JPRS ID: 8633 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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_ , Fnlt hF'N'IC'tAL USF: nNLY
JPRS L/8633
, ,
- 27 August 1979
West E u ro e Re ort
~ p
cFOUO 47i~9~
FB~~ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/8633
27 Augus~ ].979
WEST EUROPE REPORt
(FOUO 47/79)
CONTENTS C~AGE
COUN~'RY 3ECTION
FEDF~IL REPtJBLIC OF agtMANY
Economics Minister Discuases North-South Dialog
(Otto Count Lambsdorff; EIktOPA-ARCHZV, 25 Ju~. 79)
F~1VCE .
Armored Division Artil'~ry, Logistical Support Described
( AfiMF~S D ~ AUJOiktD' flTJI, Jun 79 ~ � � � � � . � � . � � . . . . . . . . . . 9
Armored Division Artillery Regiment, by D~niel
Valery
Armored Diviaion Headquarters-Support Regiment,
by Daniel Mioche
Military Rea.died To Intervene for Oil if Need Be
(Elie Ramaro; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 23 ,Tul 79) 18 -
ITALY
Ne~r Prime Minister Presents Policy Address bo Parliamerit
(Various scurces, 10 Au6 79~ 22
Re~.~oa~t on Coasiga~s Address, by Luca Giurato
Comrnwist Reaction, by Allessandro Natta
' a' IIII - WE - 150 FOUO~
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r~~UrrtniY �r~C7~toN FEDERAL REPUBLIC oF G~RMANY
ECONOMICS MINISTER DlSCUSSES NORTH-SOUTH DIALOG
Bonn EUROPA-ARCHIV in German 25 Jul 79 pp 381-388
,~Text of lecture by Dr Otto Count Lambsdorff, fed~rel minister of economic;~
Federal Republic of Germany, at the membership meeting of the German Asso-
ciation for Foreign Politics in Bonn, 20 June 197,~7
,~'Tex
~ On 3 June 1979 the Fifth United Nations Conference on Trade ~nd
Development (UNCTAD V) ended in Manila. For en enttre month some 5,000 de-
legates from more than 150 countrtes had tried to agree a,joint ap~ro~ch to
the speed-up of economic development in the young nations of the Third
World and the encouragement of their integration into the world economy.
industrial end developing countrles agreed even before the confe~ence thet
it would be relatively easy to descrfbe the challenges confronting all of
us, but very difficult indeed to meet them. This was confirmed especially
in the fin~l stage of the conference, which I had the dubious pleasure of
witnessing at flrst hand and also of helping to shape it. Coop~retion be-
tween industrial and developing nations is indeed making progress, in per-
ticular at bilateral level, and mutual understanding is growing. But it
will need a long and laborious effort to guide this cooperation along lines
which are not set by pianned economy-regimented signposts but rather by
more efficient conditions. The result of the negotiations must be judged
against this background. In general we may and should be satisfied. On
the other hand i will not disguise my opinion that materialiy better results
would have been desirable and eWen possible.
Aims and Results of the Maniia Conference
Responding to the ambitious aims of the conference, the agenda included
nearly all sectors of inte~national economics. In addition to gene~al dis-
cussions on the interdependence of trade, financial and development issues,
it was intended to deal more specifically with detaited aspects of the fol-
- lowing:
The danger of protectionism to world trade,
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~ 7he status and results of GATT negotiations, `
The intensificetion of finished goods exports from the devetoping coun-
tries, and
The integrated raw materfal progrem, the foundetions of which were esteb- '
lished in Nairobi in 197'6.
We discussed the world monetary and financiel system and its compatiiblltty
with the needs of the developing countries, the issues of the trensfer of
pubtic and privete resources end the problems of borrowing by the developing
countries. In the area of the eransfer of technotogy it was necessary to
forge ahead with negotiaeions on an tnternational code of behavior end study ,
how we may best improve the technological capacity af the developing nations.
In Manila we also talked about their obtaining a greater share of worid ship-
ping. The least developed countries, the 18nd-bound end islend nations
finally demanded that special attention be devoted to their specific problems.
In the area of cooperation among the developing countries it wes imperative
more strongly to emphasize the concept of the collective solidarity of Third
World countries and the growing share of responsibility the more advanced
nations in this cortmunity should assume for its weaker members. Last not
least--in fact this point was of particular significance for me--Ma~ila con-
~ tinued the Eest-South dialog, by which the socialist countries of Eastern
Europe were to be more than hitherto involved tn the industrialixed worid~s
efforts toward better development.
In February last, in Arusha (Tanzanie), the nations belonging to the grou~ ~
of 77 (now counting 119 develaping countries among its members) adopted a -
"program for collective responsibility." This progrem confronts the; rest of
the world with a comprehensive catalog of demands regarding all iteras lfsted,
~nd some of these demands are very far reoching indeed. The indus:rial
countries are reproached with being the ones mainly responsfble for the lack
of economic growth, inFlation and exchenge rate fluctuations; the present
worid economic system, it is said, has fefled. The Third Worid therefore
demands that redress fs provided by means of planning controls and slso
claims "a greater share in world economic management." According to Third
World opinion an exte~sive bunch of ineasures must provide the bases for de-
velopment in the 1980's, and these will in due course result in ~ new worid
economic system.
From the outset all attending pa~ties were fully aware that no more than a
fiaction of the developing countries demands could be met, and that UNCTAD V
c-uld produce progress only in certain areas.
