JPRS ID: 8637 KOREAN AFFAIRS REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080038-1
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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1~Ok Oi~I~ICIAL UtiI. (1NLY
JF~RS L/8637
28 August 1979
Kr '
a ean Affa~ rs Re ort
p
CFOUO 2/79) ~
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NOTE
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transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from ~orei~n-langu~ge
sources are translared; Chose from Englieh-l~nguage sourcea
are transcribed or reprinted, with th~ original phrasing and
other characterisCics retained.
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The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
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JPRS L/8637
28 Auguet 1979
KOREAN AFFAIRS REPORT
~ (FOUO 2/79)
CoNr~NYS PAGE
' SOUTH KQREA
_ POLITICS AND (~OVERI~iT
Au~hor Criticizes (~overnment~s Treatme~t of Pa.k Critics
(SEKAI, Jun 79~ 1
MILITARY AF'FAIRS ,
ROK Warships Likely To Be Permitted To Visit Japenese Ports
( rrtgort ~~z ss~rcBUrt, 27 su~. 79 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i5
FORETGN RELATIONS
Briefs
Saudis Training Koreans , 16
FOREIGN TRA.DE
Japexi-ROK-UaSR Trade To Be Realized With Mitaubishi as
Intermediary
(T~ NI~N KOGYO SHIMBUN, 11 Jun ?9) 17
NORTH KOREA
NILLI'PARY AFF'AIRS
DPRK, ROK Naval Forces Compared .
(Kimio Aotani; GUNJI I~NKYU, Jun 79) 18
Article Discusses Policles, Conditions in KPA
(Kimio Aotani; GUNJI I~'NfCYU, Jul 79) 30
- a - [III - k5IA - 109 FOUO]
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- � ~�~~~r ~I~/LI V?1~J~~ . .
CONTENSB (Con~inued) ~ge
FCREIaN RELATZQNS
DPRK Official. znte~~,*iewed on Unifica~~.on, ~.Other Iseues
(I~Yon Chun-~uls Tnterview; ASAHI SHIMBUN, 22 Jwn 79) 45
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S. KOR~A/POLITICS AND GOV~RNMENT
, AUTHOR CRITICIZES GOVERNM~NT'S TREATMENT OF PAK CRI:'ICS
Tokyo SEKAI in Japanese Jun 79 pp 274-284
[Article by T.K.: "Barren Soil--CorrFapondence from the Republic of Korea:
Days under House Arrest; Academy Incident"]
[Textj Days under House Arrest. 17 April, 1979 Dispatch.
It is reported in today's papers thaC the government has announced a 10-to-
40 percent hike in tihe prices of 58 items, incl.uding bus and train fares,
which have been held in check heretofore. This move is said to have become
neceasary to implement ''the measures for normalization of price structure."
Despite this price explosion," it is contended, the workmen's wagea must be
held in check as an anti-3nflation measure. Moreover, there seema no aign
the price stabilizaCion may follow this "exploaive hike." The true poaition
of the government is that no one really knows how far the pricea will soar
in a chain reaction this year. While hoarding by buyers and sellers goes on,
there seems to be no end to the shortage of daily necessitiea and the lower-
ing of their quality goes on. �
On top of this came the uproar over the Yulsan business group with its 14
affiliated companies and 8,300 employees going bankrupt and an executive
being arrested on charges of. embezzling 10.5 billion won. And for having
advanced a loan of 6 billion won while knowing the group's bankruptcy, the
president of the Bank of Seoul and Trust Co. was arrested and the presi~ents
of the Chohung and Hanil (Banks) were dismissed and being investigated. But
~ people who know what is going on at all think that the Yulsan business group
is nothing but a scapegoat. Because inflation is the biggest problem, the
people's resentment needed to be diverted toward something. This is why the
Pak regime singled out the Yulsan business group this time. A friend of mine
explained this way:
"Big business firms ars all the same. It's been reported that 30 top busi-
n~ss enterprises received loans over Chree times their asse*.s. These fig-
ures were presented solely to cover up the fact that 12 big enterprises were
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� v� ~ �uiew u~1ti UIVLI
given loana 10 eo 12 times Cheir assets. So they are arreating b~nk presi-
dente, but rhat's n~thing but a ehow. Bank preeidenta have no power.
Polie~cal puw~r holders make them do everything, and, 3n a case like thie,
they Qre u~ed as scapegoaCs~ In ehe countryaide, complaints are rai$ed
becguse of the failure of the new etrain of rice called "Nop'ung" Che govern-
men~ forcibly introduced. The government's compensation is norhing bur a
11p service. The only th3ng ehe governmenC cou~.d do to ride over this ia
oppression and manipulation by the [Korean] CYA."
There is a nortorioua enterprise called Hyondae Construction. This enter-
priae ran a big adverrisement in papers that i~ would award echolarahips
totaling 316,960,000 won to high school and college students in the new
school year. The ad alone must have cosC a huge amount, and I wonder if
ehere was any reason why it had to make such an announcement. Hyondae Con-
sCruction would nor disineegraCe like Yulsan. Hyondae is different from
an enCerprise like Yulsan, which o~as started by a young president wiCh only
a million won in assets in 1975. When rold to offer its sharea to the
public, a representative of the Hyondae group is said to have declared in
mock seriousness, "I� we do such a thing, both we ar~d the government will
fall together." Integrated with the tyranny of the Pak regime, it ie safe-
ly at peace. According to a~ournalist friend of mine, Hyondae ConstrucCion
is supposed to have openly brought in as much as one hundred million dollars
from the Middle East, despite the restriction placed to counCer inflation,
on bringing in foreign exchange. This became an ieaue once, but everything
was smoothly settled. My friend went on to tell me about the real situation
of the so-called manpower export Co Che Middle East, where Hyondae Conatruc-
tion is driving laborers hard under the worst conditions.
At present, there are approximately 84,000 ROK laborers and Cechnicians in
the Middle East. And this is supposed to increase to 120,000 this year.
The total amount of foreign currency earned in the Middle East last year
was eight billion dollars, of which five billion were brought home. In
construction pro~ects in the Middle East, 50 percent of the contract prlce
be:omes a net income, and because of the low wages of the laborers, the
enterprise gets 30 percent of thaC. As an anti-inflationary measure, the
la;orers are paid only after their income is deposited in the bank for two
years. Thus, aside from their low wage rates the laborers are forced Co
face a decrease in the net income through inflation. ~
, The base pay of the laborers in the Middle East is 300 dollars a month.
Wtth overtime pay added to it, their average monthly pay is about 500 dol-
l:~rs. But, for this money, they have to work an average of 13 hours a day
~nder the broiling sun in 52, 53 degree temperature. About two years ago _
r.ne base pay was 175 dollars. If a Korean works for a business�enterprise
of any other country in the Middle East, even an unskilled laborer will get
the base pay of 1,000 dollars, plus 21 days of vacation a year. BuC, most
of the ROK laborers are warking under the harsh conditions imposed by ROK
enterprises ;tnder political pressure, with the high wages at home these days,
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plgns are bc~ing advanced Co induc~ the ItOK laborers to ~ray on the9.r ~ob and
en use fore~gners for miec~llaneous chores~ Here my friend ra~aed hi~ voice
a 1itele in ~ng~r and he wene on to say rhie:
"'Ph~y work under one-year contracC~ bur work-relaeed hazards and their after-
eff~cra are a b~.g problem, Under their wnrk~.ng condiC~.one they cannot pos-
sibly work more than nine monrhg out of a year. Thia is the reaeon why they
ar~ wnrn out by the rime ehey return home. In order to ahorten the term of
works, subconCrncee are 1ee, and workloads exceed the standArda prevailing
in J~pnn. It is simply a lgbor concentration camp. It ie said in pr3vate
thae 26 died last year, but of course, there were probably more. They make
wine From fruits and stuff, drink and without ever riaing~ di~. In thae
heat~ under those working conditinng, there are mnny who ~ust collapse and
di~ nn the spot. This is a serious human rightg issue. A regerve officer
who was an army colonel commands each unit. The sprouting disconCenC ~s
nipped in Che bud, but it is whirling around at the bottom. The companies
fear lest Che situation become a domeo[ic iseue, but the National Aasembly
is but a servant-girl for the power l~oldera and ehe press is about the ~ame.
Wouldn'r snmebody somewhere abro~d take up this iasue and inveatigate it
for us7"
Once isolaCed form international scrutiny, the Fak regime cammit these cruel-
ties. Thus the trade deficits of the Pak regime may be eliminated., and the
power that be and the big business may eulogize the bleseings of this world.
And the foreign exchange thus earned will probably flow out as fundg to
purchnse weapons, which will please rhe United States.
In fact, news is circulating in the streets of Seoul that this foreign ex-
change pleases the United States and is thus prompting President Carter to
visit the ROK. The ROK government decided at a ROK-US Commerce and Indus-
try Ministers conference to make a 2.2 billion-dollar purchase of U.S. goods
for the purpose of "alleviating the pressure of the U.S. control of imports
from the ROK." The ROK has reportedl}� decided to buy machinery and petro-
chemicals also from the United States, which it has heretofore imported from
Japan. Thus 38 representntives of big enterprises, led by the ROK Minister
of Commerce and Industry, hurriedly went to the United SCates. And it is
also reported that the ROK and the United States will launch ~oint develop-
ment pro~ec*.s in the Middle East and Africa, in which the UniCed States
provides technology and the ROK m~npuwer. The dollar seems to have power
after all. Thus newspapers in the ROK suddenly ctianged their headlines,
saying, "ROK-US Relations Highest in History." In order to welcome this
trade delegation, American Vice President Mondale sent his own plane to
New York. Papers reported that the New York Times mobilized its publisher
and all leading staff inembers in giving a huge reception to~welcome the
delegation. Faced with the~e events, a friend of mine engaged in the de-
mocratization movement said in distress:
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Vl'?'l~lht, U,r, UNLY
"'fhl~ l~ r~ally nb~urd~ Pr~rry ~oon thc~y will probably nnnnunGe President
C~irt~r'H vitilc Cu the~ kOK. WiCh rhnt 7.2 billinn dollnr officinlly re-
e~iv~d, ynu knnw. 'rhe Pak regim~ ie planning Ca do the same tn ~uropean
countriee, too~ Tha American ambassador to the ROK is aupposed to hava
~gid th~t rhe Am~ric~n gmbaseador 3.y 3n Korea not to protect the human
right~ nf the Kor~an~ but to protect Che i.nterests of American busineaemen.
ThirCy-six American missinnarie~ 3n Korea and 250 Americatt mis~ionaries in
Japan s~nC lettere Co President Carter expres~ing'their opposition to khe
preaidenC's proposed visiC Co the ROK. The letter from Korea was diecovered
by the CIA at the airport and copied. Pak Chong-hui was enraged and acregme~!
that all will be deporCed. ~'iret two Cathnlic priesta whose vieas would
expire were eo be d~ported~ But Che American ambagsador in Seoul contended
thgt U~5. cieizena ti~d th~ freedom to write to their presidenr, thus~quieting
the situgrion, and the only rhing Che prieate suffered was ro have their
visas extended only by three monChs, instead of the customary six. Some
people say thar the American ambassador did assert himself for a change, bur
others, re~cting cynic:glly, say ehat that was nothing but the ambassador's
~move to wtn a poinC as a diplomat, on the eve of Carter's visit."
It may be said thaC most of those engaged in the democxatization movement
- are tired of theae games played by the United Statea. I~ust cannot help
feeling that both the United States and Preaident Carter are ~ust intensi- '
fying the imgge of the ugly Americ~n. A rumor is going around that even
thoge Americans staying in Korea feel that when Mr. Carter's visit to the
ROK is over, a starm of further oppression will blow hard and those Ameri-
cans who hgd signed the letter protesting Carter's visit to the ROK will
also be adversely affected. Now that the Amin government of Uganda seeme
to have disappeared, iC may be that the bad name of Mr. Pak Chong-hui alone
will become more notorious from now on.
