JPRS ID: 8730 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100039-7
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/8730 ~
- 24 Octob~r 1979
\/1/est E u ro e~ R e o rt
p ~
CFOUO 57/79) -
FBlS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATiON SERVICE ~
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JPR5 L/873G
24 October 1979
WEST EUROPE REPORT ~
~ (FOUO 57/79)
COf~TENTS PAGE
COUNTRY SECTION
INTERNATIONAI, AFFAIRS
- Analysis of OECD World Ec~nomic Projections Study
(Jacques Lesourne Interview; FUTURIBLES, Sep 79) 1
Strauss: FRG, France Should Cooperate in riilitary, '
African Policy
(Franz Josef Strauss Interview; I,~EXPR~;SS, 29 Sep 79) 15 "
FRANCE
Bri ef s `
New Military Unit 21
Cubans Feaxed Goldman 21
Intelligence Services Alert 21
ITALY
. Proposed Measures for Reform of Credit System
(Nerio Nes:i.; CORRIERE DEZLA. SERA, 7 Sep 79) ......J.. 22
_ - a- Czzz - wE - 1.50 Fouo]
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COUNTRY SECTION INTERNATIO.NAL AFFAIRS
' ANALYSIS OF OECD WORLD ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS STUDY
Paris FUTURIRLES in French Sep 79 pp 3-19
[Interview with Jacques Lesourne by Gritti Haumont: "Handling the Unforesee-
able"]
[Text] Question: Following the publication of the final Interfuturs report,
is there a central idea emerging from all of the reflections entertained _
in the context of this project?
Answer: Throughout this entire long exercise, I asked myself whether a ~
basic idea did indeed emerge from this analysis, an idea that would make it
possible to organize the various facts of life and tendencies that were -
emerging in outline. For a long time I did not find any. But then, one
day, it occurred to me that this idea was indeed contained to some extent
in a remark by Daniel Bell and, on the other hand, in my book on "Systemes
du Destin" [Systems of the FutureJ. The statement by Daniel Bell? "Goverr.
ments have become too big for small problems and too small for big problems."
The observation in "Systemes du Destin?" The existence of two control in-
sufficiencies, one of them on the level of the national system which is
not capable of guaranteeing the integration of long-term phenomena and short-
� term aspirations of the citizens and the other one we find on the level of
the international system which suffers from insufficient regulation because
it is not hierarchized. These two control inadequacies furthermore are
- entirely in line with two parts contained in the statement by Daniel Bell,
Now, most of the elements evidenced by the Interfuturs report revolves around `
this main idea. Thus, the problems of worTdwide interdependence, energy,
resources, and change in the rclative positions of the countries are directly
tied t~ the inadequacy of contr.ols on the international level, that is to say,
the fact that goverr~ments have become too sma11 for big problems.
On the other hand, the problems deriving f rom changes in ~alues, modifications
in th.e content of growth, and resistance toward adaptations in developed _
societies are diabolically related to inadequate controls on the national
- level or the fact that governments have become too big for "small" problems.
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Question: A certain number of ~er~~t points and abrupt c~ianges did emerge
as a result of this exercise. What are the major upsets wfiich might mater-
- ialize?
Answer: There is obviously a good deal of arbitrariness when you want to draw
. up a list--"the list"--of major upsets which are going to materialize when
you deal with a field as vast as the international economy! But I will try
to play along with your question.
Some major evolutions are shaping up above all concerning the relative _
- economic positions of. the major regions. There are three striking changes
here. The first one is the rise of the Third World, but a"differetitiated"
Third World, at that. By the middle of the next century--as we have known
- for a long time--it will account for the major portion of tl?e world's popu-
lation. At one extreme it will consist of countries which, because of
their economic growth level, wi~l move close to the present-day developed
countries; at the other extreme, that is to say, essentially in South Asia
and Black Africa, we are going to have countries where the per-capita income
will remain extremely low. By regrouping these countries on the basis of
- per-capita national income, mankind by the end of the century would. thus be
distributed as follows: 34 percent of the .people would be living ~.n developed
countries (with more than $1,000 (.1976 level) of average income); 28 percent
would '~~e in the poor countries (something like $300 or less in income);
and :~8 percel~: would be spread between the two of them. `
- Here is the second major phenomenon in the economic area: the ~rogressive
change the role of the United States who, after having been the unchallenged
regulators of the world economy for the last quarter of this century, will
find its internationaZ position modified. One cannot properly speaking use the
term "decline"; this will instead be a situation of maturity where you will -
have the parallel. existence of important trump cards arxl elements of weakness.
- Hence you will have the following situation: far from withdrawing within
its borders, the United States will, in tlie intPrnational game, play a card
more directly inspired by its interests, in the narrowest sense of the word.
The third phenomenon--which the Japanese described with that Far-Eastern
sense of poetry--is the appearance of the "two wheels" of the world ec~nomy.
One of them will remain the Atlantic wheel which comprises the east coast of
the UniCed States, plus Western Europe, with the participation of certain
major countries of Latin America, such as Brazil. Its importance will
rather fiave a tendency to decline. The othar wheel will be the Pacific which
will go from California to China, Southeast Asia, and Austral.ia, including
Japan.
So much for the geopolitical domain--but there will be other major trans-
formations here. Let us mention here the major technological advantures of
which there are four. By far the most important will be the electronic
' adventure, the closest one, but also the one that will be most widespread
within the social fabric. Then comes the breakthrough of biology whicli is
further distant but which will have considerable consequences in the field
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of inedicine, pharmacy, and agr3:culture. In the third position we have the
evolution af the major sources of primary energy and methods of transforming
_ primary ene.rgy into secondary energy. The fourth one, finally, perhaps
. least essential, will involve the utilization of the sea and space, with
~ the exploration of the oceans being the more promising by the way.
Another ma,jor phenomenun which, by the way, is difficult to anal.yze but wliict~ �
this Interfuturs report did not wish to skip over in silence, concerns the
change in values in the developed countries. This is not a simple evolution
of social demands in response to changes in income, relative price levels
and technology; instead this goes much deeper and involves the transformation
of preference systems themselves. The changes--which would take shape around
~ search for liberation and deep roots--undoubtedly wi.'~1 be adopted by the
majority only gradually; but, while being adopted by a rather larga portion
of the population, they will probably be demanded in more extreme forces by
minority groups. They could be such as to make the developed societies
difficult to govern since governments will be persuaded to go in for even
more complex arbitration between, on the one hand, the traditional demands
cahich will retain a certain amount of strength, and the new demands, expressed
in a heterogeneous mann~r, dependi.ng upon the social group involved.
