JPRS ID: 8690 USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090049-8
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• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 49
• Content Type: REPORTS

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~ ~PT~~R ~9~9 ~F~~d ~~/79~ ~ ~F i

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JPRS L/8690
28 September 1979 -
USSR Re ort -
p _
MILITARY AFFAIRS
~FOUO 25/79)
~g~~ Fa~EIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS Lf 8690
28 September 1979
USS R REPO RT
- MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 25/79)
CONTENTS PAGE
Soviet Comments on NATO 'Autumn Forge-78'
- (M. Vasil'chenko; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZR;NIYE, Apr 79)... 1
Soviet Comments on Control of Coalition Forces '
(I. Andreyev; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Apr 79) 6
Soviet Comments on NATO 'Reforger~ Exercise
(G. Vasil'yev; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZR~NIYE, Apr 79) 11
Soviet Comments on U.S. Ground Forces Organization
(B. Yiishakov; ZARUBEZI~iOYE VOYENNOYE OB!'ZRENIYE, Apr 79) 18
- Soviet Comments on U.S. and NATO Military Base System
(R. Simonyan; ZARUBE'LHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, May 79) 20
Saviet Comments on U.S. and NATO Off?nsive Operations
(V. Gidaspov; ZARUBEZHNOYE dOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, May 79) 29 -
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SOVIET COMMEENTS ON NATO 'AUTUMN FORGE-78'
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOY~E CBOZRENIYE in Russian No 4, Apr 79 signed to
press 6 Apr 79 pp 10-14
[Article by Lt Col M. Vasil'chenko: "NATO Maneuvers 'Autumn Forge-78 "'J
[Text] True to the obligations assumed in the Helsinki accords, which are
f~xed in the Final Document of t11e Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe, countries of the socialist community are striving steadfastly to _
improve relationships with all West European states. Steps they are taking
in this direction are leading to a significant alleviation of the politi~al
climate in F.urope and are a reli.able guarantee of international security on
the continent, But peaceloving efforts of the socialist countries are '
enr_ountering continuous resistance on the part of enemies of detente, among
whom the NATO militarists are in the vanguard as before.
Having lost all sense of reality, the politicians and strategists of the
Nor.th Atlantic Alliance continue to intimidate their nations with falsehoods
about the "growing Soviet threat" and stubbornly declaim f or an expansion in
the program of milii.ary preparations within bloc countries. A further -
improvement in operational and conbat training of NATO staffs and troops
(f:Leets) and their preparation for conducting combat operations against -
Warsaw Pact countries is one of the most important ways for implementing the
mi"litarists' aggressive schemes.
~ The command elements and staffs of this bloc play a leading role in the
planning and conduct of personnel training and ideological conditioning. At
the present time they are attempting to assume full control over the combat
training of inember country troops. This is manifested specifically in the
unif ication of a number of nati_onal and NATO exercises by means of a single
plan and operational-strategic background, as well as in common direction of
the exercises.
As the foreign press has emphasized, the views of the NATO command element
on waging war are tested most fully during the "Autumn Forge" fall maneu-
vers, which have been held annually beginning in 1975. They ar~ typified
by the integrated accomplishment of missions, broad scope and scale, and
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inclusion of troops, staffs, establishments and all branches of armed forces
- of~ varying nationality. -
Foreign specialists believe that an opportunity is created for working out
problems of strategic importance in accomplishing special tactical missions -
against the back~round oF "Aiitumn rorge~'exercises held in various regions
(from the North Atlantic to Turkey) with a certain time separation (two or -
three months) and P.l.a}~i.ng out one of the variants of the initiation and
conduct of combat operations in Europe and on the Atlantic as a whole.
The "Autumn Forge-78" fall maneuvers (August-November) included around 50
joint and national exercises. The most important and largest in ~cale were
� "Northern Wedding-78" in the East Atlantic, Norwegian Sea, North Sea and
the area of the English Channel, "Bar Frost-78" (northern Norway), "Black
Bear" (southern Norway), "Bold Guard-78" (Baltic Straits area) in the North
European Theater of Military Ope,rations; "Reforger" 10, "Certain Shield"
corps exercises of the U.S. Army V Corps, "Cardinal Sword" (command and
st~ff exercise) of U.S. Army VII Corps, "Red Dragoon" of UK Army I Corps,
"Blaue Donau" of FRG Army II Corps, "Saxon Drive" of the Netherlands
P,rn;ylCorps, "Red Tornado" of Belgian Army I Corps and th? "Cold Fire-78"
exercise of the joint air fo-rces in the Central European Theater of Military
Operations; and "Display Determination" in the Southern European Theater of
Mi.litary Operations.
Accor.ding to western press data, over 320,000 persons were brought in for
these fall maneuvers and over 14,000 tanks and APC's, around 2,700 war- -
planes and up to 300 various ships were used.
The political goals set for the part~cipants in the maneuvers bore a clearly
pxovocative character and a carefully prepared d~monstration of power ~ind
"unity" of participating countries. The U.S. ~.~ilitary-political leadership
attempted to prove its resolve to NATO allies to reinforce bloc troop
groupings in various parts of Europe. U.S. Secretary of Def.ense H. Brown
thus declared that if necessary the Americans could move three divisions of `
gruund troops, 1,200 warplanes, "dual-based" combined units (the lst and
- 4th mechanized divisions, with personnel located on the North American
Continent and combat equipment at depots in the FRG), as well as five divi-
sions of the strategic reserve to Europe in a 30-day period.
As the foreign press reported, the NATO military-political leadership
assigned the mission of practicing the f ollowing matters during the maneu- k
vers: conversion of armed forces from a peacetime to a war footing; deploy-
mei~t and reinforcement of troop groupings and fleets in European and
Atlantic theaters of military operations; conduct of combat actions in the
f irst operations of a limited war with use of conventional means of destruc-
tion and tactical nuclear weapons; organization of coordination among
braciches of the armed forces and troops of different nationalities; improve-
ment of control. and communications systems; and logistical and medical _
suppert.
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An tmporr,int I~lace was given to checking the realistic nature oL plans fc~r
- conducting operations in Europe and on the Atlanti~, as well as th:.~ readi-
ness of staffs and troops to perform the missions assigned them.
Exercise "Northern Wedding-78" (4-19 September) was the largest in the
history of existence o� the NATO joint naval forces. Command elements and
staffs of joint and national navies, NATO's attack fleet in the Atlantic,
and the bloc's permanent combined naval units in the h;~^nti_c and in the -
English Channel area (navies of the United States, Great isritain, Canada,
the FRG, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, ~'ortugal and France)
were brought in to participate in the exercise. A total of 40,000 person- _
nel, up to 220 warships and auxiliary vessels, 22 submarines, an d around
800 aircraft and helicopters took part.
The following missions were worked during the exercise: combating "enemy" _
surface amd submarine forces; conducting amphibious warfare operations in
nor.thern Norway (a lanciing on the Shetland Islands was played out), on the
Jutland Peninsula (in the vicinity of Esbjerg, Denmark) and on the coast of
southern Norway (city of Kristiansand); defense of ocean and sea lines of -
communication; providing direct air support to ground forces op~rating on
maritime axes; dafense against landing forces; convoy escort; defense of
ship forces and convoys on the sea transit; reconnaissance and MTO [def.ense
against underwater ordnance].
The amphibious operation on the Shetlands occupied an important place in the
e;cercise. Around 8,000 marines of navies of the United States, Great
3r:iCain and the Netherlands were landed by a comb.ined method (water ::r;~f t,
~ landing craft and helicopters) in its course. Operations by the amphibious
for.ce were supported by carrier-based and tactical aircraft as well as
sh ip s' gun s. �
- Air defense of the attack carrier groups and detachments of amphibious war-
fare ships was accomplished by escort forces in close coordination with
capabilities of the joint system of NATO air defense in Europe.
Spccial attention was given during the "Autumn Forge-78" maneuvers to a
study of different variants for reinforcing NATO attack groupings in the
Eur.opean theaters of military operations. This mi~sion was accomplished by
shifting American and British units and subunits of ground forces, air _
for.ces and marines to Central Europe and to the bloc's flanks, and by
carrying out mobi].ization activities in European countries belonging to
NA10.
According to data of the American newspaper ARMY TIMES, military transport
aircraft and transport vessels of the United States delivered around 13,000
American service personnel,zndcombatequipment and m ilitary cargoes with an
overall weight of 37,000 tons to the European Continent in "Reforger" 10,
an integrated exercise of the American Armed Forces (August-November). The
mission of delivering personnel directly to the zone of combat operations
was worked in this phase.
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Cc:~mbat operations were played out within the f ramework of this militaristic
show of force by combined units and units of the American Army V Corps
sCationeci in the FRG, by subunits moved from the United States, and by
ground units of some western European countries of the bloc during the
"Certain Shield" opposed forces troop exercise. It included the deployment -
of troop groupings, conduct of off ensive, delaying, and defensive actions,
. ~ tactical airborne landings, combat employment of f ire support helicopters
equipped with ATGM's, and the accomplishment of command and control,
coordination and communications missions.
Headquarters of the U.S. Army VII Corps and its organic divisions conducted _
the "Cardinal Sword" command and staff exercise. Special a~tent-ion was `
given to redeployment of troops, movement of reserves up from the depths,
organization of str~ng counterblows with a subsequent assumption of the
offensive, and the interworking of ground forces and tactical aviation. E
Exercise "Reforger" 10 is covered in more detail in the "Ground Forces"
section of this same issue of. the journal.
