JPRS ID: 8699 JAPAN REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100100008-1
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• Document Page Count: 59
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/8699
4 October 1979
~ Ja an Re ort ~
p p
(FOUO 29/79)
~ ~BIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION ~ERVICE ~
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JPRS L/8699
4 October 1979
JAPAN REPORT
(FOUO 29/79)
CONTENTS PAGE
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL :
Ohira's Popularity Falls; ~ublic Favors LDP
(MAINICHT DAILY NEWS, 10 Sep 79) 1
'ASAHI' Comments on Ohi,ra's Policy Speech
(Editorial; ASAHZ EVENING NEWS, 5 Sep 79) 4
LDP Victory Depeniis.on How Di.senchan~ed React
(ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 13 Sep 79) 7
LDP Factional Activities Geared To Fall General Election
(SANKEI, 19, 20 Aug 79) 9
Main-System Factions' Activities
Non-Main-Stream Factional Strife
'JPS' Protests JSP's Use of Trade Union Support
(JPS, 10 Sep 79) 16
'AKAHATA' Hits Komei-DSP Cooperation
(JPS, 13 Sep 79) ..................e..................... 18
MILITARY
Japan's Weapons Research and Development Analyzed
(ASAHI JANARU, 3 Aug 79) 19
Development Contrary to Constitution, by Shoji Takase
Research, Development Budget Low, Tetsuya Senga
Interview
~i.
- a - [III - ASIA - 111 FOUO]
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CONTENTS (ContinuF:d) Page ~
ECONOMIC ' ~
'ASAHI' Urges Reduction in Budget Size for Fiscal 1980
(Editorial; ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 15 Sep 79)........... 43
Government Approves State-Run Firm To Stockpile Oil
(MAINICHI DA7LY NEWS, 14 Sep 79) 45
- Oil Prices To Increase Supply Freed
(THE DAILY YOMIURI, 22 Aug 79) 46
Offshore Oil So~;rces Tapped To Meet Needs
(MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 8 Sep 79) 47
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
MITi To Start Large Scale Manganese Nodule R&D Project
(NIICKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN, 2 Aug 79) 49
Briefs
SRC-II Joint Venture 52
Auto Patent Strategy 52
Mitsubishi Diesel Car ~53
Hydrogen Automobile 53
New Fuel Cell 53
Zirconia Tool 53
New Aluminum Composite 54
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Y01.17'ICAI. ANll SOCTULOCiCAL
' OHIRA'S POPULARITY FALLS; PUBLIC FAVORS LDP
Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 10 Sep 79 pp 1, 12 OW
[TextJ Thirty-one percent of the people do not supporc Prime Minister
Masayoshi Ohira's cabinet, while 26 percent support it and a high 40 per-
cent remain indifferent to it, the MAINICHI newspapers nationwide public
opinion poll disclosed.
~.l.though the MAINICHI poll confirmed the declining popularity of the Ohira
cabinet, it showed the accelerating popularity of the ruling Liberal-
Democratic Party (LDP) with 44 percent giving solid support to the party,
up 6 percent from the previous MAINICHI poll in March and equaling the peak _
popularity of Eisaku Sato's cabinet which continued for a record number of
years. _
The Ohira cabinet won public support in the phase of diplomacy as seen in
the Tokyo summit meeting while discontent was expressed for its stand on
inflation, economic policy and Lockheed Aircraft sales scandal.
Among the opposition forces, the popularity of the Japan Socialist Party
(JSP) and the Komeito Party increased by 15 percent and 6 percent, respec-
~ tively, from the previous Plarch pol1, while the Democratic Socialist Party
(DSP) and the 3apan Communist Party (JCP) showed a slight 3 percent rise
' eacll. The popularity of the new Liberal Club (NLC) slipped from its peak
10 percent support to a mere 2 percent due to thP party's internal schism.
The latest poll clearly showed a very rapid and widespread rival of con-
servatism, especially among nonpolitical young people in stark contrast to
the waning popularity of the Ohira cabinet. At the time of the poll
(1-3 September), the conservative forces enjoyed a clear political supr~emacy.
Popularity at Variance
The discrepancy in popularity between the Ohira cabinet and the LDP, and the
tax increase issue, which will be one of the focal points of the general
election, may well establish the political framework for the 1980s.
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When compared with the previous March poll, the Ohira cabinet became an
unpopul.ar cabinet as nonsupport outstripped support by more than 5 per- ~
cent. Support declined from 37 percent to 26 percent while nonsupport
increased from 24 percent to 31 percent.
Political indifference declined by 5 percent from the all-time high of
45 percent in the previous poll. But the percentage still remained high.
' The unpopularity rate of the Ohira cabinet closely matches the 35 percent
nf the Takeo Fukuda cabi~net which remained unpopular throughout its term of
office. That cabinet obtained 27 percen~ support and 35 percent indif-
ference in the poll of September 1977.
In*raparty Conflict
By party support, LDP supporters who also back the Ohira cabinet fell Uelow
rhe 50 percent mark to 47 percent. LDP supporters who do not support the
c:~binet increased frum 11 percent to 16 percent, exposing deep-rooted intra-
~~;irty cociflicts ancl the fragility of the present cabinet.
Among the supporters of the opposition parties, ne~zr-ly 30 percent of the
DSP and NLC used to support the cabinet but the figure slipped by about 10
percent each in this poll, while nonsupporters of the cabinet increased
between 9-20 percent, with a 20 percent increase among NLC supporters.
This indicates opposition to Ohira's intention to increase taxes and an
approaching showdown between the government party and opposition parties.
By age groups, the cabinet supporting ratio increased in proportion to
age--from 14 percent of those in their 20s to 39 percent of those in their
60s. The cabinet nonsupporting ratio swelled by 9 percent both among those
in their 30s and 50s.