"The calm" before President Carter's visit to the ROK is continuing. The
Pak regime is employing nll sorts of inethods of oppression, including
detention, arrest, taking house arrest, and surveillance. Still the re-
$i.ne seems td be cautious not to cause any serious incident, if possible.
tt is an every-day occurance to be taken to a police station and detained
ir.conununicado there for a week or so. These days especially, with such
anniversaries of resistance approaching as the March First independence
movement day, Easter on April 15, and the April 19 revolution day, the CIA
and police have been very active. Beginning with people like Yun Poson,
Kim Tae-chung, and Ham Sok-hon, many in the democratizaCion movement are
row placed under house arrest. More than 20 se~curity agents have cordoned
~~tf the residences of Yun Po-son and Kim Tae-chung. Gften their wives and
ther family members are not allowed to go out either, and so things like
vegetables are being sent in by the po.lice. Sometimes, 20 to 30 armed ~
policemen swarm around the residences of those engaged in the democratiza-
tion movement, to the point where neighbors become frightened. Among the
miniaters some like the Reverend Yi Hae-tong of the Hanpit (one Ray) Church
are c~ot even allowed to go to their church services. In such instances, of
course, their church members are not allowed to visit their ministers,
_ either.
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mlic h~nlth of thoae impriyon~d are deterinra~ing~ too. Th~re gre no doc-
tors in tt~e peniCentiarieg. They sey the madical expenses for two to three
hundred inmates are only 100,000 won (approximaCely 40,000 yen 3n Japanese
currency) per month. Furtihermore~ polirical prisoners are not allowed to
see doctors unlesa they ar~ un the verge of death. In the case of Kye Hun-
che who has fo~ght a long fight, ha was allowed ~o be hospitallzed only
after more thgn a week in coma, and is still in critical condition~ PoeC
Yang Song-u is also in danger of deaCh because of an excesaive lose of blood
caused by prolapse of the anus. Writers as we11 as th~: mother of [the im-
prisoned poeC] Mr~ Kim Chi-ha, have been xppealing ta authoriCies but they
have continuously ignored ehem.
You may suy freedom fnr Kim Tae-chung lasted only 10 days afCer his release
from prison. Even now, when n f oreign reporter comes to visit hini, the
CwenCy or so agentg disappear quickly. Ineerviews with foreign reporters
is permiCCed to make iC appear that he is free. A rumor is going round
~~that in Amprica there ~re even some newspapers and magazines which carry
art'icles,'on how ~u~t to cooperate in this. They are trying to make it
appear as if the U.S. were interested in r:im and others in the democraCic
movement so that Carter's Korea visit will be completed smoothly. Mr. Carter,
on his part, may be wishing to have a amooth visit, and without harming his
own image. So, the U.S. embassy is trying to soothe democratization movement
people by approaching them and inquiring aboue their situations, thus giving
appearance of interests in them, while the Pak regime keeps them immobile
by arres ting them or placing them under house arreat. Amid all this, Che
Atnerican President who has advocated human rights is coming to confirm and
bless Korea's "calm"~ its stability, security, peace, and freedom. This may
represen t some well calculated politics. But, it looks to me like the most
inhumane insanity. Maybe power in any country is that cruel.
We can say that Mr. Kim Tae-chung has begun another pri3on life in his small
house. Even his granddaughter is not allowed to visit him in his house. (We
have included the appeal Kim Tae-chung has written himsel� at the end of this
article. But, the situation has grown worse now). Qn April 10, sixty people
representing the families of prisoners of conscience clased in on the house
of Mr. Kim Tae-chung. There was a clash with the agents there. In the end
the sixty people sat down in front of the house and stased a sit-d~wn demon-
stration. In the turmoil, Mr. Kim Tae-chung came o:lt to the door, and the
demonstrators could exchange greetings with him. Because of this, twenty
people were taken tc-, the police ~ tation. The demonstration was staged to
confirm the non-freedom of Mr. Kim Tae-chung and to let the people know
about it. Once, a few who made a call on Mr. Yun Po-son who was suffering
from a cold rushed inside the gate while the guard was dozing off. But
later, they were surrounded by a large unit of policemen, and interrogated.
Mr. Ham Sok-hon once got away from his house and went to the countryside,
but was caught and sent back to his house. Tired of these battles, those
engaged in the democratization movement may not find the time to map their
future plans. A friend of mine told me this recently:
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� � �~+~?u uuu v1YLl
"To leave adme reaiatir~g peopla in a section of the church may be for Che
purpose of mak~ng the fighCl.ng people eurface and watch them. They prob-
nbly think that this would in the end prevent a large scale maea revolr.
~'hey deliberaCely allow the massea to lay their hope on the powerlesa few.
By oppregsing and imprieoning theae few~ they create fear among the public.
Also, by keeping them on the surface~ their contacta can be grasped clearly,
too. I think an open non-violence mo~vement has now reached its limies. A
non-violence movement is possible only when there is a definite law and in
which the mobilization of the masses is possible, In the present-day ROK,
we are placed in a situation of violence~ in which CIA agenCe come to our
houses and sita Chere, lock us up and watch a11 of our moves. Aren't we all
in a prison without bars?"
Academy Incident
How long are we going Co shouC
With masks on?
How long are we going to shc~a unbecoming behavior
- With maeks on?
This is a atanza of the anonymous poem "A Battle Cry" carried in "the Human
Rights News" issued by the Human rights Committee of the Council of the
Korean ChrisCian Churches. How long on earth are we going to cry out in
the name of human rights, non-violence, or Christianity on this barren land?
Yi Hu-rak, who was CIA Director at the time of the Kim Tae-chung kidnaping,
became a National Assemblyman. Kim Chae-kwon, who was then a CIA minister
in Japan, took back his real name Kim Ki-wan and became the president of
Hanguls Insurance Company. Yi Ho, who was then the ROK Ambassador to Japan,
became the chairman of the ConsCitution Committee, and is supposed to sit
in ~udgment on constitutional violations. I don't know whether there can
be trials for constitutional violations under the Yuain ConstiCution of the
one-man dicCatorship, but, in any event, rewarding for kidnaping Mr. Kim
:ae-chung is probably over.
Under these circumstances, the New Democratic Party, which calls itself an
opposition party, is in a really miserable shape. With the party conven-
Cion scheduled in May, Kim Yong-sam, former party head, is challenging Yi
Ch'ol-sung,.the incumbent head, who has been trying to be faithful in keep-
ing his party a friendly party of the ruling party, but Kim's prospects
~~em gloomy. It has been decided that the chairmanship of the National
~ssembly will go to Paek Tu-chin, one of the president-appointed Yujonghoe
.;ational Assemblymen. In defiance the NDP declared that it would boycott
the opening ceremony of the National Assembly, but soon relented. In the
face of the intimielation by the ruling party that such a boycott would be
regarded as the re~ection of the current system, that is, a crime of recting
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Che Yusin ConsCiCution, ttie NDP gave in after a three days of defiance. 0�
courae, it was because the CIA was watching behind the acene. The t~nly
thing rhat happened was that 23 National Aeaemblymen, including Kim Yong-
3am, walked out in protesC againsC voting in the e~.ecCion of Che assembly
chairman.
Recently, there was an incident in which some family members of prisonera
of con~cience staged a sir-down demonstraCions in front of the headquarters
of the NDP. They demanded thaC Che parCy, if it called itself an oppos3tion
party, at least submit a~~roposal for the release of political offenders at
the National Assembly. Yi Ch'ol-sung, head of the party, hid himself and
did not come out. AfCer ~ix hours of demonstration, the demonstraCora left, ~
_ having obtained a promise for the party's acCion. Of course, this was not
reported in any newspapers; it ended up as a rumor. Under the circumstances
where everything is under the surveillance and direction of the CIA, there
cannot be any Narional Assemblyman who dares to take up that matter. Schools
also seem to be quiet witti the new school year begun. BuC, in colleges and
universities, there is smoldering discontent with the facC that only the
government can express an opinion about the North-South problems. So, sur-
veillance over schools has been Purther intensified. This may be attributed
to the spring season, in which resistance activities are launched frequenCly,
but it may also be a precautionary oppression for Mr. CarCer's visit to the
ROK. At Seoul NaCional University, this happened. All students who wanted
to join circle activities were ordzred to submit to the school authorities
their pictures and resumes. Because of this, not a single one remains now
out of the forty-three circles existing until then. The school authorities
are 3oyous, believing that its plan worked, but, others fear that all of
them might have gone undergrour~d.
Yonse University scheduled the mid-term examinations in spring,saying spring
should be a season f or study. But studenCs protested and it was withdrawn.
At Koryo University, 10 students were arrested fur planning a demonatratlon
against Carter's proposed visit, but all but one were released. The remain-
ing one was tried in a summary court. And the trial date happened to be
16 March, Che day the demonstration was originally scheduled, and the defend-
ant requested that he be allowed to read out a statement. The ~udge then
hurriedly sentenced him to 29 days and declared the court adjourned.
While surveillance and oppression are going on at schools this way, buying-
~ up campaigns are being launched widely against the students. When the CIA
or police fails in handing money to students, Che money then is delivered
often through the hands of the school authorities in the form of scholar-
ship. A practice like this is being applied also for those engaged in the
democratization movement. While oppression goes on, some positions are
being offered for the purpose of soothir.g. During the current semester,
two of the dismissed professors, who had been ostracized~ werP allowed to
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. return to their univeraities. Meaeures like this were taken in order to
show Char auch a generous actian may be taker? any C~.me when a diamissed
profeseor behaves well and keepd qu1eC. IC is said t11at some of Chosg in
Che democraeization movement were offered positiona as advisers to the Seoul
Municipal GovernmenC, but that Chey re~ec'ced the offer.
Meanwhile, a controversy has arisen over torcing young pnlitical offendera,
who finished their prison sentences and were released, into acCive military
service. In facC aome of these young men have already been presaed into
military service. According Co the military consaription law, anyone sen-
tenced Co six months or longer or had such a sentence suspended is exempted
from active service or even reserve corps. But, the government auChorities
do not allow them to reCurn to college, and are trying to f~rce them into
military service, without restoring their civil rights. This is not only ~
to separate them in the miliCary for three yeara, but also torture them in ~
harshest training and toura of duties. Against this, the young people are
reaiating unceasingly. They demand that, if they are to be drafted into
military service at all, they should be dropped from the liat of conacripte,
be returned to school, and then be drafted. The armed forcea in the ROK
are simply a means to retain political power. Military training ie forced
on high school and college students. As soon as they enter colleges, they
have their heads shaved immediately, are subjected to harsh ten-day train-
ing. This is a kind of brain washing and intimidation. What creative force
in the world can grow under such a Cerror rule?
As for thP labor disputes going on these days, one can ciCe Che YH Trading
Company Incident. It is quite amazing that this incident was report~d in
the newspapers. The company unilaterally gave out a public notice of its
closing as of 30 April. So, about 500 workers are supposed to have begun
a sit-in demonstration. The president of the company f led to the United
States, taking 3 million dollars worth of goods wiCh him, and consequently,
the company was driven to bankruptcy. It is very strange that such a
demonstration of workers was allawed to be reported by the press. This
c~,mpany exported wigs and textile products. Despite the public notice of
bankruptcy, the bank which is said to have advanced loans to the tune of
4 billion won to this company has not done anything about the situation
and ~ust kept silence. No attempts have been made to let the bank take
charge of the company's property or to sell the company to a new owner.
