JPRS ID: 8646 WEST EUROPE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100090005-6
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: REPORTS

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~oa nN~r~cin~. usr nNi.v
JPRS L/8646
5 September 1979
West Euro e Re ort
p p
cFOUO 5oi~s~
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERViCE
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NOTC
JPRS publicar.ions contnin inforn~Cidn pritt~rily from �oreign
n~wspnpers, pcriodic~nl~ ~nd books, bur. nlso from news ~~;ency
tr~nsmissiony and bro~dcasts, i~taterials from fnreign-l~~nguage
sourc~s are tranql~tcd; ehose from ~ngli.sh-l~ngunge sour~~es
gre Cr~nscribed or reprinted, wiCh rhe original phr~~ing ~ttd
other chctracCeristics reCained.
Headlines, ediCorinl reports, and maCeri~l er.closed in brackets
[j ~re supplied by JI'It5. E'rocessing indic~eors such ns [T'e:ct)
or (~xcerprJ in the Cirst line of each iCem, or following t;te
lasC line of a briet, indicate how the c~riginal information w~~
processed. ~~tiere tto processing indicatar is ~iven, rhe infor-
maCion w~s summarized or extracted,
Uni+^~iliar n~mes rendered phonetically or transliCeraeed are
enclose~i in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark anc: enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in conre:ct.
Other unattributed parenelictical notes within the body of: an
iCem originale with the source. Times wirhin items are as
given by sourcc.
T'he conCents ~f this publicaCion i.n no way represent t}~e poli-
cies, views or attitucles of the U.S. Government.
I'or t~ur.th~~r i;~t-nrmntian -~n !-cp:~rt cc~ntcnt
cztll (7~3~ 351-2`i11 or 351-?5~11 ~~rcc~c~~,
(;vpnis, '1'urk~~~~l.
COPYRICfi't I.AWS A;VD REGU'..~1TIONS GJVERP3ING OW~ERSFiIP CF'
MATERIALS REPF.OD(.CE:D !iE?RF:I:; RF:QL'IRE 'Cfi~iT DISSE:~�tLtit,TION
OF TE1IS PU6LICATI0;1 IiE Rf:STKICTED FOR OFFICUIL USE ONI.Y.
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~
JPRS L/8646
5 Sept~`nber 1.9 79
WEST EUROPE REPORT ~
(FOUO 50/79)
COiVTENTS PAGE
COUNTRY SECTION
~RAI~'CC
Defense ~olicy, Forces, Weapons Surveyed -
(ARMEES D'AUJOURD 'HUI, Jul-Aug 79) 1
Cautious Optimism Voiced on Industrial Nations' Future
(Thierry de MonCbrial Interview; PARIS MATCH,
10 Aug 79) 13
ITALY
PCI Probleins in Turin Symptomatic of Party at Large
(Wa1Cer Tobagi; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 27 Jul 79)........ 23
- a - (III - WE - 1.50 FOUOj
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~Oit O1~F'ICIAL US~ nNLY ,
c;UUN'1'ItY SI;C'I'LON '
FR~NCE
DEF~N5E POLICY~ FORC~'S, W~AFONS SURVEYED
Par.i,e tvthit:rs AuloUttn 'Mli in F'rench Jul-Aug ?9 pp 8-1 q, 1~8
~Unattributed articles "~ance~a Defenee Policy^ ~
/-Text % France~s defense policy ie charaoterized by continuity. It wa$
_ defined by (}er~eral de Oa~ille, eet forth in the White paper on Defense in
1972, and debated in parliement at the time of the vote on the law on mili-
tary planning.
Ita primary ob~ectfve ie to eafeguard the independence of the nation.
It therefore excludes any ayetematic aline~ment Mrith the diplomatic poaitiona
of another country, or another group of countriea, and int~nda France to
retain complete freedom to decide on the Qppropriatenees, timing, and moc~al-
itiea of committing its armed forces in the event of criais or cor~flict.
However, it doee not eignify neutraliam, xithdrawal, isolation, for r`rance~a
eecurity ie inaeparable from the international aontext. It depende in a
very direct way upcn etability in Europ,. That ia xby, while re~ecting any
idea of returning to NATO~s integrat~~; ~t~vcture, it remaine ~ fu11y parti-
cipating member of the Atlantic Alliance.
. The eecurity of F~ance can also be a~'fected by orise~ or ten~ione Lhreaten-
ing rax material8 and energy eupply sources, ae xell As the grea~; maritilr~e
tranaportation currents indiapeneable for the country~e good economic health.
It ie these facts that govern France~s military strategy.
It is baeed on the deterrent r~nd combat capabilities conferred by the exist-
ence oP mutually enhancing nuclear and traditional armed forcee.
The ~5rench strategic concept ia essentially d~feneive. The point i~ t;o deter
an aggreaeor from attacking France by convincing it that a ma~or military
action on ite part Would be likely to unleaeh atrategic re.taliation in the
very heart of ita otirn territory and to cause material damage and loasee of
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human life dieproportionate to the gain~ it ac~uld expect. 2`he intention i~
thus to prevent a? war.
~ut the threat muet be a credible ond to be taken into c:oneideration. Now,
_ there obviouely exiate a lebel of aggreaaion b~lou which reaouree to nuclear ~
weapons would not be plausible. -
An aggreeaor could therefore be tempted to evade deterrenae and to nibble
dangerouaiy at our positione through a aeriee of niinor actions for whiah it
would not be plaueible to brandiah th~ nuolear threat. That is xhy atrate-
gic nuclear capability muet be complemented by traditional force~ of auffi-
cient size to check any minor action or force the advereary to engage in
atrength in such a way that there would be no dout~t as to ita intentions of
offense.
However, an aggressor with great numerical eup~riority at its command could
be tempted ta t~ce advantage of it to eliminate our traditional capability
at it~ own convenience and back ue rapidly into a fail-eaPe aituation.
That is where tactical nuclear arinement canea in, with ite du81 role.
First, by ita very existence in the heart of the combat corpa, it impoees
on the adversary a constant threat of uae and preventa ita taking full advan-
tage of euperiority in conventional means.
Then, it aerves to deliver the last official xarning by the political author-
ities, giving the aggreeaor notice to e~cpect the unleashing of atrategic
weapons ix' it peraiate in ite undertaking.
So the st:ategic concept is an over-all one, since it is intended to deter _
at all levels af aggreseion, dele~ys fail-eaPe, and ia baaed on the prinoiple ~
t,aat modern deterrencQ resta not only on $ atrategic arsena2 but on tactical
:~uclear xeapons also, intended to ~enhance ita thr~at, and also on ground, -
sea, and air forces capable of Pighting with the greatest possible effective-
nes.~, and determined to do so if need be.
It is also specific to France, because it e8~,abliahea a direct conneetion
batWeen t~e threat of use or the actual uae ot tactical nuclear weapon8 and
the unloaehing of etrategic retaliation. St is therefore different Pran the
Ruasian and American concepts xhich attempt, on the contrary, to iliseociate
th~ use o~ the tactical from the etrategic nuclear.
'r'rlnce possooses today an effective nuclear areenal that enables it to con~
d..�t its strategy of deterrence.
French atrategic nuclear forces are not trying to r$ce the txo greate for
pc~xer and number af vectors, but aim at ~ttaf,ning adequacy.
Their technical credibility requires that they be kept at a very high techno-
logical level to preserve their aurvival and penetration capabilitiea in the
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, Paoe of deteotion, attack, ~nd defeaee eyetema. "
. They are linked in tYuree complement?ary oaapor~e~atb s
Mieaile-l~unahing eubmarinoe patroll~ in the depthe of the aea are
now aeeured of invulnerah:llity
The mieailee ~n the ~lbion plateau have in their favor an almost in-
� etant~r?eoue reaction tiave and the fact of being a#,ationed on our o~rn terri-
tory: an attack on thia eite would be oP unooaistakeable eignificance
The airarai't Qre extramely veraatile in their ueeef they can be put
on alert, deployed to etreae the intentione oY the government, and recalled
after take-off.