Respot~dents were asked to evaluate the merits and demerits of Prime Minister
Oh.ira on 11 counts. Twenty-seven percent of those samgled listed as "merits"
tlie pr.ime minister's "personality" and "diplomatic posture," followed by 14
~~~~rcenr for his "modernization of political parties," and 10 percent for tiis
"power of execution." Nine percent listed "simplification of administrative
and f.iscal policies" and "measures to cope with resources and energy"
r.espectively as his merits. Only two per~er!t referred to "investigation
into the aircraft scandals."
r1s demerits, 44 percent pointed out his "policy for prices," followed hy
31 percent for "business policy," 27 percent for "investigation into the
~ aircraft scandals," and S percent respectively for "prime minister's
diplomatic stance" and "prime minister's personality." ~
The prime minister's "diplomatic posture" at the time of khe Tokyo summit
was rated higt~, as evidenced by the fact that some 20 to 30 percent of those
supporting the opposition parties listed it as his "merit."
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- Some 30 percent of the respondents seemed to like the prime minister's _
personal.ity, regardless of their sex, age and parties supported.
OL all the respondents, 40 percent failed to pinpoint the merits of the
prime minister while 82 percent listed one or more of his demerits. The
= wide gap indicates the increasing trend of the people not supporting the
present cabinet and ref?ects the criti~al ~::mosphere prevailing among the
people toward Ohira politics.
Ttie trend of increased support for the LDP is seen at all levels. It is
conspicuous that more young people expressed their support for the LDP.
Among men in their 20s, the ratio of support increased from 18 percent to
. 35 percent.
By profession, the support ratios of salaried workers, housewives and
' students increased by 9 percent, 8 percent and 5 percent, respectively.
The support ratio of the Socialist Party had remained at a low 12-14 per-
cent in the past year. But the ratio has shown a sign of increase lately.
'!'he trend indicated that JSP is also supported by men and w~~men in all walks
of life.
'rtie support ratio of the Komeito Party increased by 2 percent wtiile those of
the Democratic Socialist Party and the Japan Communist Party remained ~
unchanged.
Those who do not ordinarily support any party were asked which party they
would support if they were to vote, with their support included, the LDP
is suppozted by 51 percent, JSP (19 percent), the Komeito Party (6 percent),
DSP and JCP (5 percent respectively), NLC (3 percent) and the United Demo-
cratic Socialist Party (2 percent).
COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Daily News, 1979
CSO: 4120
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL �
\
' ASAHI' COIrIl~1ENTS ON OHIRA' S POLICY SPEECH
Tokyc~ ASAHI~EVENING NEWS in English 5 Sep 79 p 2 OW
[ASAHI SNIMBUN 4 September editorial: "Ohira's Policy Speech"]
[Text] Prime Minister Ohira has delivered a policy speech in the extra-
ordinary Diet. It is customary for the head of a government to announce
at the outset of a Diet session his policies for running the government,
but the latest speech was different from an ordinary premier's address. .
Uhira's policy speech was tantamount to a declaratiun for disbandment of
the Diet because the dissolution of the House of Representatives w~thin
this week is seen certain. For this reason, we listened carefully, but
Ohira failed to even mention dissolving the lower house.
ror the past few months, Ohira and his aides continuously devoted themselves
to make the planned disbandment an accomplished fact. Even at, the stage when
the sciledule dissolution was only a few days away, the prime minister failed
to speak straight�orwardly to the people about this important decision.
'I'liis is very unnatural. This may pass with political professionals in the
i)iet but is incomprehensible to the people. We would like to point.out -
first of all that such an ambiguity has made the premier's speech sound as ~
ii it was made under false pretenses and in turn has undermined the people's
trust in their government. .
In his speech, Prime Minister Ohira discussed three problems--the energy
issue, the reconstruction of state finances and the establishment of
political ethics--as urgent matters. ~
}.e particularly stressed th~ need to solve the energy problem and improve
:~tate finance::~. With respect to the energy issue, he emphasized short-term
~easures aimed at curtailing oil consumption by five percent and mid- and
long-term measures designed to lower the rate of the nation's dependence on
petroleum from 75 percent at present to 50 percent 10 years hence. However,
while talking about the development of energy sources to take the place of
petroleum, he failed to outline where the money for such development projects
would come from. With the Ministry of International Trade and Industry already
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studying the need for such measures as creating a new tax on Petroleum,
the obtainment of tunds for tlie development of energy sources i.s the crux
_ oC ttie problem.
'I'he ~;ame can be said oE steps to rebuild the state finances in that specit'ic
~~olic:y decisions were blurred. We understand why the premier w~znts to p~it
bovernment finances back in the black. Nonetheless, there are problems
invol.~~ed in attaining that goa1. As concrete measures, the prime minister
listed the use of taxes resulting from natural increases in reducing the
volume of national bonds, a fairer distribution of the tax burden and higher
taxes. As for adminis~rative reforms to correct the unfair taxation system
and to reduce sr_ate expenditures--something the people want to see happen--
he merely said ~hat he would work hard toward that end. We would like to
know wliether he really has the deter~r~ination to carry out what the govern-
ment should do before raising taxes, even if it means defying the opposition
- oE government offices and the resistance of those witfi vested interests.
Concerningthe increasing of taxes, the premier said that he would try his
best to cut doc�m government expendit~-res, but he added that it would be
' inevitable for him to ask the people co bear a new burden with their under-
standing in order to cope with the shortage of funds. Hocaever, if the
E,rime minister really wants to seek the understanding of the people, he
should show an indomitable resolve concerning the reduction of expenditures
and seek the confidence of the people by frankly telling them what their new
bur.den will actually be--whether it will be the introduction of a general
excise tax or an increase in the income tax. He should have given a clear-
cut explanation on this matter because the prospect of higher taxes after
lie wins a majority in the general el~ction is obti�ious. He may point out
that he has been entrusted with a carte blance concerning the issue since
he touched on the matter in his policy speech in the extraordinary Diet.