Among the most important conference resolutions must doubtlessly be counted
the trade standstill declaration which includes a clear repudiation of pro-
tectionism. This is an obligation which--due to our, persistent urging--was
finally, albeit hesitantly, accepted by the developing countries also. it
's surely a good sign thet even the Third World netions a~e i~creasingly
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coming co appreciate the benefits of free worid trade and ~he harmfulness of
creeping proeectionlsm. Thls did much to help the status and reputation of
our country at this conference; By now th~ 7hird World netions dre quite
~were rhat the Germans are In the forefront of the baetle againse protection-
ism.
7he limited success of UNCTAD V was a~so helped by the industriel countries
declared readiness substantially to raise public development aid, though it
was not possible to provide eny quantitative promises or fixed dates: Aid
for the least developed countries (LLDC's) is to be doubled at the eerliest
possible time, end terms are to be further improved. I would also like to
mention a resolution on economic cooperation among the developing countries,
which, among other goals~ aims to improve their regional and supraregional
associatton end thereby their totel economic strength.
In other areas UNCTAD V failed to achieve some aims which would have been
perfectly feasible. That was due to the fact that some developing countries
evidently maneged completely to misunderstand the goal of this conference--
thet is to negotiate and arrive at compromises. This applies in particular
to one of the key conference issues, the so-called interdependence. Coming
to grief here was the attem t of the developing nations in future to conduct
(within the scope of UNCTAD~ a permanent exchange of experiences and opinions
on world economic problems. The developing countries we~e intent on couplfng
thfs with a demand, unacceptable to us, for a far rea~chfng mandate involving
controls and regimentation. In the end thefr design failed due to the lack
of preparedness ofi some developing countries fo~ including the energy issue
in thfs anelytical contemplation. We defended ourselves in this matter, be-
cause any discussion of *_he cur~ent world economic situetion would be in-
complete and unrealistic if it lacked the energy element. .
The Maximum Oemands of the Arushe Program and the Politicization of the Con-
ference
While unsetisfactory, this is par for the course of any such canference:
Several other impo~tAnt points on the agenda were concluded or adjourned by
way of inerely procedural decisions which mean no more than the intention to
- continue the dialog. On the whole this was a consequence of the fect thet~
in all important matters, the developing countries clung to the catalog of
maximum demands laid down in the Arusha progrem. Often following painful
internal debates within the group of 77, these demands were simply translated
into draft resolutions, some important ones submitted late and, in their es-
sential elements, all proved to be not negotiable. it is certainly not con-
ducive to the negotiating partners willingness to make concessions if they
gain the impression that they are intended merely to subscribe to the other
partners concepts. As a result the industrial countries attitudes tended
to harden also, and the potentiel scope for negotiations failed to be proper-
ly explored.
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Impressed by this less ~han fruitful atmosphere for negotiations I involved
myself repeatedly in the talks to help bring closer the differing standpoints.
On rhe part of the developing countries I had to deat with ofFiciats, usual-
ly ambassadors with strictly limited briefs, who did not feel authorixed
constructively to interpret the Arusha program. The ministers who hed adopt-
ed it fn Arusha were no longer present in the later stages of the Menila
Conference. I did not even meet them there in the final phase, when the
success of the conference depended on high level decisions.
The Eastern state trading countries demonsfirated e perticularly unpleasant
example of rigidity in negotiations. Claiming that UNCTAD V should deel
mainly with issues involved in E~st-West trade (as if that topic were not
constantly under discussion Plsewhere)~ they persistently evaded the exten-
sive Third World demands addressed to them. Altogether the developmental
role of the East European state trading cuuntries was subJected to a public
and critical review at this conference--the first such occasion. Though '
these countries tried their hardest to define developmental policy primarily
as an obligation of the Western industrial nations, I am happy to report
that the conferees in Mantla unanimously reJected all these attempts: Indus-
trial countries, developing nations and the People's Republic of China. In-
cidentally, this example shows that a certa~fn tendency to politicization sur-
faced i n Man i 1 a.
While understandable in terms of specific UNCTAD topics, the limits of :hat
which may be discussed within the scope of UNCTAD were well exceeded by a
resolution--edopted against our vote--on liberation movements. We were un-
able to accept this for quite factuel reasons, because it tended to jeoper-
dize the sovereignty of nations with whom the Federal Republic of Germany
maintains diplomatic relations (israel, South Africa). A dispute of this kind
belongs in the U.N. Assembly.
The politicization of the conference is also reflected in the fact that the
vote was split on some quite specific resolutions; the developing countries
here demonstrated their majority--although resolutions rejected by the in-
dus:rial nations as addressees are well understood to be of only minimal val-
ue. After all, UNC7AD resolutions have no legally binding effect and repre-
_ se~,: merely moral obtigations. Logically this implies that all participents
must agree. Resolutions not accepted by important countries--especially the
addressees--ere actually no more than unilateral decl8rations. At the same
time they devalue the concept of the resolution.
De~pite all this I would claim that UNCTAD V conclud~d with a minimum result
a~ceptable to the developing countries. Our gratitude~for this result is
d~e Ferdinand Marcos, president of the Philippines, and his Foreign Minister
Carlos P. Romulo who, despite his advanced age, officiated admirably as con-
ference chairman. Preside~t Marcos, in particuler, repeatedly intervened
in various talks a~d tried to protect the negotietions f~om outside politi-
cal influences. Keeping well in the background he managed successfully to
prevent fruitless polemics against certain countries. After conclusion of
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the conference he described the r~sult es satisf~ctiory, thus adding en opti-
mistlc note ln the somewhet pessimistic appratse) of other countrles.