Let us continue drawing up our list: so you want another field subject to
future upsets? Well, you have the field of the institutions. One might
in effect fear a crisis among the two major economic institutions upon which
the prosperity of the advanced industrial societies was bullt after Warld
War II: The market and the government as protector. It is tfie lialance
between the market and the government as protector which permitted the most
harmonious forms of growth achieved by certain advanced industrial countries.
Now, problems are emerging at this time which touch on the two poles of this
equilibrium.
The protector-state is suffering from regulatory inadequacies. Are not the
health and education systems going through extremely serious crises in most
of the developed countries? As for the market, its difficulties com2 from
the appearance of nomnerchandise services for which it is il.l suited from
~he challenge to the way in which it "figured" the future, from the multi-
plication of "external factors," which prices do not take into account.
The developed countries thus will have to face institutional problems that
will be difficult to resolve.
~ao major tendencies now emerge as a function of this "list" of changes and ~
evolutions: the first is the inevitable slowdown of economic growth. Growth
- will henceforth not only Ue slowed down but it will also be irregula~.
We al.ready have an example of that in the form of ttie repercussions of the
political phenomena in the petroleum producing countries. The second one
concerns the development of international interdependence, thae is to say,
the growth of interrelationships between the various countries. These _
countries wi11 constantly be torn between the temptations fully to participate
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in tiiis game of interrelaticnships (enjoying the advantages and very re- `
luctant to suFfer che consequences in terms of uncertainty) or, conversely,
_ they will wit~idraw from it partly. What they �aould then sa.;rifice in terms
of income le~el they wc~uld perhaps gain in terms of choice of ways of life -
or decline in their vulnerabil.ity.
Through these several facts, which are certainly among thP most essential, -
although they do not constitute an exhaustive list, we find the main idea
of the double control inadequacy from which we started.
Question: It seems that an important economic pole appears hear, that is,
_ Japan and China. How do you viea their influence on the international
scpne?
, Answer: Let us talk of the "paradox" of Japan. This is a paradox because
Japan would lil:e to increase its share of international income whereas it
has neither the ~nergy resources nor the raw materials needed and whereas
_ the development of its agricul~ .re is in any case limited by lack of space.
The case of Jagan therefore i~ particularly interesting since it evidences
one major fact in ttie develo~~.nent of human societies: the thing that counts
is not ~o much the resources but rather the capacity to adjust to a situation
_ and to combine all the assets which one has in the most effective manner
possi.ble.
Japan's strength' It rests on the adaptability of Japanese society, an its
keen sense of community, on the ability of its major economic uuits to make
decisi_ons. in other words, it resides in attitudes and ways of behavior.
The more open the international economic system is, the more will this
s*_re~lgth of Japan be expressed on the economic level. The Interfuturs
scenarios shaw ~hat rataer well. In th.e North-Sout.h rupture scenario (see
belo~o), Japan's ~rowth rate is more under attack than that of the United
States or even that of the EEC. It is also more sensitive than the American
growth rate with z~espect to the development of a form of protectionism between
tlie three major poles of the North even though in ttiis case Japan does derive
~ome compensation from the increased intensity of its links with Southeast -
~'~s ia .
By the end o.f the century, at least on the basis of a certain number of
assumptions, Japan will become a country whose per-capita income will be on the
same order as that of the United States. On the other hand, while Japan's
share of worldwide income will rise from 6 percent to 10 percent (and that
is a rather reasonable assumption), this situation is not such as to permit
that country to take the place of the United States as the regulator of
the world economy.
Yc~u ~~ant an example of these factors which will give Japan real power? Its
pcsitior_ with r~spect to certain major future technologies. This is the
country ~ahich rias made the most coherent effort in the field of electronics.
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APart from the United States, i.t is in Japan that you find the most am-
' bitious compone~it development program. That country is also very well
- placed in the pharmaceutical field which will be one of the pre.ferred points
, of application of biology. In other tQrms, it will be making a considerable
effort to assure its future.
Question: What about the case of China?
Answer: China rais~s at least two questions.
Here is the first one: has China entered an era of political stability, so
that effective economic strategies will be pursued in a regular and per-
severing manner? On that topic, the Sinologists are not always in agreement:
for some of them, after the enormous wave of the revolution (which lasted
longer in China than anywhere else because it ended only with the Cultural
Revolution), after the death of the founders, China should enter a period
_ where priority will be given to the search for growth and management. Others
- think that the balance between the various political groups embodied in the
tendencies represented within the Chinese Communist Party by the various
factions or provinces have not yet been attained. It seems however that the
first assiimption is more in line with historical dynamics.
TI~?e second quPStion is this: assuming that China pursues effective economic
policies, what will be the vigor of the Chinese economy's response? This
question is easier than the preceding one.
Over the past 25 years, as a matter of fact, during period when political
li�e did not prevent the normal development of the econumy, the Chinese
_ economy did exhibit a capacity for positive reactian to a�avorable environ-
ment. It is therefore reasonable to think that this will. be the same in
the future.
But China will have to solve two major problems: it will first of all have
to bring its population expansion under control because, it seems, the
limitation of population growth has not yet been assured. (The real level
of the Chinese population is still largely unknown.)
_ On the other hand, it will have to develop its agriculture: from the food
viewpoint, the balance between requirements and output remains excessively
fragile. The Chinese as a matter of fact believe that they will not be able
� to cover their requirements for agricultural products for industry before
the last decade of the century Uecause tliey would have to give priority to
the crops necessary to feed the population. We must not forget this: China
is above all an enormous agricultural country. Industrial growth thus might
be limited by the obligation of having tp give priority to demography and
= agriculture. The presence of major petxoleum and coal resources will make
it possibZe greatly to increase its energy output whicti of course is a prior
requirement for the expans-~on of industrial production. China will also have
to select an industrial development model between the Soviet-style bureaucratic
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- model and the more decentralized model and it will have ta aim at a
realistic balance between the basic industries and the more closely constuner-
related industries. The current industrial program, it seems, places the
accent both on the steel industry and metal production, on transportation,
on telecommunications, and electronics (to which China quite justifiably
- attaches great importance).
