JPRS ID: 8740 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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IY)~2 OFHI('IA1. l;til'. ON1.1' -
JPRS L/8740
30 October 1979
Near / ' -
East (~orth A~r~ca Re ort
p
- CFOUO 42/79)
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JPRS L/8740
30 October 1979
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 42/79)
- CONTENTS PAGE
ALGERIA
'AI~-WATAN' Interviews President Bendjedid
(Chedli Bendjedid Interview; AI,'WATAN AZ-'ARABI,
- 11-17 Oct 79) ......................o................ 1 _
_ LIBYA ~
Brief s
Oil Contracts Revised 22
MOROCCO
Moroccan Agricultural Development Described
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 17 Sep 79) 23 ~
Data Provided on Moroccan Dams
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS~ 17 Sep 79) 25 "
Brief s
Agreement With Sweden 27
- New Place Name 27 -
Moroccan-Ivorian Agreement 27 _
- a - [III - NE & A - 121 FOUO] ~
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ALGERIA
'AL-WATAN' INTERVIEWS PRESIDENT BENDJEDID
Paris AL'WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arablc 11-17 Oct 79 pp 20-25 JN
- [Interview with President Chedli Bendjedid by Mustafa al-Nadim; Algerian
correspondent for AL-WATAN AL-~ARABI--in Algiers, date not given]
[Text] [Question] If we were to apply the theory of the image and truth
about Chedli Bendjedid, what would you say? ~
[Answer] I have a great deal to say. But let me sum up the matter in
_ two points. The first point is that the image is distorted and improper
out of ignorance. After the death of our late president Houari Boumediene,
the Conference of the National Liberation Front Party was cor.vened. It
discussed the question of nominating a new president of the republic and
a secretary general for the party. Following thorough discussions, my
colleagues gave me the honor of electing me to tnis office.
What draws attention is that certain information media, in the Western
world in particular, and certain information Arab information media, -
particularly the Egyptian media, imitated 'the Western information media in
distorting this reali~y which manifests democracy and legitimacy in Algeria.
They portrayed an image that the elected president is a u~ilitary man, and
this meant that the army dictated the choice to the conference after the
failure of the conference to nominate a civilian.
This is a very distorted picture. I want to be well intentioned in aaying
that the reason for this distortion is total ignorance of the reality of
Algeria and its origins.
We are a country which was created by an armed national liberation revolu-
tion. Al1 the people were organized in the National Liberation Front as
strugglers always sharing work in the combat and political fields without
discrimination.
Consequently, traditional discrimination between the military and civilians
in Algeria is alien to us. Algeria can only distinguish between the
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strugglers and nonstrugglers or those who fled from or abandoned the ~
~ responsibilities of struggle.
Our national Popular Army is a product of the revolution and the National
Liberatior. F'ront and its traditions of struggle. Our army is not a
professional, conventional army. The sweeping majority of the of�icers
- and soldiers of our army zs from the sons of the workers and peasants.
- Naturally, their technical ability and combat efficiency rose after the
establishment of the independent state. However, this did not change -
their social status, struggle capabilities, or their loyalty to the heri-
tage and choices of the people and the National Liberation Front. -
The struggler in the army is like the struggler in any position in other
fields of work. He participated and is still participating in the march
of the revolution since the first bullet ~aas fired until the revolution
won victory, national authority was established and the state and society ,
were built. Since thz launching of the process of economic and social
development within the framework of the socialist choice up to the launch-
ing of the agricultural revolution and the issuance of the charter, these
strugglers have been participating in this process. They quickly arid
_ efficiently filled the sudden, alarming vacuum which colonialism and its
agents created in the country on the eve of independence, until power
was transferred in th e legitimate way. They are also contributing to
the course of the continuity of the revolution in the aftermath of the
sudden and painful death of the president and lPader Boumediene. _
[Question] Mr President, can you tell me how you have attained this per-
fect command of Arabic and good expression? Please permit me to ask this
question because I know that learning Arabic in Alg~:ria, particularly -
for:someor_e of your age, was not an easy thing under French colonialism? -
[Answer] I will tell you a secret. I learned Arabic here in Algeria
under the sight and hearing of colonialism. I will tell you another secret.
I was somehow lucky. I was from a big family and my father was somewhat
wealthy. Therefore, he brought us a special, qualified teacher to teach
us French. We liked the Arabic teacher more than we liked the French
teacher. Perhaps this is what has helped me learn Arabic.
In Algeria, we used to and still have a profound feeling of affiliation
with Islam and Arabism. Part of my generation's struggle was to learn
Arabic and to memorize the holy Koran.
I thank God that due to the rev~lutionary policy of Arabization led by
the late Boumediene, Arabic was restored as the real national language of
our youth, our new ~enerations, the party, the state and society.
~ [Question] After revealing these secrets, can we return to the second
point?
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_ [Answer] Well, the image here is delibexately distorted with a specific
goal. How? Western newspaper.s whether American or European--and this has _
been imitated by similar Arab newspapers--have been active in portraying
, Chedli Bendjedid as a president with another line and policy different than -
_ that of the line and policy of the late President Boumediene.
E
These newspapers began to emphasize the moderation and liberalism of -
Chedli Bendjedid and what they called his realistic understanding of things. ~
They have tried at times through the tactics of praise to portray Chedli
Bendjedid and Algeria as being in the climate of liberalization and~to
entice us to deviate from the path of the revolution, our soci.alist and
- national choices, and our fundamental hostility to all that is imperalist
and racist in general and to Zionism in particular, as if this is the way
~ae should follow to resolve aTl our problems.
- Then these newspapers maliciously raise the question: Does Ch.edli Bend-
jedici and the Algerian leadership produced by the conference have the power
to transfc�rm Algeria's course from socialism to capitalism, from commitment
to the common fate of the Arab nation to regional isolation within Algeria's
- borders, and from the nonalined policy to an alined policy, or at least
from nonalinement which is neutral to imperialism, colonialism, Zionism,
the unfair international economic order currently prevailing, and the
hegemony of the giant multinational companies and their ex~loitation of
the Third World peoples and their natural resources?
The objective here i~ to create doubt, hesitation and lack of self-
- confidence in ourselves, in our country and in our Arab homeland and make
us fight imaginary battles.
No, our people, and we are the sons of this people, have had long and
bitter experiences ~aith colonialism and theorgans of its violence,
' exploitation and information media. We have a precious experience in
this regard.
Througt~ the will of its people, Algeria will continue to be a revolution
and will continue its political, social, economic and national choices.
Algeria ~oill always remain an Arab, Muslim, democratic and socialist coun-
try. Algeria will remain the Algeria of the Liberation Movement and the
Third World. No one, regardless of how powerful he is or how much author-
ity he has, can challenge the will of the people and change the course.
= If anyone tries to do so, he will fall, and Algeria, its people, revolu-
tion and state will continue on that course. Algeria will remove and
_ eliminate from its way anyone who deviates from its will and choice.
Capitalism and liberalism, with their diseases, are two plants which
cannot grow or bear fruit in the soil of Algeria. If we had been after
capitalism or liberalism, why then did we stage a revolution and why were
one-tenth of our people martyred? We could have achieved this objectiv~
by reasonable understanding, as the French put it.