Considered overall~ the developing countries achieved advences in several
~reas, though they were uneble to obtaln satisfection of thelr maxlmum de-
mands which~ in our apinion~ were in~ppropriate. For us industrial nations ~
the result is acceptable insofar as we managed to maintain our basfc atti-
tudes and keep concessions within the framework initially envisioned. Yet
this may not necessarily simplify future North-South discussions. A tempo-
rary hardening of attitudes by the group of 77 is quite on the cards.
The Federal Government's Attitude
The Federal Government will orient its future Third World policy by the
UNCTAD V resolutions. Even before the conference it stated its readiness
to raise public development aid. The medium-range financial plan alreedy
provides an edditional DM500 million for the coming yec~r and another
DM500 milliun for 1981. In the course of the forthcoming budget discussions
the C~binet will decide in how far these amounts might sti~l be increased.
7he Federay Government is also prepared to grant disproportional aid to the
poorest developing countrfes and is ready to continue such aid in the form
. of subsidies.
In Manila the German delegation did now allow any doubt thet public develop-
ment eid will only have the desired effect (that is a decline in the prospe-
rity gap between North end South) if resolutely reinforced by private effo rts
in the shape of investments, lodns and the increased exchange of goods. Also
needed for greater effectiveness is the steady improvement of the investment
atmosphere in many developing countries.
UNCTAD V was an important milestone i~ the North-South dielog. The confer-
ence followed upon a series of ineetings, the results of which heve decisfve-
ly affected inte~netional economic relations. Still, UNCTAD V was unable
to finally dot all i's; the outstanding problems were still to great and too
complex. Other conferences will follow, such as the 1980 special U.N.General
Assembly.
In this larger context I judge UNCTAD V to have produced a satisfactory over-
all result. North and South are involved in a necessary though painful and
time consuming process of reflection and discussion; hopefully the hostile
confrontation of 1974 has finally been discarded.
Different Interests Among the Developing Countries
When, however, we place this result within the context of the enormous orga-
nizational, personnel and financial costs of a mass even of this kind, we
must ask ourselves whether the international cortxnunity of nations has adopt-
ed the correct method for its efforts to achieve a juster world economic
order. Much of the time spent in Manile was wasted on political discussions
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which were en~irely unrelated to the function of UNCTAD; Moreover the emer-
gence of opinions et these conferences is bound to be slow and the resolution
procedure so invulved and time consuming that it 5hould be reexemined without
any more delay.
One of the ma,jor contributing factors here is the obviously increasing con-
flict of interests within the group of 77, a~actor which certainly does not
help the negotiations to proceed smoathly. The developing countries need
more and more time to settle their internal difficulties. Perticularty im-
portant for the advanced developing countries (the so-called threshoid coun-
tries) with economies featuring dynemic industrialization, are trade Issues~
resistance to protectionism. 7he less developed nations naturally are mere
concerned with the transfer of resources~ especially public development aid.
Corresponding to the different economic constitutions, foreign private in-
vestments hold differing significance in the various developing countries~
and the various governments hold similarly differing attitudes to the prob-
lems involved. The same m~y be seid., mutatis mutandi, of issues involved
in the borrowing by developing nations. Most of ell--and UNCTAD V was the
first conference clearly to demonstrate this--does the controversy between
the oil countries and the non-oil producing developing countries increasing-
ly divide the group of 77.
Several Latin American countries especially publicly reprove~ the OPEC na-
tions for their oil price policy and thereby temporarily delayed consensus
in the group of 77--in particular its attitude to the world economic situa-
- tion. Incid.~ntally, this circumstances reveals that regional differences
as well as differences of factual interests are on the rise within the
group of 77.
The Latin Americans feel themselves afflicted by mo~e than rising oil import
~rices (compelling OPEC for the first time ever to defend itself on two
~~ronts); they also set different accents with respect to trede demands and
fre4uently expect better results from bilateral talks with the industrial
countries rather than from multilateral conferences, Much the same holds
truP for some Asian countries, such as the ASEAN nations.
7he Af rican countries tend to be poorer and therefore--understandably--con-
centrate on demands for public financial eid. Moreover they feel strong
~ only when demonstrating solidarity in a multilateral setting. They are also
in:lined to radical views. In Manila they sometimes abruptly quit the ne-
gotiations if they did not go thelr way.
T~,: example of Cuba shows that this complicated state of affairs may result
in a conflict of loyalties. As a member of the group of 77 it wes--by the
caprice of the alphabet--assigned the role of spokesman for the 77. In this
capacity Cuba was compelled to champion the serious challenges of the devel-
oping nations to the state trading countries of the Eastern Bloc though--as
a member of the Council for Economic Mutuel Aid--it is itself a member of
~
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this Bloc. In the meantime Cuba's invitatlon to have UNCTAD VI meet in
Havana was merely notsd. The group of the industrial countries, by contrest~
- displayed admirable cohesion in the course of the negotiations.
This developmen~ Justifies cerCain doubts whether the group of 77 will be
able to achieve more than formal unity at the next great UNCTAD ConFerence.
It slso confirms our opinion ~het it might be advisable rather more to em-
- phasize the differences encountered in seeking solutions to the m~ny prob-
lems of the Third Worid and take them into consideration with respect to the
various measures to be adopted. We ere alre~dy pursu:ng this idee in our
day-to-day policies toward the Third World. However, it must be up to the
developing countries themselves to Introduce it into international discus-
~ sion; if we were to do so, we would incur the accusation of wishing to split
the group of 77.
