JPRS ID: 8755 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020012-4
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JPRS L/8755
7 November 1979
= est E u ro ~e R e o rt
p p
- (FOU~ 60/79) r
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/8755
7 November 1979
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 60/79) =
CO[~TENTS PAGE
_ THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Schmidt Remarks on Italian Issues9 Euromissiles Cited
(CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 19 Oct 79) 1
ITALY ~ -
Commentary on Salt II Negotiations
(Filippo Stefani; RIVISTA MILITARE, Jul-Aug 79)....... 3 ~
Conscript Service Versus Volunteers Weighed
~ (Carlo Bess; RIVISTA MILITARE, Jul-Aug 79)............ 17
COUNTRY SECTION
I FRANCE
~
~ Briefs .
- Elite Security Force 24
j
ITALY
;
Round Table on National, Civil Defense Issues
(RIVISTA MILITARE, Jul-Aug 79).....o 25
I SPAIN
~
i ETA (P-M) Aide Interviewed on Autonomy Statute
~ (CANIBIO 16, 21 Oct 79) 45
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
e.
SCHMIDT REMARKS ON ITALIAN ISSUES, EUROMISSILES CITED
- Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 19 Oct 79 p 2
[Davide Lajolo report on FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt 18 October Interview
on Italian Television: "Germany Neutral Over PCI in Government"]
, [Excerpt] Rome--People at the Italian radio and television studios
recount that Helmut Schmidt repeatedly implored that, while he was willing
to have a conversation on television with such illustrious interlocutors,
Andreotti, Agnelli, Lama and journalists Ronchey and Scalfari, crowded
together in the studio, must not be allowed--for goodness' sake--to take .
advantage of the opportunity to argue among themselves. Whether humorous
' or serious, th~s apprehension was dispelled by the German Chancellor who,
with a couple of apposite remarks, placed not ~nly his direct inte.rlocutors
but also the broader audience of italian viewe~rs in the best passible frame
of mind.
For it must have pleased almost everyone, and not just the president of
~ Fiat oY the secretary of the Italian General Confederation of Labor, to `
learn that, in the opinion of the leader of West Europe's "locomotive
nation," "the Italian economy is much stronger than people think, the lira
is much stronger than the Italians themselves think and in the near future
some pe~ple could be surprised by the Italian recovery." Likewise the
assertiofl that, if Germany is flourishing, "this is mainly thanks to the
- trade unions" must have startled not only Luciano Lama, but all those who,
despite the existence of strong social tensions, believe in the fundamental
role of the trade union fed.erations.
I And finally the skill with which the Chancellor mariaged to handle the most
' treacherous question ("is it true that our German ally would view the PCI's -
~ presence in the Italian Government very unfavorably?") and his answer ("we
; will judge from the facts, from how th~* government liehaves, though perhaps
i at the beginning a new situation might alter the Germans' viewpoint on
~ Italy") must have met with the approval not only of Andreotti, bi.it also of
i all who believe that relations between allied countries must be based on
i' correctness and noninterference in each other's affairs.
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Schmidt was asked whether this implied "indulgent neutrality." "Just
neutralit}r," the government leader corrected, adding that he was waiting
to see the Italian and French coimnunists put to the test of the European
parliament.
_ Even wiiGz Ronchey steered the discussion toward the topic of the day--NATO
missiles in Europe and Brezhned's warnings--Chancellor Schmidt managed to
express a tough stance in soft words: "I think it would be a big mistake
to believe that the Soviet leaders are planning a war, though it is
undeniable that the Soviet SS-20s have unilaterally altered the previous
balances, and therefore the U.S. desire to achieve counterbalance is
legitimate." But Germany's concern is not only with defending itself:
Its policy is aimed at not spoiling relations with the eastern bloc. This
is why Schmidt added the following two considerations. First, that "the
missiles issue is too important to be decided by a majority within NATO."
_ Second, that in any case "there must be negotiations with the 5oviet Union."
� COPYRIGHT: 1979 Editoriale del "Corriere Della Sera" s.a.s.
CSO: 3104
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~ THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES ITALY
COI~IENTAAY ON SALT II NEGOTIATIONS
- Rome RIVISTA MIT_.ITARE in Italian Jul-Aug 79 pp 17-26
[Article by Gen Filippo Stefani: The SALT II Negotiations--Instrument
_ of Nuclear Strategy"]
[Text] Jimmy i,arter, President of the United States of America, and
Leonid Brezhnev, President of the Soviet Union and secrPtary of the Sov-
' iet Communist Party, met for the first time in Vienna, between 15 and 18
June, 3n the imposing and soYemn 18th-century Imperial Sofburg Palace to
sign the SALT II agreement and to examine the international situation at
the moment as well as the prospects for its further development.
The signing was an academic aad formal act but the su~it and the treaty-- -
above and beyond what may still turn out to be uncertain d~evelopments--
are two events which in terms of theix implicit significance go far beyond
the v~ry frontiers that they tried to delimit and indicate the recognition
y and almost the discovery of a scientific verification, of the political
and strateg3c m3.sconception of further progress in nuclear strategic
arsenals the subsequent increase in the dangers of a nuclear catastrophe.
In terms of rationality, the su~.mnit and the tr~aty sl-.ould at least mark
the slowdown in the tendency toward the nuclear area and the start, in
Russian-American relations, of a new road or, rather, the return of theae
, relations to the road of detente from which they had strayed 3n recent _
years. In terms of history--where there is no lack of examples of inen
stubbornly stickinr~__to a.bsurd positions--things could go differently. But -
this time, the dilemma is between catastrophe and survival and the United -
; States and the Soviet Union are aware that the choice really de~ends on
~ both sides. Th3s is why, even if Congress should not ratify the SALT II
~ agreements--or if *_he Un3ted Statea Senate should propose substantial
' amendments unacceptable to the Soviets--one cannot reasonably assume either
~ a final re~ection or the accord or a return to its endless renegotiation
' . since both parties are fully aware of the urgent needa for etopping any
possible ultimate disaster.
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The Nuc].ear Facts o~ Life
The SALT negotiations are based on a strictly scientific implication: The
nuclaar energy in strategic arms has the power of reciprocally wiping out
' the contending parties, literally to desfiroy them as functioning societies,
abyssally turning the glohe upside down, and kil.ling hundreds of millions -
of people. And a"truth in physics" and the laws of science cannot be -
argued with. -
The problem, as it is stated now, is disconcertingly clear and simple;
shif ted to the field of the search for a solution it instead assumes
inextricable complexity from a11 aspects. There is no effective practi-
ca1 means for protection against strategic nuclear arms. The global re-
nuncia~ion of their employment could seem to be the only coherent and
consistent solution but for the time being it is utopian and illusory. -
The fact that Wor1d War III has not yet broken out is not so much due to
= the good wi11 of the rulers--who found themselves facing situations of
- challenge much more serious than those that led to the wars of the past,
such as, for example, in connection with the 1962 Cuban missile crisis _
and in Indochina--but rather above all, not to say exclusively, to the
exi.stence o~ nuclear arsenalse This apparently contradictory fact vice-
versa expresses a"real phenomenon" from which one can only draw positive
- conclusions.
Until we see the day--if it ever~come~--when politics and strategy are ' ~
completely subjected to logic and science, not to say ethics--which by ~
itself would seem to be enough to prevent any war of aggression--the
nuclear tangle will not have been resolved. This does not mean that we
should become even more confused and, viceversa, we must not try grad-
ua11y to loosen thQ kno~s in the hope of finally and gradually, in spite
_ of many mistakes, getting to the end of this effort through the effect
of the constant change of political and strategic situations and the
- continuous advance of science and technology.
4
~ Will not the entry upon the international scene of new an.d major "partners"
--China, Japan, India, the Arab World and, soon we hope, a united Europe--
bring about the end of the bipolar system? Are we not about to produce
the energy of "annihilation" which is the absolute equivalence between
mass and energy? In our world today which is in a continuous conflicting
evolution, the sudden discarding of nuclear energy could, contrary to
the opin3on of many--including qualified personalities--bring about a
_ "desfiabiliza~ion," as we put it today, a frightening upset of the current
. unstable equilibrium or, if you wi11, of the balance of terror, created
precis~ly by nuclear strategic arms.
By virtue of their "d~structive capacity" and the �tscientif ic certainty
of the destriction" which they caused, strategic nuclear arms make the
"risk" of their employment unacceptable, no matter how high the stakes
may bee Their ~'deterrent capaeity" is absoiute; it rules out any
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possibility o~ victory; it seeka to prevent the other side from making
, the decision to employ those weapons thxough thE "threat" of ~ust as
catastrophic retaliation. "War is d~signed to force others to accept
the consequences which one wishes to impose whereas deterrence is de-
signed to prevent the decision to go to *aar," wrote French General
' Beau~re in his book "Defense Against the Atomic Bomb." But nuclear deter-
~ rence is credible only if it is exercised in the defense of existential
~ interests. This is why it does not prevent local conventional wars and
~ unpleasant political uprisings beyond. the geogxaphic boundaries of the -
~ vital areas considered or declared to be such; and here is the reason
; behind the mechanism of "escalation" which graduates the responses in
! ~ keeping w3.th the degree of danger at gravity of intimidation and aggres-
sion.
' The SALT negotiations are a part of this context, otherwise one cannot
' grasp the es~ential significance and one runs the risk of falling into
a kind of moral and intellectual error, on account of the boundless and
almost unintelligible novelties introduced into politics and strategy by
~ the advenfi of nuclear arms which mark the transition from the era that
Stalin with good reason called the era of "industrial war" to the era
which Reaufre defines, with no less justifi:ation, as the era of
"scienti~ic-technological war."
The Con~ent of SALT
~
- The k~y idea behind SALT is to ma.ke a nuclear Pearl.Harbor as improbable
as possible, the kind o~ event that would be expressed by an absard re-
ciprocal g].oba1 holocaust. By way of assumption, it does no~ rule it _
out--otherwise the probability of successful deterrence would be zero--
but it does tend to make it unfeasible and to have the nuclear power
xefia3n the funct~,on of "deterrence" through "escalation" or the fear of
this eventuality. .
SALT I was signed in Moscow by Nixon and Brezhnev after three yeaxs o�
negotiations and this was the first major and serious attempt at con-
ta3ning nuclear s~rategic armament. These treaties consisted of the
following:
A treaty limifiing ABMsto 200 on either side;
A provisional 5-year accord on e~fensive weapons co~�nitt~ng the parties
not to build new fixed land launch ramps for TCBMs and limiting the
number of SZBMs as we11 as the number of mis~ile-f iring nucleax sub-
= marines to those already ia operation or under c~nstruct3on as of the
. date the accord was signed;
An additional protocol establishj.ng a double ce3.ling for the SLBMs azid
~ submarines carrying strategic nuclear weapons.
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These treaties almos~ crystallized the actual situation existing at that
. time in line with tYte concept of "strategic parity" which it is believed
would be satisfactory by granting the Soviet Union a quantitative advan-
tage in offensive missiles--2,358 against 1,710 for the United States--
compensated by American technological superiority and the possession of _
MIRVs.
As happened years before concerning nuclear energy, the Soviets were in
a good position to know and utilize the "MIRVing" procedure, thus con- -
fi?-ming how chimeric it would be for anybody to think that he could be
the sole possessor, for an indefinite period of ti.me, of the truth and
= the discoveries ~hat are produced by science which, speaking a cosmopoli-
tan language, is neither American, nor Russian, but universal. Soviet
"MIRVing" capacities changed the balance of SALT I and it became neces=
sary to attempt a new "overall approach" to this sub3ect matter, re~ect-
ing the idea of compensating for quantity wit:h quality and substitu~ing
it with the "principle of equal security" ap~~roved at the third military -
summit meeting in Vladivostok in November 1974. Now, five years haee
passed b~tween then and last June and it has been seven years since SALT
T; duzing'those years, the objectively complex negotiations, which are
laborious from any angle, went forward with difficulty, with long inter-
' ruptions, suddea suspensions, bitter debates, frequent reviews and re-
ciprocal accusations of bad faith.
In contrast to SALT I, which almost produced a photograph of the situa-
tion at th~ moment and which committed the contracting parties not uni-
laterally to modify it beyond eertain agreed-upon restrictions (which
was verified), SALT II built a new reality, different from the existing
one, commiting t'~e parties to implement that reality by specific dead-
lines.
The SALT II treaties consist of the rollowing:
A"preamble" and a"treaty" of 19 articles which will be in force, after
their ratification, until 3:L December 1985;
A three,-year "protocol," valid ~.nti? 31 December 1891 [sic; 1981!], in- -
volving a series of questions not yet ready for settlement (on which, as
a~atter ~f fact, there is no understanding as yetj~ such as for example
the dispute on the cruise missiles; ~
A"scheme" for future SAI,T III negotiati~~ns �ahich will deal with non-
intexcontinental strategic armaments in the European theater of operations;
"Agreed-upon declarations" on the interpretations contained in the treaty
. and in the three-year protocol;
- A"memorandum of understanding�1 on the current substance of the respective
strategic arsenals.
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The sustaining wa11s of the new edifice are made up of the agreements on _
, the following: ~
; The maximum ceiling on strategic delivery vehicles--ICBMs, SLBMs~ ALBMs, _
! or bomber~ carrying cruise missiles, missiles with a single warhead that
can be launched from land bases or submarines, bombers carrying vertical- -
drop bombs--allows each side to have 2,250 un3.ts (2,400 for the first six
months after the entry into force of the accords);
The lowering of the ceiling on the iaost destabilizing weapons, that is,
strategic delivery vehicles with multiple warheads, the MIRV, to no more
than 820 ICBMs and 1,200 SLBMs for a gran.d total of no more than 1,320
units;
I The maximum ceiling of 12 warheads for each MIRV;
A slowdown ira the race toward qualitatively new weapons through the re- _
quirement, for each of the two paxties, not to develwp any new strategic
missiles;
- ~ The pledge to launch-�-immediately aftex ratification--new negotiations ~
for a further quantitative and qualitative restriction of strategic nu-
clear arms and for a reduction of nonintercontinental strategic arms;
The obligation of reciprocal noninterference in national technical veri-
fication means. '
These are the main points included in SALT II; while they do not guarantee
j anything specific, such as the certai.n start of an era of peace, they do
: con~emplate the total stoppage, including the qualitative stoppage of the
strategic nuclear arms race, tl~e total termination of new and perhaps even
more mobstl3zing technological developments, the immediate limitation of
~ nuclear theater and tactical weapons, and so on. But in the global arch-
itecture of the policies and strategy of our times, SALT II does very ~
mueh and accomplishes a noteworthy qualitative advance.