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If the question were a personal political matter for this or that -
prFSident, Algeria would not have been able to hold out in the face ~
of all the storms and plots which came to it from everywhere, nor
could it have Cackled its problems in the spirit of the collective
- revolution and continued its march and pan-Ara~i, African and inter-
national roles without pause or hesitation.
Knowing the Algerian people and Chedli Bendjedid, who became president
after the great leader Boumediene and took charge together with his _
_ colleagues, the members of tY?e political leadership, I can affirm that we
will not fall into the trap of liberalism r.egardless of its temptations.
. We will also not become isolated from our Arab nation in the Maghreb and
in the East or from our African continent and the nonalined movement. _
Thus, the image is distorted and false. The reality is that Algeria is
an Arab socialist country.
The distortion of the image reached the point where Chedli Bendjedid was �
portrayed as a military man raised and trained in French military schools.
This is not true. I was never taught in these schools, and I never served -
izi the French Army, even for one single day. As I said, my father was
somewhat well-to-do, and he was able, during the period of colonialism,
to'pay the necessary money which exempted me from military service in the
, French Army according to the laws in force at that time. He did the same
thing for my seven brothers. If Chedli Bendjedid knew anything about `
military science, he learned it during the revolution, in the schools of
the people and the Liberation Army.
[Question] Chedli Bendjedid is speaking about the president like an
Algerian citizen, speaking about another person who assumed major respon-
sibility in his coui:try. Is that due to the modesty he has been known
for throughout his life or is it due to a desire to avoid talking about the
- "personality" of the president as a topic? _
[Answer] (The president thought for a while and then said) Frankly, I
do not know. However, I feel that the Algerian citizen, who is identified
with the mind and heart of the president, should be constantly vigilant in
his conscientious watch of the president. In other words, I believe that -
the presidency is the responsibility of managing the government. In its
nature, this responsibility is temporary and transient in the history of =
the country and the president. Good citizens should assume the respon-
sibility of watching those who manage the government and making them -
account for what they do. I like, even in assuming the post of president,
to keep my right as a citizen in watching the president and making him
account for what he does.
_ When my brother stru~glers gave me the honor of electing me president
- at,.the conference of the National Liberation Front, they invited me to talk
amid overwhelming feelings. When I stood at the platform, I felt that my
responsibility had been doubled--the responsibility of the citizen and the
responsibility of the president. I decided to exercise these two
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responsibilities simultaneously. What I said was an expression of this
feeling.
a
- I said: Brothers--Our path is the revolution and the charter, and it is
the criterion which governs all of us. My responsibility as a president
is to alw~~ys adhere to the charter and the revolutionary traditions oE our -
people and to translate them into a reality in our society.
If the president deviates from this commitment= I ask you, as a citizen
and as secretary genera.l of the party, to remove him from his position
of responsibility.
[Interviewer] Frcm this point Chedli Bendjedid described himself and his
- dialectical understanding of himself and his responsibilities as a citi-
zen and president. Lde began our dialog about the current Algerian situa-
tion, its challenges and problems, the anticipated measures to be taken,
and a review of an experiment which has been talked about at home and
abroad in controversial terms. Every now and then, I interrupted him
- with a question or an explanation or a different view. He always used
the word "But...." President Chedli Bendjedid began to talk about the
25 years of the revolution.
[Answer] Revolutionary Algeria is now a quarter of a century old. One -
minute before 1 November 1954, no one thought, including France, the
United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arabs in the East and the
t4aghreb, that the Algerian people could wrest Algeria by an armed revo-
lution, and liberate it from the grip of the most oppressive traditional
colonialist and neoimperialist forces--NATO, which was at the peak of its
power--and the existing racist exploiters.
With liberation, Algeria returned with all its material, moral and cultural
weight to its own people in the Maghreb and in the Arab East. It overcame
the problems which arose from independence and the disputes which erupted
in the phase of the consolidation of the national authority, the organi-
zation of saciety and the direction of efforts for the benefit of the
people--the maker of the liberation and the 5ource of the enormous
sacrifices. With time, Algeria became a socialist Arab country with weight
and influence in the causes of liberation in every part of the world.
At this moment, 25 years after the firing of the first bullet for libera-
- tion, we cannot say that we have achieved all the aspirations of the
martyrs or the aspirations of our people. Ho~aever, we can say in sin-
cerity and truthfulness that Algeria has consolidated its political and
economic independence, rallied its ranks behind its Arab nation as a
moving force, built the main structures of power--party,state and insti-
- tutions--and proceeded in fi~m steps on the path of economic and social
development for the benefit of the masses the makers of the revolution-- _
and the post revolutionary phase according to the socialist choice.
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At this moment also, 25 years after the firing of the first bullet for
liberation, I imagine, as a citizen, struggler and official, what -
- Algeria would be line today had the struggle of the Algerian people not
, created this struggling popular force with its material and moral capa-
bil.ities, organization and profound commitment to the revolution and the -
- goals of its makers--the revolution historically known as the revolution
of the "Alberian Liberation Army."
Yes. What would Algeria be like now had the people not possessed this
organized, revolutionary instrument which was immediately capable of
filling the post independence vacuum--a vacuum sr_hemed by the colonialists
- to abort the revoZution, weaken its forces, shatter its eftorts and prevent
_ the people from becoming the real master of their country and having the -
say in it. `
As an instrument of the revolution, the Algerian Liberation Army was able
to become the actual force attracting all the revolutionary resources of
our people whether inside or outside the army and transforming the inde-
pendence of the (evane) formal agreements into a real independence. This -
was achieved through the full awareness, of the army and was a result af
its popular structure. The army did not fall victim to the temptation of
military dictatorship as was the case in other countries. On the contrary,
the a nny acted as a force for the socioeconomic advancPment of society
and for serving the goals of the revolution and the people, who are the
source of all power. -
In this connect~on, and without involving personal feelings or friendships =
in assessments, we must recognize the people who were responsible for
these achievements. Here we record with all pride the leading, responsible
role performed by the late Boumediene in the field of organization and
J mobilization and in building the army as a popular unit absorbing all _
tribal, frontal and clannish trends which prevailed and as a school for _
struggle, raising strugglers on the ethics of work and sacrifice for
liberating Algeria and rebuilding it soci_ally and economically for the
benefit of its workers, peasants, intellectuals and working, producing
~forces. We were all raised in this schools and Boumediene was truly the
teacher of this school in all his modesty and sinceri~y. He remained so
until he died, may his soul rest in peace.
There is no such thing as pre-Boumediene Algeria and post-Boumediene
Algeria. Algeria always belongs to the people. A struggler might fall
in our midst, but the people are immortal and capable of rejuvenating them-
selves. They do not die. Consequently, the will of the people is always
the mover of everything. This will is presently m~anifested in the
National Charter which was approved after a large-scale popular dialog in
1976.
The National Charter is then the guide of work and popular action. In
light of the National Charter, socioeconomic relations should be formu-
lated o~hether among indivi,duals or between the individuals on thP one
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_ hand and the state and ~ociety and all national organizations of the
popular movement on the other. Finally, in light of the National -
Charter, socioeconomic relations are formulated among the individual, _
the state and the productive establishments in the fields of agriculture,
industry, and other f ields.