, These facts point to the following finding: it is not entirely impossible that
a portion of China (the eastern provinces) might be really industrialized by
the end of the century. Between now and the end of the century, the Chinese
national income should grow between 6 and 7 percent per year (a reasonable
figure in the opinion of most experts), whereas industrial output wauld go
up by about 10 percent per year. These rates could correspond to a per-
capita income on the order of $1,000 (.1976 level) by the year 2000; that would
therefore put China in the middle group (between developed countries and poor
countries. With a population presumably around 1.2 billion inhabitants,~
it would hold a share of the international income on the order of 6 percent,
that is to say, a little more than two-thirds of Japan's share.
~ ~hina thus would not become a big power starting as of the end of the GOth~
century but it would at that moment have the foundations which wou].d enable
~ it to play a major role in the 21st Century.
One w~rd about the Chinese military problem: China's capac:ity to t~ansform
its territory into a nuclear sanctuary determines its freedom in foreign
policy matters. This objective undoubtedly can hardly be attained before
- 1990 or 2000.
This analysis thereFore excludes two extreme images of China which are often
_ presented as rather likely:
A China which over tae next 10 years.has become a big power in the international
economic game. This image does not take into account the economic time
~ span r.ecessar, for economic ~rowth. Similarly improbable is tlie image of
a Chi.na forever backward, always torn by domestic political difficulties and
incapable of asserting itself. on the international scene.
Question: The Interfutu.rs exercise should have been orienred toward action
and t:he decision-makers. How can the deci~ion-makers use it? What was the
r.eception given to that report by the political authorities in France and
abroad? -
rlnswer: The accomplistrment of a research effort of this tqpe must avoid _
two reefs ~ohich, by the way, explains the methodological analysis that
fol.lows. ~ither it is based on a collection o.f distinct studies on narrow
topics, directly tied to the concerns of the specialists in which c~se it
loses sight of relations betw~en the fields involved, or it concentrates on
the analysis of the interdependence of problems and, in so doing, adopts a
too bro~d view to take up one or the other field with sufficient precision.
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The iieed for reconciling these two approaches in research enabl.es us better
to u~lderstand the use that can be made of this kind of re~~ort. It is quite
evident that the report cannot draft proposals to such a precise point that
it wc~uld suff ice in practice to transcribe the idea in the torm of bi11s to
be passed into law,
On some of the topics taken up, the report cannot go dow;1 to the necessary
details. One must also understand that, given its intergovernmental nature,
it can only sketch broad action outlines--because the transcription of ideas
expressed in terms of decisinn-making cannot be identical for the United
Srates, Japan, Finland, or Spain. From that viewpoint there are necessarily
major differences bet~veen a study on a national scale and an international
report.
6Jhat, then, is the primary interest of such an exercise on an international
scale? Engaging in lengthy reflection on long-~erm developments woul.d in-
volve the administrations of many different countries. Getting one or the
other problem to be discussed on the same te rn~s in Japan, France, or Finland,
in other words.
The OECD is an extraordinary turntable in this respect because i.t guarantees
the dissemi.nation of documents to the competent administrations in the
various member countries.
Question: What are the main ideas emerging from the report as far as action
is concerned?
Answer: There are five major guidelines.
First of all, it is essential for the governments to contribute to the
creation of a positive attitude toward the future in the developed societies.
The citizens of those countries certain.ly are not indifferent to the future
in mediinn-range terms. But entirely too often. there are two extreme attitudes
confronting each other: on the one hand, you have dreams, utopia, the future
of happy tomorrows; on the other hand you have predictions of disaster,
fear of the Last Judgment and terror by the year--whatever.
Governments must thereEore try very hard to develop an understanding among
the citizens as to what is going on or ~ahat might happen during the next
decades; this is so because these evolutions will determine their future
life but also that of their children. j,Then you measure the efforts made
to inform the population about the future, one is bound to be struck by the
disproportion between their volume and the real importance of rhe stakes.
This absence of information is even More striking when ane discovers--through
a relatively recent public opinion survey--that 70 percent of the American
population a few months ago did not 6elieve in thz reality of the energy
crisis.
You might also think of the gaggles of candidates to high office in certain -
countries who, at the moment there is an increase in interdependence, confuse
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the tiames of important countries.! The fact that the interdependence of
- probl.ems keeps growing day after day and that these problems come up all
over the world and on a level that is difficult to reach makes their under-
standing of the average citize~i an increasingly delicate thing. For us
~ French, when cae talk about the Common Market, we know our partners. There
~oas a long historical community between France and Germany, between France
and Great Britain, between France and Ttaly; La Fayette and ttie two world
~vars brought the United Stat:es very much among us, And Russia has always
been a Europ ean partner. But Chine or Korea do not have this same "proximity!"
Besides, the compartmentalization of problems, to which we had become ac-
customed, does not work any longer. The second major lesson is known to a:!1
_ but it is always a good idea to repeat it: the developed countries must
loosen the p etroleum "noose" which they put around their necks. This finding
is not incompatible with the fact that resources should, in the long run,
- permit a substantial increase in energy consumpti~n.
Here is the third guideline: manage the change wittiin the advanced industrial
socieries, ir. other words, adjust to the evolution such as it has chances of
cuming about.
The t.ig di.Ff iculty here wi11 consist in finding a synthesis between three
complementary pol.icies. The first one assigns priority ta tfie adaptation
to ttie indus trial context at all costs, starting with the finding tfiat the
defense of s tructu:es or enterprises without a future is rio longer a possible
way to proceed ~vithin the probable state of worldwide interdependence. Just
thinlc of Ja.pan which cl.oses factories five years before tfiey cease to 6e
prof itab:Le!
The second one essentially seeks to prevent the rise of wtiat I would c:all
"gro~ath cutoffs" by trying to preserve what to my mind is the essential
achievement of ~he past 25 ;~ears, that is, a form of socially balanced
growth.