- Political ana Psychological Aspects
~ The pol3.tical validity of the SALT II negotiations is above discussion.
Evaluations are un~nimously positive not only on the part of the respon-
sible American and~Soviet off3cials, the governments.of the other NATO
countries, and the most important countries, but even from China which is
- not against the agre~rnPnt although it is very skeptical as to the Soviet
� desire to observe its provisions, so much so as to warn everybody not to _
have any "blind confidence" because "the entire military effort of the
Soviet Union over the past two decades is an unmistakable sign of its
intentions to fight and win a nuclear war." Nobody, in summa:y, feels
capable of challenging the policy of disarmament and peace. That could _
not be~otherwise. ~
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The principle o~ "mutual secuxity" wipes ~ut the traditional principle
of the search fox "strategic superiority"-- although, as we recal]., we
~ axe dealj.ng here not only with stirafiegi~ nuclear weapons that determine
the substance of both of these principles but also many other parameters,
some of which may be imponderable--and reveals, in terms of concepts and
. doctrine, the definite repudiation of Clausewitz' theory on war under-
sCood "as a continuatian of policy wi.th other means," at least as far
as a general war is concerned. This is the recognition of the new
hi~torical-scientific reality which does not allow a reasonab le alfierna-
tive to "non-war."
The start of the process aimed at reducing the level of weapons systems,
the start of quantitative and qualitative restrictions on strategic nu-
clear arms, the dismantling of several hundreds of the latter already in
operation or in readiness, the multiannual breather for the purpose of
settling the extremely difficult problem of missiles, and the immediaCe
resumntion of new negotiations on decisive reductions aad more significant
restrictiorts on nuclear armament, also to the lowest levels--these are
tremendous political facts that outline the concept of a policy following
= a new tendency of inversion which is as revolutionary with respect to the ,
past as it is positive for the entire world.
The Vienna Summit promotes the development of negotiations concerning the
general abolition of nuclear tests for military purposes (already well
along the way and, after the Soviet Union subscribed~to the idea of on-
site inspections, only some t~chnical questions remained), the continua-
tion of negotiations on the settlement of the problem of ant isatellite
weapons (perhaps even a11 the way to the renunciation of competition in
that sector), the active resumption of the ~ctivifiies of the Vienna MBFR
Confe.rence, commensurately and with properly defined methods, tied in
with SALT ITI, the placement on the agenda of the question of the mili-
tary use of lasers, ignored by SALT II, and the positive impetus toward
the downhill race toward the demilitarization of political relations.
This is not only of symbolic value but a.lso has an emblematic and ef-
~ fective value.
Still, there is something that keeps us from giving our unconditional and
~ enthusiastic support to this happy twin event, in contrast to what hap-
. pened on the occasion of SALT I which were ratified right away by the .
United States Senate almost unan3m~usly. At that time President Nixon
assumed that this was the start of an era of peace; he recited an act
of faith; he e~cpressed absolute if not blind confidence in Moscow's
understanding. Today, President Carter hope~sfor a resumption of the
policy of detente, he issues a message of hope, he expresses only a vote
of no-confidence, he speaks a less emphatic and more restrained language.
The fact is tha.t the great hope for peace which accotnpanied SALT I and
the 1972 Moscow Sumnait were disappointing.
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- Since then, Soviet expansionism cont~.nued to play its cards just about
everywhere, ~rom the Zatin American subcont3.nent to the Tndian subconti-
nent, from the Middle East to Africa, from the Pacif ic Ocean to the In-
dian Ocean. Sometimes gradually, sometimes suddenly, sometimes directly
- and somet~nes through another nation (Cuba and Vietnam), always with a
broad political-strategic approach, with much imagination, with many
different ideas and means, the Soviet Union has registered a considerable
number of successes--Angola, Ethiopia (Ogaden, EriCrea), Pakistan, South
Yemen, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iran, etc.--and it only suffered some rare
and partial setbacks (Egypt). A11 of these visible cuts in the exquisite--
ly political international fabric not ~n1y did not br~.ng us the era of
peace which Nixon had promised but they dried up and almost stopped on
the threshold of a return to the Cold War, the dialogue between the two
superpowers, conf irtning that it is not enough to comply with an accord
formally--the SALT I treaties were never violated---in order seriously to
move on the road of peaceful coexistence. In vieta of th3s continuous
increase in the political-strategic and military power as we11 as i.nter-
national prestige of the Soviet Union, the United States, under the
"shocks" of the defeat in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal, for a long
time continued to be a confused and deluded spectator and in the end at-
tempted the dialogue again by seeking a basic clarification at Vienna
(dealing not only with strategic nuclear arms) which ~.t is now too soon
to say whether it wi11 bring a real improvement.
- The psychological atmosphere thus is not only diff~rent from what it was
in 1972 but, because of what happened since then, it is almost skeptical.
But it would not be truthful to deny the improvement which we saw. It
is iiapossible to predict whether these hopes wi11 soon be confirmed but
something good seems to be taking shape. Psychological motivations cer-
tainly cannot b e easily and quickly removed and the return to detente can -
only be slow. Otherwise, we would be dealing with illusions and with
chimeras for which the realism of SALT II and Vienna do not allow any room.
_ The psychological background of diffidence and reciprocal suspicions does
not yet seem to us to have been sufficiently dispelled. That requires -
..,convinc3ng proof as to political moderation on the part of the Soviets
in international relations and in relations with the Unitad States par-
ticularly a~ part of an overall view which cannot conceal the reality of
the Washington--Moscow--Peking triangle.
Strategic and Military-Technical Aspects
On the other hand, we are not convinced by the effort on the part of the
all-out supporters of SALT II to stress the polit~,cal, purely essential
and priority aspect, overshadowing and almost completely pushing aside
the strategic and military-~echnical aspects which are of no less impor-
tance.
It is true that the "old concept~ and old definitions of strategy are not
only outdated but make no sensa in a time of strategic nuclear arms," thaC
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"a6suxd~.t}r increases i~ we th~.nk in terms oz long-range missiles built
to take th~ place o~ pa.loted bomhers," and '~to think 3n terms of winning
th~ war, u~ mak3ng ~inal victory the only objective is pure folly," as
Liddell Hart wrote ever s3.nce the start of the sixties. But it~is also
true that the ~'Perennialt' aspect of strategy retaiis its fu11 value and
that it ccsnsists of the search for correspondence, sufficiency, and suit-
ability of inea~r~s and the coordination of those means with respect to the _
political purpose ane wishes to pursue. In our case that would be dis-
_ armament and peace. The search and the choice o~ the means explain the
complexity of strategic thinking which today is greater than it was yes-
terday and which cannot be boiled down to intellectuallstic abstraction.
The opponents of SALT II are not irresponsible warmongers but are persons
~ who are doubfiful as to the correspondence, sufficiency, and suitability
of the choice of ineans in order to attain the purposes which they likewise
approve with conviction and intensity. If that were not so, their op- .
position would have no validity. To the fears and the doubts of a
psycholog3cal character--commonly found to a certain degree also among
_ tlte supporters of the agreement, as we can tell from a certain silence,
which by the way is justified in this phase, and by the measured tones
w~.th which the supporters express themselves--the opponents have been
adding negative evaluations of a strategic and military-technical char- _
actex. Here the debate becomes difficult and esoteric but it can be
reduced to terms of clear simplicity. The all-out opponents start from
the observation of that, according to them, the aecord would not provide
the basis for the implementation of substantial equivalence in every
_ sector of stra~egic nuclear armament and that, behind the formal facade
of nuclear parity among the two arsenals, there would in the end be a
practical increase in the advantages deriving from the development of
the Soviet m3litary nuclear program; the Soviet Union supposedly already
has strategic superiority which the clauses of the agreement not only
wvuld fail to eliminate but which they might potentially even expand and
codify to the very limit of unattainability; it therefore seems to us that
there is an opexational discrepancy here which would infect the substance
of SALT II a11 the way. Moderate opponents maintain that SALT II could
be accepCed if modifications or additions would be inserted into the text
of the various documents already signed--amendments or addit3ons which,
taken together, would render the grave strategic nuclear asymmetry less
grave and wh,ich would close the gaps and remove the imperfections which, _
according to them, would appear quite obviously in the carrent draft.
_ Finally, there are those who are unsure and doubtful and who have not .
yet managed to find their place in the heat of the debates that divide
the different groupings.
Here are two crucial fundamental points which have a common factor in
the aCtitudes of the critics, both the radical ones (rejection of agxee-
ment and renegotiation in a new overall strategic and military-technical
context), as we11 as the revisionist ones (introduction of substantial .
and forma.l amendment into the text which would reduce certain
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discrspanc~,es and wh:~ch would promote greater possib3,l~ti~s o� verif3.ca-
tion): ~he failur~ ~o ~,mplement strateg3.c nuclear symm~try and the in-
sufficient rel3,ability of ineans of verification or control over applica-
tion.
"Equa1 security" fihus would not seem to be capable of being pur,sued, ac-
' cording to the opponent, wherever one does nat take into account not only
the number of delivery vehicles and warheads but also the number of war-
heads held in readiness and those stockpiled in. the supply dumps, the
precisa location of launch ramps, the capacity to bring a throw weight
-i to the target, the specif~.c designation of weapons and their real destruc-
tive capacity against prntected targets, the applicability of the various
systems, the vulnerability of targets, and the fact that the technology
of nuclear axms, once contained in one sector, is being developed power-
~u11y in other sectors. "Essenfiially equ3.valent'p nuclear arm~ would not
be su~ficient to guarantee "equal security," not even if the steps pra-
moted by President Carter himself were to be adopred, such as moderniza-
tion of strategic nuclear forces within the 1im,itations provided for by
I SALT IT and the strengfi.hening of NATO; the placement of new "Trident I"
missiles on submar3nes; the launching, in 1980, of new and more reliable
"Trid~nt" submarines and the construction of new, more powerful, and more
i accurate "Trident IT" m3ssiles; the development of the cruise missile
; program which would be capable of penetratin.g almost any defensive area
which th~ Sov3.et Union might build up in the near future; the substantial ~
' improvement in the power and accuracy of the Minuteman missiles from fixed
bases and the creation of mobility for at least some of them, which will
be vulnerable 3n the future (starting iri 1980?) to a Soviet surprise
attack.
The accord--and this is the other basic line of argumenfi used by the op-
ponent--would not be verifiable because the data collection and situation
~ control system would be neither sufficient nor secure, especially after .
the loss of the bases in Iran. The ban on interference to prevent or
hinder controls, approved in the treaty, and the implementation of the
' various technical measures (satellites, radars, etc.) or measures of a
different natuxe would scarcely protect, from any possible deception and
violation, the targets which, by virtue of their nafi~ure and their size,
are easily spotted--submarines under construction or being assembled,
hangars and missile support facilities, factories buil.ding intercontinen- -
ta1 bombers--but they would not be sufficient to reveal the technological
developmen~s of the Soviet strategic forces with the necessary broad range,
precision, and timeliness.
One of� the basic objections--by no means unfounded--explicitly pertains to
the ~::ropean theater of operations. The failure to include the Soviet
"Backf ire" 3n the group of strategic dellvery vehicles (the "Eackfire" is
_ the Tupolev�Tu-26 with a speed of 1,900 kilometers per hour at an altitude
of 12,000 meters witYi an action radius o� 4,000 kilometers) not only
would constitute an unacceptable alteration of "equal security" but--
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independ~ntly of the xestr~ctions signed by the Sov~.ets to the effect
that~ th~y wou~.d bu:~1fl no more than 30 bombera pex year and that they
would nor station them in reg~ons (Por example, Eastern Siberia) from '
which thay could reach the Unit~d St~tes-~would imply the acceptance of
the Sovie~ int~ntion of separating the European theater of operat3.ons
from the worldwide strategic theater, with the most serious consequencc
o,f ~'de facto" and "de j u?-e" comrromising the Wesfi ~ s politica? -strategic
unity. Th~.s would be a11 the most serious 3f ifi were to be related to -
the commitmen~s undertaken ty the Unit~d States not to station cruise
missiles in Europe and not to transfer the pert~.nent coristruction tech-
nology to the European A11ies unt31 1982. The SALT III negotiations,
which might last a long time, and the possible stat3oning of the "Per-
shing II" missiles in Europe after 1981 would not prevent the Soviet
Union from increasing the potential detachment or separation of its
"theater nuelear forces" (fihe SS-20 and the "Backf3re") from those of
NATO and thus placing Europe in a situafi ion of greater exposure if not
political blackmail.
We are dealing here with a most delicate and difficult debate where
it is not so much the ratification of a treaty, complete or incomplete,
that is at stake, but rather the fundamen~al direction of security and
$efense policy and the consequences deriving from that in terms of the
survival of the entire world and Europe in partieular.
Prospects and Predictions
The ratification of SALT II requires a two-thirds majority in.the United
States Senate. According to a survey among the press carried out prior
to the Vienna Summit, senators definitely in favor wnuld number no more _
than 45; the all-out opponents would be no less than 25; the undecided
senators would number about 30 and 15 among them are opposed unless
amendments and additions are introduced while 15 are completely reticent
as to the posit3.on they will assume. Between May and today, many events,
beyond the Caxter-Brezhnev summit itself, could have modified the initial
13neup, such as, for example, the indications of greater moderation on
the part of the Soviet Union, especially in the conflict over the Persian
. Gulf which coumia.nds the petroleum energy sources and supply lines, from .
whose shortages and high cost the industrialized world is now suffering,
risking a general chaos, in turn capable of triggering military con~licts,
as we11 as disasters 3n production and in the economy. We also recall the
x~ception given by Moscow--although with reservations--to the "advances"
from Peking regarding a dialogue between the two of them in an attempt to
settle the numerous unresolved iasues and the outcome of the last meeting
of the council of NATO foreign ministers which ended with a resolution
expressing fu11 satisfaction with SALT II.
