JPRS ID: 8686 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090045-2
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 63
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 45
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/8686
26 September 1979
- . West E u ro e Re ort
p p ~
(FOUO 54/79)
~
FBIS FOREIGN ~ROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICtAL US~ ONLY �
~ ' '
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NOTE
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JPR5 L/8686
26 September 1979
, � -
WEST EUROPE REPORT -
(FOUO 54/79)
CONTENTS PAGE
y THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES
BELGIUM
Soviet Comments on Belgian Fighter Pilot Training
(B. Sokolin; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE,
APr 79).........o 1 `
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY . -
Soviet Comments on the West ~erman Air Force
(V. Sibiryakov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIXE,
Apr 79) 4
SPAIN
Soviet Comments on the Spanish Ground Forces
(Yu. Yur'yev; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE,
Apr 79) 10 =
TiJItKF.Y
Soviet Comments on Tasks and 5tren~th of the Turkish Navy
~ (V. Ka.nin; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE,
_ Jun 79) 15
COUNTRY SECTION
ITALY '
Differing Views an ~erlinguer's Compromise
(Valerio Castelnuovo, Pierre Carniti; IL MONDO,
7 Sep 79) 24
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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CON'rENTS (Continued) Page -
Castro-Tito Relationship on Eve of Nonalined Summit
' Viewed
(Frane Barbieri; LA STAMPA, 30 Aug 79) 33
Castro Sways Nonalined Audience, Differences Emerging
(Frane Barbieri; LA STAMPA, 4 Sep 79) 36
Erosion of Cuban Position at Nonalined Summit Viewed
(Frane Barbieri; LA STAMPA, 6 Sep 79) 39
Comments on Cuban Reaction to Vance Remarks, Kampuchea -
(Frane Barbieri; LA STAMPA, 7 Sep 79).......o....... 41
'Half-Victory' for Castro on Kampuchea Envisioned
(Frane Barbieri; LA STAMPA, 8 Sep 79) 43 -
Castro's Manipulation of Conference, Media Viewed -
_ (Frane Barbieri; LA STAMPA, 9 Sep 79) 46
ENEL's Plan To Reactivate Hydroe~ectric Plants -
(Fabrizio Dragossi; CORRIERE DELLA SERA,
21 Aug 79) 49
Problems Facing Industrialization of the South Reviewed
(Alfonso Madeo; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 14, 23 Aug 79). 51 _
SPAIN
Briefs ~
Bank Off ice in Moscow 58
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rl,
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- TH~ATER NUCLEAR FORCES ' BELGIUM
SOVIET COI~A7ENTS ON BELGIAN FIGHTER PILOT TRAINING .
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 4, Apr 79 sigz~ed
to press 6 Apr 79 pp 43-44
~ [Article by Lt Col (Res) B. Sokolin, candidate of military sciences:
"Personnel of the Belgian Air Force Master the F--16"]
- [Text] Following in the wake of aggressive NATO policy, the ruling
circles of Belgium are building up the strength of their armed forces '
in conformity with the interests of the bloc. Equipping the air force
, with the ].atest fighting planes is one step in this direction that the
mil.itary leadership of the country is taking.
It has been reported in the foreign press that four West European coun-
tries who are NATO members, specifically Belgium, the Netherlands,
Norway, and Denmark, have signed an agreement in the United States to
_ buy 348 new Amerzcan F-16 fighter planes. Of them 115 are for the
Be'lgian Air Force. According to the agreement Belgian aviation con-
struction firms will participate in production of the aircraft. Spe-
cifically, in October 1978 the first series-produced F-16 fighter with �
a wing produced in Belgium was built (see picture [not reproduced]).
Retraining programs for flight and technical personnel were developed in
~ connection with the decisions of the Belgian Air Force to adopt the
F-16 fighter plane. These programs envision training 120 pilots and r,
about 900 technicians between 1978 and 1983. -
Retraining flight personnel. The first step is for Belgian flight
instructors to master the F-16 at Edwards Air Base in California. The
pilots chosen for this have instructor's ratings and at least 1,000 _
hours of flying time, including 750 hours in F-104G or Mirage 5 jet
planes. Each pilot will go through a theoretical course f igured for
88 hours and then perform 16 flights (six training flights to develop _
flying techniques, five to master the procedures of waging aerial battle,
and five involving strikes against ground targets). Each instructor will
have a total of 25 hours of flying time.
The retraining of other pilots will begin in September 1979. The first
crews to go through it will be the crews of the 350th Fighter Squadran
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st:ationed at Beauvechaine air base. The retraining course is figured
fo:r three months. Pilots will be divided into two groups based on fly-
ing experience. The first group will be pilots who have 800 hours or
mo.re of flying time; their retraining program resembles the program for
training the fl.ight instructors. The second group will comprise the
remaining pilots, each of whom is allocated at least 30 hours of flying
time to master the aircraft.
During retraining flights will be made in two-seat F-16B training planes.
The command of the Belgian Air Force has ordered 13 such planes, which
wi:Ll be delivered as follows: six in 1979; f.our in 1980; two in 1981;
one in 1982.
~ The F-16 trainer specially devised in the United States is also to be
used intensively for pilot training. The Belgian Air Force expects to ~
rer:eive it in the fall of 1980. In addition, two other types of simu-
lation equipment will be used for pilot training: a cockpit simulator
' with a full set of equipment to help the pilot develop stable skills in :
using the aircraft instruments and systems and a trainer to practice
procedures for abandoning the aircraft in various situations.
The pilots will go through the program of combat training in line units.
Each of them will mske at least 50 flights to maste�r this program,
foreign specialists~believe.
The foreign press notes that the F-16 fighter will be mastered by pilots
who have sufficient flying experience in jet f ighter planes, while pi-
lots who have just oraduated from school will be sent to squadrans which
have not received the new planes yet. Technical personnel to service the
F-16 aircraft will be retrained at a specially established training
center in Beauvechaine from 1979 to 1982 incZusively. This subunit has
an instructor group (two officers and 23 NCO's) who have been trained
at training centers in the United States. The specialists of the group
are now developing a methodology and program for retraining technical
personnel. .
Technica~ aids such as video recorders and special simulators are to
be used extensively in the training process. In the initial period the
amount of actu~.l aircraft equipme;it allocated for the training center
' will be inadequate. Belgian specialists think that this shortcoming
can be overcome by the use of video recorders and this will enable
trainees to become familiar with the new combat equipment in sufficient .
~ detail.
The trainer for training technical personnel will make it possible to
reproduce the functioning of aircraft equipment and systems, show the
location of particular parts and assemblies, stimulate the occurrence -
of malfunction:~, and practice searching for and fixing them. At the
end of the dri?~l the trainer's computer will read out information on
mistakes made.'.~y the trainees (in order of their significance).
- A special engineering-technical group of 45 persons trained in the
United States has been formed to receive and service the first F-16
aircraft, which began to arrive in Belgium in early 1979.
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Ac.r_ording to the thinking of the command of the Belgian Air Force, taking
a].1 these steps to retrain flight and technical personnel should make it ~
- possible to put the first squadron (the 350th Fighter Air Squadron) in
the ranks ~~f the combat ready by the end of 1980. Plans ca11 for the _
four stated squadrons to be supplied with new F-16 planes by 1983.