At the same time we are bound to ask whether the advanced developfng coun-
tries should not accept more obligations vis-a-vis the less developed nations.
That does not apply only to the opening of th~ir merkets to other developfng
countries.
It would be premature, though, to assume that the group of 77 will in future
refrain from presentiry its claims by making common ceuse at leest against
the industrial countries. The conference of nonaligned nations, set for
September 1979 in Havana, will provide clues to future trends.
Thoughts on the Conference Structure
This again raises the question whether mammoth conferences are the most suit-
able approach for initiating the necessary changes. We take leave to doubt
this mainly because we constantly observe that bilateral negotiations wlth
developing countries yield quite satisfactory results while, in view of the
compulsion to bloc slidarity, acceptable solutions are far harder to achieve
in the settinq of multilateral conferences. Incidentally, the impression is
gaining ground that at this time far too many bodies are dealing with far
too many--and often similar-�-issues, and not evei~ a sensible division of
labor can always be guaranteed.
The UNCTAD consultations of past months on specific topics have also shown
that it is easier for differing viewpoints to be reconciled by discussing
definite economic problems and fiactual issues than conducting an abstract
but passionate debate. Progress was achieved in the negotiations about the
structure of the common fund, the matter of debt relief fo r the poorest de-
veloping countries and the still unfinished negotiations about an interna-
tional rubber agreement and the code for the transfer of technologies. The
reason was that all participants were ready for compromise in cleerly de-
fined areas. The North-South dialog--and this is to be weicomed--has there-
by become much more matter of fact.
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Unfortunately UNCTAD V was unable to add anything decisive to thes~ advances,
neither additional substance nor sp~cific politicel impulses. On the contra-
ry: The conference structure used in Mani1P hides an enormous denger. In the =
rnediu~n and long term unsuccessful ma~or conferences oF this kind are bound
further to fuel the ~rustretion especially of the Third World nations. The
cheap taunt of "lacking potitical goodwill" among the industrial countries
might become unfortunate reelity for many developing r~ations and~ consequent-
ly, the guideline of their political thought end sction. The radical forces~
urging confrontation, would be reinforced. We therefore consider most ur-
gent a discussion of the conference structure.
It will be necessary considerably to restrict attendance at these conferences
and limit the agenda. At the same time the individual sovereign nations
must not feel excluded from the decisionmaking process or think their con-
_ cerns neglected. Evidently the South will have special problems he~e.
For our country it will be crucial in the years to come that market economic
concepts be persuasively advocated. In the area of trdde, especially, it
will be tested over and over again. After all, only if we succeed in keep-
ing open the markets of the industrial countries to the products of the
Third World will it be possible for the structural change of the world eco-
nomy, demerded by the developing countries, to proceed successfully. The
market economic system can hope to prove its practical value and moral wcsrth
only if it helps ensure that prosperity benefits more than a minority. Only
then will its attraction be great enough in the long run to convert even
present critics to the acknowledgment of its advantages.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Verlag fuer Internationale Politik GmbH, Bonn
116g8
CSO; 3103
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
ARMORED DIVISION ARTILLERY, LOGISTICAL 5UPPORT DESCRIBED
Armored Division ArCillery Regiment
Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Jun 79 pp 72-73
(Article by Colonel Daniel Valery, commanding officer, 12th Artillery Regi-
ment, Strasbourg: "Furnish Prompt Round-the-Clock Fire Support"]
[Text] To execute his scheme of maneuver, the armored division commander
has the massive and deep supporting fire of his artillery, in addition to
'mechanized and tank regiments which employ a wide variety of direct-fire
and short-range weapons.
This artillery's organization and the new equipment it is due to receive
will very shortly give it outstanding combat supporC capabiiities which
will enab le it to play a much more decisive part in combined arms operaCiona
than it has in the past.
In its present transitional organization, the artillery regiment is equipped
with 2G 155 F3 artillery pieces and six arCillery radars. In its definitive
organization, it will have 24 155 AuFl pieces, six radars, and a large num-
ber of firing aids.
Modern Equipment
The 155F3 piece consists of a 155-mm gun mounted on an ArIX 13 tank chassis.
The gun's crew and ammunition are transported in a separate support vehicle.
This gun has a maximum range of 20 '~cilometers and a maximwa? rate of fire of
three rounds per minute. ~
The first of the 155 AuFl's are currently being issued to units. It is a
singl~ self-propelled unit with its gun mounted on an AMX 30 tank chasais
and transporting both gun crew and ammunition inside the turreC. The 155 AuFl
has a maximum range of 30 kilometers and a rate of fire of six rounds per
45 seconds.
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'Chp~e ~un~ fir~ high ~xpln~ive pro~~ctii~~--whieh d~iiv~r effpeeiv~ fire un
n be~ten ~nn~ nf i,000-1,500 ~qu~r~ m~tpr~--~nd al~o ~mok~, inc~ndi~ry, end
illumin~ting roun8~~
A~~ct~in numb~r af n~w it~m~ df equipm~nt~ now in ~~rviee or about to b~,
gr~~tl.y ~nhanc~ bnth the ~~cur~cy of fir~ and thQ sp~~d with which it c~n
be d~liv~r~d. For inec~nce, ~urvey problpms ~r~ now r~solved Ch~nk~ to thp
gyrnth~adioli~~~ thp inger r~ngpfind~r, and in the near futur~, a land -
n~vi~~ti~n d~vice. Oth~r it~m~ of equipm~ne furnish pr~Gig~ dat~ on bnllie-
tiC ~imdieicm g--Mirndop muzzl~-ve].nrity mpa~uring devic~--and aerologic con-
ditinng--5i~coCCO r~d~r--aff~cting the tr~3~crory of pro~~ctile~.