But, when 470 workers staged a strike, a mobile police unit raided them,
manhandling female workers injuring 200. Eighty of them were fairly ser-
'.ously injured and five were hospitalized with serious injuries. One
worker is sCill in coma. This happened on 13 April. The workers' sit-in
is still continuing.
It is generally be:.ieved that the incident broke out at the YH Trading
Co. because the union activities of female workers had been quite intense
in this company. In 1977, the labor union of the P'yonghwa market was
destroyed. In 1978 there was the Tongil Textile Company incident, and in
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1975 eh~ YH Trad~ing incid~ne o~curred. In Chie wa~~ they are deetroying
an~ by one a11 of th~ h~rbede nf union acGivi~ies~ 'The ac~ual method em-
ployed varied. In th~ cage of the P'yonghwa mark~t, the workere' cia~eroom
wae closed and the f~male workers who had defied the cloeing and Madame Yi
So-son, who was reepected by theee workers ae Cheir moeher, were rhroom
into ~ail, Khus, pulling down the foothold of rh~ inunion activities. Ae
ehe T~ngil Textile Cn~ th~y c~u~ed tha f~ne~ and urine inc~.dene in which
126 worker~ were diemiesed~ And, then came the YH Trading's public notice
of cloeing bueines~. In the meantime, in an effort to seal off act3vitiee
of th~ Kore~n Induatrial Mi~sion, they threw the affiliated miniet~r~ 3nto
~aii and launched oppreseion. Ir eeems likely that rh~ CIA now believes
that rhe mi~g3on ia beyond recovery.
Thus, in the en~, the arm of oppresaion ~s reaching the Christian Academy. ~
This organizarion, aided by West German churches~ nurtureg intermediate
group~ under a long-range pl~n with the motto of freedom, ~quality, and
humanizarion. Sa, the organization is also engaged in the education of
workers and farmers. The incident involving this organization began on
1 March, when the officer in charge of the aocial problems of women was
arr~~ted~ More than 25 people were either arreated, detained, or taken to
poliee gt~C3ona. Six members of the Ac~demy staff and a scholar who ~aas
doing re~~earch on rural problems were arrested. Among thoee who were taken
to polic~ ~tations were the Rev~ Kang Won-yong~ director of the academy,
and soa?e branch heads of labor unione.
The oppreseion of the Christian Academy began when the Pak regime came to
have a sense of crieis stiemming from educating farmerg and workers. This
is a manifestation of the Pak regime's determination to root out and destroy
even such undertaki;~gs. Before cooking up this case~ the CIA continued to
intimidate church people telling them that the church should keep silent
toward the incident, be~ause it was a ma~or spy case, a nase involving ide-
ology. A friend of mine who is familiar w~th the details of the hiseory of
the incident told me as follows:
"Hu~band of Han Myong-suk, who was arrested first, ia in prison serving a
15-year sentence for his involvement in the Revolutionary Party for Reuni-
fication case in 1968. The authoritiea arrested Han in an attempt to
fabricate chargea of rebuilding the ItPR, but 3t did not work. Then they
tried to cook it up as a plot for internal disturbance. They tried to
accuse the Academy staff of plotting to overthrow the government and if
succesaful, to establish a workers and farmers regime, to be headed by the
Rev. Kang Won-yong. This was because for an incident to be in violaCion
of the National Security Law, there must be a plan for forming a poWer
sCructure following the success of an internal disturbance plot. But,
again, it did not look convincing. So, it seems that they are now planning
to fabricate snother case and link it to the academy. This tantamount to
fabricate another Peaple's Revdlutionary Party case. They arreated Pro-
fessor Pak Hyon-ch'ae who specializes in rural problema, and are trying to
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link him to ehose a~~d peopl~ who h~d b~pn involv~d in th~ "Min~ok Ilbo"
caee of ~961 immedi~e~ly ~fe~r tha Pak Chc~ng-hui'e coup d'et~C. Thue, ~t
1~aat eix per~on~ were arre~tied, and eom~ ~ay tihat ehe~e includ~ Chose who
were involved ~n eh~ People'~ Party for Revo].uCion ca~e. in this way, by
linking them to ehe PPR cas~, Ch~y ~r~ trying ~o ~11~g~ eh~ti tih~~~ peopl~
~re r~1~t~d ro th~ ae~d~my's educetion of farmers. ~he PPR case, which ~a
1~G4, w~~ r~v~~~~d r~ hava b~~n erump~d ap, i~ thus r~aturning tike a ghosC ~
again and again~ On 9 Apri1 1975, eight peopl~ were eudd~nly executed who
were involv~d in the Democratic Youth-Student League cas~. Now they are
trying to revive tha PPR rhi~ Apri1, a season for reeietance.
The Pak r~gime~ feeling uneasy about ire dictarorehip, ia now making g
ecapegoat of innocent people again in order to etay in power. If they aYe
being charged with plotting intarnal dieturbance~ a violation of tha Nation-
a1 Sacurity Law, th~re is no knowing when they may or may not be executed.
No one know~ their whereabouts. Some eay rhae they are being interrogated
~t the Polic~ tieadquaYCerg, but probably lik~ the people executed in 1975,
th~y ara being tortur~d to rhe exCent that their appearance will change.
7'hey are probably trying these peopl~ to admi.t the charges fabricated by
:he CIA, by sub~ecting them to unbearable phyeical and mental paine. My
friend wenti on:
"When the church leadere ealled on him in connectioe with thie incident,
the deputy d~.rector of the CIA told them that the sraff inembera of the
~c~demy had read subver~ive literature. This repreeents very weak ~vi-
dence. It ie eaid that the academy ataff had in their pos~ession booka
entitled "Korean Women's Reader" which Was widely read right after the
[1945J li~eration, and "Social Reformera" in Englieh. Among ehe booke in
English, there ~aere buoks by Marx and Lenin, and the pagea of the Comnunist
Manifesto were torn off, and in addition, they had some North Korean pam-
phlets, but these cannot be substantiated. Also, they are supposed to
have liatened to radio broadcasta from North KArea. All thie evidence
� cited have now power of persuasion, ~ust like those cited in the fabricated
craes. 'I'he CIA's ob~ective is to propagandize the point that church affil-
iated organizations are intiltreted by the communista. It is trying to put
a red label on the democratization movement~ farmers' movement~ and labor
movement of the churches and to keep the people away from them. When they
escort those eng~g~d in the labor and union movements sponeored by churches
snd of the academy to the police, they intimidate them by linking them
with spies and caamunigts. In a climate like this, no ~aholesome movement
can grow up. This is an utterly barren era, and barren soil."
~n reality, none of those arrested or detained had received inatructions
from the north, or had attempted to organize an underground party. The
CIA fears that the church people may take a tough stand becau~e of thig,
and say that the Christian Academy is not involved in this incident at all.
It may have taken international reaction into consideration. The director
of the CIA, who was formerly a CIA Minister in Japan~ publicly stated to
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rh~ ~ht~rch peopl~ that th~re w~re ec~ndals among the male and Femela etaf-
fer~ of th~ academy. 9y ra3ging moral questione, they were trying Co have -
- the church datiach ies~if from th~ case; it 18 a dirty ~rick. With a s~.gh
my �riend went on:
"Tho~e presently i.mplicat~d in this are all good paople. They ar~ a~naci~n-
tious and virruous. They are trying to maka shameleee persone of rhase
p~ople. 7'hie ie eh~ir uaual means when they know the church people are weak
on thi~ matCer~ They are ~1~o making virtueleee people of these parriots.
In the Reading Club case, even if you charge ehem wiCh a violation of Areicle
4 of the Anei-Coromunist tdw, the maximum penalty ~.s only seven yeara �or
act~,ng in concere wiCh an anri-etate organization. So they Are gpreading
propaganda that these people are communiata and shameless resources. These
peopla may we11 harbor aome ideas which can be regarded as socinliem. It
may be erue that they tried to nurture the streng~h of the masses. Any auch
actg aYe 3nterpreted as c~mmuniat-oriented ae far ae the Pak regimc~ ia con-
cerned, and the people involved are communiste and impure elemenC~. Because
of thig ignorant and terroristic government, the ordeals of Che~e conscien-
rious people wi11 continu~ endlessly. It may b~ that the CIA ie wiahing to
trump up Che charges as big ae poasible."
When the Chrierian Academy movement became relatively succesaful, there fol-
lowed this crackdown. To the Pak regime, the discontent of workers and
farmera create unbearably uneasy f eelinga. What with the Iranian siCuation,
the Pak governm~nt feele terrified in its heart in the face of an alliance
of religion and the masae~. There is no knowing what terrible charges are
going to be trumped up during the one month befor~ thnse ~rreeted may be
brought to a erial,, Depending on the situation, this case may be used as
a meang of oppression at home before Carter's visit to Korea. The Pak re-
gime will never be able tn ignore those watchful eyes of the people over-
seas being kept on this mntter.
After the academy case, ~hat fabrication next? The ~riday Prayer Society
and the Galilee Church may also bc wrecked. In ~ny event, becauee af the
cruel determination of the Pak regime, ~aass movements will become increas-
ingly unproductive, while the good peopl,e who placed their hope on them
will surely be sub~ected to unbearable sufferings and darkness. The situa-
tion will worsen in which those intellectuals who want to deal with rhe
North-South problems from an objective and national point of view will be
labeled as communists. 2he only thing which the Pak regime is concerned
in connection with the North-South iasue is the political effect it needs
Co oppress the massea. To this end, what the Pak regime wants most are
the likes of the meeCing with President Carter and the so-called aunnnit
talks between North and South Korea. The Pak regime believes that these
are most eff~ctive in oppressing and deceiving the people.
The ROK people will be further divided under the slogans of economic de-
velopment, independent national defense, and anti-communism. This is an
era of out-and-out insanity, in which the poor people are regarded as mobs
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and the democruts are regard~d ~s craxy people. But, the climate ie such
that rhe truly insane peop~e harboring these ineana noCions can call them-
selv~ae the moet paeriotic and moet reaeonabl8. World powera, in~luding
J~p~n, the Unired States and ~urope~ will probably go along with thie. ~ti
may b~ that the more dollare the Pak regime earne in p~acae like the Middle
Eaet, by imposing those harsh work~,ng conditione~ the more prominenti th3s
tendency becomea. ~'h3~ is an era of decadenee. Wiil Che eerror~ of Che pak
r~gime conr~.nue to ~urviv~ for Che time being in the midst of Chis histiory
of ineanity?
Letter of Request from Mr. Kim '~ae-chung
To; CaYdinal Kim Su-hwan, Seoul Diocese
(Copy to: Mr. Mun Ch'ang-chun~ Chairman of the Caeholic CommitLee on
Jugtiae and Peac~j
To: The Rev Kim Kwan-sok, President, aouncil of the Chrietian Churches.
Copy Co: Tha Rev Cho Nam-ki, ahairman~ Human Righea CommiCtee of the
Council)
I pray that you alway4 en~oy excellent health with t:he grace of the Lord.
What I wish to inform you about is the fact that my hwnan rights and those
of my family are being violated illegally, and no resolution hae been
arrived at no matter how much I protest. In particular, we have been under
houee nrrest sinze March 1, and we are not even free to communica.ce with ~
the~outside world, let alone go out. I hereby note details of theae facts
to bring them to your attention. I would be happy if you, my brothers
under the Lord, render special cooperation in aettl3ng this matter.