COPYRIGHT:~ "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1979
11,176
CS0:1801
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY _
SOVIET rOMMENTS ON THE WEST GERMAN AIR FORCE -
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 4, Apr 79 signed
to press 6 Apr 79 pp 37-42
[Article by Col V. Sibiryakov: "The West German Air Force"]
[Text] Militaristic circles in West Germany are constantly building up
the might of their armed forces, including the air force. In the opin-
ion of foreign military specialists, the air force now occupies the
leading place among the air foxces of the European members of the ag-
gressive NATO bloc and is the air force most prepared to wage combat
actions.
The missions of the West German Air Force are defined in the points of
the "doctrine" adopted by the NATO command in 1976 on the use of the
tactical aviation of the unified air force. This doctrine was worked _
out on the basis of the NATO strategy of "flexible response" and the
conception of "forward lines" with active participation by represer~ta-
tives of the West German Air Force and was approved by the West
German minister of defense as the fundamental document~with respect
to employment of the country's military aviation. ~
According to this "doctrine," aviation should be capable of waging -
_ offensive air operations, providing air support to ground forces', per-
forming air def ense of important sites and aerial reconnaissance, and
transporting m~n and equipment to theaters of military operations.*
In the following ar*.icle we use information published in the foreign
pres~ to elucidate the organization, composition, combat training, and
prospects .for development of the West German Air Force.
Or4anizztion and combat composition (see Figure 1[not reproduced]).
The air force is headed by an inspector (commander) who is subordinate
*
For more detail on this subject, see ZAR
9E52NOYEeditoNrN.OYE OBOZRENIY
1978, No 8, pp 47-49 and 1979 No 1, pp
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t~ the minister of defense and inspector general. He exercises leader-
sh:ip of the air force through the main staff, which has several divi-
sions: personnel and combat training, military intelligence, command
and control of the air force, organizations, rear services, planning,
- weapons systems, and others.
_ The tactical air command, logistic command, and general directorate.
The tactical air command is the highest operational force of the air
force. The tactical air command headquarters directs the combat train-
in~ of the formations and units under it, is responsible for main-
. taining them in constant combat readiness, cooperates with the cor-
- responding NATO headquarters, and participates in organizing exercises
conducted within the bloc framework and independently.
_ According to information published in the foreign press the tactical
~ air command includes two air support divisions (lst and 3rd), two
air defense air divisions (2nd and 4th), and the trai_ning command of
the West German Air Force in the United States.
The lst Air Support Division (headquarters at Lautlingen) incluc~es the
_ 32nd, 33rd, and 34th fighter bomber squadron (36F-104G planes apiece
with bases at ~Lechfeld, Buechel, and Memmingen respectively), the 35th
fighter bomber squadron (30F-4F planes, see Figure 2[not reproduced],
~ based at Pfierdefeld), and the 51st Reconnaissance Squadron (3t~ RF-4E
pl~.~nes, Bremgarten) .
The 3rd Air Support Division (Kalkar) includes the 31sr and 36th
fighter bomber squadrons (36F-104G's, at Nerwenich; 30 F-4F's, at
Hoptsten), the 41st and 43rd light combat air squadrons (42G-91's
apiece, Husum and Oldenburg), and the 52nd Reconnaissance Squadron
- (30RF-4E planes, at L?ck).
In addition, these divisions have the lst and 2nd squadron (36 launchers
apiece) of operational-tactical Pershing lA missiles (see Figure 3[not
reproduced]).
The air defense aviation divisions include the 71st and 74th fighter
air squadrons (30 F-4F planes apiece, Witmundhafen and Neiburg re-
spectively), the 2nd, 13th, and 14th Nike -Hercules antiaircraft guided
missile regiment (each with two battalions of four batteries, nine
launchers per batte~ry), the lst, 3rd, and 4th Hawk antiaircr:.it guided
missile regiments (each with three battalions of four batterie~, six
laurichers per battery), the 31st, 32nd, 33rd, and 34th radar support
_ re~iments (equipped ~aith radar and communications equipment, as a re-
sult of which the press sometimes calls them radar support and commu-
nications regiments or even simply communications regiments). The avi--
ation squadrons of the West German Air Force usually consist of two
subsquadrons and several auxiliary subunits. The subsquadrons have
ttiree-digit numbers in which the first two digits are the squadron
number and the last is the ordinal number of the subsquadron.
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~
The training command of the West German Air Force in the United States,
which ls included in the tactical air commaizd, trains pilots and en-
gineering-techr.ical personnel for aviation and missile units. It has
a missile school at Fort Bliss _n Texas and an aviation training center
at Luke Air Base in Arizona.
~ The logistic command purchases and repairs aviation equipment and wea-
pons, supplies them to fighting units and subunits, and provides air
force personnel with all types of rations.
~ The headquarters of the command plans supply operations and replenishing
reserves, monitors timely supply of essential materiel to air force units,
and organizes development work on promising aviation equipment and wea-
pons. In addition, it is respons~he~ t�r eshofdflightesupporthe ground
equipment for radar and certain o yP
- To accomplish these missions the command has set up two logistics groups,
the North group and the South group, each with a definite area of re-
spc~nsibility. The appropriate institutions, units, and subunits are in-
cluded in the two groups.
The command has a significant number of central and field storehouses
and transport vehicles for moving goods among storehouses and deliver-
ing them to aviation units. An information service has been estab-
lished to improve the organizatian of logisticypin the ~p~anarticlesas
a computer which can store up to 2.5 million t es of su p y
in its memory.
- The general directorate is engaged in training cadres and supplying per-
sonnel to air force units and subunits. It is also responsible for air
shipment of gersoeSel I~dhastartraininghcommandeand aftransportbcomches
of the armed forc
mand.
The training command trains flight and engineering-technical personnel
for the country's air force. It has various schools, in particular
Flight School No 10 at Jever Air Base (60 F-104'S - 4andf15hFm104G
seat TF-104G trainers, see Figure 4[not reproduced],
fighter planes) and School No 50 (Fuerstenfeldbruck, 55G91T training
fi.ghter bombers) .
The air transport command has three squadrons (61st~ Thedfirst twoh)
and a special-purpose detached group (subsquadron).
squadrons have C-160 Transall planes (36 apiece, see colored insert
- [not reproduced] and are stationed at the air bases in Landsberg and
Hon, and the third (Olhorn air base) consists of four subsquadrons of
23 UH-1D helicopters apiece.
The training subunit at the [duensdorf air base, with 14 C-160 Transall
planes, trains military transport crews.
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The special-purpose group at the ~dan air base is designed to carry the
top leaders of the ministry of defense and other highly placed figures
in the country. It has various planes (f our Boeing 707's, eight HFB-320
Hanses, three C-140's, and three VFW614's). Aircraft discarded by this
group and other subunits, for example nine Pembrokes, five Noratlases,
and two C-47's, continue in use in the air force as communications planes
_ and for the performance of other special missions. In addition, the
- West German Air ForcA has more than 120 light Do-28D planes. They are
assigned to the aviation squadrons and headquarters where they are used
as communications planes, for weather reconnaissance in airfield re-
gions, and to perform other auxiliary missions. Finally, there are 16
OV-lOZ planes, several B0105 helicopters, and so on.
Thus, according to information published in the foreign press, the West
. German Air Force has more than 500 fighting planes (the types of air-
craft and their basic performance characteristics are given in the table
[not reproduced]), 90 military transports, and more than 300 auxiliary
and special-purpose airplanes and helicopters. The air force also has
_ operational-tactical Pershing lA missiles (72 launchers) and Nike-
Hercules and Hawk antiaircraft guided missiles (432 launchers).