According to foreign press reports, major troop exercises within the frame-
work of "Autumn Forge" also were held with other army corps (L-he Netherlands,
Great Britain, Belgium and the FRG) stationed in the Central F.uropean _
Theater of Military Operations. 1~ao or three days usually were planned for
_ accomplishing tactical defensive missions, and the .r.emaining time was used
to play out offensive actions, the forward movement and redeployment of
troops, tactical airborne landings and so on. Problems of moving reserves
anil assaulting water obstacles occupied a prominent place.
As reported in the foreign press,Exercise "Display Determination-78" was
~ co?iducted 15 September-13 October in the Southern European Theater of Mili-
tary ~pera~ions. Command elements and staffs of national and joint armEd
- forces in the theater, mobile bloc forces, and naval attack forces of NATO
in the Med-iterranean were brought in to participate. Missions accomplished
~luring the exercise included the conversion of armed forces from a peace- I~
time to a war footing, the organization and conduct of combat actions in
- ~:n:itial operations without the use of nuclear weapons, winning sea supremacy
and air superiority, interworking of combined units and units of different
~ nationalities and so on.
P-fovement of U.S. tactical aireraft to Europe ~aas accompiished within the
framework of the American Air Force Exercise "Crested Cap" and that of the
:tarines within the framework of the exercise hy NATO's joint navies,
"Northern Wedding-78." The foreign military press emphasizes the consider-
able increase in the role of the American Marines in beefing up attack
groupings in Europe. While they were moved chiefly to Northern Norway in
the past, marine units and subunits took part in NATO exercises in Southern
Norway and the Baltic Straits area in the present fall maneuvers.
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A great deal of a:.tention was given, as before, to checking the mobiliza- -
_ tic~n readiness oi the bloc countries' armed forces. Large reserve contin-
gents were brought in for the primary exercises. According to the French
newspaper FIGARO, Exercise "Blaue Donau" by the FRG Army TI Corps practiced -
mob ilization deployment of new Bundeswehr units. Ztaenty-four hours were -
given for notif ication, assembly and complete equipping of the reservists.
In cor~ducting the "Autumn Forge-78" maneuvers, the NATO command pursued the
goal of giving staffs and troops practice in planning and conducting combat
_ actions during initial operations of a modern war. Vast regions of NATO's
Western European countries actually were converted into military ranges '
f:om the latter half of September of last year. On the territory of the
- FRG alone eight major exercises were held almost simultaneously (see
- sketch) [Sketch not reproduced. Caption: Locations of primary exercises of. -
NATO member countries on FRG territory in September-October 1978.], in
which all combined units of the Northern and Central army groups and -
con?mand elements of NATO ground forces in Schleswig-Holstein, Jutland and
on Fuenen Island took part. Troops trained in conducting active offensive
actions characterized by great scope and swift tempos.
As western military observers noted, American strategic aircraft took part
in this type of exercise for the first time. B-52 bombers from SAC flew -
combat sorties from the continental United States.
The series of fall exercises concluded with a final command and staff exer-
cise by the NATO joint armed forces (November), which examined problems of
employing tactical nuclear weapons in a strategic operation in the European ~
Theater of War.
As the experience of "Autumn Forge" type maneuvers shows, the NATO comman~
is stepping up the intensity of operatienal and con~ar training of bloc
~ armed forces from year to year and is improving its forms. T.he scope and
ctiaracter of actions being practiced attest to a build-up of military
efforts by imperialist circles and about their aggressive intentions.
The activation of NATO's militaristic demonstrati.ons obligates Soviet mili-
tary personnel to maintain high vigilance constantly and always be ready to
come to the defense of the homeland and the achievements of socialism in
close cooperation with military personnel of fraternal socialist countries.
~ COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1979
_ 6 904
CSO: 1801
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SOVIET COMMENTS ON CONTROL OF COALITION FORCES
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 4, Apr 79 signed to
press 6 Apr 79 pp 15-18
(Article by Col I. Andreyev based on views of the NATO command: "Selected
Problems of Comm~.nd and Control of Coalition Forces"]
[Text] In preparing for a new war, the military-political leadership of the
aggressive North Atlantic Alliance is paying constant attention to improving
command and control. It views this as one of the most important conditions
f~~r achieving success in conducting combat operations. It is bel~eved that
the control system has to provide for rapid consultations of the NATO
command element and governments of bloc member countries for making
- coordinated decisions on primary issues when there is an aggravation of the
international situation and the appearance of extraordinary circumstances;
an organized conversion of armed forces and the countries' economies from _
a peacetime to a war footing; efficiency, flexibility, centralization and
secrecy in command and control of combined units and units; preservation of
deep secrecy around plans for war preparations; the continuous and effec-
tive ~oordination of joint and national command elements of branches of
armed forces and combat arms; continuous collection of data on the enemy,
and so on. -
Control points of NATO command elements set up in peacetime play an impor-
ta.nt role in accomplishing the above missions. These are stationary
(protected underground points) and mobile (accommodated aboard special air-
craft, helicopters, motor vehicles and trains). They are outf itted with
contemporary communications, situation display facilities and data trans-
mi.ssion equipment.
The following measures are to be conducted for the purpose of a further
development of the control system of coalition armed f orces at the bloc
level: improvement of the structure of supreme military entities and staffs;
an improvement.in the planning of combat operations; standardization of
ordnance, combat equipment and the basic operational documents (introduction
of common formatted combat documents--orders, instructions, reports--in the
troops); an increase in the level of language training (primarily the study
of ~;nglish by NATO country officers); regular exercises and practices by
troops of varying nationality conducted under a uniform methodology, and so
' on . � a
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Ttiere is a reorganization of NATO's supreme entities being conducted along
tlie line of setting up component elements (,directorates and sections) on
staffs which would be capable of planning combat operations of the coali�-
L:ion armed forces with use both of nuclear and conventional weapons.
Particular attention here is being given to a rational manning of staffs by
specially trained officers from various bloc countries so that, as the bloc
command element deliberately emphasizes, each country "can take a direct
part in developing decisions on primary military issues" (see table) [table
~ not reproduced].
Officer training for major staffs of the joint armed forces is conducted at
the NATO War College in Rome and in a special school (the town of
Oberammergau in the FRG). Instruction there is conducted in English. This
makes it considerably simpler to overcome the diff iculties caused by the
language barrier in elaborating plans and making decisions in the highest
echelon of military control.
In the estimate of foreign specialists, this structure of the joint staffs _
and rheir manning helps on the whole in resolving problems of controlling -
coalition forces, primarily at the highest level.
The foreign press has emphasized that the problem of interworking of joint
and national commands and attaining the maximum possible compatibility of
control systems generates greatest concern among bloc leaders. These diffi-
culties are being overcome in part by determining ahead of time the cate-
gor.ies of combined units and units te be transferred to operational control
of the NATO command, the procedure and time periods of their resubordina-
tion, and allocation of spheres of responsibility among joint and national
control entities.
It is generally known that the bloc joint armed forces include personnel
and weapons of the joint system of NATO air defense in Europe, mobile
furces, and permanent naval forces in the Atlantic and the English Channel
area in peacetime. With the announcement of a simple alert all combat units
primarily intended for inclusion in bloc joint forces are transferred to -
them. But the national commands carry out logistical support of the trans-
ferred troops. In addition, these commands bear responsibility for the
' communications zone.
A majority of the national contingents (from army corps on down) are
subordinate to the national command element. Resubordination of units and
subunits to the command element of a different nation occurs only in excep- _
tional instances if the situation requires it. _
The assignment of special liaison groups from all narional command elements
(chiefly from army corps) to superior joint commands is envisaged for
successful command and coatrol in the multinational structure of NATO. For
example, there is a group of liaison off icers made up of 11 persons (three
from the FRG, one each from Belgium and the Netherlands and six from other
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states) on the staff af the Northern Army Group. Each officer is obligated
tc> know English, the weapons and combat equipment of all bloc member coun-
_ ties, as well as the organizational structure of troops and all documents
on coordination effective in NATO.
One of the primary objectives of joint exercises and practices is to work
out coordination primarily at the tactical level, where differences in the
level of combat readiness of units and subunits, in language and so on have
the most telling effect. Provisions are being made above all to secure the
boundaries between combined units of different nations which, in the
estimate of foreign specialists, are especially vulnerable. Operations by ~
- units and subunits in these sectors require detailed coordination. To this
end NATO has elaborated special statutes regulating troop missions on
flanks (boundaries), deadlines for restoration of forces for covering the
f lanks, and organization of coordination. They have to guarantee mutual
support and the delivery of coordinated attacks, including air strikes. ~
~
~ The foreign press emphasizes that special importance is assumed by identi-
fi.cation both of allied and enemy troops during the conduct of combat oper-
- ations as part of coalition formations. For this reason NATO has set up
special instructions in peacetime for me~tual recognition of units and
subunits, which are used in joint exercises. The instructions cover the
~ transmission of various light signals and use of signal flares.
Serious attention is being given to the battalion echelon which, with the
help of skilled interpreters, provides cemmunications ~aith adjacent,
supportin~ and la~istical subunits. One of the NATO command's requirements
f or communications is an obligatory consideration for differences in mili-
tary equipment used for this purpose. For example, U.S. Army enciphered _
conununications cannot be used by the units and combined units of other
- countries, while some apparatus for enciphering wire communications avail-
able in West European armies is incompatible with American gear. NATO has
~ established uniform terminology (connected especially with the conduct of
ar.tiller.y fire and with transmission of data on the enemy) and has
el3~or.ated instructions translated into all languages of bloc member coun-
*_ries and serving as the basis for properly maintaining liaison during
combat actions, primaril} at the "brigade-battalion" level.
The exchange of intelligence also is given an important place. Foreign
military specialists believe that the accumulation of information on the
enemy within the framework of the bloc depends largely on its being at the
disposal of national command elements. It is planned to set up special
intelligence processing groups at control points of the joint command
elements. Each commander bears personal responsibility for organizing the
collection of necessary information on the enemy within his zone of respon-
- sibility and for making it known to the joint command.