7'he ItATAC [~i~1d Artillery Fire Control Radar) specifically degigned for
~d,~u~tm~nt af fir~ ig alsd e target acqui~ition device~ It detect~ and
lo~t~te~ moving r~rg~t~ ~t range~ up to 20 kilomet~r~ and permit~ very rapid
~djugtment gnd delivery ~f fire. It i~ cgp~bl~ of rondueting ar~~ eurveillane~--
m~ximum eff~etiv~ 1,000-mi1 ~~ctor--or point eurv~illance within a windo~r
of apprdximatEly 100 meterg by 600 merers.
'~nrul af 144 ttounds in 45 5econdg
A~ rurr~ntly nrganized~ the ertillery regiment can fire 120 roundg in 2
minut~s n~id thug n~utralize a shielded enemy force d~ployed over a 3-
hectare arc:a. Thie correspnnds to an ~nemy standard mechsnized company
depldyed for attack. It r.~n r~peat thie volume of fire s~~me 10 times in
1 hour, nnd 26 Cimeg witti its average daily combat allowatice of ammunition
(r.h~ fire unit reprp~rnte 3,200 rounds).
In its definitive organization~ With 24 155AuF1 gung, the regimene'e fire-
power in~reases quite substantially because it has a much faster rate of
fire. 7his ~tbrupt concentrated fire increases the neutralizatinn effect
nnd enables the regiment to repeat fire rapidly. The regiment thus hae the
c~pability of neutrglizing the equivalent of a mechanized battalion. Further-
more, whenever the divi~ion i~ reinforced by a corps artillery regiment,
ciic concentrated fire of the 4g pieces can shatter the attack of an enemy
rark bnttalion in a fes,? moments.
~'t~e ~rtill~ry regiment has 16 officer Eo n+ard observers operating aith the
bnsic tactical units of front line regiments, and eix RATAC's capgble of
all-weather ~urveillance in depth. ~~his observation sygrem furnishe8 the
r~:Pimentai commander, and hence the division commander, a continuous~ com-
p-ehensive, and rather complete picture of the divigion'a enemy situation.
.~e artillery regiment may be employed:
~ .y. In s~pport of [he arnored and mechanized regimentg against targets beqond
t}~e range of their weapons,
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~
F0~ OFFIC~AL t19E Ot~t.Y
b. ~n d~iivr~rih~ fir~ d~~p in ~n~my p~~iCion~ on ~rti.li~ry, cnmm~nd in~t~i-
i~ei~n~, ~nd irom~dinte r~~~rv~~;
in ~uppore di th~ di.vi~ion'~ echeme of man~uver with m~e~~d ot concan-
tr~r~d f.ire, p~t~ti~ularly in a~eault oper~tione. In the lgte~r cae~, ~
~rtiil~ry fir~ become~ a d~ci~ive eiemene of rh~ combined ~rma eeam.
If rh~ imporr~na~ of rh~ mi~gi~n es~i~n~d th~ divi~ion warr~ne~, th~ divi~ton ~
edmmgnd~r m~y ~l~o obt~in from the corp~ eommander:
~ieher a reinfarcing corp ~rtillery regiment. Th~ rwo r~gimene~ form
an arriil~ry group und~r oper~tional control of th~ comm~nder of the divi~ion
nrtillery r~gimpnt; '
b. Or reinforcing fire frnm on~ or mor~ other artiliery regiment~, generelly
Eor ~~p~cific operation of limited duration.
tn eh~ a~me ~pirit, th~ divi.~ion grtillery regiment m~y be called upon to
furni~h r~inforeing fir~ ~~pport to an ad3acene division or participAte in
Cnncpntr~t~d fir~ deliv~red by corp~ artillery unite.
Employment of ~rtill~ry i~ char~cterized by th~ gr~at flexibility r~quirpd
`to enabl~ the divi~ion commander to adapt fire support quickly to Che exig~ncie~ '
of the gituation. Thig means the artillery'e schpme of maneuver mugt be
clogely linked to the overall scheme of maneuver.
Deployed in Uepth
The artill~ry regiment hne 900 men and 270 vehicleg, 52 nf which are armored.
It ig nrganfz~d into a hegdquarters and s~rvice battery and four :iring
batteri~s with five guns each, but saan to be increased to six each.
In the fi~.d, the regimental cnmmander staye w:th the division commander and
ig consulced on artillery fire eupport matters. He issues his operation
nrders to hie executive officer aho is afficer in charge of the regimental
command post. He is assisted by a liaison o~ficer at the divieion coma~nd
po~t.
In combat~ the regiment is deployed as folloas:
n. In the fo rnrard area, there are four DLO's (Liaison and Observation
D~tachmentg) and gix RATAC'e. The DLO's vith thie armored and mechanixed
regiments each comprise a captdin, the detachment commander, and four forWard
observers operating aith the basic tactical unitg. The captain maintains
liaison vith the regimental coaim~nder and coordinates artillery and heavy
mortar fire.
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K~Y:
1. En~my
2. DLO: Liefeon and Obs~rvation Det~chn?~nC
3. DL: Ligi~on n~r~ehro~nt
4. TC: CombaC tr8in~
S. llivi~ion re~r echelon or b~g~
6. '~R: Regim~ne~i ~~pply trains.