In spi~e of a11 th~.s, ev~erything still remains uncertain and much will `
depend on the debate Chat will develop in the United States Senate. This
debate ia difficult to gauge because of the vast range of interpretations
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of th~ subj~ct mattex and the no 1~sser diff iculty o~ providing the spec-
3.~icall.y te~hnological knowledg~ required fox th~ discussion,
The �ixat point to establ3sh is whether SAZT II will or wi11 not safe-
. guard the security o~ the United States and its a111es and whether it
will be in line with fih~ basic criterion of modern high~level strategy:
Kr~,ow the possiT~le, seek the n~cessary, do the indispensable. The second
point is to f3gure out whether SALT II "wi11 revie~,,~ detente without lower-
ing our guard" and whather ifi would strengthen the extremely diff~.cult
process of establ3shing Soviet~Amer3,can relations and whether it wi11 con-
st~.fiute a push toward other.~.nnnediate understandings. The third point is
to estimate whether it is better to have "an imperfect world w~.th SALT IT
or an imperfect world without it" (Carter) and carefully to consider the
~ consequences of a rejection or a postponement for a more or less long
int~rval of time which, in the strategic nuclear axme sector, could in
itself be most serious.
The failure to ratify the treaty or to postpone rat3fication could further-
more lead to a hardening of international relations, the strengthening--
on both sides, which would be both ambitious and useless--of the nuclear
strategic forces, the increase in Soviet activism through the creation of
neFr and more dangerous pensions in vi~al str.ategic axeas, the drift away
from a medium-term policy of gradual disarmament or per.haps even a return
to the Co1.d War. `
We need not lend excessive credence to the scenarios of catastrophe pic- -
' tured by the supporters and the opponents, with the former announcing the
I inevitably of nuclear "confrontation" if the firea~ky does no~ go through,
i while the latter announce the codification, in case of ratif ication of
the current treaty, of Soviet strategic superiority, a11 the way to abso-
lute nuclear blackmail intended to force the United States to withdraw in
any futur~ international crisis, especially in Euxope; these are strong
propaganda moves whi,ch moreover do not help in our technical examination
and which do not help create an atmosphere of calm and reflection suitable
for making a decision of such trememdous significance. The choice is nat
between peace and war but between an attempt, albeit very risky, to launch -
! a new process of international~relations, or inaction which would lead to
obvious motionlessness but which would be no less charged with risks and
dangers.
_ There is finall one more com lication which ham ers the
Y P p possibil~.ty of
~ rat3fication to a by no means minor extent. Contrary to what is happening
3n the Soviet Un~on, the United States ia making the ratif~cat~.on of such
an agreement--becaase of the very existential implications connected with
- it--dependent upon the Congress.which, in democratic countries, rejects
i the "either-or" approach, the "take-it-or-leave-it" approach, and which
reserves itself the right to approve or disapprove and to propose addi-
~ tions or variations. The Soviet Union has hinted tha~ it is not inclined
' toward any amendments, neither substantial, nor formal, in other words,
i
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, i,t is al1 ox no~hing. ~'h~,s mak~s it rath~x dif~icult ta go on t~ a
suhssc~u~nt n~got~a~ion phase i.f any of the clauaes were to be revised. -
The Sovi~fi Union has thus forearmed its~lf againat ~he burial of SALT II
and i~s inde~3nite pos~poneMent--events which would have tremendous reper-
cussions no~ only in political and strategic terms but also in psycholog-
ical terms.
In summary, thexe is uncertainty as to the prospects after the entry i.to
foxce of Che agr~ement, there is even greater uncerfiain.*.y as to what might
happen i~ the ~rea~y is not ratified, and there is uncextainty as to the
pred3ctions on the outcome of the deb.ate in the Uni~ed States Senate.
_ Conclusions
Al1 of these uncertainties and obstacles however are con~ronted by truth
and reality wh3ch are beyond dispute and beyond challenge.
The f3.rs~ of th~se is tha~, in the era of scientific-technological war-
fare, concepts o� policy and high-level strategy have changed their sig-
nificance and theix sign: The ultimate purpose o~ policy 3.s peace and
the ultimate purpose of strategy is deterrence. The nuclear reality
commands a choice because the equipment of strategic nuclear arms--and
. nofi those arms alone--is an absurdity if one dues not wish to follow the
logic of mass suicide.
The second one is that the SALT negotiations--in spite of incompleteness,
insufficiency, imperfections, and, if you will, errors and risks--consti-
tute serious attempts at re~ecting the outdated prineiples of strategic
and military superiority and.must be evaluated'and handled as such, as-
suming of course that the application of the content of those treaties by
the two contracting parties is constantly verifiable. Let there be no
illusion about SA,LT II: It does not mean peaceful coexistence nor does
ifi perhaps, at least initially, mean a return to detente, but it does
mark the specific start (for better or worse, existing weapons will be
destroyed and those to be built Will be limited) of a gradual reversal -
= of the constant tendency toward the progressive increase in armaments
to the point where one is forced to use them in order not to be paralyzed
by their useleasness. They are the result of "a unique effort in the his-
Cory of mankind" (Carter) lasting about seven years; "they constitute a
~ triumph of patience, persis~ence, and reasonableness" (Brezhnev), an
ef~ort by two great nations to contribute to a less unsecure world, al-
though within a persistent framework of competition, while respecting the
experience of reciprocal and equal security.
The third point is that a rational dialogue will continue toward the -
restoration of less uncertain, ambiguous, and risky relations. There is
na doubt that, when the dialogue between the United States and the Soviet
' Union is 3nterrupted, the whole world holds its breath, it ~.osses its
sense of hisCory, and fa11s into a state of passive resigna~ion, just _
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Waitiz~g fox inevitably events, including eve~n nucleax disaster. It is
' also cerCa~.n that, wh~n ~h~ Un3ted~Stat~s and the Soviet Union recover
; th,e Gourage to 3nd:tcafie and f3x spec~.~ic points, impexfect though they
~aay he, the ent3re world w~.11 breathe a sigh of relief, wi11 pu11 itself -
; toget$ex aga3n, and Fri11 once again believe in and hope for reason among
-i men and eooperat~ toward the resumpt3on ~f forma of undexs~anding. Re-
_i latioas batween the Un3ted States and the Soviet Un3on, at least so far,
~ contain tha germ for any ra~3ona1 and realistic solution 1ead3ng to
~ general survival.
i
' There are no undertakings wifihout risk and that is also ~rue of SALT TI.
But no problem can be settled or solved--and one cannot even moye toward
i normalization-~if one 3.s always incl3.ned toward suspicion of bad faith
on fihe part of the other fellow and if one reasons in terms of pseudo-
~
~ Machiadellism. The SALT II negotiations may or may not be fu11 of dan-
; gers~-although it does not seem likely to us that one could accuse the
i entire Amer3,can strategic command center (Carter, Vance, Brown, Church, _
i and ~he five chiefs of staff, the entire host of diploma,ts, mil~.tary
men,.scientists, and engineers who continue to work on th3s) of incompe~
~ . tence, ~nability, and disloy~lty--and SALT II may or may not be a good
! treaty but 3.t certainly was a factor in terms of attraction toward moral
' and po11t3ca1, strategic and p~ychological ideals, towaxd putting the
' lid on the unrestrained arms race and towaxd the resurrection of indis-
~ pensable values, toward the redimensioning of a human society half-
des~royed and brutalized by nuclear terror and oppressed by the lack of
solution to its mos~ serious population, ecological, and enexgy problems
wh3.ch are ge~t3ng ever more pressing. SALT IT at least brought out the
underlying need for trying to restore an order which is above all moral
and, secondly, polit~.ca1 and strategic. .
With th3.s ohservation and with the hope thafi everything will turn out
i fox the best we might conclude these notes if we did not feel the duty
! to add one more remark, referring to what we wrote on another occasion
~
~~i'he European requirement," RIVISTA MILTTARE, No 2, ].979, p 24, Iast
~ paragraph, and p 25, first paragraph).
i
, The European members of NATO had no voice in the SALT TI negotiations.
' This is neither the fault of the Un3.ted States nor of the SovieC Union;
~ it is only their own fault. With each of them jealously guarding an
absolute sovereignty which, as demonstrated by SALT, they do not have,
" they can no longer cont3nue to reject the cess3on of portions of their
sovereignty to a European supernational or at least transnafiional body
and, failing to realize.thst their de~tiny is in the hands of the two
~ superpowers, they cannot conf3.ne themselves to expressing their satis-
faction with the way American "leadership'! has been opexating, certainly
with a conscious and 3.ntimate regret over their powerlessness. Tf the
~ SALT T~ negotiafiions are successful, they will be immediate~,y~followed
; by SALT TTT dixectly involving also the Euxopean th~ater of operations.
But fihe participation of the European countries, not even the nuclear
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ones, haS so ~ax been sch~dul~d--at ].east for th~ moment~-concerning -
SAL~ TII either~ as Was announced by secr~taxy o~ State Cyrus Vance.
European destiny and s~cuxity wi11 once again be entrusted to the United
States. To change that situation, to break the bipolarism of today and
the "3.magined" tripolarism, the only thing to do is to build a united
Euxope which alone wi11 gain "partnership" status in NATO, which would
become a protagonist of history, which could directly and with high auth-
~ ority become i.nvolved in a11 negotiations concerning security and dis-
- axmaatent and peace as we11 as the civilian and economic dev~l.opment of _
tha woxld.
But the construction of a united Europe is still far o~f. The road
leading to that goal is still long; it is strewn with obstacles and
impediments which n4ay be entirely artificial. We,cannot fool ourselves
into believing that we are going to win the race against time involved
in SALT III. But we cannot imagine that decisions on "theater weapans"
_ and on the neutraliza~ion of the rising threat of Soviet arms in Europe
would be made without consultations inside the entire alliance and.not '
just within the framework of a bilateral understanding between the United ,
States and the Soviet Union. If that were so, the European members of
NATO should above a11 build unity of views among themselves, unity of
intentions and or3.entations,_ they should emerge as bein~ in agreement
and as be3ng unanimous within NATO; in all of the various participation
bodies--1~FR, CSCE, COD, etc.--tney must not repeat the fiasco of the
- "N" bomb (the "inhuman" bomb which spares buildings and kills people,
as if ths other.nuclear bombs were humanitarian) and they should in par-
- ticular express only one united thought; they should express themselves
with a s3ngle language and they should always and everywhere act accord-
ing to one and the same understanding, especially when it comes to taking
up the issue of the "Pershings" and the issue of counterbalancing the
Soviet "SS-20~~.and the "Backfire" bombers.
CO~YR~GHT: R~VISTA MII,ITARE PERIODICO DELL'ESERCITO, ANNO CII, NUMERO
4/1979
5058
CSO: 3104
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES ITALY
CONSCRIPT SERVIC~ VERSUS VOLUNTEERS WEIGHED
Rome RIVISTA MIZTTARE in Italian Ju1-Aug 79 pp 13-16
[Article by Carlo Bess: "Draftees and Long-Term Volunteers"]
[Text] The debate on the type of recruiting system to be adopted for
the armed foress has been rather lively for quite some time in Italy ~is
in other Weste~n countries.
3ome peqple might deny that th.e draft is good enough to meeC modern
military requirements and would like us to drop it in order to set up
a career military force with long-service volunteers.
The supporters of the volunteer army assert that the draft was justified _
_ in the past when we had mass armies, when there was heavy reliance on
mohilization, when weapons were relatively simple, and when enlistments
were su~ficiently long. Now these factors have been changed profoundly
which is why the draft supposedly lost any of its funetional effective-
ness. Among those who think so is Stefano Silvestri, who mainta3ned
that "we cannot continue to defend the sen.seless system of conscriptio,n;
this is a screen behind which there is hidden an electoral, welfare-
ariented, and corporative establishment. The volunteer araay is part of
the inevitable development of an industrialized society which moves to-
ward specialization and professionalization."
, With a necessarily small volunteer army, it would be possible to invest
a larger capital share in the individual soldier 3n order to improve his -
~ armament and training.and, hence, to raise his productivifiy. That would
' not be possible with an army of conscripts because its very dimensions--
~ which caanot be reduced beyond a certain limit, given the requirement of -
I mainta3ning the general natural of the military obligation--would doom it
~ fio technological underdevelopment,
i .
~ Other people on the other hand feel that any increase in the number of
~ long-service voluntePrs would pose a threat to the armed forces model base
on the draft, as provided for in the Constitution, which in this respect
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ties in with the concept of the people's army inherent in. the kind of
democracy that sprang from the Risorgimento and that was vigorously re-
asserted during the Resistance.
Still others hold a position halfway in between. For them, the best solu-
tion would be to integrate drufteee with a strong quota of long-~ervl.c~
military personnel. In this way it would be possible, on the one han.d,
to safeguard the model of the national and people's army, with its positive,
- . not only general but also technical-military reflections; on the other hand _
it would be possible to neet the technological requirements of the armed
forces which keep growing in relation to the continuous increase in the -
specif ications of weapons of war. _
.
This is the solution which appears to us to be not only preferable but
_ also the only possible solution in the current Italian situation. By the
way, this is the solution deriving from the current recruiting law which
pruvides for the enlistment of a long-term volunteer quota equivalent to
16 percent of the draftee force carried on the budget (for the Army, that
would among to about 28,000 individuals).
Recruiting Problem is Not Only Technical-Military Problem
The recru iting problem is a focal issue not only because of the type of
instruments we want to have available but because of the very position of
- the armed forces in national society and because of the relations existing
befiween military and civilian institutions.
This problem cannot be solved only in a techn.ical fashion. That would
distort ~he substantially political nature of the issue.
The problem must instead be examined from the overall viewpoint of its
palitical, ideological, social, and economic aspects, plus of course the
- military-~echnical aspects. And it must be examined by avoiding the dis-
. cussions on basic principle which disparage the reality of things.
Political Aspect
In a society, such as the Italian society, characterized by profound dom- _
est3.c lacerations and conflicts, by a level of popular consensus in support
of the institutions of the state which is traditionally low and by quite
noticeable economic and territorial imbalances, it would be quite difficult
to consider a regular army to be an expression of the entire national com-
munity, such as it would have to be for the sake of its own efficiency.
It would inevitably be a"separate body." Its operational capacity would
decline. The latter, as a matter of fact, must not be evaluated only in
terms of specialization and professional skills. It depends to a great
extent on the links with the national community and on the consensus and
mo~ral support from civilian society. With the draft, this link is at
].east assured by the continuing rotation of draftees.