We believe that the establishment of political ethics is the biggest
cktallenge facing politicians in this country amid the succession of scandals
involving the introduction of aircraft. However, in his speech, ttie premier
merely touched on this question in a rather casual manner after talking
about the energy problem and the rebuilding of state finances. What he
actually said was that he would ask the Diet to study the proposals to be
. made by the council of ineasures to prevent aircraft scandals, which is the
prime minister's private advisory organ.
The Ohira cabinet's way of dealing with political scandals seems to be
symbolized in the premier's mode of expressing himself. We have never
detected any willingness on the rart of the prime minister, a political
leader., to reflect on his conduct or to persuade the Liberal Democratic
Party to reform itself.
That the LDP's practice of hiding scandals caused the confusion in the
recent ordinary Diet session is an undeniable fact. We would like to remind
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lli~~ I.UI' ll~~~l Clie puli~i.c~tl ~~u:~t~tt'c~ of Ch~~ prime m(itlster, whc~ iti (tti
I~~.icl~~ r, h~~ I n}~, c~u~s:; L' 1 un~~cl .
Premior (11i?r.t also talked about .lapan's diplomacy and its role, Uut what I~c
ti,iicl wa5 too Flat L-o appeal to the people. We wanted to lTear what the ~~rtmc
minitiLcr r.cally hacl in mind about specific issues. Being merely a medlry oi'
compositions penned by bureaucrats, his speech is hardly wortliy of conunent.
COPYRIGHT: ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 1979
CSO: 4120
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
_ I.DP VICTORY DEPENDS ON HOW DISENCHANTED REACT
Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 13 Sep 79 p 1 OW
[Text] A Liberal-Democratic Party victory in the 7 October Lower House
general election will depend on how the politically disenchanted, who
form the second largest bloc, will vote, an ASAHI SHIMBUN study shows.
The.study is based on an analysis of the latest ASAHI public opinion poll
which took place in~late August and surveys done over the past 10 years.
The study shows that the politically disillusioned tend to react *o the
political situation at a given time and vote accordingly, and that their
~ncrease is inversely proportional to a shif t in popular support away from
the LDP.
The politically disenchanted--pebple who say they do not support any party
or will not reply to a question on party preference--accounted for 34 per-
cent ASAHI survey, compared with 42 percent who expressed support for the
LDP and 13 percent who liked the Japan Socialist Party.
According to the study, salary earners in their 20s with university diplomas
and women over the age of 60 are typical disillusioned voters.
According to the study, the disenchanted account for 46 percent of voters
between 20 and 24, as against 31 percent who support the LDP. Their ratio
is 37 perce.nt among voters between 25 and 29y as against 34 ~ercent who
support the LDP. The, remain on top with 39 percent among those between
30 and 34, compared with 3$ percent who support the LDP.
Then a reversal of rates occurs. The disillusioned decrease to 33 percent
among those between 35 and 39 and keep falling in the older age brackets.
On the other hand, support for the LDP keeps rising from 42 percent among
those in their 40s to 54 percent among those over the a~e of 60.
While the number of disillusioned men keeps f alling from the age of 40 on,
the ratio among women stays at 35 percent.
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The disenchanted also form the largest bloc in major cities.
The ASAHI study shows that the disiliusione3 were the largesr bloc from
ttie days of wild inflation in 1973 to the days following the outbreak of
the Lockheed payoff scandal in 1976.
Disillusion with the LDP government increased the number of those who do
. not support any party, rather than increasing support for the opposit:ion
rarties.
The ~onservative resurgence began a year after the inauguration of the Takeo
Fukuda cabinet. Popular support for the LDP exceeded 40 percent at the time
_ of primary elections for the party's gresidency in October 1978, whereas ',-.he
disenchanted dropped to 29 percent.
,
COPYRIGHT: ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 1979
CSO: 4120
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POLT'PICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
~
LDY I~ACTIONAL ACTiViTTF.S GEARED TO FALL GEN~RAL ~LECTION
Main-System Factions' Activities
Tokyo SANKEI in Japanese 19 Aug 79 p 1-2
/Text/ Ohira Faction Rapidly Incr.easing Candidates. Intermediate Factions
Slowing Down 3nd Being Rearranged into Five Major Factions and Nakagawa
Faction. �
With the mood rising towards dissolution of the Diet and a general election,
the political parties are virtuall}? plunging into the election campaigns,
and the rivalry is especially intense between the Liberal Democratic Party
factions.
Although the three non-mainstream factions--the Fukuda, Nakasone and Miki
factions--are opposed to dissolution, they are as busily engaged in election
preparations as the mainstream faction, because a loss of inembers by an
Caction in the general election would be reflected dlrectly in t's:e party ~
presidential election slated for late next year. An analysis of the action
goiflg on within the LDP wou?d indicate the following: (1) A further -
realignment of potential candidates for the general election i~ taking
;;l.ace, with the intermediate Shiina, Funada, Mizuta and Tshii factions being
disbanded and reorganized into five major factions plus the new Nakagawa
faction (JIYU KAKUSHIN DOYUKAI-Liberal Reform Friends Society). (2)
F..xpansion of the Ohira faction is especially conspicuous. It is embaracing
most of the successors to deceased and retired Dietmen and is thus laying
the groundwork for Ohira's re-election to the party presidency. (3) Post-
war leaders like former Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi and forn~er House
speaker Naka Funada have retired or passed on, and a broad change of genera-
tions is in the of�ing in the 1980's. Such are the apparent trends.