The political leadership and the party had begun the implementation of
this comprehensive formula under the late Houari Boumediene. The presi-
dent suddenly died, and the action stopped. Today we are giving priority
- and perhaps top priority to the completion of the process of formulation
in all f ields.
[Question] But how, I~r President? -
_ [Answer] Well, let us take the issue of the formulation of power, its
institutions and relations among one another. In this connection, the -
National Charter stipulates that this should take place within a genuine,
democratic framework reflecting the popular will. Popular will cannot
be expressed if it remains mere formal slogans. Every citiz~~n, young or
old, regardless of his intellectual background, should participate in the -
- making of vital decisions affecting his future and the future of the
homeland. The citizen should be able to watch and criticize freely with-
. out fear or sensitivity.
Thus, the formulation is heading in several ways simultaneously.
The first way is the Algerian National Liberation Front Party, which is the
revolution's political instrument for liberation and building and under
which all strugglers in various positions are being organized. Conse-
quently, the party is the mind planning social, political and economic -
activities in all fields. It discusses policies and plans within its ~
specialized committees. These policies and plans are then discussed
by the Central Committee and the Politburo. Then they are approved. When
they are approved, they commit everyone beginning from the small employee,
the ministers, the prime minister and ending with the president.
Thus the government becomes an actual executive authority. l:t does not
_ plan policy, but translates the policy approved by the planning mind
which represents the will and aspirations of the masses. Consequently,
_ education policy, for example, does not change when the ministers change,
and the minister cannot apply his own policy. The same applies to indus-
try, agriculture, economy, information, culture, etc. -
Within the framework of this policy, the minister is empowered to act
freely and with innovation to apply this policy to achieve goals
as quickly as possible and with minimum co~t, without this aff ecting the
standard of the required quality.
The governm~nt and the ministers are politicallq responsible to the party
and are respansible for the method of implementation and the extent of its
su~cess or failure before the National Assembly, which represents the
legislative will of the people.
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In this connection, we use as a guide several principles, foremost,
collective leadership. In other words, no essential measure affectin~
- policy can be taken without the effective participation of the Politburo.
There is also the principle of the centralization of planning and the
decentralization of implementation in order to prevent bureaucratic rust
from aff ecting our operative organs. Last but not least, there is the
principle of the freedom of responsible criticism and making off icials
accustomed to accepting criticism with no hard feelings and engaging in
dialog regarding this criticism. _
Al1 this could become mere slogans void of life and impractical in terms -
of implementation. We are aware of this. Therefore, the political leader-
ship should begin with itself and give a living example. The primary
- responsibility in this, of course, is mine as a citizen and is the respon-
sibility of Chedli Bendjedid as president of the republic. As a citizen
and president, I shoulder one joint responsibility.
The truth is that our people have proven their awareness and ability to
- implement slogans. This happened during the discussion of the National _
Charter in which I directed strong criticism at several officials. It
also happened when we faced the tragedy of the death of the late
Boumediene. The discipline of the people and their determination to _
uphold legitimacy and to continue the march were the decisive factor in -
enabling us to overcome the tragedy in confidence and ability and without
turmoil which the enemies of Algeria hoped for and expected. But in vain.
[Question] But, Mr President. This is part of an issue which has
currently become an attracting force for the masses in every part of
the Arab homeland as a necessity of lif e and as a must for [words unin-
_ telligible] and Zionism and economic and social backwardness. What about _
- the other aspects of the issue. For example, what about the one party
and the multiplicity of parties? What about political prisoners and
detainees? What about the issue called the opposition abroad? What _
= about freedom of the press and information?
[Answer] I fully agree with you that democracy is an urgent and vital
matter for every contemporary society, particularly in the Third World
and more particularly in our Arab countries. Therefore, democracy is
ar. issue which we are deeply involved in. It is one of the political _
choices of our revolution and National Charter. It is not only a _
humanitarian right, but is a must if the citizens are to participate
freely, effectively and responsibly and in full conviction in building
their homeland.
Nevertheless, democracy has no immortal farmula fit for every time and
place or can it be copied or imitated. Sometimes, in numerous instances,
we decided to copy the Western liberal, capitalist examples, although
our social structure and spiritual heritage are completely diff erent from
Western society which produced such democracy. At other times, we -
decided that we are socialists and we copied the socialist example as
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it exists in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, without chang- -
ing our social structure or spiritual heritage. Our national approach
and special path to socialism is different than those of Soviet society .
and other socialist societies. _
- Therefore, to begin with, copying a democratic example from abroad and
trying to implant it at home in a different social envir.onment is an un-
healthy thing, and is even undemocratic, because it imposes on the people -
formulas which are not of their own making. This is the reason for the
tragedies which afflicted several experiments. Let us take the example
of what happened in countries which are dear to us such as Lebanon and
Egyp t .
How then can we reach a democracy formulated by our people in our country?
= We do take into consideration that democracy means that the people should
rule themselves by themselves and that power should not be forcibly seized.
What power? I mean the right of the citizens to freely express their -
- interest and ideas and the right of the citizens to share in the making
of fateful decisions. In other words, democracy, like the path to socialism
and like the education of the young generation, is basically a national _
issue.
Thus came the National Charter, to assert that democracy is the democracy
of the choices of the revolution and the people. These cho ices have built -
a unified political structure for the revolution and the people. They
represent all the working and productive forces of society, regardless
of their intellectual background. Within this structure, everyone has -
the right to freely express his views on every issue. He has the right
to approve or differ, support or opp~se. But in the final analysis, he
will adhere to the decision of the majority.
You might say that this is an internal democracy for the party. I tell
you yes. You might say that this democracy is incomplete and insufficient.
I will also tell you yes. Democracy should include everyone in society.
Nevertheless, it does not commit any citizen to become a member of the
party. Furthermore, democracy cannot be a special blessing enjoyed only
by the members of the party and denied to the rest of the people.
Therefore, we should make our information media open widely to every citi-
_ zen. This includes the press, television, radio and the publication houses
in addition to the universities, research canters and the national and ~
popular or~anizations such as the labor union, the women's union, the
youth union and other unions. In this way, every citizen can express his
views. We do not mind the multiplicity of views or trends as long as the _
dialog takes place in freedom and mutual respect of every view and trend,
with no intervention by the government or the authorities. In this way we
can guarantee a free and responsible multiplicity of political views and
_ social stands within the party, which the people chose to be the one poli-
tical revolutionary structure rallying all the forces of the strugglers in
one eff ective working unit.
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~ A multiplicity of parties does not necessarily mean democracy. Perhaps
, it is nnt a condition for the existence of democracy. The multiplicity
- of trends and stands within a unified revolutionary party in a country
facing the challenges of all forms of backwardness and imperialism is
another form of the application of democracy. This is what our revolu-
tion and our Charter chose after a wide-scale national dialog.
[Question] Nevertheless, there are Algerian strugglers--who were members
of the Algerian National Li.beration Front Party--who are cu.rrently demand-
~ ing a multiplicity of parties in Algeria as a precondition for democracy.