The big prob lem here no less involves the choice of objectives as well as
ehe choice of instruments. As a matter of fact, any policy that is~ aimed at
not introducing any growth cutoffs is based on a certain number of instruments
(social suppurt payments, subsidies to enterprises settling in certain regions,
- distribution of J.oans). But the instruments conceivable during a period of
str.ong grnwth, when st~,uctural adaptation is easier, cann~t be adequate for
the period ~f time which ~ae are now getting into. We are for example living
in a situation of double uncmployment--unemployment connected with the
economic situation as such and structural unemployment. Now, everybody
knows that, in the first case, the f ight against unemployment presupposes
a wage hike where.as in the second case it is necessary to reduce wages
(decline a.n wages whicYi however does not signify a drop in available income;
the wages reyresent the cost borne by the enterprise whereas the income is
- what the individual gets out of that).
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Here is an essential debate for the I'rance of today. It illustrates this _
problem of the chaice c~f instruments permitting adaptation but avoiding the
creation of g?-owth cutoffs. -
The third policy seeks to kF~ep up ~oith changes in values to the extent that
new values begin to become ma~ority values, But here again the opening is .
very narrow, If we go too fast, we risk running into the resistance of a
small portion of the population who will not yet have adopted those values.
Tf we go too slowly, we will wind up with a social production and national
income makeup which will be less suited to the aspirations of individuals.
Any developed country must define its own synthesis between these policies
� and rhen translate it in pragmatic terms in fields suc}~ as labor market
management, social security, the definition of arbitration between education -
and culture as well as education and individual development.
This brings us to the fourth guideline: the need for the developed countries
to spell out the long-term strategies in their relations with the Third
World. These strategies ~vill have to recognize the existence of common
prcblems while avoiding generalizing them too much because the progressive
differentiation of the Third Wor1d will make it possible to complete solutions
through actions on the bilateral or multilateral level. Here are two
- examples of elements which could be introduced into these long-term strategies:
The developed countries should contribute to the perfection of suitable
technologies, using all of the current scientific gains, but taking into
account economic conteYts in which the relative cost of labor and of capital
will be different; right now, a worldwide industrizlization is developing -
which creates unemployment. It rests as a matter of fact on technologies
which are designed for situations in which capital is abundant and labor is
rare; -
Aid to the developing countries should be reconsidered in terms of its
amount, in terms of its geographic distribution (aiming it at the poor
areas), and in terms of its sector distribution (giving priority to infra-
structure and agriculture since the future of most of those countries is a
function of_ the growth of their food resources).
These strategies should take into account the problems which the various
- groups of Third World countries will have to solve. Thus, the West was wrong
in being the accomplice of a development policy for Iran wfiich entailed _
serious difficulties. But while Khomey~i is only a historical accident,
- the Iranian developmen* model could on"ly lead to growing blockages.
' Why reject the integration, into the world markets, of certain countries
which are in the process of succeeding (such as South Korea o~r Singapore)?
They on?y implemc~nted Guizot's phrase "get rich" which ratiier we11 desr_ribes
~ the past attitude of the developed countries toward the Third World. One
cannot today refuse to integrate into the "bourgoisie" of "have" countries
thosz that have been successful in their takeoff.
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tiere is the f.iftti field ot action: since no country will hencei~urth by it-
self play the role of regulator, it would be a good idea to have new forms
of i~iternational cooperation permit the management of worl~wj.de interdepen-
dence. It is out of the question that this could be handled through inter-
natianal bureaucracies (it would be better to improve the operation of the
~ existing organizations). Each country must make an effort to rethink its
- internal administrative organization as a function of the interface with
~ the outside world and it must take into account the effects of its deci~ions
- on the other countries. Thus it is inconceivable for certain countries,
~vithout advance warning, Lo permit themselves to stop their imports from
other count:ries whereas the latter have sometimes engaged in lengthy
efforts to pen~trate new markets and develop an industrial sector as a
consequence of tliat.
Question: What is the upshot of this project?
Answer: 'I'he upsliot from such a project can be considered on several levels.
On the level of each country, first of all: it i.s essential for the admi.nis-
~ trations and ].eade.rstiip circles to study the report, to assimilate its
conl-.ent, and to r.ethinlc certain issues as a function of national speciFicities. -
'Co t:3ke an example in rrance, the Planning Commissariat in preparing the
- L':io hth Plan,decided to establish three long-range prospects study groups
one of which concentrates on the prospects of France's ;nternational re].ations.
~Jow, i:his group started with the Interfuturs report (Jacques Lesourne is
the chairman of that group) but it goes much further in tfie analysis of -
certain problems part.icularly concerning France, for instance, regarding the
inter.nal problems of rhe EEC. This is one way of using the Interfuturs
repor.t: the methods of ccurse will differ widely according to the country
involved.
t1 second o~a~ to use the report is to insert it into the current work of the
OE:CC, Wit}i its co~lmittees and study groups numbering several hundreds, .
t?~is o~~anization is studying the most diverse problems which the developed
c:ountries wi~ti a free-enterprise system have in common. Numerous questions
raised by the report will therefor.e be taken up again in the working programs ~
oF the v~rious directorates under the OECD secretariat. This will make it
possible to come out with operational conclusions as we go along.
, A ttiird way to use the report is found directly on the level of intergovern-
m~ntal cooperation; for instance, last February, 50 high officials from 20
OECD countries met on the invitation of the k'rench government to discuss
the preli.minary varsion of the Inter.futurs report. They simultaneously
took. up--and I want to empfi asize the importance of this word--the long-term
economic. growth of the developed countries, strategies in dealing with the
Thirrl tidorld, and the evolution of international cooperation.
But permit me one final thought: a~ew yeaxs ago, the researcfi directox of
the P~iilips ,roup remarked: "The laig companies a.re like elephants: you push
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them and you pull them but you never really know in what direction they will
go." That applies to Philips and it applies even more so to tfie international
A economy or to mankind! In other words, regardless of the importance of a _
report of this type, it cannot by itself modify the course of events but it
can contribute to modifying attitudes. _
In "Les Systemes du Destin" I had alr~ady talked of the need for a policy _
of a thousand paths.
In particular, the Interfuturs report can reconcile future prospects and
the decision-makers. The preceding exercises concerned with international
_ future prospects often propos ed d vision of the world that was incompatible
with that of the decision-makers: excessively globalizing or not enough
political or entirely too "utopian" (in the positive sense of the word _
- utopial; the decision-makers were not involved in these exercises, The work
of Interfuturs, in spite of certain inadequacies, proposes a more complex
vision but also a more realistic vision of our possible future. By the
same token, they should contribute to our doing a better job in taking into
account the loag-term aspects oF the policies of the developed countries. ~
- Scenario A. Vigorous Growth
_ Hypotheses
Collegial management of interests and conflicts within the developed countries;
increased commercial liberalism, North-South integration, increasingly in-
tensive participation of the Third World in worldwide economic exchange but
- with differentiation according to developing countries. -
- S~:stained economic growth in developed countries without rapid change in
values.