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The draftee army furthermore constitutes the propori:ional expressio:~ of
the various political and ideological tendencies in the country. It is
~herefore representative of the country and can be considered an asset
belonging to the entire national community, much more so than a volunteer
army could ever be. Because of the way things are, the latter would, in
_ name only or in fact, be "a ma3ority'~ and "single-member" outfit. The
draftee army can, for better or worse, absorb civilian society's dissent
and contrast within itself. A volunteer army would irremediably be sep-
arated from the mass of society, as it indeed has already been taken over
by other government institutions, likewise due to a factor pecul3.ar to
Italy. Under the specific conditions prevailing in Ita1y, the mass re-
~cruitment of volunteers would be subjected to the negative influence o�
- social and territorial factors which would modify their representativeness
of the soc~.ety of which such an army is an expression and which it 1.s call-
ed upon to defend.
In substance, even if we think that we can recruit the necessary volunteers,
there is.na reason to believe that a regular army would be better than the
. current draftee army. It would inevitably have a vacuum behind it. With
the proper adaptation of its structures and the specific methods of imple- -
menting obligatory m3litary service, the ~atter could absorb the conflicts
and dissent. But between a draftee army, even though it may be paralyzed
by conscr3pts who are dissenters or absenteeists, and a regular career
army uprooted from the population, the former is still preferable. The
former? if nothing e1se, offers the best conditions for getting the con- -
sensus of the people in the future, a consensus which already exists but
~ which will undoubtedly be strengthened and improved.
The essential problem of the military establ~.shment is identical to the
one that comes up in connection with the other ~overnment institutions;
- ~ Obtaining a broader popular consensu~ and, hence, greater substantial.
legitimation. These are the only conditions that can permit the strength-
ening of the government machinery and hence the creation of an, institution-
al framework not undermined by passive resistance if not outright popular
diss3.dence which would strengthen the bulwarks of security that shield
liberty and the democratic and republican structures.
To attain this objective, an army based on the draft is undoubtedly in a
- better position than an army made up only of volunteers.
Ideological Aspects
From the ideological viewpoi.nt, the citizen's right and duty to serve under' -
arms--strictly tied to Ita1y's national tradition, from Machi;avelli to
Cattaneo, to Pisacane, and to ~he~Resistance--is substantially shared by
the popu7.ar masses. As a matter of fact, the number of deserters, draft
dodgers, and consciencious objectors is insignificant and, at any rate,
it is lower in Ita1y than in many other nations. It is necessary to make
sure that the general acceptance of the basic pr~i.ciple wi11 correspond
to a more concrete commitment.
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The state of uneasiness and malaise, which sometimes developed in some
units, does sot spring from an insurmountable and atavistic qualunquism,
absenteeism, or lack of civic educatian on the part of the average Ital-
ian.
There are undoubtedly objective shortcomin~s. Bu~ they can be overcome `
through the improvement of service conditions for drafteese In par;:icular,
this can be done through broader information, through more intensive and
interesting training, through a disciplinary system in keeping with the ,
times, by giving civilian personnel the kind of nonmilitary housing con- `
nected with garrison life, the solution of problems of a material and
psychological character, including the recognition, in economic and norma-
tive terms, o� the services rendered by those who are drafCees so as to
give them an advantage as compared to those others wrtxo�for various reasons
are not drafted. This can. be done above all through the active and con- ~
structive participation of a11 military personnel in the life and develop-
ment of institutions, as prescribed by the basic law. In this way, mili- -
' tary se?�vice could really constitute a democratic assumption of national
responsibility, ma.king sure that the youngster will not only perform a -
precise duty but w311 al~so have a formative experience which in the future =
will be useful to hi.m and the nation.
The armed forces can and must decisively help in this rather personal re- _
covery of faith in the republican and democratic fatherland. Without that =
recovery, it wi11 become increasingly problematical to obtain from the
cadres and the troops the kind of sacrifice in terms of discipline which -
is an essential requirement to promote the operational capacity of the
units and which so far was kept alive by virtue of the exaltation of~the
- traditional values of the o1d army. The attainment of this objective con-
stitutes an essential guarantee for the constitutianal system, the country~s
democratic development, and the efficiency of national defense. The latter
must be a commitment for everybody and cannot be delegated to a few regu-
lars who are paid when they are needed. _
In the current Italian situation, the s~atus and the social legitimacy of
the volunteer armed forces would inevitably be challenged.
Social Factor
' From the soc::al viewpoint, it is inconcei~~able for us to be able to recruit
in Ita1y the young men necessary to have a volunt'eer force on1y. Proof of
that is furnishe~ by the dif~iculty we are having in rec~uiting police of- ~
ficers who have a strong txad3tion of volunte~r recruixment and who can ~
place a11 recrui~ed personnel in permanent slots.
The army, on the other hand--which must above all have young men-~would have _
to release the mass of volunteers after a certain number of years of service.
That right away introduces the difficulty of massively activating volunCeer
recruitment of this type, also with higher pay, with substantial enlistment
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- and discharge bonuses, with intensive professional training designed to
facilitate smooth re~urn to civilian life, and wifih job security at the
end of volunteer military service.
Economic Factor
From the economic angle, massive volunteer recruitment, which is not com-
plefie~.y compensated for--and that is an extremely uncertain thing--by an
increase in defense allovations would have an unacceptable effect on the
already insuff icient amounts ot money allocated for modernization and day-
to-day operation. The atta3.ament of the ob~ective of raising the Italian
army's technological 1eve1 through an increase in professional personnel
skills would be frustrated by the lack of funds needed to procure advanced
weapons systems. .
Obligatory military service on the other hand consists of a personal ser-
= vice which is not remunerated. It is a sort of in-kind tax through which
the draftee in the final analysis is a taxpayer who provides practically
free labor for the community. In this way, it is possible--also within the
framework o~ current financial resources--to shift a hefty amount of money
to the procuremen~ of new.equipmen~ and to training.
_ Military-Technical Factors
From the strictly military-technical viewpoint, the draftee army presents
numerous advantages over volunteer armed forces.
The draft permits stability in terms af numbers and promotes a qualita-
tively constant personnel level, independently of the labor market situa-
~ tion. The institution of military service as a matter of fact does ncit
depend on the will of the individual and the most qualified young men
_ can always be called to the colors. With a volunteer army however we .
cannot reach those population strata that are professionally and cultur-
ally best trained, regardless of the economic and social incentives em-
- ployed in order to attract volunteers. Instead we recruit the least
trained youngsters who would have to be trained through lengthy train3ng
courses at heavy costs. The qualitative advantages of a volunteer force
would thus be considerably reduced.
Next, the dxaft makes it possible, without training expenditures, to util-
ize special. skills and 3ob experience der~,ving frotn civ3l~,an life. This
- is a tremendous advantage. Besides, through the draft, psychological-
physical-a~titude selection can be extended to an enormously larger num-
- ber of young people with conspicuous ad~~antages for the many tasks that -
! requ3re gpecial individual gifts.
Finally, the growing sophistication of weapons of war does not necessarily
; lead to an increa.se in the difficulty of their employment. In many cases
~ the exact opposite is true. For example, it is much more dif�icult to
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employ a first-generation, manually guided AT missile than a second-
generation missile which is guided semiautomatically. Training times
can be reduced and the employment of new electronic fire control simu-
lators reduces training time and costs. It thus becomes more acceptable
from the cost-effectiveness angle, that is to say, the ratio between the .
time and the cost of initial training and the duration of effective util-
- ization in opera~ional units, to employ draftees for certain duties, even
with the currently reduced term of obligatory military service.
The requi-rements that cannot absolutely be met with draftee personnel are
those connected with the maintenance and repair of modern weapons systems.
The kind of train~ng required here is so lengthy and complex. as necessarily
to demand the employment of long-service volunteer personnel.
Whi7!e the bulk of operational functions in operational units can. be reser-
ved for the draftees, volunteer personnel would work in '~overalls," to -
pr~~vide logistic support for increasingly sophisticated and expensive stan-
_ dard issue e~quipment, rather than. serve in "battle dress." This is a vital -
requiretqent which we cannot do without, a requirement which can be handled ~
only by inereasing the number of long-service specialist personnel. It is
therefore indispensable to promote the conditions for recruiting the volun-
teers provided for by law, volunteers who, consideri.ng the current state of _
affairs, cannot be gotten because the current incentives are insignificant
and unreliable.
Final Consideration
For all of the reasons given here it does not now seem possible in Italy
to abolish the draft and to switch to a volun~ceer foxce.~
A draftee army can be an army of excellent quality, in spite of the in-
- crease in the emQloyment of technology and the increase in the sophisti-
cation of equipment and operating procedures. But it will be suffic-
iently motivated and trained so as to obtain the.consensus and p~rfection
_ of all personnel in the routine operations of the various units. In pa.r-
- ticular it is necessary for the draftees to be assigaed to combat tasks
and not to be employed in support or clerical functions which are inherent
in garrison life and for wh3ch civilian personnel can he used.
Draftees employed to meet the requirements in question here will have the
feel.tng of being utilized as low-cost labor, as unskilled day laborers
without pay. That in turn creates moral uneasiness, inconveniences i.n =
terms of trai.ning, and also a certain laxity which must be eliminated.
Draftee personnel furthermore will be integrated with long-service per-
sonnel necessary for the purpose of setting up units and for logistic
support for equipment issued.
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- Regarding the volunteers, it is necessary to implement the current provi-
sions of the 1aw, stepping up recruiting through adequate pay and furnish-
ing certa3.nty as to ultimate placement in the civil sexvice and in
government-owned industries as well as in private industry at the end of
the tern~ of service. The modern training organization of the armed forces
can turn out young volunteers in a vast range of technical specialties
- in keeping with the demand from the ~ob world.
_ The draftee army would lose all of its credibility and operational capa-
~ city without an effort to straighten out the volunteer force designed to
eliminate any narrow social and regional characteristics and without an
e~fort aimed at recruiting the qualitatively and quantitatively necessary _
long-term personnel. In the long run, the very principle of ~he draft and
the military instrument model provided for in the Constitution of the Repub-
lic could be harmed as a result of that.
COk'YRIGHT: RTVISTA MTLITARE PERIODICO DELL~ESERCITO, ANDiO CZI, NUMERO ~
4/19~9
; 5058
-I CSO: 3104
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- COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
BRIEFS
ELITE SECURITY FORCE--The First Regiment of the Republican Guard, the new -
elite unit that will hencef orth take care of honor-guard duties and security
functions for the chief of state, will consist of 840 men. Reorganized by
the Ministry of Defense at the personal request of President Giscard d'Estaing,
the First Regiment wi11 be commissioned on 11 November during ceremonies at
the Arc de Triomphe. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 22 Oct 79
p 21]
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION IT~'Y
- ROUND TABLE ON NATIONAL, CIVIL DEFENSE ISStJ~S
Rome RIVISTA MILITARE in Italian Jul-Aug 79 pp 2-11
[Round tal~le discuss3.on at Higher Military Study Center]
[Text] Gen Franco Baxbolini, President, Higher Military Study Center
This round table discussion revolves around the topic that was presented ~
to the 30th Session of the Higher Military Study Center by the Defense
General Staff.
This is a study of national defense in the broadest meaning of the term, -
iu other words, it is a synthesis of military and civil defense.
The 30th Session tried to touch upon all the possible elements as Co what
the othe~s have been doing, from the countries in the NATO area to those
of the Warsaw Pact and finally to the neutral countries and, apart from
the inevitable and logical differencesy the concrete element that emerged
- clearly was that al1 countriea, in facing the problem of national defense
arrived at specific conc~.usions that obviously vary.
In Italy the problem could not be examined--for contingent reasons--in
terms of its overall nature and we have come up only with sector solutions
dealing with specific requirements.
The decisive elemen~:--wh,ich will always have to be kept in mind in the
course of our analysis--is the conf iguration of the threat which national
defense must meet, a threat which fluctuates from a moment of ma~or signi- _
ficance and whic:i takes shape through the attack upon the country's borders
from the outside a11 the way to the possible destabilizafiion of the consti-
tutional order, to attacks upon the economic system and finally to natural
disaeters which Italy experienced in all of their tragi~. reality several
times.
We thus have here a range of extremely varied and extremely comp~.ex threats :
of differing scope which however always involves national defense as a
whole and consequently its two fundamental components, the military com- ~
ponent and the civilian component, both of which in turn, depending upon
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the type of threat, will be involved in various ways, in different propor-
tions, but always in a closely interdependent fashion.
The only res~r3.ctions imposed upon us were those that were derived from
the constitutional provision which co~sld not and must not be altered and
those deriving Prom international agreements, with particular emphasis on
those connected with NATO, where the Alliance was concerned with studying,
examining, and above a11 coordinating civilian action im case of natural
disasters or other types of disasters through the special organization of
c~vilian emergency plans.
This is the context of the problem facing the 30th Session.
It tackled it above all in an effort to ascertain how it might be possible
to organizs the basic scheme of the system, to define the decision-~making
summ3.t, and specifically to spe11 out functions, responsibilities, and
tasks.
For this purpose it accumulated voluminous data in the legislative field,
in the or~;an3,zational field, and in the area of the experiences of other
countries and a certa3.n solution model has already taken shape. But before _
arriving at final conclusions, we must still look at different specific
experiences and authoritative opinions coming From those who examined the
proUlem from a diffexent angle.
Prof Franco Alberto Casadio, Director, Ital3.an Soc3ety for Tntexnational
Organization
Nationa7. defense and c3vi1 defense--and above a11 relations existing be-
tween thsse two elements--constitute an o1d problem. But the ways of
~ de~ining ~hem and above a11 the reasons that we must pxovide for the re-
~ ~ lationsh3p we in~end to establish between them, specifically, at a given
~ moment and in a given country--~hose instead can be new. These problems -
should however emerge more clearly after we have come up with adequate
answers to thxee groups of questions.
First. By common considerafiion, the concept of nafiional defense is def3ned =
3n relation to an emergency situation in which a country may f ind itself.
- We speak o~ an emergency situation in which society feels the need for
, hav3ng to react with an instrument that would reveal the typical nature _
; and ePf~ctiveness of the military instruments. To understand what we
~ mean h~ere we must realize that we are dealing here with an instrument
charac~ex+ized by an adequate strength level and by a proportional degree
! o~ efficiency.