Tactical nuclaar ~rnw~aent ie ~t a meaningtul level. The Plutone, both the
air force and the aeronaval aircraft, are equipped xit,h nuclear rre~pon~ in-
- tended for battlefield ob~eativea.
Tho preeence of theee taatical nuclear forcee alongaide the trad~tional
forces increasee the deterrent eignificancs oF the latter and thoir ability
to give battle.
Air Stxength
Mirage IV, AN ~Nuclear Weapon~ 22
The Bomber Winga
The Mirags IY arme avatem is h~~t~~~~ii~ ~~e fir~~ aac~iea ~f the French -
deterrent nuclear araenal.
The Mirage IY ia capable of attacking etrategic or tactical targets and alao `
of effecting long-range photographic reconnaisaance miesiona. ~ance preeent-
ly has about SO aircraPt of thia type at ita diepesal.
Originally conceived Por very high speed, high altitude bombing, it moves at
a cruieing apeed of Mach 0.9, to reach a clintbing apead of Mach 2, at a
' ceiling in excaes of 15,000 metera. It caa ePfeat fully autonamous miaaiona
over 1,500 kilometera from ite departure b~e.
Oxing to ita sophisticated navigation aystam and to the use of ~an,mera, it
- ia capable of operating ~rith adequate effectivenee8 whatever the ~eather
conditiona, and of evading the adversary~e interceptora and ground-ai.r de-
- fenaea.
It car:�iee the AN 22 nuclear load, xith a power in excesa of 60 kilotona, -
the first nuclear xeapon produced by our country.
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ror~ or~tcrnr~ usE orr1.Y
A portion of ~t.eee redaurcoe are on con~t4nt al0rt and can ~ccompliah a
nucl~ar mieaion upon very ~hort notioe.
- The versatility of an nircraft and tha preaence of a man on board make t}ie
manned air forCS an irreplaceable ~netxwnent at the govornment~e diepoeal
for assuring the polltical handling of a crieia.
The Supply Wing
1t is compoaed of 11 C135 F' air~raft diatributed among three aquadrone.
In-flight refueling of' the Mirage xV from~the C135 F can be sccomplished
in all weathers, day and night, thu~ endowing the Mirage IY, in a nuclear
config~?u~ation, with an action radiue o! over 3,000 kilametera.
Modernization of tho W~apotts Syetem
The modernlxation, ~a decidsd up~n in 1975, of the Mirage TY airore.ft, will
mr~ke i~ poasible to koap them activo at lesat wntil 1985. The modificationa
uhich have occurr~d affect simultaneously the weapons aystem, t,he navigation
, apparatus, the pene~ration bnd re8lai~ance capability. The achievement of
electronic counter-measurea ha$ broudly enhanced the operational qualitiea
oP the Mirago IV.
= In addition, atudiea e~re in prograss to exemine the Peusibility of adapting
- the ASMP ~Medium ftange Air to Ground Miasile
7 to the Mirage IV.
Nouever, this is a timely moment to develop a third component capable of
brinbir.g in advantages comparable to thoae of the manned vectora.
The 9t~idies begun two yeare ago shox that a nex generation of semi-mobile
;.ilasilee or a~eroc~}m~raic mieailes could be involved, with the latter poeaibly
site-interchangeable or airborne.
Thc. "S 11" 5trstegic around to Ground Ballietic ?Si.eeilee (SSBS)
In;tallec~ on tha AZbion plateau in Uppar Provence, the SSBS carry a nuclear
, charae oP 150 kilotons power and can rea~h targete at a diatance of 3 000
' kilometers. '
These missilos, aprea.d over a 30 kilometer radiua, are buried in ailoa
er~aoed in reinforced concrete, and capped by a hermetically sealed door,
a~ so rr~de of concrete, xeighing 11~0 tons. Diepereal, burial, and reinforce-~
rr nt protect th~ miasiles from a.ll preaently known Yorma of attack.
Fire control is assured from txo control posta deeply mnbedded in the mountain
and connectod ~+ith decision and iiaplementation centers by a red�sndant and
highly protected ensemble of diversified comaaunicationa syetema.
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Nuclear warhead being loxered into eilo.
Powers 15U kilotone
Ranges 3,000 kilometera
Number of unita: 18 �
Propu].eiont txo explosive stage~
Weights 32 tone
Lengths 15 metera
Diameters 1.5 met,ere
The SSBS nuclear component, installed on our otirn aoil, expreseee tha minute-
by-rainute, second-by-aecond conatant preeence o! the deterrent that a ma~or
attack could under no circumetancee check.
~
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Strengthening the Credibility of ~he Str~tegio Nuolear Miee~ilee on the
Albion Plateau
The transformation of the atrategic ground to grouad balZiatic eyatein on the
Albion plateau xae undertaken in order to inoreaee ite fire-porrer by putting
into eervice a misalle with a megaton thernwnucle~r warhead and increaaing
ite deFenee penetr~ti~n capability.
The firat 33 artillery unit will be placed in eervice in 1980, and the aecond
in 1982. Th~ swing from 52 to 53 will bring a very notexort~r increaae in
efPectivenees to the 3SBS foroe, eince ita capaoity xill be multiplied eight-
fold and the reaction time reduaed fivefold, and einoe the range ~rill be on
the order of 3,500 kilome~re.
Mirage IIIE - Jaguar p- AN 52
An important elernent of our deterrent policy, the AN 52 nualear vespon can
conatitute, within the tramework of an open conPliat, the laat military ~
warning given an aggreesor bePore conm~itment oP the etrategic nuclear lorces
Mi.rage IV, nualear eubmarinee, ground to ground balliatic mieailes.
Two typee of aircraft act as carriera for the AN 52 weapont the Mirage IIIE
and the Jaguar.
Like that of any nuclear xeapon, ita ~.:ae can only be undertaken on the order
of the president af the republic.
Tho Mirage IIIE Squadrons
Stationed at Luxeuil, in Upper Saone, the Dauphine ~nd Lafayette aquadrons,
which conetitute the fourth fighter wing, have 29 aircraft at their diaposal.
The Mirage IIIE is an all-veather, lox altitude interceptor aircraft.
Moving at a maximwp speed of Mach 2, at a ceiling of 16,000 meters, it ia
equ:.pped with a Cyrano II intercept radar and has an action radius of 200
to 900 kilameters, depending on the mieeion configurat~on and profile.
The Jaguar A Squadrons
Th~~ Jaguer ia a supersonic tactical support twin ~et, capable of operating
1'rum improvised airfields of about 1,000 meters.
~n a tactical misaion, autonwnouely and at low altitude, it can attack tar_
gets situated over 700 kilometera from its base; ita convoy range, xhich ie
over 3,500 kilometera, can be greatly increased becauae of its in-Plight
refueling capability.
It reaches a climbing speed of Mach 1.5 and ite ceiling is 15,000 metera.
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Structurally equipped with two 30 millimeter cannona, it cen carry a military ~
cargo of about Lt,00A kilograme, which oan include, beeidea nualear weapona,
traditional xeapona~ (bomba, rookete, air to ground miaeilea).
The 7th wing, ata?tioned at Saint-Dizier, ueea the nuclear attack Jaguare.
Tomorrox, the Mirage 2000
The Mirage 2000, the air force~a future combat aircraft, ayntheeizes the
moet advanced techniquea. Ekceptionally maneuverable, it ueee the moat
modern arms now in servace, and can oper~te fraa 1,200 to 1,5pp meter atripa.
It xill be equipped with a mediwn range air to ground missile.