[Answer] They have the right to demand whatever they want. The people
are the f inal judge. The pe~ple are the arbitrator, and it is from them
that the dialog begins. These people have no right to deviate from the
National Charter which the people chose as a guide of action within which
the people exercise this multiplicity. By doing so, they are deviating
from the will of the people and the rule of the law. _
They also have the right to return to the National Liberation Front Party
and ask for membership in the party in accordance with the party's bylaws
,and then express their views within the political structure. -
Meanwhile, it is our right to note that these brothers, who are a very =
small minority, did not advocate the multiplicity of parties when they -
were members o'.: the party and were assuming posts in the government. They
were satisfied with the formula of the multifaceted, single revol;::ionary _
party within the framework of the revoluticn's political choices. _
I r.epeat clearly that the doors of the. party are open t~~ all the strugglers.
~ They can carry their ideas, trends an~i criticism to it. As for us, we will
protect their freedom of expression.
- The doors of the party are closed only to those who were involved in hos-
tile operations against the revolution and its basic political and social
choices. Fortunately, they are very few.
[Question] Mr President, but what about the forces,which are called the
opposition abroad?
[Answer] Let me ask y~u this: Is there any real value in an opposition
' which flees from society, going abroad, and has no presence at home?
~ Nevertheless, some of these people might have their own reasons.
~ No one in this country has the right to stop an Algerian citizen from
returning home whenever he wishes to do so. The door is always open
whether to those who belong to the ~o-called opposition forces or others.
_ Every citizen should shoulder his responsibilities courageously after
reassessing the situation in the country as it is, not as it is portrayed
~ in terms of distorted and false images which lead to wrong conclusions.
I again repeat that the arbitrator between us is the letter and the
~ spirit of the National Charter.
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[Question] But what about the political prisoners and detainees in Algeria
at present?
_ [Answer] Political prisoners and detainees in Algeria? As far as I know,
and speaking from my p~sition of responsibility, we do not have one single
political prisoner or detainee in Algeria. I do not think there is any
other Algeria [as published], except our Algeria, where a citizen is not -
made to account fer his political views. If any citizen is made to account
. for anything, it would be on the basis of specif ic charges falling outside
. the framework of legitimacy. Consequently, the law is enforced publicly,
not in secret, to cope with such situations. Generally speaking, the
phenomenon of political detention as known i.n certain Arab and African
countries is alien to Algeria.
[Question] But, Mr President, was not Ahmad Ben Bella a political detainee?
[Answer] When I spoke of political detention, I spoke of it as a pheno-
menon that does not exist in Algeria. Brother Ben Bella`s arrest was a
purely exceptional i_ncident which took place under extremely grave and
exceptional circumstances. There was an intention to release him, even
before the death of late President Boumedienne. This release has been
- actually enacted recently by a unanimous decision of the political command.
Brother Ben Bella is a militant citizen ~aith a patriotic history in the
_ revolution which nobody has the right to wrest from him. Furthermore, he
was the first president of the Algerian republic after independence. The
extremely complicated objective circumstances of 1965 led to a clash with
~ him. Today, these circumstances have disappeared and Ben Bella, who was
treated with all due respect during his house arrest, has been released.
It is Ben Bella's right as a citizen to exercise all his rights and liber-
- ties without restriction within the framework oF the commitment to the
National Charter and the revolution's ancl people's political choices. -
- As a struggler and as the first president of the Algerian republic, he is
also entitled to all the material and moral facilities which guarantee
him a productive, dignified and suitable life. This is also the right of
all the other strugglers who had positive roles in the history of the
revolution, as long as their commitment to the National Charter and choices _
is clear and respected.
On the future and reassessment of the socialist experiment, the president
said: The socialist line, just like the national liberation line, is a
natural and inevitable product of the Algerian revolution. It is not ~
the progeny of individual wills or personal sentiments. It is an action ~
of the masses, a popular stand and a national commitment. It is not a
mere reaction that changes with the change of circumstances or the people
in power.
= It is important to take into account several essential facts. For example,
the people's and leadership's choice of the socialist line stemmed from the _
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revolution whicta aimed at the liberation of Algeria from colonialism,
whi.ch is a form of capitalism on an international scale. Colonialism
moves from the exploitation of its local societies to the exploitation
and colonxzation of Third World nations in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
At this juncture, I would like to explain clearly that our historic and
objective adoption of socialism was due to the national liberation revolu-
tion against colonialism and, hence, against the exploiting capitalist
system. On this point, we differ from other socialist countries of vari- '
ous sizes--beginning with Russia and ending with Cuba--which have preceded
us. Their entry to socialism was a class struggle in societies that did
not suffer from colonialism and the attempted obliteration of the national
.identity of a nation with the aim of forcibly fusing it with a colonialist -
society.
[Question] But after the victory of the revolution, the liberation of
- Algeria and the establishment of an independent society, do not the con-
flicting interests of social forces and groups which are formed consti-
~ tute classes? And hence, is there any escape fz,~m class struggle?
[Answer] Yes, this is true in theory and it can actuaZly have social
repercussions. Nobody can deny or overlook the fact that in today's A1-
geria there are specific social groups which have sometimes adversely
influenced the interesrs of the masses by exploiting these masses. This
creates social pockets that are unhealthy and dangerous to the socialist
march.
This is a vital issue which greatly interests the political leadership in
the country. This interest reflects the continuity of the revolution,
- because this same issue interested the political leadership which was
headed by the late Boumediene. It led to the emergence of a new term in
the people's lexicon: "Revolutionary purity."
We are strongly determined to formulate def inite and accurate yardsticks to
measure revolutionary purity and apply it objectively to everybody, irre-
- spective of their positions or responsibilities. I would also like to
stress that the application of the revolutionary purity yardsticks should
not be taken as a method for personal revenge or the settling of personal -
accounts.
Allow me to elaborate: The average Algerian citizen knows about and sees
with his naked eye certain people who had nothing worth mentioning at the
eruption of the revolution or after independence, suddenly becoming �
billionaires in a few years. From where did these people get their
legendary wealth? Even had they toiled and sweated day and night and
employed supernatural powers and beings, they would not have accumulated
a quarter of their wealth. Therefore, it is our right to investigate,
uncover and proclaim the facts. It is our right to use objective yard-
sticks to establish culpability in a legal manner that respects the
rights of man but does not overlook for a moment the rights of the homeland
and the people.
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At the same time, the political leadership is responsible for safeguarding ~
the socialist march and its future against the formation of social pockets
that have interests and financial and political capabilities that are
hostile or run counter to the socialist option. In this connection, the
party and government are cooperating in compiling accurate files on the
phenomenon of billionaires in order to air these cases before the public
by bringing them up in the National Assembly so that legal and legislative
measures can be taken.
Laxity in repulsing this unhealthy phenomenon might lead the march of the
revolution and its socialist c:~tion astray, as has happened in some Arab
and Third World countries where such social pockets of parasites continued
to grow in the structure of society. These parasites accumulate enormous
, fortunes and use them co influence authority, corrupt morals and revolu-
tionary values and complicate the march of development. They jeopardize
economic and political independence and create detrimental conflicts which
we can do without. Briefly, they propel the country and the people into
a crisis.