It seems to me that there are t~o problems to which we must find answers:
Are ~he causes involved i.n the provocation of emergency si~uations the
same as they were in the past or are there some new ones? What is the
emergency threshold and how do we measure it? ~
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As regards t:he causes of the emergency situation, the tendency, which has
taken shape in G11 countries of the world, is oriented toward broadening .
its range wh3.1e including in it not only conflict and various types of
conflict but also natural disasters. Conflict situations, which involve
the defensive instrument, no longer are those which go beyond the threshold
of hostilities but also the tensions, crises, and controversies; they are
no longer "outside" conflicts, looking toward the outside world, but they
also include "internal" conflicts, that is to say, domestic conflicts; they
involve not only wars but they first of all iaclude the situations and
moments leading up to wars.
How much time before a conflict or before an assumed natural disaster is
it necessary to arrange the required means and instruments? What is the
cost which the community as a whole is prepared to sustain, today, in order,
tanorrow, hypothetically, ~o reduce the damage deriving from a conflict or -
a disaster which might on top of it all never happen %~r?yway?
Along with conflict and, hence, among the assumptions of a certai.n action
to be taken, we must include natural calamities, rrom disasters all the
way to catastrophes. We all agree that the element constituting civil
protection is rePresented by the population and that the pximary mission
is to restore it after the impact of conflict and dieaster.
But we must ask ourselves this: In what way does the civ3.lian population,
_ so to speak, get into the emergency, in case of conflict and in case of
natural calamiti.es? We realize that the civilian population is involved
in a disaster, such as a flood or an earthquake. But the way in which
the population can be involved in a war is vastly different and much more
manifold, for example, as a target of aggression, as a theatPr of opera- -
t3.ons, as the social fabric within which vialence spreads, as an instrument
o~ military action, as a target of moral assault.
As of what threshold of external aggressiveness is or can the civilian
population no longer be protected? But let us look back for a moment: ~
Is it permissible to 11ken the case of war to the case of catastrophe in
ordex to ca11 for the defen$e.of the civilian population by anybody,
- military or civilian, in other words, by somebody who is supposed to do _
' the ~ob on the basis of institutional provisions?
We think tY~at one of the most appreciable results of the recent trend of
thinking, which goes by the name of "operations analysis," concerning
conflicts consists precisely in measuring the emergency through the cal-
culation of vulnerability. The external factor, indirect permeability,
direct permeability, and the essential nature of the internal factor are
measureable. It suffices to use the proper method.
- Second. What characteristics must the instrument, to be used in response ~
to an eanergency situation, in which the country may find itself involved,
have? Obviously, you have fio calculate the efficiency here. There are
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= two conditions for this efficiency: Central decision~making and the capac- _
ifiy for making the available means, instruments, and methods creative and -
comparable among each other. -
- F3rst of a11, what are the factors that make centralization useful and pro-
�itable? I think that central~.zation will serve its purpose as a function
of time and space. Centralization does its job as a function of time,
prior to the emergency, by preparing the necessary mer~ns and by checking
their reliahil3ty. At the moment of emergency, it serves to reduce the
effective reaction t3.me. I believe fihat the latter requirement would suf-
fice to explain centralization.
Bufi when it comes to space, centralizatian creates some delicate problems.
The s~ructure of the central vertex, of the peripheral vertexes, a real
and proper peripheral structure, does raise questions which in many cases
have not yet been matched with satisfactory answers. The problem remains
- in theory and above all in practice. "
The other e�ficiency factor--the capacity to make the means used coherent
and compatible--~aay be measured in two different ways. The first way is
s3,mply the way of economical employment. Can one measure the economy
inherent in the mi.litary instrument or in the civil defense machinery in
a suitable fashion? Would it be better to use absolute indicators (how
much we spend on fihe establishment as such and throughout the fiscal year,
how much we spend on fixed assets and operational expenditures) or relative
ind3catoxs (how much we spend to get civilian defense ready as compared to
; how much we spend for schooling, public health, hunger throughout the
~ world) ?
Another way of ineasuring the efficiency of the civil de~ense machinery is
even simpler: Here we try to find out whether it is capable of coping
~ with the situation if the moment should come to prove itself. But how
~ broad is the range of emergencies which we are considering here? Lu we
determine that by drawing up a really complete list of presumed types of
~ action? Ts there anybody who has the power to place upon the community as
a whole ~he consequences and burdens deriving from being too pessimistic
~ when the list of likely emergencies is drawn up? .
! Qn the ofiher hand, it would be a good idea to realize that simply dropping
the problem would inevitably lead us to two possibilities. We could in
i ~hi,s way avoid preventively assigning a specific authori~y to the decision-
~ making and operational centers, both civilian and military, both central
~ and per3pheral., putting our trust in the combination capability which these
! centers might reveal under the impetus of the urgency of circumstances.
j The other alternative consists in putting our trust in the grant of "full
~owers"--at fihe moment of the emergency--to an authority to be designated. .
.j Third. What legislative and administrative instrument would it be good
' to have in ant3cipation of the development of the emergency? In countries,
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such as Ita1y, which do noC yet have a legislative and administr.ative
instrument capable of covering a11 of the possible situations with all of .
the available means--in such countries what could be the causes of such a
delay?
We have no reaeon for hiding the fact that some of those causes Y:ave a
paychological root. Other countries, where the system of govercur:ent is
much more centralized thaa in Italy, are much further along thar, Italy in
"defense planning and civil protection." This is very natura3 and we are
therefore not going to emphasize it.
The fact or the impression that it is a good idea to postpone the listing
of specific emergency cases, in which we might find ourselves involved,
is of a psychological uature. It is ~ust as natural for us to be inclin.ed -
to postpone the assumptions of misfortun.e. But the psychological roots of
the attitude of those who do not look kindly upon the concentration of
power, not even in the face of an emergency--thos~e roots are much more
subtle.
Might it not happen then that the delay, materializing at auch points in
~ the legislative aad administrative horizon, concerning national and civil
defense, would spring from some defect in the domestic aad foreign policy
decision~ntaking process? Finally, .could it not be that even scholars
study,ing strategic and military topics might have at least a little bit
of responsibility, if not also blame? Are we sure that we always raised
~he right problems at the right time and in a clear manner? Are we sure
that we ourselves understood them?
~e Hon Giuseppe Zamberletti, former Government Commissioner for the Earth-
quake Areas of Friuli
This situation offers me an opportunity once again to think about a series
of topics which I have addressed myself to several times before and which
we worked on, in the legislative area, when we drafted the civil protaction
1aw, and in the action area, when we found that the civil protection-1aw
stood up to the test of the emergency. Professor Casadio introduced a
series of questions and I would like to make my contribution toward
answering them.
What is national defense? It is the overall effort made by the nation to
cope with a threat. When, in parliament, we drafted a bill on civi:l pro-
tection, which then became the law on civil protection, we found ourselves
facing the diPficulties which Professor Casadio recalled. In line with
the request of some political parties, we did not want to include a threat
from.other countries under the headi.ng of national defense, in other words,
aggression against the nation; we therefore had to create an instrument
which at least--regarding another type of threat (natural calamities and
disasters)--could render the 1aw operative in Italy.
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Wh~t then was the objective of the legislative branch? The objective was
above a11 to create an infiegrated structure for the anticipation, to the
extent possible, of the threats that might materialize in terms of civil
defense and thus to have an instrument that would add anticipation to the
structure of emergency action, gathering data through the most suitable
instrumenta. That would iaclude instruments of a military type, in cer- -
tain aspects, but also civilian instruments, deriving for example from the
existence of the regional setup in.Italy. This is why we provided regional
civil protection committees which are under the region but which9 in ad-
dition to the latter's authority, would also have the author3ty deriving
from the bureaucratic decentralization of the state as found in the region.
~.'hey should handle everything concerning the identification of the threats
that may arise in a certain region.
The data pertaining to this study should go to the interministerial civil -
protection committee, chaired by the minister of th.e interior, and they
should then be worked up into an. overall national plan which, for manage-
ment purposes--and this is the interesting point in tl~e law--should be
assigned to the national civil protection secretariat which is run by the
director-general of civil protection, under the ministry of internal
af f airs.
Having extrapolated from the list of threats only those of a natural
character, the competence of the minister of internal affairs in this
i f ield is quifie evident; we already touched upon it in the law on the
j ministry of public works because here we realized that the ministry of -
~ public works is not in a posit3on to have a network for checking on the
~ "alert" systems since this is a ministry that has nothing to do with
~ emergency situations whereas the ministry of internal affairs, due to
~ factrrs connected with national security, does have an. apparatus--also
i concerning communications networks--capable of handling a11 of the infor-
mation that might come in and operating an "alert" system with a per3pheral
~ structure in the prefectures and in the government coumdssioner's offices
~ attached to the region.
! The plans drafted by the national secretariat should be handled, on the
peripheral level, no longer by the region, but by the government commis-
sioner attached to the regions, that is to say~ by a civilian authority
under the central power. This is so for two obvious reasons: Fixst of
' a11, because responsibility for a response to the threat is held by the
state and the central government (as a tnatter of fact, even though this
i threat may involve citizens of one region, the result of the response may
' involve all of the other citizens); second, because responsibila.ty for the
defense and security of citizens is not held by the regions but by the
central government since, to respond to the threat, it is also necessary�
to ca11 upon forces outside the region and, hence, forces which are
mobilized within the national context.
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It is therefore necessary that the operational command, when the emergency
breaks oufi, can derive its authority from the central government and would .
be an extension o~ it. The anticipation aspect on the regional level there-
fore was and is being assigned by the civil protection law (I always say
"theoretically" because the civil protection law has not yet been imple-
mented and the implementing regulations have ~ot even been issued as yet)
to the civil protection committees which will draw up a list of possible
threats and also resources that are available on the regional level. But
the executive phase, implemented by a.ny action des3gned to respond to the
threat, springs from the central government which, on the regional level,
uses the government commissioners and, on the provi.ncial level, the organ-
ization of the prefects.
What is the prohlem we face today regarding the standards? It springs fram
the discovery that the type of legislative instrument we have available is
partial because it selects the threats and concern~ itself only with those
deriving from natural disasters.
I believe that we must make an effort to provide a multivalent possibilty
for using one organization: Rather than having two different organiza-
tions, one for civil defense and one for civil protection, I think we
should have only one national defense organization which would coordinate
the entire national effort in reponse to aay type of threat. I believe
that, at least as regards civil protection, the problem anticipating the
threat and the analysis of the means we have available has been resolved
rather we11, theoretically.
Professor Casadio has made a reference to the nation's effort to line up
~ resources to confront a threat, that is to say, he talk,Qd about the cost;
I th3nk ~hafi the kind of planning effort designed to rec:ipond to a threat
in the international context in which we move today (als~o considering our
alliances) must be made a part of our national planning,effort.
Let us now talk about the second phase, that is, the res,?onse to the threat.
Here I had a rather unique experience: After having draited a law on civil ~
protectioa, I found myself in a position where I had to carry it out, almost
by a strange quirk of fate. And here I must say that we certainly noticed
the absence of a national secretariat for civil protection and even more
so the lack of a combined general staff which would make provision for
everything that might happen at the moment when the threat turns into ag-
gression; we found ourselves facing aggression, not by an enemy, but by ,
natuxe, with a11 of the tremendous shortcomings which we still have today;
T~found myself without any programs to back me up, without any plans beyond
the sector plans, drafted as a command function in dealing with almost
serious threat, assisted only by good luck and some extremely helpful coin-
cidences; the first of these circumstances was represented by the intuition
of ~rim~ I~inister Aldo Moro to give me a combined staff with the appo3ntment
of a deputy commiss3oner takiag into account the forces that would have to
tackle that threat. Luck would have it that this combination was particu-
larly fortunate. ~
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$ut we cannot ttu~t in good 1.uck for the future when it comes to specific
appointmea~s; zhe structure muat already be in existence and it must have
been tested. T recall that I met and was introduced to the staff, with
which I was suppo5ed to operate, only at the moment we were drawing up the
plan and at the moment we had to go into action; this is incredible from
the viewpoinC o$ operational possibilities. We do know in fact that the
first 48 hours, during which the threat turns into actual aggression, are
the decisive ho~srs; during those 24.hours you eifiher save a certain number
of lives or eve~ything is 1ost; during those 48 hours, either the organiza-
tional machinery and fihe integrated system work fu11-speed, or the initial
delay during the period of uncertainty may turn out to be ruinous. One of
the most 3mportant things to do is to have unity of command because, at
that moment, ua~.ted command is a necessary and indispensable requirement
for bei.ng able ~o ~espond to the threat; a11 forces which are involved in
the action must be under that command, from the first steps a11 the way to
the end .
Besides, this conunand should be set up in advance and it should be organized
in advance wi.th resp~ct to the threat; we should not have to spend ten hours
to decide whether or not to appoint a supreme commander; perhaps the most
delicate moment 3.ti the entire affair was the political.consultation to find
out whether we Were really facing a disaster that did ca11 for the appoint-
ment of the cont~i,ssioner. -
That mamen~, which can be really decisive, should be clari�ied in the law
so as not to confront the priae minister--who must provide the special -
~powers--wifih a gi~uation where he has to.consult with other people in
order ~o deter~ine in the first place whether or not an operational com-
mander should be apPointed. I believe fihat, in a near edition of a civil
defense law, we should provide a whole series of threat 1evels in response
of which we auto.matically set in motion certain procedures leading to the
appoin~ment of tihe operations commander, that is to say, the un3fied com-
mand. This i.s g problem of an organizational character which we face up
Che 1ine; we have ~o find what kind of unified command we may have with
reference to the threat; the civil protection law is quite flexible on
this point and does not tell us what type of command we should try to set
up; it leaves it up to subsequent regulations and common sense to select
the men who are to be a part of that team, in the light of the threat.