Convergent evolution of relative productivities in developed countries.
Macroeconomic Image
Within 25 years, taorld output was multiplied by 3.4 and per-capita income
grew 2.3 times. The shares of the major regions in the worldwide gross
domestic output were greatly modified (from 31 down to 19 percent for
North America, from 20 down to 16 percent for the EEC, from 6 up to 10
percent for Japan, from 10 to 30 percent for the Tfi ird World, including Chtna,
while the Eastern European r_ountzies remained steady at about 16 percent).
With a per-capita income on the order of $10,000 (at 1970 level}, North
America and Japan came ahead of the EEC (with $9,000) and Eastern Europe
- which is at a figure of,around $8,00.0; at the other extreme, Black Africa -
and South Asia remain very poor areas with $380 and $210 per-capita,
respectively.
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In terms of regional per-capita income distribution, the present situation
is not fundamentally altered: in 1975, the OECD countries, with 20 percent
of the world's population, produced 66 percent of its income; in 2000, these
figures will be, respectively, i6 percent and 53 percent.
Scenario B. Grad~~al Growth
Hypotheses
Hypotheses identical to those of scenario A concerning the nature of relations
bet.ween the developed countries, tietween the developing countries, as well
as between the two groups. On the other hand, the developed economies will
experience moderate growth which will differ according to three variants.
Variant 1: Slowed expansion. Changes in values will be fast and the growth
slowdown will be the subject of a consensus because it will be accompanied
by a transformation of the content of "social production" (in the broadest
meaning of the term).
~ Variants 2 and 3: Gradual and penetrating growth of Japan.~,In these other
two variants, on the contrary, there will be no essential evolution of
unanimously accepted values and the growth slowdown will spring more from �
structural adaptation difficulties on tlie national and international levels,
rather chan from a conscious desire as in variant 1.
Macroeconomic Image
In 25 years, between 1975 and 20Q0, world output is mtaltiplied by 2.9 and
ttfe per-cagzta output is only doubled.
The share of the OECD out of the worldwide gross domestic output will drop
From 62 percent to 50 percent, The share of the Third World (including ~
China) will come to 32 percent; Eastern Europe will be around 18 percent.
The per-capita income will drop as compared to scenario A: United States
($8,130), Japan ($8,230), EF.C (.$6,110). The various developing regions will
find their incomes reduced.
As for scenario B-3, it is not yet expressed on the 2000 horizon hy major
modifications in the macroeconomic image even though Japan's share grows
_ while the share of Europe shrinks. At the start of the next century, on the
other hand, major gaps wi11 hegin to appear.
Scenario C. North-South Rupture
Hypotheses
Scenario introduced to analyze signif icance of North-South confrontation.
It is characterized by the implementation of "uncoupling" strategieslay a
majority of dev~lop~ng countries.
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Collegial management effort on the part of the countries of the Nort.n
which accentuate the domestic liberalization o.f their trade; slower growth
withc~ut change in value:s within those countries; absence of convergence of
productivity rates due to the fact that the major zones of the OECD have been
differently affected by the North-South split.
Macroeconomic Image
It transmits an unambiguous message: the North and South are seriously
affected by the rupture,
Betw~en 1975 and 2000, the world's output is increased only 2.4 times and
the per-capita income is only $1,500 (1970 level) at the end of the century.
Considerable impact, taken in various ways by the different regions:
The United States: its share of international income will decline only 30
percPnt instead of 40 percent in the heavy-g,-owth scenario but the per-capita
income nevertheless is slightly smaller than in scenario B-2;
EEC: much h.arder hit; its share will shrink by 40 percent, as against 30
_ percent in the strong-growth scenario; the per-capita income will barely
come to $4,500;
Japaii: its share will drop from 6.3 to 5.3 percent and the per-capita income
will grow only 1.9 perc:ent per year or $3,600 (Z970 level), roughly, by the
end of the century.
The share of the Third World will now represent 33 percent out of interna-
tional income but the per-capita income will only come to $640 as against
$890 in scenario A, -
Scenario D. The Rule of Protectionism
Hypotheses
This scenario is characterized b the fra mentation of the ~
Y g group of developed
countries and a rise in protectionism with emergence of spheres of influence
centering around the three poles. represented by the United States, the EEC,
and Japan. These spheres include regional groupings (on a continental scale~
of developing countries; the flow of trade and capital wi11 develop pre-
ferentially witfiin these spberes.
These hypotheses are tied in with the assumt.tion of slower growt~ partly
caused by the destabilization of the flow of trade. The absence of con- -
vergence of productivity rates here results from tfi e differ~nt impact of the
fragmentation process upon the major zones of the OECD.
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Macroeconomic Image
Around the year 2000, the three poles of the OECD should--by restructuring
their economic activities--manage to compensate for the efforts ~f commercial -
constraints imposed upon the North and they should benefit from the liberal-
ization of trade with the South. The image thus is less catastrophic than
in scenario C. International income reaches 2.8 times the 1975 level; per-
capita income has almost doubled.
- North America improves its per~-capita income ($8,450 at 1970 prices).
Japan steps up its cooperation with Sautheast Asia and the South. Compared
to scenario B-2, its incoine goes down (.$7,560).
The EEC is most hard-hit by the protectionism of the Nortti. Its per-capita
income is only 60 percent of that of the United States ($5,680).
COPYRIGHT: Association Internationale Futuribles 1979
5058
C:SO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
STRAUSS: FRG, FRANCE SHOULD COOPERATE IN MILITARY, AFRICAN POLICY ~
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 29 Sep 79 pp 56-60 LD
[Interview with CSU leader Franz Josef Strauss by Branko Lazitch: "Brandt's
~ Ostpolitik Has Been a Fraud"--date and place not specified]
[Text] L'FXPRESS: Despite the fact that you were never a member of the
National Socialist German Warkers Party, your political adversaries in
Europe often represent you as the spokesman for German nationalism. Is
there no risk that your candidacy could arouse some anxiety among a European
oginion so sensitive to the demons of German's past?