ENMfMI
c2~
0
_ _ ~
_
~ i
O 10 KM
x
~
~ ~3~ X
x ~ ~4~ x
0
~o~
KM
BASE cs)
TR ~6~
xx 40KM
~
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`Th~ RA~AC'~ ~r~ depioy~d by ~roup~ of two on high po~.ne~ providing ~ -
f~v~r~ble in-depth view of ~n~my poeiti.one~
b. Back oE ehe forward are~, the four firing b~tt~ri,es ke~p pace with the
divi~ien'~ c~per~?r~on ~nd po~i~~on ehert~elve~ ge c1o~e 88 po~~ibie ro tihe
- Eirsr echeion regimenta. They are ~nder the operational cor?trol of the
r~gim~nt~i eommand ~o~t whieh direce~ target acqu3~ition oper~tion~, de~ivery
of f3r~, and movemen~ ~f ~quipment.
e. La~t1y, ~tii1 further back, ~ombat train~ in th~ wak~ of the b~tt~ries
~nd r~~im~ne~l ~~ppiy truing op~rat3ng out of the division re~r ~~chelon
furni~h io~ietic ~uppore to Ch~ diviaion.
'Ch~ ~rtillery regiment constieut~s a pow~rful and irreplaceab~e inetrument
ac the divieion eommander's disposal. It is, in face, the only one which
ha~ an ai1-weeCher and round-the-ciock capability of delive~ring prompt and
conc~nCrat~d firp on any tgrg~~ within range of itg guns. In addition~ itg
great mobility ~nable~ it to diaplace a11 of its weapon~ f,on~ard within
firing range of more digrant targete.
The performance characCerigtica of iCs new equspment and the flexibility of
~ ite nrganization will, in the near future, make the artillery become g
ma~or ~saet in the armored dtvision's tactical op~rationa. (See illustraCion
next page]
Armored Divieion Headquartera/Support Regiment
Paris ARt~ES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Jun 79 pp 76-77
[Articl~ by Lt Col bar?iel Mioche, commanding officer, lOth Headqugrtera
~nd Support Rep,tment, Chalons-sur-Marne: "Headquarter$ and Support Regiment") _
(Text] The armored division'g principal characteristics are firepoWer,
roability, and fl~xibility. Its firepower implies a large expenditure of
ammunition: tank anm?unition and especially arCillery ammunition. Ita
mobility, achieved by the exCensive mechanization of iCs units, requires
subetnntial fuel aupplies and createa smintenance and diaplacement probleros.
Its flexibility dema.nds ~ communica[ions system enabling the division com-
- mander to issue "voice" orders to hie regimente, and the traffic control
means capable of en~;uring that the division's 1,800 armored and aheeled
vehicles move freely~ and rapidly in conformitys with the scheme of maneuver,
no matter what chang~s in posture or direction aiay be involv~d. Lastly,
combat itgelf inevitalby entails casualties: wounded peraonnel have to be
evacuated and treated, equipment has to be repaired.
- In one day of combat. an armored division consumes 300 tons of fuel, 385 tons
of ammunition, including 230 tons of artillery ammunition, and 15 tons of food:
a total of 700 tons or 100 kilograms per man.
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I
.d_
'i'h~ or~anie re~our~ee, initi~i combar gupply, and b~~ic ].ogd (of gmmun3-
rion) of rh~ armor~d divteion'~ combae and combat ~upport regiments allow
th~m eo handie th~ir r~quiremente for ~ limit~d time only~ and ev~n then
only incomp].eeely~ Additional resourcee and capabilit~,ee are furniahed
th~m by th~ headquarters and eupport regiment which operates within the
~rmy cc~rp~ complete logis~ical support eyetem.
Gu~rant~ed Str~ngCh
Lngi~Cics ae division 1eve1 may be defined e~s the reeeption, trangehipm~nt
and di~tribution of supplies, the maintenance aed repair of aquipment, and
th~ edllecting triage, and evacuation of wounded peraonnel. The three func-
tional chaine of the army corpe--suppiy, maintenance and repair, and
medic~l--thu~ exe~nd 3nto the division.
The nrmor~d divieion ha~ a subetantial organic logietical support capability.
Iti c~n tran~port almoet 1~400 tona, which is the equivalent of 2 days of
gupply. More than 70 apecialized repair tegme can provide support aimultaneously.
V~rious cypee of wreckers~ maintenance vehiclea, and tank tranaporters, are
gvailable for Che r~cover, repair, and salvage of equip~aenr. The Medical
Servi~e'c~ equipment and pereonnel can ~eceive and imr~ediately traneport more
th~n 200 wounded to a triage center, and there treat and evacuate (based on
the urgency of the treatment required) 15 to 20 wounded per hour.
All of this equipment and personael is distributed among the units. The
nrg~nic resources of the combat and combat eupport regiments afford Chem an
initial degreg of self-aufficiency and the reaources of the headquerters and
support regimenC enable the armored divieion to adapC to the exigenciea and
hazardg of combat by guaranteeing units rapid replenishment or even augmen-
tation of their strength.
Cives the bivision Endurance
The headquarters and support regiment (RCS) is compri~ed of peraonnel from
~11 arms and servicea under the command of transportation corps officera
grd noncommissioned officera. It encompaeses all of the operational
division-level command and control, movement support, aad logistical
gupport pergonnel and equipment. Theae include:
n. ~lements directly responaible to the armored diviaion commander, and
~�.ecessary to:
Exercise command and control of the division: particul~rly a signal
company capable of equipping alternate command posts and~ if neceasary, a
lightly-manned forward tactical command post;
2. Furnish the division appropriate movement support during preliminary
phaseg and when it engages the enemy. This mission is assigned to the
traffic control company.