But the most in~poxtiant thing is automati~ally to provide for the entry into
action of the operational segment in order to respond to the threat, also
; taking into account the levels of standard power. And here Professor
i D'Onofrio can be more precise than I in terms of doctrine. This as a
; matter of fact 3.n~olves not only coordination but also command; we get
~ coordination thtough command. Either we command, and then we get co--
; ordination, or We do not command, and then we coordinate nothing, we
, only exchange rePo~'ts and we often wind up multiplying our probl.ems, rather
than reducing them. Therefore the command must have legislative authority,
that is Co say, the.power of delegation, in our case. In the second
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emergency this came out so ev3dently that, with the help of the law and
the decree-law, the government, following the 15 September earthquake,
took stepe to provide the commissioner not only with power of command over .
the forces operating to meet the emergency and the threat but also to
an~end a11 laws that hindered the use of those forces or that made certain
operations, necessary in order to meet the threat, difficult.
These are real iegislative powers; as a ma.tter of fact, it occurred to me
tt~t we might no~ only innovate and amend laws ranging from the highway
code to procedures for the~confiscation of buildings but also. regarding
the evacuation of the population; it also occurred to me that we should
change the income tax deadline for a traumatized population which was
encountering difficulties in meeting certain normal everyday requirements.
We amended the laws providing certain procedures for gettiag a driver's
license or for having civilian vehicles driven by military personnel, in ~
other words, a whole series of things that caruiot be resolved through the
pure coffinand of forces involved but that are most important in terms of
their execution in connectioa with the effort to contain the threat that ,
crnnes up. These powers must be established in such a way that, in coping
with a"yellow" threat, we would have poeaers extending up to a certain
level; in dealing with a"green" threat, there would be other powers on ,
a di~~erent 1eve1; and in responding to the "red" threat, there would be
sti11 other powers on a certain 1eve1.
~ We are going to get specia.l powers which, accord3ng to some experts, even
modify the very principles of the constitution because the limitations
were only the basic principles of the juridical system. But I realize
that those powers were important. In those cases it is possible to get
the entire organization to respond if we protect it from the risk of having
to violate some federal government laws which in reality do not permit
certain types of action or certaia summary procedures connected with
requisitions and evaluation, the establishmeat of schools an.d hospitals
in varioua places,.etc. It is true that, during the first phase of the
emergency, I did exercise these powers without actually having them be-
cause the 1aw on civil protection did not recognize them; but there are
special moments when power derives from things, as they develop; since
~he emergency always covers a long span of time, the problem therefore
must be ~ackled and resotved.
In conclusion I would say that we have a good civil protection law but
we lack a civil defense law. The civil defense law in my opinion must
complete the civil protection law. This does not meau that w~e should turn
it into something e1.se; in substance, the orgaaization for responding ~to
the threat involves the same type of model; it would be a mistake to have
a defense orgaaization and a civil protection organization because in
reality a11 civil pro~ection also serves for civil defense and a11 civil
defense also aerves for civil protection.
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- I want to add on~ last consi,deration: When we have laws, we must imple-
ment thew; I ae,a with soa~e discom~orfi that the laFr on civil protection
does not y~et have it~ regulation and a combined sta�f has not yet been
constituted. F]hafi would Rappen if we were to find ourselves faced with
anothe,r calamity?
Well, I am very much worried because I think th3t, under such assumptionsn
we would have to start from scratch every time, We would.have to set the
organizat3on up, we would have to put the staff together whereas, on the
basia of past experience and laws in~force, we could already h�aue the
~ entire structure capable of reaponding without losing ~hose 48 hours
! which other countries also lost during earthquakes. ~
i
~ Under these circumstances, time is so tight as to ca11 for immediate
I action, with organizat3ons and persons already trained to work together,
~ people who kaow each other, people who know the various 1evels of auth-
i ority noti only in legal and formal terms~but also in terms of tasks as-
! signed to thean in advan.ce .
I
I have perhaps been a little bit expansive 3n my present.~~tion but, being
~ invified to a discussion of this kind someCim~ ago, when th3.ngs were seen
( in terms of all of their aspects, also from the weak points, constituted
~ a taagniiicent opportun.ity for reviewing a topic which is always timely
~ in I~a1y, where problems continually come up once the acute phase has
! passed, with the risk of finding ourselves in. a worse fix when these
~ tragedies come up again. I asked myself what would have happened if,
- instead of in Friuli we had to face the same emergency along the ridge
- in Calabria, where problems involving co~nun3cations, the armed forces,
and the tranaport of individuals and equipment are much more complex than
~in Friuli, without advance planning.
~I Pxof Francesco d~Onofrio, Professor of Constitutional and Comparative Law
~ I would~ like to alert you to the facfi-~-in a11 of its gravity--that the
~ topic complex concerning the military establishment so far has attracted
the attention o� only a few constitutional law experts so that the overall
j~, contribu~ion from university thinking on this topic is by far inferior--
~ at least quantitatively--to what we could and should have here.
~ This most probably--and aa the Hon Zamberletti noted a ahort time ago--is
; one of the manifestations of that phenomenon of dismissing the military
~ ~opic complex which the~Italians experienced with intensity that perhaps
; only today is beginning to decl3ne and whose roots go far back into Italy's
! national history, both before and after the republic.
I
` If I therefoxe seek to answer the questions which were put to us here by -
~ Professor Casadio at the beginning of our endeavor here, I wi11 have to
~ .do s~ with an approach that wi11 constantly seek~to hold together the
~
' consti~u~ionalist and the cultural--political aspecfis of our debate here,
' . .
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in ~u11 awareness of the difficulty of this undertaking, which grows even
fuxther as w~e mov~ on,from the general military topic complex to the more -
specific and more complicated topic complex concerning the concept and
the institut3,on o� oa~erall defease, where the contributions from Italian
consti~utional law experts, it seems to me, are practically nil.
The need for constantly keeping in mind these two focal aspects of our
debate appears clearly also in the light of the two premises outlined by
Genera~l Barbol3ni in his 3ntroduction: The consfiitutional framework, on
the one hand, and the system of current military a113ances, on the other
~ hand.
It is as a matfier of fact evident that an exclusively domestic approach
(which is rhe one that can be related to the constitutional framework)
or an exclusivel.y foreign-affairs oriented approach (the one that can be
related to the framework of military alliances) is bound to run the risk
of losing sight of the interconnection between the two approaches in a
situation, such as the Itallan situation, which, since after World War IT,
has been so profoundly marked by the almost simultaneous existence of
constitutional choices and international choices.
Discussing the issue of national defense; which in. so many other ~ountries
has been taken up years ago with results that look quite respectrible, in
substance signifies discusaing the meaning of the emergency and �the powers
that can be exercised in an emergency situation.
That we are dealing here with an essential topic complex for the purpose
of describing the status of institutions i.n a certain country is something
that emerges very clearly only if we realize that one of this century's
. �utost incisive authors on political theory and coastitutional law--I am
talking here about Carl Schmitt--asserted rather sharply Chat "sovereign
is he who decides on the state of emergency."
Although this is not supposed to mean that we subscribe to the political
and constitutional view of Carl Schmitt (which, by the way, the passage
of time has pxoven to be correct more often than we can say following the
wartime di.saster of the forties), we do want to say that the issue of -
na~ional defense is indissolubly tied to the issue of sovereignty, re-
gardless of whether it is viewed in its strictly domestic dim.ension or
whether it is viewed in its international dimension.
We11, 3~ seems to me that I can say that, over these past 30 years, the
- consensus on ths px~mises and on the ultimate purposes of our constitu-
tional system has been gradually broadening, increasingly turning the
constitution into a point of reference above and beyond political contests;
in short, we can say qui~e calmly that the constitution today has much ~
more of a uniting e~fect than we can say 30~ years or so ago.
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As I see it, the top~,c GQpapl,ex o~ national defense can concretely make
substantial progr~ss in th~ cultural debafie and in fihe confrontation among
the political forces everyt~sne we must take up topics deal3.ng with Che
security o~ oux const3.tut3onal setup.
The debate concerning the internat~onal focal point of this issue however
sti11 looks di~f erent to me today; the system of mil3tary a111ances, as a
matter oP ~act, has not produced greater political and popular consensus
to the same extent as ~he consensus on the constitution grew, although we
can now detect by no means minor indications of a change of opinion, also
among the political forces that are trad ifiionally most hostile to NATO,
forces that at least reveal a certain reconsideration of the view of world
~ aEfairs expressed at the time NATO itself was set up and during its consol-
idation as an instrument for peace in Europe. .
- The ~act ~herefore is that the issue of national defense wi11 tend to be
considered in a different light and probably in a more uncertain light
every time it must come up with decisions directly connected to Ttaly's
membership in NATO.
Going back for this purpose to a passage in the remarks by the Hon Zamber-
letti, I think that the speci.al powers, with which he was provided on the
occasion of the Friuli earthquake, were not challenged politically by
anybody (in spite of the doubts as to constitutionality which he himself
expressed at ~east with regard to some of the forms of intervention, using
his powers as commissioner on that occasion) precisely because the "natural"
qual3ty of the phenomenon, which made those powers practically applicable,
did not confron~ any political force with the problem of relating those
powers to the mliitary alliance or to any other aspect of the question of
civil defense which is p~litically so controversial.
It is evid~nt, as a matter of fact, that a natural event by def inition, at
least according to common acceptance, cannot be related to any ideology,
to any pol3.tical persuasion, to any religious face, to any overall view of
relations between the state and civilian society, although it does instinc-
t3,vely unify the national conscience in defense of the assets threatened by
the natural event itself.
Whenevex we want to establish, in a normative fashion--and hence, at least
- in a law--those cases which constitute emergency situations different from
those cau&ed by natural events, we wi11 have to visualize a gradation of
consensus whi,ch would range from a maximum, relating to situations which
everybody today connects with a natural event, to a minimum, covering
emerg~ne,y~� situations that might spring exclusively from Ita1y's member-
ship in NATO.
It is true that substantial progress has been made recently on the road
toward the verification of the consensus on the defense of institutions,
, as demonstrated by Law No 382, of 1978, spelling out the principles of
milifiary discipline.
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As w~ know, th~,s ],aFr expxessly asserfis that the armed forces will assist
3,n the d~~ense of r~publican institutions, thus also concerning the spirit
of ~he conati~ut3onal provisions perCaining to the armed forces, but at
the sam~ ~ime demonsfirating the maturation which has taken place among the
political Eorces in connection with the topic complex concerning the ar~ed
Eorces in the Italian system of government.
- The possible development of the political debate and the legislative de~i-
sions on this matter therefore enables us to consider as having been over-
come, at leasfi in part, ~he prejudices that confined the fiopic complex of
national defense to questions which one could not talk about without causing
profcund dissent in Italy.
That obviousJ.y does not mean that we are moving toward new forms of mili-
tarism, nor does it mean asserting that Che topic complex of national de-
fense has now been backed up by a consensus equal to the one we were able
~o record, for example, with regard to a particular aspect, such as civil
_ protection in the strict sense of the word.
This more precise~.y means that the debate on national defense (or, as we
say, on ov~rall defense) has found the Italian parliament more inclined to
understa~d the value of national interest in terms of not necessary, radical
~uxtaposition of overall views.
It follows from this that we can anticipate the possibility of launching a
revision of the 1aw on c3vi1 protection in terms wh3ch would enable us to
pxopose that which, at the time, although not too long ago, was difficult
to include in the legislative text.
But I must inject a warning note here: While the area of consensus on the
constitution is broader than the area of consensus on military alliances,
it is a good idea for the parliamentary debate not to try to impose legis-
lative solutions designed, all at once, to cut all of the preliminary
political knots concerning the organizational solutions for national de-
fense, but to demonstrate the flexibility necessary in a situation, such
- as the one that involves the subject matter which we have gathered here
_ today to discusse
= The cons~itutional principles relating to the defense of the republic are
a help here.
It is certainly not by chance that the Italian constitution provides only
for war as a prerequisite for having parliament give the government "nec-
essary powers."
This is a very broad forumula which precisely leaves parliament with the
specific evaluation of the quality and quantity of powers--also evidently
the normative powers--to be conferred on the government in order to cope
with the state of war.
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But the ~~talia,n consti~ution does, no~ contain any provisions for a domestic
stat~ o~ em~tgency, nox ~4r a atate of siege, ariaing from facts not con-
nec~ed wd.~h w~r so Chat the ordinar}r 1eg3sZator must be quite aware of the
1~mitations which ~he conaCitutional system now 3n Porce places upon the
- ins~rum~n~~ r~~cessary :t.n order'~o tackle emergency situations not related
to a state o~ war. ,
The deba~e 3n ~he Cvns~ituen,t Assemb'ly on. these poin~s was very intensiv~
and high-lCve1 and was testimony of the e~fect~which fih~'experience of the
prec~ding dictatoxship and the war of 1940-1945 has on ~h~ draft3ng of the
constitu~ion.
7.'he various phras~s to be found in other constitutional texts, among th~m
particular~y ~he constituti,on of the Fifth French Republ.ic, enable us to
say thafi ~he possibilities'given fio the varivus national legislators, in
- ~erms o� nortaat3.ve and ope~rational ins~rumeats connecfied~ to the sCate of
e,~t~rgency, a~~ not entirely identical; this has to do wi~h the different
extent o~ the palit3cal and popular consensus on the vary concept of
national uni~Y and natioaal in~ereat.
It follows from this that a set of legislative instrum~nfis, designed to cope
w~,th problems axising �rom the need for guarantee3ng the instruments for
nationa7, defense, w311 have to move wl.thin the environment of formal and
substantia~ i~.d~.cations deriving from the Italian constitutional system;
~ , very pxobably, th~ c~uality aad quantity of the powers, which the Han Zam-
ber3.atti t;o1,d us earlier he got on the occasion of the Friuli earthquake,
~ cannot he ex~~nded te maay assumptions of emergency.
~
An except3,on here, for example, would involve the con.stitutional limits
aa the resexyat3ons of 1aw and 3urisdiction instituted to safeguard basic ~
. individua~, 1~berties, although normative government powers may take shape
' on the assump~i.on o~ an emergency that would lead to amendments in le~is�
lative souxc~a likewise, in pulil3c organizational structures, and in the
system o~ au~horities.
Th~ regionalistic topic complex assumes its full we3ght precisely at
this point, ~
It does not s~em to me that one can seriously challenge the government's
authoxi~y in Xegislative and administrativs matter's conn~cted~with civil
d~~ense; not only ar~ we not dealing here with "sub~~ets" in.cluded among
those ~ha~ axe under reg3.ona1 authority but we also note~that the terri- .
' torial limit of r~gional and local powers is difficult to reconcile with
the iZecessary organ3e ~s~tup--often rather prevalently ultraregional--of
the actions to be taken by the public authorities~ in responding to emer-
gency situat~QnB.