All the forces of military aviation plus the ope~:ational-tactical mis-
siles and antiaircraft guided missiles of the West German Armed Forces
are included in the 2nd and 4th joint tactical air commands of the NATO
~ Unified Air Force in the Central European Theater and, in the opinion of
foreign specialists, are the most pow~erful aviation group in this
theater after the U. S. Air Force. In addition, part of the forces of
the ~dest German Air Force are included in the comanand of the NATO
Unified Air Force in the Baltic Strait zone.
The combat training of West German Air Force units and subunits is or-
ganized in conformity with requirements of the NATO command and aims
at a further increase in their combat readiness. The crews of West
German aviation perform regular flights more for the purpose of im-
proving combat skills than to develop flying techniques. Significant
attention here is devoted to mastering flight at low and extremely low
altitudes, waging combat actions from standby and field airf ields
(including specially rigged sectors of highway), delivering strikes
against ground targets at any time of the day or night under complex
, weather conditions in close cooperation with other branches of the
armed forces and independently.
As the foreign press observes, the Wes~ German Air Force is trained
under conditions maximally approximating those of combat, with an
eye to both conventional and nuclear weapons. West Germany has spe-
cially prepared proving grounds and training bases for this purpose.
At the same time the air force command makes extensive use of the
, training bases, airfields, and proving gr_ounds of its NATO allies for
_ personnel training. For example, each year 2,000-2,500 West German
pilots, navigators, missile experts, and other specialists go through
training at American military training centers. The crews of fighting
planes practice bombing ground targets and firing at aerial targets
year-round in the proving grounds at Sardinia and Crete.
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Prc>spects for development. Because they consider the air force one of -
the principal means of achieving their revanchiste designs,which are di-
rected against the USSR and the other socialist countries, the mili-
taristic circles of West Germany are constantly increasing their combat
might and combat readiness. One of the important steps being taken by
the country's military leadersh~p in this direction is the program to .
~ re-equip air force units and subunits with r.ew aviatioa equipment and
weapons.
In the first stage of this program 273 Phantom tactical aircraft were
bought in the United States; of them 88 were the RF-4E reconnaissance _
variation and the rest were F-4F f ighter planes.
_ As noted in the foreign press, the second phase was to begin in February
1979 with the delivery of the first of 175 light Alpha Jet ground-
attack planes that have been ~rdered. They are to replace the B91 -
plane, first in the training unit of Flight School No 50 (after which
it will be renamed the 49th Fighter Bomber Squadron) and later in the
45th and 43rd light combat aviation squadron.
The third phase will begin in the 1980's when the air force r~ceives
the first multipurpose tactical Tornado fighters; 324 plan~s have been
_ ordered, 212 for the air force and the rest fo'r naval aviation. The
- Tornado fighters are to replace obsolete F-10~G's in four squadrons
and the TF-104G's in the training subunit.
Concurrently with the delivery of new aircraft programs have Seen de-
veloped and are being carried out to mudernize the aviation equipment
now in use, including the comparativ~ly new F-4F fighter plane. ~dork
is also underway to equip f ighting 'planes with the latest weaponry
and reconnaissance and flight navigation equipment.
Along with this the command of the West German Air Force continues to
improve ground air defense means. In pariicular, a large share of the
Hawk antiaircraft guided missile subunits have been supnlied with the
improved Hawk antiaircraft missile complexes and work has also been
done to modernize the Nike-Hercules complexes. The foreign press re-
ports that these complexes will be kept in use until at least the mid-
1980's. However, the country's military leadersh ip is already con-
- sidering the question of replacing them with more sophisticated missile
systems, for example the Patriot antiaircraft missile complex under de-
velopment in the Unit~ad States.
_ All the air defense personnel and means of the West German Air Force
- are part of the NATO unified air defense system in Europe. In the
opinion of West German specialists, one of the weak points of the air
defense system is ineff ectiveness against low-flying enemy aircraft.
In the first place, they say, the network of radar stations in West
Germany has primarily long-range stations, for example, the AN/TPS-43E
(see colored insert [not �reproduced]), whicn do not completely overlap
the air space when detecting and tracking targets flying at low alti-
tude. In the second place, the Hawk and Nike-Hercules missile complexes
do not provide reliable cover for air bases, command and control elements,
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, storehouses, and other important objects when enemy aviation operates at
_ low altitude and the 20-millimeter twin-mounted antiaircraft guns now in
use are ineff ective.
To solve the first problem the West German Air Force bought 55 mobile
_ MRDR30/1 radar sets, and to resolve the second problem they plan to
adopt the mobile Roland 2 antiaircraft missile complex.
The West German military leadership is taking steps to improve the sys- ~
- tem of command and control over combat actions by its aviation, devot-
ing considerable attention to increasing the reliability and speed of
control. For this purpose the West German Ministry of Defense in 1975
approved a plan to establish a unif ied automated control system for the
air force based on broad use of computers. This system is to be set up
hefore the mid-1980's. It will be a composite system consisting of
several distinct automated control systEms and an automatic communica-
tions network.
All the measures mentioned above illustrate once again that the mili-
tarization of West Germany is continuing. These measures testify to _
the aggressive aspirations of the West German military leadership. ,
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1979
11,176 '
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES SPAIN
~
SOVIET COM[~NTS ON THE SPANISH GROUND FORCES
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZI'.ENIYE in Russian No 4, Apr 79 signed
to press 6 Apr 79 pp 26-30 ,
[Article by Lt Col Yu. Yur'yev: "The Spanish Ground Forces"]
[Text] The military-political leadership of the United States and of
NATO, nurturing aggressive plans against the Soviet Union and the other
countries of the socialist community, have been concentrating attention
recently on Spain. Spain occupies an important military-strategic
position on the European continent. The militaristic circles of the
~ North Atlantic Alliance aspire to turn the country into a military
springboard and to draw it into the growing arms race. As a result
of bilateral military cooperation with the United States and the lead-
- ing Western European countries, the Spanish command is building its
armed forces, directing great efforts to increasing the fighting power
of the ground forces by equipping them with up-to-date weapons and com-
bat equipment and refining the organizational structure of formations
and units.
The ground forces are the chief branch of the opanish Armed Forces. As
observed in the foreign press, they are structured with regard to
specific purpose and at the present time are subdivided into combat
' forces and territorial defense forces, as is done in most of the Western
European countries (see Figure 1[not reproduced]). General command
over them is exercised by the chief of the main staff of the ground -
forces who is directly subordinate to the chief of the general staff of
the armed forces.
At the present time the Spanish ground forces have two forms of organi-
zation: administrative (for peacetime) and combat (for exercises and
wartime).
In peacetime formations of the ground forces are maintained with reduced ~
complements. A division has three brigades (one of them regulars) each
consisting of two regiments (two motorized infantry battalions in a
motorized infantry regiment, one tank battalion and one motorized infantry
, battalion in a mixed motorized infantry regiment, one tank battalion and
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one motorized infantry battalion in armored personnel carriers in a
mechanized regiment, and two tank battalions in a tank regiment). When
necessary eacfi regiment establishes one additional battalion for the
regular brigade. The tables of organization for wartime envision
switching to a different structure: battalion - brigade - division -
' (see Figure 2[not reproduced~). In the opinion of the Spanish cam-
mand this system saves money on the maintenance of armed forces in
peacetime.
Organizationally the ground forces are included in nine military dis-
_ tricts and detached military commands on the Baleric and Canary Islands
and in the zones of the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, which are ad-
ministratively subordinate to the corresponding headquarters of the 2nd -
and 9th military districts.