Note
I. F'gcts of Infringement Upon Human Righta
1. Surveillance. Following my releaee from prison on 27 December,
1978, several watch posts were biilt around my house, and a 24-hour surveil- -
lance has been on for the movements in the house as ~aell as.the people com-
ing in and going out of the house. I am also aware of the fact thaC the
wr.tch posts are equipped with field glasses, radios, movie cameras, and
several cars. �
2. Trailing and Wiretapping. Whenever I and my wife go out, one or
two cars of the intelligence agency follow us, and all our telephone con-
versations are being monitored.
].2
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3. intimidation and Buying Off 3chemea. Vie~.tore to my houee are
int~.midated either prior tc the vieit or aftar the vieit ~o etop either the
current vieit or future coneacte, and attempte are made tio buy off vieieore
or ~uet ~.ntimid~ti~ them.
4. tiouee Arrest. Finally, eince 1 March we have been forcibly placad
undar 11,1ega1 house arreet.
(1) For the 15 out of the 26 days, from 1 March to presenC, I was under
houae arrest. (2) The police authoritiea of our dietrict not only failed
to provide the 1ega1 grounds of the houae arrest but also acknowledged the
illegality of it. And yet~ they have been enforcing it on the pretext of
"ordere from above". (3) At firet, Che po].ice rried to ~ustify the house
arrest by citing Paragraph 1, ArCicle 2 of the Reguletione Governing the
Protection and Obaervation of Parolees. It was made clear later that thie
prov3sion means that "when anything abnormal is 8etected on the behaviors
of the aub~ect, that must be reported to the public prosecutor immediately,"
and that the proviaion does not a11ow the police to exerciee any right to
enforcement antions. Thus the police at last acknowledged the illegal nature
of the house arrest. Especially, there is no queation that it ia illegal
to place my wife under houae arrest, or to prohibit the people in general
from viaiting my hou8e. (4) In enforcing the house arreat, there have been
frequent over-mobilization. Sometimea, over 100 persona in aeven or eight
vehicles including buaes, were mobilized, and often the passage of passers-
by are prohibited, with some vehicles alwsys blocking our garage. (5) In
a nutahell, my house has become a prison already, and if thie eituation con-
tinues, I would rather be placed in prison again. Above all, I feel snrry
for those people around ug. The peace of our home has been loat completely
and there are some membera of my family who are suffering from mental of
physical illnesses brought on by teneion. (6) FurChermore, the police do
not allow normal religious activitiea for me or my wife including going to
church on Sundays. My wife was not even allowed to attend her mother's
memorial service held for the family on the 24th.
II. Appeal for Settlement
I will leave everything to you, requesting that you take the moat appropriate
action. In addition, it is respectfully requested that the human right
organization of your church take the following actions in particular on my
behalf :
1. Legal Action. Al1 these illegal acCiona are perpetrated ~ointty
by the Central Intelligence Agency and the police. Therefore, when you
eue, please make direct your action against the persons in charge of these
two.
1.3
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2~ Protes~. Pleaee request tihat tihe organe concerned take ac~ion
immedia~ely to puC an end to the iilegal ~,ituation. If this ie not done~
pleaee request thati I be i,mprieoned again~
I would be grateFul if you make thie letter of mine public ~nd widely die-
eeminate it.
'
26 March, 1979. ,
' Kim Tae-chung (Seal)
COPYRIGHT: Iwanami Shoten [1979]
7989-R
CSO: 4105
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S.KOREA/MILITARY AFFATRS
ROK WARSHIPS LIKELY TO BE PERMITTED TO VISIT JAPANESE PORTS
Tokyo NIIiON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 27 Ju1 ~9 p 2
[Dai1y summary of Japanese Preae, American Embaeay, Tokyo]
[Text~ Seoul, 26 Jul,�Special Correspondent Sh3nohara--At the 26 July preas
conference, JDA Director General YamaehiCa revealed that he was asked by ROK
National Defense Miniater No, "Will an ROK [Navy] training aquadron be per-
mitted to call at a Japaneae port when it atarta on a long d3stance cruiae"?
The director conveyed his intention to welcome it. According to a source
accompanying Yamashitaa the RCK had for a long time hoped for a training squad-
ron to call at a Japaneae port. In the aunmaer of last year, the 1tOK sounded ~
out [Japan's intention] on the problem of having auch a aquadron call at
Sasebo on its way home from the U.S. But reportedly the plan was not real-
ized because of the Japaneae circumstances. In view of the fact that Director
General Yamashita has promiaed National Defenae Minister No to approve a
training equadron to call at a Japaneae port, the same source accompanying
the director general thinks that ROK warahips' stop-over.in Japan may be
realized next year.
According to Director General Yamashita, National Defense Minister No a[ated
that he will welc~ome aJapaneae training squadron to call at an ROK port.
Yamashita'8 reply;, "I will atudy it in a forward-looking way." Thus, the
possibility is st�rong that there will be mutual visits by training squadrons
between Japan and the ROK as a part of the propoaed strengthening of defense-
1eve1 exchange between the two countries.
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha 1979
CSO: 4105
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B. KOREA~FQREI4N REI,ATIONS
' BRIEF3
SAUDIS TRAZNIN(~ KOItF.~N9--Intensive military training is being g3ven, by
the Saudi Arabian Ar~r, ~0 100,000 Koreans who are employed by Abu Dhabi.
~extJ [~?aris PARIB MATCH in French 24 Aug 79 p 7]
CSO: 4200
~
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S. KOREA/FOR~IGN TRADE
JAPAN~ROK-USSR TRADE TO BE REALIZED WITH MITSUBISHI AS INTERMEDIARY
Tokyo THE NIKKAN KQGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 11 Jun )9 p 1
[Text] MiCsubiahi Corporation (President Bunichiro Tanabe) has decided to
embark on a Chree-way trade arrangement with Che Soviee Union and South
Korea, which have no diplomaCic relations. This became possible because
Mitsubishi was under strong preseure from powerful South Korean companies,
and also because the Soviet Union considera that there are no epecial
problems with regard to where goods are purchased~ For the time being,
types of goods and the amount of money will probably be very limired, but
in due course Mitsubishi hopea to serve as a commercial base ~or the
three-way trade.
When Mitaubishi Corporation aounded out the Soviet Unior. on exports of
South Korean goods to the Soviet Union, the Soviet e*_ance was; "There will
be no problem where we purchase goods because we are going to buy Japanese
goods." Mitsubishi also coneiders that there will be no problem with goods
which are hanciled s~olely as Japanese goods.
Nevertl~eless, it is certain Chat good marked "made in Korea" are not
desirable; therefore, South Korea will probably sell them under the name of
~riginal equipment manufacturer (OEM).
'Ip to now, goods exported from SouCh Korea are moatly textiles. Soviet
exported goods are mainly marine products and processed marine producta,
but coal and steel sought b,y the ROK will likely be excluded because they
are considered strategic goods.
IC is not unlikely that the volume of transactions will grow quickly in this
three-way trade because of Soviet consideration for North Korea, but now
that Atitsubishi, which had been rather passive toward the three-way trade,
has begun to launch into it, the three-way trade with the USSR and the ROK
is seen as finally starting to move forward.
COPYRIGHT: Nikkan Kogyo Shinbun 1979
CSO: 4105
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N. KQREA~MSLITARY AFFAZFtB '
DPRK, ROK NAVAL FORCES COMPARED
Tokyo GUNJI KENKYU in Japanese Jun pp 34-42
Ng~i,1e by Kimio Aotani, mili~ary analys~: The ROK Navy and ~he DPRK"
[TextJ The Korean Peninsula, aurrounded on three sides by water~ can be
said to have a very long coastline for ies land area (219,000 square kilo-
meters) . ~
The eastern seacoast is comparatively regular and ia about 1,729 kilometers
long. The western and southern coasts are very irregular. The western
coast extends about 4,718 kilometers and the southern coast ia about 2,244
kilometers long. The combined length of the aeacoast ia 8,691 kilometers.
Scattered beyond this long seacoast are 3,962 islands of various sizes,
large and small. Furthermore, these islands are numerous on the western
and southern coasts where there are many irregularities.
When the Korean Peninsula was divided into North and South at the 38th
parallel on 15 August 1945, the result was that the South, li.ke a reduced
version of the Korean Peninsula, was left surrounded on three sides by water
and possesaing many islands and a very long coastline compared to North
Korea.
Since these geographic conditions presented many difficulties for nval
- defense, the South began to build its navy before the North. The South
began to build a navy the year it was liberated. It was not until July
of the year following liberation that the North began building iCs naus?
forces.
Thus, with help from the United States or the PRC and Soviet Union, the
navies of the ROK and the DPRK have developed through many changes until
today, and although they are small, they are respectable naval forces
responsible for naval defense, ship escorts, protection of fishing vessela
and so forth. ~
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1~ CurrettC StaCus of ROK and DPRK Naval Forces
Both the ROK and the DPRK are eaid~Co be basically oriented toward ground
forces and i.t seems that the construction of their navies seems to lag
behind that of the army or the air force.
~he current status of eheir naval forces ie as shown in Chart I.
CHART I
Current Statue of ROK and DPRK Naval Forces
ROK DPRK
Total Troop Strength: 642,000 512,000
Breakdown of Troop StrengCh:
Army: 560,000 440,OU0
Ng~?Y ~ 50, 000 30, 300
(20,000 marinea)
Air Force: 30,000 45,000
Total Vessels:. 118 435
Total Tonnage; 83,400 tona 58,300 tona
Ma~or Vessels:
Destroyers: g p
Escort Vessels: 7 3
Submarines: ~ (4 "W" Class
15( i
(kk "R" Class
(10 "Komar"
Missle PaCrol Vessels: 8 18( Class
(8 "Osa" Class ~
Subchasers: 6 16
Torpedo Gunboats: 34 303
Large and Medium Minesweepers: 8 0
Small Minesweepers: 1 0
Landing Craft: 8 p .
Landing Ships: 13 70
Naval Aircraft 23 (S-2) Antisub- 0
marine Patrol Planes
Several helicopters
(Note) Based on Military Balance 78-79 and JANE'S NAVAL YEARBOOK 78-79.
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,
By looking at this chare~ rhe firat Ching which can be said i~ Chat �or
both North and South, naval troop etrength consCitutes only about eix per-
cenC oF tioCal Croop strength (for the Japanese Mar3time Self-Defense Force
iC ie 15.7 percenr) and, as sCated above, the building of the navy lage
behind and is far out of balance with thaC of the army and air force.
Secondly~ Che ROK Navy has ~he greater tonnage despite Che fact that it has
a small number of vessels, bue the DPRK Navy has xather low tonngge compared
to its large number of vessels.
The average tonnage per ROK veasel.is~710 tona and the average tonnage per
DPRK vesael is a sma11 acale 134 tons~ That ia to say, Che ROK Navy is
composed mainly of comparatively large ships while the DPRK Navy ia made
up mainly of ama11 types of vessels.
In other words, one can say ehaC while the ROK Navy r?as ocean-going typea
of vessels, tihe DPRK Navy has coastal types. Thiz�dly, from Che viewpoint
of different types of vessels, the DPRK Navy pos5eases aubmarinea, which the
ROK Navy does noC have. Moreover, the DPRK Navy is composed mainly of high-
speed missile craft and torpedo gunboats.
From the viewpoint of effectiveness, these could be said to be mainly used
for surprise attacks.
In contrast, the ROK Navy possesses mainly destroyers which generally have
anti-aircraft, submarine and ship capabilities and it also possesses,
on the average, tactical capabilitiea for patrolling, mining tactics,
amphibious operations and so forth. However, because of their compara-
tively large size, these vessels cannot turn qui~ckly, and they have the
additional disadvantage of being few in number. This also seems to be the
reason for a calling for a build-up of small~ high-speed vessels to counter
the DPRK Navy.