Franz Jos.ef Strauss: I call this assertion--stemming from a mixture of ig-
norance, prejudice and hypocrisy--willful slander. It belongs to the arsenal
of psychological war whose architects brand anything conservative as na*_ion-
alist and sometimes even fascist. T~?ue, they mention "national socialism"
= less often because they do not want to recall the fact that both Marxism and
national socialism constitute forms of collectivism. Ever since I learned
to think in political terms I have seen nationalism as the gravedigger of
Europe.
I have not merely proclaimed this on innumerable occasions but I worked in
support of Eruope's unity at a time when the same political adversaries of
mine were still seeking to neutralize the FRG and achieve a confederation
with the part of.Germany that is under communist rule.
My political credo can be defined as follows: _
I am an integral liberal, not just someone with liberal tendencies;
a modern canservative, not a reactionary;
an enlighted patriot (national), not a nationalist; and a man with a social
conscience (social), not a socialist.
This credo is based on Christian teaching in accordance with the broadest
interpretation of the concept.
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I disp~ite Che validity of the belief that only a bad German can be a good
European and r.egard as mistaken the view that the Germans should play the
role of repenting sinners until the end of time. We Germans must overcome, -
without forgetting them, the dark chapters of our history. We have no right
to overluok noble chapters t,ecause a very dark period once occurred. -
Not must we tamper with the truth, as if all crimes in the course of history _
have been committed by Germans only and all othe�r peoples have been angels.
For, after al.l, World War II, which was instigated by Iiitler, started with
a pact betc~een Hitler and Stalin.
There are now ot~er reasons for "a certain anxiety" in Europe apart from my
candidacy for chancellorship--I have in mind, for instance, the strategic
situation in and around Europe, the socialists` blindness in the face o~ in-
creasing dangers and the dramatic symptoms of conflicts now taking shape.
'Chose who now deny the Germans the right to also show their national feelings
and a national awareness oriented toward Europe and purified by history and
to put forward their legitimate national interests are committing a cr:Lme
against Rurope.
L'EXi'RESS: During the European elections struggle against a socialist
Europe was one of your slogans. Are you not being indiscriminate in thus
lump~ing together three kinds of socialism--that of the communist parties in ~
powEr in the East, that of Euro-communists in the West and that of social
de~mocracy as known in WESt Germany and Austria, for example? -
Franz Josef Strauss: It is the leader of French Socialists who stated before
i:he European elections: "Ttiere will be a socialist Europe or no Europe at
all." This is the first major difference between us--we believe that Eur~pe
must be a political fatherland for all the families which come within the
democratic spectrum--conservatives, liberals, left-of-center and right-
uf center democratic forces and, obviously, social Christians who combine
the best elements of tlie concepts of various democratic organizations and
should achieve a synthesis of them all. I reject the claims to everything
advanced by the social:Lsts, who want to confine Europe in a strait~acket of ~
a reactiona~ry ideology like Ma.rxism.
I believe that the classification of the left mentioned by you in your ques- `
tion i.s erroneous. True, there is a difference between communist parties in ~
the East and in the West, namely, the fact that the former are in power and
t~e latter are not. But the common bond of faith in Marxism-Leninism and
subordination to the Soviet Union is stronger. This also applies to the so-
- called Eurocommunist parties of Spain, France and Italy, which have freed
themselves from neither. However, the concept of Eurocommunism is more
fiction than deliberate fraud unless it is both at one and the same time.
The democratic concept that, irrespective of the way in which it has
achieved power, a party can be deprived of it through democratic elections
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appears nowhere among Eurocommunists. Social~st parties are either oriented
toward Marxism, especially in countries where social democratic parties also
exist, like Italy and France, or they unite both Marxist and liberal forces
- under one label as they have done in the FRG and Austria.
- It is, in fact, within the SPD that this tension is most obvious. Its
two principal trends are represented by social democrats, who want to extend
the welfare state as far as possible without transforming society, and
Marxists who seek to transform society fundamentally, primarily through col-
lectivization of ineans of production. A revolutionary streak can also be
observed among the latter. They dream about a democratic way to socialism.
Hence their displeasure with Chile, not only because of Pinochet but also
_ because Allende's Marxist experiment--a democratic way to socialism--failed
in that country and threatened tc; lead, through chaos, to communist dictator-
ship. They cannot understand thatconsistent socialism is bound to lead to
Marxism and that consistent Marxism cannot be reconciled with democratic
freedom.
All the programs of the German Social Democrats display this tragic schizo-
phrenia--the desire to reconcile Marxism with democracy. This applies to
the 1891 Erfurt program, with 1925 Heidelberg program and even the 1959
Bad-Godesberg program which used a skillful covering-up tectinique and should
therefore be mainly read between the lines. What is at stake in the spiri-
tual sphere in this century is the path between freedom an.d collectivism,
between the individual and the masses and between man and organization.
Ma.rxism, communism, fascism and national soc3alism are all monstrous products
of the same antispiritual mold. This is why it is quite logical that certain
ma.jor protagonists and champions of fascism both in Italy and in Germany -
were products of socialism. This is what I mean when my friends and I
struggle under the banner of "freedom or socialism."
L'EXPRESS: You have always been one of the most persistent critics= of the
Ostpolitik initiated by Willy Brandt and of detente. What changes do you
propose in this policy? -
Franz Josef Strauss: Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik was based on an error of
interpretation of the Moscow partner's attitude, self-delusion and fraud with
respect to the public. This is why it has led to agreements which violate the
famous principle of Italian diplomacy "patti chiari amici cari" (clear agree-
ments make good friends). For many years, I have held the view that it is
necessary to conclude agreements with our Eastern neighbors. However, such
agreements cannot be negotiated in the manner of Egon Bahr, as if it was a
question of a television movie about bogus diplomats, whose length is deter-
mined in advance, and with a feeling of naive respect or even admiration
for the opposite side. If you recall all the problems which have arisen
between Germany and Russia (World War I, Rappalo, the interwar period, the
Hitler-Stalin Pact, World War II, partition of Germany and so forth), you
will realize that no second-rank regotiator [sous-negociateur] can find clear-
cut solutions like a magician and conclude clear agreements.