As the foreign press observes, the formations and units of the ground
forces are stationed virtually everywhere in Spain. Detached infantry
and airborne brigades are located in the north, while there are two
mountain infantry divisions on the border with France, a motorized in-
fantry division and detached units in the south, and a mechanized divi-
sion in the wvst. An armored division and detached units are stationed
. in the central part of the country, around the city of Madrid.
The combat forces are the main element of the Spanish ground forces.
They include the basic formations and detached units as well as support -
and service subunits. The peacetime complements have 75-80 percent of
full personnel and 85-100 percent of a full supply of weapons and combat
equipment.. When an extraordinary situation or war occurs, mobj.lization
plans envision that the combat forces will be joined in one army corps.
According to the foreign press the combat forces include the following
formations and units. .
The lst Armored Brunete Division (headquarters in Madrid) comprises the
12th (E1 Goloso) and 13th (regular) tank and llth Piechanized Biigades
(Campamento), an artillery regiment , a light armored cavalry regiment,
an engineer regiment, and other units and subunits. In all the division
has 162 medium ANIX-30 tanks (see Figure 3[not reproduced]), more than
50 M-41 light tanks, 12 M107A1 175-millimeter self-propelled canons, _
~ four 203.2-millimeter tractor-drawn howitzers, 18 M409A1 155-millimeter
_ self-propelled howitzers, two launchers for 381-millimeter rocket shells
(see Figure 4[not reproduced]), 32 40-millimeter antiaircraft cannons,
more than 250 armored personnel carriers, and other equipment.
The 2nd Mechanized Guzman el Bueno Division (headquarters in the city of
Seville) comprises the 21st Mechanized (Badajoz), 22nd Motorized Infantry
(Jerez de la Frontera), and the 23rd mechanized (regular) brigades.
The division has 162 M47 medium tanks and 58 M-41 light tanks, 24 155-
millimeter self-propelled and tractor-drawn howitzers, and more. The
other units and their weapons are the same as in the armored division.
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Tt~e 3rd Motorized Infantry Maestrasdo Division (headquarters in Valencia)
includes the 31stlCastellon de la Plana), 32nd (Cartagena), and 33rd `
(regular) motorized rifle brigades. It has 162 M47 medium tanks and 68 _
M41 light tanks. The organization and weaponry of the other units and
subunits are similar to those of the uniCs and subunits of the armored
and mechanized division. -
Accord ing to the views of the Spanish command, the brigade is the tac-
tical formation capable of ~raging combat action both as par~. of *_he divi-
sion and on its own. The wartime tabl,s of organization envision 3-4
fighting battalions, an artillery battalion, a rear support battalion, `
and other subunits in each brigade. P1ans call for the tank brigade -
(two tank battalions and one motorized ii:fantry battalion) to have 108
medium AI~IX-30 tanks (produced on a French license) and 18 155-milli~.leter
_ self-propelled howitzers, while the mechanized brigade (one motorized
infantry battalion in armored personnel carriers, two in motor vehicles,
and a tank battalion) should have 51 M113 armored personnel carriers, _
54 M47 medium tanks, and 18 M108 105-millimeter howitzers, and the
motorized infantry brigade (three mozorized i.nfantry battalions and a
_ tank battalion) will have 54 M47 medium tanks, 15 M41 light tanks, 39
M113 armored personnel carriers, more than 500 motor vehicles, 18
105-millimeter howitzers, and other weapons.
The Spanish military press remarks that the ground forces today have
detached units designated to support the combat actions of the army corps
to be created in an exceptional situation. Among these detached ur~its
are the detached armored cavalry Jarama brigade which has its head-
quarters in Salamanc.a (one light armored cavalry regiment and three con-
ventional armored cavalry regiments with 52 M41 light tanks ar~d 102 M48
medium tanks), the detached corps ar.tillery brigade (stationed in
Northern Castile with field and rocket artillery regiments), the corps
light antiaircraft artillery regiment (headquarters in Valladolid=
40-millimeter antiaircraft canons), the detached airborne brigade (head-
quarters in La Coruna), and other units.
The territorial defense forces are designed to wage combat actions in
cooperation with combat forces primarily within the country's boundaries
and to defend important sites and structures, combat enemy sabotage and
reconnaissance groups, and so on.
As the Spanish press reports, the territorial defense forces have forma-
- tions, units, and subunits staffed at 50-60 percent of personnel and
supplied with 70-80 percent of regulation weapons and combat equipment.
The mountain infantry division is the chief formation of territorial
forces. There are two, the 4th Mountain Infantry Urjel Division with
headquarters in Barcelona and the 6th Mountain Infantry Navarra Divi-
sion with headquarters in Pamplona. A division includes two mountain
~ infantry brigades (one regular), an armored cavalry regiment, an ar-
tillery regi.ment (equipped with 105-millimeter mountain howitzers), a
light antiaircraft artillery battalion, a mountain ski company, a
mixed engineer regiment, and other subunits. The mountain infantry
brigade has two mountain infantry regiments (a total of three
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battalions) and a battalion of pack animal artillery (1'L 105-millimeter -
= mountain howitzers transportable on mules).
Ttie detached alpine brigade has two alpine regiments (three batta].ions),
a field artillery regiment (105-millimeter mountain howitzers) and sup-
port and service subunits.
The territorial def ense forces also include 10 detached infantry bri-
gades (one reserve brigad~). In these tim.~.s they a,re maintained with
reduced complements and have two infantry regime.nts of one battalion
(a battalion has 768 men, 33 88.9-millimeter antitank grenade launchers,
eight 106-millimeter recoilless M40 guns, 18 mortars, 20 7.62-millimeter
machine guns, and 78 wheeled vehicles) and the headquarters of the third,
regular regiment; a light armored cavalry group (five medium M47 tanks
and 65 wheeled vehicles); an artillery regiment including a howitzer
battalion (12 105-millimeter tractor-drawn howitzers) and a regular =
cannon battalinn; a mixed engineer battalion (sapper company and signal
company). With its wartime complement the territorial defense in-
fantry brigade will have more than 6,500 personnel and 700 transport
vehicles.
In addition to these formations and units the territorial defense
forces have 20 special-purpose companies, three antiaircraft regiments
(one of which includes a Hawk antiaircraft missile complex bac~alion
and a Nike-Hercules antiaircraft guided missile battery), 13 ~:ixed ar- ~
tillery regiments, and support and service units.
Foreign specialists believe that the lack of nuclear missiles and the
presence of many outdated modelG of basic weapons significantly re-
duce the fighting effectiveness of the Spanish ground for^.es. However, -
in ttie opinion of the Spanish command, the continuing process of
supplying them with modern combat equipment and weapons will make it
possible to increase the firepower and mobility of formations and units
, and to bring their combat readiness close to the level of the NATO -
countries.
Specifically, the ground forces are continuing to receive medium AMX-30 -
tanks, and production of them is to be expanded. The M47 and M48 tanks =
are planned for modernization. Amphibious wheeled armored personnel
carriers produced in Spain, the BMR-600 and Pegasso 3550~are being
adopted by units and subunits.
In the next few years purchases of modern equipment and weapons in
other countries are contemplated; M60 tanks, Tow and Dragon anti-
tank guided missiles, improved Hawk missile complexes, 35-millimete.r
Erlikon antiaircraft guns on modernized M48 tank frames, BO105 fire
support helicopters, and others.
All these steps to increasE the f ighting effectiveness of the Spanish _
ground forces are assessed by the Western press as a significant
Spanish contribution to the militaristic preparations of the NATO bloc
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into which the United States is trying to draw Spain, considering it as
a~otential reserve in Europe if a new war breaks out. .