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IiJ.oc military specialists believe that introduction of a standard Format
for planning combat operations in NATO substantially facilitated the
control of coalition forces. But there still are differences in the under-
standing of tactical issues, in the graphic presentation of the concept, in
certain special terms and so on. It is planned to eliminate these deficien-
cies through personal contact of commanders and use of interpreters and
liaison groups.
Con~nanders at all levels are acquiring skills in command and control when
conducting combat actions as part of the coalition during joint operational
and combat training activities. For example: in the annual "Autumn Forge"
maneuvers the NATO command element performs an. immediate check of the effec-
_ tiveness of the system for controlling joint armed forces it has created.
The basis of this system are regulations, manuals and so-called standing
- instructions which regulate the procedure for combat employment of combined
units and f ormations in a battle or operation. The latter are an appendix ~
to the uniform regulations developed at the present time for actions by
ground forces and tactical aviation. For example, the NATO ground forces
regulation is supplemented by more than 30 such instructions: operation
orders with appendices, orders on logistics and ~ITO [defense against under-
water ordnance], reports on results of air srrikes and artillery and mortar
bombardment, situation reports, intelligence report~, forms for planning a ir
movements, and so on. Each NATO joint tactical air command has dozens of
its own standing instructions.
_ Foreign military specialists believe that the introduction of uniform
personnel training programs, methodologies for holding exercises and prac-
tices, and common criteria for evaluating the results of combat training
also help in successful resolution of tr~e problem of controlling coalition
forces. These documents are drawn up by staff s of army gr.oups and OTAK
[joint tactical air commands], coordinated with national command elements
and approved by commanders in chief of NATO joint armed forces in theaters
of military opera*ions.
As the foreign press has reported, a certain amount of experience has been
gained at the present time by the bloc supreme command and the staffs in
controllir.g coalition armed forces during major exercises involving troops
of different nations. The standardization being carried out ~aithin the bloc
also helped this to no small degree. In particular, in evaluating joint
operations of the Bundeswehr and uther NATO troops during Exercise "Autu~nn
_ Forge-78," FRG i-Iinister of Defense H. Apel remarked that overall coordi-
nation had been arranged in bloc armed forces as a whole, but that
there remain problems involving language barriers and the organization of
control at the tactica]. level. They have to be resolved Chrough a further
deepening of standardization in documenting information.
A special role is given to the NATO Military Committee in this process,
inasmuch as it bears responsibility as the bloc's supreme military entity
for elaborating common strategy and tactics of the troops and for adopting
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~ common regul~tions, manuals and other documents. The Committee also
~ condiicts centralized planning of operational and combat training at the
NATO level and monitors the fulfillment of agreements in the f ield of -
seandardication.
The military-political leadership of the North Atlantic Alliance thus is ~
seeking to achieve complete subordination of national armed forces to its
own interests. In addition to carrying on extensive ideological condi-
tioning of personnel in the anti-Soviet and anticommunist spirit, it is
attempting to set up a finely tuned military mechanism for implementing -
the aggressive plans of imperialism.
GOPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1979
6904
- CSO: 1801
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SOVIET CUrIIKENTS ON NATO 'REFORGER' EXERCISE
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 4, Apr 79 signed to
press 6 Apr 79 pp 19-24
[Article by Maj G. Vasil'yev: "Exercise 'Ref orger' 10." Passages elclosed
in slantliues printed in bol.dface. ]
[Text] Ttiauks to the peaceloving efforts of the CPSU and Soviet government,
firm foundations have been laid down in recent years in the relaxation of
international tensions and the achievement of a mutual understanding among
narions. But reactionary circles of imperialist states are attempting to
return minkind to the "cold war" times and provoke armed conflicts by placing
special t~opes on the aggressive NATO military bloc. An important role is -
given to militaristic demonstrations in this regard, which are bei.ng inces-
santly conducted near the borders of socialist countries. -
Troop and command and staff exercises are one of the primary forms for
preparing ~iATO`s joint armed forces for war. The primary goal of these exer-
cises is ro work out different varzants in unleashing armed conflicts against
countries of the Warsaw Pact and training staff s and troops to conduct combat
operations under conditions which approximate to the maximum those of a
realistic wartime situation.
Maneuvers held regularly by American tioops with the participation of com-
bined units and units of other bloc armies under. the codename "Reforger" are
devoted to accomplishing just such mission~. The idea for the "Reforger"
(abbreviated from the English words "Return c~f Forces to Germany") exercises
aiose in 1967 in connection with the return of the U.S. 24th Infantry Divi- -
sion and 3d Separate Armored Cavalry Regiment from the FRG to the United -
State:.~ together with combat support and combat service support subunits (a
total of 35,000 persons). The troops who were moved and the cc,mbat equipment
stockpiled for them on tJest German territory remained part of the NATO joint
armed forces according to their operational mission. The "dual basing" con-
cept was tested in practice for the first time i:z i969, when 12,000 service
personnel were moved from the American continent to Europe for th~ period of
the exercise.
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The latest exercise, "Reforger" 10, took place in August-October 1978 in the
European Theater of War. It was a component of the NATO joint armed forces �
fall maneuvers under the codename "Autumn Forge-78."
As the foreign press noted, the exercise's military goals reduced primarily
to testing the capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces to move troops of the
strategic reserve from the American continent to Europe for reinforcement of
the existing grouping of joint armed forces of the North Atlantic Alliance
and for practicing operational deployment and the conduct of combat opera-
tions in the initial period oi a war.
_ Political goals also were pur~sued: to demonstrate the U.S. government's
capab ility and resolve to give the necessary assistance t~o its NATO
- satellites in conformity with obligations it had assumed; to emphasize the
bloc's unity; and to urge its allies toward a further buil3-up in military
preparations under cover of the myth of the "threat from tt~e East." The
exercise plan, under which military operations were begun, as always, by the
"Orange," also was drawn up i~: a tendentious manner with consideration of
this.
According to the leaders' plan, the beginning of the exercise was preceded
by "complication" of the international situation in Europe, which then
developed into an armed conflict between NATO countries ("Blue") and the
Warsaw Pact ("Orange").
While the military-political situation is growing complicated, the "Blue"
command element is taking steps to convert troops from a peacetime to a war
footing and for their secret mobilization. It is moving screening units and
subtulits to the border area and the main body to a forward defensive lirie.
There is a simultaneous build-up in the grouping of ground forces and air
forces in Europe through the move of "dual-based"combined units and units
from U.S. ~erritory.
- Under the guise of exercises, the "Orange" troops concentrate in the western ~
borcler areas of rhe GDR and CSSR. Taking advantage of a superiority in
p~rsonnel and weapons, they suddenly "violate" the FRG's state border and
swiftly develop an attack into the depths in order to defeat groupings of
NATO joint armed forces in the Central European Theater of Military Opera-
tions. After overcoming the zone of covering forces, their troops battle
to take the f.orward defensive line. In the situation at hand the "Blue"
forces halt further "enemy" advances at the cost of considerable losses,
deliver a number of counterblows with second echelons (reserves) and assume
. a general counteroffensive.
- As with similar maneuvers of past years, Exercise "Reforger" 10 was conducted
in three phases which were associated by a single concept and by the
missions being accomplished. General Blanchard, CINCUSAREUR, was in charge
of the exercise. Control over the air movement of troops and cargoes was
assigned to fleadquarters, U.S. Military Airlift Command of the Air Force,
and control of movements by sea was assigned to the Military Sealift Command.
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During/Phase One/(15 August-17 September) there was a move of personnel from
the United States to Europe by the combination method, arrj.ving troops -
received combat equipment and heavy weapons from American depots in the FRG
and subsequently moved up to operating areas. A total of around 13,C!00
service personnel and over 37,000 tons of cargo caere delivered.
According to foreign press reports, forward support groups intended for
receiving, servicing and accompanying the arriving units and subunits were
moved by air initially (15-31 August) to West European airfields.
Subsequently (1-13 September) aircraft delivered the main contingent of
service personnel with light weapons from the 9th Infantry, lst, 4th, 5th
Mechanized and lOlst Air Assault divisions and from combat support and combat
service support subunits of the National Guard and Army Reserve.
C-141 and C-SA military transport aircraft were assigned the airlift
missions and flew an overall total of around 140 sorties. As the foreign
press noted, f our heavy Boeing 747 aircraft of the civilian airline TWA were
used for the first time to transport troops. They car.ried over. 600 persons
and around 70 tons of cargo.
~ Personnel were loaded at airfields located near permanent bases of the units
and subunits used for the exercise. 'I'he military transport aircrafl- flew at
an altitude of 9,000-10,000 m at an average speed of up to 800 km/hr over
the so-called North Atlantic Route with an intermediate landing at Goose Bay
Air Base (Canada) for refueling. Unloading (taking 20-40 minutes per air-
craft) was accomplished at Ramstein and Rhein-rfain air bases (FRG) and at
Brussels (Belgium), Schiphol (the Netherlands) and Luxembourg air bases.
After dis~mbarking from the aircraft, the arriving service personnel were _
taken by motor transport to American depots in West Germany (in the vicinity
of Germersheim, Karlsruhe, Kaiserslautern, Mannheim and Pirmasens) for
demothballing, checking and preparing comi~at equipment for the u.pcoming
' graund phase of the exercise. The motorized infantry battalions required an
average of 4 hours to receive their authorized combat vehicles. Combat
readiness of the combat equipment stored at the depots comprised 90-95
percent.
