or Crant(GJ No.
- Arlington, Virginia 22201 _
_ (G)
12. Sponsoring Orgenixatton Narne and Address 13. Type of Report 6 Period Cavered
As above _
14.
- 15. Supplementary Notes
]6. Abstroct (Limit: 200 words)
This serial report contains information on socioeconomic, government, political, -
- and technical developments in the countries of the Near East and North Africa.
17. Document Analysis a. Descriptors -
Political Science Inter-Arab Affairs x Libya Sultanate
Soci.ology X North African Mauritania of Oman ~
_ Economics Affairs x Morocco x Syria
Culture (Social Afghanistan People's Demo- x Tunisia
Sciences) x Algeria cratic Republic United Arab
Ethnology Bahrain of Yemen Emirates ~
- Geography x Egypt Persian Gulf x Western Sahara
_ Techological x Iran Area Yemen Arab
. Military Sciences Iraq Qatar Republic
x Israel x Saudi Arabia -
- x Jordan Spanish North
Kuwait Africa
- x Lebanon Sudan
b. Idenliliers/Open�Endad Terms
c. COSATI Field/Group SD ~ rj(,' ~,rjK ~ ],rj
IB. Ave(la~ility Stetement 19. Securlty Class (This Raport) 21. No. ol Pap~~
Unllmited Availability UIrTCLASSIFIED ~ 121
Sold by NTIS -
Sprin~f. i.eld, Virginia 2216~. 10. Seeurity Class (Thts Page) ZZ, Prics '
UNCLASSIFIED
(See ANSI-Z39.IB) Sot Imt~uetlan~ on R~v~ne OPTIONAL FORM 272 (4-77)
(Formerly NTIS-35)
_ Oep~rtm~nt of Commem
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I
JPRS 74572
- 14 November 1979
- NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
No. 2044
. CONTENTS PAGE
NORTH AFRICAN AF'FAIRS
- Brief s
- Berber I,iberation Movement 1
AI~GERIA
.
Meeting on Paxty Base, APC Elections
(Djillali Guezzan Affane;EL MOUDJAHID, 18 Sep 79) 2
~ Oran Cites Algerian Paper's Criticism of U.S. Arms for Morocco
(Oran Domestic Service, 24 Oct 79) 8
'LE MONDE' Ccrrmients on Dismissal of Algerian Hydraulics
Minister
' (Daniel Junqua; LE MOND~, 16 Oct 79) 10
EGYPT -
FRG Mini ster Inte~�vi~~red on Trade
- (Ranier Offergs?_d_; Cologne Deutschl~.~: �unk Network,
30 Oct 79) 11
. IRAN
_ Well Placed Source Predicts Cabinet Shakeup
(I~YHAN, 28 Oct 79) 13
All Political. Parties, Groups Unite for Celebration
(BAI~IDI~D, 4 Sep 79) 14
_ ~
Returning Students 1}issillusioned W'ith Khomeyni Land ~
(Erich Wiedemann; DER SPIEGEL, 21~ Sep 79) 18
. -a- [III -NE &A-121]
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page _
- Unrest Spreads Among Military, Police ~
(EXCZUSNE, 7 Oct 79) .............................0 23
- Rift Between Arrr~y, Pasdars
400 Homafars Arrested
Artr~y Purge Plar.ned -
Retirement Requests on Rise
Police Officers Uiihappy
I~and Forces Chief Assays Kordestan Unrest
( BAMDAD,16 Oct 79) 27
Soviet Involvement in Kordestan Rejected
(ETTELA'AT9 23 Sep 79) 2~
- 'I7i stinguished Religious Sectaxians' Criticized by NF
(ETTELA'AT, 25 Sep 79) 30
~re in Tehran Afghan E~nbassy Zabeled Plot of
- 'Unidentified Elements'
(ETTELA'AT, 25 Sep 79) 32
Revolutionary Newspapers Express Views
(BANIDAD, 1 Sep 79) 33
Cautious Criticism of Flogging as a Punitive Measure
(ETTEZA'AT, 2!~ Sep 79) 38
State of National Econo~y Analyzed
(IRAN ECONOMIC SERVICE, 6 oct 79) 39
Nationalization of Secondary Industries Suggested
(ENQ~I.AB-E ESLAMI, 3 Sep 79) 42
Government Appropriates Millions To Spur Production
(ENQEI.AB-E ESLAMI, 2 Sep 79) ltl~
Press Highlights Corrmiercial Developments
(IRAN ECONOMIC SERVICE, 6 Oct 79) ~,6
Eshraqi Paved Way for Ilismissal of NIOC Chief
~ ~TTELA'AT, 25 Sep 79) 1t8 ~
Industry F~nployees 17issatisfied With Nazih
Khomeyni: No Confidence in Nazih
-b-
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
51na11 Cor.sumers To Get Water, Electricity Gratis
- (KEYHAN, 19 Sep 79) 50
Naval Bases To Be Converted Into Ports
(BAMDAD, 29 Aug 79) 51
Tricot, Knit Goods Industry Nearing a Standstill
(ETTELA'AT, 25 3ep 79) 53
Domestic Industry Seeking To Make Spare Parts for Autos
(KE'YHAN, 19 sep 79) 55
~ Brief s
, Arms, Urugs Haul 5g
Khomeyni I,oyalty 58
ISRAEL
'DAVAR' Foresees Cabinet Falling, Analyzes Reasons
(Daniyel Bloch; DAVAR, 28 Oct 79) 59
Palestinians React Strongly to Israeli Land Decision
(Vaxious sources, 18 Sep 79) 63
West Bank Mayors ~
'AI~-QUDS' Editorial
Arrr~3r Desertions, Offenses by Wamen Soldiers Increase
(David Richardson; POST, 30 Oct 79) 66
'HA'ARETZ' Provides Statistics on Expropriated Land
- (Ze'ev Schiff; HA'AR~TZ, 1 Nov 79) 67
JORDAN
- Authorities Keep Eye on Musli.m Brotherhood
(AZ MUSTAQBAI,, 22 Sep 79) ................o.......... 68
Investment Opportunities Attract Foreign Capital
( AIr-NAH~'iR. AI~- ~ ARABI WA .AI,-DUWAI~I, 1-7 Oct 79 ) . . . . . . . 70
- LEBANON
Effect of Jumblat's Death ~n National Movemen~t I}iscussed
(THE ARAB WnRLD WEEKLY, 13 Oct 79) 7~
Religious Leaders, Iran~s Interest in South
(THE AR~AB WORLD WEEKZY, 20 oct 79) 79
-c-
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. '
C6NTEI3TS (Continued) Page
Iran's Role in South Lebanon Problem
(AL-NAHAR, 16 Sep 79) 80
Armeniatl-Phalangist Confrontations Analyzed
(AZ-NAHAR, 14 Sep 79) 84
_ Zebanese-Palestinian Reconciliation Is Key to South
Lebanon Problem
_ (AI~-N~HAR, 15 Sep 79) 88
Official Bi-Monthly Bank Statistics Published
(Z'ORIENT-LE JOUR, 21 Sep 79) 92
Briefs
Flight of Workers Reported 94
I,IBYA
_ I,ibyan Relations With ~ance Deteriorate
(LE M4NDE, 29 Sep 79) 95
Zibyan Military Equiprnent Development Detailed
(DEFENSE NATIONALE, Aug-Sep 79) 97
MOROCCO
'AZ-M'JHARRIR' Urges 'Privileged Class~ To Bear Its
Share of Sacrifice
- (Editorial; AL-MUHARRIR, 18 Oct 79) 99
- 'AZ-'AI~AM' Says South African N-Test Sets Off Arms Race
- ('Umax Najib; AZ-'AZAM, 27 Oct 79) 101
Briefs
Uranium F`ind 103
Corrament on UN Resolution 103
SAUDI ARABIA
' Power Plant Development Planned for al-Jubayl
(Chris L. Parr; AR,AB NEWS, 22 Oct 79) 101~
High Yield Rice Devel.oped in Hasa
(ARAB NEWS, 17 oct 79) ......................v...... 106
Briefs
Airport Radar S~rstems 107
-d-
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
' SYRIA
~ Regime Seen Determined To Overcome ~Conspiracy,~ -
Shortcomings -
(Wadi ~ a1-Hilu; AL-NAHAR AZ-'AR,AT3I WA AI~-DUWALI,
1-7 Oct 79) 108
_ Hamah Housing Project; Anti-Cholera Measures 1}iscussed
- (AI,-THAWRAH, 18 Sep 79) 113
= TUNISIA -
Bri ef s
- Envoy F~o:n YAR president ii5 -
Message to Lisbon Conference ~i5
W~STERN SAHARA
- PCF, PCI, PCE Issue Cormnunique on Western Sahara Visit ~
(Algiers Domestic Service, Nov 79) . , , , , , ~ ~ ~ � ~ ~ , 116
- _e~.
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' NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
~ BERBER LIBERATION MOVEMENT--A new movement called "The Berber Liberation
Fro~t" has come into beir..g and has established its headquarters in an Arab
North African state. The aim of the front is to establish an independent
_ Berber state extending from southern Morocco to the Algerian riff. A French
source has told the AI~-HAWADTTH bureau in Paris that the front was originally
formed against Morocco but it is possible to move it agairist Algeria when
_ necessary. In the opinion of the French source the Arab side behind the
movement in question aims to gain Gontrol of the area extending from Mauri- -
- tania to the upper Nile valley, that is the uranium-rich area sep~rating
North Africa and Black Africa. The source also says that the aid being
given to opposition in northem Sudan falls within the framework of this
movement. The French source affirmed that opposition leader in Mali (Didi -
Demba Moina) has received financial and military aid from the Arab country
in question sufficient ta raise a 7,000-man force under the name of the
"Mali Liberation Movement " which is expected to be moved against President
M~usa Traore shortly. [Text] [LD051129 London AL-HAWADTTH in Arabic
- 2 Nov 79 p 11 LD] ~
CSO: 4402
1 -
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I
ALGERIA
MEETING ON PARTY BASE, APC ELECTIONS ,
Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 18 Sep 79 pp 1, 3
[Chairman of party election commission, Djillali Guezzan Affane, chairs -
meeting on coming party base and APC [People's Communal Assembly] elections]
[Text] The upcoming elections of the party base and the APC were the main
subject of the important meeting held yesterday at the People's House, a
_ meeting which brought together all the resp~nsible ones at the party base, -
under the presidency of Djillali Guezzan Affane, member of the FLN (National
_ Liberation Front) Party Politburo, and president of the party election com-
mission. The meeting was attended by Messrs Abdallah Demene Debbih, Hache-
maoui, and Ould Kablia, members of the Central Committee of the FLN party
and secretary general of UGTA [General Union of Alegerian Workers], national
party commissar of ~he Algerian governorate, and governor of Algeria,
respectively. The meeting was within the framework of the campaign sur-
- rounding the elections of party base organs and the APC, which was launched -
last Tuesday in Bejaia. The orientations set forth by Guezzan Affane .
were followed by a debate attesting to the common will at base and manage-
ment levels, aimed at increasing and affirming the party's role in the con-
trol and direction of public affaixs. That role will.be carried out by the
militant work of mobilizing the social revolutionary forces by an in-depth
study of democracy both at party functions and at all sectors of economic
and social life. The parties involved stressed that revision would have
to be marked throughout by integrity.
_ Guezzan Affane took up the question of revising the cell elections and those
of the kasmas, the APC and Che GSE (Socialist Management of Businesses).
We present here 'a synopsis thereof.
These elections were not the first to be organized, but they differ from
previous ones. For the country has had improvements in its state and party
institutions. There is a national charter; there has been the party con-
gress with its statute and rule of procedure, and some significant resolu- -
~ions. The real task is in organizing the party. The various party struc-
tures are pressing for a program which seeks to expand the party base to all
- revolutionary elements, even those still outside the party. In confronting
the problems of the country's development, the widest base in the party is
required. -
2
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I
And in order that this base be equal to the demands placed upon it, the
party doors must be opened to all revolutionary elemer.ts, in terme of the
nationai charter's criteria. -
In some regions, a campaign and a significant party adhesion took place.
In other regions, on the other hand, that campaign did not take place and
the adhe~ion remained weak.
The campaign of adhesion to the party was launched by President Chadli
Bendjedid. It was the principal motivation for the report at the AFC elec- -
- tions that one could no longer clai~, tnat the party doors were closed.
, Because many candidates for adhesion stated tnat they had disposed of their
~ files which remained without follow-up.
Of course, there were elections in 1978, but in the upcoming elections, we
_ are concerned with applying the rule of procedure and the party statute.
_ The structures of the party must know the elections before those of the APC
and the APW. They will have to taJ;e place before next Octobe-r 15.
How can one have a real sense of this revision? What is at issue here is
arranging the responsible structures with the responsible elements and com-
batting the evils from which the party body is suffering. There must not
be revisions just for the sake of revision, but in order to put "the needed
man in the needed place." "Moreover, c.riticism and self-criticism must be
employed in order to put an end to nepotism and regionalism."
- We believe that the party base has the appearance of the revolution and
today this base knows the evils which the elections, not the division into
- cliques supporting individual personalitie~, can inflict upon the unity o�
the party base.
If today the elections of the party base organs will take place before those
_ of the APC, it is because the choice of candidates to the APC elections
must be that of the general assembly of the kasma militants. ~
- The militants will have to strive every day to ins~re that the p~rty will
~ have its feet planted firmly on the ground, 3irect its activity, master its
problems, and thus establish its authority.
_ Are we capable today of inspiring the party with the militant force to
apply the national charter and the resolutions of the fourth party congress? _
_ The party's authority is acquired day after day by the work of militants
at all levels, as they fight their battle for economic and social inde-
per.dence .
3 _
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- Of course there are gaps, because in previous years, build-up of materiel
= had priority. The party's responsibility had not been affirmed. Pressures
against the militants were exercised.
- Today, the party has a leadership, What remains to be done is to give the
kasma its true identity. That is the work of the militants who believe in
the principles of the revolution. Thus, making a good choi~e in the next
elections will give the party new strengtho
Link the Revolution to Democracy
_ There are the kasmas which work at ground level for the snlution of problems. -
- Others remain inactive. The same comparison can be made between two APC's
of the same governorate, two APW's which show that one governorate is more
- active than another. Thus we are concerned with strengthening the party and
the country by responsible elections. That method is outlined by the party
statute and its rule of procedure.
What is involved is linking the revolution with democracy. Two methods can
- be adopted. The militants at a general assembly will propose a long list
of candidates, consisting of revolutionary militants whose names will be _
submitted for public choice.
The second method is the elaboration at the general assembly of a single
= list in the context of a long and unanimous debate. _
The popular choice concretizes the principle of the revolutior_ by and for
the people, by allowing the people to participate, at all times, in the choice
of inen and in the direction of public affairs.
The party base has an important role to uphold, because it is that base -
which, at the commune level, constitutes the political le~dership. We
must see to it that it is comprised of revolutionary militants. Ne~ct, we
will have to have our thought united, speak the same language and, as it -
is commonly said, sing the same song: that of the revolution.
It is there that all economic, social, and organizational problems of our _
country will find their ultimate solution.
Let us go back to the national charter which stipulates the need to hold
general assemblies of citizens, militants, mass organiZations, and the party. -
The cou~unal assemblies, the kasma, the mass organization, must be joined `
together in an assembly of militants. The party will be able to recl3scover
its true expression when this assembly assumes its prerogatives, studies
- the pr~blems and decides on solutions.
_ ~
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, For years, we have debated placing our best mi.litants in positions of
- responsibility. We noticed each time that those elected by the APC or the '
- kasma do not carry out the will of the general assembly but act separately '
from one another. This happened because the Qeneral assembly did not exer-
= cise its authority. Could it have been due to a lack of commitment?
~ There could certainly have been some types of inentalittes prevailing be- -
- fore the national charter and the fourth party congress, but they must no =
= longer be the case. In fact, a militant from within the party usually thinks -
differently from on~ from within the state. But that comes from a lack of
connections with the base.
In the context of the elections which will have to be held before 15 October,
the general assemblies will have to assert their responsibilitiess.
The weaknesses evidenced up to then were due to a lack of openness and a
failure to denounce the faults which were committed. Fur that, nepotism
_ took precedence over militantism.
~ To Practice Criticism and Self-Criticism -
= Thus, the two methods are the choice of a single list or a long list of can-
didates. This choice will fall to the general assembly. The best one is -
a single list, after the longest possible debate, so that the militant b~~2
can strengthen its unity. But that requires political courage and openness
on the part of the militants. It is well known that the militants do not
express themselves in the general assemblies but wait until they are on the -
- streets to speak. That is contr~ry to the principles of the party and es-
pecially a party of the avant-garde. -
_ If we are not clear-sighted in the general assemblies, when will we be? _
_ If criticism is brought against one who is responsible, it is taken to ~
- mean an attack against individuals. That reveals a failure in the practice
of criticism and self-criticism. As militants, we must discuss matters
openly among ourselves.
Set Up a Political Reckoning From the APC Mandates -
- The elections of the APC will take place for the fourth time. Today,
the question is raised to all of us as militants.
Have the APC acted in conformance with the national charger? Have the
_ APC worked in the context of applying the charter and the communal code?
We must formulate a political debate, e~tablish a political reckoning. The
- general assembly must be ready to discuss this political question. This
requires studying the communal charter to demand accounts on that basis. F
_ Thus, it is not a reckoning of problems of an administrative reckoning that
5 -
~
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.
� is required, not that everyone should bring up all the problems of his own
city, but it should be a reckoning of the APC as an organ of the party and
the state, on the basis of the national charter. This clearly defines the
relations between the party and the state, on the one hand, and the APC
on the other. In its dual political and administrative role, it answers
_ to two guardians: the party and the state.
Why is an APC of ten divided in two? It is because the guardianship at
the party base has not been exercised. For who is responsible for the acts
of the elected one, if not the one who proposed him as a candidate. And
it is clear that the elected one is a representative of the party from within
- the state.
~ With regard to the national charter, I recall the words of President
- Boumediene. "We have created a burnoose but haven't found a man whom it
fits." -
Today, it is up to us to create such men. In fact, today, the situation
is such that the president and the government must become involved with
the tasks of the APC.
Is It a Lack of Direction?
Thus, we have the task of purification! That does not mean denying responsi-
bility over some others, but it means discussing the causes. Is it a lack
of direction? Is it a lack of ineans?
Besides, the role of the APC is completed by that of the party, the mass _
- organizations, the general assembly of militants which must insure the general `
mobilization. It is clear, in fact, that social evils cannot find their
_ solutions by virtue of a campaign, but reach a point where each person will
assume his responsibilities. It is clear that the demanding of accounts
can only be carried out in that framework. Thus, the reckoning which APC
_ and APW will have to give must be exposed in its real and global, not~specific, ~
context.
These elections must serve as the occasion for raising the level of conscious-
ness by means of interventions, while being m~.litant over the plan nf direc- -
- tion and the effective control of the communal management aimed at improving
- the country. '
_ That is important, because when the APC fails, the citizen says, "See what
- rhe party has given us."
= 6
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;
Today, there are new elements springing forth from among the workers, ~
youth, and peasantry, which were formed in the context of the farmers re-
volution. The militant playing an active part in the labor union can be a
militant of the party. The choice does not have to be made by the ones re-
sponsible, but by the general assembly of militants. Because it is that
base which experiences the problems, knows the militants on their own ground.
If we make mistakes in the choice of inen, we will have to live with those
problems. ~
We have created the APC's, but they ~xist as a body without a soul. We
- must impart to them their revolutionary militant life. In order to do ~
that, there must be effective control. The APC will have a mandate of 5
~ years. The choice must be militant in order to give the APC their true -
expression.
There is an election commission, composed of some 30 members. But that is
_ not the body which will choose or cuntrol the ones elected. For who must
implement the party's program, if not its base? Control must be exercised _
- not just every 4 years, but permanently, every month, each year...Those -
elected must render accounts at all times to the base, and not from one man-
date to another. The citizens must also be informed about what is going
- on and must use their control.
Regarding the GSE, we as militants are responsible for exercising this -
choice.
Everyone, whether he agrees or not, will have to exercise his choice. -
_ Certain resnonsible ones will say that the lack of authority in the unity
and in the undertaking comes from the GSE.
The GSE does not represent a weakening in tlie authority of those responsible,
but a strengthening, by the information of the worker who, in his undertaking,
participates in the decision, so that the work will seem to them that its ~
future and that of the undertaking are related.
Todya, we cannot say that we will improve this country without effective -
popular mobilization. It is through this militant work that the party,
day after day, will find its authority. Because the respect, the authority,
which are due to the party cannot be dictated.
Guezzan Affane then invited the militants who were present to take part in
debate. The debate affirmed the desire for a democratic choice, the need
for integrity from base to highest levels to be strictly respected, and
' the concern for making the base aware of its pressures and its militant and
revolutionary prerogatives. =
9475
CSO: 4400
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ALGERIA
ORAN CITES ALGERIAN PAPER'S CRITICISM OF U.S. ARMS FOR MOROCCO
LD252202 Oran Domestic Service in Arabic 2200 GMT 24 Oct 79 LD
["Maghreb of Peoples" Program]
[Text] The National AL-SHA'B has published a commentary on the decision of
the U.S. President Carter to supply Morocco with newly developed U.S. weapons. -
The newspaper writes:
The justification presented by Washington for the new deal and the doubling
of military support for the Rabat regime aimed at enabling it to negotiate
- from a position of strength, is a justification that can only be described
as (?strange). Rabat did not hesitate to repeat the echo of this 3ustifi-
cation when its foreign minister said yesterday that his government has al- _
ways been willing to negotiate but [words indistinctJ. This is the [words '
_ indistinc~] the United States [words indistinct]. The problem has imposed
itself and all international organizations have come to consider it a prob-
lem of decolonization that should be solved within (?this context) as other _
similar problems have been dealt with. This nature of the problem and the ~
tasks which the Rabat regime has undertaken to accomplish as an agent of
colonialism and U.S. imperialism in the region, and even in Africa, should '
not be mixed. ,
The Carter administration is on the eve of elections which seem, according !
to first public opinion polls, not to favor the White House.president. Sub-
- sequently, wagering on all cards which ma.y prove w3nners~: has become impera-
tive. Therefore, the latest U.S. decision was taken only for electioneering
- motives in view of the strong links between the American Zionists and Hassan , -
- II and in appreciation of the latter's efforts in achieving the Camp David
deal. The commentator [name indistinct] was right when he said that this aid
is within the context of [words indistinct], otherwise how can it be logical
- for Washington to [words indistinct] the cause of people in opposition ta the
tradition it has followed up to now. The talk about other attack weapons
and other defensive weapons is mere prattle. It is being said in the ~merican -
capital that there is an agreement sanctioning the use of the weapons by ~
Hassan II outside his borders because Washington does not recognize the his-
torical borders of Morocco. Did the American administration protest even
once when its aircraft, tianks, and artillery shelled the Saharan population
and [passage indistinct]. ~ ;
- . ~
;
g . -
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If there is anyone who deserves assistance and who has been actually exposed
- to aggression [words indistinct] it is the displaced Saharan people. Washing-
ton very well understands the way American arms are being ur~ed because the -
given ~ustifications are merely an exposed distortion which deceives no-one.
= The United States has taken a step with serious consequences [words indis-
tinct].
_ CSO: 4402
~ 9
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ALGERIA
`LE MONDE' COI~IENTS ON DISMISSAL OF ALGERIAN HYDRAULICS MINISTER
LD250901 Paris LE MONDE in French 16 Oct 79 p 4 LD '
- ~Ldniel Junqua Dispatch: "Mr Ghozali Is Removed From the Government"]
[Excerpts] Algiers--A short communique from the Presidency of the Republic
announced after the cabinet meeting on Suday 14 Oct~ber that Mr Ahmed Ghozali
was no longer Hydraul ics Minister. He will be temporarily replaced by Ma~
Brahim Brahimi, Secretary of Sta~e for Forests and Reforestation.
The news was unexpected, but the form it took was more surprising than the _
content: This is the first time for a long time that the sacking of a top
official has been announced so bluntly. Resignations for "health reasons"
and silent departures are clearly no longer the order of the day. This is
a new style which Pres ident Chadli is introducing.
The first sign o~ Mr Ahmed Ghozali's disgrace appeared when the PTational
Liberation Front Congress in February elected him only as a candidate mem- -
- ber of the Central Committee. On 8 March he lost the Energy Portfolio and -
was given the newly created Hydraulies Portfolio. He apparently accepted
it only with reluct3nce and showed bitterness at being removed from a sector -
and a team to which he had devoted himself completely. At his prompting--he ~
has a diploma from the Paris School of Sighways and Bridges--Sonatrach had
. become a positive emp ire (more than 70,000 employees), often creaming off
the country's best cadres at the expense of other sectors. _
- The sacking of Mr Gho zali, who has not been given any other job for the time
being, comes 1 month after the launch of the "cleanup" campaign, which has
hitherto been principally aimed at ordinary citizens. However, the press has
constantly announced that sanctions would be taken at all levels against offi-
cials who proved unequal to their tasks. Therefore Mr Ghozali's.dismissal
might we11 serve as an example and would in no way conflict with the head of
state's policy of nat ional union. Above all Mr Ghozali has the status of a c
higher civil servant and his modest contribution to the liberation struggle--
his otficial biography simply points out that he was a"member of the National
Liberation Front French University Section 1958 through 1962"--was bound to
be of disservice to him at a time when the party's predominance is being con-
stantly reaffirmed in all spheres.
CSO: 4400 ~
10
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- EGYPT
FRG MINISTER ?NTERVIEWED ON TRADE
~ DW311028 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German to East and West Germany
1610 GMT 30 Oct 79 DW
_ [Excerpts from interview with Ranier Offergeld, federal minister for economic -
cooperation, by Reporter Gerner in Egypt--recorded]
_ [Text] [Question] Why is Cairo given such obvious privileges with regard to
obtaining credits?
_ [Answer] We agreed to give Egypt development assistance credits amounting
to a total af DM1.9 billion. I do not believe one can term that a privilege.
Certainly Egypt is a main point of our development policy efforts aimed at
achieving stabilization here in the Middle East.
[QuestionJ Did the Egyptians on the oecasion of your visit here ask for or
expect an increase?
[Answer] The Egyptians expect in the future an intensification and extension
of cooperation in the field of development policy. Figures have not been dis-
cussed in the talks with the president of the ministers, but there was the
clear wish of the Egyptians that we increase our credits to them.
[QuestionJ How do you assess the economic situation of Egypt?
[Answer] The economi~ situation of Egypt is more positive thgn had been ex-
pected a couple of months ago. We discussed future cooperation very intensely -
--that was a main point of our talks. The Federal Republic: wants to concen-
trate coopera~ion on a few sectors. Full agreeatent existed in this respect
with the Egyptian partners. Cooperation will be concentrated on such pro~ects
as infrastructure and telecommunications, second there is agriculture and ~
- particularly increased productivity and, third there is improvement of build-
ing industry capacities, with an annual growth of the population of more than
1 million. The Egyptians cannot catch up ia the field of construction work.
[Question] A1pre than DM800 million of the credits granted have not yet been
used. Are the Egyptians at all in a position to use th~ money that was guaran-
teed them in a sensible way?
- 11
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_ [Answer] Yes, we consider it very important for our development policy co-
operation to find sensible projects for financing, pro~ects that would facili-
tate economic and social progress in the country. No problems at all exist -
here. The implementation of pro~ects, however, occasionally leaves something
to be desired,sometimes matters do not develop as quickly as we would like.