.
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1979
11,176
- CS0:1801
~
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- THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES TURKEY
~OVIi~.T COMMI~TTS ON TAST~S AND STRENGTH OI+' TH~ TURKISH NAVY -
Moscow L~~?UBEZfINOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 6, Jun 79
signed to press 6 Jun 79 PP 59-64
~Article by Captain 2.d Rank V. ganin: "The Turkish Navy'!~
~Text] In their militaristic preparations for war, the North
1~tlantic alliance's military and political leadership is devotin~
considerable attention to the development of Turkey's armed
forces, particularly her navy.
~l'he importance of the Turkish navy's role in executing the mili-
tary operations planned by the NATO command is determined by the
country's advantageous strategic position (the Bosporus and
Dardanelles straits connecting the Black with the Mediterranean
Sea belong to it) and the naval-oriented nature of the Southern
Luropean TVD ~theater of military operations).
.~ccarding to foreign press reports, Turkish naval forces are �
charged with the following primary missions in time of war:
blockading the Black Sea straits, action against submarine and
surface naval forces in the Black Sea and the northeastern por-
tion of the Mediterranean Sea, providing support for land forces
operating in coastal sectors, shore antiamphibious defense, de-
fense of their own sea-lanes and the disruption of eneroy communi-
cations and conducting reconnaissance on behalf of both their own
national armed forces and OVS N~1T0 ~combined NATO armed forces).
In order to insure the accomplishment of these missions, Tilrkey, '
relying on NATO assistance, is continuously strengtliening her
- nav~l forces. The U.S. and the FRG ~'ederal Republic of Germar~
are the pricnary suppliers of ships and arms ~or Turkey's navy,
these countries also providing her technical assistance in ex-
panding her national shipbuildin~ capability and in training
cadres. The~general principles ~overning the development of ner
nava.l forces, their combat employment and their operational and
combat training are being developed under the supervision and
with the participation of American military advisors. During
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_ pEaa~~ime, thc nav~,~ is subordinate to national authorities; but
upor.~ ~he outbreak of war or the a~gravation of the world situa-
, tion and during the conduct of exercises ~vithin the framework of
the '~loc as a whole, they are placed under the authority of the
comb:ined N1~T0 naval command in the aouthern :~~uropean theater of
- onerations. �
'1'urkey's naval forces constitute an independent service of her
- ~rmEd forces. They are headed by the chief command`r, who exe~-
cise~ administrative and operational command of tYie navy through
_ headquarters locate~~ in Ankara. The navy is comprised of the fol-
_ lowing elements: the fleet, the northern a~.d southern naval zones,
naval aviation, the G~lc~ik main naval b ase, the naval training
command and the general directorate of shipyards and ship-repair
ente:rprises.
The .fleet consitutes the Turkish navy's primary operational com-
mand. and comprises virtually all vessels divided organizationally
into three flotillas: the submarine, the battle (surface) and the
mines~aeepin~ flotillas. Theae in turn are divided into divisions.
l~cco:rding to Jane's naval reference, the navy numbers approxi-
mately 200 combat ships and boats (including 12 submarines, 12
destroyers, 2 frigates, 6 small ~!SW vessels, 21 landing ships and
48 rrtinesweepers, 7 guided-missile boats, 13 torpedo boata, 41
_ patrol boats and 36 amphibious assault craft) and 50 auxiliary
vessels and boats.
_ The basic types of vessels (submarines, destroyers, frigates and
the small ~`:.S~rl ships ) comprising the combat nucleus of the navy
are primarily former American ships built during the Second ;~lorld
;,lar or the early postwar years. They have been handed over to
Turkey as part of a military assistance program and, in the esti-
mation of foreign military specialists, possess only limited
capabilities for waging naval warfare under present-day condi-
i~ior~s. The navy's newest ships are thought to be 3 Project 209
subm.~rines built by ~~lest Germany and 2"Berk" class frigates
(Fi~ure 1) built in national shipyards. The "Gearing" and "Al1en
M. ~:umner" class destroyers, which have undergone modernization
unde:r the FRAM program, maintain a sufficiently high level of
combat capability. The tactical-technical specifications for
_ these ships are presented in the table.
The minesweepers include 21 coastal and 13 inshore minesweepers,
7 minelayers and 7 boom-and-net tenders built by America, jrJest
Germany and Canada from the 1940's thraugh the 1960's. The
- largest of these ships is the N110 "Nusret" minelayer (Fi~ure 2).
It was built in Denmark for the U.;~. and transferred to the
Turkish navy in 1964 as part of a military assistance program.
Its dzsplacement is 1880 tons, m~ximum speed 18 knots, armament--
2 76-mm twin-barrelled gun mounts and up to 400 mines. It car-
ries a crew of 146 men. ~
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Amphibious landa.ng force vessels include 4 tank-landing ships,
17 small laizding ships and 36 landing boats. The tank-landing ~
ships were f~rmerly of the American navy and were transferred to
Turkey during 1974-~.975. Their total displacement is 4000-5800
tons. As a rule, the small landing ships and landing boats have _
been built in the national shipyards during the 1960's and early ~
- 1970's (600 and 100-400 tons displacement reapectively).
The small comb atanta (guided-missile, torpedo and patrol boata)
are the most numerous type of veasel in the Turkish navy. The ~
guided-missile c~rrying boata C3 "Dogan" type and 4"gartal"
clasa) are the most up-to-date. The type boat "Dogan" was built
in the FRG in 1976 (ita displacement is ~+10 tona; its armament =
consiats of the "Harpoon" guided-missile system and 2 76-mm gun =
mounts), while tw4 others were built in Turkey and put into ser-
vice in 1978. The "Sartal" claas guided-missile boats have been
converted from torpedo boats (fo~cmerly of the We~~ German "Jag-
uar" type) by mounting ~'penguin" guided-miasile systema on them -
in place of two torpedo tub es.
Tactical-Technical Specifications for Basic Types of Ships in the
Turkish Navy
asic
Type of ship: Displace- dimen- Power
number, country ment, t: sions, plant Maxi-
of construction stan.dard m: L= capac- mum Crew, Armament
and year of length, it~, speed, men
, commissionin~ load B=beam, hp knots
D=draf t
Submarines*
Project 209- 90 L=54 10 31 533-~
3, FRG, 1975- ~ 8=6.2 ~ ~ torpedo 8
197g D=5 tubes
"Balao" (mod- 1~~ L=99.4 6400 20 85 533-mm
ernized under 54o B=8.2 I~j torpedo
GUPPY-3 pro- D=5.2 tubea-10
- gram) - 2,
u.s., 1945
Displacement: numerator - standard, denominator - aubmerged.
Power plant capacity: numerator - diesel-engine, denominator -
electric-motor. Maximum speed: numerator - aurfaced, denomina-
tor - submerged.