The naval tra~tsports "Admiral Callahan" and "Comet" rarried over 50 medium
tan~cs, around 120 army helicopters, 30 APC's, 1,000 vehicles and trailers,
and up to 300 containers of military cargees for the exercise. Around 3
days were spent loading combat equipment and cargoes in the port of Beaumont
(Texas) and 16 days for the crossing of the Atlantic (the route was over
_ 9,000 km long). On the route across the Atlantic the American transpores
were protected by ships of NAT~ member countries. Problems of couybating
"enemy" submarines were practiczd while escorting the sea convoy.
The transports were unloade~ in the ports of Ghent (Belgium) and Rotterdam
(the Netherlands), to wh~ch tank driver-mechanics, helicopter crews and
~ vehicle drivers had proceeded ahead of time.
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Sub sequently the tracked vehicles and heavy weapons were transloaded to rail-
road flatcars for shipment to West Germany. Wheeled combat equipment was
_ sent to assembly points located in the immediate vicinity of the ports of
debarkation to undergo maintenance, after which they proceeded under their
own powel in columns of 20-30 vehicles with 30-50 minute intervals between -
columns. Technical monitoring and servicing points were deployed along move-
ment routes (every 30-40 km). The average movement speed of the vehicular
columns was 40-50 km/hr.
In addition to this, in Phase One of the exercise the American command moved
- two squadrons of F-4 tactical fighters (48 aircraft) to the FRG from Seymour
Johnson Air Base (North Carolina). Their flight was made without intermedi-
ate landings (with aerial refueling).
/Phase Two/ (18-28 September) played out an opposed forces troop exercise of
_ the U.S. Army V Corps under the codename "Certain Shield" and a command and '
staff exercise by the U.S. Army VII Corps under the codename "Cardinal Sword."
Their primary content was the practicing of the organization and conduct of ~
def ensive and offansive actions against superior "enemy" forces.
Exercise "Certain Shield" took place on 18-28 September on the territory of _
the West German State of Hesse.
Participating in it ~oere ground forces including units and subunits of the
4th, 5th, 8th Mechanized and 3d Armored divisions, llth Separate Armored
Cavalry Regiment, 229th Ariuy Aviation Battalion, and two field artiilery
groups fron, the United States and the 34th Tank Brigade, 2d Infantry Division -
of the Bundeswehr; and air forces including units and subunits of the U.S. 3d
and 17th 3ir forces, the FRG Tactical Air Command, as well as aircraft of
Great Britain and Canada. Other units moved from the United States perf ormed
firing at West German ranges.
A total of around 56,000 service personnel, 2,800 tracked vehicles, 6,400
wheeled vehicles, and up to 500 aircraft and helicopters took part. Overall
directian of the exerc ise was assigned to Lt Gen S. Berry, commander of _
tl~e V Corps. Units and subunits of the U.S. 3d Armored Division and the
FRG's 34th Tank Brigade operated realistically on the "Orange" side and repre-
sented a tank army in the exercise, while the remaining troops operated on
the "Blue" side (an army corps was deployed conditionally). _
~'he exercise began early on the morning of 18 September with a violation of ~
~he conditional state border by the "Orange." By the end of 19 September
:hey had succeeded in overcoming the delaying actions of screening troops in
~iie security zone as a result of intensive f ighting. Combat operations were
char.acterized by variable success in the following 2 days.
In attempting to prevent further "enemy" advances, the "Blue" forces
delivered a series of counterattacks with the simultaneous launching of
serikes by tactical aircraft and f ire support helicopters. The "Orange"
troops halted the offensive without having broken the defenders' resistence.
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The "Blue" forces drew reserves up from the depth, regrouped, assumed the
counteroffensive across the entire front after a powerful fire preparation,
threw back the "Orange" troops and restored the initial position on the
conditional border.
Exercise "Cardinal Sword" was held from 18 through 23 September on FRG
territory (in the vicinity of Bischofsheim, Kronach, Kuenzelsau, and
~ Aschaffenburg).
The fo.llowing headquarters were brought in for the exercise: the VII
Corps, lst and 3d Mechanized divisions, lst Armored Division, 2d Separate �
Armored Cavalry Regiment, two f ield artillery groups and an engineer brigade
_ of the United States, and the 14th Tank Brigade, 12th Tank Divisiot;. of the
Bundeswehr were the ground forces; and units and subunits of the U.S. 3d and
17th air forces as well as subunits of the FRG, Great Britain and Canada
represented the air forces.
Lt Gen J. Beckton, commander of VII Corps, exercised overall direction of .
the exercise.
A tank army (the troops were not actually represented) operated conditi.onally
on the "Orange" side and the aforementioned participants on the "Blue" side
in conf ormity with the exercise plan.
The play of combat actions began on the morning of 18 September. The
"Orange" forces conducted powerf ul f ire preparation at dawn, took advantage
of the surprise factor, violated the conditional state bor~ier and assumed
the offensive, concentrating main efforts in the penetration sector.
Supported by artillery and aviation, the "Blue" force.s conducted delaying
actions to slow up the advance of attacking troops and give their main body
favorable conditions for deployment and organized commitment,
Despite the stubborn resistance of screening f.orces, the "Orange" forces
overcame the security zone in 2 days of combat operations and moved up to
the forward defensive line. In the following days the "Orange" forces built
up efforts and wedged into "enemy" defenses to a depth of 7-15 km in
individual sectors. They made tactical airborne landings to develop the
attack tempos.
In the situation at hand the "Blue" forces regrouped ~heir troops, committed
second echelons and assumed a general counteroffensive after delivering
powerful bombing and straf ing attacks.
As noted by the foreign press, significant attention was given in the ground
phase of Exercise "Reforger " 10 to the following matters: employment of
tactical airborne landings and f ire support helicoprers; praceicing methods
of combating kanks and other armored targets; performing aerial reconnaissance
using radioelectronic capabilities; exploring methods for optimum use of
means of transport to move troops and cargoes to areas of combat operations;
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periccting means of combat support and combat service support to troops; and
improving the system of control, communications and coordination of combined _
units and units of different nationality.
In particular, exercises were conducted in parallel with Exercise "Reforger"
10 to work out the coordination of NATO troop actions in operations of the
initial period of a war. These exerc ises were "Saxon Drive" (19-29 September)
by the Netherlands Army I Corps and "Display Determination-78" (15.September-
13 October) by the NATO joint armed forces in the Southern European Theater
of Military Operations with the participation of separate U.S. Army units
and subunits.
In /Phase III/ ;28 September-27 October), the combined units and units moved
from the United States for Exercise "Reforger" 10 performed artillery and
tank field firing at the Grafenwoehr Range and mothballed and turned over
combat equipment and heavy weapons to American depots in West Germany.
The return of troops and military cargoes by air and sea to the American
continenr was accomplished in the same order as i_n the first phase of the -
e~;ercise. Combat equipment was delivered to ports of embarkation from areas
where the ground phase of the exercise had been held and personnel and light
weapons were delivered to the airf ields from the depot areas. �
According to foreign press reports, 23 service personnel died and 198 were =
injured during the e~ercise (in 1977 there were 17 killed and 120 injured).
The total cost of damage to roads and crops during the NATO fall maneuvers -
is set ar $19 million.
Western observers note that the objectives set by the American command for
Exercise "Reforger" 10 were completely attained. A feature of the 1978
exercise is a noticeable expansion in the contingent of U.S. Army units and
subunits used to practice combat training missions under conditions of the
European Theater of War. It is emphasized in this regard that a signif icant
portion of the troops moved to the FRG under the exercise plan do not come ~
t~-~der the so-called "dual-based" combined units, the combat equipment of
whici~ is stored at American depots in West Germany in case of war.
According to a statement by official NATO representatives, the bloc's
leaders plan to continue to hold "Reforger" type exercises. A new Exercise
"Reforger," which the foreign press reports was held in the FRG in
January-February 1979 for the first time since 19;3,can serve as confirmation
of lhis intent of the NATO strategists. Like the fall exercise, it had
three phases: a move of personnel and combat equipment from the continental
Uiiited States to Western Europe "to reinforce NATO in a critical situation,"
exercises by combined units and units of American troops and their allies,
and the return movement. A total of over 65,000 officers and men of armed
forces of *he United States, FRG, Great Britain, Canada, the Netherlands and
Luxembourg took part in this exercise.
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The. large-scale exercises being held in Western Europe attest to the fact
that militarisCic circles of the North Atlantic Alliance are continuing
intensive military preparations having a clearly aggressive character and
aimed primarily against the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist
community. All this obligates Soviet military personnel to increase their
combat readiness constantly and stand vigilantly on guard over the revolu-
tionary achievements of the people.
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1979
~ 6904
CSO: 1801
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~
SOVIET COMMENTS O1V U.S. GROUND FORCES ORGANIZATION ~
~
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 4, Apr 79 signed to
press 6 Apr i9 pp 24-25
- [Article by Col B. Yushakov: "A Build-Up in the U.S. Army's Power"]
[Text) In continuing to develop plans for new aggressive wars, U.S. mili-
taristic circles are conducting extensive activities to raise the combat
readiness of ground forces and outfit them with the latest systems of ord-
nanc:e and combat equipment.
As L-he American press notes, the organizational development of tile country's
= ground forces in 1979 is being planned along the following basic lines: an
increase in the strength of the U.S. Army in Europe by mid-year of 8,200
persons, who will be used to bring up to strength the combat units and
subunits of f our divisions, three separate brigades and two separate armored
cavalry regiments stationed in the FRG; an increase of three battalions in
the composition of corps and division artillery; the move of weaponry from
_ the United States to Europe for one more armored division (the movement will
be accomplished by sea and is to be completed by the end of 1979, including _
the construction of new depots and mothballing of ordnance and equipment);
aild the delivery there of another 210,000 tons of ammunition, after which
the total ammunition stockpiles in this war theater will comprise 700,000
t~-~ns, and by the beginning of 1983 they will practically double and reach 1.3
million tons.