Although it is customary for the LDP to decide on their official candidates
. on the day of the Diet dissolution, in actuality each faction is already
making concrete preparations for the general election separately from the
party's formal selections. The~reason is that the general election will
bear the earmarks of a factional election due to the medium-size election
district system, which differentiates it from the Upper House election.
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CANDIDATES OF LDP FACTIONS
(Sankei Shimbun Survey)
(Faction) (Incumbent) (Former) (New} (Tota1)
Ohira 33 5 21 plus alpha 59,plus alpha
Fukuda 49 7 10 p2us alpha 66 plus alpha
Tanaka 43 6 5 54
= Nakasone 43 5 7 55 `
Miki 33 4 5 42
Nakagawa 8 1 4 13 ~
Note: "Former" includes former Lower House and Uppez House Dietmen. The .
Nakagawa faction includes many members whose names are duplicated in the
Fukiida faction. However, only bona fide members of the Nakagawa faction
have been listed here.
The breakdown is as shown in the table. Especially noteworthy is the
advance by the Ohira faction, which with the Miki faction had claimed the
least members among the five major factions. The Ohira faction's strategy
calls for a need to develop into the leading party faction, in order to
wrest the leadership held in the past by such non-mainstream factions as
_ tiie rukud,3 faction, not only vis-a-vis interim policy for next year's party
presidential election, but also regarding the forming of the Cabinet and
the appointment of the secretary general and the Lower House speaker. The
faction is therefore endeavoring to attract the newcomers and the successors
to deceased and retired Dietmen of other factions. It is cooperating with
the friendly Tanalca faction in order to fill such blank areas as Tokyo,
- where Ohira`s men have hitherto been non-existent.
Meanwhile, the Fukuda faction--the largest faction (with 52 members, among
which 3 will retire)--will set up approximately 66 candidates (more than
the Ohira faction), seeking further expansion. However, since it embraces
a number of elderly Dietmen and unsettled younger members, it cannot
~scape the disadvantages in comparison to the mainstream faction which has
access to the party organization and funds. Therefore, it faces the danger
of slipping from its position as the largest faction.
Compared to the Fukuda faction, the Tanaka, Nakasone and Miki factions are
all on more solid ground with a strategy for expansion by 10 members each,
via the comeback of former Dietmen and the seating of newcomers. However,
since the Nakasone faction is pushing Nakasone himself, and the I~.iki faction
has its eye on party policy chief Komoto, as party presidential hopefuls,
it is imperative that both factions increase their memberships in order
to be within second place in the presidential primary. The competition
between the two is thus far greater ~han the table of candidates indicates.
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~oii c~Hrlc;rni, usi~: c~Ni.,v
The impact of the .~ive major facti,ons is seen in the disintegration of the ~
intermediate factions--the Shiina, Mtzuta and Ishii factions. In addition
, to zero prospects of increasing their numbers, there is a conspicuous
switching of incumbents to the mainstream faction. Meanwhile, moves by
former Agriculture Minister Ichiro Nakagawa stand out. His faction has
not only added four new members, but the view is that eight of the pr.esent
19 incumbents of the JTYU KAKUSHIN DOYUKAI, who are not members of the
five major factions, will make a new start as members of the Nakagawa
faction. Thus, the general election will determine whether he will achieve
power, albeit as the leader of a minor faction.
It is estimated that the official LDP roster for the general election will
total between 320 to 330 candidates, and that the competition between the
party factions will influence the increase of winners. The mainstream
faction with a cor~servative outlook thinks the party will be able to garner
a comfortable majority of 271 seats (it won 261 seats, including addition
of Cormer independents, in the 1976 general election).
, Ohira I~action Aims for Fifty-member Increase. Tanaka Faction Works Hard
Eor Comeback
Ohira Faction: Although it is the party leader's faction, it is a"minor"
faction with 33 members, similar to the Miki faction. Therefore, its main
strategy points to a gain of at least 15--if possible, 20 or more--members
and to become the party's major faction overnight.
At present its slate includes 21 new candidates (plus two other Ohira- _
affiliates), as well as five Ohira-affiliates who are planning to comeback.
Of the total of 28 hopefuls, 26 are considered to be probably winners.
Among the new faces, the convergence of so-called "second generation can-
didates" or the sons of former incumbents aspiring to become the "backbone
of the party leader's faction," is noteworthy. Ritaro and Jiro, the sons -
of Soichi Kamoda (Saitama 3rd district-Funada faction, deceased) and
Shuji Kawasaki (Mie lst distrii;t, deceased), respectively; Takeshi, son
of. Cormer Justice Minister Seigo Hamano who will retire; Motoo, the son
of tormer party vice president Etsuzaburo Shiina (Iwate 2nd district,
retired); and Hajime, grandson of former Lower House speaker Naka Funada
(Tochigi lst district, deceased) are viewed by certain sources as candida.tes
from the Ohira faction.
Additionally, in the case of Kosuke, son of the deceased former Lower House
Speaker Shigeru Hori (Saga prefectural district), the situation is somewhat
complicated. He is "farmed out" to the Tanaka faction and his campaign
funds are paid by the Ohira faction, since he will run from the same district
as the incumbent Keniichiro Otsubo of the Ohira faction.