But generally there is no lack of socially and economically sensible pro~ects
here in Egypt. -
CSO: 3103 ,
J
lG
I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ .
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J
IRAN
WELL PLACED SOURCE PREDICTS CABINET SHAKEUP -
LDO11005 Teheran KEYHAN in Persian 28 Oct 79 p 2 LD
- [Unattributed report: "Rumor of Reshuffle in Bazargan Cabinet"]
[Excerpt) Rumors of a reshuffle in Bazargan's cabinet are resurfacing and
= it is now being said that thr~e of the larger ministries ~will be affected.
The reshuffle is expected to take place by ttie weekend, although no infor-
mation is available as to the extent of the move.
_ A source close to the government revealed today that the changes in engineer
Bazargan's provisional goverr?ment were at ministerial level and that they
were discussed during the previous shake up which resulted in the appoint- -
ment of. Espahbodi as labor minister, Mo'infar as oil minister and the
transfer oi [Labor, Social Affairs Minister] Foruhar. The source added:
"The necessity for a cabinet reshuffle increased 2 weeks ago, following
the major events that took place in tha country affecting several ministries,
in the middle of which one [unnamedJ minister, who had presented a national
plan, was insisting on resigning."
~ The reshuffle in the two other ministries is rumored to be connected with
the country's economy, an economy which in a period of revolution needs
fundamental changes and rapid leaps toward the regene~ation and restoration
of production and supply. As for economic progress, which of necessity
_ rests on the launching pad of the country's heavy industry, mention may be
_ made of the re~uvenation of agriculture, tha development of animal husbandry
and the dairy industry, and alongside this the role of fishing, which is 1
of special importance and which recentl.y led to a problem 3n Bandar Anzali,
giving rise to concern.
The shakeup rumor comes just when the governmenti is facing numeraus
criticisms from all sides, and according to the source quoted 3.t will
def initely take place soon.
CSO: 4906
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r
i
IRAN
ALL POLITICAL PARTIES, GROUPS UNZTE FOR CELEBRATIaN
, Tehran BArIDAD in Persian 4 Sep 79 pp 1, 9
[Text] Following announcements made by the Celebration Headquarters for the
_ anniversary of Martyrs of 17 Shahrivar [September 8], ;~esterday political
and ~slamic Societies and groups issued statements in honoring the commemora-
tion of thase who suffered martyrdom on 17 Shahrivar last year and announced
- their support in celebrating the anniversary more splendidly. As of last
night dozens of political and Islamic organizations, societies, centers -
have announced that they would participate in the ceremonies.
Martyrs Day
The Unity Protection Society related to the Construetion Jehad (holy war)
issued a statement yesterday announcing its particlpation in the ceremonies
and suggested naming 17 Shahrivar Martyrs Day. ~
The Blood and Message P-:y
The Society for the Uni_*y of the Poor and the Islamic.society of teachers ~ ~
and employees of the state technical and professional/vocational organiza-
tion in Tehran issued a statement announcing that it would part~cipate with
_ other organizations in the ceremonies of 17 Shahrivar. The message indicates:
According to the martyred teacher, Dr Shariati, the revolution has two faces:
blood and message. The 17 Shahrivar was both a bloody day and a day of ines-
sage. A bloody message and blood mixed with me~sage. The poor rose. -
_ They revived the memory of 'Emar Yaser, Maqdad, Mosa'eb Ebn Amir, Abuzar
- Ghafari, Kamil Ebn Ziyad, Mohammad Ebn Abi Bakr and Malek Ashtar. They sent
_ a message for the poor to rise and take their rights from the arrogant
(those who have gold and power and hypocrisy) and nct to allow a bunch of
selfish, Westernized, bewitched by users of:Napalm bombs, iaternational colonial-
ists etc, destroy our rights from right and left and wittingly or unwittingly
become the loudspeaker for the worldeater colonialists. ~
_ With bloody and embossed lines, the voice of the poor was written on the ' `
G~eat Bear on 17 Shahrivar 1357 and it echoed in the world. Wtat the peo-
ple did on this day would not have been possible with bil3.ions of money, -
1~+ -
-
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_ thousands of tanks, guns and machine guns. The voice of "Allah Akbar" of
the poor and the bZood that was shed unfairly stopped the machine guns and
the coarse voice of Oveysi(s) and promised a government of 'Ali's ~ustice.
The 17th of Shahrivar has two contradictory faces: It is a day of death,
blood and sorrow and it is also a day of victory and joy; 17 is the day of
the martr. Suffering martyrdom has also two contradictory faces: sorrow -
and joy, death and Iife, defeat and victory. -
On ttie anniversary of such a great event, no matter what we say in its com-
mendation will not be enough. We perform the noon prayer at Shohada Circle,
this historic circle, the wrapped scroll of 2,500 years of monarchy, and
participate in the ceremonies honoring this day. Victory to the memory of
the martyrs of 17 Shahrivar, Iong live the movement and revolution of Iran's
Moslem people under the leadership and guidance of Imam Khomeyni. May the -
provisional government of the Islamic Revolution be successful.
In a statement the Zahmatkeshan Party also announced that it would patcticipate
in the ceremonies of 17 Shahrivar and indicated: Ir. order to honor the martyrs
of rose-colored winding sheets on 17 Shahrivar [Black Friday] and in order
to renew our promise with the great leader of Iran's Islamic Revolution,
the Grand Ayatollah Imam Khomeyni, and announce our hatred for the servants
and devotees of Imperialism who create riots in every corner and bother
the souls of those who sacrificed their lives, we hereby announce that the
Party of Hard-Working People will take part in the walking on 17 of Shahrivar
just as -it had done in the past.
'Asef Towhidi Organization [Asef Monotheism Organization] also issued a
statement in this respect and said: By congratulating the families of the
martyrs and announcing that we would continue their way (to implement the
Islamic principles fully), we accept the invitation of the Celebration flead-
_ quarters marking the bloody Friday and ask all the people to actively partici-
pate in this ceremony and prove their unity, in uplifting ~orld monotheism
in its true meaning under the .leadership of Imam Khomeyni. We persist in
wanting the provisional governennt of Iran's Islamic Republic, in a symbo-
lic and revolutionary action, to turn the U.S. Embassy (an area of 115,000
metexs) into an equipped hospital and put it at the disposal of the handi-
capped and the wounded of the Islamic revolution, as the embassy has not left
anything but an experience of adversity or misery and destruction and has -
_ always looted the poor nations.
Iran's Women's Society has also issued a statement honoring this historic =
day and announced: The bloody Friday in the heart of the month represented
the fighting morale and the unity of the great hero nation. It blossomed
like a red rose and struck the roaring anger of the people at the structure
of the shah's regime, disgrace for imperialism, and brought down the monarchic
15 -
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regime which was rotten to its roots. The 17th of Shahrivar was the symbol
of power and the strong determiaation of the people and the incapability and _
- weakness of the enemy. And now after the victory, the awakening of the people
against the two superpowers of America and the Soviet Union and their clandes-
tine and overt agents is a vital factor in determining the country's future
destiny and the continuation of the struggles so that everyday it is agitated -
more than the previous day in various ways. The resistance, bravery, and unity _
ot the people on 17 Shahrivar and Cheir ability to accurately distinguish _
between true enemies and friends should always direct our future. -
Iran's Women's Society of Tehran District will hold some ceremonies at 4 p.m.
on Friday, 16 Shahrivar, at its office. -
- Iran's Islamic Struggles Organization has extended its congratulations and _
- c.ondolence~ to Imam Khomeyni and the hero nation of Iran on lthe martyrs' -
anniversary on 17 Shahrivar and by addressing the Celebration Headquarters -
it has announced; From the beginning of Iran's Islamic revolution, the..Islamic
Struggles Organization started its activities against the satanic regime pub-
- licly by suffering several casualties (martyrs). It will participate in
the ceremonies of 17 Shahrivar and if necessary it is ready to provide se- -
curity with its military unit. _
In addition, various Islamic and religious groups have issued statements -
announcing their readiness to participate in these ceremonies which will be
~ held in Shohada Circle.
The na.~nes of the Islamic societies are as follows: The Committee of the _
Islamic Society of The roundry in Tehran: the Council of Employees of the
National Society for the Protection of Children; the Islamic Society ~f
Shroudwearers; the Mujahedin Organization of God's Way; the Islamic Society _
of Husayniyeh Sar Kurd Mulla; the Islamic Society of West Tehran; the Islam~.c
Society of the Students of Nazi Abad; the Islamic Society of Mehr Villa,
- Karaj; the Islamic Society of Ferdos Shahriyar; the bazaar businessmen and
syndicates affiliated to the Mujahedin Organization of God's way.
The names of some of the other or~anizations and societies were published in ,
~ the previous issue. : ~
Based on the report of the Celebration Headquarters for the anniversary of -
17 Shahrivar, up to last night the foll.owing groups and societies have =
announced their readiness to participate in the ceremonies:
The Islamic Society of Iran's National Gas Company', the Islamic Society
(community) of employees of the Central Bank; the Central Council of Non-
commissioned Officers and Personnel of the Police Department of Iran's
Islamic Republic; the Islamic Community of Iran's oil Personnel; the Islamic
Community of the Children's Mental Development Center; thz Islamic Community
16
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of the Office in Charge of Attending to Medical Documents Affiliated with
- the Ministry of Health; the Islamic Community of the Personnel of the 011
Industry in Tehran; the Islamic Community of Agricultural Development Bank;
the Islamic Community of the Personnel of Tehran's Regional Water Organiza-
tion; the Islamic Community of Personnel of Vahed Company; the Islamic Com-
munity of the State Aviation Personnel; the I~lamic Community of the Em-
ployees of Iran's Agricultural Cooperative Bank; the Islamic Community of -
Shemshak; the Islamic Community of Atomic Energy; the Islamic Community of
Iran's Communication Company; the Social [delfare Orgar.ization, Branch l;
the Islamic Community of the Foundry in Tehran; the Islamic Community of
Employees of the Ports and Shipping Organization; the Islamic Community of
- the Ministry of Mines and Industries; the Islamic Community of the Ministry _
- of Culture and Higher Education; the Islamic Community of the National Wel-
fare Organization for the Elind; the Islamic Co~unity of Iran's Carpet Com-
= pany, Inc. related to the Ministry of Comme:ce; the Islamic Society of the
Medical School of Imam Khomeyni at Tehran University; the Islamic Community _
of Qasr Garrison, Zd Infantry Division of Tehran; the Handicapped Society;
Iran's Islamic Struggle's Organization; the Javadiyeh Committee; the Islamic
Community of Employees of the Regional Organization for Health and Welfare of
Tehran Province; the Islamic Community of Employees of Tehran's Regional
- Power; the Mujahedin Organization of God's way; the Islamic Community of
Ministry of National Guidance; the Islamic Revolution Housing Foundation in
Tehran and all cities; the Islamic Community of PARS NEWS AGENCY; the Society
of Employees of the Official Newspaper of Iran's Islamic Republic; the Islamic
- Community of Employees of the Insurance Industry; the Islamic Society of
Javadiyeh-Vali 'Asr Fedayee Group; the Pro-National Youth; the Islamic
Community of Welfare and Education Organization for the Youth and Children
Affiliated with the Ministry of Health and Welfare; the Task Group of the ~
12th Committee; the Group of the Islamic Community of Saviors of Islam; -
the Islamic Society of Mehdi's Call; the Society of Qomi Patriots; the Islamic ~
Society of the Employees of Pharmaceutical Plants and Related Companies;
the Islamic Society of A'ameh Mosque in Shemran; the Islamic Society of
Employees oi Iran's National University; the Islamic Council of Pars Oil
Company Empioyees; the Islamic Society of Civil Defense Organization Per- ~
sonnel of Iran's Islamic Republic; the Islamic Society of the Ministry of
Housing and City Construction and Development; the Society of Unity of Islam; _
_ Nabi Akran Mosque. ,
~
9156 -
CSO: 4906
,
;
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~ _ ,
IRAN 1
RETURNING STUDENTS DISILLUSIONED WITH KHOMEYNI LAND
Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 24 Sep 79 pp 151, 154, 157 ~
[Article by SPIEGEL editor Erich Wiedemann: "We Fell Into the Mullahs'
Trap"] , ,
[Text] "Everyone listen!" cries the mullah. "Is there anyone who saw how
the dogs of Sajjed Sheikh Oleshmade ate from golden platters?"
Of course there is scmeone. The revolutionary court always has appropriate
witnesses at hand when it is in need of evid~nce. Outside the door of Kasr
Prison continually huddle three or four dozen young people who are ready to ~
furnish statements as witnesses if necessary.
, The witness who saw the dogs of the multimillionaire Sheikh~Oleshmade in
the golden bowl was the chief witness in the trial of the functios~ary of the
former SAVAK secret service only last week. If he continues to do a good
- job, he may become a jail-keeper--the chief judge has promised it.
Meanwhile, the trials in the mosque of Kasr Prison are quite well balanced.
_ Ayatollah Chalchali, the head Jacob in of the regime, completes six death
sentences within a half hour--completely without witnesses.
The job of j ailer has a good future in Tehran. The Evin and Kasr prisons are
well f illed. Not long ago, the army cleared an entire block in Bareshar ,
Caserne in order to accommodate the new arrivals which the young Khomeyni ~
commandos deliver after nightly raids. That creates 3obs.
The expanded penal catalog, although not yet even codified in an orderly
- manner, has revived old intrigues. a 70-year-old widc~ww and her 74-year-
o1d married male friend from the southern side of Tehran were whipped, under
the supervision of a mullah, until they were half dead after a relative had
allagedly caught them in a compromising position. One can put an obnoxious
neighbor b ehind bars with the aid of only an empty beer bottle from his
garbage can.
18
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In place of the SAVAK sadists, today the "Odamhooje bedun-i-nachun"--the
~ "people without fingernails"--are operating the inatruments of torture.
They are repaying the imprisoned helpmatea of the toppled regime with an
: eye for an eye,
The official fingernail-rippers can be satisfied with the revolution--unlike
the person who made the coffee for the Iranian atomic energy authorities -
who, on the day of Khomeyni's return, rushed through the hall with a cocked
machine gun and announced himself as the new director. For weeks now he
has been making the coffee again, and he does not actually know why he
supported this revolution.
- The tens of thousands of students who followed the Ayatollah home to Persia
to assist in the rec.onstruction of the country do not know why either. The
Moslem papists had decided to send them out to Belutschistan to work on
: street construction, but the young intellectuals had not envisioned t~ie
reconstruction that way. ~
Now hoards of them are streaming back to France and the Federal Republic of '
Germany. All flights to the West are booked for weeks in advance. The week
- before last, the American embassy on Roosevelt Avenue, barred and nailed all
around, had to close its consular department 1 hour after it had reopened
because the visa applicants threatened to crush the clerks.
Many of those wishing to returr? to America have settled in the amusement park .
- on Mossadegh Avenue (formerly Pahlevi Av~nue) where they meet their daily
needs at shashlik and cola stands. _
"41e have been deceived," says Gholamresa Yazdani, former medical student in
San Francisco and today owner of "Gholamresa's Popular Hamburger and Kebab ~
_ Studio." "We fell into the mullahs' trap"--or their own.
Ayatollah Khomeyni and his followe�rs have never made a secret of the fact
that there would be no place for left-wing and liberaT. intellectuals in the
Islamic Republic.
The proletariat cannot be consolidated; the students have tried it often
enough. Two weeks ago, Khomeyni's bonebreakers broke up a student demonatration
in the center of Tehran with such force that the street cleaners had to work _
for 2 hours to scrub the blood off the pavement.
Only the banner with the day's slogan swung for another half day in the
branches of the trees on Firdausi Square: "Margbar chodam ke gof tam margbar
shah"--"Death to me who called for the death of the Shah."
~ Shah Reza would not recognize his old and new friends. "Iran was truly fre e
only in the last 6 months of the shah's rule," says Gholamresa Fazdani. In
_ January he was still a part of the academic mob which looted the villa of
19
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~
the shah's sister Sham in Beverly Hills. In the mullahs the intellectuals
_ had seen only a means of implenienting their own revolution. Now the situation
_ is completely reversed.
A previously unknown differentiation can be sensed in academia. Today one ~ -
differentiates between the shah of torture who sent his SAVAK executioners
_ after peace-loving citizens and the shah of reform who wanted to lea_ his
~ people out of the Middle Ages into the present. .
The Shi'ite clergy has lost much ground, above all with women. The mullahs
dismantled what remained of the rudiments of emancipation from the emperor's
time. Educational opportunities f or girls have decreased again; women must
_ still pass a virginity test to acquire civil service positions; and in divorce
law women have once again been reduced to the status of property which can
be returned if it fails to please. "Who could have suspected all that?" asks -
Gholamresa.
Bahrnan Nirumand from Berlin, who for many years was the spokesman for the
German resistance to the shah's regime, is also no longer happy about his
revolution, after Khomeyni's Moslem thugs beat him up during a demonstration.
- When asked by a reporter what he was doing now, Nirumand replied: "Nothing,
absolutely nothing, nothing at all." Demonstrating in Berlin is certainly
less dangerous.
The opposition in jail, the press and parliament under the control of the
mullahs, the students have fled or else afi the shashlik spits--where is the
resistance?
At the cemetery, for example. At the beginning of the month, the central
- cemetery of Behesht-Sahra south of Tehran was closed for 2 days after
unidentified persons placed hats on 500 headstones on the graves of victims
of the shah regime.
A scroll on the mortuary illustrates the meaning: "Big hats have been placed
- on you." In good German: "You were deceived." ;
- Revolutions are seldom annual festivals of relaxed gaiety. But this one here
has included melancholy right in its manifest. Laughing aloud is the devil's
_ work; music is opium for the people; an@ women are allowed to bathe only ~
in a full veil. Even 7-year-old schoolgirls must appear in school dressed
in black.
Islamic morals are subject to continual attack~. Khomeyni's guards had to
awarm out in order to collect the nonalcoholic beer in shops and supermarkets: ~
It had been reported to the authorities that Moslems, under the evil influence
of nonbelievers, had augmented the mild brew--brand name 1�Ayatollah Lager"--
with alcohol-produc3ng yeast. -
_ 20
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Even the foot soldiers of the holy man are not afraid to evade the prohibition
- on alcohol. Mullahs and the committees which are subordinate to them are '
practicing the art of making schnapps and brewing beer. There were 10
- breweries in Tehran earlier; today a fragrant aroma rises from a few hundred ~
illegal breweries.
The illegal art of brewing has, to be sure, not yet reached its zenith.
Every day at least a dozen "schnaps corpses" are brought into the hospitals--
victims of overdoses of the methyl alcohol which remains behind in the
sloppy processing of the home brew.
The person who wants to get drunk safely buys his liquor from the committees
a.~ which confiscate the duty-free whiskey of the tourists from the West at
Mihrabad Airport. It is pure even if, a~ 8000 rial (DM 150) per bottle, it
~ is twice as expensive as the sour laundry slop made from dates or oranges
which is sold at the bazaar.
~veryday life in Tehran proves that the mullahs and their worldly adepts
from the bazaar had something more secular in mind than th~ theocrat Khomeyni -
would have been ready to tolerate--had he been aware of it.
The houses of rhe rich in Shemiran and Niavaran were to become meeting placea
for the Mostafasin, for the poorest members of Iranian society. Nevertheless,
today mullahs reside in the villas. Some have taken over entire blocks of -
apartment houses which were left behind by their owners. One mullah who
lives there has for a long time been arriving at the mosque not as a beggar
but rather in a Mercedes. _
, It is also harvest time for the bazaar merchants. They financed the way
back to Qom for the Shi'ite pope with their billions of rial; now they want
_ their dividends. With the exce~tion of three, all ministers in the Bazargan
cabinet come from the bazaar. Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi, descendant
of an old bazaar family, considerately looks after the Pahlevi foundation which
is worth billions and was left over from ttie shah kleptocracy.
The youth are the most audacious. Khomeyni's son Hadshi Ahmed and his
_ brother-in-law Shahab Esh~aghi were observed as they emptied a suitcase
full of dollars at the teller's window of a Geneva bank. Ayatollah Montaseri,
~ Jr had the T.ehran airport occupied by loyal swordsmen because the flight -
procedures were not to his liking.
Newspapers which report on such excesses risk being banned. On 22 August,
_ 22 newspapers were shut down in a surprise move. Entire editorial staffs
were imprisoned. Rer~aining were the supportive enterprises like the TEHRAN
TIMES, which considers the censor "axiomatic"--"because there must be a
body which ensures that the moral standard of the revolution is not harmed."
21 ~
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Much more difficult is control of the moral standards of the foreign press. _
= Ali Behaadnia, forme�rly a gynecologist in the United States and today
director of the Foreign Press Office in the "Ministry of National Guidance"
is purging as well se he can. In the last quarter-year, he has expelled an
aver~qe of rwo EoxeiAn correapondenta each week.
It was Behsadnia's idea to criminally prosecute journalists for each publication
of their newspapers. Journalists who stay in Tehran without an official ~eal
of accreditation are treated as spies at his direction. And spies are to
be shot; that is international custom.
"Write what is true," is on the slogan pasted on the walls everywhere
foreign correspondents go. Over it threatens the diabolically distorted
face of a European correspondent who is in the process of shoving a cartridge
belt into his camera.
True is only that which is useful to the revolution. Even admitted revolu-
tionaries today doubt that this revolution is still useful to anyone at all
except the mullahs.
True, however, is also the fact that, despite everything, the masses support -
Kho~eyni. The left wing and the liberals seldom ~ather more than 50,000
demonstrators on the street. But when Khomeyni calls, millions still march.
9241
- CSO: 4403
~
;
22 ~
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IRAN
UNREST SPREADS AMONG MILTTARY, POLICE
Rift Between Army, Pasdars
Tehran EXCLUSIVE in English 7 Oct 79 p 5
- [Text) Reports reaching from the Kurdish regions in West Iran have indi-
cated that there is a grea~. deal of disagreement between the Revolutionary -
Guards (Pasdars) and the army officers stationed in the region. Exclusive
sources claim that the disagreements have gone very deep and after the
appointment of Mostafa Chaurran to Minister of National Defence. Pasdars -
in the Western regions claim that the army troops are not fighting vigor-
ously with the Kurdish r~bels and therefore Pasdars are induced to inter-
vene in order to win the war.
Non-commissioned officers and ev~n the officers are compelled to take -
orders from the Pasdars who give.them ammunition only when they deem it
_ necessary. pasdars are also giving instructions to the troaps concerning
any battles and if they do not obey orders, they will be punished by
Pasdars. ~
Exclusive sources also said that all the armed Air Force planes are accom-
panied by at least one armed Pasdar in order to supervise their operation
and have a tight control over them.
Meanwhile, informed sources in the region repart that mo~t of the young
Pasdars are fleeing from the baetle scenea since they.have said that they
were sent to fight the foreign elements and former Savakia while they are
forced to fight even Muslims and young Kurds who claim they are Iraniana.
The morale of the young Pasdars has reportedly declined as most of them -
are hoping to be able to escape from the region. However, there is no re- ~
turn for those who do not put up a fight and are said by their own officials
that if the;~ refrain from fighting the Kurdish rebels, they are'considered
- as counter-revolutionaries and enemies of Islam
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400 Homafars Arreeted _
Tehran EXCLUSIVE in English 7 Oct 79 p 5
[Text] A group of Air Force officers calling themselves progresaive per-
sonnel of the Air rorce have issued a statement claiming that 400 Homafars
(warrant officers) have been arrested on the orders from Dr. Mostafa Chamran,
the new National Defence Minister for preventing army and Air Force trans-
_ port planes from transporting food and supplies to Lebanon for those fight-
ing under the banner of Amal Political Party.
Exclusive sources claim that Chamran is still the leader of Amal in Lebanon
and that he was trying to use Air Force and Army planes to supply the mem- _
bers of Amal with food and clothing just before the onset of the cold
weather. It was said that the Air Force personnel have already published
a list of goods and other coIIanodities shipped to I,ebanon srnce Chamran's ~
_ new appointment.
Army Purge Planned
_ Tehran EXCLUSIVE in English 7 Oct 79 pp 3-4
[Text] The new Minister of National Defence, Mostafa Chamran has said that -
he is planning to purge the army in order to have a true national army who ~
will only defend the interests of the Iranian people.
Exclusive sources believe, meanwhile, that the main reason for appointing ~
Dr. Chamran to this position is the fact that he is not a military officer
and has no prejudice towards the army and the former officers and thus . -
= would have a free hand in purging the army officers who are sti11 hoping ~
for a change in the governmental conditions in Iran.
An exclusive source reported, meanwhile, that the army still does not co-
operate with the Islamic government and that the higher officers are in- ~
fluencing the junior officers. Therefore, Chamran hae been appointed to .
_ purge all the army officers from Major to the highest level.
- Following the purge, officials of the Islamic government are hoping to
appoint their own officers to key positions, most of who have already
undergone military training abroad. To this end, it seems that the govern-
ment and the army would welcome the former officials to be retired since
they hope to have a smaller army and on the side, develop the revolutionary
- corps as another source of military might.
Exclusive sources, meanwhile, believe that it would be difficult for the _
- new army to have trained pilots who wi11 be able to fly the highly sophisti-
cated American jet fighters, unless they sign an agreement with the United ~
States to train the new pilots.
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Retirement Requests on Rise
Tehran EXCLUSIVE in English 7 Oct 79 p 6
(Text] Informed sources in Bank Sepah, the bank in which all army officers -
are receiving their salariea, said last week that the number of army and
air force personnel requesting to be retired or dismissed from the army ia -
on the rise. -
- He said that each day between 150 to 200 professional officers, ranging _
from pilots, engineeXS to doctors asked to be either retired. or dismiseed
from the army. It was said that most of these officers have undergone
advanced training programmes and have been assured of better positi~ns
with much higher salaries in various countries, including Oman, Persian
Gulf sheikhdoms, Egypt and even Western countries.
- Informed sources said, meanwhile, that already many pilots have managed to
' be retired and are presently hoping that new National Defence Minister
_ Morteza Chamran would begin his purge of the army at various levels and -
that they would be able to either retire or be dismissed in this purge.
_ In most cases, pilots, doctors and engineers working in the army have left
their position without getting any compensations from the grmy since they
- have been assured of better positions with much more attractive terms by
certain neighbouring countriea.
Meanwhile, exclusive sources said that most professionals have been banned
from leaving the country, but they have managed to leave via the Persian
Gulf with the assistance of certain locals who had received large sume of
money from the officials of the countries who had hired these Iranian army
professionals.
_ ~'olice Officers Unhappy
Tehran EXCLUSIVE in English 7 Oct 79 p 4
[Text] The annual promotion of police officers this year has been delayed
and the officials have asked them to secure the consent of the local com-
mittee members before requesting a promotion. Members of the police forcea
stationed at various police stations are working closely with the members
of various committees who have recently moved to these police stations and
- working closely with them in various capacities.
_ However, it has been said that the police officers are not cooperating
with the committee members claiming that they are not trained for the job
and that police jobs need training as well as experience.
Thereiore, it seems that the officials are trying to induce and encourage -
the police personnel to have closer cooperation with the members of the com-
mittees who will also be purged to clear them out of all the undesirable
elements.
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In addition, police personnel have also lost some 40 per cent of their
usual income which they would normally have received for diacovering crimes
or narcotics. This has resulted in the total dissatisfaction of the police
personnel and they are not willing to teach the trick of their trade freely
to the newcomers who are members of the local committe~s.