In ].979 there will be an increase in the U.S. Army inventory in Europe of
719 tanks (this will lead to a 19 percent increase in their numbers in the
;uropean War Theater), 914 APC's and 316 Improved Hawk ZRK [surface-to-air
.nissile system], which will increase their numbers by 19 and 16 percent
respectively. In addition, the U.S. Armed Forces command intends to increase
::t~e combat readiness of the ground forces grouping in Europe by beef ing up
means of electronic warfare, communications, and chemical defianse and by
increasing the unit reserves.
- A great deal of importance is attached to combined units and units of the
strategic reserve stationed in the United States and intended for movement to ~
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Europe. The U.S. Army command envisages deliveries of a signif icant amount -
~ of weapons and an increase of the strength of combat units and subunits of
the lst Mechanized Division, 4th Mechanized Di.vision, 2d Armored Division,
5th Mechanized Division and 24th Infantry Division to 100 percent.
During the year the 24th Infantry Division will complete a conversion to the
T/0&~ of a mechanized division and it will be redesignated the 24th Mechan-
ized Division. As units and subunits of the 2d Infantry Division are removed
from South Korea, they will be converted to the T/0&E of a"heavy" division.
In this regard it is planned to activate two new tank battalions, an army
aviation (helicopter) battalion, and battalions of the Hawk ZRK and field
artillery.
According to western press reports, the Pentagon's organizational activities
conciucted after the end of the Vietnamese War permitted a change of the
ratio in the strength of the headquarters apparatus and support subunits and
combat units in the ground forces in favor of the latter. It is planned to
bring the personnel strength of combat subunits at the tactical level up to
63 percent in 1979 and to provide the troops as a whole with 81 percent o.�
battle tanks, 87 percent of fire support helicopters and 92 percent of self-
propelled artillery (with respect to authorized numbers).
The American command also is planning to cease production of M60 tanks and
its modifications by 1980 and accelerate the production of the new XM1 tanks.
It is planned to supply the f irst 110 vehicles of this type to units and
subunits as early as 1979. The U.S. Army command intends to ask Congress to
- agree to the production of at least 7,000 XM1 tanks instead of the approved _
3,31.2.
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1979
6904
CSO: ].801
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SOVIET CONII~IENTS ON U.S. AND NATO MILITARY BASE SYSTEM ~
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENr10YE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 5, May 79 signed
to press 4 May 79 pp 3-10
[Article by riaj Gen R. Simonyan, doctor of military sciences, professor:
"Imperialism's System of Military Bases"]
[Text] In recent years the mast reactionary forces of imperialism,
weapons makers, and militarists have joined in a broad campaign against
derente and disarmament. With increasing regularity they attempt to sup-
press people's liberation movements by force and intervene in the domes-
tic affairs of other countries. Carrying out the will of these reac-
tionary circles, the Pentagon, followed by the leadership of the NATO
bloc, often revises its military-political views, military strategies,
and strategic conceptions. However, they have a common foundation:
ttte aspiration to set up a system of support points in foreign terri- .
tory which can be used to carry out the aggressive designs of imper-
ialism on a global scale.
Historically the policy of locating miliLary bases in foreign lands be-
gan in the days of colonialism. Its primary purpose was construction ~
~f military outposts. The colonizers relied on them to keep enslaved
peoples in submission. Military bases became especially significant in
~he age of imperialism. `I'he capitalist countries began using them in
the struggle to divide up an already divided world, to put down people's
actions toward national independence, and to guard the sea and air lines
of communication between the mother countries and the colonies. After
World War II the so-called "base strategy" of imperialism was further _
elahorated. The United States, which had assumed the role of a kind of
gunrantor of international capitalism, began setting up a global system
of. bases and deploying enormous amounts of inen and equipment at them.
In its striving for world domination the White House has given excep-
tionally great attention to this aspect of its foreign policy. Accord-
ing to the testimony of H. Kissinger, "We (that is, the United States -
author) even looked at military alliances chiefly from the point of
view of the possibility of using them to get the air bases we needed."
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The military authorities frequently have exclusive jurisdiction in rela-
, tj.on to all persons living or working at the military facility, regardle~s
of citizenship.
The Pentagon has been modifying and improving its military bases through- _
out the entire postwar geriod, adapting them to the demands and poten-
tial of new weapons, above all nuclear missiles. In this connection they
have built launch sites to launch guided missiles. In addition, nuclear
ammunition storehouses have been built and the system of communications
is constantly being developed and ref ined. "
As the foreign press emphasizes, many air bases in foreign lands, for
example in Spain or Micronesia, are designated not only for tactical,
but also strategic aviation. The capacities of the airfields are such
that the number of planes stationed at them can be increased sharply. -
During certain periods of the war in Vietnam, for example, the American
command concentrated about half of its strategic aviation in Southeast .
- Asia.
Foi-eign military specialists consider that the naval bases should main-
tain constant presence of American ships, aviation, and marine units in
regions that are thousands of miles f rom the United States. In their
opinion, the navy has a steadily increasing role to play in demonstra-
tions of force and putting pressure on other countries. Another factor
considered here is that, for reasons that are perfectly clear, it is _
becoming harder and harder for the imperialist p~wers to maintain large
contingents of their own troops in foreign landsa
- In this respect, Adm T. Moorer, former chairman of the U. S. Joint Chiefs
of Staff, made a revealing admission. He said, "Although the United
SLates is pursuing a global policy (and is bound by treaty obligations
to 43 countries), current trends are such that we should expect even
greater resistance to granting the right to foreign bases and flights over
foreign territory. The time may soon come in many regions of the world when
we will not be able to move our ground and air forces through the ports
and airfields ava ilable to us as was done in Lebanon, the Domini.can
Republic, and Vietnam. Therefore, the American Navy must be ready for
periodic, unforeseen actions in various regions of the world in conflicts
of varying scale." The fears of the imperialist circles are not un-
founded� This has been confirmrd once again by the events in Iran where
the popular masses resolutely opposed the American presence in the
country. -
At the present time the United States has concentrated i~s greatest number
of military bases in Western Europe, especially the central part. This
region occupies the chief place in American imperialism's "base strategy" -
and is considered the main base of operations for preparing and conducting
" military actions against the socialist countries. At the present time
the United States maintains about 200 large military sites with up to
?.25,000 servicemen in West Germany. Great B:itain is also keeping its
military bases in this region with the principal grouping of English
ground forces, the 55,000-strong British Army of the Rhine, stationed
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~~o~i ~1~ r rc rni, irsi. ~rr~,r
~ ~t. them. Ronghly 7,000 nuclear warheads are stored at special storehouses
in Western Europe under the control of the American command.
_ The military bases of the NATO countries form two large ares in Northern -
and Southern Europe. The northern arc passes through Great Britain,
Iceland, Norway, and Denmark, while the southern arc goes through Spait,, ~
Italy, Greece, Turkey, and the Mediterranean islands.
There are more than 20 diff erent American bases with 2U,500 personnel in
Great Britain. The most important one is the advance atomic missile
submarine base at Holly Loch, to which the 14th U. S. Navy Atomic
MissilQ Submarine Squadron is signed. The Pentagon also gives an im-
portant role to its air bases in this country. These bases are suitable
for various classes of fighting planes including strategic bombers.
Several headquarters of the American armed forces are in Great Britain:
U. S. Navy in the European Zone (London), 3rd Air Army (Mildenhall), and
14t_h U. S. Navy Atomic Missile Submarine Squadron (Holly Loch). Near
rtoor on the east ;~~ast of Gr.eat Britain is a radar post which, together
with the Clear post in Alaska and Thule in Greenland, is assigned to de-
_ tect the launching of strategic missiles. According to official figures
it cost the United States 120.4 million dollars to build it.
The American base at Kef lavi~c in Iceland supports aviation of the U. S.
Ai.r Force and Navy and of NATO. Its strategic importance is a result
af its location near important lines of communication between Europe
and North America. The facilities at this important site enable it to
talce all types of strategic, tactical, and transport aircraft.
In Norway, the foreign press has reported, the airfields at Gardermoen,
Bocib, anci Bardofoss have been equipped with underground hangars and
storehouses for basing units of the Unified T1AT0 Air Forces. In addi-
t-i.on, 15 very large civilian airfields have been redesigned according
to the requirements of tile bloc command. Along the Norwegian coast
there are three naval bases, seven basin~ points, and numerous bays
~hat can be used to disperse the bases of NATO ships. The rlorwegian
minister of defense R. Hansen recently told representatives of the
press that the government intends to make a decision to stockpile
military gear and equipment for subunits of the British and Canadian
armed forces in Norwegian territory.
- An extensive network of headquarters of the Unif ied Armed Forces of
NATO, three large naval bases (Copenhagen, Frederikshavn, and Kors~r),
anci four airfields, as well as other military sites are located in
Denmark. Many of. them were constructed according to the NATO infra-
structure program. Since 1951, with the consent of Danish militar-
istic circles, Greenland, which belongs to Denmark, has been included
in what is called the "security zone of the American continent" within
the NATO system. It has been converted into a vast American
military base of operations in the Arctic. They have built two air
bases there, including Thule, the lar~est air base in these northern
regions, as well as several naval basing points. In addition, radio
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, engineering stations have been established there for early detection and
navigation support for American atomic missile submarines.