Also, from the standpoint of filling the blank areas and presenting an
array o~ candidates worthy of a party leader's faction, there is consider-
able cooperation with the Tanaka faction. For instance, Akira--the younger
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hroelier oL Ec~rmer Diet woman Hide Awayama (rukushima lst di5tr.ict)--~~lthou~;h
a member of t.h.~ .5hiina faction was close to the Tanaka faction, and Sadatoshi
Kozato (Kagc:~him~ 2nd district) is a newcomer affiliated with former party
Secretary Gene,ral Susumu Nikaido of the Tanaka faction. They are both
clarifying the~:r support for the Ohira faction. Also, a special case is
seen in Fukujiro Kikuchi, ai~ incumbent who recently bolted from the New
I Liberal Club and is campaigning as an independent. He has decided that, if
he wins, he would return to the LDP fold and join the Ohira faction. In ~
the selection of Ohira faction candidates, there are numerous cases which
are in competition with the other factions. However, in the case of Taro
Aso who is ~ potential newcomer in the Fukuoka 2nd district, he has the
support of former agriculture minister Ichiro Nakagawa--a pillar of the
non-mainstream, and his moves will be watched with interest in the event
that he is elected. ~
Tanaka Faction: It presently boasts 43 members. In the upcoming general
election, ~.t wi11 ambitiously present, in addition to its incu:nbents, a
dozen or more new and old faces as candidates and aim for 50 winners. In
the previous election, former deputy chief Cabinet secretary Seiroku Kajiyama
_ (Ibaraki 2nd district), Ryohei Tamura (Kochi prefectural district),
Yukio Yamamoto (Mie lst district), Kishitaka Ihara (Ehime 2nd district) -
and Kanezo Muraoka (Akita 2nd district) were defeated as a result of the
Lockheed scandal. Full efforts are being made for their comeback, as
, well as that of Shinjiro Yamamura (Shii~t4 faction-defeated in the Chiba
2nd distr~ct) who has switched to the Tanaka faction. ~
Needless to say, utmost care is exercised to prevent other incumbents from
defeat. For instance, when it became apparent that Saburo Toida of the
Hyogo 4th district would encounter difficulty by losing a large bloc of
votes to party policy chief Komoto, former prime minister Tanaka, party
_ vice president Nishimura, Susumu Nikaido, Noboru Takeshita and other cadres
of the "Tanaka army" convened at the "support Toida rally" held at an Osaka
hotel (6 August) to encourage the candidate. However, there are some
~orrisome problems. The leader of the faction, party vice president
Nishimura (Oita 2nd district), is 81 years old and is pressured by three -
new independents and former bureaucrats with conservative affiliations who
_ are seeking a"change of generations." Moreover, since one of them is a
former member of the Tanaka faction, Tanaka faction cadres feel rather glum
about the situation. Former Prime Minister Tanaka himself has reportedly
decreed "not to let the vice president be ousted." Move~ t~~ acquire new
members are rather negligible, perhaps due to the emphasis on support for
former and p'resent incumbents. From the standpoint of "strengthening the
mainstream Ohira faction".there are cases where newcomers like Ko~zato of
the Kagoshima 2nd district are registered under the Ohira faction, and
also cases like Kiyoshi Ozawa (Tokyo 7th district) who are endorsed jointly
with the Ohira faction. Inside the party it is called the "Ohira-Tanaka
alliunce."
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'rherefore, the bona fide newcomers of the faction are limited to f.ive. They
are Shinjun Oshiro (Okinawa prefectural district), Tadakuni Iwanaga (Nagasaki ~
lst district), Masahiko Yam3da (Nagasaki lst district), Yukio Miyauchi
(Nagasaki 2nd district) and Ei~iro Hata (Oita lst district).
't'here is also Tomizaburo Hashimoto of the Ibaraki lst district who is a ,
Eaction member, albeit as an independent. In his case also, he faces ~
ciifficulty due to the candidacy of two new independents from the conserva- -
tive wing in the same district and he is receiving support from faction
cadres. In any case, the plan is to form an election policy committee by
the end of the month (August), with Masatoshi Tokunaga, chairman of the
LDP Upper House Dietmen, as "election policy chairman." The Upper House
members will support the Lower House members by forming a concrete election
winning system.
Non-Main-Stream Factional Strife '
Tokyo SANKEI in Japanese 20 Aug 79 p 2
, /'fext/ Fukuda Himself Takes Command. Miki Faction to Maintain Status Quo
Rather Than Seek Expansion
Fukuda Faction: Speaking of the Fukuda faction, its attempts at expansion
- during the previous general election have nat been very aggressive, but the
situation is different with the coming election. With a sense of impending
crisis in the words of Mr Fukuda that "if the Fukuda faction were to lose
any seats, it would mean the weakening of the advocates for interparty
reform and modernization," the faction is gathering around Mr Fukuda and
campaign organizer Shintaro Abe, preparing to go all-out in support of its
candidates.
Of the present 52 faction members, three veterans--former Prime Minister
Kishi, Kaneshichi Masuda and Kazuomi Fukunaga--will retire. However, the
~ Caction will appoint three successors: Akira Suita (Yamaguchi 2nd district),
Nobuhiko Masuda (Nagano 4th district) and Kosuke Fukunaga (Kumamoto.2nd '
- district) as candidates. The faction has been intently seeking out new-
comers and, in addition to Masami Tanabe (Aomori lst district) and Akio
Karino (Ibaraki lst district) who were barely defeated in the previous
election, it is supporting Sohei Miyashita (Nagano 3rd district), Takashi
Uchiyama (Shizuok~ 3rd district), Tohru Nogami (Toyama lst district),
SaUuro Fujiwara (Hyogo Sth district) and Shizuka Kamei (Hiroshima 3rd
district) who are entering their first race. It also has an eye on several
new potential candidates in Saitama, Toyama and Shiga prefectures.
Reflecting on its defeat in last year's party presidential election, it
is attempting to fill the "vacuum areas" of the Fukvda forces.
In addition to backing newcomers, the faction is boosting its freshmen
Diet members whose bases still require solidification. Furthermore, its
goal is to emphasize support for the comeback of seven of its former Dietmen,
including Ichiro Sato (Kanagawa 4th district) who switched from the Upper
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Houv~ as a ne4r candidate for the Lower House, and to secure at least 55
or 56 seats. Former ]'rime Minister rukuda has been actively campaigning in
f{okkaido and Nagano since early summer. However, there is no denying tt~e
existence of numerous young and new candidates who are borderline cases.