'The point is related to point three. Since the ROK Navy does not possess
submarines, it does have naval air units composed mainly of antisubmarine
patrol planes as a means of counteracting submarines. Furthermore, because
of the geographical conditions m~ntioned above, the ROK Navy has marine
units for defense of its many large and small islands.
In particular, the island of Paengnyongdo and the other islanda of the so-
called "five West Sea islands," ;ahich are close to DPRK territory and are
far from ROK territory, are in the ROK Navy's defense zone.
From this point of view, it.would seem that the navies of the two
countries in their current state were organized by giving direct expression
to the geographical conditio::s of their enviYonments~and the strategic
intentions arising from those conditions.
However, except for the most recently constructed vessels, the naval carft
of both the North and South are growing obsolete. For example, the DPRK's
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submarines date from the 1950's and the deatroyera which are the mainerrength
of the ROK riavy are said to be already 30 yeare old. The equipment of
the two navies is ~lso said to be generally growing obsolete.
Nevertheless, although both navies hava their respecrive atrengths and
weaknesses, iC would seem that in th~ overal.l perspective Che DPRK Navy -
is somewhat superior to the ROK Navy. -
2. Command Structure and Organization in the Two Navies
Command srructure'and organization of the ROK and DPRK navies is as shown
in chsrCs 2 and 3, respect3vely. Here, too, ~ust as in the preceding
paragraphs, various characteriatica of the respective navies can be aeen. `
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Chare II
Command Organizatiion of the ROK Navy
Secretar of Defense
Joint U.S.-Korean Naval Chi f of Sta�f
Headquarters
Composite Naval First Deputy Chief Second Deputy Chief
Force � of Staff of SCaf�
~
Fleet Head uarters --Landing Division Naval ir Regional Naval
~ ~ UniCs Head uarters
Escort Flotilla --Landing Brigades ~1~
Amphibious Oper- --Island Defense
aCions Flotilla Units
Fast Boat Flotilla ontrol Office Naval College Naval dock
~ yard
, Minesweeping Naval Academy Supply Depot
Squadron
Tactical Support Education Train- Inatalla-
Squadron ing Group tions Depot
Training Squadron Ordin~ance
DepoC
. Procurement
Office
Other Units
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Chart Zii
� Con~nand Organization of the DPRK Navy
Mini~ter of the Peopi~'e Armed Porcee
Chief of Genaral Staff
Commander of the Nav~r
~
Eastern F1eet Western Fleet --Naval College
Headqunrters Neadquartere
Wonean ~ Nam 'o
--Na~in Base --Yongamp'o Base --Nava1 Academy
--Chongjin Base --Namp'o Base --N~val Technical Train-
Center
--Kim Ch'aek Base --Pipagot Base --Central Naval HospiCal
--Ch'aho Base --Cho-do Base
--Mayangdo Base --Seqot-ri Base
--Wonsan Base --Hae~u Base
--Chongjon Base
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Looking fir~e a~ ehe ROK Navy we saa ehae eil of iee naval power i~
subordinaCed to Fleet N~adquartera, geveral groupe or squadrons have been
formed for rhe dif�~rent rype~ of veee~i~, and eheee ar~ ai~o pare of a
compoeit~ naval force whieh 38 eubord~nate ro a~oint U~S. end ROK Haad-
quareers~ F1eet Neadquartere ie locae~d et Chinhaa~
Nexe ~har~ are the marineg. Previously theee troope had been under the
unifi~d conm~and of a Marine Corpe Coo~mand@r who was under the conm?and of
ehe Nava1 Chief of (ian~~a1 St~ff; how~v~r~ ~s part of e~impiifieaeion
o~ ehe structure, Marine Corps Headquarear~ Was dig~olvad on 10 Oetober
73 and the eeruc~ure was revisad eo thar rhe Navai Chi~f of Staff commande
direcely~
For this reason, one of ehe ewo deputy ehiefa of the general etaff who
assist the chief of general sraff~ is epecially charged wieh marine corpe
matters,
The ROK navai air units are made up of S-2 anti-eubmarine patrol planes
and helicopeere. Sgveral yeara ago th8ae were traneferred from ehe Air
Force to form "a navy wirfi winge" in name as well as fact.
Regional Naval Headquarters were eatabliehed on rhe baeie of the "Law on
Naval Basea" which was reviaed on 31 December 1973. Ir is poseible to eee
this as further strengthening of the functions of the former defense office.
That is, the law stipulates, "Tactical b88es~ 3ncluding forward bases and
radar bases~ shall be establiahed as tactical basea to ~upport military
supply and naval tactics in the various naval zones, and regional naval
headquarters shall bg located at tactical bases."
Previously~ the namee "defense bases," "defense office," and "naval
defense" had been used, and the terminology and the mission wag expanded
to "naval tactics."
It is not known how many naval regions have been deT.ineated but probably
the division is about the same as when the defense office existed.
Also~ with regard to the actual units needed for naval operetions~ on the '
basis of the function and characteristics of the naval regione, the
required navgl ahips are dispatched by fleet headquartere, to be under the
regional command.
Thus~ the vessels which have been dispatched carry out missiona euch as
patrol of oceas, protection of fishing boats, defense against the DPRK's
�xst attack craft or carry out operations to resupply five islande in the
West Sea [Yellow Sea] and other places.
The Control Office is the entity which manages Chinhae military port, the
operational base of the ROK naval fleet. Located here are not only the
fleet headquarters 6ut also many organizations related to the navy such as
educational organizations and supply facilities. The Control Office is
charged with rear support, legel an24 anagerial control for theae entities.
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,
Oe the oCher hand~ in the DPRK Navy~ Naval Haadquareare ~s not able to
exeYCiee a uni~ied command over ehe Qet~,re ~laati be~ause of tha Nor~h'a
epaciel geogYSplt~,cal chara~ter~stice. Consaquee~ly, Che DPRK ~s d~vided
broadiy into Eaetern aed Westarn fieeee and rhere are several individual
bases uader Che command o� tha respective f~eat headquarters. To each
og rhe base~ are aseigned a torpado squadron, a defense equadron aed othar
uni,t~~ Th~ u~~~~ ar~ mad~ up of ~everai ind3vidual formatione and tha forma-
tions are compoaed ~f ~ev~ral vaseela.
The zonee oP responeibility of the individuai basae are not known.
3~ Ma~or Diepositions
As stated above~ F1eet Headquartera exercises unified comm~and over Che
ROK Navy and diepatches ahipe as required by miesion to the command of
regionai naval headquartere. ConsequenCiy~ ehe diepoeition of tha ROK
Navy ie not aiways fixed. However, ~udging from geographicai couditions of
�he environment and the frequency with which naval hostilities have occurred
in the past, one would think that more amphagie ie placed on ehe western
coaet than on che eastern coasr.
Furthermore~ about 5,000 mar3nes are stationed in the five West Sea [Ye11ow
Sea] islands, mainly on Paengnyongdo. A landing brigade 3a starioned on
rhe Kimp'o peninsula and a landing divieion i8 etationed behind the eastern
coast at P'ohang. Thus, the marine8 are in atrategic readinese. Further-
more, it seems that~ as in the past, about a company of marines ia atationed
along with Navy personnel at each regional naval headquarters.
In contrast to the diaposition of the ROK Navy, it aeems thar the DPRK
has placed somewhat more weight on the eastern coast in the dispoaition
of its navy. This can be seen in~the Pueblo incident of January 1968 and
in the downing of the EC 121 in April of the following year. �
Reginning in August 1977, the bPRK establiahed a 200-mile maritime
economic zone on its Japan Sea aide and went on to set up a military
c~arning zone~ a rarity world-wide, which is a military sea boundary within
the economic zone extending 50 miles from a direct baeeline.
Purthermore, within the last aeveral years the DPRK has moved its disposi-
tion �orward by completely converting Sagot-ri and Hae~u on the wesC
coast and Chang~on on the east coast which had been forward bases and by
increasing naval vessela.
'Phese indications, as was mentioned earlier~ may be taken to mean that
the DPRK Navy suggests plainly the possibility of a surprise attack.
Certainly, one has to say that even though the DP1tK Navy is 8ma11, it ia
dangerous and not to be taken lightly.
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Chart 4 i~ e map ahowing the diepoeiti~n of ine~or b~eee of both ROK ~nd
DPRK navie~~
4. Characreristice of Che Tfao Navi~e
In additiion to the epacial ch~rACteriet3ce eCated above, rhe ROK and DPRk
naview have the characteris~i~e given below.
The ROK Navys
1) Gain~d combaC experience by eending marines and ~hips ieto the war
in Viernam;
2) Cives each year the graduares of its Naval Academy experience on the
ocean by sending them for 2 to 3 montha on a long dietance training cruiee
ro the United States, South America, 8outheaet Asia and the Middla Eaet; ~
3) Hae reised the level of it~ trai.ning by carrying out landing~ anti-
submarine and mining exerciaes ~ointly with the United States Navy and
Marinea several timea a y~ar.
In contrast, the DPRK Navy has no long dietanc~ training cruieea nor does
it conduct ~oint exerciaes with naview of other nationa which would
correspond to the ROK navy's training~
Neverthele~s, the DPRK navy has its own special characCeristica which the
ROK Nav; does not have.
1) The DPRK Navy has atationed shore batCeries at poines on
its eastern and western coasta. It has aleo deployed shore to
ship (Samlee) misales and thereby hopea to have complete coaetal
defenses. ~
In January 1967 the ROK Naval vessel PC56 was sunk off the
DPRK's eastern coast; it was sunk bv the DPRK's shoYe batteries.
In the ROK, the army is mainly in charge of thia sort of coastal
defenae.
2) As stated above, for the pasC several years, the DPRK has '
been pushing its bases forward, and in its most forward bases it
has constructed anchora~es in cevea to protect them from enemy
attack and hide them from reconnaiseance by eatellite, etc. It
can be said that this could be possible only if the DPRK veesela
are small types.
3) In addition, political education in the DPRK Navy is carried
out thoroughly by organizations of the Political (Committeej
a
to the same extent that it is carried out in the army and air
force.
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4~ Auxiliary Nava1 3trength of the ROK and DPRK
In rh~s eontexC aUx~ligry naval aCrength 13ke ehae of Japan's MariCime
3afeey Agency or merchane ahipo and eo foreh~ which can be uead direcCly
as naval ~trengCh in Cime ~f emergency~ Iti al~o r~f~ar~ ~ith~r to th~
uniqu~ naval r~s~rv~ force of the ROK and the DPitIt or to the CDPRK~s~
navai Red Worker--Peaeant M3litia.
Ler us look firse at the ROK.
Fir~t there is the "Maritime Police Force" which ie equivalent eo Japan's
Maritime Saf~ty Agency. Thig is undar the Kaadquartere of National Pol~ce
of ehe Ministry of Hom~e Affa~rs. Ie hae a totai of over 900 membere~
poeaessee abour 20 vegsel8, and its headquarears are in Pusan.
Prior to reeCoretion of diplomatic relatione beCween Japan and the ROK,
wh~n Japanese fishing boata were eeized from time to time, the seizuree
were made by this Maritime Polica ~which~at the time wae called ehe
"Coast (tuard"),
Secondly~ the ROK has its naval reserve. This was formed with people
invoived in coastal fisheries, along with the formation of a local reserve
force on land on 1 April 1968. Ita strength, however, is not known.
Thirdly, th~ ROK has merchant ahipa. According to JANE'S NAVAL YEARHOOK
1978-79, the ROK has more than 1,000 auch veeaels and a total tonnage of
over 2.49 million tons,~and there it may be possible that this will
gradually increase in the ruture.
Next we have the DPRK Navy.