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The correctness of my judfiment has been confirmed by the memoirs of Helmut
Allardt, who was our ambassador to Moscow at that time. This experienced
diplomat sub~ects to crushing criticisms the way Egon Bahr conducted the
negotiations and the results he achieved.
I also feel that my opinion is vindicated by the ~udgment delivered by the
Karlsruhe Federal Court on ~1 July 1473 in which it clarified an interpreta-
tion of the agreements with the East which was uneq~ivocally rejected by
Moscow. Now the Federal Government led by Willy Brandt stated that it
agreed both with the court's verdict on the subject and with Moscow's inter-
pretation. This is where the main point of my criticisns lies.
Anyone in favor of peace must be in favor of detente. But what is detente?
My view on this point has always been similar to the view now held 'oy Henry
Kiss:Lnger. This is why what follows is valid with respect to a real policy
of detente; �
First, Moscow cannot dE:termine on its own what detente is and what it is not.
Second, the policy of cletente must neither be based on nor arouse illusions.
Th~s means that it must neither weaken the will for defense nor nrepare the
grounc: for inter-European or inter-Atlantic dissentions.
_ And, third, detente is indivisible. There will be no real and lasting
detente as long as the Soviet Union prepares and implements political changes
in other countries, mainly in the third world, with a view to creating new
situations of dependence. Despite all the efforts to insure detente, and
all the conferences on security and cooperation in Europe, our continent
rema.ins exposed to two dangers:
First, direct military pressurP on its eastern border and outside Europe,
and ~ �
Second, encirclement: boch of NATO on its two flanks and, outside Europe,
in the third world, especially in the Middle East and Africa.
- Unfortunately, the Americans have ceased to be consistent ad~ersar�Ies of
this dual strategy, but it must also be said that Europeans have failed to
support them. You can neither refuse to recognize the merits of this large-
scaZe and long-term Soviet strategy nor to ignore it stupidly by shutting
your eyes to it. I do not believe that the Soviets are planning a major
war, but the Soviet Union is prepared to consider any military option. How-
ever, it has been achie:ving its objectives with less risk to itself because
of the West's politica7. paralysis. The danger lies in the fact that the
Soviet Union underestimates the West--this could lead to a conflagration
~nce the West has to admit, for instance, that a new division of the world
has takeii place against it. This is why I am in favor of a policy of de- ~
tente devoid of selr-delusion and ideology which could insure peace for
all in the long term.
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L'EXPRESS: Is there a correlation between the two following facts: Your
_ meeCing with Leonid Brezhnev in May 1979 and the stopping of Soviet press
attacks sgainst you in which you were called "revanchtst" and an "advocate
_ of cold war"?
Franz Josef Strauss: I bel~.eve that Mr Brezhnev is a remarkable statesman
who embodies, within the limits imposed on him by Soviet policy, the ob~ec-
tives of his empire's political expansion skillfully and consistently but
who certainly does not want any major war. Like myself, he firmly believes
that war is no longer at the origin of all things but an end of everything
and that there are always more problems which cannot be resolved aftPr a
war than before. Let us add that he realizes the importance of good Russian-
German relations for the two peoples. During our talk he heartily agreed
with me when I stated that everything went very well for the two peoples--
the Russians and the Germans--when they lived peacefully side by side and
very badly for both when they were at war with each other. As a partner I
might be less convenient but more reliable than Brandt or Schmidt. There is
perhaps a link between this and the fact that these senseless and slander-
ous attacks against me have quieted down.
L'EXPRE~S: In your opinion, are Franc~-German relations sa~~!sfactory or do
you intend to put forward new ideas concerning this subject during the elec-
tion campaign?
Franz Josef Strauss: rranco-German relations should not be the subject of
statements during the election campaign; they should be a natural result of
a joint historical destiny, awareness of mutual dependence, belief in common
' tasks and indivisible r.esponsibility for Europe's future. However, the French
and Germans should also achieve friendly cooperation in other parts of the
world, for instance, in the spheres of security and development of the Afri-
can continent. Franco-German relations are certainly good but it is neces-
sary to develop them further in certain spheres, including that of energy and
raw material suppies for our economies and also that of military cooperation
--from joint arms production--this is already taking place in some limited
sectors--to a joint d~fense prugram.
L'EXPRESS: What are your views on the present relations between Europe and
the United States?
Franz Josef Strauss: Relations between the United States and Europe are
neither as bad as the communists would like them to be nor as good as they
should and could be. This is why the "creepi~g"estrangement which has been
taking place between the United States and Europe since Vietnam and Water-
gate should finally be stopped since for Europe the question of its relations
with the United States is a question of a free and secure common future. It
is only within a strong and confident alJ.iance with the United States that
Europe has a historical opportunity for preserving its right to self-deter-
mination and, at the same time, can insure for itself a right to codetermina-
i:ion in the sphere of international politics. Europe has not yet responded
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to a challE~ngt~ which is consistent with ~te size, its population, its eco-
nomic power, ~tts capacity for scientific and technical achievemc:nts ancl,
especially, its historical and intellectual heritage. Despite increasing
international pol3tical., mil3tary and economic threats, Europe has not yet
managed to adopr an unanimous and resolute attitude toward some vital prob-
lems rel.ating to foreign policy and economic and energy defense. Nor has
it been able to speak with one voice on the international scene. It has ~
been unable to do this not because of any lack of any clear-cut views on the
_ political requirements of its security and on international relations but
because of inter_nal political weakness and partisan political tactics.
This is why Europe has been unable to firmly take in hand its own destiny
and assume in international politics responsibilities which the Americans
would be willing to leave to it today rather than tomorrow. As Jean-Jacques
Servan-Schreiber said9 Europe has an appointment with history, It is up to
us to insu.re that we keep it. If we do, there may be a better chance of
- insuring that once it is freed from an excessive burden and overcomes its in-
~ ability to act, the United States will resume the role to which it is en-
titled and that, furthermore, France and Garmany will cooperate more closely
- to insure greater independence for Europe.
L'EY.PRESS: Should the West play "the Chinese card" and if so how?
Franz Josef Strauss: The PRC is a big power which is of fundamental import-
ance fo:r the balance and correlation of forces both in East Asia and on a
world scale because of its size, its population and its scientific and tech-
nical potential. Its reintergration in active international politics through
- an opeiz-door policy toward Europe, a friendship treaty with Japan and the
establishment of i�11 diplomatic relations with the United States has not
only been an indication that the bipolar world of Yalta has come to an end
rut has slso been an example of global interdependence and universal inter- ~
penetration of all political problems.