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~dk U~'~ICtAL U3E ONLY
K~y:
1. ,Armor~d divi~~.on ha~dquarr~r~ and support regimenr
2. Cammanding officer
N~adqu~rt~rs and h~adqu~rt~r~ cnmpaay
4. TraEfie conCrol comp~ny
5. Signal cnmp~ay
6. Trunsportation compgny
7. ~ivi~ional r~pair group
8. Casualty collecting ~~ction
9. Medical rri~ge section
' ~ 1) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ M~ ~
~2~ c~ a. co~v.
� ~.cdoa d.
~aoadror+ eN ~'M'~~
ekoul~tio~
4 4> > x a~
~ ~
E.~,aro� d~ s ~
~ al ~q~i d~ ~ action d~~9~
tdr~iNmTaa~ionr tel~p~
15
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~dit d~~~CIAL US~ ONLY
Kply:
~ 1. To r~giments up to 30 kildm~ters digt~nce
2. Divi~ion r~~r ~ch~ion or ba~e (abaut ~0 km2)
3 ~ Medic~~. ~r~a
4~ Command and eontrol area
S. MaiaCenance and r~pair are~
6. S~pp1y ~r~~ ~
7. i'~rw~rd Graup of Ch~ Logietical Drig~de
9. Army corp~ rear bound~ry, 80 to 120 kilometers
~jwqbus�~~~D mt ~L)
x BASE DIVISIONNAMiE (2) x
x t 80 km' envi~on 1 x
~N ~rr
M` ~
~
1 ~3~ ~ ~ j
~
' (4~ i
~
~ �wr~~~ (6) i
~ 1 ~
1 ~ 5 ~ C01~l17'I~N ~ ~
~ f . ~
~ ti--
~
~ GROUPEMENT AVANT LA B'RKK~AOE
~o ,
LOGISTKIUE
u~ni~ ~aaiEaE cu coaPS o~na~EE
ao ~ ~io k~+ ( g)
~
~6
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t~UR hH'N'ICIAL USE ONLY
b. ~1~menr~ dir~etly r~~pnneibl~ tn eh~ 1tCS commgnder~ n~mply thos~
aper~ting nuC ~f ehe div3~i~n r~gr area ech~lon or bgee.
'Th~ d~.v:t~ion re~r eche;lnn norm~lly locaeed nea~r and in~ldg Che division
rear bdundary ~a ed hav~ r~lgtive stabil~.ty and security. Its 3n~tallgtione
ocnupy ~n area nf som~ 80 ~quare mile~.
'Phe EtSC comm~nd~r i~ gl~o the commander of the divi~ion rear echelon and a~
~uch is r~~pon~ible for implemenCation of the d~.vi~ion~l logisCical eupport .
plan. Ft~ i~guee order~ to ~upply, ~ervic~, and aupport uniCg on th~ ba~ig
of a~en~r~l concept of Che ~cheme of maneuver and accord~.ng to prioriCiea
establiehed by the division comcr.ander~
T,ogiaClca], support unite and facilities are normally aeperated within the
division rpar ech~lon into four functional nreag:
A command and control area with the regr echelon headqugrterg and
communicgtions facilitiea located Cherein;
b. A supply area in which the rear echelon rer~ives, transshipa, or , _
digtributes ammuniCion and peCroleum,�oiL, and lubricantg delivered by
, corps vehiclea. The transportaCion company with iCs 100 t~ctical vehicles
and gas t~nkera has an immediate capaciCy of 450 Cons and 75 cubic meCerg of
fu~l and permita raiaing the division'e level of aelf-sufficiency to 3
dgys af combat. The cargo handling section has a transshipmenC cnpacity
of more rhan 60 tona per houre.
c. A maintenance and repair area in which the armored diviginn'g r~pair
group which makes on-site repaira which take a relatively short time and
which the combat echelons have been unable to perform. The group also
supplies repair parts to units, recovers and salvages priority items
of equipment.
d. A medical erea where the wounded are acreened, procesaed, and treated
befnre being evacuated to corps hospital facilities.
The combat and combat support regiments give the armored divigion its
firepower and mobility. The headquarters and support regiment, by the
services and supplies it provid~s, enables the armored division to maneuver
~nd gives it endurance. '
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Revue des forces armees francaisea "nrmees d'aujourd'hui"
8041
CSO: 3100
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.
FOR OF~ICIAL US~ ONLY
~OUNTRY SECTION FRANC~
MILITARY READIED TO iNTERVENE FOR OIL IF NEED BE
paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 23 Jul 79 pp 24-25
[Article by Etie Ramaro; "The Return of the 'Colonial Troops"'j
[Text) French paratroopers in the oilfields of the Middle East? As
extraordinary as it may seem, the question has been aeked during the
last few weeks by several French newspapers, which have a tendency to
attribute most of the domestic problems of their country--unemployment,
inflation, regtrictions on consumption, and so on--to the "Arab oil.