CSO: 4920
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- IRAN
,
LAND FORCES CHIEF ASS.AYS KORDESTAN UNREST ;
LD010811 Teheran ~AMDAD in Persian 16 Oct 79 pp 1-2 LD ,
[Unattributed report: "Present Situation in Kordestan Explained"]~
[ExcerptJ In an interview with BANIDAD following the attack on his life
General Fallahi, commander of the land forces of the Islamic Republic nf
Iran, gave an account of the attack on his car (carried in yesterday's
_ edition) and spoke about conditions in Kordestan, the role of the army
and the martyrdom of the guards, an account of which is continued in �
today's edition. '
As regards the state of Kordestan, the land forces chief said: "The
_ Kordestan area, from Arasi to a line ~oining Tamarchin, Gardaneh Sheykh,
Piranshahr, Postuh, Jaldian, Naqadeh and Bukan is ca1m, and both the '
_ goverrnnent and the army are in control. A particularly authentic version '
- of the revolutioa~ will gradually be applied to this region.
"In southern Kordestan, bounded on the north by Ravanshahr, Paveh, Nowsud
and Showshami, the goverrnnent and the army are in total control. A large
number of people in this area believes in the revolution and only a small
- number has shown no desire to go along with it. In the central regions, `
including Kamyaran, Sanandaj and Marivan, the people are gradually beginning
ta understand the revolution, and as they do so the area becomes calmer.
"However, in certain regions of Kordestan, such as Mahabad, Sardasht and
Baneh, the people are strangers to the revolutian, which for various
reasons has made no impact here since its successful. accomplishment. The
people are perceptibly under the influence of the de�unct democratic party's
propaganda. It must be stressed that the peopl.e of Kordestan should be
distinguished from the Democratic Party of Kordestan. My personal under~
standing, which is based on my visit to the region, is that some decent
Kurdish people have been intimidated by the party's armed activitles."
- CSO: 4906 -
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IRAN
SOVIET INVOLVEPiENT IN KORDESTAN REJECTED
Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 23 Sep 79 pp 1, 2 .
[Text] Iranian Envoy to the Soviet Union discloses: "Foreign Planes Wanted
to Intervene in Conflict of Kordestan--It Is Not Right to Accuse the Soviet -
Union for the Events of Rordestan--American Plans Concerning Persian Gulf
Will Not Be Left Without Counteraction From the Soviets." ~
'"he PARS NEWS AGENCY--In an interview with the PARS NEWS AGENCY, Dr Makri, ~ -
Envoy of the Islamic Rapublic of Iran to the Soviet Union, stated: "When
Occidentals want to carry out a colonization plan in some place of the world
they first collect its literature and create a quasi-scientific backgroutid,
and then using this backgr~und they achieve the sought-for reeults. It is
.likewise as regards Islam. They brought forward a kind of Isl.am in the
- North of Africa that outwardly was very hypocritical and attractive, and they
_ defended it against another group that acted as historiana and Islamists who
were finding fault with that fslam and asserted that Islam wae the cause of
backwardness. These two schemes had formed the base of the plan of coloniza-
tion, and the Islam they commended was liable to the same ob~ectione ~nd
criticiams."
z
Foreign Planes '
Regarding the events of Kordestan and the Weat country Dr Makri stated: ~ ~
~
As I have already said earlier in thie reapect, if there had been the
slightest delay in the issuance of the Imaa's order, Kordestan would be
separated. It was even about ta happen that eome interaation~l organiza-
tions, such as ~urists for human rights and freedom, Red Crose, and some ~
Western foundations and countries, would recognize the Kordiah separatista.
And there was even a poasibility that the planea of other countries would
enter the disturbed area. If that happened, grest difficulties might ariee.
_ I am a Kurd, but I don't believe that Kurds are a distinct or pureat
Iranian people. I am rather of the opinion that we are all Iranians and
that no city is better than the other." ~
; -
;
,
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There Was No Soviet Involvement
"Likewise I should say that the agitatora in the West were not Kurds.
In the events of Kordestan there hae been interference of colonialist
countries and there were soma with 100 percentZioniet influence. I don't
coneider ae true the involvement of the Soviete in theae events and have no
proof in thie respect, unlees thie inte rference comes from some countriee
unfriendly to us, and I have likewise heard nothing in that respect. On ~
the whole, our friendly relatione with the Soviet Union are auch that it ie
not in the interest of the Soviete to interfere in our internal affaire."
In anawering the queation whether the Soviets will counterreact the plana
of America and aome countries of the Persian Gulf in that regfon, and the
question of the 110,000-strong American force for the protection of the oil
fields, Dr Makri said: "This problem is very intricate, and the Soviet
authorities should speak of this matter themselvea. However, our viewpoint
and policy is against the presence of any superpower in the Persian Gulf,
and such a presence is also not in the intereat of any of them. Anyway,
it is my opinion that theae deveZopments will not remain without a counter-
action on the part of the Soviets in view of the fact that they have forces
in the South Yemen. It is also possible that the Soviet insistence in their
support of Afghdnistan is not without connection with this matter."
1015
CSO: 4906
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~
IRAN
'DISTINGUISHED RELIGIOUS SECTARIANS' CRITICIZED BY NF
~
- Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 25 Sep 79 p 2
[Text] The National Front, in a 12-page brochure entitled "Open Letter to
the Iranian People from the National Front," criticized the operations of -
the Council of Experts, deviations from accepted legal standards and the
formation of special ~udicial bodies by the clerics.
The brochure warned the Iranian people that a body called the Council for
- the Higher Study of Basic Law has ratified tfie principles of a new basic
law that is inconsistent with tfie economic and social realities of present- ;
day Iran. This cannot be conaidered a progressive law~ one which safeguards ~
the righte of inen in different social, political and econotnic spHeres. Not
only will the new basic law confront any future Iranian government with ~
numerous abmiguities and inadequacies, but any government established on the
basis of this law will no~ be responsive to the nation's need for a political
structure in keeping with today's scientific and technological advances, and
which will preserve a free ~nd progress~ve sociPty.
The Council of Experts' Policy
The brochure had the following to say about the formation of a Constitueat
Assembly:
"The government's failure to enact a regulation for elections ta a Cansti t- -
uent Assembly, which had been ratified, and ita acceptance of 73 members
instead of 350, ia a ma~or step Backwards for the revolution. After the s~.,
excitement of the early days of the revolution had subsided on account of
the government's indecisiveness and its basic incompetence in organizing
and carrying out pressing plans, disorder and inaecurity began to envelop
the country."
Elsewhere in the brochure, the National Front had this to eay about the way _
the Council of Experts works:
"The National Front, in its statement of 26 June, spelled out in detail ite
ideas about tfie Constituent Assembly. . .
~
r
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"Unfortunately, however~ no attention is paid to the viewa~ obaervations
and proposals of ind~viduals and groups with social and political views. -
Thus all of the Front's proposals were ignored. While the Prime Minister _
has paid attention to the facts in his statements, unfortunately he and the
other members of his government capitulate to the monopoly-seeking clerical
circles and pur the latter's views into execution or facilitiate their
execution. As a result of this incorrect policy, the center of power has
shifted outside the legally constituted government, and a amall group hae
stepped forward on the political, economc and social stage." -
Formation of the Clerics' Special Islamic Court
The formation of the clerics' special Islamic court was the first step
towards consolidating their power, as opposed to the basic goal of the
_ revolution which was the elimination of privileged ruling factions.
After the establishment of this court, the next step was the approval of a -
law giving the revolutionary courts separate ~urisdiction in cases involving
the revolutionary guards. At p resent the clerics' power is based upon the
revolutionary guards and the committees and the revolutionary courts. The
clerics' wide-ranging role has ample historical precedent~ such as the
Zoroastrian priests in pre-Islamic Iran and the Christian Church in Europe
in the Middle Ages. -
In its brochure the National Front referred to the Council of Experts'
deviations from accepted legal principles and the formation of a new ruling,
class. It concluded by saying:
"We expect that after the victory of the revolution the voice of the National
- Front, which reflects the wishes of the informed strata of society, will be
heeded for the first time by the ruling elements. Then the revolution wili -
take its place as the renaissance of the Iranian people and a progressive
example to the rest of the world.
8921
CSO: 4906
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IRAN ,
FIRE IN TEHRAN AFGHAN II~IBASSY LABELED PLOT OF ' UNIDEN'I'IFIED ELIIKIIVTS' '
Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 25 Sep 79 p 14 , -
[Text] The PARS NEWS AGENCY informs that a fire broke out last night in the
vicinity of the Afghan Embassy on the Abbasabad Avenue next to a gas station,
_ and was quickly extinguished with help ~f local residents and Police officers
assigned to that district. ~ ~
One of the eyewitnesses told our reporter that the fire actually started
outside the building in a small watch box. This witness said that the fire _
was intentional and that the damage inflicted was very small. ~ ~
In the aftermath of this event we contacted the Afghan Embassy and a apokes-
man of that embassy, who didn't give his name, has confirmed the occurrence
- of fire and called it a plot on the part of unknown individuals.
In de~cribing the cause of the fire he said th~t at 9:00 p.m. last night the ;
small booth that served as a shelter was set on fire by sprinkling it with
gasoline, and that then the fire has spread to the embassy building and i
resulted in burning of a window and venerian blinds. ,
He has also pointed out that the fire broke out in the vicinity of a gas
- station with 2,000 liters of fuel. However, with the aid of the local peo- ,
ple and embassy's personnel the fire was extinguished and there is some damage
as a result of it. Col. Sepehri, Deputy Chief of the local Police Station, :
also said that this fire was very npgligible and that it occurred probably ;
from carelessness, such as dropping a cigarette, and that it had not much i
importance. He added that a dossier on this occurrence was sent to the ,
Public Prosecutor's Office, and that the matter is not worth notice.
~ Viewpoinr of Spokesman of Ministry of Foreign Affairs ~ j ~
- The spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in response to a telephone
' inquiry of the PARS NEWS AGENCY concerning the fire beside the Afghan Em-
bassy in Tehran said that according to their information a small fire occurred ~ ~
~ in a watch box near the Afghan Embassy in Tehran, but that a detailed
- description of how and what happened is not as yet available and that the
competent authorities are investigating this event.
32 -
1015 ' -
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_
- i�
IRAN
REVOLUTIONARY NEWSPAPERS EXPRESS VIEWS ~
Tehran BANIDAD in Persian 1 Sep 79 p 9
~
[Text] (1) This part is an impartial view of the press in Iran.
(2) The long articles have been summarized due to limited space.
(3) BANIDAD does not take responsibility for the accuracy or in- ,
accuracy of the articles. ~
- The Unity of the Revolutionary Moslem Forces Published by t~MAT, 20th ~ saue. _
The progressive religious (forces) have heavy responsibilities, because,
on one hand, they have the peopJ.e on their side and, on the other hand, they _
. act as one of the arms of the revolutionary leader. It is their duty to
_ free themselves from the influence of the reactionary and mc~nopoliatic forces.
. Furthermore, instead of banishing the Moslem revoluti~nary elements, they
- should take steps to cooperate and unite with them--putting the revolutionary
- Moslems under pressure would result directly t~ the benefit~of imperialism
and the reactionaries. They should also take a more decisive position with
- regard to the ruling liberal force. By dominating the decisionmaking
- channels, they should put the government under pressure to purge and :.evo--
lutionize the offices and army and for the full implementat3un of revo lution- ;
- ary projects and stop the regrowth of capitalism. _
, Under the existing sensitive conditions, any type of pressure and limiting :
the activities of Moslem revolutionary elements and forces is condemned and
dangerous. We need revolutionary unity for all Moslem revolutionary and ,
progressive forces to f ight against the plots of colonialism, to purify the -
country from dictatorship ties and relations and to cease the influence of
capitalism, to provide the country's full independence and to renovate the ,
society's genuine economy. Under the current sensitive conditi~ns, more aware-
ness and unity is required from all forc~a sincere and faithful to the revo- ;
lution. Under the existing conditions, the reactionary (opposition) and
capitalists have had more growth because of the apparent excuses for reform
(protecting the revolution and overcoming the economic crisis) for stabilizing
_ the position of favorite elements and those remaining fram tha era of dicta-
~ torship (under the pretext of the need to fight against antirevolutionaries)..
33
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_
Under the existing sensitive conditions, considering the re~olutionary aware-
ness that the people have, you should take gositive steps for the unity of
progressive and Moslem for~es and accomplish your historic duty concerning
the continuation of the revolution, serving the poor people ar~d supporting =
the revolutionary leader by overlooking personal motives and issues and
following principles of virtue and by getting away from liberal and reaction-
- ary factors. That is all.
"The Greatest Factor of Profiteering," Published by Burse, Shahrivar 8
[30 August 1979]
If our revolution has been a political revolution, ti~ere should also be a
revolution in f ighting with profiteering and high costs. The revolution should
_ take place in the bazaar and for the general base of prices and for cutting
off the hands of brokers and a bunch of looters and freeloaders. We all know
that in overthrowing the satanic regime, there were freeloaders and profit-
eers, unaware of God, acting as Moslems who were economic and social leeches
- under the name of forward purchasers, who buy, in.advance, the products of
the farmer's labor at no cost before the harvest. After hoarding the food ~
and agricultural products in storage, they sell them to the consumer se-
veral times higher. Consumers constitute a majority of the inhabitants
of this country.
The forward purchasers for instance had concentrated on citrc+us gardens in
the North (Shahsavar and Ramsar) for such products as oranges, tangerines,
_ etc. They buy the best quality of oranges when they are unripe and still
on the tree for 10 rials a kilo maximum and then sell the same oranges for
100-1,200 rials or even higher before New Year's Eve. This is also done
with summer crops, such as, cucumbers, tomatoes, eggplants, onions, potatoes, _
- vegetables, water melon; of cantalopes, melons, etc. Isn't this the only
factor in profiteeYing by forward purchasers, hoarders of food products,
businessmen, those who pretend to be Moslems, hoarders and some of the un- ~
- fair businessmen in the bazaar and the distance between the production, dis- _
tribution and consumption sites? -
"Fighting with Profiteers" Published by JOSHAM, 8 Shahrivar [30 August]: -
There is no Chamber of 9yndicates in the Islamic Republic. What is considered
and respected is the degree of inercy and fairness or justice. Such a degree
determines the belief of the guild in Islamic justice. The Islamic Court of
the Guild has announced that from now on any businessman, merchant or owner
of factories who profiteers and overlooks the rights of eonsumers will be _
punished according to religious standards. The least punishment would be
- introducing them as antirevolutionarie~ and lashing them at Friday prayers -
conducted in front of thousands of faithful persons. Perhaps it is necessary
for all to know as a reality that pretending to follow the Is'_amic Republic's _
standards cannot protect us from sins and disobedience. Profiteerir~g is a
sin in violation of the people's rights and God's commandment. Go~? 5aid
- 3~+
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~ahosoever violates the people's rights will not be under my mercy. There-
fore, you businessmen who call yourselves the beloved ones of God treat the -
consumers based on Islamic justice and do not intend to make violations.
Consider a profit for yourselves that would be fair and not in excess of the
usual limit. If you do other.wise, your actions and behavior will not conform
_ with God's comm~ndment on justice and will be far from Islamic justice and
therefore you cannot enj~y ~od's mercy or forgiveness--the God who is every-
where observing the actions of his servants.
"Yesterday Marivan, Today Paveh, Where Tomorrow?" Published by PASDARAN ~
12th issue:
With the cooperation of their sincere friends, that is Palizban and Barzani,
the leftist elements are carrying out the conspiracies of CIA one by one. _
- The blood ef the Marivani broth~rs shed with injustice and in a dastardly
way has not yet dried than the mercenary and traitor agents (who have even
sold thei.r honor) have made preparations for wider bloodshed in another
part of our country. Those who, under the pretext of supporting the rights
of the workers, attack all of our national and religious sacred things with- _
out having achieved any results from so much effort in trying to make our
revol.utionary nation deviate from its path, have decidr~d to get revenge frotn
this deprived nation. Tnose who found their dreams lost with the 98-per- ~
cent referendum which was a knockdown answer to their carrying out any
plan that Zionists and imperialists find advisable and leading our nation to
bloodshed and fire directly or indirectly. Then again without any shame =
and with a].1 their antipeople positions, they expect to be considered to be -
of the people. If the government does not carry out its duty, which is to -
be decisive toward antirevolutionaries, the enemp will become a bloodsucker.
Yesterday in Marivan, today Paveh and tomorrow the whole country. Who is
to respond? God knows. Hoping that the government would not be participat-
ing in wasting the bload of the martyrs. Amen.
- "It's a Pity that Itan..." Published by Etehad Bozorg 8 Shahrivar [30 Au~ust]: -
All of us are bereaved when any Iranian is killed. Kurd, Lor, Mazandarani, -
Azerbaijani, or Tehrani, we are all the children of this country. 'And, un- _
doubtedly we want honor for our motherland and peace for our fellow citizens. -
Why should a small dispute and an unworthy involvement lead to the death of
so many of us? Undoubtedly, in the tragic catastropY~e which took place in
the west of our country, the government is the most: guilty of all as it did
not respond on time to the natural and certain demands of our oppressed -
Kurdish fellow citizens. The governrient Government overlooked the Kurds who -
want~d to keep some of their culture within the framework of Iranian nation-
ality, The presence of antirevolutionaries helped spread insecurity and,
on the other hand, by giving opportunity to opportunist elements, they pene-
trated.and made aggressions at the boundaries of mil9.tary garrisons and in- '
- flamed the (forgotten) differences. A knot which could.have been untied with
- optimism became an entangled knot by showing partiality and harshness.
35 , -
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I
Who suffered the consequences? Zt i,s a pi,ty ~.f we do not put an end to the
- war right now.
_ Mr Bazargan, it is not so late now. ,
- Take a step forward and overlook all of the negligences and mistakes of ,
both sides. Think only of Iran which it would really be a pity to ruin. ~
- "We Al1 Made Mistakes," Published by MARDOM-E IRAN (JAMA) 8 Shahrivar
[30 August]: .
: In the 6 months that have passed from the first phase af revolution, we have
witnessed deviations and observed individual and groups going to extremes.
Sometimes, this caused anxiety that the moveinents which were contradictory
to the revolutionary spirit might halt the revolutionary trend. However,
each time what was hopeful was the guidances of the Imam and the deep belief '
and faith of the people in the genuineness of the revolution and their sup-
port of the decisive leadership of Imam Khomeyni. The rich Islamic cultura'1 -
movement swept away people of every type who were in the way. This should
be a lesson fo r all, including the intellectuals. the government, the revo-
lutionary council, political organizations, the clergy and everyone since
some of the mistakes can be compensated. However, some cannot and they are
- unforgiveable from the people's point of view. We should try not to make
more mistakes because we will be condemned by history and God will not for-
give our faults. , -
We should also consider the point that some of the individuals or groups
who can use the special existing conditions and the people's fee~ings to
their own advantage will be faced withti~e revolutionary le3der's anger and
fury, considering the sincerity and frankness that we find in the revolu-
_ tionary leader who reminds us of the sincerity and frankness of Hazrat-e
Ali, the true leader and Imam of Moslems in the world. The revolutionary
leader has nothing on his mind but the needs of the poor and the oppressed. -
The Imam's warning that we all made mistakes should be an alarm for everyone -
that if we stop serving the poor and the deprived, we will willy-nilly be ~
destroyed by the flooding of the revolutionary uproar of the people.
_ "The Message Of The Leader Of The Paveh Guards," Published by Islamic Repub-
lic 8 Shahrivar [30 August 1979]:
Question: Do you have a message for the Iranian nation?
~
Answer: Do you mean our message or the message of the Revolutionary Guards
- of Iran. Because the philosophy for the existence of the corps is to pro-
tect the Islamic revolution. Therefoxe, the message is the same Islamic
messa~e which tells all people to protect the revolution. We are not the
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~ only paramilitary force established for the protection of this revolution.
Our real backing is the people. Because if the people did not participate
- in the movement, we would not have been successful in this revolution.
I want the people to put the government under pressure and if possible to
beat the government and to follow the Imam's policy, because the Imam under-
' stands the nation's pain, as he fullows Islam. I ask the Imam and the whole =
nation everywhere in this territory to beat the government if it shows some
- weakness or makes compromise with the traitors. The government shows a lot
of weakness. We also see this weakness in the government's foreign policies.
Perhaps they have some roots. Can we say it was a political mistake? It
is the Iranian nztion that protects the revolution. The nation should nat -
expect all their work to be corrected by the top officials. They should
get into action and if they see that the government does not respond to the
nation's cry, they should put the government under pressure and destroy it.
This is my message.
"Remarks made by Isma'il Ra'in," Published by RUYDAD, 20 Mordad, 1358
[11 August 1979]:
a
Following the publication of the book "Freemasonry and Freemason's Lodge in
, Iran" which I had written and some other books and articles published in
this respect, some groups assumed that the "Okhovat Society" was also one
of the organizations related to the official Iranian Freemasonry Organization,
affiliated to Molavi's Grand Lodge and Iran's Grand Lodge. This has created
some anxiety for the reputable men and women who were members of the above-
- mentioned society and other para Freemasonry organizations such as the honor-
able professors, Dr Abdol Hussein Zarin Kub and Dr Abbas Zar Yab Khu'yi.
- I find myself morally and conscientiously obligated to inform everyone that _
as far as I have personally u?ade studies, none of the above mentioned pro-
fessors and teachers has been affiliated to any of the 41 lodges of Iran's
official Freemasonry Organizations related to the grand lodge of Iran.
Any assumption made about these persons is nothing but a misunderstanding
and a mistake or an intention to damage the reputation of these reputable -
persons who are the rare scientific resources of our country.
9156
CSO: 4906
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_
. . IRAN
CAUTIOUS CRITICISM OF FLOGGItdG AS A PUNITIVE MEASURE
Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 24 Sep 79 p 1
(Text] Last night, a young man and woman were publicly flogged for
allegedly exchanging sensual glances.
The undesired side-effects of thie act may outweigh the "warning" intended
by the per.sons reaponsible for the flogging. The publication of this
article was prompted by the simultaneous appearance of aeveral items in the
- preas and on TV~
First, the Imam's son said in an interview: "Do not punieh the effecte of
corruption; stamp out the causes, and the effects will vanish by themselves."
This is an old saying but ~ true one, and it should be repeated for the
benefit of those who thank that lashing several women who have miebehaved,
black-marketeers and drinkers of wine will banish these evile from the earth. ~
The same day, a religious ~udge said that floggings cannot be ordered at
some individual's pleasure; such floggings must stop immiediately. This
verdict is a source of ~oy in places where the lash has been used as a
means of settling old scores and showing power; it is hypocritical to call
it a means of protection from evil. .
That same night, a film was shown on TV about socia~ probleme as the source ,
: of corruption. There was also a televised discussion ataong aevsral authori-
ties about the intellectuals' role in the Iranian revolution, during which
the question was raised of how to reconcile human nature and the mercy of ,
Islam with the harshness of flogging. ~
The mercy of Islam, which is exemplified by our religioua leadera, such ae ,
_ the Imam Khomeyni and Father Taleqani --why is it allowed to be distorted ~
by power-seeking and harsh-natured men, furnishing domestic and foreign
critics with material they cite as evidence of the revolution's collapse?
When we have built the perfect Ic~lamic society, you will have the right to , C"
flog anybody who violates its order, txanquallf:ty and progreae. For the
- moment, however, we are atill in what our father the Imam calls the "Sh~h's
society." Therefore, enough of this harahness, 1et us r~build our countiry
with kindness and cooperation. Let us not give the enemies of religion and
the atate grist for their mills, nor throw away the fruita of our God-given
revolution, nor promote harshneas. A correct economic program will burn
out the roots of profiteering, smuggling and other misdeede. ~ _
- 8921 -
_ CSO: 4906 38
~
~ _ ; ;
_
, , . , . .s-
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IRAN ,
STATE OF NATIONAL ECONOMY ANALYZID
Tehran IRAI~? ECONOMIC SERVICE in ~nglish 6 Oct 79 pp 16-18
[Text] Political events that occurred in Iran during the last Iranian year
sharply reduced investment and production in the private and public sectors;
the country which had suffered from inflationary pressu~es, also faced
severe stagnation and unemployment.
While total demand somewhat moderated during the year due to stagnation,
unemployment, and substantial drops in private and public investment, the
fall in domestic production coupled with suspension of imports disrupted
the balance of supply and demand.
Available statistics and evidence show that during the early months of the
current year, production remains relatively stagnant in both the private -
and public sectors despite efforts by the Government to reactivate the
econoirry. For instance, during the first quarter of this year government
payments for development amounted to R1s.15 billion, shawing a drop of
92% compared with the corresponding period of last year. At this rate,
the budget allocations amounting to R1s.880 billion for development under "
the current budget will not be spent; and that in turn will lead to undesir-
able consequences arising from continued unemployment and stagnation.
Apart from operational obstacles on the path of government development
' projects, those industries which have been nationalized by the Government
presently face numerous problems of management, labor, imports, etc.
Government measures such as nationalization of banks and some industriea ~
and generally the Government`s approach during recent months Y~ave to some ~
extent defined the rules and the order that will regulate the private
sector's position in the future economy of Iran, and have reduced the
crisis of confidence that had appeared during the revolution. iVonetheless, _
= at least for the current Iranian year it would not seem likely that the
top elements in the private sector will show much inclination towards
investment. Therefore during the ysar 1358, reduced production by the
private and public sectors during the revolution and the current problema -
faced in the reactivation of the economy, coupled with the inflexibility '
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of the economy's structure and tlie generat shortage and lack of elasticity
of supply in the short-term, will act as major elements in sustaining
the inflationary pressures.
Such tasks as overcoming unemployment and stagnation, or fighting infla-
= tion can be carried out within the economic structure through fundamental
measures and comprehensive and ~aell-coordinated planning and in any case,
_ economic reconstruction and improvement is not a task that can be carried
out speedily; yet these problems require speedy and resolute action by
~ the government in the following areas: _
- a) All difficulties and problems that hinder implementation of development
projects should be examined and removed through urgent measures; -
b) While production in the private and public sectors remain low, and -
since it is not possible to rapidly increase domestic production in a
short period, the Ministry of Commerce should review its import policies
- and provide adequate facilities for importation of essential goods and
services (both consumer and commodities). [dhere the private sector is
- reluctant to import the Ministry should directly import essential goods.
, This will also erode the part played by middle men who in recent years
have effectively contributed to higher inflation.
c) Greater speed and resolution should be shown in connection with the
selec~ion of managers, solution of labor and import p~oblems.
d) In view of the fact that the country's foreign currency reserves were
announced to be between $15 billion and $12 billion during the first months
of the current year (Iranian calendar), and since most of the economy
cuts in the budget were in the foreign exchange field, it is essential--
in order to ensure adequate availability of rials for the budget--for
the public and private sectors to use all the foreign exchange that is
to provide the rials allocated in the budget. Otherwise, in practice, the ~
volur~e and b3se of the currency of the c.ountry in practice will have to
be increased; and the monetary element will be added to the shortage of
supply and the lack of its elasticity, as causes for higher inflation.
The Central Bank therefore must not only review its foreign exchange policy,
but also actively supervise changes in the private sector liquidity; and -
to adopt appropriate policies in times of need and in connection with the -
- overall state of the national economy. ~
- e) Special priority should be given in the country's credit policy for
the current year to funds aliocated directly for the reactivation of the
~econonry and those effective in increasing ~upply, especially in the build-
ing industry which is still stagnant. In view of the shortage in housing,
as far as possible, loans for house buying should be discouraged while -
-iiverting bank loans towards house building.