Sea Strength
Miasile-Launching Nuclear Sutamarinee (SNI,~) in service:
The Redoutable (aotive aervice 1971)
The Terrible (active aervice 19?~j
The Foudroyant (active service 197L~)
The Indomptable(active earvice 1975)
Suhaarines under conetruction or nearing canpletions
(Redoutable type): the Tonnant - commiaaion to active service planned
for 1980
The Inflexibles sutunarine dimenaione more or leae identical, perfor-
mance improved - new xeapons sy8tem
Specificationss
Displacements 7,500 tons
I,engths 128 meters
Beams 10.60 raeters
Poxers 16,000 horee poxer
Speed: above 18 knots
Armamentt
Each SNLE of the Redoutable type has 16 2~I20 miaailes ~rith the following
specifications:
Mass: 18 tons
Range: over 3,000 kilometers
Nuclear xarhead; 1 megaton.
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Evolution of Se~:~ Strength
T1ie New Miseile-launching Nuclear Submarine
The decision to begin construotion in 1979 0~' a new generation SNLE, the -
"Inflexible,~~ was definitlvely made by the preeident of the republic in
September 1978 after three yeare of atuc~y.
It eppeared indi ~poneable to aasure coordination betxeen launching this
new SNL~ and putting the multiple wurhead rocketa oP the Mlt arms eyetem
into servi.ce.
Lnprovement of the "InYloxible"
The precision and autonorr~y of its navigation devices ti+ill be increaeed by
the use of a new over-all navigation syetem.
Tt will be pr~vided with perfacted computers and muoh morb elabo:,ate counter-
measure and under~aater detection systems. With reepect to acousicical con-
cealment of the submeraible, the advances eurrently pl~nned conceirn a new
propeller, improvement of the superstructuree, and the suapension syetem of
the auxiliariea.
It should be added that a new tac~tical xe~,pon wi1], increase the defenae
capability o~ the SNLE, and that operational diving safety will be improved,
that the reliability, ease of maintenance, r~nd airqplicity of operation of
on-board equipment rrill be increaaed.
i;ze naw SNLr; will enter the operational cycle in 1985. Though. submersibles
c~ure studied durin~ the decade of 1960, the new submarine "Inflexible" is -
a vessel of the decade of 1980. A new generation is involved. ~'hough it
has the same displacement as tr,e preaent SYL~s, it differs from them in ite
we~:,ons and navigation aystem8.
The ~ N,issile
The M1.1 missile has a range of about l~,000 ki1orneters and is equipped with
seversl separate 150 k?.loton nose cones reinforced againaL the effecta of a
nuclaar exploefon. It tskes ~ench deterrence through a decisive ph8ae on
th~~ lovel of efYectiveneas. The I~t missile, compriaing multiple loads, cap,- ~
at.;.e of reaching several targets, presents a very clear improvament over the
Mi~ mi~sile with a aingle megaton load that can reach only one target.
After the "Tnflexible"
.7.~istallation of the M20 Weapons System on the SNLEs
The program set, by General de Gau~.le included five miaeile-launchi:~g nuclear
aubmarinea. The fifth veasel of this type srill be finiahed in i980, and
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there will then, with five veeaele in eervice, be four armed 9NLEe in ~the
operational cyole at all timea, which will guarantee a constazit minimwn of
two aubonarinee on aea-patrol. Theae eubraarinea xill all be equ3pped, ae oP
- 1979, with the M20 xeapona syatem, xhich includee miaailee equipped with
megaton thermonuclear lnads, with d~coy~ of over 3,000 ~ilometere~ range.
~ Super Etendard and the AN 52 We~pon
The aircraft carrier Clemenceau ia alreac~y, arid the aircraft carrier Foch,
after modernization in 1980, will be, equippsd to launoh the 8uper Etendard
carrying tactical nuclear weapon 52.
- SpeciPicatione of the Super Etendards
Launching xeights 11.9 tona
Speed: in excess of Mach 1
Lo~r altitude
Weepons: cannons /-firing exploaive shella
7, rockete, Magic ai.r to air
mis~iles, air to aurface AM 39, nuclear weapon (AN 52).
On 1 April 1979, 13 Super Etendard are with the fle~t.
By 1 January 1980, 21~ xill be operational.
Ground Strength
The Pluton ,
LAON�
SUIPPES ~ J
. MA1LLY~ ~gERHOFFEN I
BELFORT ~
Cor~position - Inatallation ~
F`ive Pluton nuclear artillery regiments conetitute the ground component af
nuclear armament.
They are atationed in the north and e~at of F~ance~
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~Ott U~~ICtAI, US~ nNLY
, Chain of Commar:!i
On1y the pr~eident of th~ republic oar~~nake tk~e deoieion to uea nuclear
weapons. He hae a1; hia pereonal diepoev, epeoitio teohnioal devioee rrhich
~ phyeically guarantee him control of theee we~pone.
~ The army le aharged rrith coordinat,in~ the dieaharge of nuclear weapone.
The arrr~y coxps are reeponeible for the opera~ional uee of the r~gimente.
Organization of a Pluton Regiment
A pluton regiment coneiete of a~roup o! 1,000 men diapoaing of 300 vehiclea.
Three grtillery batteries, with two Pluton r~pe each, conatitute the mear~s
of diecharging nuclEar uoapone.
The comrvand and service battery comprieea in particular two oormngnd a~nd
liaieon t~eme xho diepoee of high performarice co~aunicatione ayeteme, per-
mitting delivery of moveinent aad tiring ordera under the requieite condi~
tione of eecrecy and apeed.
The ~afety and nuclear transportation bat#~~ry ia reeponeible for the delivery
of miaeilea and xeapona.
The Pluton Weapon Syetem
r
iEi~ SI .,~a., a ~*!y:X:. ~
. f~ K'.~.A~t,
t~.
The Pluton miaeile haa a range of 120 kilanetera and carriea a nuclear load
of about 20 kilotons. It is guided by an inertial control unit aad ie thua
independent of ar~,y contact ~+ith the ground during ita flight.
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~ ~Ok n~FICIAL US~ ONLX
i
~f~
~
~ ~ fr f ~ I
i I ~ I
~ ~I ~ j
,r ~ ~ ~r. .
~ -
~
~ ~ f.
i
, . .
~ w ,x - ~ ~
~
a~,;;.
, ~ ?
The launching ramp fa mounted on the AHY 30 chaseie which includee all the
optical and electronic equipment required for Piring, ae xell ae the miaeile
loading crane. The Pu11y equipped eyetem ia mobile. Firing aan take place
a few minutea a~ter atopping.
The Air Force
The effectiveneaa of a nation~e air strength reata on four basic principleat
conatant alert, immediate reaction capability, mobility, and fire porrer.
For perfect reconciliation oP theae delenee imperativea, the French air
force ia orgcnized according to a dual etructures
a functional atructure, compoaed of aeven large apecialized commanda
comprising operationel unite grouped to accomplieh a apecific raiaeion, and
ahich for thie purpoae diepose of their oxn peraonnel and materiel (in par-
ticular equipment)
a territori~l atrur,ture, con8tituted by four air regiona, which in
addition to strictly operational reaponaibilities (~?ir traffic, operational
defen8e of the territory, and defenae of aeneitive pointa), take care oP the
routine neede if the gre3~ co~manda, thus conatituti~ng aupport for thera.
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~he point et Which tlis funation~l and t~rritoral atructures converge ie at
- the level oP the air baae. At thie lev~l~ the baee aotamander ha+~ under hia
authority all uni~e et~tioned on the bae~j hs ir rerponeible for thoir -
preparadneae ~?nd for exeoution ot ordere to ue� ~aoh oo~and conoern~d,
epeaiali$ed or regiottal.
This organizntion enablee the air force
to aeawne air defenee of the national ep~toej
to maintain immediate reaponee capability againet aqy attack on the
territory or ita land and sea approachea, canbining if need be ite actiona
with thoee of the other txo arined forcee~
to maintain over8eas intervention oapability.