First, the DPRK has the Naval Red Worker-Peasant Militia which is made
~r~, of coastal fiehermen. It is already known that North Korean fishing
boats are armed with machine guna, etc. The fact that the (P'yongain-
ciiong) (146 tons), which came to Shimonoseki seeking asylum on 17
September 1966 was armed with machine guas, automatic small arms and hand
greeades, is fresh ~n our memory. The strength of this force, however, ig
not knoWn.
~econdly, the DPRK has the vessels~ uader the conLrol of the Liaison
9epartment of the Korean Workere Party, operating against Japan and the
dOK. These operational vessels are very amall and weigh only about 40
to 80 tons, but they have extremely high apeed and are armed with machine
guns, recoilless rifles~ etc. These boats, disguiaed as fiahing boats,
operate i~n ~he dead of night by approaching the South Korean or Japane~e
coasts and they unload or take back guerrillas and operative agents.
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Th~r~ aYe said ro be ~ume Cen~ of th~se craf~ and they sea~n to ba ba~ed
~ at Chong~in, Wonean and Namp'o~
Finally, ~here are ehe DPRK's merchant ehipe~ Compared to the ROK~ the
DPRK hae very few merchant shipa~ AccoYding to JANE'S NAVAL YEARHOOK
1978-79, the DPRK has 19 merchant ehipa with a CoCal tonnage of about
90,000 tona. As is evident in Premier Kim I1-song's New Year apeech and in
the budget repcrt to the Supreme Peopla's As~embly, thie f3.gur~, tno, can
be expeeted to become gradually larger.
6. Trends in tha ROK and DPRK nav3ew
At the beginning of th~ 1970's~ in order to counter the fast missile patrol
boara and faet ships o� the DPRK~ the ROK began buil,ding ite own fast
patrol boara and introducad and equipped itaelf wiCh anti-ship mieailea
from the WeaC.
(hi the other hand, beginning in the 1970's the DPRK began to build and
coann3ssioe eacort ships and submarines.
Judging from Chis trend, it seems that the ROK Navy will tend toward
gradual reduction in the siae of ita ships~ while the DPRK Navy will
gradually move toward larger vessels. '
However, JANE'S NAVAL YEARBOOK 1978-1979 reports that the ROK Navy has
one escort ship under construction and consCruction of three more vessels
is being plannQd. If this is true the ROK Navy would not at all aeem to be
tending toward smaller ships.
It would seem thaC because of the demands of the era~ i.e., for the sake
of neval defense which is of ever increasing importance becauae of es-
tablishment of the 200-mile economic zone, the expanaion of territorial
seas and increased ocean going traffic, accompanying expansion of trade
with foreign countries, both the ROK and DPRK Navies will continue Co be
built up but will retain a balance between large and sraall craft.
In particular, the pattern would be for submarines which are now lacking in
the ROK Navy to be introduced in the next 2 or 3 years. If this is
realized, it would seem safe to eay that a long term aspiration of the ROK
Navy will have been achieved.
_ However, the ROK Navy which has to defend longer coastline than North
Korea seems to be quantitatively one step behind the DPRK Navy. Rectifica-
tion of this situation is the pressing task of the ROK Navy. The DPRK
Navy, however, will not ignore this, and the question is how long this
see-saw game can actually continue.
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(1) Changgan'goti , ' ,
, 4~~~~ ~
(2) Paengnyongdo ' '
( 3) Taechongdo ~ ~ M9 9)
(4) Sochongdo ~~Z~ Nn ' ~ R"'
(5) Kirindo ~
(6) ~hangnindo ~ .
~ . ~
(7) Ong~in ~3) ~ ~(5~ '~~a ~ ~ ~ o
(8) Sunwido ~~,p C ' ~5~ a10~ow
(9) Hae~u ~4) , q
Yongmaedo ' ~
(11) Taeyonpyongdo ~__~~a~_:,,~ (11~'~~~res
(12) Soyonpyongdo ~ (12) (1~P
(13) Udo _
Area and Popularion (End of 1972)
Ialand Name Area (km2) PopulaCion Householde
Paengnyongdo 45.6 8~674 591 Slightly amaller
than Japan'e
(Miyake Ieland)
Taech'ongdo 12,6 2,233 403
Sochongdo 2.9 158
Taeyonpyongdo 6.2 2,431 472
Soyonp'yongdo ,
Udo very small 0 p
1. Shortest distance between Paengnyongdo and North Korea attd Inchon:
(1) 14 kilometers to Changsan'got in North Korea
(2) ~180 kilometers to Inchon in South Korea
1. Shape of Paengnyongdo:
(1) 12 to 13 kilometers east to west; 15 kilometera north to south;
covered moatly by mountains 50 to 100 meters in height; almost
no streams.
(2) Beaches which when dry become as hard as concrete and can be uaed
as a natural landing sCrip.
COPYRIGHT: Japan Military Review 1979
9111
CSO: 4105
. ~9
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N. KOREA/MILITARY AFFAIRS
AftTICLE UISCUSSES POLICIES, CONDITIONS IN KPA
Tokyo GUNJI KENKYU in Jap~nese Jul 79 pp 68-75 .
[Article by Kimio AoCani, military researcher: "Kim I1-song's Private
Army: Korean People's Army"j
[TexC] I~ SocieCy That Places Kim I1-song's Teachings as the Priority.
Preaently, North Korea is vigorously calling Co dye Che entire aocieCy wiCh '
Kim I1-song's "chuche thought."
That thought is now regarded as "the encyclopedic thought which can boldly
nvercome Any existing principles and notiona," and it ia regarded to be
"absolute and unconditional."
Accordingly, "the teachings of Kim I1-song" are somQthing of supra-legal
nature, and Chey take precedence over all things.
Still more, when iC comes to "the Korean People's Army" which is called
"the Party's army" or even "Kim I1-song's army", needless to say thinga
are done according to Che thinking and insCruction of Kim I1-song.
Having these Chings in mind, I would like to examine the reality of the
military system of North Korea.
II. Military Service SysCem.
"The Socialist Constitution" of North Korea promulgated in December, 1972
extols the people's duty to defend the fatherland in the following manner: .
"The defense of the fatherland is the utmost duty and honor of the citizens.
The citizen must defend the fatherland and must serve in the military
according to the provisions of law." (Article 72) The compulsory military
service is thus explicitly stated. Furthermore, it is determined that "all
ciCizens aged 17 years and above shall have the right to vote and the right
to be elected. The citizens serving in the military shall have the right
to vote and the right to be elected." (Article 52) (In South Korea, it
applies only to the right to vo~te from age 20.)
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I~'Uli UI~'1~'Lt; lAL U~~ UNLY
Ac~curcli~n~ to rhe n1d con~atieuC:ton, rhe righe ~o vo~e and rhe righr ro he
~~I~~rtt~cl w~jr.r~ ~tv~n ue ~I~u ~ua nf 18, r~nd "tlio r~~ul.nrtnnH CnnCnrning tl~a
~~~~u~~l~~'N iui l lt~iry K~rvlce" rrc?clr~im~d in lyS6 n1HO prnvlded ~he ~g~~ nf
Cui~yc:riprinn and mi1~C~ry c~1~ ro be L8-25 years for pence eim~ dnd 18-45
y~ury for wttrCime~ In renli~y, however, it appears ehar peraong ~C Che
age n~ 20 were aonscripted on Che grounds that if extremely young people
w~re enliseed 3n rhe nrmy, ~.ea qua~ity would go down. Later, due Co ten-
gions, th~ ~nllsemene ~ge was apparenrly lowered to nge 18; but afeer ehe
~n~crm~nC oE "rhe Socinlist ConaCituC~.on", iC was thought Co have been
1ow~r~d ro d~~ 17.
AcCnrdin~ en ehe gr~t~menC made by a snldier who defecCed tio SouCh Korea
in 1977, th~ enlistment age was J.owered even furCher, Co nge 16 from around
L975.
Arriclc 29 of thp const~.rution which prohibiCs child labor, stipulatea thaC
"eti~ ng~ ChnC CiCizens cgn sCart to work is 16. Children who have not
re~ched eh~ working nge are prohibited from working," and this may be the
rensdn for lnwering Ctie age to 16. Sixteen is Che age ae which one grad-
uAres From Che five-year higher middle school, and it is posaible ta think
thar r.onscription At age 16 as one form of cut-off point.
Soldiers Chus conscripCed are required Co serve, according to "the regula-
tians an milirary service in the People's Army," �or 3 and a half years in
the army and for 4 years in the navy and air force as Che period of acti~+e
dury. In reality, however, one cannot be discharged from Che army unless
he tias served for 8-10 years, which is 2 to 3 times the sCipulated length;
~~nd w}~en it comes to personnel in the special services, it is customary to
hav~ ~n extention of 1 to 2 years in addition to that.
'Chis sort of long-term service inevitably causes the aging of Che troops, �
but one may also consider that this is necessary in order to convert the
army into "n cadre army" in preparation for emergency st~pulated by "the
E~~~r m~3or�miliCary policies" or Co Crain the all-powerful soldiers capable
oC Ei~hting a"one ~ match for a hundred" or a"one a match for a Chousand"
ba;C1e.
After completing this long-term service, persons who were discharged from
thc army at the ages of 25-28 must perform miliCary service as Che core of
Che Red lr'urker-Peasant Militia aC reassigned working places unCil about
~~e 45.
'n regard Co the conscription, Che way North Korea conscripts officers from
~n1r of South Korea where the qualified persons who are of draft age are
a11 drafted after the physical examination. In North Korea, 16-year-olds
are called individu~lly and are enlisted; later their service-status,
branches of service, and assignments are determined on the basis of phys-
ical examination, ability and other considerations.
3].
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Ilc~wcvar, Chp relgti.v~s nf Choee who fled Cn Soueh Korea, Che sons oF formnr
lund~.urd~, nr Cho~e wl~o hnve recently returned from J~p~n ~re excl.ud~d from
elic~ d~gignarion of enligrmenC A9 "impure elemeneg."
A1~o exclud~d frnm conscr~.ption are those technicians indispengnble �or
econnmic conaCrucCion, gpecial peraonnel, or sons and brothers of importanC
off ici~l~ of the government and the p~r~y.
'Thc:rc ~~rc~ wdmen's eorps in ehe people's Army (s~id tio be 30 percene of the
Cot~71 miLit~ry force), but iC is not clear wherher the sam~ conscr~.p~ion
n~e ~nd l~n~eh of service apply to ehem.
III. ltnnk, Promoriott System, and RetiremenC
NnrCh Korea calls rank "military riele," and it has ndopCed ~ four-rank
syyt;em. In promotion, "party loyalty" seems to have Che highest priority.
(1) ltanlc (MilitAry Title)
i. 'l'ti~ rr~nk af Marshal: Marshul, Vice Marshal
2. The General Officers: General, Colonel General, Lieutenant General,
Ma~ or General
3. The' Field Grade Officer: Senior Colon.el, Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel,
Ma~ or
4. 'I'iie Company Grade Officcr: CapCain, Senior LieutenanC, Lieutenant,
Junior Lieutenant
S. The Noncommissioned Officers: MasCer Serge~nt, Senior Sergeant,
Sergeant, Junior Sergeant
6. 5olcliers: Private First Class, Private
Currently only Kim I1-song who is the supreme commander of the People's
Armed Corces of North Korea is "Marshal"; Ch'oe Yong-kon who was consid-
ered as the number two man in North Korea used to be vice marshal, but
now ri~ one seems to hold that position af ter his death.
Usually, senior colonel and colonel are called "high ranking military
off icers," and other officers from lieutenant colonel down are called
"military officers." Noncommissioned officers are at times called "pri-
mary level leaders," and those from master sergeant down are usually
called "noncommissioned officers and privates."