For this reason, we have opted for total and firm confrontation. In order
to prepare and pave the way for a healthy atmosphere to exercise this con-
frontation, we have launched a large-scale campaign to purge society of
what we term social diseases, which are alien to our people's revolutionary
values and which aim at planting germs of a lack of respect for humane
action and cooperative relations among the various sectors of the masses
and their institutions. These are diseases of looseness, lack of restraint
and disregard of and tampering with the law, etc. The aim of this campaign,
- which began on 1 September 1979, is not only t~ eradicate these social -
diseases, but also to test the depth of interaction between the masses and
the political leadership through the revolutionary purge.
We thank Go~ that the test was successful beyond all expectations. The
depth of the interaction confirmed the revolutionary nobility of the
people's mind, heart and will, which insures the essential guarantee for
the march. It is in this way that a sound atmosphere and groundwork are
being prepared to purge society of these social pockets that deviate from
the revolution and the people as well as from the democratic and socialist
march of the revolution and the people.
[QuestionJ But, Mr President, I have also heard that there is another,
simultaneous political campaign based on a reassessment of the socialist
experiment. Does not this pose a contradiction with the revolutionary
purge campaign?
[Answer] Yes, a reassessment of the socialist experiment is under way.
We are scrutinizing the positive and negative aspects of this experiment
_ in order to bolster the positive ones and deal with the negative ones so
that the latter will not accumulate to a degree that threatens the march
as a whole. This reassessment, which we consider necessary and inevitable
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between one stage and another, is the other face of the revolutionary ~
_ purge process, linked to it and complementing it. -
This reassessment is tantamount to a diagnosis of the blemishes in the _
experiment and the methods of application of the experiment which
revealed its incompleteness or failure. It is a process of self-
criticism to rectify our mistakes on our own. If we do not 'earn from -
our mistakes and if we do not have the courage to admit these mistakes
and seek to prevent their recurrence, we are not worthy of the respon-
siblity.
There are all types of inevitable mistakes in every socialist experiment .
in the world. Socialist regimes are a new phenomenon in the history of
mankind. The application of the socialist exp.riment differs from one -
country to another in accordance with the variety of circumstances, the
degree of development, the quality of the social and psychological struc-
ture and the culture. Hence, there is no escape from error. The genuine
revolutionary, however, does not conceal these errors but uncovers and
analyzes them in order to learn from them.
We are reviewing the methods of application, such as the department of
- production establishments and its progress; relations between one estab-
lishment and another; plan formulation; the nationalized economic sector's
role in leading and guiding the~ national economy and development and its
relationship with the privata: sector; etc.
Briefly, there is a reassessment but not a retraction. A reassessment of
the methods o:E implementation of the socialist option and not a retreat
~ from it. Thus, the~process of revolutionary purge and the disclosure and
eradication of error run in one stream that flows in one river, the river -
of boosting, promoting and doubling the effectiveness and productivity of
the socialist option in the ser~~ice of the masses.
[Question] But, Mr President, in actual fact, where does reassessment
. end and retraction begin? Should there not be a practical yardstick that
commits and guides the movement?
= [Answer] Precisely. I agree with you completely. We have a yardstick-- _
the National Charter--and we have the power to make this yardstick a
' cutting sword--the people, the National Liberation Front Party and the
patriotic and popular organizations which have shown their maturity,
- solidity and adherence to legitimacy and their revolutionary choices.
You should know that some people are apprehensive that the social, poli.-
tical and national setbacks which occurred in some revolutionary experi-
ments in the Arab world or the Third World as a whole might also take place
in Algeria under the slogan of reassessment. These apprehension:~ are illu-
sory and imaginary. Today's Algeria is the country of the 1.5 million
martyrs who shed their blood and watered the values of revolution, political
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and economic independence, the socialist option and the A.rabism of
destiny. Nobody can under any pretext or argument mislead the people
or derail their march.
Un Algeria's stand on the Arab level, the Arab-Israeli conf3ict and Camp _
David, the presi4ent said: We draw up our policy on the basis of the
basic ol~tion clearly and firmly stipulated in the Charter: Algeria is _
part of the Arab homeland. We apply this option to our utmost, taking
- into consideration what is special to Algeria as a countr~~ in the Arab _
_ Maghreb and what is general and common concerning all the components of
the Arab homeland. We do not distinguish between what is special and
general, but we establish a vital and dynamic relationship between the
two in order to multiply Algeria's special weight and capabilities to
employ them in the service of the common Arab cause.
In our opini_on, this is a sound scientific and realistic course that is
_ inspired by the unity of destiny. Therefore, caring for Algeria's devel-
opment and progress does not mean that we are introverts and that we are _
isolating ourselves regionally. No. This development and progress is a
strong asset for the Arab nation as a whole. The ~auge here is deeds and
not words.
It used to be said, for instance, that Algeria is thousands of miles from ~
- the field of Arab confrontation with the Israeli enemy and that it can
afford to adopt extremist stands on the conflict because that does not
cost it anything. What actually took place when the confrontation occurred
in 1967 or 1973? At this juncture, I do not want to list our actual par-
ticipation. This is alien to our nature and traditions. Furthermore, we
consider it a pan-Arab duty~and we do not expect gratitude or appreciation
from anyone. The Arab individual, nation or state is not to be thanked or
given aupreciation for doing his or its duty.
What I would merely like to say is that the building of our Algerian
materiel and military capabilities, including the blood and sweat of
the Algerian strugglers, enabled us to contribute to the military, poli-
tical and economic confrontatioti against Israel at the right time and on
the frontlines despite all the miles that separate us from the battlefield.
The point is not a geographic one. It is one of a pan-Arab option that
is translated into deeds and a total militant policy, not a partial and
separate policy or bargaining, in dealing with the Israeli enemy and its
allies. Sometimes, differences in viewpoints emerge regarding the means
and methods of confrontation. It is our duty and privilege to analyze these
differences and to try to reach, through discussion, a unified stand which
tak.es into accaunt all considerations, including actual capabilities. These
differences in viewpoint, whenever they occur, have not prevented Algeria
from being effectively present on all the military, economic and inter-
- national fields whenever the need arose.
We believe that total Arab unity is a basic pan-Arab objective and an
_ option dictated by the factors of history, language, soil, spiritual and
cultural structure and common interests. At the same time, we believe that
we cannot bypass the material and i~ ral ba~is of this unity in an emotional
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and unstudied manner. We have a number of ideas and basic stands on this
point; namely, the need to adopt a common and comprehensive development .
plan for all the Arab countries, irrespective of differences in their
political or economic systems. This develogment plan should creatively
interact with individual development plans for each country, in accordance
- with each country's social option and circumstances, in order to att,ain a
balanced and integrated economic growth for the entire homeland. We pos-
sess all the manpower, resources and material potentials required to
attain th is goal.
We are against the exportation of an experiment particular to one Axab
country to another Arab country. Hence, we do not impose our experiment
on others and oppose the imposition of the experiments of others on us.
~ However, this does not prevent the exchange of expertise and lessons which
have bean gained so that we can learn from one another with all modesty.