~
COPYKTaHTs 1979 - Revue dea forcee armeee francaieoe "Armees d~Au~ourd~hui"
t2~49
CSOs 3100
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COUNTRY 5ECTYON ~'RANCE
CAUTIOUS OpTIMISM VOICEn ON 2NDUST~tIAL NATIONS' ~UTUItE
parig PAItI5 MATCH in ~r~nah 10 Aug ~9 pp 15, 17, 83-85
[Intervi~w with Thierry de Montibridl, director of ehe French InstiCue~ of
Intern~Cion~l ItelgCions, daCe not givenJ
[TextJ A wav~ of peasimism engulfed the Weati with the appearance in 1972 of
the repnre of the Club de Rome--an association of economiats and managers-~
enCitled "The Limite of Growth." This documenC predicted that the induetrial-
ized world would collapse beginning in 1980, after having exhausted all the
raw materinls. One of the reporters of the Club de Rome, Thierry de Mont-
brial, director of the ~'rench Institute of International Relations, in an
interview with PARIS MATCH, atCempta to aeparaCe what is true from what is
excessive in Chese apocalyptic viewa. He aeke the questiona: Is the world
r~ally threatened ~y startages? Is it not instead auffering from the diffi-
culty 140 to 150 nations--most of recent creation--have of coordinating their
policies when urgent problems arise: Were they able to do so, the crisea
could perhaps be overcome. Ten years [as published] after the great scare,
a more lucid look.
[Question] In 1972, the Club de Rome had forecast the rapid exhausting of the
world's resodrees. Are you econQmists who are close to the Club de Rome more
optimistic now?
[Answer~ I will begin with a historical anecdote. At the end of the 18th
Century, iC was thought that the English coal mines were in the process of
being exhausCedl That notion of Che exhausting of natural resources is,
therefore~ extremely sub3ecti~e and, above all, dependent upon the state of
the technology. The Club de Rone's warning in 1972 has to be rethought in
1979 in the following manner: we are living in a world which is prone to
consume increasingly more raw materials, particularly energy raw materials.
Technolagy, although it is making a lot of progress, is not progressing at
the same rate. If there is not a basic change, either in the behavior of
people or in technology, of necesaity the day will come when there will be
shortages.
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[Que~einn] In 1J'72, the Club dQ Rome recognized Ch~ fc~cC th~r technic~l ici- ,
novation~, new diecover3e~, cnuld ~o1ve energy problems or problemg of Che
exl~~usting of mineral depos3te. ?iowever, it questioned whether th~se die- ~
cover�les can be mnde:~n time gnd Chought that the cata~troph~ would take place
b~fore h~nd.
[Answer~ Th~e in facti ie the hegre of the real problem. With regard to these
qu~sttons df e~chnologi~~, one distinceion ehould be m~de. Thpr~ i~ Che
ueiliz~tion of existi~.ng eechnologies gnd new technnlogieg. An ex~mple of
u~ilizarion of exist3ng technologie~ is the production of synChetic fue1. It
is u technology which hae been known for g long tim~, as Nazi G~rmany ae-
enined s~lf-guff~ciency during the war by mgnuf~cCuring Che gasoline iC
n~eded from coal. AC pregent, in 5oueh Afric~, enormoue effores are being
exereed to achieve s~lf-~ufficiency, thanks to piloC ~ynChetic gasoline planCe. ~
In a few year~ South Africg will b~ ~ble to meeC 1te toeal n~edg with syn-
thetic g~soline. The CarCer plan also foresees the developmenC of synthetic
gasoline. The problem--we eee it clearly--is not a problem of availabiliCy of
resourceg since, theoretically, we can manufacture ne much gasoli:te as we wish
frnm coal which exists in very large quantiCiee thgt will lasC for years. The
problem is the cost--extremely high--o� these technologies. And yet, if we
do not put these technologies to work sufficiently soon, we run the riak of
facing ~horCnges.
[Question] At that time, Che Club de Rome said very clearly: "We will not ~et
there." Now there is a change. We hope to get there before the crisis.
[Answer] It is on thia point thaC I, personally, and with many others, dif-
fer with the Club de Rome's pessimism. The Club de Rot~e emitted a cry of
:ilarm in 1972, because it was convinced of the danger. The Club de Rome had
reason to say: "If nothing is done, there will be a catastrophe." Personal-
ly I think the catastrophe is not absolutely inescapable. BuC the probability
that it will occur is very high, in fact, if action is not taken in time.
T'hos~ are terribly weighty decisions which co~z.: enormous amounts of money.
What is more, such decisions involve many changes in peoples' life-sCyles.
wicr regard to technologies, one more com~ent: "It is one thing to utilize
existing technologies and take acCion in time; iC is quite another to count
on entirely new inventions which, by definition, are unimaginable. There are
some inventions upon which we can more or less counC, such as thermonuclear
fusion; there are others which, by definition, we cannot anticipate.
[Q,.estion] One question on the sub~ect of bituminous schists. It seems that
th~re is a lot of Chis material in the Paris baein. We are given assurance
tt?~c nearly 10 million tons of fuel can be obtained from it. Do you have an
opinion on this sub~ect?
[AnSwerJ Yes, of course. The question of bituminous schists is a good
example in France. The problems are as follows: first, we atill do not know
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how much ehaG wi11 cn~t. 7'h~ e~tim~e~g which hgve been m~d~ r~gul~rly for
_ th~ ln~t 10 ye~ra fluceuee~ ennrmously. The ~~t~.mated co~C~ of produc~ng
g~~nline from bituminoue ~chi~ts in fnct increae~ much more quickly than
th~ co~t of OPEC ni1. Tha~ means we have no~ yet sufficienely m~etered the
eeChnical aepect~ of rha problam~ ~ven though we are clo~e to being able to E
do so.
Another much more ~erioug ob~eceion--nnd here we aggin encounCer th~ conc~rng
which were nrigin~lly thdge of ehe Club de Itome--ig thnr exploitation of the
bieuminous echi~ts will poet absolue~ly colo~s~1 environm~ntal probl~m~. ~x-
plnit~tion of the bituminou~ schieCe ~.~.c~r~iiy means mnving mountains. We
knnw how tn do it, at 1easC theoreCinally. But we do no~ know at what coat,
at whge pr~.re gnd above a11 we do noe know how to do this nnd limiC the con-
g~quences for the coun!:ryside.
[Questionj And whgC ~bout pollution?
[Answer~ ~xplnitaCion of the biCuminoug schises will not cause any more pol-
lution ehatt other technologie~. Above all iC is an environmental problem.
~QuestionJ A litCle while ago you spoke about thermonuclear fusion as one of
the solution~ envisaged for the producti.on of energy for facCories nnd ~ixed `
installations. Wh~re are we now in this regard?
[Answerj That is ~n area in which there is a certain amount of agreement
among scientists. With respect to thermonuclear fusion, there are things
that we know for aure, namely thar ir exists and operates in nature. That
is glready an important resulC. I am not Calking about the H bomb, which by
definition ia an example of uncontrolled fuaion, but about the stars. We
know how to reproduce fusion on a reduced scale, at the experimental level.
What we are not certain we can do is to bring about fusion with a yield high-
er than the fuel mass [unite), that is, we are not certain that we can pro-
duce more energy by fusion than the amount consumed to produce the phenomenon.
There is almost unanimous agreement in the scientific community which has con-
cluded that in the present and foreseeable atate of affairg it will not be
before 2015 or 2020 at the earliest that we will be able to start practicable
exploitation of a fu~ion process. It would be totally unreasonable for the
moment to count on fusion as a normal source of energy. Another obstacle:
although there are already many ecological problems--heaven knows how much
talk there is about them--for the production of energy by fiasion, a fortiori
we have reason to believe that fusion will also pose such problems. ~or the
immediate future, it will be the well thought out utilization of fisaion-
produced energy.
[QuestionJ By that do you mean the extension of the technologies of nuclear
reactors and fast-breeder reactors?