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"Balao" (mod- 182 L=95 4~800 1 85 533-mm
ernized under B=8.2 ~ ~j torpedo
GUFPY-2A pro- D=5.2 tubea,
gram) - 7, 10
u.s., i9~+-
_ 1945
Deatroyers
"Gearing" 2~ L=119 60,000 34 275 127-mm
(modernized B=12.4 two-gun
~ under FRAM-1 D=5.8 mounta -
and -2 pro- 2, ASROC
grama) - 5, antisub-
U.S., 1945- marine
1947 guided
misaile
system
- or
"Hedge-
hog"
depth
~ cha~.rge
launcher,
�Mk32 tri-
ple tor-
pedo
tubes -
2, ASW
heli-
copter
"Fle~cher" - 2100 L=114.7 60,000 34 250 12?-mm
5, TJ.s., ~943- 3~ 8=12.1 two-gun
1944 D=5.5 mounts -
4, 76-mm
single- ~
gun
mounts -
6,
"Hedge-
_ hog"
depth
charge
launcher-
2, 533-a~m
quintuple
torpedo
tube
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"All.en M. Sumner" 2200 L=114.8 60,000 34 275 127-mm
(moc~ernized under ~3~ B=12.4 two-gun
FRAI~I-2 program) - D=5.8 mounts -
1, U.s., ~945 3, ~32
triple
torpedo
tubea -
2~
"Hedge-
hog"
depth-
charge
launchers,
2
"Robert H. 2~ L=114.8 60,000 ~4 274 127-mm
- Smith" - 1, B=12. two-gun
u.s., 1944 D=5.8 mounts -
- 3, 40-mm
~ 4-barrel
automatic
AA guns-2,
20-mm
automatic
A.A guns -
11
- Frigates
"Berk" - 2, I 1~ L=95 24,000 25 76-mm
Turke~, 1972-- 195o B=11.8 two-gun
1975 D=5.5 mounts -
2, Mk32
~ t~ ~~l e
torpedo
~ tubes -
2, depth
. charge
rails,
ASW heli-
copter
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Small ASW Ships
Guided-mis- 280 L=54 2800 19 65 ?6-mm
- sile - 6, U.S. B=7 6~
~5~~ i943~ D-3,1 mount,
Turkey (1),
i965 automatic
AA gun,
"Hedge-
hog�
depth
charge
launcher,
depth
charge
launch-
- ers - 4
Comprising the torpedo boats are 12 "Ja~uar" type boats (dis-
placement 190 tons, maximum speed 43 knots, armament: 4 torpedo
tubes, 2 40-mm gun moun.ts, may carry mines on board) and a boat
- of domestic construction (delivered to the navy in 1976, its dis-
pla.r ement is 75 tons , it s armament 4 torpedo tube s and 2 40-mm
gun mounts).
The patrol boats (former American as well as tYiose of laest German
and domestic construction) have a displacement of up to 170 tons
and are armed with 20- or 40-mm gun mounts. Some of them have
been converted for AaW operations and are fitted with depth
charges.
The Nortnern and Southern Naval Zone commands are considered ter--
ritorial operational formations and comprise six naval regions:
Bl~.ck Sea, Bosporus, Dardanelles and ~ea of Marmora (Northern
Zone) and ~egean and Mediterranean (Southern). These commands
- are responsible for the missions of organizing all types of de-
fence of the coast, VMB ~naval bases,,~ and ports, as well as of
providing material-technical support for naval combat forces.
Under normal conditions they comprise only command and control
_ or~ans, shore units, small units and installations of the rear
and a small number of auxiliary naval vessels. For the conduct
of combat operations within the individual zones in wartine, the
re9~zired number of combat ships is transferred to their command
from the fleet.
- Turkish naval aviation numbers 20 "Tracker" patrol aircraft
(ei~ht 521~ and 12 S2E) and nine "Agusta Bell" AS~tiT helicopters
(three ~;B-204B and six AB-212B) which are divided organization-
ally into two s~uadrons.
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The limerican-made coastal patrol aircraft a.re considered obso-
let~. :~ix aircraft have been removed from the combat-operational
inventory because of the poor condition of the equipment. Sever-
al aircraft have under~one modern~.zation in the U.S. involving
their fittin~ with up-to-date ~ubmarine detection and tracking
systems.
In recent years Italy has de].ivered ASW helicopters to Turkey,
including six during the years 1977-197s. The process of fully
mastering the employment of these helicopters is still under w~y.
Turkish naval development is proceeding primarily along the lines
- of the qualitative improve~.ent ~~d modernization and the quanti-
tative increase in the inventory of ve.ssels by means of both for-
eign deliveries and the construction of co~.bat vessels in domes-
tic shipyards, and especially of boats. The Turkish coinmand's
vietiJ is that, as compared with large ships, they are less vulner-
able to enemy weapons and the most advantageously adapted to
operations in the coastal regiuns of the Black, Ae~e^ii and Medi-
terranean Seas, as well as in the zone of the Strai.ts. Attention
in this regard is bein~ devoted primarily to uidecl-missile boats.
_ They are being bui.lt in the Taskizak (Stambul~ sh~.pyards with
technical assistance from the FRG. As indicated in the foreign
press, construction is norra being ~ompleted here on the third
"Dogan." type boat, and four more are expected to be laid down.
Plans call for continuation of the process of conver~l~ing "Jagua-r"
type torpedo boats into guided-missile boats. P1ans ~~.lso provide
_ for fitting Project SAT~33 (13 units) patrol boats, which are
being built with the assistance of the FRG, with ~uided ;nissiles.
The processes involved in the construction of Project 209 diesel-
powered submarines are bein.g assimilated and mastered in the G~il-
c~ik shipyards; their basic equipment is being suppli~ad by the
FRG. The first submarine of this type has been under construc-
tion here since 1975�
_ ~iccording to foreign press reports, the country has set up for
the series production of small landing ships (four-six units per
year).
Dur:~ng the period 1979-1980 Turkey anticipates obtaining from the
_ United States five submarines and three destrayers of postwar
construction but whi~h. have undergone modernization.
Efforts are being made to enhance the combat capabilities of the
~lurkish naval aviation. From Italy deliveries continue of the
AB-212B .AS~~I helicopter. Plans call for their number to be in-
creased by six during 1979. Negotiations are under w~y with the
U.S, for the replacement of obsolete ~'Tracker" aircraft with
more up-to-date models.
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_ The Turkish naval command has in recent years turned its atten- ~
tiori to the developm~nt of diversionary forces whose mission is
_ to conduct diversionary and reconnaissance operations in enemy
_ coastal territory and waters and to insure the security of the ~
undercaater barriers at the approaches to naval ba~es and the -
Straits zone. The navy has formed several small units of frog- -
men. '
According to foreign press reports, Turkish naval personnel num-
ber 45,000, of which 15,000 are career offi:ers and petty offi-
cers. The system of recruitment operates '~~n the basis of a uni-
versal military service law. The period of active service is 20
months. Approximately 10,000 recruits are called up for naval
service each year. `
Rank-and-file enlisted personnel under go training at the train-
ing center in GtSlci~k, petty officers in Beylerbeyi (Istanbul re-
gion) and G~lc~ik. Officer cadres receive their training at the
~ naval academy on the island of Heybeli. Each year it ~raduates
approximately 1.20 naval command and engineer.ing officers. Gen- -
eral officer personnel undergo training at the naval academy in
Istanbul, as well as at the NATO War College in Rome.
According to the estimate of foreign military experts, the navy
could, in case of a declaration of war, call up more than 25,000
trained reservists.
_ ~ls indicated by items in the forei~n press, the Turkish navy's
oper.ational and comb at training is oriented primarily toward .
practicing the missions it would have to execute in wartime.
The seperate elements of this combat training are the subjects
of S_ntensive work during the course of an entire year of train-
ing exercises ~nd individual instruction. The navy's readiness
to execute specific operational plans undergoes comprehensive
test;in~ in the course of independent naval exercises, as well aa"
_ in maneuvers conducted jointly with services of the armed forces.