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f) The cottage and small industries which account for about 35% of the
value added of zhe manufacturing sector, in the past mostly obtained its
finance outside the banking system through the unofficial money market.
In the country's credit policy in future, greater attention is essential
for these labor-intensive industries. .
g) The government policy of subsidies for consumers and financial assistance
for producers must be reviewed and gradually reduced while using this method
mainly as additional incentives for domestic production either directly or
by reducing the cost price for raw materials and other goods required by =
industry and agriculture. In special cases, such as cement, where, in tile
_ past, a major portion of the shortages were due to corruption and the
- inadequacy of the distribution system, it is essential that the financial
= burden of such aids be reduced through appropriate measures in this field.
Financial Situation -
The final estimate of government receipts and payments during the last
(Iranian) year and a comparison of these figures with the 1356 annual
budget as well as the current year's budget estimate are given in Table 1.**
As will be seen, the 1357 annual budget had the substantial deficit which
could not be f illed even by domestic and foreign loans and other credit
sources. Consequently, the budget envisaged a net deficit of R1s.480.5
billion.
The political events of the year deeply affected the 1357 axinual budget
both in terms of receipts and of payments, so much so that public revenues
(including oil and gas revenues, taxes other incomes, loans, etc.) fell ~
from an estimated P.1s.2,656 billion to R1s.1,150 billioa, while expendi-
tures out of the public budget fell from an estimated Rls.3,287 billion
_ to Rls~1,986 billion. (These figures exclude private incomes and expendi-
- tures given in the budget.) _
The decline in.the general budget revenues during the past year compared
_ to budget estimates ~oas basically due to the decline in oil exports and
its full suspension during the last months of the last (Iranian) year.
- Oil and gas revenues earmarked in the approved budget amounted to
:tls.1,542 billion while in reality they did not exceed P.1s.1,013 billion. _
To be continued. �
CSO: 4920 ~
41 -
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IRAN
= NATIONALIZATION OF SECONDARY INDUSTRIES SUGGESTED
~ Tehran ENQELAB-E ESLAMI in Persian 3 Sep 79 p 9 .
[Text] Take, for example, an automobile factory which cannot produce
- autos unless the rubber and tire industries caa meet its requirements. Un-
der these circumst~nces, a capitalist would try to buy and gain control
of factories capable of supplying him with the needed components. Thus he
gains a monopoly and control of the market.
Nationalization and the Capitalists _
. ,
In previous sections we have explained how capitalists own and manage most
factories, banks and services in order to increase their profits and strength-
en their domination until they have a monopoly over the market. Our aim -
~ in explaining this is to illustrate the ~apitalists' way of working and to -
confirm the need for nationalizing their holdings. The demands of produc- -
tivity and economic laws rainforce the need for total nationalization of the
large capitalist firms. If the government nationalizes one firm but not
its suppliers, then the p.rivate c.~pitalists can paralyze the government-
owned firm by withholding supplies. In our opinion, the Commission on the
Protection and Expansion of Industry ought to feel compelled T.o do the same
thing as the capitalists, i.Q., to completeiy control t~ie different stages
- of production, the credit system and services.
In other words, they should national.ize and get control of alI the firms
and establishments in various fields which are controiled by capitalists.
Clearly, insufficient attention to this matter has stood in the way of
_ achieving the final goals of nationalization, in loosening the grip of the
capitalists anc: their fore~gn masters on our economy. . Na~ti.onalizing some
industries, wha.le leaving the rest in the capita~lists' hands, i s not really
nationalizations and ultimatel;~ it will str-engthen zhe capitalists. The
chief priori~y in nationalizing large industries is removing~ them from the
control of ~heir pre~ious owaiers and entrusting the work to the workers and
employees, ~n ~uided by the i~.terests of society. Dealing ~ith the plun-
- derers and cnlonizers in halfway measures wilr only double ~heir power in ~
the end. It i~ ~he responsibility of the wozk~rs an~ o~her ~teadfast indi-
viduals to demand real nationalization of industries. ~
_ ~+2
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A Clarification for the Me~bers of the Khavar Council of Technical Services
With regard to the fact mentioned in your letter, that your company is 98-
percent owned by the Khavar Co, nationalization of the latter automatically
means that 98 percent of yeur company is nationalized, unless the share- -
holders anticipated what was going to happen and put your company's shares
in another name than Khavar's.
8921
CSO: 4906
- ~+3
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IRAN ~
GOVERNMENT APPROPRIATES MILLIONS TO SPUR PRODUCTION
Tet~ran ENQELAB-E ESLAMI in Persian 2 Sep 79 p 10 ~
[Text] The government has appropriated 50 billion rials to stimulate pro- -
ductive activities and services in the small to medium size range.
e 'Ali 'Akbar Moinfar, Deputy Minister in charge of the Planning and Budget
Organization, made this announcement. He said that many individuals through- -
_ out the country are ready to undertake all kinds of productive activity.
He added that for a long time now our country's economy in the industrial
and manufacturing areas has relied on operators who se products and services
were widely needed. At present, the Provisional Government of the Islamic
Revolution seeks to expand the activities of the private sector and hard-
= working individuals, according to the precepts of the Koran and Islam.
Acc~rding to Moinfar, in order to stimulate small and medium size manufac- ,
turing and service enterprises, the Planning and Budget Organization, in =
collaboration with the Central.Bank and the National Bank, has proposed a "
plan which will be passed on by the Economic Council next week. According
to this plan, a sum of 50 bilJ.~~~~ rials is to be set aside for small and :
medium size manufacturing ?nC service firms. It is a simple plan, intended �
to promote the establish~~^_t or expansion of needed manufacturing and ser-
vices by extending easy credit to firms in more than a hundred fields, in- i
cluding drugstores, dental clinics, repair shops, i cemaking and manufacturing
rope, packing materials and cardboard out of bits of paper. The exact cre-
_ dit terms will be announced by the National Bank of Iran. The aim of this
plan is to satisfy the public's needs through the efforts of khe publit
- itself. Accordingly, the basic aims of the plan are as follows:
1. Paying special attention to the importance of, small producers of diverse
goods in our econemy, since they account for a large share of total output; -
2. Expansion of small industries and shops with one or several employees; -
_ 3. Encouraging firms to renovate and innovate; i
- ~
4. Expansion of agricultural and industrial ~utput, as well as needed ser- ~
vices; ,
'i
. 4~+ ; -
~ ~
;
;
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5. Creating productive and useful employment opportunities, especially for
youth; `
6. Increasing the proportion of domestic value-added;
7. Increasing the prestige of useful and productive occupations in the agri-
- cultural, manufacturing and services sectors.
8. Promoting various activities outside of Tehran, particularly in rural
areas;
9, Expanding the sphere of private-sector operations and a correspc~nding _
~ decrease in the economic and market role of the government.
10. Increasing the tendency toward change in patterns of consumption and -
attention to various domestically produced goods. In conclusion, Moinfar _
- said that a sum of 50 billion rials was envisioned in the first stage of this
program. If it is successful, the policy will be continued and the National
Bank will be mobilized to extend loans throughout Iran.
8921
CSO: 4906
k
`
_ . . ~5 -
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~
Ii2AN
PRESS HIGHLIGHTS CON`.MERCIAL DEVII.OPMENTS
Tehran IRAP1 ECOtdO?4IC SERVICE in English 6 Oct 79 p 7
[TextJ FO~EIGcI EXCHAIIGE: Still new foreign exchange regulations, rather,
restrictions were announced Thursday. Any Iranian travellen c~lding a _
passport can *~aw buy only $750 exchange at the official rate and ~lySQO
at the unoff icial governmental rate ~ahich ia announced very satuiday by
the Central Bank of Iran. The wife gets $S00 and $1,000, respectively -
_ whtle each child gets $250 and $500, res~ectively--a total of no more than ~ ~
~6,000 on a joint passport.
- , r-
PORT CONGESTION: There is no more port congestion or queueing of ships _
near harbors any more due to reduction in Iran's imports, according to
P.oads Deputy 24inister p.bbasali Qavam. During the ?~ast 6 months 690 ships
arrived at Iran's seven ports to unload nearly 4 million tonnes and load
about 314,000 tonnes of goods. Import and export volume has decreased by
50 percent.
MEAT SHORTAGL: Supply of ineat to supermarkets has been cut down by abnut ~
75; and this has faced the populaces of congested parts of tawns with
meat shortage. Some 400 tons of ineat is distributed in Tehran daily-- �
300 tons of mutton and 100 tons of beef. The government buys the meat at
280 Rials and sells it to the butchers at 80 Rials per kilo on the average.
NEW TELEPHONES: Iran will be able to install 250,000 new telephone lines -
without any need for foreign expertise, PTT Minister Dr Hassan Eslami says. -
UNEI~L~YED ON THE MOVE: There have been many instances of demonstrations
- and sit-in protests across the country by the unemployed high school
graduates. Instances have been reported from rToshahr, Langaxood, Babak,
Babol, Rasht, Noor, and some other parts of the country. Unab le to provide
jobs or give more convincing promises to the impor tuning 3ob-seekers,
- the Governor of Noor had to flee the town!
' FOREIGN BATTERIES: Co~erce Ministry has authorized importation of up to
- 2.2 million car batteries of 6-volt and 12-volt capacity. This is expected `
~ to eliminate the black market caused by reduction in'internal production.
46
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~ BANK IPdTEREST: Seven percent bank interest will Ue paid to those who
deposit their savings in houaing credit schemes in banks, the Housing
and Urban Development Minieter Katirai promised Tuesday.
1d0 I,IPORT DUTIES : Agriculturgl machinery and parts are to be made exempt
from import duties and commercial benefit tax according to a new bill
which has been approved by the Council of t4inisters. Local production is
to be encouraged . -
VEGETABLE OIL: Import duties on vegetable oil will be cut by fifty per-
cent in order to reduce its market prices. The government subsidizes t11e =
marketing of vegetable oil by 12 billion Rials annually,
CSO: 4920
~ 47
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IRAN
ESHRAQI PAVED WAY FOR DISMISSAL OF NIOC CHIEF
Induatry Employees Dissatiafie~l With Nazih
Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 25 Sep 79 p 15 '
- [Text) Hoj~atoleslam Eshraqi, son-in-law and representative of the Emam
Khomeyni in the country's oil-producing areas, satd this morning in a presa
interview in Esfahan that the oil workers are greatly dissatisfied with
Hassan Nazih. ~
Ho~~atoleslam Eshraqi said in the interview, which was held in the Sayyed :
- Mosque in Esfahan, that he had been dispatched to the oil-producing areaa
by the Emam in response to complaints reacl?ing Khomeyni �rom the oil workers.
- He saia that the oil workers had complained during his mission about the
- rules which have caused a split between the workers and other employeea. _
The difference in wages between workers and other employees has grown from
3,000 tomans to 5,500 tomana.
Ho~~atoleslam Eshraqi said, furthermore, that the workers are not allow~ed -
_ the use of the librariea and other employee benefits. ~'his kind of
discrimination, he said, is ~ust like the discrimination against blacks in
' America.
= Emam Khomeyni's representative turned next to the sub~ect of Hassan Nazih's _
selection as head of NIOC in the Bazargan government. He said that while
, the government remains subordinate to the Emam, the latter refrains from
- involvement in small details. Thus, the Emam wae init3ally satisfied with
the Prime Minister's selection of Nazih as head of NIOC.
- Eahraqi added, however, trat in view of the workere' complaints and the .
results of his mission, the Emam will find Nazih's contfnued leaderahip of
the oil industry unacceptable: and it will be up the prime minister to -
find a solution,
Hoj~atoleslam Eshraqi finished by eaying tfiat "the Prime Minister certainly ~
; knows that we do not have a grudge and, God willing, fundamental decisione ~
will be made in the future." �
48 ~ .
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Khomeyni: No Confidence in Nazih
Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 25 Sep 79 p 16 ~
?
[Text] The Emam's repreaentative, Ho~~atoleslam Eahraqi, who traveled to
the oil--producing regions to investigate their problema, said in an inter-
view that the prime mini~ter has always en~oyed the Emam's confidence,
while t4r Nazih does not. He added Chat Nazih's policies as director of
NIOC are responsible for unreat in the oil-producing areas.
- Mr SRdeq Tgbataba'i~ the government's epokesman in the Nazih affair, said ~
that tre prime minister went to Qom to discues various mattere of etate with
the Emam. The Emam spoke about the problems surrounding the national o:Ll
company, including the problem of its director. The Emam eaid that the -
- relies upon the prime ministe~ alone to rua the gr,vernment, and to appoint
and diamiss government officials. The prime minieter'a confidence or lack
- of confidence in a particular official is the basis for deciding whether or r
- not that offocial ahould remain in office.
Ho~jatoleslam Shahaboldin Eshraqi, who on the Emam Khomeyni's orders ti+isited
~ the country's oil-producing areas, ~3aid yeaterday after a visit to the oil
installationa at Eefahan:
"The Emam has received many reports and complaints from peraons in the oi1
' and gas industry, and therefore, sent me, along with Hoj~atolealam Abtehi
and a group of engineers, to the oil-producing regions to investigate. We
- held long meetings everywhere with oil industry workers and employees, and
after detailed study we ca~e to understand that the problem lay with the
- director of the national oil company, Mr Nazih. The latter's policies have
caused the rift t~ widen between the workers and other employees of the oil
i~dustry, by increasing workers' pay from 3,000 totnans to only 3,300 ~amans, `
while the other employees received a raise to 9,G00 toatane, thus increasing
the pay differential between the two groups from 3,000 tomane ta 5~700 tomans.
_ This has been a source of indignation in the oil industry. ~cher diaparities
include d.ifferences in eating facilitiea, some of which are ~.~csAd to workers,
_ ~ust as in some countries which bar blacks from arzas reserved tor w?:+.tes,"
Eshraqi also said that "while the workers and employees are demanding a ~
thorough reform of the NIOC, Nazih is conten_t ~ust to move staff inembers -
around."
Next Ho~~atoleslam Eshraqi stressed the need to pay more attention to the
oil industry. He said that "the Emam Khomeyni does not involve himself in
the details of running the country, and that it was not he who appointed _
Mr Naziti. Trusting Prime Minister Bzzargan completely, the Emam has
- entrusted fiim with rhe responsibility for making official appointments.
However, based oz my own contacts with the Emam's office, I know that he is
very dissatisfied with the management of the oil industry. He will never
agree to let Nazih remain in office and, God willing, when I submit my
report on my visit to tHe oil installations, it will not be long before the
necessary decisions are made,"
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zxaN
- ~
SMALL CONSUMERS TO GET WATER, ELECTRICITY GRATIS
- Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 19 Sep 79 p 5 ~
[Text] The exemption of small consumers from paying water charges, a measure -
which was proposed by the Minister of Power and passed by the Council of -
Ministers, has been approved by the Revolutionary Council.
Mr Tobatuba'i, financial advisor to the prime minister, elaborated on the ~
plan as follows: . '
1. Small consumers who use less than 10 cubic meters of water per month are ~ -
exempt from paying water charges;
2. Consumers who use more than l0~cubic meters of water per month will
pay all water charges according to the present fee schedule. ~
The spokesman made the following points about the exemption of small domestic .
consumers from electricity charges, which has also been approved by the Re-
volutionary Council:
1. Consumers who use less than 100 KWH per month will be exempt from elec-
tricity charges, while consumers using more than 100 KWH per month will be
charged the full rate according to the residential or commercial fee sche- '
dule, as applicable; :
i -
2. Small public services and large industrial concerns will also re billed =
according to the appropriate fee schedule;
3. Individual apartments will each be considered as a separate ~consumer for
purposes of applying this regulation, provided that each has a segarate elec- '
tricity me+ter. ~
,
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~
- IRAN
- NAVAL BASES TO BE CONVERTED INTO PORTS -
Tehran BAI~IDAD in Persian 29 Aug 79 p.12
[Text] Tehran-PARS NEWS AGENCY-Yesterday Ali Akbar Moinfar, Minister of
State for the Plan and Budget Organization, who had recently visited Chah
Bahar and Bandar Abbas iiz southern Iran .together with Engineer Mostafa
� Katirayi, Minister of Housing and City Development, for a period of 2 days
to study the development works, announced yesterday that they had first
studied the condition of the incomplete projects of all naval bases. Since
the government had changed its mind about continuing the work on the base
as its project had originally been prepar~d, it was decided to put into -
operation the completed part of the project and investments that had been -
made for the establishment of a commercial port with a loadjng and offload-
ing capacity for ships of up to 25,000 ton (capacity). The decision was made
_ by taking the demands of the local people into consideration. For some time, _
Iran's Islamic Republican Navy and the Plan and Budget Organization had made
- studies to�utilize the completed portion of the projects for improving local _
_ conditions in serving the people.
Moinfar added: In addition to this port, it was decided to establish two
fishing ports near Kodar Chah Bahar. For promptness in action, the Ports
and Shipping Organization undertook to prepare the project in 3 weeks and tt~e
Plan and Budget Organization provided the required credit immediately.
Monifar said: We visited Bandar Abbas and the existing problems regarding
the commencement of projects were studied, so that the w~ork on this port
_ which is one of the most important and fundamental projects of the country
_ would be started quickly. He added that it was also decided to take action, -
as soon as possible, regarding the establishment of a fishing port at Qishm -
- Island. Representati~~es of the Ports and Shipping Organization have vieiCed
the site and undertaken to prepare the required prnject as soon as possible.
The credit will be immediately provided by the Plan and Budget Organization -
for the establishment of the port. ~ -
51
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3
In Bandar Abbas, the Persian Gulf shipyard was also visited. So far $170
million have been spent on this shipyard. Talks were held with the reapon-
sible authoritiea and considering the studies made in the paet few montha,
actions will be taken to limit it to a aomewhat acceptable pro~ect. -
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IRAN
- TRICOT, KNIT GOODS INDUSTRY NEARING A STANDSTILL -
Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 2~ Sep 79 p 14
[Text] The shortage of raw materials on the one hand and the uncontrolled
- increase of costs on the other has brought into serious danger the tricot _
and knit goods industry of Iran, as a result of which 150,000 workers of
this industry might lose their jobs.
One of the wholesale dealers of Tehran's market stated to ETTELA'AT in
this respect:
Compared to the last year the increase in costs amounts to 15 percent. -
' Most of raw materials which are now in short supply had been previously the
monopoly exercized by a managerial minority.
One of the chief exporters to the eastern districts stated: The prices of
_ the raw materials have increased after revoluti~n in several successive
- stages. At present more than 12 spinning mills are in operation in the
country, of which the-largest, called "Naznakh," has a capacity of 18 to
20 tons, whereas the actual production of this factory has decreased to one _
third. At present, with exorbitant increase in costs of raw materials and
finished goods, we cannot compete at the international level.
~ Formerly, we imported raw materials from .~apan, China and Korea, and reckon-
ing the payment of 80 to 90 rials for custom duties our imports were still
cheaper by 50 to 60 rials than the goods manufactured inside thP country. -
The internal production of knit goods and tricot is not only insufficient,
but the government is also compelled to import a considerable amount of
these goods. On the other hand there is interference of persons without com-
petence in pricing knit goods and tricot and in handling related matters.
One of the executives responsible for distribution of articles produced by
the "Naznakh" factory, while stressing the sma].lness of production and
great d~emand, stated:
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_ Before the revolution the "Naznakh" factory had 600 Korean workers, and all
o� them were dismissed. There are at present about 1000 Iranian workers
in the factory, man}� of whom are not technically skilled.
The other spir~ning mills, whose post-revolution executive and administrative
diffi~ulties were not yet properly settled, have not placed their purchase
orders for raw materials from abroad and even if such orders were placed -
they are insignificant compared to tha past.
As regards prices of artificial fibPr raw materials, they are directly f
interconnected with that of petroleum, and they increase day after day.
Production parallels the situation. Increased wages also aggravate the con-
dition. The majority of factories are likewise confranted with delaye,d
settlements by buyers and bank pressures. ~
Shokuhi, director of the production of the "Nakh" factory of cashmeres,
said:
The cashmere factory which started its operation 9 years ago had belonged
_ to Mr. "Hay." After revolution the property of this person was confiscated
and the Factory was turned over to the Foundation for the Indigent. In the
- past month of Bahman [January-February] 150 Indian and Sinhalese workers
and specialists of the factory were dismissed, and because of want of raw
materials the work of the factory was temporarily stopped.
- The capacity of the factory is 5 tons, but under actual conditions the pro-
duction of one shift only did not exceed 2 tons.
To eliminate the present difficulties, the government itself should take
- direct steps to import ar*ificial fiber and ensure raw mat~erials for the.
factories. ~ ~
~ The "Polyacryl" factory of Isfahan was founded by a joint Iranian and
- American investment. After the revolution it did not begin its operation
and did not start producing raw materials.
With the onset of winter and the need of the people for clothing espeically
tricot and knit goods, it is necessary to take care of these problems as
soon as possible.
Shokuhi added: According to statistics of the last year, 150,000 workers
were employed in the tricot and knit goods industry of Iran. Under narmal
conditions the cashr~ere factory should have 500 workers, whereas our actual
personnel. does not exceed 220 workers. ~
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IRAN _
DOMESTIC INDUSTRY SEEKING T~ MAKE SPARE PARTS FOR AUTOS
Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 19 Sep 79 p 8
[Text] Rings, mudguards, springs, gear boxes, and differentials--very soon
all of these parts may be manufacture3 in Iran by Iranian workers, and even-
= tually Iran may be producing complete automobiles by itself. The first step
= in this direction has already been taken, with~:the establishment of an exhi-
bition of the different parts and components which go into the various kinds
of autos--Peykan, Zhiyan, Renault and Jeep. Iranian craftsmen who visited
zhe exhibition were confident that they could build more than 90 percent of
i~he items on display. _
The Peykan, Renault, Zhiyan and Jeep factories, by putting these spare parts
on display, tested Iran's capability to produce them. About 540 workers
, visited the Renault and Zhiyan displays; 175 of them said that they were
ready to begin making the spare parts and engines themselves. In addition,
104 workers from the big tractor and machine works at Tabriz and the Arak
- mathine works came to view the exhibit, and a number said that they could
build spare parts for the Renault in their shops. They expressed amazement,
after seeing the exhibit, that Renault's spare parts were so uncomplicated.
The owners of 74 large and small shops were sh.own the spare parts for the
Renault and Zhiyan, and a group of them offered to make the plastic and elec-
trical components for these two cars. Some also offered to build the internal
- components and small parts. A total of 2,240 different auto parts were put
= on display in the exhibition: the Iranians said they could fabricate 2,040
of them. They said that their lack of financial means is an obstacle to
building these items. One young worker from Kerman Province said that he
- is prepared to build the Renault's carbuerator. Yhis same young worker
already has 26 technical inventions to his cr~dit.
However, the person in charge of the Renault display said that the Renault
factory also buys carbuerators from Germany, and that building them is not
easy. Students from the industrial colle~es also visited the Renault and
' Zhiyan displays, because the government intends to use the industrial and
polytechnical colleges to build auto parts. Officials have said th~t tech-
nical and industrial college instructors and students can put the results of
- their research and learning at the disposal of the Ministry of Industry and
Minerals. To this end, there should be close coordination between the
country's industrial and educational policies. "
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I
An official of the Renault and Zhiyan factory, in speaking of the possibility
of cooperation between his factory and independent shop and factory owners,
- said that "one of the goals of the exhibition was to become better acquainted
with these individuals. Many of them are prepared to cooperate with us,
and we are talking with them together in groups or 10-15, asking them abo ut
their factories' technical qualifications and their financial resources. ~
- A questionaire is also under discussion, which would be given to shop and
factory operators concerning their production methods. After preliminary
- discussions with these operators, c~ntracts must be concluded with them.
, According to the contract with Renault of France, Iran can produce all of
the spare parts for this auto, provided that they are subject to testing by
Renault. However, even if Iran's technology is not of a sufficiently high
level that we are capable of t~uilding the entire car here, I can say that
Iranian ~aorkers can produce 50 percent of the Renault's spare parts."
At present, 95 percent of the spare parts for Renaults and other foreign -
cars are imported. Under the old regime, engines and spare parts which w~ere
supposedly "made in Iran" were actually imported from abroad, prolonging
Iran's economic servitude and foregoing the opportunity to use Iranian
workers. The workers expect the revolutionary government to change 'this _
misguided policy, to use our own workers' skills and to end the unnecess ary
importing of automobiles and spare parts. They expect the government to help
in obtaining the capital needed to upgrade their facilities. Given such a
policy, Iranian workers can manufacture spare parts which measure up to fac-
tory standards. The head of the Renault exhibit says that "we shall conclude _
cooperative agreements with manufacturers who we are certain will produce
spare parts just like those that come from the factory. We shall also inspect
their plants and, when they have given us all their technical qualifications,
we shall ask them to build parts similar to samples which we have given
them. We shall test the quality of their work.
"We shall choose those whose work is of the highest quality. Quality, not
price, is the most important consideration for us. They should be able to
produce spare parts just like those made in France."
Most Iranian manufacturers can produce plastic parts, and auto, bus and truck
bodies. According to the head of the Renault exhibit, Renault engines very
_ probably will be built in Iran. One company even announced that it could
build 500 cylinders daily. Its factory has the type of computer equipment
required to turn out Renault cylinders.
- Raw Materials the Chief Question
The heads of the Renault and Zhiyan factories are responsible for provid ing
- their subcontractors with needed raw materials. At present, the Esfahan
steel mill is capable of ineeting only 3J percent of the domestic demand for
steel, so that most of the needed stee"1 must be imported from abroad. With
_ 56 ~
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the planned increase in the Esfahan steel mill's production (to a level of
8 million tons), the output of spare parts will also rise. Another thing
which should be pointed out here is that the auto manufacturers have con-
cluded a cooperative agreement with other industries, so that they may be
certain of being able to buy the goods they need. If this arrangement proves
practical, the annual auto production will be scaled to match the availa-
- bility of spare parts.
Iranian workers also said that they are capable of making all 230 of the parts
_ for the Peykan auto which were put on display, and 121 out of the 183 Jeep
parts .
The Minister of Industry and Minerals has said that other such exhibits will =
be set up in the near future.
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~
IRAN `
~
BRIEFS
_ ARMS, DRUGS HAUL--The spokesman of the gendarmerie of the Islamic Republic
of Iran annourced that as a result of the effort s by gendarmerie officials '
- in Fars, L~restan, Sistan and Baluchestan, Esfahan, I1~orasan and
i~taazandaran different types of combat weapons, side arms, hunting rifles,
= submachineguns, 11 pieces of equipment, 31,291 rounds of ammunition,
43,221 packets of foreign cigarettes, 5,660 kg of foreign tea, 200 kg of `
caviar, 15 kg of opium and otiher goods valued at 4 million rials have been
- discovered and seized. The guilty individuals have been arrested and
handed over to the appropriate authorities. [Text] [LD291845 Tehran
- Domestic Service in Persian 1530 GMT 29 Oct 79 LD]
~ KHOMEYNI LOYALTY--Reports f~om Ahvaz indicate that a Iarge group of people '
from tihe Muslim Bani Ka'b tribes, bearing pictures, slogans and placards, met
opposite Khuzestan's govexnorate~general office this afternoon. Accordir.g to
this dispatch the representative of the Bani Ka'b tribesmen expressed in a
speech the tribes' readi:~ess to carry out the wishes of leader of the Islamic
- revolution of Tran Imam Khome}mi and condemned aIl discord-sowing and rioting.