[AnswerJ There is an improved technology, the fast-breeder reactors, which
permiCs, as we have often said, the extraction of 50 to 60 times the energy
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p~r unie ot urgnium con~umed~ 5inne yau gre epe~?king of ~ranC~, iC h~~ be~n
e~tim~eed tihae w1r1? the uranium r~eouree~ w~ k~ave aveilgbl~ in our territory,
if nll tihe~e resourcee were uC~.1~.zed to produce ~nergy wieh fgsr.-l~r~~der
re~cCnr~, we would have re~erve~ of energy ~t our di~posal aC lea~t equal
rn th~s~ n� Sgudi Arabia in equ~.valent oi1~ �
[Que~tionJ Franc~ h~s .nad~ Che decieion Co equip it~elf wieh �a~t-breedar
re~ct~rs ag oppo~ed to Cttrter whn hgs re�uged Co expgriment wiCh thia t~ch-
naldgy in Americg. W~ ~re, eherefor~, w~ll in Che legd in thi~ g~ctor. We
huve re~son to believe thgt with the dawn of Che year 2000 w~ wi11 be quit~
ind~pendent wiCh regnrd to pnrt of our energy, gC ~.eaeC ~lecCr~.c en~rgy.
(Angwer] It ie true rh~t w~ are building fast-breeder regctors, and it ig
tru~ ehgt we have a t~chnulogical legd vie-a-vie other countrie~, including
the UniCed Stateg. But we shnuld noC be too opCimisCic. Firet, it is not
certain that we wi11 noe hnve ~xploitation problems, bec~uge we gre still in
the development ~tnge of these technologies; ~nd it ie nnly thrnugh exper-
ience th~t we learn nbnut the geotechnicnl problems. Next, even the moat
optimiatic person$ rule oue ehe hypoChesie according Co which we would rely
exclusively on thig source of energy. On Che contrary, I feel thaC every-
one thinks the future will be a certain mix of different technologiee. One
of the things we have to regret is having placed too much confid~nce in ~
single form of energy.
Let u~ say, if ~11 goes well, we should be capable of producing a certain
fractinn of our energy with fast-breeder reactors; however, even so we Bhould
not count too much on this.
[questio~] With the hope of thermonuclear fusion and with the more certain
t?ope of f~st-breeder reactora, one could say that dependence on oil will be
lessened and that, therefore, there is no reason to panic, particularly since
~il reserves are in the procesa of reevaluation. Certain individuals who
were talking about 50 years of reserves are now talking about 70 and even
100 years.
(An~.wer] On the question of evaluation or reevaluation of regerves, there
are a certain number of comments to ne made. Following publication of its
first work in 1972, the Club de Rome was reproached for concluding that
natur~l resources: oil, energy, raw materials, were a kind of cake of
very limited size which was destined to disappear if it were eaten. The
tr~~th of the matter is that this is not the way things are. The reserves,
~~h._tl~er we are talking about oil or any other raw material, ure not a well-
dc~ined stock of the products considered. The reserves are eatimates made
a~ ~ certain point in time of the resourcea we have available, at a certain
cost with given technologies. As we consume, or as we produce, or invent,
we are constantly reevaluationg these reserves. The fact that the reserves
increase is something quite normal. It has always been that way; it will
always be *hat way.
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~QuesCin~) The horiznn renl ~horting~~ hg~ b~en pu~hed bn~k nlmo~t tio
infiniey, since ~very tima the coee incre~~~s, exploitabl~ r~gou~ce~ nr~
fnund ~e ehaC co~e. WhgC i~ ehe limiC, if Chere ie ona?
[An~wer] mhere~ Co~, ~he reaJ. probleme are two in number. ~'irst, Cher~
the problem of co~t. Our ~cidu~tri~lized Western economi~s wcre bn~ed on the
fnct thgt the fraceion of the national effnrte devotQd to Ch~ ~~urch for rgw
mat~rial~ ev~n so wg~ very mod~~t. The qu~~tion 3~ on~ of know3ng whether,
progre~gively, th~ fraceion of the economi~ effort Co be devoted to the uc-
qui~itinn nf ngCur~l re~nurce~ 3g Co t~ke an enormnug proporCion of the total
natinnal ~ffnrC. The second aue~C~on ig th~t of delc~yg. If it takes 10 ta
1S yegrs between the time we deci.de to exploiC such gnd such deposit or guch
~nd such new Cechnology gnd the Cime when this depoeit or this t~chnology
b~gins Co effectively produce, we run th~ risk of making ~rror~ in calcula-
tidn; and prrore in c~lculation lead td t~mporary cri~veg ~uch ~e the one we
~re experiencing ~t ehe presenc time. Th~re ie no ren~on tn fe~r abaolute
phye~ical shoregges o� no matter wh~t; however, there ig reasnn to fear in-
crea~ingly frequene crisea of adapeaCion. Over Che long-Cerm, everyCl?i.n~ is
alweys resolved; however, as Che ecouomigC tieynes put ie: "In the long-Cerm
we will aZl be de~d." ~ven though we knnw that over the long-term paradiae
nwaits us, we need to knnw whgt is going to happen in the coming 10 or 15
yegrs.
[QuestionJ If the coeC of settrching for raw ~Ceriul~ for energy or any other
production incrense~, thr ie, if we musC devote a greater part of our efforrs
Co Che search for raw ma~_cials, does that mean there will be a drop in the
standard of living?
[Mswerj Absolutely.
[QuestionJ And for a rather long time, perhaps?
(Answer) Exactly. We have entered a period in which the only way to solve
our problems without having to constAntly face up to crises which create
unbearable disorders and tensions within society is ta change our consumpCion
behavior in the broadeat sense and, conaequently, to live more modestly.
Tt~erefore~ to reduce the at~ndard of living and at the ~arae time to make an
effort to develop our energy nnd raw materials resources.
[QuesCionj We consume 4 billions tons of oil per year. }{ow long will the
reserves last at this rate?
(Answer] Several. years ago, they were saying 20 to 30 years. Today Che
effective reserves have been reev~luated to between 200 and 300 billion tons.
That is equal to 70 years. But the question is 4lways the same--excuse me
for repeating it--at what cost? Because oil which costs a quarter of a
dollar to produce, as is the case in Saudi Arabia, and oil at the bottom
of an ocean, which would cost $30 to produce, are economicully quite dif-
ferent.
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rtorcover, even it' there were oil banp~Ch Che Ant~~ce~.c, and thut noe cEr-
ruitt, ~nd ev~n we lcnew aC wha~ coee w~ were going Co produce it, the ~ime
heeween d~.ecovery and exCrgction would be several yeare. In all Chc:ge ca~~~,
�lr i~ a queeCion of planning in eime. Time is Chg eseential variable.
(t~ua~tinn] What you are i.mplinitly emph~sizin~ ie that pessimistic Eorecaets
are nn longer ~.tt ~t,y1~ ~nd Ch~t we now recngnize thg fact thar there is
cnough oil perhgp~ r'or 100 mor~ yeara. AC whae cost? The question may be
~~ked; bue in ~he �inal ~n~~.yeis oil exisee. We know that a search will be
tt?,~d~ Edr ie.
[Answ~r] I nm quire in agreemene and all the more so because oil can be ob-
t;~ined in many way~, including aynthetic~lly from coal. Therefore, Chere i8
no re~~~n to b~ concerned about tihe av~ilability of oil products, 1et us say
liydrdcarbons. Not now, nor in 20 years, nor in 100 yeara, nor in 200 yeara.
Tlie rea~ons for concern are of another order; ~taving what we want aC Che
right tjme.
(QueytinnJ According to certain specialists, in some layer.s of Che earth
ehere ure quantitiea of inethane--thaC is, combustible gas--coloseal quanti-
ties dw~ir�in$ rhe present atocks of known natural gae which, therefore, ren-
dcrs Che energy problem soluble for all timea. Reportedly, t~is methane
is to be found at a great depCh in layers of saltwaCer.
(A:~swerj It is still the same problem. The meth~ne does in fact exist.