An extensive system of imperialist strongpoints has been established in
the southern part of the European continent. In Spain, especially,
large American air bases have been built at Torrejon (near Madrid)
and Zaragoza, as well as the important air and naval complex at Rota on
the Atlantic coast. These sites have more than 9,000 personnel, The
United States concluded the first agreement to build these bases with
the Franco Government in 1953. The treaty was extended in 1970, and
then a new one was concluded in 1975. Rota, as the base of the 16th
Atomic Missi"le Submarine Squadron, which is equipped with Poseidon
missiles, plays the key role in the U. S. system of military bases in
Spain. The principal aviation element based at Rota is naval recon-
naissance aviation. These planes carry on observation beyond the ap-
proaches to Gibraltar from the Atlantic and Mediterranean sides. The
journal MILITARY REVIEW, giving an assessment of the strategic importance
of this country to the United States, points out that "Spain not only
occupies an advantageous position as the connecting link with the chief
ports of t.he Mediterra.nean Sea, but also backs up the NATO defensive
structure on its southern flank."
The foreign press observes that the Spanish people are increasingly -
calling for the elimination of th e American military presence. It was
under the influence of these actions that the Pentagon was forced to "
move the 16th Atomic Missile Submarine Squadron irom the Rota naval
base to Kings Bay in the state of Georgia. This transfer is to be
carried out tl:is year.
Italy is given an equally important place in the Pentagon's "base
strategy." As a NATO member Italy has allowed the United States to lo-
cate the shore headquarters of the 6th Fleet in Naples. In the assess-
, ment of foreign esperts, this fleet is the main force of the bloc's
naval strike forces in the Southern European theater. It usually has
two aircraft carriers (160-180 fighting aircraft on board), two or
- thr.ee missile cruisers, up to 20 destroyers and frigates, several
atomic submarines, landing ships, auxiliary vessels, and shore-based
patrol aircraft. In addition to building in Naples, the United Sta~es
has built an airfield for base aviation at Sigonella on the island of
Sicily and a large number of support points in more than 25 regions of
Italy. These military sites have modern means of communication and
various storage and other equipment, A broad network of airfields has
- also been establ.ished in Italy according to the NATO program to base
tactical aviation (Aviano, Ca~tania, and others). According to re*~orts
in the foreign press the Americans, with important bases and support
points for various purposes (naval, aviation, general, supply, communi-
cations, and so on) in L-he country, maintain more than 10,000 military
servicemen in Italy.
Speaking of the significance of this militarily important region to the
Pentagon, the Western press emphasizes: "The United States wi11 be able
to adjust, even if it is painful, to the loss of its other Mediterranean
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5ites, llowevc~r, without its present disposition of forces, tt will noe
he able to operate effectively in this sea without its Italian bases."
rt~i:iy American and NATO bases are concentrated in Greece. In establish-
in~; them NATO strate~ists figure that this country is located at the
intersection of air and sea routes connect:ing Europe with the Middle
East and Africa and borders on countries of the socialist community.
There are foreign military airfields in Suda on the island of Crete
and in continental Greece. The communications center of the Sixth
Fleec is also located on the island of Crete. The United States has -
more than 3,000 military servicemen in Greece.
Tt i.s common knowledge that since August 1974 Greece has occupied a `
special place within NATO. It announced its withdrawal from the mili-
tary organization of the bloc and a review of the status of the American
troops located in Greek territory. Extremely upset by this development
of events, the United States offered Greece almost 1 billion dollars
to keep the previous status of American bases in the country. Judging
Erom reports in the foreign press, in 1976 the Greek Government signed
such a treaty, but did not make a final decision on this question. At
, the present time, foreign strategists are doing everything they can
to force Athens to ratify a new treaty on bases and bring the country
back into the NATO military organization. Their thinking is based on ~
thc, idea that the military presence of American troops in Greece and
T'~_trkey "rel.iably secures the eastern flank of NATO." A weakening of
tlii.s presence would curtail the Pentagon's access to support points in
tIle Eastern Mediterranean and "undermine U. S. power not only in the
mil.itary balance in Europe, but also in the balance of forces along the
entire coast of the Middle East."
'fl~c�r.e are up to 40 American military sites in Turkey, including 26 bases
witt~ 4,800 personnel. The most important ones are Inj~rlik (Adana) and
. Izmir. Intelligence posts whose purpose is to obtain espionage informa-
tic~n about "Soviet activities" are located near the cities of Sinop,
Karamursel, D~yarbakir, and Bolbashi. It is known that in July 1975
the Turlcish Government halted operations at American bases in its
t~~r.ritory in response to an embargo on delivery of U. S. arms which was -
imposed by the Congress after the 1974 Cyprus crisis. At that time Ankara
announced that it would monitor all American structures and that in
tne future they would be used exclusively in NATO's interest. However, -
on 4 October 1978 in response to lifting the embargo the Turkish Govern- _
nent adopted a decre~~ on the provisional status of the American bases
::ncl renewal of. their ~3ctivities.
In connection with the events in Iran, pressure on Turkey from the NATO
leaders intensified greatly. Representati.ves of the United States,
iJest Germany, France, and Great Britain called an emergency meeting
to work out a program of er_onomic aid for Turkey as one of the "hulwarks"
of the 4Test in the Middle East. In the evaluation of foreign spe-
ciali.sts, the forced ~vithdrawal of the U. S. military machine from Iran
increased the importance of similar militaristic sites in Turkey,
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bor.dering the Soviet Union. Negotiations are underway at the present ~
ti.me ro establish the permanent status of American forces in Turkey.
According to a report by the NEW YORK TIMES, in January 1979 the Americans
were already removing secret electronic equipment from Iran to Turkey.
The foreign press emphasizes that after the fall of the Shah`s regime,
a mountain of rubble was left from American interests in Iran. Accord-
ing to representatives of the new authorities in the country, Iran aspires
to maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union and refuses to serve
as a base for aggression or hostile propaganda against the USSR.
Considering the ever-expanding struggle of people against the military
presence of the United States in countries of this region, Pentagon
. specialists emphasize that "no reasonable U. S. strategists will be able
to plan the future of the American military presence in the Mediter-
ranean Sea on the foundation of existing base facilities; he will be
compelled to give serious concern to backup variations." These varia-
tions are being developed. According to information in the foreign
press, talks are now underway with the Government of Israel to turn over _
military bases on occupied Arab territories to the United States and to
lease space in the port of Haifa for basing American ships. In addi- -
tion, Egypt has agreed to offer bases.
' The Far East and Southeastern Asia have long occupied an important place
in imperialist policies. After the end of World War II the imperialist
powers, above all the United States, created a far-flung system of
mil_itary bases and support points th.ere, a significant share of whicli
- are concentrated today in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and
- several other parts of the Pacific Ocean. There are about 200 military
bases and support poi.nts in Japan today, several operated jointly with
troops of the host country. More than 46,000 American servicemen are
stationed at them. According to official figures, the Pentagon spent
more than 4 billion dollars to build these bases. The largest naval
bases are Yokosuka and Sasebo, which have become the principal forward
bases of the U. S. 7th Fleet in the western part of the Pacific Ocean. -
In conformity with the American-Japanese "security pact" concluded in
1951 and extended indefinitely in 1970, all U. S. Navy fighting and
auxiliary vessels may enter the ports oF Japan freely.
The U. S. Air Force makes full or partial use of 15 air bases and air-
fields. The main ones are Yokota, Misawa, and K3dena (on Okinawa).
The United States has more than 40 large weapons and ammunition store-
houses, an extensive network of communications equipment, a command
and control system, and other facilities on the islands of Japan.
Assessing the place of Japan in Washington's overall military plans,
the foreign press emphasizes that no other country in Asia is so im-
- portant for the United States in political, economic, and military
strategic terms than this country, which has mighty industrial poten-
tial and great military capabilities.
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In recent ye~rs *_!-~e American bases and support points in South Korea
have become much more important. The Pentagon considers them the last
~ ii, S, base of operations in contir~ental Asia, in addition to being in
rhe immediate vicinity of North Korea and the Soviet Primor'ye, The
- United States has 41,600 armed forces personnel stationed in the
southern part of the Korean Peninsula. The most important base points
are Seoul, where the headquarters of the 8th Army and lst Unified
American-South Korean Corps headquarters are located, and Inchon (Red
Cloud Camp), which is the headquarters of the 2nd Infantry Division.
Fighting units of the air force are based primarily at four air bases: -
Osan, Cunsan, Kwangju, and Taegu. As for the American Navy, it has a
permanently functioning element in the headquarters of the U. S. Navy
Command in South Korea, which insures appropriate readiness at points
cvhere American ships are based on the South Korean coast. U. S. navy
fighting task forces and units are not permanently stationed or as--
signed to this region, although ships of the 7th Fleet, including air-
craf.t carriers, often visit the ports in the southern part of the
~ peninsula to perform so-called "Pacific missions."
- The American press has written a great deal recently about the decision
= of the Pentagon and U. S. congress to withdraw American ground forces
from this region. According to informa~ion in the foreign press, how- -
ever, the total number of American forces in South Korea, far from de-
creasing, has actually increased by 1,500. Certain influential circles -
i.n TJashington have set their objective as forcing the White House to re-
nounce its earlier plans of reducing forces in this region.
The American armed forces have three very large bases in the Philippines:
the Subic Bay naval base, Clark Field air base, and Kubi Point naval air
base. In addition there are several small sites. The United States has
about 14,000 servicemen in the Philippines. The government of that
coiintry has raised the question of reviewing the treaty on bases several
times. Only in early 1979 after three years of American-Philippine talks
was agreement reached to make several changes in the treaty envisioning,
~n particular, a slight decrease in the territory occupied by bases and
an enhancement of Philippine jurisdiction over them. According to the
.~greement reached the Pentagon keeps the right to conduct any military .
operations from the sites it occupies.