_ At the conclusion of the speech by the representative of Che Bani Ka'b tribes
an eight-point resolution was read out. The re~~lvtion, while renewing
the league and covenant of the Bani Ka'b tri~es i~ Khuzestan with the Imam
Khomeyri, leader of the Islamic revolution of Iran, expressed the tribes'
decisive support for all people who enjay the support of the leader of the
Islamic revolution of Iran. This resolut3.on also says: We warn hypocrites
_ and counterrevolutionaries, in whatever guise, that the overwhelming ma~ority
of the Muslim nation of Iran, particularly the p ious people of Khuzestan,
are keeping an eye with the ~Cmost vigilance.and wakefulness on the ~
provocations 3nstigated by malenolent peop~e and are exposing their malevolent ;
intentions against the pious and be~ieving peopl e of thib area. The hypo-
_ crites should not 3~nag3.ne that by pretending they can divert the vfigiZant
and dedicated people of Khuzestan from the course of the Islamic revolution
of 7ran. [Text] jLD301912 Tehra.n Domestiic Service in Persian 1630 GMT
30 Oct 79 LD] '
;
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ISRAEL
~
'DAVAR' FORESEES CABINET FALLING, ANALYZES REASONS
~ TA280931 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Aebrew 28 Oct 79 p 9 TA
- [Co~ntary by Daniyel Bloch: "A Spoke in the Wheels of Cabinet
Reorganization"]
[Text] Some people thought Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan's resignation
= would make it easier to reorganize the cabinet portfolios; and, there
were even those who played with the thought that this resignation would
= unite the Coalition and extend its life, even if only by means of an
artif icial lung and kidney. This might have been correct had it been
possible to carry out the simplest, not the most complicated, version
of changes in portfolios: giving the foreign affairs portfolio to
Dr Burg, who is in any case alreadq fully involved in dealing with
autonomy affairs; and giving the interior portfolio to Simha Ehrlich,
since this is an area which he understands and which is close to his
heart and that of his party. A change of thia sort would have allowed
appointment of Yiga'el Horowitz as minister of finance, something most
of the components of the Likud and the NRP want. These changes would
have prevented any complications with the Democratic movement over the
matter of the foreign affairs portfolio and dealing with matters of
welfare. They would have provided the Liberal Party with suitable
campensation for having the finance portfolio taken away from it, given
the NRP the ~ost honorable status in the c~binet, made dealing with
foreign affairs more efficient and finally put the Ministry of the
Interior in the hands of a minister capable of devoting an appreciable
part of his time to his ministry's work.
_ However, the simplest thing was not done because Dr Burg did not want
- and refused to accept the foreign affaira portfolio. He did this for
- two reasons: Firsic, Burg fears that the younger generation in the NRP
intends to get rid of him before the next elections and that the
foreign affairs portfolio would serve as the finale of his career, since
there is no guarantee that the NRP wi11 be alale to hold on to it in the
next government and ~erhaps there will be new elections this year.
Second, the heads of h is faction in the NRP are not prepared to give up
the Ministry of the Interior, which is a position of power both w~thin
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_ the NRP and ir, the country, a position they are not prepared to lose,
especially now when there is a poasibility of new elections. We read
_ in Friday's HATZOFE that religious educators appealed to Dr Burg, asking
him not to leave the Ministry of the Interior becauae in his position he
greatly helps th~ religious educational institution~. And we, for some
reason, thought that Zvulun Hammer was in charge of matters of religious
_ education. But in any case, Burg is not prepared to move over to the
Foreign Ministry. ,
If Begin only had to appoint a foreign minister without any regard to
changes in the government's functioning or to moving Simha Ehrlich out
of the Ministry of Finance, then he could have found a nonparty person
from out~ide the government for this job or given this portfolio to a
man from his party--Yitzhaq Shamir, the Knesset speaker. However, such
an appointment would not have solved the Coalition problems, just as the
appointment of Justice Minister Shmu'el Tamir to foreign minister would -
a?so not solve the problem because Simha Ehrlich is not a legal expert.
The only possibility remaining is the appointment of Yiga'el Yadin as
_ foreign minister and Simha Ehrlich as deputy prime minister. On the ~
_ surface this is a reorganization dropped from heaven, but it appears
that matters are not so simple. -
_ First, there is Yadin's personal problem: How can a man who does not
- accept some of the government's political lines--especially in the field
of settlement--and the desires of the prime minister and other ministers
- to annex territories, conduct Israel's diplomatic political contacts?
How can Yadin accept a situation in which the autonomy negotiations are
~ being conducted by the minister of the interior (and Burg will certainly
not give up this role in favor of Yadin)? In any case, Yadin is being
severely criticized by the public for his participation in the govern-
ment. His excuse is that he is dealing with matters of welfare and the -
interior, which were primary among the DMC's interests. How can he -
justify himself, leave these issues and move to political affairs,
regarding which he is not happy with the government? -
Second, Yadin cannot and is not prepared to let the status of Minister
of I.abor and Betterment Dr Katz be damaged. It is no secret that the
Likud is casting envious eyes at this portfolio, and only a threat of
- resignation by Yadin in the past prevented this portfolio from being
taken away from Katz. The number of Democratic MK's in the government
certainly does not justify an addition in the form of the foreign
affairs portfolio. On the other hand, the Liberals will not agree to
_ having the finance portfolio taken away f rom them without compensation
in the form of another important portfolio such as labor and betterment.
It is true that over the last few days a solution has been proposed--the -
establishment of a Ministry of Information headed by Minister Moshe
Nissim. But this is a fairly weak solution since it is doubtful whether
the Foreign Ministry will concede the infarmation issues it deals with,
whether Zvulun Ha~ner will give up domestic information, which is in his
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~
- sphere, and whether the prime minister's office will easily give up the
government press office. In addition to this, Moshe Nissim's suitabil-
ity to aerve as the peraon in charge of information mattera is not
exactly great.
Neither is Yadin enthusiastic about the NRP demand to have Dr Ben-Me'ir
appointed deputy foreign minister. Cynics claim that the division of
labcr between the pair would be as follows: Yadin would be in charge
of the ceremonies, the banquets, the cocktail parties and the trips `
_ abroad, and Dr Ben-Me' ir would be in charge of the way everything is
run. Experience shows that in coalition governments it is difficult to
= work in a ministry where the minister and the deputy minister are not -
members of the same party, and Yadin is not interested in having a
Kashrut supervisor tied to him in the Foreign Ministry. _
All these developments have brought the reorganization of the government =
to the threshold of a cris is. This is so even without mentioning Yiga'el
Horowitz' peak of cynicism. Having resigned from the cabinet because of
his opposition to its policy, he is now prepared to return to it in ~
- return for the finance portfolio.
There is no doubt that many ministers will be against him either because
- it is him, or for the same reasons which made Ehrlich fail, and. Begin's -
guaran~ee of sunport is now meaningless. We can predict with certainty
that, in any event dispute between Horowitz and David Levi, Begin will -
; support Levi. Also, in any dispute between the minister of finance and
tre education minister, Begin will support Hammer. We will not mention
such difficult customers as `Ezer Weizman, Yitzhaq Moda'i and Hayim
Landau. Those close to Ehrlich also said this week: There is no doubt
_ that Horowitz will fail within 2 months. But as things turned out at Che -
_ end of Che week, the:e is no guarantee that he will be given the chance ~
to prove his ability or lack of ability in the Ministry of Finance~
This bundle of complications was added to on Friday by Ari'el Sharon's
bombshell demand that, as a conditton for his remair.ing in the govern-
_ ment; there mi!at be legislation which will in the future prevent the
high court of justice from interfering in the settlement issue. Every
political observer knows that meetin~ such a demand would be a compli~
= cated and alm~st impossible task. First of all, because it might create
international complications. This is so because such legislation would
- mean applying Israeli law to the territories, someth~ng Israel commiCted
itself at Camp David not to do, either during the autonomy negotiations -
_ or during the 5 years of the autonomyo It committe~l itself not to do
this before the end of the negotiations over the final status of these
territories. However, in addition to the international side, it is
doubtful whether such legislation would find a m~jority in the Knesset
since the Democratic movement, some of the Liberals and 'Ezer Weizman _
~aill vi.gorously object to it and the Democratic movement`s opposition ie
sufficient for the government not to have a majority in the Knesset.
~
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We believe that Sharon is presenting a vigorous demand to the cabinet
because he is interested in cauging a government criais even before the
end of the 30 days stipulated by the high court of justice for the
evacuation of Elon More. Sharon probably believes that an interim -
government, facing electiona, will not take the risk of a confrontation
with Guah Emunim and will leave the iaeue frozen unCil after the elec- -
tions. It is doubtful whether the government, or even an interim govern-
_ ment, will be able to take such an approach, and we cannot know whether ~
Sharon will carry it through to the end. However, it is clear that last
= week's two dramatic events--Moshe Dayan's resignation and the high court
of ~ustice decision on Elon More--have not strengthened the government,
but have speeded up the process of disintegration within it. There were
_ those who said in the Knesset this week that the government has already
fallen, but the ministers have not yet heard about it.
- CSO: 48~5
~
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,
ISRAEL
PALESTINIANS REACT STRONGLY TO ISRAELI LAND DECISION _
West Bank Mayors
Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 18 Sep 79 p 1, 5
[Article: "Widescale Reaction to Decision To Permit Israelis To Buy Land.
The Mayors Explain the Serious Dimension of the Decision"] _
- [Text] The Israeli Governmen~t's decision adopted Sunday to allow Israelis
to buy land on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip has provoked widescale -
reactions .
The Municipal Council of Nablua has prepared a protest memo to be submitted
to the Israeli authorities.
- The mayor of Nablus, Bassam al-Shak'ah, said that the decision is a per- _
_ petuation of occupation, a confirmation of the policy of expansion and re-
= veals Israel's true intentions and the falsehood of ita claim of seeking
peace.
= He added that the decision is a blatant violation of valid laws, as well as
ehe Geneva and the UN charters. This makes it incumbent upon local, Arab
and international public opinion to firmly resist this policy and to secure
~ the national rights of the Palestinian people including the right to es- ~
tablish their independent state, as the only basis for peace in the area.
Muhammad Hassan Milhim, ma.yor of Halhul, stated that this decision is an
- extension af Israel's old policy which it had used to confiscate Arab ~
lands under the pretext of security. He called fox the issue to be brought
before world public opinion. -
The mayor of A1-Birah, Ibrahim al-Tawil, expressed his belief that no cit~-
zen is willing to sell his land to the Jews. He said that anyone who =
allows himself to violate the national consensus in the occupied West Bank
should be dealt with with an iron fist in various means and fashions. -
The Gaza Municipal Council held an emergency session, after which it isaued -
a statement stressing that the decision is aimed at usurping Palestinian
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land and enabling Gush Emunim to establish settlements by various authori-
tarian means.
_ The Municipal Council sent cables of denunciation to the Israeli prime
- minister and defense minister, the U.S. President, the ruler of Egypt
and Dr Kurt Waldheim.
Ilyas Frayj, the mayor of Bethlehem, condemned this decision and stated
that it will have serious consequences because it means that the Israeli
- Government is pursuing its policy on self-administration before the con-
clusion of the talks on this issue and despite the Palestinians' opposition.
'Adel Ghanim, the secretary general of the Trade Unions Federatio~l said
that the decision was absolutely unjust and illegal. It indicates Israel's
desire to expand and to annex the West Bank, and it belies all words about
~ the alleged peace.
Zafir al-Masri, head of the chamber of commerce and deputy mayor of Nablus,
stated that all citizens have expressed their indignation over this deci-
sion which confirms Israel's intentions to annex occupied Arab lands and
- deprive our people of their right to their land.
- He said ~hat this decision fully contradicts existing laws in the occupied -
territories which fo~~~id th~ sale of land to non-Palestinians, let a].one -
the citizens of the ~~ccupation state.
Haj Ma'zuz al-Ma.sri told AL-SHA'B: "We do not accept this decision, nor
= do we accept autonomy. The Palestinian's adherence to the land will not
~ be affected by this decision."
A number of citizens expressed their views to AL-SHA'B reporters about
- this matter.
'Abd al-Rahman al-Shumali said that this decision compliments Israel's plan
to expropriate the land gradually and is another link in this plan's chain
adopted long ago and which [has been upheld by] A1-Sadat's policy.
Khalid Shabaru, president of A1-Najah University's student federation, said
that the citizens are too aware to be affected by such decisions.
Khaldun 'Abd al-Haqq, a municipal councilman, said: "We are just like -
= passengers on a hijacked plane who are subjected to one extortion after
another by the hijacker, but are helpless. Those laws and decisions are
- a totally false pretPxt." _
'Atef Sa'd said that this decision is an extension of the pattern used by
the occupation authorities. "We categorically reject this decisior_ and _
any others like it," he said.
64 -
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- Merchant Subhi al-'Anabtawi said: "Our land was made fair game by the
occupation of 1967. It is not sarprising that now it is fair game to be
= bocght and sold."
Isma'il Safiyah said: "This is an entirely illegal decision; the Israelis -
have no r7.ght to own a single inch of Paleatinian Arab land."
'AL-QUDS' Editorial
, Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 1$ Sep 79 p 1
_ [Editorial: "The Israeli Decision and Us"]
[Text] From the practical standpoint, the Israeli decision to permit indi-
vidual Jews or private organizations to buy land in the occupied areas has -
nQt had unexpected or unknown results.
- ~ If we say that the step is contrary to international law and custom, this
would not be the first time, nor in all probability would it be the last,
in which Israel has violated international law. In fact, Begin and other `
senior officials do not hide their allegation that occupied territory is -
"liberated Israeli land." Moreover, members of "Gush Emunim," who enjoy ~
official support, have gone so far as to say that Jordanian and interna-
tional laws do not apply to the occupied territory because they are,
according to their claim, Israeli territory.
If we were to say that the objective is to seize more land and to establish
settlements, then the Israeli Government in fact has not been "remiss" in
this regard. It has seized vast areas of land before the issuance of this ~
decision, either by open confiscation of land for settlements or by veiled
confiscation such as closing of certain areas, security reasons and eatab-
lishment of military areas. All of this leads ultimately to the same
objective which is to turn the occupied territories into a Jewish area as
quickly as possible in order to settle it and absorb in the Arab territories
_ i~igrants from all parts of the world.
Although we, as Palestinians, have so far been unable to prevent the Israeli
Government from confiscating land and building settlements because its
- power is b~gger than us, we can certainly confront the recent decision.
If the Israeli Government feels that it is entitled to pasa laws for the
_ purchase of Arab lands, then we feel that it is our right, since the land
is oura, to refuse to sell this land which is the crux of the conflict in
the past, the present, and the future. Therefore, it is our responsibility,
= from a purely practical standpoint, to invalidate this decision since no one -
pays heed to denunciation, proteats and citation of international law and
covenants. If Israel chooses to conzinue to confi~cate land by its ape-
- cial well known fashion, then this is another matter which is unrelated to
its recent decision.
~ 7005 65
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, -
- ISRAEL `
ARMY DESERTIONS, OFFENSES BY WOMEN SOLDIERS INCREASE ~
i
TA300726 Jerusalem POST in English 30 Oct 79 p 2 TA
[Article by David Richardson] ~ ~
[Excerpts] The number of soldiers deserting from military service has been
growing since 1973. This was revealed yesterday by Tat-Aluf Baruch Arbel, -
- the commander of the military police who was briefing military reporters in
Tel Aviv to mark Military Police Day this week.
Arbel noted that avoidance of military service was becoming more acceptable
among certain sections of the population. He mentioned in particular people
whose parents had been excused from military service because of absorption
problems and who did not provide their children with ax~y positive incentive
in this direction.
_ Among the daserters there are also a significant number of foreign volunteers ~
from countries such as South Africa, England and Canada, who desert during
their service and leave the country on their foreign paesports.
The number of soldiers who go absent without leave for short periods is about
15,000, he noted.
Referring to the military prisons, Arbel mentioned that the past two years -
had seen a disturbing upswing in the number of women soldiers imprisoned~
I.ast year's total was nearly 1,000.
He attributed the increase, in part, to the fact that the army was being
forced to draft women whom it would normally turn~down because many others
were exempted on declaring themselves observant.
Referring to the recent case in which soldiers allegedly stole weapons from _
an ordnance corps store in the Sinai and sold them to Arab arms dealers in
- the Wadi Ara region, Arbel disclosed that in the past two years there have
been about 10 similar cases.
CSO: 4820 '
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ISRAEL
'HA'ARETZ'PROVIDES STATISTICS ON EXPROPRIATED LAND -
TA010947 Tel Aviv HA`ARETZ in Hebrew 1 Nov 79 pp 1, 2 TA '
- [By Ze'ev Schiff, HA'ARETZ Military Correspondent] -
i
[Text] Since the IDF conquered the West $.ank and the Gaza Strip, 61,040 dunam
have been expropriated there on grounds of military and security needs. About
21,000 dunam have not been put at the disposal of the settlers, distributed in
65 settlements of various types. In addition, the state purchased 80,000 dunam
of private land in the West Bank. These findings emerge from figures gathered
by the defense ministry. According to~this survey, 61,000 dunam have Y,een ex-
propriated in Judaea and Samaria, and only 40 dunam in the Gaza Strip.
According to International Law, this expropriation is considered to be tem- -
porary as long as the conquering force remains in the area and no final arrange-
ment is reached. This confiscation does not expropriate the ownership.
[Sentence as published].
, Out of the expropriated lands, 21,OOO.dunam have not been given to the various
settlements. Hence the rest of the land--40,000 dunam--has been earmarked for
- settlements and the settlers' agricultural needs. The number of Jewiah aettle- -
_ ments of all types (excluding footholds or neighbortioods near Jerusalem) reaches -
- 57 in Judaea and Samaria and 8 more in the Gaza Strip.
According to data obtained by the defense ministry, 696,000 dunam in the West
Bank and 40,000 dunam in the Gaza Strip are currently registered as state-
- owned lands. In addition, there are 63,000 dunam of disputed ownership in
the Gaza Strip. The same undetermined status applies to 530,000 dunam of
land in the West Bank. It has been reported that no thorough survey of the
unregistered and uncultivated lands in these two regions has yet taken place.
Other lands registered under various elements: private lands--3,200,000 dunam ~
[presumably in the West BankJ and 250,000 dunam in the Gaza Strip. [According �
to International Law, even municipal lands are conaidered private].
Absentee property--430,000 dunam in th~ West Bank and 8,000 dunam in the Gaza
Strip. Land registered as belonging to Jews from before 19/+8--30,000 dunam
in the West Bank and 800 dunam in the Gaza. Strip.
- 67
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~
JORDAN
_ AUTHORITIES KEEP EYE ON *NSLIM BROTHERHOOD
Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 22 Sep 79 p 25
- [Article: "Has the Confrontation Between the Muslim Brotherhood and the
Jordanian Authorities Begun?"]
[Text] Last week the Jordanian capital, 'Amman, witnessed the first in a
series of steps in the anticiapted confrontation between "the Muslim Brother-
hood Group" and the Jordanian authorities.
_ On Thursday evening, 6 September 1979, the residents of the capital were
startled to see large numbers of police armed with truncheons and light _
weapons take up positions in the center of the city, particularly in the
great square facing the Great al-Husayni Mosque and along the narrow streets
and markets leading from it.
Naturally nosy people would flock together to find out the facts, particu-
larly since it was something completely new, for the first time in more than
7 years, for security forces to appear in such a fashion.
- Jordanian sources said, "W~iat the Jordanian security officials had done was _
merely to take 'precautionary measures` to warn the 'Muslim Brotherhood Group'
and give it to understand that the authorities were vigilant, and that it
could not begin a new confrontation with them after years of an unannounced
truce between the two sides."
However, what did happen?
The same sources related the following odd tale to AL-Mustaqbal: ~
On Wednesday evening, 5 September, the Jordanian security machinery got hold
of a"secret publication" which had been distributed by the "Muslim Brother-
hood in Jordan" and called for "solidarity with the Muslim Syrian people who
were being sub~ected to eollective repression and ma.ssacres." The statement -
called upon the Jordanian Government to intercede with the Syrian Government
to halt these alleged massacres and also called upon all Muslitns in Jordan
to hold a peaceful demonstration the next day--that is, Friday--to express
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their sympathy with their brother Muslims in Syria. The statement, or
publication, also fixed the Great al-Husayni Mosque, the largest mosque
in Amman, as the starting point for the demonstration, which would start
right after the prayers.
- The Jordanian sources went on to say: So the security machinery found it-
self between a rock and a hard place. It could either ignore the affair,
as it had ignored a number of earlier movements by the Muslim Brotherhood,
and in thi.s event the Brotherhood would escalate the crisis, leading who '
- knows where. Or it could follow a compromise solution, heading off and
i aborting the Brotherhood's plan. The latter cour.se was ehosen.
The Jordanian source went on to say that a rumor went around at the same
time that there would be an execution of a man condemned for a serious moral
crime, and the execution would be at the front of the al-Husayni Mosque
square, the site of all hangings for more than 30 years. No sooner had
this rumor spread with great speed then crowds began to collect at the
execution site, and this attracted the attention of the security authorities.
They had to impose control over the area, and this prompted the Muslim
~ Brotherhood to launch a demonstration against them. This is what happened.
Throughout the morning and until the afternoon, police surrounded all the
exits from the mosque, and so any idea of a demonstration was automatically
abandoned. Naturally there was no execution, there having been no crime
against public morals.
However, the question raised Uy this "incident" is still going around the
- Jordanian capital, whetting the appetite for what story tomorrow will bring.
The question is: Has the time come for a confrontation between the Jordanian
Governmeat and the Brotherhood?
It is an important question, one well understood by those aware of the history
of the "Muslim Brotherhood" in Jordan, whether from the standpoint of its size
in the Jordanian streets and its ability to arouse them, or of its being the
one political oroanization permitted to operate publicly in Jordan. This
comes from the fact that the law banning parties passed in the mid-1960's
does not touch it, since the Brotherhood is not a"party" but a"gro+zp,"
- azd the law bans "parties," not "groups."
In any case, nothing is certain except that a relationship of "watchful
waiting" and extreme watchfulness pervades the "group's" relations with
the Jordanian authorities. This relationship began when the Muslim Brother-
hood organized a"popular delegation" to go to Iran and congratulate Imam
al-Khumayni on the success of the Islamic revolution. This relationship
was stepped up w~ien the Syrian authorities declared war on the Muslim
Brotherhood in Syria shortly before arid following the Aleppo massacre.
8389
CSO: 4802
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~ JQRDAN
~ INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES ATTRACT FOREIGN CAPITAL
Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 1-7 Oct 79 p 21
[Interview with the Jordanian Minister of Trade and Industry by Randah Taqi
al-Din]
[Text] There are only a very few countries that are not grumbling about the
sparse inflow of Arab fiscal surpluses and not claiming that their balances
of payments are suffering because of oil prices, and Jordan is one of those
- few. It is confident of the ability of its economic structure to attract '
the flow of capital, in the wake of productive projects and economic assets
that can make it the startir.g point for many industries operating ~ointly
with foreign institutions wishing to market their products in Arab markets.
Hawever, what are the factors behind this Jordanian position?
Dr Najim al-Din Dajani, Jordanian Minister of Trade and Industry, defined
these factors:
- [Question] How do you appraise the Arab aid policy, what is Jordan's share
of capital, and what effect does this have on the domestic sectors?
[Answer] The Arab oil-producing countries are currently playing a large
role in helping with the er.penses of ecanomic development and the costs of
purchases by developing countries. However, the rise in oil prices during .
the past 6 months has also affected the prices of all materials, whether
_ oil products, foodstuffs, industrial commodities, manufactured goods, or
, minerals. There has been a great rise in the prices of all these things.
While the oil pri~e rise was in the 15-percent range, the prices of many
commodities rose more than 60 percent, with an overall average of 25 to 30
percent. This high percentage had severe inflationary effects. ~.'he devel-
oping countries have specific financial needs so as to continse to implement
- their development plans and to cover the costs of purchases abroad. However,
the prices for exports by the developing countries have not risen as much a8
the prices of their imports. Therefore, one has to say that the [oil] exporting
Arab countries are playing a much larger role than ~any industrial country,
countries with great capabilities. What some Arab countries, such as Qatar,
have provided has amounted to 20 percent of their national income, while
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Saudi aid has amounted to 4 percent or income and the UAE 10 percent. These
are high percentages. What has been provided by the industrial countries-- .
the United States, for example--amounts to not more than .03 percent. Bs~er1
on national incomes, the Arab countries are providing at least 10 times what
the j.ndustrial countries are providing. We would like to find a higher per-
centage earmarked for aiding the Arab countries, but this percentage would
- require a specific climate and specific investment opportunities. Some
countries are luckier than others, in the Gense that they have readied their ,
investment opportunities. Jordan attracts a great deal of Arab capital. While .
the economic nature of some countries require a reliance on a flow of govern-
ment capital for developing the infrastructure, others have moved into a
position where they can use these investments in production projects. Jordan
is one of these latter countries, because throughout the 1960's and the early
part of the 1970's it undertook huge projects within the context of building
its infrastructure and created an economic base to enable productive invest-
ments to play a part in economic development. Consequently, Jordan's share
of foreign investments is greater, for example, than that of other countries, .
such as Yemen, Somalia, or Sudan. The economic infrastructure is there, on
the one hand, and on the other hand it helps to attract private capital. While
some countries depend totally upon off.icial outside capital, Jordan is in a
position whereby private and public funds alike can be invested. I would
estimate that investments in the industrial sector, education, and tourism
in Jordan as the result of privatF foreign financing and investments have
amounted to $1 million a week during the past year, in addition to the extensive
funds that ent~r Jordan for real estate purposes, and about 70 percent of
these investments are Arab.
The Arab Common Market
[Question] There is continuing talk about the importance of the Arab Common
Market. T_s this market a reality or is it still just an idea? What does
Jordan hope to gain from belonging to it?
[AnswerJ Official investments for the most part Cepend on the level of
inter.national relations and on specific bilateral relations. The bases of
the market issue are completely different from the private investments sector,
which is fundamentally working for revenue and profits and is influenced by
the level of confidence and by the investment climate in the country and .
guarantees felt by the inves~or that his investment will last. An evaluation
of the situation in any countiry hinges upon the nature of the offers, whether .
they are agreements of the Arab Market, bilateral agreements, or agreements
to guarantee investments or bar double taxation. They all help. However,
the basic thing ~s the availability of investment opportunities. Jordan's
being a member of the Arab Common Market helps it for foreign investments.
Moreover, there are European institutions that recently have begun seriously
to discuss entering into joint projects in Jordan with the objective of.
marketing their products in the Arab Common Market countries and the other
Arab countries. In the industrial s~ctor, for instance, there are a number
of German, Danish, Britisil, Norwegian, and Bulgarian institutions and others
that have begun to try to Find Jordanian partners to carry out ~oint projects
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aimed at enterin.g Arab markets which they find difficult to enter directly,
such as the Saudi market. By industrializing and creating Jordanian industries
~ with Jordanian material and labor, they can now get into these markets. Then
_ thzre is another investment approach: some industrial countries, particularly
European countries, have begun to feel the need to hold on to their share of
_ certain markets and, consequently, have to get preferential treatment or
lose these markets. An example of this is the electronic industry. Color
television industries are being established today, for example, in Syria
and Iraq, and the industries of these countries are entering Arab markets in
the meniber countries of the Arab Couunon Market exempt from customs duties.