It is a faet mox~over that the Italian regional system and the system o� '
local powe.rs 3~311 performs a function of guaxantee3ng the political forces, ,
in addition tio a function of self-government for the 1oca1 communities.
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It follqWa ~rom th3.s that le.gislation on civil de~ense should--for the
sake of safeguarding ~e~dexal government authoxities--provide for the pos-
sibility o~ using r~~3.ona1 administrative structures and loeal agency
structures, as we11 as regional and local polltical personnel itself in
order to implement the decisians made by ~he aational constitut3onal bodies. ~
The involv~tnent oP tha regional and 1oca1 authorities as a matter of f act,
seen not only as constitut3,ona1ly required--which, I repeat, does not aeem _
- suatainaDle to me--but as polit3.ca11y determinable in the specific actual
situation, could r~present ~hat flexibility to which I referred earl3er in
connec~ion with ~he legislative formulation corrcerning fihe peripheral ap-
paratuses of civ31 defense, both 3n the preventive survey phase and in the
operational phase following the development of the actual emergency situa-
t~,on.
I definit~ly think that the way is now open toward a broader discussion on
the topics of national defense, desigaed to t~,ke place aot only in a climate
of civilian confrontation. but also to give Ita1y cultural, organizational,
and juxidical instruments for overall defense. ~
Dr Vito Sansone, Journalist.
I have no difficulty in confessing that this is the f irst time I f ind my-
self involved in. a.discussion of this kind and I th3.nk Che whole thing
3.s rather stimulatiug. Besides, when I was invited to attend this meeting,
I was tempted not to accept because I realized the difficulty of making an
effective contribution. But then I thought about it and I said to myself:
No, this is one of those opportunities which one must nofi miss. Thus, be-
cause of my owa scruples, I went to the files of a big Rc~man daily and I
asked the austodian to get me the file on "civil defense."
- We11, in it I only found sotae things I.already lmew, that is; some essays
~ on civil defense in the United States and in the Soviet Union with relation
to 13mited war, the problems of nuclear war, etc.; much material was written
by special correspondents on the atomic shelters in China but apart from
tl~at there was nothing e1se. Go3ng further back in time, there were man~y
sensational articles on the pxoblems of~the billionaires who were having
atomic sheZters built for themselves, first in Amexica and then in Europe,
etc.
I'was stunned to make thi.s discovery and I asked myself: Lookin8 at these
axticles, how could a journaliat react who, overnight, finds himself facing
a problem of tY~is txemendous significance, what meaas does~ he have avail-
aA1e, what means of in~orunation? This fact is particularly worrisome be-
cause in my judgewent--and I think that the remarka made~~so far fully con-
fi~ this 3udgement--the problems of information, organization, and con-
sensus are absolutely pr~eminent and�fundamental.
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I think--and Rrofeasox D'Onofrio emph.aaized th~s xather we1l--that we are
de,~7,ing h~x~ FTith prol~7.~mo ~ha~ ~t~ust~be xesolved fixst of a11.
And in this conn~ction I would 13.ke to shaxe with you a personal, profes-
sionat expex~.~nc~: T was and ~~i7.1 am one o~ the f~w ~ournalists---I am
talking about th,e daily press wh3ch reaches everybody or ~ust about every-
body--who concexned hima~l~ w3th m3litary problems in the sense that X
tri,ed to coyer proAlema o~ m,i~ itary strategy, of East--West relafiions,
nucleax problems, efic. ~11, I must te11 you that I always found obstacles
a~ the Rewspaper and the main obstacle was represented by the at~itude of
the managing editors and the desk editors ~+~t above a11 the former. I
~ think that this is an obstacle that must defir?itely be removed by makin~
_ an effort to convince those people that problems of defense, military
problems, both national an,d international, are important problems on
- wh,ich public opinion must be inform.ed and sensitized. And since the man-
aging editors are precisely worried about selling newspapers, we mus~ tell _
_ them that those problems, those problems likewise, offer ~.nteresting sub-
ject matter for discussion and reading.
This purpose can be a~tained by asking them for their op3nion, by getting
them intexested somehow, by inviting them ~o television debates or round
table discussions,
I am convinced that the probletns o~ defense often represent something en- -
; tirely new fihat can be of ~Mtexest to the people.
I Having made ~hese points, T hope you wi11 a11ow me to ma~Ce some simple and,
i I would say, e~.ementazy stateanents on the obstacles in the way of a fu11
~ understanding of the prob7.ems of defense. I believe that there are po13.t~
; ical obstacles but also obstacles of'a psychological nature. It is not
~ that people are talking only very little about c3.vi1 defense; people in
~ general talk very little about ~uilitary problems, about defense in a gen- -
' eral sense. Why? Perhaps we can draw an analogy. Some tiitae ago we had
a touch o~ a debate on the problems of austerity. We a11 know that this
' d~bate, which looked so promising, finally wound down because it was
; discovered--th~ politicians diseovered or at least they think so--fihat
' th~ problem o~ austarity is not a popular.one and does not make anybody
else popular. Peo~1e do not want to hear talk about savings, about ti.ght-
- ening their belts, etc. People want to continue to live the way they have ~
been living for a11 of th~se years. Bufi we all know,.incl.uding the poli- -
ticians, ~ha,t this is precisely the moment we must talk about auster~;ty. _
It is the~~fore necessary to seek th~ means, the insrr.uments, w3~thout both--
~ ering fihe people, in ordex to foxce them to think about what shape we a17.
; are in naw.
I think that, 3n view of the gravity of the civil defense problem by now,
viewed in its overall aspe~ts and in terms of national defense, in other
words, as an i.ntegral part of national defense and, hence, of the context
of a de~ense pol3.cy that fihe public would f ind clearer and more acceptable,
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w~ will hav~,to.fi~d a Way o~ g~tting this pxoblem to th~ forefront like-
wise. And we Fr117. succeed in doing t~iat ~o the extent that we manage to
convfi~ca ~he peopl~ o~ its importance, using proper~meaiis and methods of
disclosure.
There has been talk of the perception of the threat but the people do not
wan~ to h~ax anything about threats and they do not 1~ke to hear talk about
dangers and imminent disasters. If you talk about it, they immediately
knock on wood. This, by the way, 3s an understandable~~mentality. I my-
self, when I s~art out on a trip by car on the highway, try not to think
about what m3.ght happen. The first problem to be solved therefore is
this: The people reject anything that is unpleasaat, even though it may -
be the real fihing.
Another motive of a psychological character, which in my judgement makes -
civil defense quite incredible, is that, whenever anybody talked about it,
it was done in relation to nuclear disasters, that is to say, events of
such d3mensions as to seem impossible~and unrealistic to us. The idea of -
civil defense has for some time been discredited also by a11 of the news
about private atomic shelters when we learned about the bi111onaires who
were spending m3.llions upon millions in order to creafie a little safe
corner ~or themselv~s wh31e everybod~ else who did not have the b311ions
in cash would remain exposed to fihe disaster. In other words, civil de-
fense, understood in these terms�--:~lthough it was in these terms that it
was being talked about--~wss ~omP~ning unattainable. Now, we obviously
know that civil defense has a di~ferent meaning and this is the meaning
which was brought out during this round table con~ference. -
I must add that, as far as Italy is concerned, the obatacles are not so
much of a psychological but rather nf a political.character. They are
those problems which were touched upon by Professor D'Onofrio, that is
- to say, prob~.ems which we might define as being historical, problems
which came from our hisfiory and which took shape throughout the period
of time frrnn the unification of Italy until today. The armed forces have
been a sepaxate body only for a very short time. That o� course is nothing -
new. Onl.y now is a new situation beginning to take shape in the sense of
a more incisive involvement of the armed forces in the nation's civilian
life~ I~ is with gr~at pleasure that I can see the following printed, for -
example, in "Libro Bianco della Difesa" [Defense White Paper]:
Tlie armed forces however atrongly note the urgent need for an instrument
th,at would be closely connected abroad with the civilian organizations
+ that ~presa the life o~ the nation in its aspects. etc.'~
I was also happy to read an article in RIVISTA MILTTAR~ [M3.litary Review]
tal~~g $bout the need for the axmed forces to be involved in a civilian
circuit.
Here, it seems to me, we have the way to make th~ inaag~ of the armed
~orces more at~ractive and tnoxe acceptable, that is, the~armed forces
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whi,ch axe..interest~d i,n ~ivi], de~ens~ problews, in economic pxoblems--and
it is quite.corx~ct Ghat ~hey should b~ intexested in that, since they are
part o~ our society~ a,t, large.
_ Pro� Franco Alb~exfio Casadio
_ Tt is a good th3.ng to be a,waxe o~ the fact that, in Ttaly and in every ~
- country of the world, ~h~ debate on defense daily involves diverse and
changing aspects. The solution which is provided from time to time to
- this type o~ problem is only one aspect of the broader problem of civil- -
ian society and the manner in which it must be experienced. After having
resigned ourselves to this situation of "permanent study," it remains for -
_ us however to find out wheth,er we are not falling behind the events as
such.
The valuable confiributions by the speakers and those who commented during
the debate covered the entire broad range of questions we asked ourselves
at the beginning. The threat represen~ked by the emergency is now being
perceived by ever}~body in such a manner as to explain, justify, and gvide
the milifiary functions and, in a broader sense, the function of defense.
The list of causes of possible emergencies is getfiing longer. The emer- �
gency "Chreshold" is being lowered under the weight of the quantity and
variety of possible emergencies. The example of other countries.,,which
are ~ust as sensitive to those pxoblems, confirms this tendency. The
"place" whexe thi.s emergency can arise no longer concerns only domestic
interests but 3.nvolves fac~s which may happen far away from Ita1y. The
"time fra~e" an.d early action in respo.nse to c3rcumstances therefore are
of fihe utmost importance, as we saw during the debates.
Defense has been considered not only as a guarantee of individual liberties
but as Che environment within which the citizen has the right to be admit-
ted to experiencing his right and his duty to participate. The juridical
apparatus, whose object is defense, has not yet been completely worked out
in a11 of its possible po~.nts. The time has come foz us to real3ze what
fihe two aspects of the juxidical problem are and they are fortunately
complementary: For the national defense agencies, the area of available
autonomy would probably, in the opinion of some people, be explored with -
more of a calm attitude; on the other hand, the constitutional limitations
and the control mechanisms with which the country's juridical apparatus is
equipped do represent valuable "shields."
Gen ~'ranco Barbolini
This series of comments pointed up the fundamental aspects of our problem:
The juridical aspect, wi,thin whosa context we conducted our investigation;
' The operational aspect, through concrete, in some c3ses totally realistic
authoritative experience;
i
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~he inforulation asp~ct whi,ch tends to mak~ puhlic opinion participate in
the handl3n.g o~ th~ prohlem by�aensitizing it and arous3.ag its sense of
responsih~.lifiy.
Finally, Dut perhaps decisively, ~he polltical wi11 to put up for diacus-
. sion a problem of such tremendous concern as the choice of the most oppor-
tune moment for taking action.
National Defense
By Air Force Lt Gen Francesco Cavalera, Chief, Defense General Staff
The topic of overall de!'ense, ass3gned to the session which is about to
conclude, in my opinion is of the uCmost interest not only because of its
timeliness but also because of the noteworthy broad range of factors char-
actexizing 3.t.
The study here undoubtedly will not fail to hold the attention of those
who hold responsible positions on the national Ievel ia the vast field of
defense; at the very least, we hope that the work produced by the 30~th
Session of the Higher Military Stuc~ Center wi11 effectively contribute
to a better awareness of the fundamental problem and wi11 activate those
3azitiatives and those measures which are cons3dered indispensable in giving _
Ita1y a concrete defense guarantee.
It is not my intention here to come back to the results of the~study since
it will be the various staffs and departments concerned who will utilize
the results in the common attempt to perfect and, where necessary, to
create suifiab~e structures in order to assure overall defense. However
it s~ems that.I should conclu$e with some remarks on the images which were :
presented to us here. ~
I would like to ta1,k, for example, about a statement made by General Bar-
bolini, when he talked about the determinatian necessary to implement the
proposed oxganization.
I would 13~ke to expand a little bit on this concept of dete~cmination.
I talked about fihis when fihe subject came up and when I had to emphasize
that a defense 3.nstrument is of no value whatsoever--especially the mili-
tary instrument--i~ the nation, the people, do not have the~will to defend
themse7.vea .
I musfi po3.nt out that, by the wi7.1 to defend ones~lf, we must not mean
the wi1.1 ~o take up the necessaxy weapons at the~moment the need arises. _
This will is certainly no~ lack3ng even in the most indifferent and the
most diss3dent individuals and 3t would perhaps not even be lacking in
thoae who preach total and unilateral disarmament at the moment they are
rea11~ struck by the enemy's offensive, at the moment they axe getting hit
by enemy fire. 43
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But by th~n it Wou~d be too J.~te.
By th~ wi~,l to d~~~nd onesel� w~ must mean th~ w'i11, at the right time and -
certainly ~ar PxoTa th~ mom~n~ of truth, to consti~ute a system that will
be capable oP Euncfi~oning Pixst.oE a11 to deter a potential advexsary--and
thi s ie the moe~ va11d de~ense because it preven~e the offenae in every
~ sense--and, a~ter that, if deterrence should fai1, to prevent or reduce the
damage deriving from the oPPenses and to stop it as soon as poss.ible.
For that we would n~ed correct inforniation, an awar~neas and a sense of
x~esponsibillty~oz~the part of everybody, in any action that can contribute
to defense, even from far away.
In the constitutional charter of the Italian Republic, our legislators,
in drafting the a~t3cles pertaining to political r~lationships and when
approving the well~known phrase at the beginning of Article 52---that is to
say: The defense of the fatherland is the sacred duty of the c~.tizen--
certainly did not want to talk only about a poseible final event, the
momen~ when arms must be taken up, but a11 of the actions necessary in
order to prepare and guarantee the defense.
It is therefoxe the sacred duty of all, in their own fi~ld of activity, and
. T want ~o underscore that phrase "in their own ~ie1d of activity," to pro-
mote and implement those measures that are necessary in order to make the "
defense system work properly, a system in~which weapons represent the f inal
act undex the responsibility of the military.