The largest of these has been the "Deniz kurdu" ~transliterated~
type standard training exercise. Special emphasis during the ~
conduct of this exercise is placed on organizing cooperation
bet~~ueen the various naval and air forces.
Turkish naval forces also participate actively in the annual
exe:rcises conducted on the basis of NATO plana in the Southern
~!~~.irapean theater of operations (exercises such as "Dawn Patrol,"
"Display Determination" and others), in the course of which the
'"urkish command devotes its attention primarily to the process
of shifting the navy from a peacetime to a wartime footing, to
operational deployment and to maintaining communications with
headquarters and command posts. Several of each of the various
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cla:~aes of ships are usually detached from the Turkish navy to
- participate in the execution of joint operations within special-
purpose naval forces and groups forming part of 1 arge t1kT0 naval
forces.
COPYttIG~iT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreni~re", 1979
8963
:t:SO: 1801
� . 2,3.
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~
COUNTRY SECTION IT ALY
DII~FERING VIEWS ON BERLINGUER'S COMPROMISE
Mi"lan IL MONDO in Italian ~ Sep 79 pp 12-14
[Ai^ticles pro and con by Valerio Castelnuovo and Pierre Carniti]
- [Text~ The 1eft; as they say at Montecitorio, doesn't -
take any summer vacation. Last year it was
Bettino Craxi, PSI secretary, who toolc advan-
tage of the holiday to stir up flagging politi-
cal ardor with his essay against Leninism and
in support of a reevaluation of Joseph Proud-
hon. This time, in mid-August; it was up to -
PCI Secretary Enrico Berlinguer to launch the
att ack: ~en ~a1id-set pages in the Party's
weekly I~TI~tASCS~A . ~pelling out once again the
basic thrust of his strategy, from the his-
toric compromise to austerity. Pinning his
opus to one of Palmiro Togliatti's editorials
published in August of 1946, he argues that in
- order to settle the Italian crisis "the Italian
~ mass parties must work together on a joint plan =
for recovery and reneu~al, gathering and giving
voice to the common hopes of the great masses
of the people from ~~hich each dra~-�s its elec-
toral support and by V~hich each is follou~ed. "
Vitally necessary,, according to Berlinguer; is
"an economic policy that is altogether new, in
. r~~hich degree of development and its quality, its
expansion and its end goals are given a new foun-
dation and find further expression in a new
kind of intervention by the working class, not
merely in the distribution of income, but also
in the kind and quality of consumption and hence
in the very process of [capital~ accumulation."
, The issues Berlinguer raised will, whatever else
happens, certainly be on center-stage at the
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. next two major political conclaves: the DC Na-
t;iona7. Couc~cil (meetin~ in Rome f'rom 4 to 6
Sc;E~l.tmber ) and l;hc; of f icial encounter~ between
Socialists and Communists, slated for the days
immediately following those.
This new pitch for the communist strategy has
stirred up controversy even among the unions:
Giorgio Benvenuto, UIL secretary, fired off a
blistering attack on Berlinguer's political
blueprint, pulling into the fight even CGIL
Secretary Luciano Lama, who had publicly spo-
ken out in support of the PCI leader. Labor
is directly involved in its own right anyway
- by this new ca11 for the austerity line which,
according to Berlinguer, is more urgently needed
~hat ever because of the terrifying resurgence
of the economic crisis. In the debate touched
off by the RINASCITA article, IL MONDO has gone
for economic background and political enligh-
tenment to Valerio Castronovo and to CISL Se-
cretary-general Pierre Carniti, who found it
necessary, in responding to Berlinguer, to
begin with an overall assessment of the poli-
tical situation.
Valerio Castronovo: Togliatti's Mistake A11 Over Again
Enrico Berlinguer's article in the 24 August issue of RINASCITA
in which the PCI secretary beats the drums once again for his
historic compromise, contains one new element by contrast with
other quite recent stands. The news is the top priority assig-
ned by the Communist leader to the seriousness of Italy's eco-
nomic crisis, to which he devotes far more attention than to '
any other issue. The concerns Berlinguer voices in this sense
- are thoroughly justified, as is his excoriation of the countless
ills that have so long beset our country. The trouble is that
the political premises and conclusions in his article, raised
once again in justification of the cogent points that have so
far shaped the strategy of his party's policy-makers, seem
sirigularly vague and contradictory.
Fii~st of all, the comparison with the immediate po~twar years, and
the citation of the "compromise" Togliatti put together then
with the Christian Democrats, do not come off as altogether re-
levant,~judging by the way things were going in the area of eco-
nomic policy. It is, in short, hard to see how the lesson of
those years can be adduced in support of the historic compromise _
argument. Quite the contrary. It is worth recalling that the
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cor~f.rontation over the issues of reconstruction, successfully
settled with the adoption of a moderate stabilization 1ine,
coi.ncided with the death in biay 1947 of the three-party DC-
Sociaist-Communist government.
- Ber~linguer wi11 admit today that during the postwar period the
PCI committed an error of evaluation by failing to perceive the
growth potential in the economic system in other words, by
hewing, precisely because of its ambiguities, too closely to =
the orthodox Third Internati.onale line on the imminent collapse
of capitalism. And this stymied, among other ~th3.ngs, the e1a-
boration of an adequate reform strategy among the 1eft, on the
basis of an overall design for economic planning~ Yet we must
no~, forget, whatever we do, that the people who shot down every
single innovative proposal for "steering the ecanomy" were the
DC leadership. Whi1e he never took really reactionary positions,
De Gasperi and the ba.g guns in the DC, witin the backing of the
marlcet-economy types, successfully thwarted even the pleas from
segments of their own party which favored a Keynsian orienta-
tion of economic policy. And then Togliatti was the first to
realize, and to reckon with the f act that any structural re-
forms would have imperilled relations between the PCI and the
DC as well as the already rocky road to ratification of �the
- republican constitution.
But let's drop the historical parallels and get down to the sug-
gestions Berlinguer makes for coping with the problems troubling
our country today. The PCI secretary's analysis has merit, as .
we said, in that it points out with exernplary precision the more
spectacular symptoms of the "Italian case."
If we move along, however, from Berlinguer~s diagnosis to the
cure he prescribes, it is impossible to see just how the elimi- ~
_ nation of corporate waste and privilege, much less the objec-
tives of a"new economic policy~~ (based on the centrality of
the working class and its autonomy in direct control of some of
- the mechanisms in the production process) could coexist, and
come to fruition, with so heterogeneous and antagonistic an
all.iance of political parties and interests as that inherent in
the historic compromise formula. Nor, to te11 the truth, do
even Berlinguer's prescriptions for an updating of collabora-
~ tio:n among the "great progressive and moderate wings" of the
antif ascist front, help much in untangling the snarls.
Be that as it may, the proposal to pitch into a fight against
the evil effects of welfare statism, against organized waste
and untrammelled patronage, should include, if we take it li- -
terally, a very tough contest, certainly not a privileged rela- -
tionship or a summit agreement with the Christian Democrats who,
although not without help, have provided over recent years, ab-
sent evidence to the contrary, a very we11-feathered nest
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for the state bourgeoisie and other income or corporate classes.