The difference in duties in this regard amounts to 70 to 80 percent, with a
minimum of 40 percent. Enjoying this exemption gives these projects an ad-
vantage. Therefore, a number of countries are trying to set up such industries
in Jordan to get this advantage, because after there is sufficient industriali-
_ zation, their products can enter these markets as a local industry. A third
pattern arises from the fact that our area is wealthy. Jordan continuously
works to develop its industrial sector by pursuing a specific strategy aimed
at expansion in order to export industrial commodities to foreign markezs. ~
_ The local Jordanian market is limited in size because of low population.
Therefore, the Jordanian industries that have been established during the
past 3 years have had a goal of more than 70-percent dependence on the export -
market. Jordan enjoys certain advantages in having a trained and qualified
- labor f~rce, a high degree of education, and the availability o~ certain
basic material, in addition to the preferential agreement~, being a member of
the Arab Common Market and the cooperation agreement witn the EEC in addition
to agreements with a number of countries of the socialis~ camp and Asian
countries, such as Japan, China, and Indonesia. All these factors have openeu -
up new opportuniti.es for export of Jordanian commodities, and, consequently
_ these countries in turn have obtained cor~cessions for the entry of their
goods. _
' [Question] How much have Jordan's revenues been affec~ed by the downturn
in phosphate prices, and do you think that the prices will continue to fall? -
[Answer) Phosphates are Jordan's primary export commodity, averaging 2.5 =
_ million tons this year. Production has currently begvn at a new mine, and
our production from it is expected to rise to about 1.5 million tons. Jordan
_ also exports fruits and vegetables to the Gulf area and Saudi Arabia. Next
in line comes industrial goods, starting with raw plastics and movjng to
~ building materials, fabricated metal products, and a number of consumer and -
middleman commodities. We are now concentrating on high-technology industries -
which require intensive capital. Although Jordan exports labor, it at the
same time imports some and, therefore, tries to rely on techno].ogy more than
on labor-intensive projects. Phosphate prices have again begun to rise
gradually, but I think that during the coming year the increase will be in ~
the range of 12 to 15 percent. Nevertheless, Jordan's exports of phosphates
and industrial commodities are al~ost enough to cover the cost of our crude
oil imports. Given a strong industrial posture relying on outside financing,
revenues from tourism, and remittances from Jordanians working abroad, Jordan -
is in a good financial position, despite the rise in prices, and its balance
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of payments still registers a surplus, though a small one. Jordan is still
_ suffering from an external deficit, as is the case with a large number of _
developing countries.
[Question] How is Jordan meeting the challenge of the problem of food
security? -
[Answer] We are constantly working to ensure food security. One has to
, remember that when the 1967 war broke out, there was no lack of food supplies
in Jordan, particularly flour and wheat. Food stocks in Jordan are sufficient
for more than 2 weeks. We now have grain storehouses and mills sufficient for
- our consumption for a long time. As for other commodities, such as meat and
poultry, we now have widely dispersed cold storage and frozen food depots
with sufficient quantities to last us for months, in addition to a number of
- s trategic commodities. We ha.ve paid careful attention to all these things.
However, the rise in commodity prices has proven to us that our actiuns have
had a good return. For example, there has been a big rise in the prices of ~
s everal co~nodities, but storage costs and interest charges on the funds tie% _
up in storing them have still been far less ~han what we would have had to .
pay were we to buy them at current prices. With regard to local food pro-
duction, during the past 2 years Jordan has seen a severe lack of rainfall
which has prevented us from taking advantage of a large number of dams we
had earlier constructed, because they did not collect the required rainwater,
and this had an effect on agricultural crops. ~
- 8389 -
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~ LEBANON
EFFECT OF JIJ1~B7~AT' S DEATH ON NATIONAL MOVEMENT DISCUSSED
Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in Engl.ish 13 Oct 79 pp 16-20 -
[Text] It is often said thaz the death of Kamal Jumblat marked the begin-
ning of the end of the National Movement's unity. The ?rlovement, which groupa
now around 22 leftist, nationalist and progressive part~es and organiza-
_ tions has been consistently trying to preserve its unity and existence ever
since the 3eath of its leader and founder, in March, 1977. However., the
assassination of Kamal Jumblat was not the only reason why th~ Movement fell
. in trouble, many other factors have provoked the disintegration of the Move-
ment. And th~ general impression today is that the National Movement, in _
addition to being torn apart, has somewhat failed in fulfilling the purpose
. for which it had been created.
?irst Steps. The birth of the Lebanese Leftist National Movement, like
that of the rightist Lebanese Front, was not in the natural order of things.
It was merely a regrouping of parties that were separated by many factors, -
including their ideologies, and especially their allegiances, within move- _
ments orc fronts whose sole purpose was to fight against each other and which
failed to come up, towarda the people, with an alternative to the aystem
they w~re supposedly denouncing.
- The b irth of these fronts and movements was linked to the onset of the
Lebanese crisis. Drawn from the real~ of traditional opposition to which
they belonged, these parties wer~ ~vund to return to it as soon as their
role was fulfilled. The politicai aspirationa they fermulated were already -
_ beneath the aspirations of the mass they were to represent, and, although -
~ the Idational Movement drew up a detailed programme of political, adminis-
trative and social reforms, it faile~ to present concrete proposals of
; economic reforms which could have palliated the political and ideologi~al
_ lackings of their policy statements and platforms. -
- The National Movement has been known under this name only since 1974, but
it was founded several years earlier, in 1969-1y70 as the "Regrouping of
- National and Progressive Forces and Parties". Led by Kamal Jumblat, this
~ group included mainly Jumblat's Party--the Progressive Socialist Party-- _
- and the Lebanese Communist Party, as well as a number of Lebanese
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,
- leftist personalities. The Baath Party joined it in 1971 as one ~a-~ry and -
_ remained as ~ pro-Syrian branci7 and a pro-Iraqi branch after the Syrian ~
and Iraqi Baath parties split. -
The "Regrouping" was represented in Parliament by a bloc call~d the National
Struggle Front which was also led by Kamal Jumblat. It dealt mainly with
social and political problems. On the social level, the Regrouping devoted
tine and attention to the problems of tobacco planters, fishermen, students,
factcry workers, etc... And on the political level, it called for political
and administrative reforcr.s and for official and popular support for the
Palestinian cause, especially after the September 1970 events in Jordan.
. The ..Tordanian events marked the beginning of close cooperation between the ~
_ National Movement and the Palestinian resistance, and the beginning of ~
strained relations between the National Movement and the Lebanese atate,
_ especially after the first major Army-palestinian clashes of 1973.
~ The National Movement acquired this name in July, 1974, after a meeting at ~
the Beau Rivage Hotel in Beirut. All progresaive, nationalist and leftist -
- parties and "unions" (Ittihad) joined its ranks. A few months later, a
- Central Political Council was formed under Kamal Jumblat and a number of
institutions were created--such as the Regional Councils in the various
riohafazats (provinces ) of the country.
From A Cause To A War. In the early 1970's, Kamal Jumblat accomplished -
_ two steps, oae was to ~onfer a legitimate status to the Lebanese Communist
_ Party which thus became the only Arab Communist Party not to be bannedy and
the second was to unify the various leftist parties and forces in the country. -
_ The creation of the National Movement came,in the wake of theae moves and
was primarily aimed at setting up, in Lebanon, a movement that could work
f~ and struggle alongside the Palestinian resistance. Jumblat is said i:o have
had a two-fold purpose:
1--On the one hand, he was eager to assume the Ieadership of a movement -
serving an enormously popular cause in the Arab world, which ~~ould have
- seated his political weight and influence on bases reaching fa~ beyond the
limits of Lebanon.
2--On the other hand, such an action ~ould have enabled him to rei~force
_ his position on the local political scene to give momentum to the programmes
_ of reforms and the changes he was calling for, and to strengthen.his action
against the rigY:*..ist alliances. -
" A non-National Movement source who knew Jumblat well to?d THE ARAB WORLD
- that in his opinion Jumblat "was cornered" and had no choice but to tread ~
the path he tread, when the Lebanese war wa~ looming. The source added
that he was "probably wrong in his calculations because the data were not
- ~lear.... He was not aware of the reality of the Syrian role in Lebanon."
- 75
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The Factora Of Disintegration. The assaeaination of Kamal Jumblat in March,
1977, dealt the National Movement a heavy blow on more than one level. It '
- soon app eared that it was only the personality of this leader and the nature
of his leadership that could bring together and keep together parties that
_ only shared a role in common, but very little by way of prospects, princi- _
ples and purpor;es.
, On the internal level, the loss of Jumblat meant the loss of unity for the
National Movement. On r_he local level, this loss cost the National Movement
the official support that had enabled it to survive and enjoy some influence.
Furthermore, it also cost the Movement the Arab and international support
it had enjoyed because of the Arab and international support and esteem
- Jumblat had earned,
In addition t~ the suppart, the National Movement lost its independence, of
- thought and r~ction and fell because of the inter-Arab differences that were
not long to override the unified action the Movement had maintained during
the two-year war.
_ Little by little problems and factors emerged that further deepened the
gap b~tween the various sides regrouped in the Movement:
1) The problem of choosing a successor to Jumblat at the head of the Movement. -
2) The conflict betraeen the Baath parties and the couununist parties
3) Inter-Arab conflict and differences
4) The change in National Movement-Palestinian relatians brought about by
the recent Middle East Developments
5) The new pattern assumed by the Lebanese question since the onset of the
Middle East peace talks, and the change in the attitude of the Lebanese
_ leftis~t and Moslem base. -
Leadership and Conflicts. More than two years have now elapsed since the
_ death of Jumblat and no solution has yet been found to the problem of his
- succession. That the PSP would remain the daminating party in the Movement ~
and Kamal Jumblat's son, Walid, the leader of both party and Movement, was
_ questioned by most of the other sides because of Walid Jumblat's young age ~
and lack of experience. Each sponsor-state also sought to put foxward its
own side and the unity of *he Movement fell prey to the inter-~1rab conflicts. -
- The main consequence of these conf licts was that the National Movement lost
its independent decision-making and policy making which led to the outbreak
of many internal conflicts, such a~ the recent crisis with the Lebanese
branch of the Iraqi Baath Party. After the arLests and executions that -
followed the announcement of an abortive coup d'etat in Iraq, PSP leader
Walid Jumblat criticized the executions. This drove the Iraqi B~aath Party
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I
~
to quit the National Movement. It returned a while later to avoid being ~
completely isolated on the Lebanese scene.
Another lasting problem has been the defiance of the nationalist or pan- ~
Arab parties towards the main leftist organizations in the Movement: the
Communist Party and the Organization of Cottanunist Action in Lebanon (OCAL).
Earlier this summer, a conflict developed between Walid Jumblat and the f
Nasserite Independent Movement (Mourabitoun) following the impl.ementation
~ by Jumblat of a decision to close down most of his Party's offices in West
Beirut. He was accused of trying to comply with t?ze demands of the state.
As time went by less joint communiques were issued by the National Movement
and, whereas in Kamal Jumblat's time communiques expressed the position of
the entire Movement, after his death, each party, organization issued its
own statements and they were sometimes contrad:ictory. The Movement's
paper AL WATAN, which is mainly controlled by the Left, sometimes ignored -
declarations or statements made by other parties and this prompted Jumblat
to re-open the PSP's organ, AL ANBA.
The Rai:on d'Etre. Primarily, however, National Movement sources believe
that the Movement has lost its raison d'etre. Founded to take up arms
alongside the Palestinian resistance they have been outrunned by the Pales-
tinians in the first stage and, in ':he second stage, the Palestinians have .
_ stopped the struggle everywhere in Lebanon, except in the South, to launch :
political and diplomatic activities on an international level. In addition -
- to this, they have also lost a substantial part of the support given to
them by the Moslems of Lebanon who were irritated by abuses and have now
turned their attention and support to formations such as the Moslem Alli-
ance, the Front for the Safeguard of the South and the Higher Shiite Council.
On the other hand, intensive efforts aimed at bolstering coordination and
unity between the National Movement and Fronts such as the pro-Syrian -
National Front (led by Kamal Chatila) and the National Confrontation Group-
ing (led by Minister Talal Meraabi), have failed.
Prospects. The internal situation of the National Movement has slightly
imgroved over the past few weeks as its leaders have been trying to build
a new solidarity among the parties and organizations on the ~asis of agree-
ment on some principles such as attachment of the unity of Lebanon through
the balanced entry of the Lebanese Ar.!:y in the South and elaewhere and the
reform of the political and administrative system. _
Plans to divide the Movement into two new movements one more pro-Syrian and
_ the other pro-left have b~en set aside, along with plans that ca~led for ~
enlar~ing the Movement to include the National and the Confrontation fronts.
+ Efforts are currently being deployed to bolster cooperation and coordination ~
between the three groupings.
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On the internal level, it is expected that a solution will be found to the
leadership issue by appointing Walid Jumblat as president of the National ~
Movement and appointing Secretaries to each of the Movement's institutiona ~
in such a way as to have each institution managed by a different party.
The Secretaries would meet once a week around Jumblat and thus constitute
= the executfve body of the movement. The 22 parties represented in the
- Movement are expected to be soon increased to 30.
For the time being, the National Movement's role is to maintain its posi-
tions pending the turn the situation will take in the country. If peace
returns, some of the parties will return to parliamentary life and the
otners to non-parliamentary opposition, with prominence given, again, to
the individuals rather than their parties. If violence breaks out again,
_ it is expected that it will account, again, for these parties' solidarity
on the battlefield.
CSO: 4820
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LEBANON
RELIGIOUS LEAD~RS, IR,AN'S INTEREST IN SOUTH
Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in Engliah 20 Oct 79 p 17
[Text] The n.ew Iranian regime's interest in South Lebanon became manifest
- over the past two weeks with the visits to Lebanon and in, particular to
_ South Lebanon first of Foreign Minister Sadeq Tabatabai and then of Imam
Ayatollah Khomeiny's grandson, Hussein Khomeiny. � .
4
= Beth Tabatabai and Khomeiny held talks with Palestinian and Lebanese Shiite
. leaders and toured the South. �
Two Positions. The two leaders apparently came for the same purpose as both
denounced the Israeli aggressions on 5outh Lebanon and promfsed~to extend
assistance to the population of the 3outh. However, informed sources say,
the two Iranian leaders came as~the representatives of two factions of the
- Iranian rQgime that uphold different, although not contradictory, positions
concerning the situation in the South and the policy to follow to settle
the prablem of that region.
Foreign Minister Tabatabai, who is also the nephew of misaing Imam Moussa
Sadre, came, the sources said, as the representative of the ~ranian govern-
ment of Prime Minister Bazargan. The official Iranian position which he
expressed is that Iran should give all its support to the Shiite populgtion
of Lebanon and to the demands of the Shiit~s who have been calling for the
withdrawal of Palestinian armed elements from the South and fbr the deploy-
ment of the Lebanese regular armed forces in the region. Even if the grow-
ing antagonism between the Shiites and the Palestinians ahould lesd to an
armed confrontation between the two sides. _
Hussein Khomeiny, on the other hand, came to Lebanon as the representative
of Iraae's religious leaders and in particular of his grandfather Ayatollah -
Ruhallah Khomeiny whose position is that a compromise must be achieved be-
tween the Shiite population and the Palestini.an resistaz~ce in or.der to avoid
a confrontation between them. ~ . ~
It is worth noting he~E that the PLO despatched a delegation this week to
Tehran for talks with both official and religious leaders. According to ~
the observers, the mov.: reflects the concern of the PLO towards the atti~tude ~
- that Iran may take an~1 especially the support that it may extend to the
Shiite population of the South at a time this population is growing more and ~
more angered by the sufferings it is enduring. The PLO is particularly con-
cerned over the r,O88ib31ity that Iran may arm the Shiite8 and that, in case
_ the Army deploy~ed in the South, a confrontation b~tween the Shiites and the
Palestinians mxy involve the Army. ~
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LEBANON
IRAN'S ROLE IN SOUTH LEBANON PROBLEM
Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 16 Sep 79 p 2
LArticle: "Lebanon Wants Results Before Arab Summit To Be Able To Make
~ All Face Their Responsibilities"/
/Text/ Recently, there have been growing murmurs about an important role
which the new Iran is playing in helping the authorities reclaim south
Lebanon from the illegal authorities and overcome the obstacles which are
blocking the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions pertaining
to this region. Some have begun to fear that these resolutions might be
transformed into mere formalities which are impossible to implement--a
situation which would result in future enshrinement of the accomplished
fact, namely the apportionment of the south between Israel and the Palestinians, ~
especially if the current efforts to produce an overall solution to the
Middle East crisis falter.
Local political circles have increasingly begun to wonder about the real
nature of the Iranian role and the reasons behind the information blackout
about this matter despite the great importance it holds for the country
and the significance attached to it by a number of Iranian sources both -
official and unofficial.
When asked about these mumurs and questions, widely informed political
_ sources said that the Iranian move in the south proceeded primarily from
two factors: _
_ 1. The Ir3nian revolution's absolute belief in the Palestinian cause.
- It was on this basis that the Iranian revolution became concerned about
the south because it is the only Arab front open to Israel, as a blanket
of silence covers the other Arab fronts, and because the Palestinians are
the originators of the issue and are invol~ed in it from the human, military
~ and political standpoints.
2. The desire of the Iranian revolution to aid members of the Shiite sect, _
who form the ma~ority of the population in the south, and help them to remain
steadfast and avoid subjection to the threats of expatriation, forced
immigration and occupation; and to provide the capabilities for steadfastness -
' and survival through coordination with the Palestinian revolution, in which
they believe and with which they have a good relationship.
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= The sources added that the developments which occurred after the Security ~
Council issued its first resolution concerning the south, resolution 425,
have made the application of it and subsequent resolutions an impossibility.
Israel has continually obstructed the application of these resolutions, and -
- thus the Palestinian resistance has been affected by considerations which,
_ in its view, are strategic in nature.
The price has been paid by the inhabitants of the south, and especially
- the inhabitants of Jabal 'Amil which holds a special importance for Iran.
The price has beer~ paid by all Lebanon, as well, since the Lebanese situation
has remained chaotic because of the failure to plug the dike in the south
through which the water is leaking.
- Everyone Takes Stock
The political sources said that all parties have begun taking stock of their
situations, particularly members of the Shiite sect whose effective leaders
such as the Supreme Shiite Islamic Council and the "Amal" movement are greatly
respected and understood in Iran. A series of contacts and meetings has
_ been held in which it has been agreed that Iran will exert whatever efforts
and possibly even pressure it can to bring the Palestinians into final
agreement with Lebanese authorities on the implementation of the Security
Council resolutions, even if Israel, on its side, refuses to agree. Such -
a refusal on Israel's part would expose it before international public opinion,
which has become fed up with its impudence and no longer looks at the Middle
East situation from a single viewpoint. Moreover, Iran is to make every
possible effort to assist the Lebanese authorities in restoring the balances
in Lebanon which were in effect before the 2 years war, because it cannot
exist without them and simultaneously they provide all kinds of guar~ntees -
to the Lebanese sects, including the Shiite sect which, in the f~r?al analysis,
constitutes a minority group whose nation is Lebanon.
The same sources added tr,at at Iranian-Palestinian meetings the resistance
was told that Iran is prepared to help the revolution to the maximum exte*~t,
possible, but only on the condition that it provides the ingredients for
peace in the south and reaches agreement with the Lebanese authorities and
the UN Security Council.
In this connection, responsible Shiite sources say that the Palestinians
have tried to gain time and have not reached a decision on the matter,
= passibly because of their belief that conditions or standards could change. _
But nothing of the sort has occurred. What has occurred is a continuation
of the Israel aggressions against the south.
Meetings and Initial Agreement
Shiite efforts are again underway with Iran, and Iranian efforts have b~en
renewed with the Palestinians, all of which has resulted in contacts and
_ meetings between the Shiite and Palestinian sir."~es. The most important
of these include:
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1. A meeting between Representative Husayn al-Hussayni, secretary general
of the "Amal" movement, and Xasir Arafat, head of the PLO Executive Committee,
which took place prior to the strike protesting the cont~!nued disappearance
of Imam al-Sadr.
2. A 4-hour meeting held this week between Mr al-Husayni and Palestinian
leader Abu Jihad. .
3. Another meeting has been arranged with Mr Arafat after his return from
Spain, .
Shiite sources report that the meeting with Abu Jihad was fruitful. In it,
Mr al-Husayni affirmed that the southerner is prepared to sacrifice everything
for the Palestinian cause, but not to the extent of sacrificing his land.
He also stressed that the present phase, especially in th~ wake of the -
international victories achieved by the resistance, is one of diplomacy
- rather than military activity because tY~e latter would especially serve
the interests of Israel at this time. -
Abu Jihad's position, according to the same sources, was initial agreement
to the demand that the army enter the south (Sur and A1-Nabatiyah) and -
implementation of the Security Council resolutions. _
When the discussion moved to the practical details of implementation,
A1-Husayni felt that this should be discussed with the legal authorities.
The encouraging thing in the eyes of the same sources is that these details
- will be discussed with the authorities in the near future, either at the
anticipated Lebanese-Palestinian suamit or at the meetings held periodically -
between Prime Minister Salim al-Huss and Palestinian officials. _
- Informed sources believe that there must be agreement on the issue of the
south among the authorities, the Palestinians and the United Nations, and
that what they agree upon must be implemented beFore November, i.e. grior
to the convening of the expand~ed Arab summit. This is ~o that the agreement _
can be sanctioned and at the same time additional measures can be approved
which would ~;ut Lebanon in a position to reconstruct the soutih within the
feasible framework.
- If the efforts regarding the south are not goirig to achieve positive and
practical resul~s, the concerned parties insist that this be uxiderstood -
prior to the summit as well so that the Arabs will assume their respons!~-
bilities toward the south and Lebanon and approve appropriate measures, if ~
i it is within their capability to do so. -
Under any circumstances, negative results from ~he efforts aould force ti.~ �
concerned tarties--particularly the authorities and the po~ulatiun of the
= south, which means the Shiites--to search for another way to save the south
and its inhabitants and an alternative formula which may not be pleasing
to some.
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Extent of the Wager on the Iranian Role
- Is betting on the Iranian role conceivable under Iran's present conditions?
Some Lebanese and Arab political sources urge that betting on the Iranian
role not be carried too far and that such a role should not be blown out
of proportion. This is because unsettled conditions in Iran do not
permit the officials in Tehran to concern themselves with issues considered
peripheral to domestic issues, and also because nothing could be worse for
the Lebanese situation, particularly in the south, than increased interference
from abroad, whether Arab or foreign.
Nonetheless, Shiite sources regard the wager as ~ustified, particularly
since Iranian authorities have demonstrated their ability to maintain a
hold on the domestic situation.
In this connection, the sources wonder why the Iranian preoccupation with
the resistance is seen as advantageous despite the growing number who
are similarly involved with it, and yet the same preoccupation with Lebanon
and the issue of the south is not advantageous. They urge no action until
all the stages of the Iranian move on behal� of the south are completed.
The sources disclosed a secret in this connection. ThEy said that Iranian
~ officials have made the south a main item in their talks with Soviet officials,
and they have asked the Soviets to deal seriously with the south to insure
that the Security Council resolutions are implemented. The sources added
- that the Iranian officials will make the same appeal in any dialog with
_ American officials, in the event that such a dialog takes place.
8591
- CSO: 4802
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LEBANON
ARMENIAN-PHALANGIST CONFRONTATIOhS ANALYZED _
.
Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 14 Sep 79 p 2
/Article: "Toward Frank M~eetings T~ Remove the Elements of Mutual Suspicion
in Order to Ohviate Compli~ations Which Keep Lebanon as the Sole Loser"/
lText/ Official circles welcomed the cease-fire agreement approved last
Wednesday night by the Phalangist, Liberal and Tashnak parties, as the
numerous steps in this agreement continue to be implemented one by one.
The two factions called for disregard of the fo.rmalities and adherence to
the substance which will restore solidarity and kinship to their former
familiar clashes and difficulties between the two factions will resume
- after a while because the scale reached by the latest clash uncovered con- -
trived purposes and preparations among the factions. This indicates that -
~ne must look beyond the immediate cause of the clash, ~n spite of its
importance, to the real causes of the tense situation between r.he Armenians
and Phalangists in order to eliminate these causes and prevenr n.w clashes--
_ especially since immediate causes or pretexts can be created every~ day.
_ What are the basic reasons for the conflict between the Armeni~a rar~ies,
- in particular the Tashnak Party, and the "Lebanese Front~' parC3es, in -
particular the Phalangist Party, which put the political and electoral
alliance which spans 30 years in danger of collapsing?
Sources close to the two factions, say that an extended discussion of these
reasons would prove inconclusive, aside From being very ler.~thy due to the
mcltiplicity and diversity of the causes. This is especiallq true since
the 2 years war and subsequent wars brought about fundamental developments
which altered many of the gi~~ens both on the ground and in the people;'s
minds and which gave room for the ~emergence of new positions or movements -
backed by weapons.
Mutual and Renewed Suspicion
~ ~
The s~~srce s sum up the condition which has befallen yesterday's allies with -
~ne word: suspicion--suspicion which developments and events~have made
mutual and are possibly buttressed by evidence and proof.
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In the "Lebanese k'ront," and the Phalangist Party ta be specific, there is
suspicion of the Armenian position. This suspicion began during the 2 -
years war in which the Armenians remained largely neutral between the two
struggling factions in the country. This suspicion could have died down -
if the ordeal which Lebanon is experiencing had ended with the fighting
in early 1977. However, the renewal of the fighting ~rith an alteration in
the map of alliances and enmities caused this suspicion to arise again
since the Armenians again maintained neutrality despite the fact that they
- were forced out of their neighborhoods and ~obs on a rather large scale as
- a result of the "wars" in the capital during the summer of 1978. This
neutrality was not limited to avoiding participation in the fighting but
also applied to sharing the burdens of "resistance," in the view of the
"Lebanese Front." Thus, the suspicion and mistrust increased. Clashes
began on an individual basis at first and then expanded.
The Armenian faction responds to this by sa~ing that its military neutrality
helped the "Lebanese Front" considerably in its war because the Armenians
maintained an open channel which was utilized fully to supply the front ,
_ with all sorts of vital supplies from which they had been cut off.
The Armenian faction ascribes its lack of active participation in the war to
the fact that the wars which the Armenians fought in their country did not
bring any results, and moreover civil wars are ezcploited from abraad and _
in the end always work against the welfare of the nation--any nation. They
_ say that they did not spare material support, but they want the support to
be voluntary and not as a propitiation for not participating in military
conflicts as the front tried to suggest, because giving in to this logic
would make the Armenians subject to continual blackmail.
The Armenian faction believes that the objective of the gradually escalating
clashes is to strike a blow at the Armenian Party structure. -
_ Do the two factions talk frankly to each other in their frequent meetings
in order to contain the incidents and eliminate the mutual suspicions?
Sources close to them say that the misgivings remaind withir~, the walls built
around each faction, and that accusatory remonstrations dominate the meetings.
For instance, the Phalangist Party accuses the Armenians of endeavoring to
create a~ independent sector within the easLern area, and of seeking to
pestYr r:~e Phalangists, on advice from outsfde. The Armenians say that the
Phalangists want to contain them; and, as they see it, the solution is to
turn over all ~he "independent sectors" to the legal authorities.
The Authorities Fear Complications
What are the drawbacks of a clash between the Armenians and the front?
Government sources believe that if this clash is renewed and escalates, -
it will certainly have an effect on many areas and will create new situations `
that will increase the authorities' confusion and compound their apparent
_ inability to deal with basic problems and incidental matters.
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The most important repercuss~ons of the clash, according to the same sources,
are:
- 1. A deepening of the wounds between the Armeians and the Phalangists which ~
will make them di~Eficult to heal.