We will thus formulate an Arab conviction that is made by all the Arabs.
We ~aill be able to establish a common groundwork for the unity of Arab
action in all fields that will inevitably lead to a~;enuine and produc-
tive Arab unity.
Let us go from genaralities to particulars: We in Algeria have considered
and will continue to ~onsider the Palestinian issue and the victory of its
national revolution for ~iberation, as embodied by the PLO--th~e sole legi-
timate representative of the Palestinian people--as the basic pivot for
_ any Arab action. At the same time, it is a concrete yardstick to gage
the seriousness and Arabism of each country, regime or people in the Arab
homeland. We consider the Palestinian issue as much an Algerian issue
as it is a comprehensive Arab issue. Our adoption of this line is founded
on the basis of the responsibility of a partner and the frankness of a
comrade in arms with the Palestinian revolution. We discuss everything
with the Palestinian brothers without any sensitivities. We familiarize -
ourselves with their viewpoints and we tell them ours. We agree most of
the time, and we sometimes differ. However, in the end we always tell _
them: The decision that should always be respected and implemented is
your decision. Despite our viewpoint, we unreservedly and strongly support
the Palestinian decision. -
We support the independence of the PLO in making its decisions, since it
is the primary and essential force concerned in the revolution as a -
responsible leadership body before its people. The PLO's independence
in making decisions--after acquainting itself with all the Arab viewpoints
and the actual capabilities in the area and the world--is what strengthens
the vital and essential relationship between what is special to the
Palestinian people and what is general and couunon to the Arab world.
- Without the triumph of the Palestinian people and their revolution, and
without the recognition of the right to self-determination and establish-
ment of an independent Palestinian state, the danger of Zionism and imper-
ialism will continue to threaten the independence and progress of every -
Arab country equally, irrespective of their geographic location or poli- `
tical or social systems. This danger will also threaten Arab progress, _
deuelopment and unity as a whole.
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Thus, our concept of the Palestinian issue will continue to be thar_
expressed by late President Boumediene, who said on behalf of all of us _
that this issue is like fortified cement which builds strong Arab founda-
_ tions, or like a bomb which blows the Arabs into isolated and impotent
smithereens.
[Question] What abo~.~t the Camp David policy and the Algerian stand
regarding it?
[Answer] Camp David has not and will not achieve peace in the region or -
resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Camp David is an Israeli pact with the ~
Egyptian regime and President al-Sadat under the U.S. umbrella. It not
only sticks a knife in the back of the central Ardb cause, the Palestinian
issue, but, by virtue of its nature and Israel's basic participation, is -
aimed against all the Arab states in the region despite their various trends.
President al-Sadat has departed from the joint Arab strategq and its
minimum requirement as stipulated by the Algiers and Rabat summits. He
has resorted to unilateral cooperation which has been accompanied by un-
limited capitulation to the Israeli enemy.
- President al-Sadat's departure is a departure from the Arab commitment
which, in our view, has been and still is supported by Egypt with its true
Arab people; Egypt has been faithful to this commitment, acting as its -
- guardian and principal sheild. A1-Sadat's departure is a departure from
Arab legitimacy and its joint pan-Arab interests; it is a departure from
the international legitimacy represented in the UN resolutions.
In order to defend Egypt and its people, who are dear to our hearts, Arab
and international legitimacy and the Palestinian people's participation
and its revolution, the Arabs met and adopted measures against the pact
and the Camp David policy at. various levels and degrees that ranged from
steadfastness and confrontation conferences to the Baghdad conference,
which proved the Arab nation's ability to confront and defend the holy _
- issues.
The Baghdad conference was a bright and encouraging beginning for a posi-
tive formulation of a unified Arab stand which mobilizes all Arab poten-
tial on the local and international fields. But this remains a defensive
rather than an offensive reaction. It rej~cts Camp David without offer-
ing an alternative. This is being exploited by President al-Sadat in his
alliance with Begin.
Circumstances are now favorable after the Baghdad conference, during which
the spirit of unity prevailed among the Arab brothers, and now that the
- Camp David pact has reached a deadend. We believe that present circum-
stances urge us to take the Baghdad conference from reaction to action, or
at least to the beginnings of planned action. We must shift from negative
rejection of Camp David to an alternative which should be realistically
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. possible and which should answer international legitimacy and achieve the
Palestinian people's national rights, including their right to self-
- determination and to establish their independent state. This alternative
should also bring Egypt back to the Arab nation and the unified Arab
work. In this regard, I can say that in Algeria we are preparing some
~ ideas about defined propositions and policies to move from the reaction -
phase to the active stage and from rejection to offering an alternative.
We will submit them to our brothers at the next Arab summit which, we
hope, will be convened before the end of this year. -
_ There is no other way for the Arabs it they want to stay free now and
tomorrow, but to defeat Camp David and circumvent it in order to create a _
new status which would impose a just and comprehensive peace in the region--
a region extremely sensitive due to its uniquely strategic nature--based
on the liquidation o� imperialist influence, religious and ethnic fanati-
cism and on the fact that the Arabs, with the Palestinian people and
territories at their heart, are one~unified and independent entity which is
master of its destiny and future.
On Morocco, the Western Sahara and the Polisario, President Bendjedid
said:
Morocco is a fraternal Arab state and a dear neighbor. It is Algeria's -
firm policy to establish the strongest and most binding relations with
Morocco as an Arab state, relations which will proceed from neighborli-
ness to the maximum cooperation and coordination for the common interests -
of both states and the Arab homeland as a whole. While we do not accept
- interference in our internal affairs, we have, at the same time, ahdered
to the policy of noninterference in Morocco's internal affairs, since these
are solely the Moroccan people's concern, just like our affairs are only our
people`s concern.
[Question] But, Mr President, there is the problem of the Western Sahara
and your support for the Polisario organization. How does this affect
relations with Morocco?
[Answer] We do not hide our support for the Arab-African Western Saharans _
who, like all other struggling peoples all over the world, have been demand-
ing the right to determine their f.ate ever since the days of Spanish
colonialism.
This is every people's legitimate right and was the principle governing _
our revolution against French colonia'lism, just as it is the principle -
behind the Palestinian p~ople's revolution against Israeli occupation and
colonialism and behind all liberation movements in Africa and the whole _
world. Thus, we will be illogical and self-contradictory, indeed even
, opportunists, if we do not support the Western Sahara's right to determine
their fate. _
We have announced and still announce and clearly affirm to all the world
and our brothers in Morocco, in particular, that we have no claims of any
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kincl tt~~~ Wc;;l~~rn S~~hara. We alwu hiive unnounced and Ht.i.ll announcc~ our
adherence to all that the Western Saharan people and their Polisario -
_ movement freely decide on, be this independence, unison with Morocco or
Mauritania or anything they see fit.
When we support and recognize the Polisario Front, which is recognized .
- by more than 30 states, we neither impose any opinion on anyone nor inter-
f ere with anyone's affairs or decision_s. Yes, we do wish the fighting
to stop and negotiations to be conducted between Morocco and the Polisario
Front on the basis of the right to determine their fate.