Whi1e an important or predominant part in, the defenae role is assigned to
the military instrument, as has been decided by the Italian people so far
thxough its democratically elected representatives, it is necessary to
make sure that this instrument will have maximum effec~iveneas.
Tt~is e~fectiveness is the result of a product, a product in the mathemati-
ca1 sense, a pxoduct of four factors. If one of those factors is zero,
then the entixe product wi11 be zero.
These factors are: Personnel, materiel, training, and organization.
Personnel is undoubtedly the most sensitive and the most delicate factor.
Tts efficiency is proportional to its motivation. Mot~.vation is developed
~.n the environment and is conditioned by treatment, not only economical .
but also and above all moral.
COPYRIGHT: RTVISTA MILITARE PERIOAICO DELL~ESERCITO, ANNO CII, NUMFRO
4/1979
5058
CSO: 3104 44
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COUNTRY SECTION SPAIN
ETA (P-M) AIDE INTERVIEWED ON AUTONOMY STATUTE _
LD291235 Madrid CANNIBIO 16 in Spanish 21 Oct 79 pp 14-17 LD
_ [Interview with Basque Homeland and I,iberty Politico-Military Wing (ETA -
(P-�M)) unidentified.spokesman in San Sebastian by Juan Gomez Puiggros:
"ETA (P-M) Speaks"; date not specified]
[Text] CAMBIO 16: ETA (P-M)'s support for the Guernica statute [Basque
autonomy statute] has caused.surprise in many quarters. Why do you
~support it?
ETA: It is true that this may have caused surprise, but not among people
who know ETA (P-M)'s line. Our struggle has been aimed at clarifying the
class struggle in the Basque country. The Guernica statute will serve
to clarify who serves the bourgeoisie's interests and who aerves the
interests of the working classes in the Basque country.
There has been an ambiguity so far in the struggle in the Basque country,
and it is the struggle against the central government which has promoted
interclass collaboration between the bourgeoisie and the working classes.
CAMBIO 16: Could you enlarge on this point? ~
ETA: Yes. The period of transition to democracy has left many Basque ~
. leftwing political forces--for instance, Herri Batasuna, the LKI (Com-
~munist League) and the II~ (Communist Movement)--perplexed, and Chey
have been unable to ad~ust to the present situation, continuing with the
same methods and policies as under faecism.
We foresaw that things would change and hastened to take part fully in
the new situation, since it is also revolutionary to combine with our
struggle the struggle within the bourgeois institutions. Thus we have
aupported forces which are using all the machinery and possibilities of
this "democracy."
. And it can be said that bourgeois democracy is now coming to the Basque
country with the Guernica statute, but under very specific conditions....
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As we have said, interclass coll.aboration has so far predominated in the
Basque people's struggle. Very well, henceforth there will be a Basque
government with some powers and a party heading it--the Basque Nationalist
Party [PNV]--and the latter will have to govern, approve crisis proceed-
ings [with respect to enterprises in difficulties], direct Che Basque
country's industrial reorganiaation and so forth, and it will be clearly
seen what interests everybody defends.
Moreover, the statute will clarify another historical problem in the
Basque country: What is the framework of the revolution? Statewide or
nationwide? The Guernica statute establishes the nationwide framework.
Thus the right wing which~will govern, in accordance with the oligarchy's
plans, will unmask itself and the leftwing forces will have to define
themselves clearly in the Basque country.
Well then, if we wish to achieve socialism and independence, we will have
t~ pressure and drive forward the statute, which is a broader framework
of freedoms within which the left will have to be leftwing and within
~ which it will be possible to create unity in a single party for revolu-
tion and also a powerful armed organization dependent on that party.
CAMBIO 16: The patriotic [abertzale] left's criticisms of the Guernica
i statute concern three isaues which, in their opinion, have not been
~ included--that is, Navarra, the refugees and an amnesty.
ETA: It is untrue that the statute does not include the issue of Navarra.
It includes it and raises the possibility of integration for the first
. time in the Basque country's history. However, the issue has not been
- resolved, although it could be resolved by implementing transitional
provision 4(a). Herri Batasuna, the PNV and the Spanish Socialist
- Workers Party must now demonstrate their resolve that this be done.
~
~ Either all the parties which are initially in favor of this integration
reach agreement in the Navarra regional parliament, or, as a result of
another kind of pressure, forces which are now even opposed will change
~ their views in a new political situation.
I ~
~ In this connection we r,~ish to point out that Herri Batasuna's stance is
~ to agree with the Nava.rra oligarchy's proposals, since, being the non-
~ negotiators par excel'~ence, they have gone to Madrid to negotiate the
j enlargement of the fUaros [local rights], which coincides with the
~ intention to make Navarra a"tax haven," so as to create different
~ processes conflicting with the rest of the Basque country.
I CAI~IO 16: And what about the refugees and Che ~mnesty?
i
~ . ETA: An autonomy statute in the Basque country cannot function with
political prisoners in the prisons. Under these circumstances the Basque
government would be unable to function.
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This situation creates such a state of instability that all the institu-
tions would be affected. And so if this problem is not resolved, the
degree of instability will remain and it will not be possible to clarify
the class struggle.
[LD291237] CAMBIO 16: How will you act on these issues?
ETA: We will convince the central government, the bourgeoisie and the
PNV that they must take up these issues and that the action-repression-
action dynamic which produced results under fascism must be eliminated
under bourgeois democracy; and the PNV and the PSOE must involve them-
selves in this solution since it closely concerns them. Otherwise, they
will be unable to govern.
We are now at the historic moment of discarding this dynamic. ~
CAMBIO 16: You have spoken of the situation of the FNV and the PSOE.
What is your opinion of the other political forces?
ETA: The best way in which the Union of the Democratic Center [UCD] can
.achieve what it proposes--"breaking" Herri Batasuna and ETA's military
wing--is to cooperate in resolving these issues, since i~t is these which
are fostering them.
Otherwise, if the national police remain, if roadblocks persist and if
torture continues, the ambiguity of the antirepressive struggle will
continue, and it will be impossible to govern the Basque country. And �
it is in this atmosphere of repression that Herri Batasuna's demagogic
and populist atance finds an.outlet, since the bad mood created bq wage
freezes, unemployment and so forth takes the false outlet of the
national and antirepressive problem, since when a workers strike is.
repressed, the cry of "ETA, kill them" is raised, as a result of which .
~the strike loses its nature as a wage-claim dispute.
In this conn.ection we believe that the UCD wants a"yes" to the staCute,
but not a massive "yes," because it is encouraging abstention with the
probable trials of Monzon and Letamendia as marzyrs, since with such a .
weak "yes," the institutions which emerge will also be weak.
One of our fundamental policies is simed at inducing really leftwing
sectora in Herri Batasuna to reconsider its activity and act consistently
as a leftwing force.
CAMBIO 16: Will your support for the statute Entail abandoning the
armed struggle after its approval? ~
. ETA: No; the armed struggle will continue. The Seventh A.ssembly fore-
cast that the forms of domination would change under bourgeois democracy
and that it would be necessary to change the forms of political and
~ armed struggle as well, but this does not mean abandoning the latter.
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Within the context of the mass struggle against the central government,
the oligarchy's plans and so forth, these may be instances in which ~ust
demands cannot be achieved, whether as a result of superior strength on
the part of the central government or as a result of a limit to the
masses' capability for organization anc3 struggle. It is then that the
armed organization's role comes into play to guarantee their success
and also to serve as an educational element for the masses and demon-
strate to them in practice the usefulness and need for the armed
struggle, as a further element in the mass struggle.
We believe that there will be no revolution without an armed insurrection,
and since we do not believe in Santa Claus, we believe that it is ne.ces-
, sary to begin immediately to prepare the organization of military cadres
and the material and logistic means, so that when the masses are deter-
- mined to make this leap forward, they will have the means for doing so.
CAMBIO 16: So what will have priority in your struggle: preparation
for that moment of inaurrection which you mention or military inter-
vention?
ETA: There are two convergent forms of struggle--that of th~ party
which raises the masses' level of organization and consciousness and -
also its own level of organization (political and ideological struggle),
and that of the armed organization which will create principally the
material means for guaranteeing the masses' triumph at the time of
revolution, but this cannot be understood unless armed intervention's
educational role at the present time is understood, since this educates
the masses with respect to its uaefulneas. We have thus prepared what
we term "intervention areas," which is where we will concentrate our
intervention in trade unions, culture and so forth, always in accordance
with the armed struggle.
This is how the'armed struggle's strategic and tactical aims are com-
bined, and it is also how we will succeed in the long term in driving
the statute forward, and in this connection we wish to alert the left
~ in the Basque country to its historic responsibility to create that
party capable of leading the revolution.
[LD291239] CAMBI0.16: The atmosphere which is being created in the
Basque country has caused talk of army intervention in some military
circles.... Do you believe this possible? What would your stance be
in that event?
ETA: We believe that the government has for the most part opted now
for the democratic and bourgeois path--that is, that of persuasion and
political and ideological control--and that military intervention in the
Basque country therefore forms no part of its plans.
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However, if it became convinced at any time that this form of domination
is not working for it in the Basque country, we believe that it will not
hesitate to use other means, even the army, to perpetuate its dominaCion.
However, we repeat that we do not believe that this is its present
approach.
But if they opted for the latter solution--that is, military interven-
tion--we would not hesitate to attack the government where it could be
hurt most, and not necessarily in the Basque country. We would take
our intervention wherever necessary, and we are prepared for doing this.
Today the stance of ETA's military wing could provoke this intervention,
but this would occur in a situation totally unfavorable for the Basque
revolution~ry forces, since there is no armed organization prepared for
victory or an organized working class.
Today, blowing up Parliament or~killing the king would mean returning to
the situation of 40 years ago and having to starC from scratch. And if
there are sectors of the military wing which are seeking this, we tell
them that it is totally counterrevolutionary.
CAMBIO 16: There has repeatedly been talk of negotiations with the
Spanish Government. Have there been negotiations on the topic of the
statute?
ETA: Yes, there have been negotiations: the transfer of some prisonera,
the withdrawal of the repressive forces from Soria prison and the very
contents of the statute are the result of them, and also of the armed
struggle.
CAMBIO 16: Who conducted the negotiations on behalf of the government?
- ETA: We~prefer not to say, but it is a fact that Prime Minister Suarez
himself has been direetly involved in them, as a result of the Mediterranean ~
campaign (they are referring to the bombs on the beaches during the
summer) and the attack against Gabriel Cisneros, whom we initially wiahed _
to detain and question. But his attitude at that time caused him to be
shot.
CAMBIO 16: Have there also been negotiations with the French Government
on the situation of the refugees? ~
ETA: We have not held any, but we know that ETA's military wing has
held negotiations, negatiating residence permits. And this when people -
say that they are the "hardliners," who do not negotiate. And note that
we are not opposed to negotiation and regard it as a valid weapon, but
we do not claim to be what we are not. ~
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CAMBIO 16: What is your opinion of Basque General Council Chairman
Carlos Garaicoechea's role?
ETA: He is the perfect bourgeois politician; his role cannot be sepa-
rated from that of the PNV. The latter will be the instrument which
will guarantee the oligarchy's interests in the Basque country. When
it holds power in the Basque country government, the sectors of the
working class which follow it will clearly see the interests which it
defends, who will carry out the Bas que country's industrial reorganiza-
~ tion and subj ect to what interesta and how Che issues of unemployment,
bilingualism, health and so forth will be tackled.
It will be very difficult, not to say impossible, for them to reconcile
the interests which they really defend with those of the working class
and low-income groups, and their role is becoming increasingly clear,
now that even people like Olarra (a prominent Basque businessman) are
backing the PNV.
CAMBIO 16: What is your opinion of Telesforo Monzon?
ETA: He is the person with most power in Herri Batasuna; his personality
and stance sum up Herri Batasuna's entire policy and ideology. Neither
! Ortzi (Letamendia), nox Solabarria nor Castells holds power there--only
~ Monzon.
i
,
CAP~IO 16: How are your relations with ETA's military wing progressing?
I ETA: The ar e not ro ressin and are ve unlikel to ro ress� how-
Y P 8 S rY Y P g ~
ever, if we learn of some sector among them which wishes to seriously
consider the real situation in Euskadi, we are prepared to hold contacts
with them.
i We believe that the military wing can be asked to hold their Seventh
j ~ Assembly, since they are continuing to operate with the same presupposi-
' tions as in 1973, and many things have changed in the country since then.
; And it is aft er that Seventh Assemb ly that we will be able to talk.
i
~ But we wish to draw attention to a matter concerning relations between
i the military wing and ourselves, and this is that there are currently
~ people who want to cause conflict b etween us. The attack against the
~ Herri Batasuna San Sebastian counci lor, Tomas Alba, was carried out
! with buckshot--a weapon which we us e a great deal--and a Euskadiko
i Ezquerra memb er was recently shot with "Geko" ammunition, which th~
military wing also uses, and we did not attack Tomas Alba, nor did they
~ attack Emilio Guitia. For our part, we will not fall into pro~rocation,
~ and we hope that they will not, either.
[LD291241] CAMBIO 16: The conclus ion of the "Mediterranean campaign"
; was truly tragic, with the bombs in Madrid. What can you say about this?
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ETA: The warning that the bombs had been planted was given long enough
in advance and was sent by our usual means. So it must have been reli-
able, and their explosion, or at least victims, c~uld have been averted. -
We had previously announced the sec:,~zc1 stage of this campaign, if the
government did not carry out the agreEments on the return of the Soria
- prisoners, and so they had warning.
So if the reliability of the 11 previous warnings had been demonstrated,
why did the government not intervene on this occasion? All the more so,
since we have evidence (a tape recording) that the San Sebastian police
chief informed the civil gc~vernor and police chief of Madrid of tlie bomb
warning.
CAMBIO 16: If it was a deterrence measure, why did you not plant the ~
bombs deactivated? The effect could have been the same....
ETA: In the first place, we gave warning about 2 hours in advance, and, _
second, if you plant a deactivated bomb, it loses its deterrence effect,
. and the same applies to subsequent bombs. We deeply regret the victims
we caused, but the principal responsibility rests not with ourselves but
with those who, although able to avert these victims, did not do so.
- COPYRIGHT: 1979. INFORMACION Y REVISTA.S, S.A.
CSO : 3110 E~
� 51~
FOR OFFICTAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020012-4