American strategists have given concentrated attention to Micronesia in .
recent years. As the WASHINGTON POST testifies, the Pentagon is dis- -
turbed about the future of U. S. military bases in Japan and the
Philippines. Therefore, it is considered essential to bolster the U. S.
position in the Pacific Ocean by expanding existing military sites and
establishing new ones in more "secure" regions. For example, the -
large Andersen military air base receives heavy B-52 bombers while
atomic submarines carrying Polaris and Poseidon missiles visit the naval
base. There are various military compler,es on the islands of Saipan,
Tinian, and Majuro also. The military strategic system of support
points in Micronesia, Pentagon strategists believe, will help establish
U. S. control in this part of the Pacific Ocean. It is no accident,
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therefore, that to preserve its military bases in this region in the -
United States is conducting negotiations to annex it as supposedly
� "freely associated territory," and is trying to use "referenda," such as
the one planned for the Marshall Islands, for this purpose.
That is the picture of t-he U. S. military presence in the Pacif ic Ocean
today where, according to foreign press reports, the Pentagon maintains
- upwards of 130,000 servicemen in different branches of the armed forces.
_ A similar picture is observed in the Indian Ocean region. According to
a 1955 agreement ships of the British Navy and of its allies may be
based at Simonstown, the principal naval base of the South African Re-
public. With initiation of operations at the large military sites on
the island of Diego Garcia the imperialist forces hope to combine all
the support points created in Western Europe and the Middle East with
th~ far-flung system of bases in Asia and the Pacific Ocean. Speaking
of the significance of Diego Garcia in the system of the Pentagon's
overseas bases, former Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Zumwalt observed
that this complex "gives the United States the possibility of deploying
armed forces in ttle Indian Ocean region and thus supporting the conduct
of American foreign policy there."
At the present time the United States is nurturing plans to establish a
new 5th Fleet in the Indian Ocean to assure a"permanent presence"
there. The Indian newspaper PATRIOT writes that, together with the 6th -
Fleet in the Mediterranean and the 7th Fleet in the Pacific, it would
- form a continuous military-strategic semicircle enveloping the entire
Asian continent.
_ The United States has built a far-flung system of military bases in
Latin America, particularly Puerto Rico and the Bahamas, under the slogan
of "joint defense." The Panama Canal Zone has been transformed into a
- major stFOnghold. In addition to military fortification, training
points have been established there for specialists in the struggle
against the revolutionary movement in Latiri America and on the other
continents.
"I1ua1-base" formations have been established to quickly reinforce
American armed forces at overseas bases. The personnel o� these forma-
- tions have light weaponr~ and are stationed in the continental United
States, while their equipment is located in storehouses in strategically
important regions of Europe. When a situation becomes critical the
personnel of these formations can be moved quickl_y to the appropriate
region.
r[ILITARY REVIEW has emphasized that in deciding the question of "advance _
deployment" of the armed forces of the United States in the 1970's and
1980's and the specific location of military bases it wi7_1 be necessary
to study carefully all factors in order to avoid a situation where po- _
litical considerations may hinder the use of military advantages of-
fered by this method of relocating troops. Formations and units, the
journal continued, should, as much us possible, be stationed in territory
under the control of the United States or its allies.
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Ho~vever, even in countries which are allies of the United States there
are increasing demands to put an end to American military-political
pressure or at least reduce it. In this setting the policies of the
Be:L~ing leaders, who are calling for an increase in the U. S. "military
presence" in all regions of the world, looks very unseemly.
The positive changes that have occurred in the international arena in-
creasingly reveal the flawed character of the imperialist strategy which
envisions military bases of the United States and the other NATO coun-
tries in foreign territories serving the goals of the aggressive poli-
cies of imperialism and threatening international security.
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1979
= 11,176
CS0:1801
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SOVIET COMMENTS ON U.S. AND NATO OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 5, May 79 signed
to press 4 May 79 pp 29-35
[Article based on foreign press materials by Maj Gen V. Gidaspov "Views
on Waging Offensive Operations"]
[Text] The military leadership of the United States and NATO, continuing
to enlarge military preparations for carrying out their aggressive in-
tetitions and working out new notions concerning the use of armed forces
in diff erent types of battle, are devoting considerable attention to
furthering the effectiveness of the use of field forces, formations, and
- units of ground forces in modern warfare.
As the foreign press testifies, the ground forces of the NATO countries
are capable of waging combat actions in different theaters either inde-
_ pendently or in cooperation with the navy and air force and with or -
without the use of nuclear weapons. It is observed that the offensive
is one of the primary forms of operation accomplished by the ground
forces. Its essential features are reliable suppression of the enemy
with all types of weapons and a swift advance by formations and units
to the depth of the enemy disposition to wipe out or seize manpower,
weapons, and military equipment and to take vitally important regions
(sites).
In the opinion of the U.S. and NATO commands, the success of the offen-
sive depends on a number of factors which determine the increase in
the fighting might o� ground forces under contemporary conditions.
The corresponding American regulations and manuals emphasize that at
the present time the capabilities of ground forces in waging offensive
operations have increased greatly. The main explanation for this is
that it has become possible to carry out rapid movements of formations
and units with regular weapons and equipment to various theaters or to
remote regions of the same theater (strategic mobility) and to use
contemporary combat equipment to wage aggressive offensive actions right
on the field of battle (tactical mobility).
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The armored troops are the main striking force of the ground forces of
the principal NATO countries. In the opinion of foreign military spe-
cialists, the combination of high mobility and fire power enable tank
formations to deliver swift strikes against the enemy, break up and
wipe out groupings of enemy forces, and concentrate efforts quickly in
the decisive axes (see Figure 1[not reproduced]). It is observed that _
modern tanks have enormous fire power. A World War II tank needed 13
shells for a 50 percent probability of hitting a stationary target; a
modern tank needs one. The armor protection has almost doubled even as
a general trend occurs toward reduced dimensions by improvements in the
technology of producing engines, tracks, and suspension systems. The
power rating of engines has also roughly doubled, while the energy avail-
ability has increased by 25 percent, specific pressure on the earth has
been reduced, and range has tripled. In addition, tanks are equipped
with night vision instruments which increase the e�fectiveness of com-
bat actions at any time of the day or night. The effectiveness of fire
on the move has been sharply improved by installing stabilization sys-
tems on the tanks.
Ho~vever, according to the views or foreign military specialists, tanks
cannot operate independently in current conditions, They need support from
~oL�orized infantry, field artillery, air defense forces and means, tac-
tical and army aviation, and engineer troops. Maximum eff ectiveness in
thP use of armored formations and units in offensive operations is
achieved in cooperation with them.
In an of.fensive infantry and motorized infantry perform the missions of
wiping out or neutralizing enemy personnel, seizing and holding the most
important terrain sectors or sites, and f ighting airborne landings and
sabotage-reconnaissance groups. In the opinion or foreign military
sp~cialists, the infantry now has the necessary firepower and combat
equipment to accomplish these missions successfully in an offensive
operation.
Th~ contemporary ground forces of the principal NATO countries have con-
siderable artillery fire power, and views concerning its use have changed
significantly in recent times. It is observed that the regular and at-
tached artillery of armored and mechanized divisions of the ground
f.orces has become almost completely self-propelled. As a result, it is
possible for the commander to use it in general battle formations with
striking (tank) subunits during the offensive and to maneuver rapidly
with fire along the front to concentrate efforts in the main axis.
Field artillery, moving with the advancing units of tanks and motorized
infantry or directly behind them, can concentrate fire at the necessary
time and place to wipe out enemy infantry and motorized infantry, artillery
and mortars, and air defense forces and means. In addition, less time is
required to prepare firing data for unforeseen targets and control of
fire has been made simpler by equipping field artillery battalions and
batteries with special automated systems, in particular the Tacfire
system (United States). The use of laser rangefinders has greatly en-
hanced the effectiveness of the first salvo.
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The range of fire of all artil.lery systems has increased greatly. For
example, close support artillery has increased its range from 10-11
ki~ometers to 18-20, and general support artillery has gone from 14-15 '
to 30-32 kilometers. The area hit by a salvo by one battery has also
gone from 1,500 square meters during World War II to 25,000 square
meters at the present time. The ability of artillery to hit point tar-
gets has increased sharply with the adoption of shells that are guided ~
- in the final leg of the tra~ectory. As foreign specialists observe,
the fire power of close fire support artillery has increased an average
- of SO percent compared to World War II artillery and its range has in-
creased 60 percent.
Army aviation as a fundamentally new arm of troops has c.onsiderably
broadened the sphere of application of ground forces. The ability of
helicopters to hit virtually any target on the field of battle (see
Figure 2[not reproduced]) combined with the ability to land large tac-
tical parties greatly increases the pace of the advance, according to
foreign military experts. The use of helicopters for aerial reconnais-
sance enables commanders of the tactical element to observe the terrain
and enemy action continuously, which helps them size up a situation
quickly and adopt appropriate plans.
It is especially emphasized that modern helicopters equipped with power-
- ful aviation cannons and missiles are highly effective in destroying
enemy manpower and combat equipment, chiefly tanks and other armored
vehicles. Antitank helicopter units and subunits are being formed in
many NATO countries for more effective use of helicopters on the field
of battle.
It is observed that the use of helicopters in the interests of infantry
formations and units increases troop mobility and significantly re-
duces their vulnerability on the f ield of battle. It also enables them
to operate in regions that are inaccessible to tanks and armored ve-
hicles (swamps, mountains, jungles, and large populated points). In-
fantry subunits that are transportable by air can provide a greater
degree of surprise than tank and mechanized units. The broad introduc-
tion of army aviation helicopters in the regular organizational struc-
ture of the subunits and units of the ground forces has given them com-
pletely new combat characteristics which infantry has never before had.