Any inferer.ce from ail this that the West should conclude a military alliance
~�~ith China would run courter to geographical and military facts and political
possibilities. But good relations with China based on economic, technical
anci scientific cooperation in accordance with prevailing circumstances are
both a requirement of realpolitik and a natural consequence of the European -
ostpolitik.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 S, A. Groupe Express
CSO: 3100
~
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
BRIEFS
NEW MILITARY UNIT--The 31st demibrigade, the new French intervention unit
for use in overseas operation theaters, will be set up in 6 months. It will
include the 4th marine infantry regiment, to be garrisoned in Perpignan and
Rivesaltes; and the 21st marine infantry regiment, equipped with the AM}C-10
light armored vehicle, Which is to depart the Sissonne compound and be
garrisoned in Frejus. With a strength of 2,500 men, this unit will be
especially adapted to average-size operations in Africa and on Mediterranean
shores. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 1 Oct 79 p 22]
- CUBANS FEARED GOLDMAN--Pierre Gc+ldman, author of "Souvenirs obscurs" [Dark
Souvenirs], was perhaps killed by secret agents from Havana. Goldman,
formerly very closz to the Antillean and Venezuelan revolutionaries, and
watched closely by the French counterespionage services for that reason,
had reportedly increased his criticism of the Castro regime lately. The
Cubans decided to get rid of this man who was liahle to reveal certain of
their subversive methods used in the Antilles. [Text] [Paris VALEURS
ACTUELLES in French 1 Oct 79 p 22]
INTELI~IGENCE SERVICES ALERT--The French intelligence services were able to
inform the government very quickly concerning the delivery to Algeria by
the USSR of six MiG-25 reconnaissance aircraft. These very advanced aircraft,
whether piloted by Sovi~t pilots or not, can change the strategi~ balance
in the Western Mediterranean. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French
24 Sep 79 p 19]
CSO: 3100
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PROPOSED MEASURES FOR REFORM OF CREDIT SYSTEM
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 7 Sep 79 p 13
[Article by Nerio Nesi, the president of the National Labor Bank] .
[Text] On the problem of the reform of the banking law,
- which is currently unde.r discussion by the finance minister,
we are publishing an article by Nerio Nesi, the president
of the National Labor Bank, who proposes a new str.ategy
for the credit system in Italy. -
In It~ly, during the last 20 years, public opinion, economists and the mone-
tary authorities themselves, have paid little attention to the strategic and
structural aspects of financial intervention. The credit system has heen
seen and analyzed more as an instrument for the transmission to rl~e economy
of ttie impulses of the monetary policy than as a component of the economy
having its own particular function. There;~has, therefore, been a lack of in-
depth consideration and progressive updating on the rol.e of the system as
_ such.
The situation presents a quite different aspect in other countries: in the
United States as early as 1961 the "Commission on Money and Credit" began
to deal with the problem and in 1970 the "Hunt Commission" was given the task
of reexamining the basic structu.res of the system; but even in Eurooe and in
particular in England, in France and in Germany, import~ant structural changes
have occurred in recent years. In France, the results of the "Majoux Com-
mission," which proposes a courageous territorial decentralizatian of finan-
_ cial activity, have just recently been released.
Last May, the German banking association published the text of the Gessler
Cominission's conclusions under the very significant title, "Basi~ Problems ~
of the Credit Economy."
J In Ita1y, except for the research conducted by the Luigi Einaudi Commission,
practically nothing has been done in this area and debate on this subject,
_ which has been so prominent_ in recent years, concerns much more casual and -
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:~omrLi.mrti ticandalous aspects ot hanking and financial activity rathcr than =
rl~E~ atialysis of its main structures and its strategic prospects.
n?,~ yet even recent painful events cannot fail to call our attrntion thr~
Cact rl~at the Italian banking system is going through a profound identity
crisis which does not concern this or that man, thi.s or that insritution,
hut the system in its entirety. It will be useful, therefore, to hegin ro
- set forth--beyond the occasional discussions--some firm points; all the more
since the eigtith legislature of the Republic, which opened a few monttis ago,
will not be able to avoid dealing in an organic way with the proposals whicl~
the government will certainly submit to the parliament.
I will try here to point some of the goals which should be aimed at, on tl~e
- basis also of the disucssions which, very oppportunely,are heing thoroughly .
examined within the banking sy'stem itself.
A) To increase technical and operational efficiency, that is the capacity
to produce the services oF intervention, using techniques which minimize
unit c:osts;
_ B) To improve the quality of the product, that is of the totality of hanking
and parabanking services; -
C) To reconcile investment efficiency with that of the transmission of tl~e
monctary policy: that is to say to seek the type of structure in which tl~e
~ monetary policy (and above all reiations with foreign countries) and the ~
- domestic credit policy can be better reeonciled.
1)) To reinvent the development of the transmission function of the long-term ~
economic poiicy: that is to say to reexamine the system of credit incentives
and of the distribution of decisions bet~aeen the �.oment of economic policy -
entrust~d to the political and administrative organs aad the moment of credit
- econoniy within the competence of the credit institutions.
If these, generally, are the administrative goals at which to aim, their
re~lizatian suggests the affirmation of some basic principles; here they are,
in thei.r barest outlines: ~
A) the exercise of credit constitutes a functi~n of public interest, by what-
ever public or private subject it is carried out: it is necessary, therefore,
1 to define legislatively the unit of the legal state of all the banking enter-
' Prises to alloca all the institutions the same operative possibilities in Italy
and abroad.
fil The banking system must be competitive, efficient and profitable; the com-
petitiveness must bP based not on the s~arch for continually greater size, -
hut on a technir.,al and.operativs challenge capable of extending to the banking
sys~em~ of other countries. To do this, we must reexamine the conditions
of dehierarchization and despecialization which were characteristic of these -
yEars, addressing fixed categories of banks to fixed functions.
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Wr. must r~store to the selection of credit and to r.he apprai.sal of thP
hanker the role which has heen taken away by welParism and by diG~~rSion of
rr;;pontii.hiliry; it- i~ iinp~,~xtivc to d~Eeitd th~ re5~~