Unless, of course, you think that given the state of affairs we
already have, the only chance of managing the system is to make
certain, na matter how much it may cost in terms of spiraling _
inflation, of the survival of a vast political-bureaucratic mass
protected in one way or another, or possessed of the clout re- _
quired to bring very heavy sectorial pressure to bear. ,
If, though, the Communist leadership's objective (as seen in
Berlinguer's proposals) is to ferret out the pockets of fraudu-
lent wel~arism and parasitism and to do away with them in f avor
of expanding the productive base, and, at the same time, to fos-
. ter the emergence of a meaningful voicP for the working class
_ in the process of capital accumulation, then it will have to
face up to a tough and specific choice of fields and map out a
sound reform strategy. Here again, there~9re, we confront the
issue of the alternative as well as the closely related ques-
tion of a joint program for the left as a power in government
in an industrially advanced western society. In many respects
the essence of the crisis in this country lies not so much in
the difficulty of putting together some sort of committee on
the public welfare with the indiscriminate participation of all
political parties as in the fact that for the past 30 years any
and every real chance for a change in the ruling class has been
systematically snuffed out.
The historic compromise is certainly not going to resolve that _
dilemma, and yet the PCI~s falling back to a position of isola- _
ted opposition would help to worsen it. On the other hand,
Berlinguer's reworked "austerity" proposal, posed in terms of
a constructive confrontation between "those who are concerned
solely with how much to produce and those who are more interes-
ted in what to produce and why to produce it," may well remain
mer~ely an abstract rhetarical formula, unless there is some
accompanying indication as to which social alliances and which
operating tools would make it truly f easible. _
Pierre Carniti: He's Right: There Is No Alternative
The establishment of the Cossiga government as the result of a
stormy and precarious solution to the political crisis should
- make it possible to halt the decline of the image of our insti-
tutions and give us a momentts breathing space before we come
to grips with the complex problems of the new political balance
and the governability of this country. The future development
we can see coming lies in the DC congress, from which we expect
a definition of the conditions for a five-party government with
"equal dignity" among its.majority-party members and its social-
ist prime minister. After that we will get still another cis-
sis, and a$-party government. Not even the communist opposi-
tion, placing the emphasis on content, wauld be viewed as incom-
patible with some sort of agreements in parliament on a measure-
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by-measure basis. Any move by Berlinguer~s party into the oppo- .
sition, in the wake of a national unity crisis, would thus be .
_ calculated to increase ii;s bargaining power in an attempt to
get back iri.
- It is certainly diff icult for anybody to get a clear idea of the
political future of the nation as it is built under the burden .
of still unsolved problems, between a rock and a hard place.
However, as we look at the trends emerging now, we can certainly
not help worrying.
First of a11, even though I was favorabl~~ impressed with Craxi's
appointment to form a government, I personally see the t~rhole is-
sue of a"non-confessional prime minister" as misleading anci
ambiguous. There is certainly need for change and renewal in -
out; politics. The test, though, ought to be not between the
churched and the unchurched, but rather between one policy and
annther, between one bloc of society and another.
The answer to the problems of this country's governability, fur- '
thermore, is not to be found (vrithout implying considerable un-
derestimation) in carefully measured sharing of power among the
parties, much less in the devising of ruses for walling up one
party or another. You can indeed, as we have seen, manage to
form a government with tricks like these; it is very difficult,
- though, to get it to work once you have formed it. Pol.itical
stability cannot in f act be separated from the solution of the
more acute of our social problems.
None of this is possible, though, without generating conflict
and running into stubborn defenses. without a profound change
in economic policy, which must go far beyond the 3-year plan's
prescription for an equilibrium determined in advance by the
major sectors of the economy on the basis of financial and mone-
tary compatibility, while all the rest becomes vnimportant.
A11 the rest, that residual "rest," includes jobs, and it includes
the Mezzogiorno. What I mean is that you cannot solve the cri-
sis in this nation's governability by staking everything on a
policy of stabilization and consolidation; on the contrary: -
you need a culture, a strategy, a policy, a solid bloc of power
that has chosen as its goals renewal and change. Nor is it -
mere whimsy to believe that our national unity has swiftly spent
its v~t al energies in attempts to disentangle these knots. Our
best energies have been eroded, spent on running after formulas
that have never been planned, because in the search for the line _
of least resistance on the part of the productive middle class,
we have stopped trying to imbue our economic and social palicy
with a scale of values, with aims, and with alternative goals
to replace those of a burnt-out culture.
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I am certainly not unaware of the difficulty o� bringing off
such an operation. Nobody was ever charged wii;h extremism for
espousing the views of Fiat or the Bank of Italy, although the
contrary example is fairly frequent. Zt is~ however, on this
gr~ound that we can face and seek to resolve the social, economic,
and political crisis. The energy crisis, further, raises this
issue in dramatic terms.
The latest change for the worse is the new rise in prices and
rates. This is a resumption of the inflationary spiral that is
now moving upward at a rate of 18 percent per year. We we11
know that inflation is the most perverse and iniquitous kind
of income redistribution. Unreliable and outdated as they are~
the statistics show that inflation is transferring wealth from
the aged to young adults, from the poor to the rich, and from
the south to the north.
This trend is not only unfair: it involves very serious politi-
cal issues. It is not very 1ikely that the elderly and people
_ on pensions will be able to start a revolution, but there may
well be very different reactions from unemployed young people.
from poor people, and from the fringe pupulations in the big
cities. When injustice is the order of the day, disorder may
look like the only way to get more justice.
We must never forget that the problems of defense of democracy,
of the state, and of the spread and increase o~ freedom also
run through this bottleneck. Poverty does not need the state
to prune back the freedom of the poorti When the spectres of
poverty and want do not govern our behavior, we are freer.
Inflation is essentially a reactionary policy, and labor cannot
but muster all its forces to fight it because, as inflation
- heightens divisions and severs communication within society,
i~L threatens labor's very strategy, makes the conflict b~tween -
~ those who sti11 havE jobs and those who do not irreconcilable,
and exacerbates interest-group self ishness and defensive exclu-
sionism. This awareness is felt throughout the united labor
movement, but it has not reached such a point as to fall in with
the views of those who, even of recent weeks, would shift onto
- labor's shoulders the burden of adjustments as costly (the.y would
strip labor bare of its defenses) as~they are illusory and empty.
I am ref erring here to the renewed offensive against the cost-
of-living adjustment in wages. The several proposals offered
on this count differ from one another, but they are equally
_ unacceptable.
- Mr Reviglio's proposal has sti11 to be determined. From announce-
ments made to date, however, we know that it would involve ex-
clusion of the impact of petroleum price hikes from calcula-
tions of the cost of living index, which would be offset by an
increase in income tax deductions for family dependents.
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_ Certainly this is a step in the direction of fiscal equity
that can no longer be delayed, but we fail to see why it should
be taken out of the hides of employed workers. Confindustria
- Pr~esident Car~1i has taken advantage, so to speak, of the issue ~ s
- being raised to disguise as a technical solution a proposal
that is both paradoxical and provocatory. Zt is paradoxical be-
cause it ca11s, in essence, for a transfer of resources from the
state budget to the profits of corporations. It is provocatory
because, without even makiz~g explicit mention of it, it would
lead to a complete subversion of the collective bargaining struc-
ture .
And 1astly (although it actually came first in time) there is
the Spaventa proposal which ca11s for sterilizing three contin-
gency points caused by the oil price increases, and returning
them to the workers in the form of a tax cut .
- From the angle of worker incomes this proposal looks harmless
~nough. Even so, it is equally unacceptable, for one basic
reason.
'I'he increase in oil prices has in fact nothing to do with the
short~~erm state of the economy: it is not an extraordinary
hal~pening to be dealt with by means of suitable technical ad-
justments but a fundamental alteration in the economic situa-
tion.
It marks the end forever of a phase in development (in Ita1y
- an