2. The authorities' attention will be distracted from important matters
and fateful issues so they can searCh for a way to end the clashes.
3. A consolidation of the organizations which the war in Lebanon had isolated.
4. Another new social calamity would be added to those already created by
_ the 2 years war--calamities for which the state has not yet been able to
- produce a solutinn, such as forced emigration and the continuation of a
collective existence under constant mistrust and fear.
5. A confirmation of the weakness of the state and, possibly, the enshrinement
- of this weakness.
While the clash was taking place, the state was unable to do anything except
contact the two sides involced in the conflict and try to convince them to
stop. Nearly 3 years after the end of the war, this is seen as an indication
of considerable weakness.
The other sources feel that the front must not make a final break with the ~
Armenians, because they could harm the Leban~se cause which is championed ~
abioad, i.e., in A~erica and Europe where their presence is well established
_ and effective.
Why Hasn't the Army Been Deployed? ~
Will the army be deployed to maintain the peace in this area if the clashes _
resume? Why wasn't it deployed when the clashes escalated during the past
2 days? .
Both government sources and those close to the two parties say that the
_ deployment of the army would only be possible at the request of bcth factions.
It would be deployed as a peace force and would take all the necessary measures
to prevent a renewal of the incidents--similar to the way in which it was
_ deployed in 'Ayn al-Ramanah and Furn al-Shubbak--but would not be deployed
in the case of a clash. When the two conflicting facxions reach a stage
in which they are unable to gain or impose solutions or to continue fighting,
then the army would be deployed at their request and with their approval. _
This is impossible, however, as long as one or both of the factions are
. convinced tihat they have the potential to settle matters or steer events
to their advantage.
~
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- Informed political sources believe that the fragmentation occurring in
the "eas.tern areas," which began with former President Sulayman Franjiyah's
_ withdrawal from the "Lebanese Front," and is slated to continue, matched by
the continuing Pragmentation in the "western areas," is in the interest of
the legal authorities because it will allow them to take possession of the
entire region. Despite everyone's welcome of state control, the citizens
want this to be achieved w3thout casualities, victims and the carnage which
would make things all the worse.
8591
CSO: 4802
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LEBANON
LEBANESE-PALESTINIAN RECpNCILIATION IS KEY TO SOUTH LEBANON PROBLEM
Beirut AL-NA~".AR in Arabic 15 Sep 79 p 2
/Article: "Palestinian-Lebanese Concord Is Sole Avenue to a Solution of
= the South Lebanon Problem Sanctioned by Syria"/ -
- /Text/ The official Lebanse efforts to hold a special Arab summit on the
south continue despite neg3tive signals which make the likelihood of such
a summi~ remote. -
Government sou:.�ces explained why the authorities are clinging to the idea ~
- of convening a separate summit on the south and why they are doing every-
_ thing in their power to achieve su~h a summit. The sources said that Lebanon "
is in a hurry to produce a solution to the problem of the south--a problem =
- which will broo~ no delay. The Israeli aggressions continue despite
periodic cease-fires and w~th them the exodus of the population, not to
, mention the negative repercussions which affect the entire Lebanese situation
and involves the entire country--particularly during this historic period in
which th~ destiny of the region may be decided.
These sources indicated that t~he Arabs might not be in any rush to meet
in the type of expanded summit which they agreed to hold periodically at
the latest Baghdad summit, particularly if they perceive that there has
_ been no change in the international equation which would necessitate a -
meeting, and if they feel that such a meeting might unravel their formal
solidarity. This situztion has compelled Lebanon to work for a summit speci- -
fically concerned with the south. Aside from this, Lebanon wishes to treat
the issue of the south within a framework which is detached from the Middle
East crisis and the Yalestinian problem. However, this would be impossible
in the approved annual summit which is set up Co study the larger crisis,
because the discussion at the summit would deal with the south from the
standpoint that best serves the efforts being exerted to produce a solution
- to the region's crisis which would satisfy all sides. Such a smlution
' establishes and reinforces the link between the problem of the south and -
the general regional problem, when what is needed is to dissociate the two
problems or at least lessen the linkage between them.
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.

i4 NOVEMBER i979 N0. 2044 2 OF 2

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Despite the dee~ underst~nding which Arab leaders showed toward the problem -
of the south and the motives behind the move made by Prime Minister Dr Salim
al-Huss and the personal delegates of the president, conversations with these
= leaders have caused Lebanese oPficials to doubt the likelihood that a summit
will be held before November, or tr.at two separate summits can be held during -
a 2 month period.
In view of the lack of agreement on the Lebanese demand, the authorities
decided to seek to get the issue of the south included as a major item on
the regular summit's agenda, having obtained promises from some Arabs that
they would support any Lebanese position.
- Despite the importance that the problem of the south be discussed at the
Arab summit--whether it is a special summit on the south or a general summit--
the most important poin~ in the view of the government and the administration
_ is that Lebanon approach the Arab kings and leaders with definite ideas,
.a solutions and alternative solutions wliich guarantee Lebanon's welfare and
= do not put hard choices before the Arabs--choices which are painful at best.
' Lebanon cannot be content with presenting the problem and asking for a
~ solution from the Arabs because, whether due to i~nability or lack of desire, -
they will not offer one.
Lebanese-Palestinian Accord Required
In the view of government circles, the best thing that Lebanon can do is
reach aa accord with the PLO as soon as possible and then carry this accord `
to the su~nit, make the Arabs face their responsibilities and demar_d from
them whatever solutions and positions are feasible.
- For, in the opini~n of these circles, an Arab summit would be easy to convene
- in the presence of a Lebanese-Palestinian accord and would be guaranteed =
to produce results. Howe~er, the summit would be difficult to convene and
its outcome would be uncertain in a climate of continued Lebanese-Palestinian -
incompatibility.
- This is because the Arab states, whether because of intimidation, enticement
or their own belief, side with the Palestinians right or wrong. Moveover, .
the Arabs cannot possibly be less Arab than the rest of the world which
has begun to enter the Palestinian era--particularly since it has become
convinced that continued neglect of Palestinian rights will result in,
economic, political and social catastrophes. _
The government circles point out that a Lebanese-Palestinian accord would
not alone fully realize both Lebanese or the Palestinian interests in full, -
and they insist that this accord be sanctioned in the expanded summit which
would then constitute a guarantee for the accord and its continuation and
implementation in the app roved form, thus eliminating any futui~: sudden
shocks or disputes.
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- The government circles believe that a Lebanese-Palesti.nian accord must be
followed by a Lebanese-Syrian accord which will solve the pi�oblems pending
between the two countries and help form a specific guarantee for the first
accord prior to the achievement of a broad Arab guarantee. Syria is concerned
, with the situation in Lebanon for a number of reasons, as well as being
concerned with the Palestinian problem and the overall Middle Eas~ crisis. ~
Above a11, Syria maintains a presence in Lebanon, and coordination with
' the Lebanese on all matters is a must.
Is a Lebanese-Palestinian Accord Possible?
In spite of the fact that tne problems pending between Lebanon and the
Palestinians are numerous and multifaceted, recent developments have
- amassed them all into one big problem, namely that of the south. It is on
- this issue that the efforts of an accord between Lebanese authorities and
the PLO must concentrate, because it has become the key to a solution to many
issues both at home and abroad--and the padlock on such a solution as well. -
In the view of the authorities and the international community, the problem
_ of the south can only be solved by putting the resolutions of the UN
Security Council into effect. Thia means that terrorist operations and
Palestinian infiltration must be halted, and there must be no obstruction
_ to the return of sovereign~y and legality through the introduction of the -
army into the area, along with security and vital administrative activities.
By definition, the solution will begin immediately, according to the
authorities and the international community, when the authorities send thQir
- ~rmy to Sur and A1-Nabatiyah after armed Palestinians vacate these cities.
Such a move would tend to give the international community, and especially ~
the United States, an opportunity to pressure Israel to halt its aggressions -
and operations and ultimately end its support of the border groups which
would pave the way fox the army to enter the border area.
Th.ese matters will constitLte the main topic of discussions at the anticipated
- Lebanese-Palestinian summit, which everyone hopes will result in the desired
= accord.
Interests of Three Sides
_ Widely informed political sources believe that the interests of three sides
will be served by the pacification of. the south. They are: .
1. Lebanon, of course, because the south is the gateway to the problems
affect~.ng all of Lebanon, and tranquility there is considered the key to
A an overall Lebanese solution.
2. The PLO, some of whose staff feel, along with devotees to its cause, _
that any military actions by or within Lebanon and any armed incident afford -
Israel an opportunity ta continue its war of attrition against the PLO
and possibly to plunge the PLO once again into the Lebanese war in order to
- divert it from its ~oal which has begun ~o acquire international ir.terest
90 =
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I
and appro~Jal. This does not mean an end to Palestinian military action,
however, as tile "zealots" would try to proclaim. Such action would be
maintained as an efPective reserve and would be developed and modified
- according to circumstances and dEVelopments.
3. Syria, for whom the south is considered a real trap. For this reason, -
Syria's welfare requires that the necessary backing be provided to put the
ZIN Security Council Resolutions into effect in the south and thus prevent -
- Israel from luring the Syrians into a destructive situati.on. -
Accordingly, the political sources feel that the authorities must take -
advantage of the benefits to be 3chieved by moving the army into the south
and solving the problem there. Moreover, they feel tliat the Lebanese,
Pspecially those who sympathize with the Palestinians, must rid themselves
of the difficult demand for prior consent and take the initative to request
the entrance of the army and approve this move.
~
These sources also feel that the argument that Leba~on has performed its
duties and now it is up to the United Nations to fulfill its obligations ~
- is not accurate. While it is true that Lebanon sent an army into the ~
south and carried out other measures, the Security Council resolution .
stipulates that the international forces will assist Lebanon in reclaiming
_ its sovereignty and extend�ing its authority, and not that they will reclaim
sovereignty and extend authority and then hand them over to Lebanon on
- a silver platter.
_ 8591
CSO~ 48d2 -
91 -
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- LEHANON
OFFICIAL ~I-MONTHLY BANK STATISTICS PU~ISHED -
t3ei!'ut L~ ORIrrNT-I,E JOUR in F~ench 21 Sep 79 p 9 -
/-Text 7 The Banic of Lei~snon published yesfi.erday its bi-moathly report as
- established on 15 September, which, co~pared to that of 31 August, elicits -
- the ~ollowing comments:
1: F'iduciary currency shows a two percent decrease from one two- -
week period to the next, falling from 3,71~1,728,653.82 Leb~nese pounds to -
= 3,b6Lt, 523, 722.9l~ I,ebanese pounda (LL) .
At the same time, assets in gold and foreign currencier3 (the elements for -
_ aecuring the pound) dropped by two percent, ~mounting on 15 September to
_ 2,993,71~8,630.58 I,L, compared to 2,993,899,391.31~ LL, thus maintaining ~
cover of our currency at 80 perceht.
- 2: On the other hand, demsnd deposits made to the Bank of Lebanon
by the Lebanese banking sy.stem incraased by~ 7.4 percent, riaing to
2, 31~0, 733, 977. 37 I,L, compared to 2,180, 551t, 779. 71t LL on 31 August. ~
3: The result ia a net increese in monetary aseets during this
period, on the order of 1.1~ percent, for a total of 6,005,257,700.31 LL
compared to 5,922,283,1~33.56 LL.
1t: The "Other Deposits" entry also increased, rising from
1,191~,l~72,l~62.51 J.L to 1, 221~, 962,102.51 LL.
5: The other assets of the Bank of Lebanon increaeed by 3.2 percent, r
amounting on 15 September to 3,929,260,828.l~ LL compared to
3,808,22~,971.10 LL.
_ 6: Loans in the public sector rose by some 50 million LL in 15 days, -
whereas those granted to the private sector remained stationary at -
61.8 million LL.
The report as issued by the Bank of Lebanon is reproduced below.
92
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~
I
On 15 Sept ?9 On 31 Aug 79
- ~ LL
ASSETS:
1: Goid antl foreign currency 2, 933,11~8.530.58 2, 993, 899, 391.31a
2: Loans tQ public sector 931,11~4,1 i t.08 88~,1l~l~,111.08
3: Loans to private secto* 61 y 8l~1, ;~1. 26 67 , 7?,~.~, 328.68 ~
4 s I~oane under I~aw 28/67 5~~ 567.58 1~72,1t0l~. 78
7: Other aseets and debit accounts 3,929,260,828.!~ 3,808,221~,971.10
Qa ~ s~~ a a a~ j
LIABILITIFS:
1: Demand liabilities
_ a: Fiduciary money 661~, 523, ?22. 91~ 3, 71t1, ?28, 653.82
b: I3emand deposits 2, 3110, 733, 977. 37 2,180, 55lt, ?79. 71~
. 2: Other de oaits ~
P 1; 221~; 962;102.51 1,191~,1i72;1t62.51
- 3: Capital 15,000,000.00 15 000 000.00
1t: General reserve fund 263,085,660.55 263,085,660.55
~ 5: Other credit accounts 352,231~,l~05.57 � 350,673,550�36
> > > � ~ s> > .
s~itisi~if~itt~~ ALS=is~a~~i1~~~~~~
121lt9 -
CSO: 1~800
,
93
. ~ . . ' . . ' . - ~ . ~
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LF:BAAi ON
~ ~ - BRIEFS `
FLIGHT OF WORKERS REPORTED--Minister of I~abor and Social Affa~,rs Nazem Kadri
has requested the proper services in his department to give him a thorough
report on the ex~dus movement of Lebanese workers to ~oreign countries. But
_ it has become evident that th~ese aervices do not have at their disposal the ~
_ full statistics on the subject, and the only figures they have been able to -
establish are those rQgaz~ding workers ~rho request a work permit from the
_ ministry in question before t~eir departure. This permit, incidentally, is
required of Lebanese workers hy certain Arab3c countries, Saudi Arabia in ~
~arti.cular. Tn the absence of full, exact statistics on the matter, some
economic establi.shmenta have had recourse ~,i approximate estimates. ihus
it has become apparent that the industrial sector has witnesaed, during the
past four ~ears, the exodus of over 60,000 workers, made up for the most
part of technicians and spec~aliats. For their part, the trade and finance
sectors have been deserted by some 20,000 workera. As for the banking sec-
. tor, loss~s have been limited, not exceedin~ ~,000 employees, whose loss
has largely been made good as a result of recruiting arnong university gr~_
uates. /-Text 7/'"~irut L~ORIENT-LE JOUR in French 23 Sep ?9 p 9 7 ~2~1~9
cso: 4800 ~
~ ~
_ '
94 -
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' LIBYA
LIBYAN RELATIONS WITH FRANCE DETERIORATE
Paris LE MONbE in French 29 Sep 79 p 1
[Excerpt] In spite of a good number of turbulent initiatives from Tripoli
and sometimes vehement charges of "Imperialism" recently accused of
wanting to "halt the progress o.f Islam" with its military intervention in
- Central Africa Franco-Libyan relations have been marked lately by an -
_ apparent cordiality and close cooperation in many areas. .
In fact, Franco-Libyan cooperation dates from the first years of the new
regime. Colonel Qadlidt~, had always praised General de Gaulle's Arab policy
_ and his attitude toward Israel. After the 1973 war, Tripoli went so far as
to organize some symposia on Gaullism, often welcoming representatives of
- the leftist movements.
France's flaunted independence from the United States, especially on the -
level of defense, was also greatly appreciated in Tripoli, where they called -
on their industry to succeed Great Britain in the equipment of their army,
_ especially in aviation. Mirage planes and helicopters were supplied. -
Military cooperation between the two countries is currently continuing with
_ main"tenance of materiel, although since Libya's break with Egypt in 1972
- and the border war in 1976, the USSR has worked its way up to first place
among Tripoli's suppliers.
On the econoruic level, French sales to Libya have developed considerably
in recent years, especially in the automobile sector, in which France has -
carved out a large part of the market for itself. This progress is all the
more remarkable since France buys a share of Libya's oil production judged
very modest in Tripoli: 3.6 million tons in 1978, or 3 percent of our
total imports. ~
Nevertheless, Tripoli. has not ceased to assert its African ambitions which
_ have at once collided with those of Paris. Colonel Qadhdhafi keenly in-
terested in the black continent, has since 1970 been working on a wide-
spr,ead operation aimed at breaking the ties that many African atates have
' z6ruied with Israel on the diplomatic level and in the areas of civil and
95 ~
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I
military cooperation. Thanks/to its large financial means, ~,ibya has been
able to score spectacular successes, natably in Uganda. Unfortunately,
, those rapprochements were to send Colonel Qadh~fi flying to Gen Idi Amin
Dada's defense in the conflict with Tanzania, which was to be fatal to him.
Li.bya's intervention in the internal conflicts which tore Chad asunder were
even more dangerous for Franco-Libyan relations. While serving as a refuge
~ for FROLINAT, Libya did not hesitate to have its troopa occupy the Azouzou
= Strip in Chadian territory. Tilat attempted annexation was to provoke the
break between Tripoli and current head of the N'Djamena regime Goukouni
= Oueddei, Libya not succeeding in. playing the role of inediator between the
different disputing factions. Was it the failure of this policy which
pushed Colonel Oadhd-nfi to look for "military facilities" in Central Africa
and make it stand up to France, without, however, provoking a reaction
from Paris thus far?
11937
CSO: 4800
96
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LzBYA
_ LIBYAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT DEVELOPMENT DETAILED
Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Aug-Sep 79 pp 171-172
[Text] The Beir Grassa, prototype for a group of 10 missile-launching
. patrol boats ordered from Mechanical Shipyards of Normandy [CNM] in Cher-
bourg, was launched on 28 June.
_ These boats, which are an intermediate version between the Combattante I
and II types from those shipyards and whose reputation is well establis~:ed,
have the foliowing characteristics:
Displacement: 300 tpc
- Dimensions: 49 x 7 x 2.4 meters
Propulsion: 4 MT[J diesels, 4 propellers, 20,000 hp (14,710 kw)
- Maximum ~peed: 40 knots
Armamen:.: 4 Otomat antisurface missiles* 1/76 CA Oto Melara compact
forward 2/40 CA (II x I) Breda Bofors aft
Otomat is a rocicet conceived jointly by the French firm Matra and the
Italian company Oto Melara. It~ maximum theoretical range is over 150 km
but aboard these patrol boats, will be limited to that of the radar
horizon, or about 40 lan.
- The ordering of these 10 patrol boats fro~ CrIN and 4 co3cvettes from Italy
shows Libya's desire to increase its naval f~rces and play a role in the _
Mediterranean in line with Colonel Qadhdhafi's ambitions.
These r:orvettes, whose construction was entrusted to CNTR [expansion
unknowii] in Riva Trigoso, are boats of a little over 600 tons and 32
_ k.nots. Their main armament includes 4 Otomat missiles, 1/76 Oto Melara
compa.ct, a dauble gun carriage of 30 as well as 6 T/ASM (II1 x 2) MK 32.
* Three very similar boats but with 4 mm 38 Exocet instead oF the Otomat
missiles were ordered from CMN by Nigeria. -
~ 97
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The first two, Wadi ri'rach and Wadi Majer, are on their trial runs. The
other two are still under construction. They will be in service by 1982.
In addition to these boats, the Libyan Navy currently has the following
vessels:
--3 1,950-ton, F-type submarines, supplied by the Sovie.*s: A1 Badr,
A1 Fateh, A1 Ahad. The f irst was delivered in December 1976, the other `
- 2 in 1978. Three others are reportedly expected. These very modern sub-
marines are furnished Grit h 10 533-TLT (6 forward, 4 aft) with a total of
22 torpedoes (10 in tubes, 12 in reserve). Th~ese torpedoes can be replaced
by 24 mines. -
--1 frigate, Dat Assawari, 1,325 tons, completed in 1973 in the British
ahipyards Vosper Thornycroft (37 knots) 1/114 CA (II x I) and 2/30 CA
;II x I) and 1 ASM mortar. -
--1 440-ton corvette, Tobruk, dating from 1965 and also built by Vosper.
--6 Osa II ~r~issile-launching patrol boats supplied by the USSR since 1976 _
(240 tpc, 36 knots, 4 ant isurface SS-N-2b Styx missiles, 4/30 CA). Six
- others are expected. Th e order, which was originally for 24 units, was
' apparently reduced by half, which explains the order for 10 patrol boats
f rom CMN .
--7 95-to-100-ton patrol boats built in Great Britain, some 10 years old.
--2 LST, Ibn Ouf and Ibn Harissa, completed in 1977-78 at La Mediterranee
shipyards in La Seyne. Their cargo displacement is around 3,000 tons.
~ Their armament includes 6 40-CA (T.I x 3) Breda-Bofors cannons and 1 81-
mortar from the army to support a small landing operation. The capacity
of these LST is about 570 tons. -
- --3 Polnocnyi-type LSM built in Poland, Ibn A1 Hadran, Ibn Omaya, Ibn E1
Farat. The first was del ivered at the end of 1977 at the same time as
another, christened Ibn Qves, which was destroyed during the night of
14-15 September 1978 aft e r a fire. The other two were delivered last Jun~e.
~ --1 small, 2,000-ton rep air ship, Zeltin, whlch, thanks to its apron, can
accommodate, for example, the.careenage of Osa II-type patrol boats.
11937 ~ _
CSO: 4800
98 -
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- MOROCCO
_ 'AL-MUHARRIR' URGES 'PRIVILEGED CLASS' TO BEAR ITS SHARE OF SACRIFICE
LD291523 Casablanca AL-MUHARRIR in Arabic 18 Oct 79 pp 1, 8 LD
[Editorial: "No Third Choice for the Bourgeoisie"]
[Excerpts] The war which Algeria is waging agaiiist our country is multi~
faceted. There is the military front, on which it deploys troops and large
quantities of ammunitions and equipm~ant. There is the diplomatic front, on
which it has mobilized all its political and financial capabiliti~s as well
as its experience in international circles and gatherings. There is also
the propaganda front which Algeria considers as important if not more -
_ important than the other two fronts.
What is significant in the psychological warfare which Algeria is waging
- against us in the press and radio is its exploitation of the mistakes which
the ru~ers or the privileged class cammit.
For several days now the Algerian information media have been linking
[Morocco's] economic difficulties to the Sahara problem. Of course, what
interests the Algerian rulers is not the prosperity of the Moroccan people
but rather seeing them weakened so they will give up their adherence to the =
- integrity of the national soil. For this reason the media insist that the -
cause of the economic difficulties and the social crisis is the adherence
to the national rights in the Sahara and that this crisis will be solved
as soon as the Sahara is abandoned and the establishment of the all?ged
Saharan state is allowed.
It is by harping on this tune that the Algerian information media, in their
psychological warfare against Morocco, are trying to undermine and weaken -
adherence to the integrity of national soil. It is worth noting however~ ~
that it is not this psychological warfare alone that is trying to attribute
the causes of the economic difficulties to the cost of the Sahara war; the
privileged class is also doing the same th3ng. This class often alleges
that the Sahara problem with its past and present costs is the principal
reason for the economic difficulty from which the country is suffering.
- Indeed, this unsubstantiated allegation has been adopted by some gover~ent
officials themselves.
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- The allegation that the Sahara war is responsible for the economic difficuity
- serves the psychological warfare which Algeria is waging against our country.
In fact what the privileged class is reiterating objectively and clearly _
~ agrees with what the til.gerian information media r.eiterate in their daily
intensive psychological warfare against us.
Discreditatian of the psychological warfare against our country cannot be
achieved solely by the bourgeois class giving up blaming the Sahara problem
_ for the effects of economic, capital and liberal policy and renouncing the
false allegation that the Sahara has led to the economic crisis. This alone
_ is not enough. Rather, the bourgeois class must also take the step of bearing
its share of sacrifice for the sake of preserving the territories that have
been regained. The bourgeoisie is called upon to offer part of its wealth--
- a part commensurate with this wealth as well as with the size of the
bourgeoisie groups themselves. By making such a contribution and abandoning
the theme that the Sahara is responsible for the economic difficulties the -
bourgeoisie would repay some of the debt it owes to the national cause and
would foil the plans of the enemies of the integrity of Moroccan soil, who
_ are exploiting the mistakes of the privileged class in assessing the situation
_ and in failing to bear its share of the sacrifice in the continuing war
against Morocco in the diplomatic, military and psychological war fields.
The privileged bourgeosie has no third choice.
CSO: 4402 -
100
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MOROCCO
'AL-'ALAM' SAYS SOUTH AFRIC.Aiv N-TEST SETS OFF ARMS RACE
LD020913 Rabat AL-'ALAM in Arabic 27 Oct 79 p 2 LD
[Article by 'Umar Najib: "Africa Enters Nuclear Age From the ~ate of
- Destruction"]
[Excerpts] A U.S, television station, cit3.ng CIA reports, said on Friday
- that racist South Africa detonated a low--yield nuclear bomb in the Indian
Ocean on 22 September. U.S. spy satellites confirmed the occurrence of
such an explosion and seismograph stations in several countries atso recorded
it. .
In South Africa the ruling circles denied the explosion story in a manner
aimed at achieving two objectives: intimidating the African states by hinting
at the potential existence of a nuclear weapon and forestalling the antici-
pated wave of protest and condemn~tion from all parts of the world because
of South Africa's entry into the nuclear club and the introduction of this -
weapon to a continent hitherto free of it.
_ South Africa's ability to manufacture a nuclear weapon comes as no surprise
to anybody because for many years reports have been indicating that the
Pretoria go.verrnnent is developing its nuclear capability in cooperation with -
many Western countries, foremost among which are France, West Germany and -
the United States, in retuxn for supplying these states with raw uranium,
of which South Africa is considered the most important producer. Where is
the surprise then?
The surprise is tha.t the Western states have allowed Pretoria to carry out
its threat to possess a nuclear weapon after these states had made the world
and the African states in particular believe last year, when there was an
uproar about an imminent nuclear explosion in the Soutfi African desert, that
they would not a~low Pretoria to possess such a weapon. What makes the ~
surprise even more seriously politically and militarily is that the dis�-
closure of the explosion was made more than 1 month after it took place,
, which thus means the South African Goverr~ment has been given time to ~
maneuver and an opportunity to impose a fiat accompli on the world with
- the connivance of its allies.
101
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Western pressur.e on South Africa last year to prevent it from exploding a
nuclear bomb was aimed at forcing it to reach an agreement on the independence
of Namibia, at least as far as appearances are concerned. When the
nationalist forces in Namibia rej ected this agreement and the United Nations
did not endorse it, it was logical for the proponents of the agreement to seek
to enable Pretoria to possess an additional lever in order to be able to
c~ictate its will. The nuclear bomb was the best means for ~oing so.
- The existence of a nuclear bomb on the A~'rican Continent will upset many -
balances. The people of the continent are struggling to get rid of the
vestiges of colonialism at a time when the international powers are struggling -
to control its destiny. In order to restore the balance that Pretoria has -
L~pset, these [African] states will be compelled to acquire strength
equivalent to South Africa's nuclear capability. Some of these states might -
_ succeed in manufacturing their own nuclear bomb or greatly increase their
military expenditures. Other states might be compelled to look for powerful
- allies who possess nuclear weapon s in order to safeguard their stability and
security in an equation called the balance of nuclear terror.
_ Africa has entered the nuclear age through the gate of destruction and not
the gate of construction. This is its fate.