He will start on a nationwide stumping tour in September and take commanci,
in the campaign.
Natiasone Faction: In the previous election, the faction took a great leap
forward by ~arnering 12 seats with new candidates. However, this time it
is limiting its new candidates to seven and concentrating on winnable
candidates. Nevertheless, it is true that there is the underlying factor of
its "sad inability to compete as a non-mainstream faction with the mainstream
faction in capturing new members," (according to a cadre of the election
policy committee). Among the "big new fish that got away" was Kosuke Hori
oE the Saga prefectural district. The faction campaigned vigorously, counting
on the relation between cadre Tadashi Kuranari and the deceased former Lawer
Hotise speaker Horl, but it lost him to the "Ohira-Tanaka allied forces."
Eijiro Ha'~a (running from the Tanaka faction), successor to Mas~o Hirose
(Oita 1st district) who will retire soon, is a similar case. The faction
tias given up any notion of putting up new candidates in the Yamagata 2nd
and Iwate lst districts, since it has no prospects of receiving party endorse-
ment. On the other hand, its seven new candidates all have good potential
for winning. Especially due to efforts by top cadre Sadanori Yamanaka,
_ Sukeya Nagano (Kagoshima lst district) and Saburo Kowatari (Okinawa prefectural
district) were won over after competing with other factions.
Among the previous losers, former Ohira faction member Sadayoshi Ya~a
(Fukushima 2nd district) will run this time from the Nakasone faction because ;
of his previous competition against Masayoshi Ito of the same Ohira faction
and the vacant seat left by the deceased Tetsuro Minato of the Nakasone
factiort. He will receive all-out support by Nakasone and his cadres who
have stated that "his switch from a ruling faction to our faction is a
sumbo.lic event."
1he faction seeks to expand its present 43 members by 5, but since some
dropout of the incumbents is anticipated it takes the position that "any
increase is a blessing. Our goal is 45 seats. (election policy committee
cad re) "
Miki ~action: I'ac.tion leader and former prime mi~zister Miki confronted
Prime Minister Ohira with a personal draft on a"Special Measures Law for
the Purification of Elections" and is applying the brakes on a Diet dissolu-
tion without proper justification. The faction is therefore not in a
~osition to prepare openly for the coming election. Howe~~er, there is of
course no member who stands by id1y. ~
Those who are definitely running include, in addition to the 33 incumbents,
four who are seeking a co~;~eback. They are Goro Ito (Yamagata 2nd district),
~Iyosuke Niwa (Aichi 2nd district), Kazuho Tanigawa (Hiroshima 2nd district)
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I
FOh UI~CI:Cit1L U513 UN1~Y
nncl Munc~nori Akagi (Ib~~r.aki 3r.d district) . There sre also Eive new faces--
Hideo Usui (Chiba lst district)", Akio Hisama (Nagasaki lst district),
Kuro Matsuda (Nagasaki 2nd district), Keijiro Nishiyama (Hyogo ~th district)
and Ayahiko Matsumoto (Tokyo 9th district). A total of 42 candidates will
run fr.om the Miki faction. Among the new members, Matsumoto is secreCary
to III.rc~hide Tshida, while the other f.our are receiving earnest backin~ by
'Po5liio Komoto: An especially torrid race is shuping up t.n the Naf;asaki
lst and 2nd districts and, in order to strengthen his influence within the
faction, Komoto is going all-~~ut to win seats for the new members under
t~is aegis.
'The faction as a whole seems tc be avoidi:~g a profusion of candidates. From
the standpoint of preventing defeats by the incumbents, the minimum goal
appears to be the maintenance of the status quo and the avoidance of a
~ rash expansion policy.
Nakagawa Faction and Others: Among the intermediate factions, Etsuzaburo
Shiina, leader of the Shiina faction, has decided to retire, while Naka
Funada and Mikio Mizuta are both deceased. Therefore, many members of tt;ese
factions are faced with the choice of either joining the major tactions or
~ starting anew.under their own power. Under these circumstances, the Nakagawa
who organized the JIYU KAKUSHIN DOYUKAI, the coming general electian provides
an excellent opportunity to consolidate the foundation of the Nakagawa
faction. The JDK consists of 19 incumbent Dietmen. In addition, there are
~ormer Dietmen Yasuo Shimada (Tottori prefectural district) and Hiroshi Nakao
(Kagoshima 2nd district) and eight newcomers. Among the incumbents and
those who lost in the previous election there are many who belong to the
rukuda and Nakasone factions, while half of the members are "owned jointly"
by the Fukuda factivn.
The new face~ who are considered to be directl.y affiliated with Nakagawa
are Yoshio Uekusa (Hokkaido 2nd district), Tatsuo Takahashi (Hokkaido 4th
_ district), Takeo Hiranuma (Okayama lst district) and Yoshio Skiyoshi (Oita
2nd district). The faction is also enticing Taro Aso (Fukuoka 2nd district),
_ who is said to be a cnember of the Ohira Faction.
COPYRTCHT: Sangyo Keizai Shimbun, Tokyo, Honsha 1979
5884
CSO: 4105
r
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i
~
POLTTICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
, '
. i
'JPS' PROTESTS JSP'S USE OF TRADE UNION SUPPORT '
i
'1'okyo JPS in English 0918 GMT 10 Sep 79 OW ' !