~verynne agrees in sayin~ that in the final nnalysi~ the energy problem i~
~olvad for all time since we have an almo~t infinite qunntity of hydrogen in
the universe. The Club de Rome's error, or more exactly the interpretations
wtiich may have been nade of the initial theses of the Club de Rome, is having
~zesented the problem as being physical in nature when iC ia of an economic
u1d sociological nature.
(Que~+tion] It is also said that the Club de Rome's sin is not having had
con~idence in the innovation possibilities of science and having made a judg-
ment based on a given state of affairs as if that state of affairs was to
r~�m4in static.
(AnswerJ Yes. You are speaking of man's inventive capacity. I would say
~nore generally adaptation capacity. I think that man has a fabulous capacity
for adaptation, at all levels. What the Club de Rome did that was useful,
du�ing that period at the beginning of the 1970's was to show that there are
llmits to optimism. These limits demonstrate that complex problems (and
ir.reasingly complex problems) cannat be solved over the short-term. When
I say increasingly complex, I am saying that curves are more difffcult to
negotiate and that inertia is greater. We should not negotiate a curve in
ti~e same way with a light automobile and an exceptional 40-ton trailer truck
(convoi].
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~on or~zcr~, us~ ortLY
[Qu~gr~.nn] OP~C Cried to ~u~~~.fy Che incre~ses in oil pricea of $20 and more
by snying ehae it was ehe m~rginal cost oE new and d~.fficulC depos~.~s. Is thaC
~ v~lid pret~x~?
_ (Answer~ I do noe bel~.eve thati Che present QP~C prices are ~uetified on the
economic level. T belleve that the chiefe of state who met in Tokyo were quite
r~.ght in saying so. Tf in fact we did not have enough oi1 and had to exploit
ehe b~.tuminous achisCs, it would be normal for the price of Arabian oi1 to
equ~l the cngt of tihe marginal source, namely the bituminous schist.
Today, in real3Cy, ~here is enough oi1. Z� we are having difficulties ie is
because OPEC is areifically limited its production. If it c~tere not for this
limitation, we would have u much lower price.
[Queseion] OPEC is, Cherefore, pockeCing the money which should go into explor-
ation and ehe exploitation of new deposits?
[Answer] I agree with you. They are pocketing what in economics is called
what the market will bear. Oi1 income is now diverted and often wasCed.
~Question] Therefore, Chere is not enough investment in oil exploration or
in technologies which permit its manufacture. That is the result of the
OPEC price increaaes, and that is the new peril which threatens. us over the
long-term.
[Answer] It is the result of OPEC policy and also the result of shortages on
the part of certain governments of the indusCrialized countries. And Chat
unforCunately was the case in the last 5 or 6 years in the United States.
It Was incapable, for many reasons having to do with American domeatic poli- -
_ tics, takfng the steps which could have permitted them~ to face up the situa-
tion. Now we can hope, but unfortunately it is nothinZ; more than a hope, that
~ the new measures taken by the Carter Administration will permit a solution to
Che problem.
Carter's idea, if I understand it correctly, is to crea~te a kind of energy
NASA, that is, to invest considerable s~ttns, $140 billion over a 5-year period.
[Question] In the Club de Rome's report, there was another chapter besides
energy, a chapter on world food supplies. Rather serious famines are fore-
case for the 1980-1990 decade. The perspectives seem to have changed con-
siderably. Food shortages during this period are not forecast. Famines be-
cause of poor distribution are forecast but not because of shortages. Is there
a way to improve the situation?
[Answer] This question of food is also a problem of production effectiveness.
Just one example: the Soviet Union. Everyone agrees on estimating aC about
10 perc.ent the amount of grain production lost due to elementary management
mistakes in the USSR. Some 20 million tons of wheat rot, almost literally,
on the roadsides. Such waste is extremely wideapread throughout the world.
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~oR orrzcraL usE ornY
[QuesCion] Could we say Chat the ~pecter of great �amines, which were so
prevulent in Lhe 1970'~~ is diegppearing?
[An~wer] It is di�ficu~.t to makn a balanced ~udgment of ~hat kind of thing.
T,et us t~ke Che ex~mple of the Vietnam refugeea, because, unfortunate].y,
th~t is a presenC day phenomenon. One of the reasons the people are fleeing
from Inclochina ia because they are dying from hunger. Conaequently, the
- inabill.ty of a cerCain number of countri~s to solve the basic problema of
life and survival is being translated today into a few spectacular crises.
I~ver.ytfil.n~ depends upon knowing what kind of linkage we make between the
events. I reud somewhere tha~ Cambodia was probably the only country in the
wor:ld where one cnuld say with certainty that there was famine.
[Question~ Anoeher question, ~C~ii along the lines of the Club de Rome's re-
port: overpopul~tion. According to Che 1972 forecasts, the population ex-
plosion will brinb about an ecological and food catastrophe. Today demographic
experCs arz maki.ng le~s disCressing forecasts. Can we reasonably be optimis-
t~c?
[Anawer] 'rhe reevaluation in queation is rather marginal because, on the
whole, from now until the end of the century, more or less, the increase in
world populatian w311 not be too far from the 1972 predictions.
The oFtimism/pessim3.sm pendulum is in the process of moving in the other di-
rec.Cion. I do not believe that the figures have changed fundamentally in the
population sector.
_ [Questionj The fears expressed in 1972 concerning shortages of raw materials
and ener~y, the exponential increase in population, the threats of famine have
been attenuated or are expressed in a more reasonable mgnner. Can new fears
epring up taday which were not envisaged at that time? For example, the
*:hreat of deforestaCion which c~.tild have consequences for ~�the composition
oL rhe atmosphere.
[Answer] Let us say that there are two kinds of new fears. There are fears
of u physical kind and fears which are, in my opinion, much more basic and,
unfortunately, more justified, namely fears of a geopolitical kind.
Def.orestation is a good example of fears of a physical kind. Why? Once again
~.t is a problem of time. A forest is natural wealth which many people say is
rc~;ecoable. The problem is that it takes 100 years to make a forest, while it
r~~es a few days to destroy one. What is much more serious is the fact that
t'~ soils become sterile, which is an almost irreversible evolution; I say
almost because I can accept the fact that technologies may revitalize sterile
~ soils; however, we have not reached that point. What is happening in the
Sahel is probably very serious. All of these fears have been partially ~usti-
fied. That said, we must not on the other hand exaggerate Chem, because the
earth itself is in the process of permanent evolution; periods of glaciation
during which.~rance was covered with ice will probably be produced again in
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Fox n~rzc~nr. usE ox~,Y
severul cenCures; nor ehould we overexnggeraCe Che fears conn~cted wiCh phy-
stcal developmenes; everything ~.s a mattier o~ degr~e [mesure], In addition
to thoge questiona, tihere ttre problems of Chexmal pollution.
WhaC ls Chermal pollution? Zt ~a ar? excess amount of carbon monoxide or
dioxide which at g certain poinC in t~.me would produce irreversible changea
in Che atmosphere. Since we cannot deal with a11 the queseions at one and the
same time, ~us~ as we cannoe from one day to the next chgnge civilizations and
sweep away all technologies, iC is a problem for Che 21st Century and not
Che 20th. Thnti does no~ mean we should not be thinking about it now. The
real new fears, which in my opinion are enCirely ~ustif3ed for ~he Cimme being,
are of a geopolitical kind. For we are going through a phase of internation-
al relations, in Che broadeat aense of the term, during which at one and the
same time we are much more interdependenC and Che world ia much more split
up than previously so that no country is in a position to govern the system,
in the cybernetic meaning of the term,
Up to the decade of Che 1960's, let us say from the end of Che 1940 war unCil
the end of the 1960's, the structure of the world was extiremely simple. You
had the two superpowe~s on the one side. Each one had iCs camp within which
it maintained order in a very ~eneral sense; as for the Third Wor1d countries,
they were sCi11 in the colonization stage or aC the beginning of decolonizn-
tion. This entire system was highly structured. It was a well-ordered sCruc-
ture.