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_
?~Vi~ v~~ctuL~w u.lu v1~Ll
(2) hrmm~eion
Promoeion is gtven with various faceors Caken inro conaideraCion, such ~s
eh~ lengCh of service, milltary service records, Che nature of origin, and
pnrCy l~.fe in Che army, but in reality priority is given ro pgrey memberg.
Specifically, iti gppec~rs th~C promotion is given when vacanciea are creaCed
~t th~ upper r~nking pnsiCions, and in actual practice rhe minimum requ~.r~d
lengrt~ nf service for promotion is disr~garded.
1. I~romotion of MiliCary Officers
As Cor promoeinn of milit~ry officers, it is done by advancing qualified
persnns wl~en vacancies occur ar the upper ranking positions of an organi-
zntion; it is recommended through the chain of command and finally announced
by Che minisCer of the People's Armed Forcea (rhe miniater of defense) with
rhe consent of the General Polirical Bureau after a documents review ar Che
Bureau oE Cudres of th~ General Staff,
Ptill.Cary ritles fro~n colon~l above are conferred after being reviewed and
conEerred by the Central People's CommiCtee.
`As Eor the promotion of ineriti soldiers, a special promotion of 1 to 2 ranks
can be given by the order of the minister of the People's Armed Forces
Chrou~h the decision of the Central People's Committee.
tn rhe promotion of ineriC soldiers and political officers, there is no
consideraCion given to such a thing as length of service.
The relationship between the military titles and the duties is as shown
on the charC below.
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_ Du~ie~ And I~'uncC~.ons
MiliC~ry 'C~.Cle Comm~nd~.ng pnsirion Sr~ff Pnsir~.nn
,1r Li.euten~nr P1aCoon Cnmmander
Lieu~enunt ~/ic~ C~mmander of Company
Sr. LiautennnC Company Commander B~rt~lion Stiaff bffic~r
C~~~~ttitn Commnnder nf Independent Baeealion Chief of 5Caff,
Company SecCion-Chie� of Che
Regiment~l SCaff
htu~or BaCtalion Commander, Commander RegimenCal SCaff
o� DMZ Security Company Officer
LC Coloncl Vice Commander of Regimenr, Respective Section-Chipfs
Commnncler of IndependenC of the Regimental Staff,
Batr~lion Staff-Personnel in Division
(:olonel RegimenCal Commander Operational Section Chief
Division
5r Colonel Vice Commander of bivision Division Chief of Staff,
Staff-Personnel of Army
Corps
Me~~or General Division Commander, Vice Staff Officer of General
Commander of Army Corps SCaff
Lr General The Commander-in-Chief of the Bureau-Chief of General
Navy and the Air Force, Staff and Ministry of
The Commander of Army Corps People's Armed Forces, Vice
Chief of General StafE
Coloncl General Commander of Army Corps Bureau-Chief of Ministry
of People's Armed Forces,
Vice Chief of General
Staff
Ceneral Minister of People's Chief of General
Armed Forces, Chief of Political Bureau
General Staff
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~ ,a � ~~v~~y YM~I V~ILI�
, 1
2. rromoCinn o� Nnncottun~yaioned Officers and PrivAC~s
Although it is sripulnCed that Che lengeh of s~rvice for promnrinn from
pr~tvt~te tn privatie firse class is 2 years, almos~ no one seems Co ge~ pro-
mored unl~ss vacxncies occur in the organization o� the upper ranks. Thus,
disconCenC is s~id eo be rising because one muse serve as a common private
for 4-5 years. ,
The crireri~ of selection for promoCing include: Che nature of one's
nrigin, strong pnrty loyAlty, dedicaeion Co the military service, and per- ~
�ormance o� core roles at given unitis. The designatiion is'madp by the
battulinn commander for ehe rank of private, by ehe regimental commander
Lor sergeane and ~unior sergeant, by the division commander or the equiv~a-
lent to senior sergeant and above. �
Speci�ic~lly, promotion for the ranks of sergeanC and above is given in
principle to rhose who have completed the noncommissioned officer's school,
thus t~aving the qualificaCion of noncommissioned off icer; but in special
ca~cs, promotion is given also to those who are able and have mer all the
political requirements. Conversely, no maCter how excellent one's qu~lifi-
cation and ability may be, he can be excluded from Che sub~ecCs of promntion
if there is even the sma]lest infraction of the political requirements.
3. Retirement
'The retiremenC of military officers from colonel down is stipulated ns
follows, but it is unclear whether it is practiced as stipulated.
'Che age of 55 for colonel, 50 for lieutenant colonel, 45 for ma~or, 40 for
capCain, 37 for senior lieutenant, and the age of 31 for lieutenant and
junior lieutenant.
A~;ain, it is not clear about the military officers from senior colonel and
above, but the oldest person in the military at the present time is the
7'L yc.~r-old General Ch'oe Hyon, a member of the Political Committee of the
KWP, a member of the Central People's Committee, a vice chairman of the
tdarional Defense Commission, and the former minister of the People's Armed
Forces.
IV. Remunerations and Supplies
~1) RemuneraCions
.:emuneration consists of the basic salary and other supplementary pay and
allowances, and a considerable disparity seems to exist between the well-
paid top and the meagerly paid bottom. Although there is an opinion that
a salary was increased after October, 1970, it is not yet confirmed.
Shown below are, therefore, the salaries and supplementary pay prior to
the time. (1 won is about 130 Japanese yen)
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.
~~r~~t c~~~~r't'r.rA~, ~ist~; c~tvt.,Y
1. 'I'he 13nsic Salary (in won). general=350, colonel genernl=~80, 1leurcn-
ane ~ene~a1~230, ma~or general=180-200, senior colonel.=150, colonel=iio,
1.ieutenanC cnlonel=90, ma~or=85, captain=75, senior lieutenant=70, ,lieu-
ten~nC=65, ~unior lieutenanr~60.
Masrer serge~nt=7 (however, 50 for those in a long period of service),
senior sergeane=5.6 (40 for long service), sergeant=4.2 (35 for long serv-
ice), ~unior sergeant=2.8, private firsC class=1.8, private=l.4.
2. 'I'{~e I'ositionnl Salttry. In North Korea, position has precedence over
r~nk, and if one holds an upper ranking position, he is paid a s~lgry com-
mensurate with rhe position. For insCance, should a~unior 1leutenant be
appointed to the position of company commander, he would be paid Che basic
salary of senior lieutenanC.
3. Milirary TiCle Stipend. It is paid only to the general miliC~ry offi-
cers. IC is paid with a difference of 2 won for each of the consecutive
r~inks. rnr example, 5 won for ~unior lieuCenant, 7 won for lieutenant,
and so Portli, and iC covers up Co lieuCenant colonel.
In lieu of this, a thing called "supplemenCary sCipend for intelligence"
seems ta be paid to colonel and above.*
4. Service Allowance. As additional pay, 5 percent of the basic salary
i5 paid to those who served 3 years or more, and 10 percent of the basic
salary is paid to those who served 7 years or more.
5. Family Allowance. It is paid only to military off icers. A uniform
~ayment oE 10 won is given regardless of the number of dependents.
6. As other allowances, special service allowance is paid to the members
of tank crew, servicemen on the sea, and aircraft pilots; technical per-
sonnel allowance is paid to army surgeons, ship engineers, and the aircraft
ground crew. The amount of these allowances is not clear.
(2) Supplies
The supply of the People's Army is based on the fixed quantity system and
it i.s said to be administer.ed with differentiation on the basis of rank
and the branch of service, ranging from No 1 to No 17.
It is f ixed at 700 grams a day for ordinary noncommissioned officers and
privates, and even this is mad~ of rice and miscellaneous grains in a 50-
50 proporrion. Furthermore, because a saving of 150-200 grams is forced
*Translator's note: In the original it is printed "below" instead of
"above". It seems to be an error.
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eu~~ urri~tfu, u~t~ UNLY
~~n t{~~m in erd~r en prnvid~ warCim~ ~m~rg~ncy r~~arv~, v~rarinug ydung
~aldi~r~ ~~~m Co h~v~ diffi~u].Cy 3n fi~.ling eheir hungry ~tom~ch~. A1~o,
ti~ f~ir Hu~iht~m~nEary f.ond~, mea~ ~nd veget8bi~s are suhpe~~cl eo b~ px~=
~lur~~~l rit� thr Nuhhlc~m~ntnry wurk farm of ~uch miiir~ry unie~ t3ut b~caur~~
~~P prudu~t tdn r~hort~g~, ~ecl~ unie e~n only m~n~ge td fQed 200 ~rnmg or
1~~r~H nf tli~ ~eaplh food ~ilon~ wirh r~di~h ~oup ae ~ach m~~l, ~nd ehe~~ eon-
ditinn~ ~~~m e~ �r~due~ ~n incr~a~iag number of person~ ~uff~rin~ from
ma.tnutrieion. ~e ig r~part~d Ch~t on~ c~n ~u~t bar~iy Ca~~~ m~~t, ~e be~e,
nnc~ rv~ry ~-4 mdnth~.
Mnrt~iv~r, ~ven rhdugh chc~ main fc~ad 3s fix~d at 700 ~r~tm~ ~ d~y, 3.C varieg
~~~~urJing t~ Che branch~~ of ~~rvic~--in the n~ge of 1ighC infnnery unie,
f~r rx~~m~~l~, r11e ~rnp~rr~nn b~tween rice ~nd mi~cellr~n~ou~ gr8in~ i~ Eixed
rie 1:~~ The~ ~upply r~nditi~n~ th~e c~n be ~~eerti~in~d ehu~ f~r (nn ehe
b.ti~i~ ~t rul~~ ~nd r~gul~tions) 8re ghawn b~1ow.
AmounC of AmounC of
Nn. Sub ect Main Food (g) Calorie Intak~
t: Priv~t~ - Lt.__Colonel 700 3,711
. 2. Colan~l -__Sr. Colonel, Scouts ~00 4,354
,3. G~ner~lg 770 4.992
4. AtrcrAft Pilot _6,541 ~
8. Anti-5outh Pnlitical Oneratives
g. Submgrine Cr~w ~ 6.691
10. Tank Crew 800 4.754
12. Memb~r of DMZ Securit Company 800 4,449
V. Services and Duties
(1) ba i ly Etoutine
'I'l~e y~enr.ral daily routinc of the people's Army in the summer is as ~hown
br1.oW.
b~OU-OS10 waking up/ 0510-0540 washing up and clesning/ 0610-0620 morning
rnli call/ 06~0-0710 breakfastl 0720-0750 preparation for lesson/ 0800-0850
Cirst les~on period/ 0900-0950 aecond lesson period/ 1000-1050 third lesson
period~ 1100-1150 fourth lesson period/ 1200-1250 lunch/ 1300-1350 afternoon
n~~p/ 1400-1450 fifth lesson period/ 1500-1550 sixth lesson period/ 1600-1650
~eventl~ lesson period/ 1700-1750 eighth lesson period/ 1800-1920 caring of
we~npons and equipment/ 1920-2010 dinner/ 2020-2110 group cultural entertain-
~ent/ 2110-2140 free time/ 2140-2155 evening roll call/ 2200-0500 bed time.
'This daily routint is said to be determined by the regimental commander on
the basis of the situation of the unit, and in the winter time the afternoon
n~~p is excluded, and [he wake up time is also changed to 6 o'clock.
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Thug, rcrurt~dly, dn~ ig nne ~11ow~d eo ne~lect i minutie nr ~ven 1~~cond
~r~m Ch~ eim~ he g~t~ up in the morning ti.11 th~ eime h~ goes to bed ~e
nt~i~e~ No~~bly, tfi~r~ ar~ ~ome ~eemingly favorabl~ tim~~ ~uct~ s~ "grnup
~ultut~iil ~:nt~rtainm~nt" or "fr~~ time" provided ~ft~r the evening m~~],
bue Chr~r nr~ mo~tly app.tieable when g~n~ral m~~ringt~ ~f rl~~ P~rry c~r el~r.