[Text] Tokyo, 10 Sep, JPS--As the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan +
~
(SOHYO) came out for election coo~eration in the general election with the {
Komei Party, AKAHATA carried an editorial on 9 September entitled: "Socialist 1
Party Makes Duplicate Use of Trade Union as Its Own Effec:ts." The editorial
said that this, the election cooperation between the JSP-supporting SOHYO ~
with the Komei Party, "is a double or triple use of trade union as the
personal effect or a specific political party." The gist of the editorial
L-ollows:
"(The SOHYO-Komei el.ection cooperation) will force SOHYO unionists in certain
constituencies to support Komei candidates. In exchange of getting Komei
siipport for socialist candidates in the election, in which SOHYO is compelled
to 'support only the JSP,' this is really the worst type of making the trade ;
union the personal effect of the Socialist Party." '
"[n the local oovernment head elections in Kyoto, Osaka and Yokohama, the ~
union members who were compelled to support the JSP, had to follow the
.1Sn's restlessness unlikely of the progressive forces, and its betrayal of ~
the progressive cause by taking side with the LDP and the anti-communist i
c~:~trist' parties to divide the progressive forces and to subvert the ~
progressive local governments. i
"Drawing no severe class-conscious lessons from this, SOHYO is going to make ~
'election cooperation' with the Komei Party, which is advancing on the way i
o~ anti-communist, anti-progressive line to become a new ruling party. This
i.s very serious." ,
.
"Moreover, in the light of the basic line of SOHYO, it is clear that no~
basic agreement exists between SOHYO and the Komei Party on the major [word ~
indistinct] in the nation~l administration." ~
~
For the Japanese trade union movement to carry out the historic task for the I
_ victory of the progressive foxces in the 1980s, "the error of the compulsive
� i
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'support Eor a specific political party' must be decisively swept away.
[t lias become an unavoidabLe urgent task to establish, in the name and
r~~~~l. i e,y, thc~ ~riiic iple of the trade union's independence from capit~i].
- ~uicl ~~ol [.~1c:~~.L ~~rirty, to upholcl the class-co~nSC~Ious selE-reli~~nca oF. the
lr~ide ~mion."
CSO: 4120
�
�
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~
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
' l
~
'AKAHATA' HITS KOMEI-DSP COOPERATION
Tokyo JPS in English 0919 GMT 13 Sep 79 OW ~
[Texr] Tokyo, 13 Sep, JPS--The Komei Party and the Democratic Socialist
Party agreed on 11 September to effect election cooperation in 28 constituen-
cies in the general election. AKAHATA carried an article on 13 September
sharply commenting on it.
The "a~reement paper" for the election cooperation says that it is aimed
at defending the one-party rule by the Liberal-Democratic Party," or
"prospecting the course for the establishment of a progressive coalition
government." This, AKAHATA article says, "is a preposterous make-believe.
This is a selfish calculation to get a ministerial seat or two in the
coalition government with the LDP, to push ahead with the reactionary
~ line." ,
The article goes on to say, "their real aim is to check the advance of
the Japanese Communist Party, the driving force for the progressive chan~e
in the national administration, and to render devoted service to the LDP." ~
CSO: 4120
s
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MILITARY
JAPAN'S 4?EAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ANALYZED
Development Contrary to Constitution
Tokyo ASAHI JANARU in Japanese 3 Aug 79 pp 10-17
[Article by ASAHI SHIMBUN editor Sho~i Takase: "Japan's Weapons Develop-
ment Revealed"]
[Excerpt] When peace is discussed as a plus symbol, there
is not much discussion on war as a minus symbol. To be
sure, the concerned parties are tight lipped about dis-
cussing the weapons that are the implements of war, and
the actual situation is not well known. ~
In the category of weapons are the aircraft and missile
industries whose technological development has been
questioned as future industries of the information
gathering type. This is why an inquiry was made of the
present status of development and its problem areas
based mainly on conversations with on-site technologists
to probe just what is bei.ng developed at the present
time.
Japan is a country that has chosen to exist as a peace-
f.ul nation. Development of weapons and their production
are, first of all, contrary to the constitution and are
under the stern eyes of world opinion and legal
restrictions, and it is a fact that these factors are a
deterrent to develapment in this area at the present
time.
One wonders whether there is not the need to reassess
both the present restrictive situation and the principle
as well as its true intention, even if just to under-
stand the weight of peace in daily life.
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� This is the rationale for introducing the present status of
weapons development in Japan. .
(Editorial Department)
The experimental sea zone established in the Sea of Japan to the north of
Wakasa Bay on 13 June was the scene of a concentration of Marine Self Defense
Force ships and helicopters, and there was an unexpected sense of tension.
This was because the air-versus-ship missile that the Defense Agency has
been developing since JFY 1973 was.undergoing its first actual f iring tests
in a very secret manner under the strictest security conditions.
� This domestically produced missile with the exact name of "short-range air
versus ship-guided missile" (XASM-1) is one type of warship attack missile
that has suddenly come to be regarded as an effective marine weapon, since
the Egyptian Navy ship-versus-ship missile "Staix" (supplied by the Soviets)
siicceeded in sinking an Israeli destroyer and a commercial ship with but six
missiles during the third Middle East War in,1967. Where the Soviet "Staix"
is launched from a high speed m3esile is an air-versus-ship affair, which
'means it is launched from one of our own aircraft.
Speaking more specifically, a missile is loaded under each wing of the Air
Self Defense Force F1 support fighter plane and is used to attack any enemy
vessel that invades the seas off Japan.. It is fired a few kilometers away
from the target by the pilot's operation. Although its range is classified
"Top Secret" and is not publicized, it may be safe to assume that it has
nearly the same range as the French "Egzose M39," which is an air-versus-
ship missile of about the same scale and has a range of 50 kilometers. The ~
problem here is the precision of the guidance technology that directs a
missile fired several dozen.kilometers away to home in on the heart of the
ship under attack, and this is the ultimate factor that determines the
missile capability. .