Thus, wnen we say that we are not a party to the dispute between Morocco -
and the Western Saharans' Polisario Front, it is not a mere political
maneuver but a sincere expression of the truth.
Thus, despite our disagreement with Morocco on political views and stands
on the Polisario Front; we persistently affirm our sincere wish that this
disagreement in no way hampers or prevents the establishment of the strong-
est relations of cooperation and neighborliness between our two fraternal
states.
- [Question] Why then have the numerous attempts to mediate between your
two countries failed, which accordingly prevented the convocation of a
summit conference between the two states' officials?
[Answer] The attempts to mediate between our two states, which you
describe as failures, proceeded from the concept that there are con-
~ flicting claims in the Western Sahara between Algeria and Morocco. No, -
we have no conflicts with Morocco over the Western Sahara. Rather, we
differ with Morocco in our perception and evaluation of the Western
Saharans' movement and their right to determine their fate. _
= Such a disagreement needs no mediation to be settled, for it is a differ-
ence on a principle believed in by Algeria as a state which is founded on
a revolution that was in turn based on the right to determine one's fate,
and another principle believed in by Morocco; namely, the right to join
the Western Sahara and ~ts people to Morocco.
Despite these differences, we have absolutely no objections to convening ~
any meeting or summit between the two fraternal states on any level in _
order to bolster and promote fraternal relations between the two states,
on the condition that we are clear on the fact that the Saharan problem
cannot remain a point of disagreement between us without the knowledge
of the Western Saharans and their Polisario Front.
[Question] What is your opinion on repeated reports to the effect that
Algeria's stand on the Western Sahara issue was primarily Boumediene's
_ stand and that now that you have assumed presidential responsibilities,
y ouu will alter this stand in order to ward off any threat of a Moroccan-
Algerian clash, which seems to be looming on the horizon?
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[Answer] I will once again repeat what I said on the image and the truth, _
for it is pure image which portrays the Algerian stand on the Western
Sahara issue and its support of the Western Saharan's right to determine
their fate as the deceased president's stand.
_ No, the truth is that our stand is an objective A1gerlan stand which was
- approved and unanimously agreed upon by the political leadership. I per-
sonally was a member of the revolutionary council and actuslly participated
_ in reaching this decision on the Algerian stand, a decision which I have
assumed as my responsibility from that moment until this very minute.
Our stand is purely a national stand which is based on our revolutionary -
heritage and the principles of our Arab and international policy.
Furthermore, if clashes between Algeria and Morocco do actually occur as
a likely result of colonialist and Zionist plotting, they will not: be con- -
fined to the Arab Maghreb and East. Rather, they will spread to ~Lnclude _
the Mediterranean Basin and even Western Europe, which is what I had pre-
- viously aff irmed to the U.S. and European officials I met in the past.
These are realities, and I hope that everyone--including the United
States, Europe and the al-Sadat-Begin pact--will take these realities
into consideration before paving the way for some people to undertake
a calamitous adventure.
For our part, we affirm that we will not allow anyone to provoke us to
clash with fraternal Morocco whatever the provocations, which range from
- media onslaughts on Algeria to shipping weapons to this side or that .
through al-Sadat in order to insti~ate a clash with Algeria.
[Question] What about Algeria's foreign policy?
[Answer] Algeria's foreign policy continues to be based on its previous -
line. We are part of the Arab homeland and Africa. We belong to the
Third World and to the nonalined movement ;_n their opposition to imperial-
ism, colonialism, Zionism and the giant multinational companies' hegemony. .
We aspire to build a new world based on an international economic order
more equitable than the present one wh3.ch has increased the gap between
the rich industrial countries and the developing countries, which still _
suffer from backwardness. We are for international detente and peaceful
coexistence on condition it becomes a comprehensive and general detente
= which will cover U.S.-Soviet relations and all other international relations
and will recognize the rights of the people and states to liberation,
- independence, national control over their resources and their free choice
of the course for their economic and social development. -
Algeria's strength on the international level stems from the fact that it
is an active and responsible member in the nonalined movement and the Third
World and from its relationship with the Arab homeland. From this premise
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we deal with the Soviet Union, the United States, China, Western Europe
and socialist countries. We differ and agree according to our Algerian
and Arab interests and to our commitments to the nonalined movement but
without obliterating the special nature of each of these international
forces.
Our relations with all world countries are pretty good. Naturally there
_ are some differences with some of them either because of the Camp David
pol.icy, which we reject, as is the case ~~ith the United States, or because
of foreign interference in the affairs of the Sahara, as is the case with
France. In general our relations with France are noticeably improving,
particularly since the trend of neutrality toward the Sahara issue has
_ been increasing in France and since France reexamined measures it had
previously adopted to deal with Algerian citizens residing or working in
France. ~o you have any more questions?
[Question] There is one final question. What is your evaluation of
the late President Boumediene?
[Answer] May God have mercy on his soul. He was a man of the revolution
and a statesman at the same time. He was a comrade struggler, a friend
and a leader and a very modest teacher.
. COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
CSO : 4402
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LIBYA
BR'IEF S
OIL CONTRACTS REVISED--Libya has informed several of its customers that it
plans to reduce the amount of crude petroleum it delivers under current
contracts. This reduction will probably be from 10 to 50 percent, depending
- on the customer. This measure is interpreted as a desire on the part of
~ Libya's President jQadhdhafi] to sell the major part of his country's oil
on the free market where the price 3s higher. jText] jParis VALEURS
ACTUFLLES in French 15 Oct 79 p 80]
CSO: 4800
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- MOROCCO
MOROCCAN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT DESCRIBED
- Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 17 Sep 79 p 2441 '
[Text] Published by the French-Arab Chamber of Commerce, *_he Journal of
French-Arab Trade (REFA) examines the major lines of Morocco's agricultural
development in a special July-August 1979 issue.
Accounting for 26 to 30 percent of th~ gross domestic product (GDP), pro-
viding income for two-thirds of the population earning a living directly
from agriculture, employing more than 5 million workers, agriculture is
considered one of the country's bases of development. In a highly docu-
mented article, Mr Lahlou Abdallah, general director of OCE (Moroccan Export
Office), analyzes the main lines of agricultural development and sectoral
plans with a view to exportation.
First, an established fact: the Moroccan trade balance has declined con-
tinuously for a decade, in the food sector as well as elsewhere. Self-supply
is amply attained for leguminous plants arid particularly fruits and vegetables,
_ fresh and processed. It is barely sufficient for meats and insufficient for
_ grains, sugar, milk and dairy products. How can these deficiencies be reme-
died while assuring the best development of national wealth?
The author says that the results reflect the limitations of the system: the
gap between demand and production is only widening. According to him, priority -
areas of action could be defined to overcome inhibiting structural factors:
Make existing hydroagricultural investments profitable. Potential irrigable
- land is estimated at 1.080 million hectares, nearly half of which is currently
equipped. A number of crops would benefit from additional installations.
Thus the sugar plan provides for 550,000 tons of sugar, which implies 200,000
new irrigated hectares by 1982. Grain cultivation, which produces 40 to 50
million quintals, should provide 70 to 80 million by 1982; more intensive use
~f farm eguipment and fertilizers, improved seeds and modern marketing methods
should help. The oilseeds plan similarly provides for 69,000 tons of olive
oil and 58,000 tons of seed oil.