The use of helicopters has also changed the system of logistical troop -
support abruptly. It has become virtually independent of the condition
of. roads, passability of the terrain, and d~gree of preparation of
sites for receiving various types of supplies.
The capabil.ities of tactical aviation as a means of support for ground
forces have expanded considerably. It is emphasized that contemporary
fighter planes provide a high probability of hitting targets. In addi-
tion, their combat load, radius of action, and, related to this, length
of time the plane is over the field of battle,have also increased.
- The effectiveness of actions by subunits and units of tactical aviation
in the accomplishment of various combat missions has risen sharply with
- the appearance of automated control systems.
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TYie combat capabilities of troop air defense means r~ave increased. The
Western press reports that current antiaircraft artillery systems have
high rates of fire and are equipped with automatic or semiautomatic de-
vices that insure reliability and speed in all processes involved in
their use in combat. Antiaircraft guided missiles, which the armies of
all the world's ma~or countries have now adopted, are considered to be
a highly effective means of fighting an aerial enemy.
The number of air defense weapons in combined arms formations has in-
creased concurrently with improvement in their quality. Current divi-
sions have almost twice as many air defense weapons as the divisions of
the late 1940's (some divisions today have 100-110 weapons units). Air
defense subunits have become an inalienable part of the organizational
structure of any combined arms formation.
The combat capabilities of formations, units, and subunits in action at
ni~ht have grown. The adoption of small night-vision instruments and
equipping not just tanks, armored vehicles, and helicopters, but also
artillery, mortar, guided missile, and other combat teams, with them en-
ables the commander waging battle in limited visibility or at night to
accomplish combat missions with the same men and equipment that he would
use in daylight.
The combat might of formations and units of the ground forces is also in-
creasing through the adoption of radioelectronic forces and means, called
"radioelectronic warfare" in NATO terminology. One of the American regu-
lations says bluntly that any commander may suffer defeat regardless of
the number of troops if enemy radioelectronic means prevent him from con-
trolling subordinate troops, issuing instructions for fire support, lo-
gistic support, and so on. It is also thought that these devices can
have a major effect on electronic weapons control systems. In general,
_ as the regulations and manuals of foreign armies emphasize, correct use
of avai.lable radioelectronic forces and means enables the enemy to
suppress the control and cooperation radio network, disrupt control of
.novements of reserves, and reduce the effectiveness of f ire.
in the assessment of foreign military specialists, these are the factors
that have brought about the current increase in the combat might of the
grc~und forces. Now let us review some questions of ttieir waging of-
fensive actions.
According to U.S. Army regulations, the principal mission of ground
forces is to wage combat actions against the armed forces of the Warsaw -
Pact countries. It is observed that to achieve the goals of an of-
fensive operation forces and firepower appropriate to the situation
- must be concentrated in the decisive sector and then combat actions
waged by the combined efforts of all arms of troops in order ta insure
maximum use of friendly weapons and reduce the effectiveness of enemy
use of weapons.
To create superiority over the enemy it is recommended that primary at-
tention be devoted to the surprise factor, making maximum use of the
mobility of friendly troops and broad deception (simulation of radio
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- communications, radio silence, disorienting radar, "psychological war--
fare" operations, concealed movements, and the like). The effect of
surprise is greatly enhanced with an attack at night.
It is recommended that the commander use aLl types of reconnaissance to
study the enemy, including commander's reconnaissance of the terrain and
reconnaissance by fighting to determine the grouping and location of
enemy forces and f irepower and identify the regions of weakest or
weakened defense and concealed approaches to the area where the weakest
grouping is. The commander is personally responsible for timely organi-
zation of the gathering of reconnaissance information about Che enamy
- and for the use of all regular and attached reconnaissance forces and
means.
The decisive condition for smashing the enemy is considered to be con-
centrating the main forces in a narrow sector of the front where the de-
fense is most weakly organized. This requires concealed regrouping of
forces, which is achieved by the high mobility of armored, mechanized,
airmobile, and airborne troops and by flexibil�ity in the use of artillery
and army and tactical aviation.
During the period of regrouping and concentYation of friendly forces in
the axis of the main strike the commander must organize neutralization -
of enemy weapons in the zone of the upcoming offensive, enlisting regu-
lation and attached forces and means for this purpose. In t?.~is primary
attention is given to neutralization of reserves which may be used for
counterstrikes and air defense weapons, because carrying out these and
other steps insures successful fulfillment of the missions of the of-
f ensive.
The regulations and manuals of the NATO armies generally consider two
types of offensive action, the offensive prepared ahead of time and the
offensi.ve on the run. The commander chooses one or the other depending
on the concrete combat situation.
The offensive prepared in advance is usually carried out where there is
direct contact with the enemy and the commander has adequate informa-
~ tion on the enemy's men and equipment, system of defense, intentions,
and possible nature of actions. It begins after 7.engthy, caref~:l plan-
ning with a powerful artillery and air strike to the fu~_1 depth of t~he
enemy defense. This may last 1-2 hours. Then comes a swift assault
by tanks and mechanized units and subunits in the breakthrough sectors.
The primary goal of the first strike is to rapidly overcome the cover
zone and break through the primary line of defense iri the sector or
sectors of the offensive, inflict ma.~timum damage on the units of the
enemy's first echelon, disruPt control of enemy forces, and create con-
. ditiuns for development of the offensive in the o~+erational depth,
After a successful breakthrough, fresh fcrces from the second echelons
or reserves should be committed to the fighting and move swiftly to
the depth of the enemy defense, seize important terrain sectors, sites,
and communications centers, cut off paths of retreat, wipe out ie-
serves without stopping to f ight encircled or blockaded groups of ener:~.
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troops and, d~veloping the success, force the enemy tio stop organized
resistance and begin retreating. r
This is followed by the stage of pursuit o� a withdrawing enemy, which ~
involves chief ly actions to break up the remaining group and encircle
it in order to wipe it out with all available fire forces and means.
The pursuit should be carefully planned and precisely organized so that
the enemy feels constant pressure along the entire front of the offensive
at all times of the day or night.
The offensive on the run is organized against an enemy who has suc-
cessfully occupied a defense, when friendly forces perform a maneuver to
close with him. This type of offensive is recommended in Che case where
the opposing side has not had time to organize command and control of inen
and equipment, prepare defensive lines, arr3nge fire cooperation, and
- bring up fresh forces from the reserve or second echelons.
The chief ob,jective o� the offensive on the run is to inflict maximum
damage on the enemy to prevent him from withdrawing and force him to
begin combat actions under unfavorable conditions. For a successful
offensive on the run it is considered essential that cover forces which
begin the fighting be strong and mobile, including subunits of all arms
of: troops, and that they be prepared to perform combat missions away
from the main forces. After beginning fighting they pin down enemy
first-echelon forces and support immediate commitment of the main
forces of the offensive grouping to the battle. Special attention i5
directed to the need to maintain a high rate of advance by searching
for ~oeak spots in the enemy defense, open unit boundaries and flanks.
In. the opinion of foreign military specialists, losing speed in the ad-
vance threatens tr~e entire operat ion and usually forces troops to
switch to an offensive prepared in advance. In modern highly mobile
combat action the offensive directly on the run is considered most
likely. -
The regulations and manua].s of the ground forces of the principal capi-
talist countries devote considerable attention to logistic support of
troops in the off ensive. It is emphasized that the success of any oper-
ation depends significantly, if not decisively, on how well the com-
mander is able to provide his subordinate units and subunits with all
necessary supplies to wage combat actions. With this in mind it is
considered imperative that the system of deployment of rear units and
institutions correspond to the missions of the attacking troops.
Depending on the situation rear support is organized as close as pos- .
sible to troop battle formations so that combat equipment may be
serviced and restored as quickly as possible. One of the chief require-
ments of the system of rear support is continuity of logistic supply
in a11 stages of preparation and conduct of an offensive operation. _
During combat ac~ions rear units and subunits must satisfy all needs
of combat subunits, especially those in the first echelon.
To do this, centers for special technical servicing of combat vehicles
and weapons, wheeled transport, army aviation planes and heli.copters,
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aMrnunitiori, communications and radioelectronic equipment, and ground ap- -
paratus are usually established in the corps rear regions. These cen-
_ ters deliver spare p~rts, individual aggregate units, and entire systems
and also send teams of repair experts to the regions of most intensive
fighting where they cooperate with the appropriate subdivisions of di-
vision repair battalions.
Such are the views of the U.S, and NATO commands on waging off ensive ac-
tions by ground forces without the use of nuclear weapons. The regu-
lations and manuals of the NATO countries demand that personnel be ready
- to wage combat actions with decisive objectives, for only an attack can
rouc and destroy enemy forces and then seize his territory. The prin-
ciples of the regulations and manuals are constantly tested durin~
numerous troop and command-staff exercises of the national and NATO
- Unified Armed Forces (see colored insert [not reproduced~).
During consideration of the principles of waging offensive actions using
conventional weapons, one notes those "characteristics" which may also
be typical for combat where nuclear weapons are used. It is not con-
cealed here that "under. certain conditions" the NATO command may decide
to use them first. It is no accident that, in connection with the sharp
inr_rease in the f ighting poten.tial of the formations and units of ground
f:orces achieved by adoption of more up-to-date and effective types of -
weapons and combat equipment and improvements in organizationai struc- _
ture, the armies of the NATO countries have recently increased the
nur_lear potential of both gr.ound forces and air. and naval forces further.
Our answer to all the machinations of our enemies will be high vigilance
and combat readiness to defend the gains of socialism against infringe-
rnent by any aggressor.
COYYR.IGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1979 _
11,176
CSO:1801 END
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