~The actual firing tests of the XASM-1 have been under way since May of this
year in the Sea of Japan, using the deregistered ship "Kaya" (1500 ton) as
' actual target. In the May test the warhead was replaced by a telemeter
equipped instrument in the missile used, which was launched from a modified
T-2 high level trainer used by the Air Self Defense Force, and three such
missiles were directed at the "Kaya." Starting with the accuracy of the
,;uidance system, items such as the damage to the target and effectiveness .
lgainst evasive measures that are indices of the missile performance and �
r.eliability were subjected to a severe check.
Based on the results of this first series of tests, the firing tests in June
involved ehe use of missiles with actual warheads and were designed to test
actual total performance, including target destructive force, and to serve
as the final tests.
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As the experimental personnel watched intently, tr.e first XASM-1 missile
fired from the experimental craft maintained a horizo;~tal attitude as it
dropped close to the sea surface and assumed a low altitude tra~ectory over
the sea. It is the usual practice of sending anti-ship missiles on this
low altitude course of th~: order of 10 m above the sea surface as they search
and approach the target in order to avoid radar detection. The XASM-1 that
had pursued such a low altitude path for several minutes and had come in
close proximity to the target ship abruptly vibrated its nose~upward and
climbed sharply. This was the final flight maneuver called "pop up" that
is designed to evade enemy fire while enhancing the power of the warhead.
In the next instant the climbing missile described a shell trajectory as
it made its way directly to a point about one-third fr~m the stern of the
target ship "Kaya" where the warhead exploded.
According to the comments of the observers at this test, the results of
the firing test far exceeded expectations. "A missile that is in no way
inferior to the American anti-ship missile "Harpoon" both in performance
and reliability has been developed," and the technologists who had participated
in the development were elated. According to the report from the observation
ship positioned to examine the power of the actual firing test, it was
stated that the "Kaya" which had begun to sink as a result of the direct
hit by the first missile, capsized early in the morning of the 15th day, 2
days after the initial hit. As a result, the planned three firings to this
round of tests was terminated by a"cease f iring" after the first shot.
According to Sagao Uehara, chief of the Guilded Weapc~ns Laboratory of the
Equipment Bureau of the Defense Agency, the results of technical tests to
date will be the basis for actual use by the defense troops this year for
conducting various tests. Should these tests go in an expected manner, it
is expected that this missile will become a formal weapon of the Air Self
Defense Force next Japanese fiscal year.
As may be surmised f rom the emphatic statements of the develogmental
technologists that "this missile is not inferior compared to the American
'Harpoon'," there are foreign air-versus-ship missiles that are very
similar in size, shape, and performance to this XASM-1 missile. The French
"Egzose AM39" and the American "Harpoon" come under this category. Both
of these ship-versus-ship missiles equipped with solid fuel boosters, and
the version in which the booster is removed is used as the air-versus-ship
missile (see special table on ne~ct.page).
The basic features such as size, cruising ~peed, and guidance system of these
three types are remarkably similar. Their external appearances also are very
similar in that they have pencil shaped slim hodies from which emerge shark
�in lik.e forward wings at the center section and an after wing at the tail.
The forward wing is used to stabilize the flight attitude, while the after
wing is used for steering in an assembly that is very similar in all three
missiles.
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One ma_jor difference is the use of a turbojet engine on the American Harpoon
making it a so-called "cruise missile." Now by what mechanisms does this
air-versus-ship missile home in on its intended target?
The first step starts with the support fighter carrying this missile cal-
culating thF ~exact position of the target enemy ship. Since the target
search and track radar installed aboard an Fl fighter plane has a range
(discriminating distance) of about 100 km, the location and movements of any
ship within ~his range can be readily established aboard this plane.
Delicate Guidance System of the Anti-Ship Missile
This target data then are loaded into the "inertial guidance device" loaded
into the ASM-1 suspended under its wing and stored there. Here a small high
performance digital computer is in operation which calculates instantaneously
what direction and what distance the target is from the point of launch,
what speed and direction the target is taking, and to what direction the
missile should be guided in order to strike th~e target, and the flight ilirection
of the missile is indicated. The third step is that in which the missile
launched from aboard a plane follows the path of flight so indicated and
approaches to within a few kilometers of ttie target guided by an inertial
navigation method. Here the precision of the inertial guidance facility
becomes a problem, and it must be able to guide the missile~directly to the
initially prescribed direction no matter what kind of crosswind is operating.
As mentioned before, this cruising flight by the inertial navigation method
must be along a low altitude course about 10 m above the sea surface to avoid
detection by enemy radar. To this end there is an electromagnetic wave
altimeter installed within the missile that constantly transmits electro-
magnetic waves directed to the sea surface to measure altitude and make any
adjustments while this horizontal flight continues. The guiding of this
missile is accomplished tlirough four steering tabs located on the after wing.
When the missile comes to within a few kilometers of the target (about 10 km
in the case of "Egzose"), the guidance mode shifts from the first stage
~ inertial guidance to the second stage active radar homing. This is step 4.
What is called active radar'~homing is a guidance mode in which a radar homing
head installed on the forward end of the missile transmits radar waves in a
forward direction, receives the waves reflected back from the target enemy
ship, calculates the direction and distance to the intended target, adjusts
~he flight direction based on this information, and tracks the target.
~lhile this device has the feature of accurately tracking the target, it
..ransmits radar waves and can thereby become a victim of radar waves trans-
~ mitted by the enemy and other evasive tactics.�
There are a number of counterproposals that have been advanced in order to
overcome enemy interference and evasive tactics, and the fastest is to provide
the enemy no time to calculate the position and direction of the missile in
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the event it is detected by their radar. To this end the time of transmission
ot these radar waves is cut down to very short intervals and in a very inter-
mittent manner in a method Chat has been devised and is being used in a number
of