- Today the relative weighC of the Cwo great powers has diminished considernbly.
A considerable number~of new actors have appeared upon the international stage,
with Che attainment of independence by the developing countries; and that
entire world is very nearly incapable of maintaining strucCured relations with
the other nations, at a time when growing interdependence demands coordina-
tions. That is what is serious.
The real drama of our Cime, if I may use this excessive term, is that we know
fairly well what the solutions A~e to the problems buC are tangled up in an
international network, that includes some 140 to 150 states which do not know
too well how to go about re~ulating their affairs.
[Question] But which know very well how to go about creating a cartel.
[Answer] There are certain subgroups which know how to take advantage of cir-
cumstances to advance their own short-term interests. However, what we do
not know how to do, for the time being, is to manage the earth in the gen-
eral interest. And that is what is serious.
(Question] In certain countries of the world, deforestation is due to the
fact that there is no heating material other than wood. Entire forests are
burned, whose destrucCion damages the quality of the atmosphere. There should
be an understanding at the world level so that these peoples can be supplied
with coal or oil.
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[Answer] z coulca. make a simil~r observation ~bout Che fishing s~ctor, There
is ~ certain numlier of countries, notably the Soviet Union--2 am sorry I have
ro mentinn iti again--which are known for the manner in wh~ch they systemgCi-
n~11y despoil cerCa~.n f iehing regions without paying attenCion whatever to the
irreversible consequences such a pracCice may have. Unfortunately, whae we
do not a~ present know how to do is come to understandings at the interna-
tiion~l leve].; in a syatem thae ia so aplit up and divided, sc?ch as our present
system, this is practically impossible. The rea]. challenge of the coming
years is Co find the means, the procedures capable of bringing real solutions
Co Che prnblems of Che earth.
[Questionj Are you optimistic?
[Answer] No.
COPYItIG~iT: 1979 par Cogedipresse SA
8143
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION TTALX
PCI PROBLEMS IN TURIN SYirII'TOMATTC OF PARTY AT LARGE
M31an CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Ttalian 27 JuJ. 79 p 3
(ArCicle by Walter Tobagi:~"The Italian Communist Party (PCT) Misses Its 1950
Years."]
[Text] Turin. What is thia Turin cominunism which regularly'resurfacea in
a11 the sacred histories of the party? "Tt is the most 'worker' and 'worker
oriented' party: it can be compared, in Che SovieC Commun3st Party, with the
party in Leningrad," answered'Piero Fassino, in charge of the commis~ion on
manufacturing plants. His face is thin and his eyes move quickly, like those
of the bri~htest boy in the class. BuC why has this left-leaning PCI lost votes
right in the most popular electorate, namely that of the workers? Fassino isn't
even 30 years old. He is very active and h~s done his homework: he lists those
explanations repeated so often in these past weeks.
Then he insists on one point: "We have taken up moral positions. We stated
Chat one should not moonlight, without being aware that one out of every four
workers has a second ~ob. Problems are not solved by moralisms: it is necessary
to understand why the worker does this, which necessities force him to...".
Wnile not wishing to unduly burden the reader with citations, one may neverthe-
less remember that Gramsci. spoke of a"frontier city." This is still a very
valid definition: a frontier city with a frontier communist party. The electoral
defeat (from 40 to 34 percentj is a symptom of a more profound illness. Turin's
society is changing: FIAT has brought about an impressive industrial re-
organization: unemployment is practically nonexistent, while terrorism for
most is a daily nightmare. The PCI can barely keep pace with the changes.
"It was the opposition parCy par excellence: now it has radically changed its
function," noted the historian Massimo Salvadori. "It is veering toward a
socialist bent. An opposition party? For real?" .
The stories o� the grandiose workers' resistance in the 1950s smack of rhetoric.
The [creation] of the Valletta empire coincided with the semidecline of
communist presence in Italy's largest manufacturing plant. In the summer of
1969, eve of the mythical Hot Autumn, there were 180 PCI members in the Mira-
fiori plant, which has 60,000 dependents. It is necessary to reflect on that
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~dtt U~'Ft~tllL U5~ t~NLY
f.i~ure tf on~ wi.~h~g cd und~r~e~nd ehe mue~Cidne nnw p~rty membe~~ ~L ttia
~tlr~ftori p1~ne r.oe~l over 2,~Od~ And ehe ~cgrd ~nrrierg fnr the Turin fed~r- _
~~eion in~iudin~ b~eh ~i~y ~nd ~~uney tnt~l dv~r 4G,000 wi~h gimd~e ~0 perc~ne
wnrker~ or r~eir~d ~nrmer w~rk~re.
'T~1�~nted Ydung ~er~ong
'1'he numberg are eher~, refleCti~ci by gn impeeuou~ growCh bue rh~y ~r~ ~1~0
proof: nf a giv~n iong-eerm frngillCy: how~ver, Che Turin pCI r~m~ing a~m~1L
n~~rty if rdmpttred witit~ the t3ologn~ ~r ~v~n Che Mil~n ~Cructure~. At Ch~ h~ighe
o[ tl~e elector~l ~ucc~g~ in 1976, for ~v~ry p~rty m~mb~r rh~r~ were 16 vot~rn.
The pnrey had be~dme ~~reat collection of nonnonflicting opinion~, buC iC
~:ruld not tidp~ to espira to ~n ~ffeative hegemony in tha gociety. Moreover,
the 1975-76 SUCCE59 ~aw Ch~ tr~nafer to public adminieCration po~itione of
:~ome of rhe begt m~nngerg. At Che head of the federation thus were many young
p~ryons with ~reae tal~nt, who perhapg iack~d axperience, however~
The leadership cndre questi~n i~ a m~eCer th~C gCi11 has to be regolved~ Th~
re~i~nal ~ecret~ry, I3runo ~~rrero, has become g~uropegn parli~menC~rian.
~fany m~ke mention of th~ CZ&gS~C pramdventur, ut gmoventur: ~errero had voiced
n~inian~ which were not covpred or ggreed upon prior to the congre~s,
~riticizing in pgrt~.culnr eha rules d~aling with intarnal pc~rty life. Now who
wil~. fill his position7 tdill a replacement be found in ~urin? Could Che
fuct that regionnl el~ctions are but 10 months aw8y p~rh~ps help the situ~tion7
[F'erhapsj if a direCtnr were to come in from ehe outaide, he might loae too
much tir~e becoming ncquainCed with the situaCion. Not everyone, however, is
in a~reement; and rumors abound.
'ChE~ n~me Ginnni Cervetti has come to the fore: he was formerly respoesible
f~r n:~tic.~nat or~~ttization. Or, if Cervetti were to return to Milan,
+:~tenfrnnco Borghini might be transferred fror~ Lombardy to Turin, to fill
t,~e posi.tion of regional secretary. Hypotheses aeide, there exisCs a veritable
~:ilemna: at the last meeting of the Central Committee (CC), mayor Diego
`ovetli requested that an old custom of the 1950a be brought back, when there
wa:, 1"constant, permanent rapport between a group of important comrades in
lead~rsliip positions and major regional groupinga." Reading betwzen the lines:
on~: of ~he party's VIPs should be directly involved with the Piedmontese PCI.
In the Via Chiesa bella Salute offices, where the federation is hegdquartered,
no stp,7s of nervousness are evident. The party, granted, has sustained a loss,
b~.t evcryone wanCs tn avoid improvised answera: meetings upon mpetings Cuke
~l ce. The GS (PCIj officials canvass the neighborhoods gathering up opinions.
~ p~lrry is attempting to open up, to correct the blunders of these years,"
s3id Giuliano Ferrar~, officer in charge of culture. Further still: "In 10 years
tt~e c1~1ss has undergone a radical change, but our analysis methods are antiquated."
To spea~-. of a workers' class as a compact, homogeneous reality serves no purpose.