~
CSO: 4402
~
�
~ 102
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- MOROCCO
- BRIEFS
URANIUM FIND--Uranium has been discovered at Wafaga in the western High
Atlas region. Drilling has revealed the existence of a3- 5-meter seam of
radioactive ore with an oxidized ore horizon of 1,500-2,000 ppm 4(3)0(8)L
[expansion unknown]. Furthermore, following the conclusion ~f a uranium
prospi~cting program in the "Tarekochid" pilot zone of the High [as pub-
lished] Moulouya project, some encouraging indications have been observed. -
These two pieces of newa, revealed by the Mineral Exploration and Investment
Office in a booklet published on its 50th anniversary, encourage high hopes -
- for future exploration and exploitation of this strategic materi.al. [Excerpt]
- LD051141 Casab lanca LE MATIN in French 24 Oct 79 p 4 LD]
- COMrIENT ON UN RESOLUTION--Following the vote at the UN fourth committee on ~
the question of the Sahara, the spokesman of tY�e Ministry of State in charge
of foreign affairs and cooperation has made the followinb statement: It
is noted that despite the efforts exerted by Algeria on all levels--finan-
~ cial, diplomatic or pol.itical--and despite the pressures and distortions
it used on some occasions, the Algerian draft resolution aecured only 83
votes and there were sonie reservations in respect to some of its paragraphs.
This same draft resolution secured 89 votes last year. On the other hand,
the number of countries which voted against this draft resolution, abstained
- or did not participate in the voting was ~0. It ia also noted that even
some of the countries which voted in favor of the draft resolution, particu-
larly Yugoslavia and India, have demanded the inc~usion of some amendments
in some paragraphs. These reservations concerned the description of the -
POLISARIO as the sole legitimate representative of the Western Sahara people -
and the need for the.withdrawal of~what Algeria insists on calling occupa-
tion forces and the need to respect the territorial integrity of the Western
= Sahara and the sovereignty of what it calls the Saharan people. This entire
paragraph was canceled out by the invitation extended to Morocco to partici-
pate in the dynamism of peace. [Text] [LD032140 Rabat Domestic Service in
Arabic 2000 GMT 3 Nov 79 LD] ,
CSO: 4400
103
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~n~ri~Tn nr.n~; tn
_ I'OIJI?I; YI,~N'P UI?VI:LOPMI:N'i' F'I,ANNLD I~OP nL-.JU13~1'I,
lidcl:ih ~\RAB NEWS in English 22 Oct 79 pp 20-21
_ (~rticle by Chris L. Parr) -
~ 1 eX t~ The Jubail industrial complex will soon have primary and secon-
dary industries in production. A public electric utility established by
" Royal Decree will supply massive amounts of energy a's production -
increases at the three oil refineries, four petrochernical plants,
- aluminum smelter, steel mill, petroprotein plant and two fcrtilizer
plants which will be in operation in the earl~~ 1980's. _
'I'he hub of this system is the Ghazlan Generation Plant located '
eight kilometers northwest of Ju'aymah. It is the first major steam
powered electric gene~ating plant in the Kingdom, and will have four, -
400 megawatt generators producing 1600 megawatts for the 230 -
kilovolt transmission system. ~
The Ghazlan plant will provide much of the electricity that will be
- needed aftcr the sharp rise in use in manths to come as steel produo- -
tion gces on stream. The Ghazlan facility is part of the Saudi Con- ~
- solidated Electric Company (SCECO).
, The size of projects in the Eastem Province can be seen from th~
fact that most of ihe electricity generated there will be nothing but a
. by-product of desalination projects producing fresh water for human
and industrial consumption.
Mitsubishj Corporation has just signed a SR 935 million contract ~ `
to build a 550 megawatt power station driven by steam from the -
Multi-Stage F7ash desalination processes. It will help provide water -
for industrial projects as weil as for nearby town and village use. _
When SCECO was created by Royal Decree in August 19~6, its -
main functions included directing t~ e electri~ity from the desalina-
tion processes to the 150,000 consumers in metropolitan areas,
towns and villages, and to large industrial Erojects like the Jubail
complex.
It is a public utIlity whose single purpose is to deal wi4h the intricate
problems that arise when a valuable energy source like natural gas is
being tumed into electricity.
Aramco has a special contract with SCECO to manage, maintain
and operate SCECO for a five year period &om 1977. Because
Aramco has SR1.6 billion worth of shares in SCECO (of SRS billion -
total), it is an operator of generating plants, a shaceholder and a
paying customcr of SCECO. -
The reason Aramco was chosen for this role is obvious. It had the
- largest existing power network when SCECO was created and the
developed skills necessary to deal with large electrification programs.
The first step taken by Aramco was to consolidate. upgrade or -
. scrap inefficient or duplicative smaller generating facilities forming a -
1~
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~i~ntnton gn~l. 'Chcrr wcrt� _'h .mall ruinpunic. in thc I::~.Irrn Pru-
vince that uwallV suppli�i Ic~s energy than was nrr~lc~i bv local
consumers. � '
_ F3y Decemher, 1977 all ?4 companies had brcn bought. Jharehc~l-
ders were given generous shares in SCECO in a ratiu of threc new
_ shares for every old share held hy indcpendcnt companir~. Also a 15
pcr cent rrturn profit ~xr vear ~r sharc was gu,irantrr~i.
Thc results for Eastrrn Province cunsumcrs h~ivc hc~n startling. In
_ thc AI Hasa oasis, for cxamplc, 62 villagcs nuw arr clcctrificJ th:it -
heJ no power bcforc la~t,ummcr. Within thc ncxt twu ycars rcmutr
_ areas such as the Wadi ~li~~ah between Ain Dar and Nariya will havc
aU its villages elcctrified. '
" In some very remote villages there will be ternporary local cicc-
tric generation until main transmission lines.are constructcd, " sai~i
_ Jadi Uthman, acting manager of SCECO Public and Customcr
Affairs. " This will casc an~~ har~iships cncountcred in thc smallcr
towns and villages far from mctropolitan areas," he continurd.
Another area of SCECO cuneern are large citie~. .urh a. thr
tri-city area of Dammam, Dhahran and AI-Khobar which aircadv
have been supplied adequate Rower by SCECO.
The largest potential responsibility that SCECO ha~ will hc to -
supply poH-cr for large consumers: thc Jubail Royal Cc~mrnis~ion, -
the Dammam Industrial Estates, Aramco oil installatiuns an~1 special
govemment industrial projects.
Thc cnormous clcctrification systcm that SCECO operatcs for
~~~~ms an~ villages, metropoliten areas, and large industrial consum-
cre usc5 naturil g;is to run its turbincs. -
llntil now flare~i up gas at gas-oil separation plants (GOSPs) was
I: r.t ,is a pc~wer tii~urce. But suon passengen on jets flying to and from
thr I;astcrn Pruvincc witl no longcr scc thcsc tlares lighting the
!Icticrt.'i'hc n;~tural ~ati will hc tapped at thc ratc of thrcc billion cubic =
f':rt da~' an~1 it will provide the fuet nccded to run such largr
t~cncratiun plants likc that found at Ghazlan.
"I~hc Gh;izl:in Plant u�ill hr pro~iucing 1600 mcgaw;itts t~y 1984, an~l
" therc i~ ungoing coordination between SCECO and the luhail
Royal Commission c~ncerning cnergy needs, " said Uthman. As the -
r~c~ds ~f Jubail rxpand, clcctrical ~ro~uction will increase te~ meet
these needs.
In 1978 two substatio~s wcrc establishcd in Juhai!. f\It,, twu,
8O0,000 gallon fucl tanks for a 50 megawxtt pow~cr pi;uu hacl bcrn ~
erected, pressurc-tested, and wcre bcing fillcd. Ovcnc~a~i po~vcr
lines were completed and energiud.
The therm~l power plant at Ghazlan has a imiyuc titr,uc~ic ~e~,~;
raphical location to major present and futurc lua~l rcntcrs in thc
Eastcrn Province. It is capahlc of utilizing various liyui~l fucls in -
addition to natural gas ; ethanc, fucl oil or naphtha can ~ils~i hr
burned.
With a superahundancc of these fucls in the Eastrrn Pru~�incc thr ~
_ ~uccess of variuus SCECO electrificati~n project~ tiuch ;~s the .fub:~il
_ industrial infr~titructure th:~t ~ic~pend on this cncrky K�rn?~assurc~~
CSO: 4820 ~
- ~~5
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snui~ln nizn~;in
1I IC11 Y I I;I.U R iCl? UI:VELUPI?U 1N IIASA -
.liddah AItAI3 NFWS in English 17 Oct 79 p 3 =
~'1'ext J
J~DDAH, Oct. 14 - A begins, and this could reduce out- animal feed.
- Nationalist Chinese agricultural put by GO per ant. The local vari- The Mission also found thaj
team in ~iasa has developed a var- ety takes 160 to 180 days to gmw. Taichung, Indica Number Three,
_ iety of red rice that may double To remedy these defects, he a long-grain white rice vatiety alsu
output in the area. said, the Chinese mission decided developed in Taiwan, is cxtremciy
The Chinese Embassy here said to crossbrced Hassawi with vari- suitable for the region.
Tuesday Ehat yields of the new var- ous dwarf varieties, and from the Output of that variety in thc
iety, Hassawi Number One, run offsprings of Hassawi and Ai Chao missipn's farm reaches a rare, ] 0
from five to seven :ons a hectare. Chien it selected the new variety tons per fiectare. �According to -
That compares with the two or in early 1978. Lin, the variety's best perfor-
_ three tons given by the local Has- After further experiments, the mance in Taiwan is seven tons pcr
sawi strain. mission has determined the new hectare.
It is the result of hybridization variety is suitable for the regiont Lin hoped that 1n cooperation
between Hassawi and Ai Chao The plant height of the Hassaw~ with the Hasa Irrigation and
Chien, a dwarf, high-yielding var- Number One is only 70 to 80 cni, Drainage AuthoriRy, the Hofuf
iety devcloped on Taiwan. and it stays erect even when the Regional Agricultural Rescarch
Prof. Ling Cher~g-yi, 6ead of the rice is ripe. In addition, the new Center and the Directorate of
Chinese mission gave a demonst- variety tak~s only 100 to 120 days Agriculture of Hasa, the mission
ration Sunday in Hofuf. to grow. ' will begin carryidg uut extension
He said the local variety has Another advaritage of the new work so local farmers can benefit
many characeeristics restricting variety, he said, is that its straw from its research.
especially the extremely tal) plant still contains eight per cent of pro- Attending the demonstration
height and long growth duration. tein after harvest as compared were HIDA Director-General
He said with the plant height with onfy 3.5 per cent of Hassawi. Muhammad Abdullah Ahu-
running from 150 to 160 cm, Has- This will enable farmers to earn Butain, HRARC llirector'14ahJi -
sawi rice droops before heading extra profit by selling the straw as Ramadan and some 100 farmer~,
cso: 4820
_ 146
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SAUDI ARAB IA -
BRIEFS -
- AIRPORT RADAR SYSTEMS-- Jeddah, Oct. 17--Saudi Arabia's aerial monitoring
system has been completed. It covers 28 airports. According to the presi-
dent of Civil Aviation, Abdullah Mehdi, the syatem will be in operation by ~
the end of the year. Mehdi told AL-BILAD the system has 21 earth satellite
stations, 12 landing control devices which monitor the movement of planes
from touchdown to rest and communications equipment for direct ground to -
_ air and air to ground connections. The existing five radar systems w~ll
- be improved. Once they are re~dy plane movements at the country's airports
will rise to 100 per day, he said. A new runaway has been opened at Jeddah ~
airport to meet increasing demand. The aprons at Jeddah and Riyadh have ~
been enlarged to take more planes. Stud~es have been completed on proposed
airports in Turaif, Qurayyat and Khafji and contracts are expected to be
awarded shortly. Mosques and housing uinits will be included. [Jiddah
- ARAB NEWS in English 18-19 Oct 79 p 2J
CSO: 4820
~
_ ~ `-i
_ 107 -
_ ;
.
,
. ,
.
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SYRIA =
REGIME SEEN DETERMINED TO OVERCOME 'CONSPIRACY,' SHORTCOMINGS
_ Paris AL-NAAAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 1-7 Oct 79 p 8
_ [Article by Wadi' al-Hilu: "Amid Expectations of More Assassinations and
Bombings, Damascus Keeps One Eye on the 'Conspiracy' and Another on the
Gaps in the Regime"]
[TextJ Damascus: A visitor to Damascus has no trouble
realizing that "something" within the authority needs to
be corrected and that the individual assassinations and
bombing incidents have left clear marks, but have not -
J caused confus~.on within the regime.
There is nothing unusual or "unnatural" in Damascus. The explosions which
occur from time to time, which are followed by individual assa~sinations,
have caused the citizens to question the country's ability to withstand
them; however, to the authorities, they are actions to be expected at a
- time when the Syrian regime is opposing the Camp David agreements. Syria,
in the view of a num~er of party and governmental leaders, is like a fire-
man who rushes about putting out fires anywhere that is required. Now,
the C~mp David parties are trying to ignite a fire not only in the Syrian "
fireman's house but also in his clothes.
These leaders say that the ob~ective sought by the Camp David parties is =
to divert Syria's attention to its internal problems by creating these
incidents on the one hand or on the other hand by utilizing gapa which
exist within the regime--on the principle that such gaps are like open
windows through which winds can bZow through the entire house.
= Talk of change in Damascus begine at this poiat, because the existing gape =
at various offiaial and party levels open the way for "those who fish in
muddy waters." Such a situation could become like a rolling anowball,
which increases in size every minute and every hour.
The matter of the Moslem Brotherhood is another iaeue. The arrest of
. Husni 'Abu, one of the Brotherhood leaders and the accidental murder of
'Abd al-Sattar al-Za'im by the security men affirm that the suthorities' _
� .
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= crackdown on this group has so far been fundamentally successful. The -
_ Syrian offici.als acknowledge that a number of Brotherhood leaders are atill
free and admit that some are still operating in Syria, although some have
succeeded in fleeing to certain Arab countries which Damascus still refuses
to identify. However, a Syrian official says that these countries encour- -
age the Brotherhood to operate outside their territories while banning
their activity in their own territory. Syrian officials say that those
Arab countries are threatened with sectarian outbursts themselves unless
they "assist" in stopping Moslem Brotherhood activity from emanating from
- their territory.
' Explosions of a Sectarian Nature ~
How will the Syrian authorities deal with this problem?
Officials here expect that the intensity of the sectarian explosions will
multiply until the end of this year at least. They say that the more
Syria presses on with its opposition to the Camp David agreements, the
more the wave of assassinations will multiply but the wave will continue
despite everything within certain limitations wl:ich are well known to more
~ than one country in the world. Syrian officials emphasize at the same time
that while such things are possible, the eruption of a sectarian strife -
_ in Syria is impossible. Such a prospect is not possible even in the calcu-
lations of those who are seeking to weaken or create confusion in Syria
_ not to soften up its position regarding peace with Israel but to make peace
possible between Israel and other Arabs. Syrian officials think that as
long as Syria is willing and capable of political and military action,
other Arab parties who wish to join the Camp David bandwagon will not move
in that direction. One official says that Syria now is strong and capable
of both enduran.ce and confrontation at the same time. The air battles
= which occur over Lebanon from time to time are in fact an actual expression
of Syria's ability to endure and confront--an ability derived from a polit-
ical decision made some time ago and being carried out by the competent -
- agencies.
The Syrian official adds that what is happening inside Syria is an attempt
to so~a confusion carried out by certain elements in service of political _
- goals. The aim behind all this is to subjugate Syria to the logic of Camp
_ David. It other words, the objective is to force the Syrian Ieadership to _
make decisions in such an atmosphere--decisions determined either from fear
_ of what lies in the future or as a reaction to what is taking place. The
Syrian authorities will not heed the Israeli warning to stop intercepting
its aircraft which roam Lebanon's skies at will--it means that "Syrian
confrontation will continue."
Ther Is Another Matter
This is one thing, but the gaps caused by some officials unwittingly or
- premeditatedly are another thing. The Syrian leadership is convinced that
it is urgently necessary to plug these gaps. This "corrective action"
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will be carried out through the general party conference which will be
held before the end of this year. Well informed party circles in Syria
think it likely that the conference will be held between November and
December. At this conference, there will be an assessment of what has
been done thus far on all political, economic and organizational levels,
through reports currently being prepared and which will be discussed in
- various party branches. After each branch secretariat has drawn up its
own co~ents and suggestions, the congress will then be called to convene
so that it won't last a long time as in the past. Indeed, the Syrian
leadership is currently studying a proposal that the conference be convened
in two stages--the first on the party branches level and the second at the
congress itself, so as to save time. The question of time is being taken
into consideration because all the officials will have to devote their full
attention to the congress, r~esulting in a disruption in administrative work.
In the past, debate over reports and votin~ on proposals was done during
the congress, and this process was very time consuming. The congress will
be called to convene by President al-Asad, in his capacity as secretary
~general of the Ba'th Party.
It is expected, as reported by officials in Damascus, that the congresa
will result in major changes in positions and responsibilities. The con-
gress is also expected to draw up a new plan to confront the next phase.
Meetings are being held within this framework between the regional leader-
ship of the Ba'th Party and the central leadership of the National and
Progressive Front which is participating in the government. A Syrian
_ official says that the purpose of these meetings is to strengthen cohesive- =
- ness and cooperation among the parties participating in "the national
front" and to broaden the base of that front by including nationalist ele-
ments and personalities who enjoy a fund of popular respect and support,
It is well known that the statement made by President Hafez al-Asad upon
his renomination to the presidency included a statement to this effect.
Strife Is the Goal
A political observer returns from Damascus with impressions which may be
- summarized as follows~
1. The assassination incidents which have occurred so far are a preface
to explosions designed to inflame sectarian disputes and escalate them to
~ the point of a sectarian strife, such as the strife which set Lebanon on
fire.
2. Syrian authorities expect more such activities but completely dismiss
the possibility of a sectarian strife occurring.
3. These authorities acknowledge that while the Moslem Brotherhood is being
incited externally and partly funded by Arab money, there are within the
political system gaps which must be pluggQd in order to prevent violent
winds from blowing through them.
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4. 8yria staads almost alone in confronting Camp David. It is still
= strong, but the international objective is to weaken it and sow confusion
in it to pave the way for the kind of decisions which would satisfy the _
policy that the Camp David signatories are attempting to carry out in the
= Arab region. -
~ 5. Syrian officials are convinced that despite these givens, reaistance is
possible and capable of undermining the policy of capitulation to Israel
- on the ~ne hand and achieving an honorable Arab peace on the other.
- 6. With this in mind, officials confirm that Syria will continue to con-
- front Israel in Lebanese or Arab skies, and that Syria will not allow
Israel free movement in Lebanon regardless of the sacrifices. The Syrian
eye will resist the Israeli awl so that this awl wi11 not reach the heart.
7. It is expected following the meetings of "national front" that the
front, after it is expanded, wi11 play a larger role in public and polit-
ical life. Public resolutions, and others that will in all probability
remain secret, will conf~rm this course of action.
8. There will be no governmental changes before the congress. ~y~rian
Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam confirmed this before his departure -
for New York.
= 9. All of these conditior:s will remain the main hallmark of Syrian activ-
ity prior to the congress. It is difficult to speculate right now what
the picture will be after the congress.
The Confusion Is Deliberate
Nevertheless, the primarily deliberate confusion presently occurring in
Syria is designed to disfigure the features of the present regime. During �
and prior to the Baghdad conference, Syria was able to persuade the Arab
states that endurance and resistance were possible because it was strong
and capable of doing so. However, the increase in the assasainations and
bombings might rock a strong regime, without necessarily toppling it. This
is the view of those who oppose this regime. What is being sought is only
to rock the regime. Syria is now fighting against such attempts. The
Moslem Brotherhood, no matter. what it does, will not succeed in creating
a popular trend or in finding sections within the army which will support
and help it carry out a military coup, nor wi11 it succeed in fomenting
secta~ian strife which would burn [passage dropped] [the Ba'th Party]
succeeded over a number of years to creafie a broad popular base from the
diverse sects in Syria, as well as in maintaining an international balance
in the Arab region. This is something which cannot be easily overcome.
Therefore, an incident generates whispers which make it look to be more
than it actually is, but soon the whispers will evaporate. Officials in
Syria anticipate such incidents and say that some anticipated incidents
may surpass in severity anything that has happened so far, so as to make
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- the regime appear unable to control the internal situation or to drive it
into reactions which would be necessary first step toward igniting a
sectarian strife.
However, does that mean that things will occur with such simplic:ity? This
is not so. The plot to which Syria is currently being subjected may sur- ~
pass the level of the resistance shown by its rulers. However, one offi-
cial says: "Regardless of the size of the plot, we will maintain our
positions until we attain the peace we want. Although the regime in -
Damascus has thus so far shown some of its weapons, it has not yet shown
- them all." An observer needs only to visit Damascus or any Syrian city,
on the coast or inland, to feel that the features of the city have not
changed and that nothing has actually changed. An observer needa only to
ask the ordinary ~itizens to find out whether "something" within the -
regime needs to be corrected or changed.
7005
CSO: 4802 -
112
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HAMAH HOUSING PROJECT; ANTI-C.~OLERA MEASURES DISCUSSED
Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 18 Sep 79 p 4 -
[Article by SANA and AL-THAWRAH correspondent: "100 Million Syrian Pouflds -
To Build Housing Units in Hamah"] -
[Text] Hamah: One hundred million Syrian pounds has been allocated to -
. build new housing units in Hamah, at a time when the health situation in -
the province has been examined and the actions taken to prevent the epread
of cholera reviewed, especially after its appearance in neighboring coun- _
tries.
It was decided that the Public Institution for Insurance wo~ld participate
ix~ financing the housing units which wi11 be built on A1-'A?amayn St. in
the city. That was the resulfi of a meeting between the governor and com-
rade branch secretary with the director general of the institution and a
number of its officials.
- The director of the institution in Hamah stated that agreement on financing
~ the construction was reached between the municipality and the inatitution
by sharing the amount of approximately 100 million pounds from the funds
reaerved for life insurance which the office of the prime minister has per- -
mitted the institution to use. -
The organizations concerned in the municipality are beginning to prepare ~
the necessary studies and plans for the project. _
Hamah's director of health chaired a meeting which included the directors ~
of the national hospital, the A1-Salmiyah hopeital, and the nursing school, '
- and the chiefa of the health centers in the province. They reviewed the
- health situation in the province in general and the actions taken to pre-
vent the spread of cholera in Syria, especially after it had appeared '_n
some Arab countries. The chief of preventive services confirmed the readi-
ness of the city's quarantine station and the health center to receive chol-
_ era cases at any time. .
The director of health also urged health authorities to show concern for
the sick, give them good treatment, as well as insure good maintenace of
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the health centers and institutions, and the safeguarding of drugs, in
order to provide excellent health services for the citizens. The director
of health emphasized the need for full compliance with duty hours by all
doctors and those who work in hospital~ and health centers, and said that
all violations should be reported to the health directorate so trat any
delinquents could be brought to account.
_ He indicated that simple surgical operations could be performed in the
health centers, so that the patients would not have to bear the difficulty
of being transported to hospitals for that purpose.
The directorate of health has provided all health centers with surgical
, equipment to this end. He emphasized the need for the centers to be stocked
with drugs at all times and said that the chiefs of the centers will be held
responsible for the lack of any such drugs. _
In the meeting he also reviewed the subject of innoculations and providing
tizem for children at the prescribed intervals, as well as the need to apply -
this program strictly. They also discussed the need to preserve vaccines -
_ by professional methods after distribution of special containers in order -
to preserve and carry vaccines to various areas. -
It was als~ decided to provide the health centers which have recently been
established in the province with refrigeratora.
.
7005
- CSO: 4802
114
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= TUNISIA
BRIEFS ,
ENVOY FROM YAR PRESIDENT--Prime Minister Hedi Nouira received Lt Col Husayn
Muhammad al-Daf.'i, the Yemen Arab Republic president's special envoy to
President Bourguiba, in the Kasbah government palace at 1100 yesterday. In
a statement to the Tunisian News Agency [TAP] the North Yemen envoy indi-
cated that the talks related to relations between Tunisia and the Yemen
- Arab Republic. The Yemen president's envoy told a TAP representative that
the meeting took place within the framework of permanent consultations be-
- tween Tunisia and the Yemen Arab Republic. "The talks r~lated to the _
strengthening of bilateral relations between the two countxiea and the ~
latest developments on the Arab political scene," Mr al-Daf'i added. -
_ [Excerpts] [T~D061429 Tunis L'ACTION in French 24 Oct 79 p 4 LD]
MESSAGE TO LISBON CONFERENCE--Tunis Nov 2(TAP)--President Bourguiba conveyed
to Lisbon world conference on solidarity with the Arab world and the Pales-
- tinian cause, a message in which he emphasised that the conference would ~
allow to better inform about the just cause of the Arab peoples who are ~
seeking to recover by force, their occupied territories and eapecially =
institute a s~ate, for the Palestinian oppressed refugees, in their homeland. -
- Furthermore, the president stated that the Palestinians under the PLO
chairmanship, are gaining more and more support on the international lev~l.
This let thenihope to find a sett.lement to their problem conformably to -
the civilized world's principles and international laws. Finally, the Tunis- ~
ian head of state asserted that some western countries, radically, despise -
the Palestinian problem. This atemmed undoubtedly from a lack of informa-
tion. Events~such as the world conference on solidarity with the Arab world
and the Palestinian cause wi11 help restore the internaCional justice and -
_ morals as well as peace. [Text] [LD021525 Tunis TAP in Englislx 1423 GMT
_ 2 Nov 79 LD]
- CSO: 4400
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- WE~TERN SAHARA -
PCF, PCI, PC~; ISSUE COMMUNIQUE ON WESTERN SA~~ARA VISTT
LD042358 Algiers Domestic Service in French 1300 GMT 4 Nov 79 LD
- [Text] As was agreed in Madrid, a joint delegation of the French, Italian
_ and Spanish communist parties consisting of Mr Gremetz, member of the
Political Bureau and secretary of the Central Cammittee of the French Com-
munist Party [PCF]; Mr Pajetta, member of the Italian Communist Party [PCI] -
Directorate; and Mr Ballesteros, member of the Executive Committee of the
Spanish Communist Party [PCE), have visited Western Sahara at the invitation
of the POLISARIO Front. This is how the communique begins which was jointly
publ:ished by the commun.ist parties today;
The delegation of the three partiea had detailed discussiona with Mohamed
Abdelaziz, secretary general of the POLISARIO Front, on the aituation and ~
the prospects of the struggle. It traveled aeveral hundred kilometers
across the country and had talks on the political-military situation with
the minister of defense.
The delegation--the co~unique says--has thus acquainted itself with the '
Saharan people's lives, their living conditions, their social attainments,
their administrative organization under the direction of their unquestion-
able representative the POLISARIO Front. Everywhere it saw great activity,
_ strong participation b,y the people, the people taking real charge of their
own affairs, their determination in their fight for national indepQndence
and freedom, which is reflected in important military and diplomatic suc-
cesses.
_ The examination of equipment seized by the POLISARIO fighters from the
_ aggressor has allowed verification of the aid given to Morocco by govern-
ments in the first rank of which are those of the United States, France
and Spain.
The delegation--the statement says--is returning convinced that the only
solution is that of the cessation of the Moroccan aggression and the open-
ing of negotiations with the POLISARIO Front which will allow the Saharan ~
people to live free and independent on their territory. The representa- -
tives of the three parties commit themselves to do everything to enable
these talks to go ahead in each of their countries so that their respective
goverrnnents may contribute to the positive settlement of the conflict in
this part of the world.
_ END =
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