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Intensify and improve the development of marshy areas, giving priorit.y to
~ the 3 million hectares with heavy rainfall. _
Increase animal production, especially in irrigated areas and those devoteu
to grazing. Thus the dairy plan provides for 850 million liters in 1982,
as opposed to 620 million in 1977; in the same period, meat production should
" reach 260,000 tons or 13 kg per inhabitant per year.. Genetic improvement,
intensification of fodder crops, processing plants and organization of live-
stock breeders are some relevant aspects. _
Establish ~ program for creation and production of improved vegetab le seeds =
and breeding animals.
Upgrade agricultural produce by promoting agribusiness, without neqlecting
to modernize plants already installed.
Finally, create conditions for development of the farmer: in property struc-
tures, in vocational training, i;~ truth and openness in pricing. A national
industry of agricultural products and fertilizers, equipment and spare parts,
livestock feed and seeds would make it possible to prevent being dependent
on imports. And the development of rural areas, including their social and
cultural aspects, would enable the farmer to have a real hand in making
decisions, which would likely result in an econamic surplus that would be
a real incentive for intensifying production.
Four plans of action concerning vegetable cz~ops have recently been approved:
citrus fruits, early fruits and vegetables, viticulture and vegetab le canning.
A program for modernization of citrus �ruit orchards involves 15,000 hectares
000 tons
over the next 7 years. Moroccan exporting potential will reach 850,
by 1985, as opposed to 660,000 tons presently, a dynamic way to start becom-
ing more competitive. The truck-farm plan likewise aims at increasing market
goals to 250,000 tuousbdecline foral0 years) and1400,000ttonslby11985/gg.the
result of a contin
This will require action in many respects. ~
In the viticulture sector, expecting 2.5 million hectoliters to be exported
in 1985, the plan provides for a maintenance stage of current trends (1.250
million hectoliters) through modernization of vineyards and an expansion phase.
Finally, vegetable canning will be promoted in sectors complementing those of _
the European Community, but without neglecting diversification with regard
for other markets in Europe, America, Africa or the Near East.
'I'hese proposals, Mr Abdallah concludes, imply the participation and under-
standing of all economic officials inPconom aas auwh lecome part of the
development strategy of the~Moroccan Y
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979
11915
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MOROCCO
DATA PROVIDED ON MOROCCAN DAMS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 17 Sep 79 p 2442 -
[Text] The economic journal of the French Chamber of Commerce and Industry
of Morocco recently did a report on Moroccan dams. Of the 12 dams built by
~he Protectorate, only two were used to irrigate agricultural areas: El
Kansera and Bin-el-Ouidane; the others were used to produce hydroelectricity.
Independent Morocco wanted to expand irrigation, to combat flooding and to
provide certain cities and areas with industrial or drinking water. The
establishment of the ONI (National Irrigation Office) in 1961 was the first _
_ stage of a government effort which took shape in December 1966: "To irri-
gate 1 million hectares by the year 2000." The policy is now one of large
' dams; a Department of Hydraulics was established under the Ministry of
~ Public Works and Communications. ~
During the first 5-year plan (1968-72), the construction of six dams consumed
16 percent of the national industrial development budget. Four of them were
completed during the second plan (1973-77) and seven others are under con-
struction. Their completion, as well as the start.of Sidi Driss and the
bypass channel, are scheduled during the 1978-80 3-year plan. The rest
(20 percent) of the package allocated to the Department of Hydraulics will
be used to finance comprehensive studies, surveys ~f sites and maintenance
of existing structures.
With the opening of the Oued Makhazine dam, Morocco has 23 major hydraulic
structures, to which about 10 others will soon be added. The following
table lists the dams built or started since 1972: -
[Table on following page]
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Volum~ toul SuAaa Zonr ~Gm~ntY~ ~ d ~ ~5 ~
~ 1 ~ a ~nMw ~ 2~ Nno~a~ ~ 3~M u~ ~ew rbe~A~oa IY
Imillion~ d~ m~l (t 00D lul w inlunnlN 1'IbcuidW wma
En~iink~ : - - - - -
Tou~ulOniTKMm~,.. 310 20 - - 1A72
IOntt 1� 1280 8D - ~],Q~wi 197~ -
S~M Moh~n~md Mn
AIMN+6 500 - CuFp~IN - 1Y74
TM~ 4J 2 T~nyw - 1977
Ourd el 4l~YAUin~ 1200 40 lwkkot ~~.~~~N 19)8
~ 7 ~ En conatrus~dcn :
T~miN'OuVin~ 3 - - ~ZO~~i _
Cued Meh?~w . . . . . . . . 13 5 AI Heuinr - -
AlM~is~ra 2800 Y5 Oumtdi~W, (],~~ai -
JoA lThr
lit4 1~kMpiM
)IswNemianl...... 79 10 - - 1980
- 8f~mnwn 21E A A~N'ir - 19E1
6uG du LaYYw . . . ~ - - - -
( 9~ S~6 Dnu r uiul b -
ioud~ 7 Fl~oia Nhrt~Md - -
amnl
Key:
1. Total reservoir volume 5. Put into operation
(millions of cubic meters) 6. In operation
2. Irrigated areas 7. Under construction
(1,000 hectares) 8. Raised dam -
3. Areas supplied with drinking 9. Sidi Driss and bypass channel
or industrial water 10. Yes
4. Production of electricity �
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979 ~
11915
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. ~ . . . _ . . ' . ~ . . . . . ~ : ~ . . . - ' . . . . . . . . ~ . . _o~t
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FOk U1~FIC1.~L US1s UNLY -
MOROCCO
BRIEFS
AGREEN~NT WITH SWEDEN--Mr Mohand Naceur, Moroccan minister of transportation,
went to Stockholm at the end of August to sign the agreement on international
road transport of goods and passengers between M~rocco and Sweden. The im-
portance of this agreement stems from Morocco's pivotal position between
Europe, the Arab world and Africa. An initial agreement on air transport
was recently signed between the two countries and the agreement concerning
international road transport will further develop relations between the two
kingdoms and boost tourist and trade developments. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
, TROPICAUX ET NIEDI'I'~RRANEENS in French 17 Sep 79 p 2441] 11915
NEW PLACE NAME--The little community of Ellouizia, located on the main Casa-
_ blanca-Rabat road at the level of Fedala, was formerly called Saint-Jean-de-
Fedala. The site o.f a service station and an agricultural school, it has
grQwn large enough to be given a new name, after its resident tribe which
has long been famous there: Beni-Ikhlef. This may indicate that several
other provincial localities, particularly beachES such as Sablettes, Pont-
Blondin and others, will in turn change their names in the r.~ar future.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 17 Sep 79 p 2441]
11915
MOROCCAN-IVORIAN AGREEN~NT--Morocco and the Ivory Coast signed an aviation
agreement in Rabat on 1 September, authorizing the Royal Air-Maroc and Air _
Afrique companies to provide direct flights between Casablanca and Abidjan.
LText~ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 17 Sep 79 p 2441]
11915
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