Renr.o Giannotti, the federatian's secretaty stated: "We werc unable to form
meetinfls in the plants regarding equal rQnt. There were workers who rented
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~hnd thoughe nn~ w~y, ~nd work~r~ whn dwn~d h~u~~~ ~nd thnu~ht in ~n nppo~it~
n~nnner, ~nd wnrker~ whn w~r~ in pubifc hduging who warried ~baue diff~r~nt
thin~g nienge~h~r." Th~ mor~1 ig th~C "parCi.e~ ~nd lebor unian~ hgv~ d~.ffi-
Cu1ty in d~nlin$ with ~n ~rer di'fferanti~eed�1g~dr el~~~."
Gignnn~ti innk~ iike ~ ydung moneignor, 1asrn~d ~nd int~llig~ne. Ne maneged
t~ ~tC~nd ~ finighing courg~ in Mngcow in eh~ y~~r~ b~Cw~~n Khru~hchgv ~nd
gr~zhnev, tt~ b~li~v~s in th~ pgrty, which mu~e b~ nh~r~nr~rix~d by "g gr~gt
np~nn~~~ ~dw~rd ~oei~Cy, bue ~1~~ mu~e pley ~ pad~gogicai rvle: thi~ is th~
gre~e ~rigin~l gelling pdinC di the rCI~"
Alien V~1ueg
~low~ver, h~ ge~e~g eh~t regliey dn~s ch~nge: r~cently, in fgct, "tih~ in~lueneQ
nf ma~s medin h~s inCr~~ged on ~l~rt~r~ a�~~d even on p~rty memberg." The pgrty
ig nn longer n my~Cicg1 s~pargti~ body, closed witihin itg~l.f: it i~ mor~ and
mor~ influenc~d by ~ ch~nging ~acieey's charace~rigtic~, ttnd it t~ke~ in v~lues
which gr~ gLi~n eo wark~r gnd crnnmunigti trgdition. it tg ~ nightmarg for
Novelli, ~ m~yor wiCh ~ 3oura~li~m background: h~ ~xemplifi~~, with a faca af
q~dn~gs ~lmo~e iike Mord's, Che ~itiy's contradiCtinns. "Gonsumeri~m," lam~nC~
vovelli, "h~s entered in~o tih~ p~~ples''thoughC process. And it ig her~ Ch~t
rh~ party funceion h~g been tound td be lacking."
The nosealgin is dirgcC~d back to the pnrty of the 1950s, whgn it w~s the
center of politic~l milie~ne~ ~nd Was, as well, the schaol of 1ife. In the
brewing of Che p~sC decgdQ, thi~ iron-fir~ qualiCy hgs been losC. Novelli
pu~heg demagogical prnnduncem~nt~ agide: "It ig noC ~nough ro hav~ n pCI card
to be n communi~t. It i~ Cime, iC is Cime Co puC the brein to work, and nnt
to yel.l slogans alnne." Md he remembers those duys', ~ong ago when yearg of
exemplnry militancy were needed in order to be aecepted into the federal committee.
The Turin office of UNYTA ~the ~CI daily~ gave a grpat party when that honor
was bestowed on Psolo Sprinno.
Is it pos~ible to return to that discipline? Novelli defends the zeal With
which the PCI has tried to restore a given amount of order in the administra-
tion of the city, chosing to ignore even thQ nost disjoinCed situatione: a case
in point is the exgmple of ~ low-rent.housing pro~ect where 132 families havE
gone so tar as to refuse to give their namee.
T}?~se administrative problema weigh on the party's choic~s. In the yearg that
Berlinguer postulated on the "compromesso storico" (Hietoric Cnmpromiae),
the Turin communists did not hesitate to set up left~wing ~untas renging rrom
county to regional levels. They cen boast oi more than one succese. Hoaever,
these governing responsibilities have brought about the need to assume a"more
responaible" nttitude. And with what result? (The result being~ that the
party ended plnying a role of nediation: it resembled the assembly of a constel-
lation of diverse realities." This is the opinion of I'augto Bertinotti, the
CGIL (Italian Labor Genergl Committee] regional secretary, Who is considered
to be one of the most knowledgeable experts of labor and communist left.
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~
Wi~hin ~h~ ~~I~ ~ureh~~ma~~, d~,��ezing politie~l po~ie~on~ ~xi~C~ Thg mo~c
nde~bie axampl~ o~ ehig c~n b~ #nund i.n ehe 39Ch ~e~eion, which h~~ ~1w~y~
Gnneeseed ehe p~rey ~.in~ and citied L~n~.nigti orChndoxy~ It i~ g wnrker~' s~ctiun~
wirh 2S0 memb~rg~ estabii~hed in 1952t ~acratgry sinc~ ie~ inc~pC3an h~g been
bind ~~bbid, g r~~ir~p wi.eh n long and ~harp na~e.
~te ~reeeect me by ggying: ''W~ da ~$r~~ rd $ive inti~rvi~~wg ro bnurg~di~ n~w~-
pap~rg~" ~hen, h~ m~llnwed ~ biC gnd ggv~ ~ rad~.c~l crieicigm of Berlinguer
(h~ pranounc~d hig n~me wiCh rh~ ~CC~nt nn ~he "i."),~a~ w~11 ~f ~h~ r~~e
of eh~ cdmmuni~e 1e~derghip. "Th~ w~rking claag," h~ ~gid, ''h~~ c~.a~~ intier~~t~
whiCh ~r~ nde under~tond ~t PCI higher i~~~i~. Une cannot ~~y tih~t a policy
b~ nn,t undergtnod. Lenin taught u~ that 'if g pol~ny i~ not under~tood,'
that m~nns it ig wrong."
~t~bbin do~s nee b~li~ve in ~urdcommunigm: he cla~.m~ that "eh~ Soviet Un~on
gnd eh~ L~st~r~ cnuntri~s r~pre~ent ~ unit nf progr~g~ and r~pr~gant humaaity'g
future." He ~ritieix~~ ~~rlingL~r'g ~he~~~ on auateriCy. ''Nnw could I be gunter~?
I g?iduld refrgin from ~~ting ine-cream? I have never dwned g car...."
Cert~inly Rebbin ~ppe~rs to be more an exception within tii~ Turin YCI: hie
t,~ninigt orthndoxy pusY?es h~m to the liwie~ of political h~regy. ~ue hig
i~~r~h npinion~ againge "unequal rent" reflect a di~conC~nt whicn is wid~gpread
~nd m~y explnin Che nwnerous elect~ral losaeg or th~';nasees: irom Che rami-
l.ies living ~n 1nw-income houbing to retireea nit by tl~e medicine ~tr?mps.
'Cne problem in Che Turin pC2, w;thout twigCing the poliCical line, ig to allow
voiceg such that ot Rebbio to be heard: voices af chose who iive among the
mor~ ht~mble p~ople. Ferhaps the editor Giulio ~inaudi is right When he gugg~s-
ted thnt che Y~I mu~t "ugain bind its rapport ~ith tne people, with the new
c~zer;i,~~ clnsgea, and wirh the second society. It muse under~tand what Toni
Negri calls the social worker. It must understand the ~spirations, the needs
~~E youth...."
But uctually this is not a problem which concerns the Turin PCI alone: it is
a J~lertcmg for the party as a whole. (The PCI isJ a party that has always
atte,~pted to play a leadership role with respect to society, but it must
sectle nccounts with a divided, fra~mented society, now infused wirh values
which seem to be in strident contra:~t to the traditional political commitment
~f the militant communist: The following is the sad confession of a communiat
direr.tor: "Last Saturday I left home early to go to a meeting. I ran inCo
t1~c lon~ tine of cars going to the highway which leads to the beach. They
wc:�e ~11 going to the beach. I was the only one going in the opposite direc-
t~_~n. At chat mo;~ent I thought that we lost votes because of this also: we
c~tinuc to hold mcetings among ourselves, while the people go to the beach."
CopYRIGliT: 1979 Editoriale d~l "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
9209
CSO: 3104 ~D
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