SuGtrili~r Wnrking Youtl~ L~ngu~ ~re 1�].d, bue ~h~ fa~r of eh~ maee~r i~ thc
fr~~ ~im~ must b~ u~~d tc~ pr~par~ for eh~ next day, and ther~ 3a no~ ev~n
sny tim~ ro rhink ~bouC g~Cring a pa~~.
A~~drding Co ~ c~rC~in officer'~ st~tem~nC: it ig commnn for Ch~ offi-
cer~ td ~t~y up n11 night for duCy, but the noncommi~gioned officere and
pr.iv~~C~s c~n go ed b~d at 2200 since they have fewer meetings than rhe ~
officerg~ How~v~r, b~eau~~ they too have waech-dut~es and urhers, rheir
time f~r sl~ep i~ 4-5 hour~ e d~y on the average. (2) IC would be a big
migruk~ ~o think th~ton~ c~n ae leaet relax on Sunday. Such things
"th~ day o� ~~si~ting rural villag~," "rhe day of paCrintin labor" are
rleverly g~t up, and n11 rh~ officerg, noncommigeioned officers and privnt~g
~r~ mobilized 100 percent for group labor. (3) If there is ever a time to
r~~r, iC would bc ehe once-in-a-month athletic game, in which one is obliged
tn aet~nd ~ither as ~n athelete or ~ppctator. (4) After Kim I1-song gives
an on-thp-spot guid~nce, meetingg will follow day and night for a week.
(5) Most of th~ off ic~rs 1iv~ in Che barracka, and it is conaidered Cn be
a l~cky monCh if they geC to sleep at home 2-3 days a month. These are
the r~portg.
tn tl~is way, the daily routine is the continuation of eension, day after
d.tiy, linving no leeway even for a minute or ~ second.
(2) hgss and ~urlough �
According to "the instructional manual of internal regulations," there is
n system of pass (reportedly there is no differentiation among the offi-
cers, at~d nnncommissioned officers and privates), buC it appears that none
ts nrncticed in reality. If the pass is ever used, it is used for going
out af camp for official business. But even in this case, the noncommis-
stnncd ofEicers and priv~Ces ~re reportedly never permitted to go out by
tiiem:~elves; they must always be nccomp~nied by the officers. '
Al~o, even though there are the following kinds of furlough, they do not
~ppear to be pracCiced as stipulnted; and it is considered to be good if
on~ can t~ave one of these once in 5-6 years.
i. Regular Furlough. Once a year, for 14 days excluding th~~ time spent
for the roundtrip.
2. Special Furlough. A 14-day leave is given when a member of his imme-
diate family dies, excluding the time spent for the roundtrip.
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3. Comm~ndarion Furlough. A~.5-day �urlough ~i.ven in Che form or rew~rd
en tho~e who accomp~.~.~h meritorious serv~.c~s ~n battile, excl~ding Che C~me
~p~ne for eh~ roundtirip.
A1tl~nugh p~~ee~ �or the~e furlougha are i~sued under the name of commsnding
hf[tc~r~ aC the level nf regimental commander ~nd ~.ndep~ndene bartalion
Cc~mmnnder or above, its pro~edures ar~ reportedly extremely diffieulti.
Th~re ar~ even c~g~s wh~re when one reached home on a epec~.ai �urlough, ie
w~s mur~ ehgn 20 day~ after ehe death, and the ~ystem nppeare Co be becom-
in~ ~ gourc~ of digcontent~
In nrder Co elimin~te even a smn11 dQgree d� disconCent and complainCa
~ristng frnm such gystem of pa~s and furlough, "obaervation tour team" is
nrgnnized en conduet ~ tour of rh~ rear line once a year for ehe noncommig-
sioned officers and priv~Ces and once in every 3 year~ for the officers.
'Cl~is is noC a l~isurely sightseeing tour, however. Ite purpose is to mak~
rhem realize Che correctness of Che party policiea after going Chrough a -
pre-arranged course of factories and farms; it is Chug done enCirely as a
means of political education.
(3) biscipline
Needless to say, there is a demand for strict discipline in the army of
Nnrth Korea as in the ~rmies of all countries. Particularly when it comes
to thc army of Kim I1-son~ " and "the army of the Party", it is not neces-
sary to restate that "the teachings of Kim I1-song" rake prioriCy more Chan
they would in the general society.
At the lOth Plenum of Che Sth Central Committee of the KWP held in the mid-
dle of February, 1975, Kim I1-song taught "Che Five Ma3or Teachings'! in
ordcr to develop and strengthen the People's Army: 1. strong and tenacious
revolutionary spirit; 2. surprising and skillful tactics; 3. iron-like
rhysical strength; 4. 100 percent markmanship; 5. sCeel-likp discipline,
nnd demand to carry out "steel-like discipline."
mao and a half years later, at "the KPA Agitators' Conference" held on '
30 November 1977, which was attended by more than 6,000 officers and enlist-
ed men of the People's Army, once again demanding strict discipline, Kim
I1-song presented "the 16 articles of oath to be observed by military serv-
icemen of the People's Army" as shown below, and emphasized that the rnilitary
me~ should be made to arm themselves strongly with the Party's chuche
thoughts and its policies. IC is comparable, in a sense, to the Five Arti-
cles of the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers in the former Japanese army.
First, the military servicemen of the People's Army shall always observe
the military regulations thoroughly.
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FAR OFFICIAf. US~ ONLY
S~Cand, th~ mi.~.itary gerv~cemen of th~ Peop1~'~ Army ~h~11 ~lway~ hav~ fam-
iliarity with their weapon~ ~nd ~h~11 ~ak@ exe~ll~ne c~r~ of them.
Third, th~ milieary ~ervic@m~n of eh2 Peopi~'~ Army ~h~ll c~rry oue miiie~ry
ord~r~ thoroughly u~d~r wh~e~v~r eirCUmsCancee.
Fourth, Che milit~ry ~erv3cemen of eh~ Peaple's Army ~heli carry ouC wirhour
f~il th~ due~es ~s~ign~d by th~ Party and politic~l or~~ni~z~Cion~.
Fifth, th~ mil3t~ry gerv3~emen of th~ Peopie'~ Army sh~11 ~Crictly guard
th~ cenfidential informaeion of th~ nation, m~lirary ~ecr~t~ and rhe organ-
ixaeionai secrets of ehe Par~y.
Sixth, the miiit~ry ~~rvic~men of th~ People's Army sh~li ~bide thoroughly
by the ~oei~li~t l~w ~nd ord~r of Che nation.
S~v~nth, ~h~ militgry ~ervicempn of Che ~eople's Army ~h~ll pareicipat~
withnut fsil in military and political training~ and sha~l ~nthusia~tic~lly
l~arn rherefrom.
~ighth, the military servicemen oE th~ p~op~e'g Army ghall love th~ p~opl~
and shall in no way encroach upon their properties.
Ninth, th~ military servicemen of the People'~ Arnry sh~ll strive a11-out
for the proteceinn and economization of national properties and military
~upplie~.
Tenth, the military g~rvicemen of the People's At7ny ~hall love their com-
rade~ much like their own brothers and sha11 establish completely good tra-
dition of unity and solidarity among men frcm top to below within the arary.
To carry out these "teachings of Kim I1-song", a round-the-clock vigilan[
uttieude is firmly maint~ined without allowing a minute or even a second
of Ere~ time. .
Kim I1-~ong once snid, "the people's Army is t? school for connnunist edu-
Cation." Indeed, when one'~ behavior is restricted for 24 hours, it can
be said that the People's Army is the best place for the theory and prac-
tice of communist education.
(4) Party Life in the Army
Within the People's Army, not being an exception from the practice of the
armies of many socialist countries, there are "party organizgtions" and
"the Socialist Working Youth League organizations." Politics takes pri-
ority and education of poliCical ideology is equally emphasized in military
training.
(
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pUN Wrp'lt~lAL Uy1~ UNLY
~e i~ ~urr~n~ly known eh~e i00 perc~ne of th~ ~ff3c~r~ ~nd 4~ p~re~n~ df
ehe non~ommi~~ion~d offie~r~ ~nd pr~v~ee~ ~r~ parey m~mb~~~. Thog~ who
nre not memb~r~ of eh~ parey ~r~ ~nd~r oblig~~ion eo ,~oin "eh~ So~i,~lige
Workin~ You~h L~~gu~" or, if f~ma~~, "Eha Wom~n'~ Unia~."
l~nr~y memb~r~ g~e privil~g~d er@~tm@nt in every r~~p~ee. For Chi~ rea~on,
eti~ hi~1~~~t ~~pir~~ion of eh~ noneomm3s~ioned offi,eer~ ~nd priv~e~~ from
th~ mom~nC of eh~ir ~n~i~em~ne in eh~ army is, repor~~dly, eo ~~t ~ p~rey-
~~rd by th~ tim~ of th~ir digeharg~ from the army.
If dn~ do~~ not h~v~ ~ parey-eard, h@ can not be assi~eed to a good ~ob, '
nor ~~n h~ find a~uit~bl~ msrriag~ partner.
~dr ehi~ rc~~nn, p~rty poiitieal aetivitieg ~r~ e~rri~d out wi.~h ~xtr~me
vigor wiehin th~ ~rmy. Accordin~ Co the case of ~ e~rtain naval offic~r,
th~ parey m~~eingg wiehin th~ mil3e~ry seem Co enmpris~ Che following 16
m~reingg:
1. Th~ P~rry C~11 C~n~r~1 Meeting; 2. the Parey Pranch Or~~nization
M~~~ing; 3. ~hg Prim~try l~ve1 Party Meeting; 4. the Pria?ary tev~l P~rty
Committee M~eCing; 5. the Base Party Standing Committe~ Mepring; 6. the
~~sc Party Repr~~entaCive~ Me~ting; 1. ~h~ Bas~ Party Activists' Meeting;
g. rhh Ngva1 Ne~dquart~rs Party Representatives Meeting; 9. the Naval
Nrndqu~rtcrg Pdrty Activistg' Meeting; 10. the Cell Commirtee Meeting; -
11. the Ce11 ~x~anded Committe~ Meeeing; 12. the Oppn party Ceneral
i~fec~ting; 1S. rhe Primary Level Party Expanded Me~ting; 14. the Party
Cnnyuledeiv~ M~eting; 15. th~ Parey Members' Lectur~ Clgss; 16. the
R~vnlutionary Tr~ditinn Etesearch Seminar.
Be~ides these, when other types of ineetings are included, the number of
various types of ineetings is gaid to total 37.
Undc~r these circumgtnnces, it is eo wonder one collapse~ at the meetings.
~'urtl~crmnr~, one cen not ju~t remain silent and listen to others at ehese
m~~eingg; one must self-criticize his own behavior and remarks, as we11
~s criticize the shortromingg af others. By doing so, he is considered
tn be a man of strong party loyalty.
'ftws, it appears th~t something utterly unthinkable in the armies of the
West~rn naCi~ns is being carried out vigorously. _
E'areicular~y when "the teachings of Kim I1'song" are newly presented, it
is considered proper to hold all-night debates on how to carry them
tt~rc~u~h, and to investigate the results day after day.
41
FOR OTrFICIAL USE ONLY �
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080038-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080038-1
FOR OFFICEAL USE ONLY
Vl. Itawr~r.ci~ and P~in3.~hmenrH
C l) Awurd~ nnd D~~aorutinn~
'I'li~~i~~ ~ii~~ 1~y~~~~~~ ~~I ~iw