The conservative elements, which dominate the army, top-level adminis-
tracion, the p~rliament, and of course the government, are in fact of the
opinion that freely opening up the oil deposits, as well as opening up the
routes for shipp~ng the precious fuel, are the canditions for their country's
survival. They are thus considering the possibility of resorting to a
' "gunboat policy" in the event that this privileged access might be threatened
in one way or another. As pare of this policy, they are in harmony with the
i~;eas recently set forth by American strategists, who announced the
- establishment of a foreign intervention force of 110, 000 men capable of
serving their imperialist schemes "in any place in the Third World where
the vital interests of the USA might be threatened. "
[n fact, the French general staff did not wait for the fears expressed
1� ecently by politicians to work out interventian plans that take into account
r.he strategic facts of the moment. They have become accustomed to
categorizing as unmfstakable aggression the mere defection of a supplier
of raw materials, or the setting up of a political regime that does not
ee - o : "1~e Carter poctrine. "
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~orr~spond with th~ wish~~ of p~ris: both ~cenarios, studi~d by "cri~is
t~ama, " Call, they s~y, for a auitable countermeasur~, Miiicary speci~tiscs
- h~v~ ~v~n gone so far ~a to plan for "source control" of deposirs--petroleum
or oth~rwise; one might also think of the uranium in Namibia, or Che goid
in South Afric~, A~rborn~ ~dmm~n~lo uniCs, compri~ed of overtrained
profc~yionalg~ ml~ht f~rm the privileg~d instrument of these activities of
r~primand nr repris~l, which must be able to be carried out quickly,
effi~i~ntly, and even discreetly.
However, controlling all the Cransit points of rankers or other freighCers
carrying v~rious raw materials is also part of the field of concern of the
Fr~nch general staff. In particular, they are researching ways of
strengthening aurveillance and means of French intervention in the Straits
of Ormuz (ar the exit to the Gulf), in the Bab el-Mandeb channel (at the
entr~nce to the Red Sea), in the Mozambique Channel (along the Malagasy
and Comoran coasts), a route along which passes two-thirds of the petroleum
consumed in France.
These alarmisc projects are, for the time being, mainly aimed At
, reassuring public opinion, which is frightened by what has been presented
t~ it as "the decline of the West, " at dissuading the producer nations from
being too greedy in their rates, or versatile in their alliances, and at
making an impression on the Soviet Union--often accused by the general
staffs of imperialist armies of preparing an "economic strangulation of the
West. "
But France has shown on several occasions recently that it is, once again,
developing a taste for a policy of foreign intervention and that its army is
preparing for it. It should be sufficient to recall the actions in Chad, in
Zaire, in Mauritania, or in Lebanon during the last 2 years, as well as the
consistency of its land and sea presence in the Indian Ocean. France has
also undertaken during these past few months a reorganization of its
specialized overseas forces, which could, with good reason, worry the
progressive countries of the ~ird World, for this is, finaily, a question ~f
t~e reconstructron of the former colonial army, after remodeling it to the -
current fashion with its parachute troops or its marines.
The initial disposition is as follows: for the past several years, the French
army has been comprised of--in addition to its Eastern forces~ its security
forces, and its strategic forces--units that have been combined together
in "foreign intervention forces. " Firstly, it is a question of units
permanently stationed overseas--that is, 26, 000 men distributed in the
barracks of the Antilles, Reunion and Mayotte, New Caledonia, and
~9
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!'c~lynr.~iu, ~ra wc~ll uy In Ou~kam (S~ncg~l), I'ort ao~C ~Ivory CongC), ['ort
Gr.ntil (G~bon)~ ~nd above ~11 Djibouti (which is ~till ch~ main land b~se
oursid~ French terricoryl, To this must be ad~ed 3, 500 soldi~rs av~ilabl~
"on ~ t~mpnr~ry b~~is", tihey aCaCe in the ~rench Ministry of Defense, in
Mauritani~, Ch~d, or L,eb~non, And the men from th~ French squ~dron
of th~ Indi~n Ocean (between 3, 000 and 5, 000 ~ailors, d~pending on the
month), ~s we11 as thos~ of th~ Mediterrane~n (who watch ov~r the Middle
~ist ~nd North Africa) or of th~ Atl~ntic (who watch over French-speakir~
Wcst Africtt).
However, the r~serves from these units stationed overseas are formed,
in Fr~nce itself, from two major army unita that can be routed abroad
with weapons and baggage: the 2d ParachutisC Division srationed in Che
southwest, and the 9th Marine Light Infantry Division, in Brittany. The
2d paraChutist Division includes 14, 500 soldiers and 2, 200 vehicles,
distributed amon~ a dozen regiments specialized in assault, armored
tanks, support, command, and signals. The 9th Marine Light Infantry
Division can draw 8, 200 men and 1, 850 miscetlaneaus vehicles.
'I'he recruitment and training of these units has been especially well taken ~
care of: one finds in the units a growing proportion of enlisted soldiers~
wt~o have signed a minimum contract of 3 years (to the detriment of the
number of dr~fted soldiers, the number of which is decreasing). Already,
by the end of this year, the majority of the men from the 9th Marine Light
Infantry Division will be ~rofessionals: the general staff thinks that it s;~~~ '
demand more mobility and availability from them than in the case of
ciraftecs.
The political ulterior motives for this "professionalization" are obvious:
one can remember the weight of the uncertainties caused by draftees ~
~n the morale of the French army during the Algerian war: they did not
always understand the kind of war they were expected to wage.
Among these enlisted men are many who came from the French overseas
departments and territorie5, as well as children of harkis (African
native auxiliary contingentJ or pieds-noirs [Algerian-born FrenchmenJ,
unemployed youth from the working class, and the tough guys taken from
"laxcr" units. 'Il~e training spirit can be summed up as follows: "You
1~avP signed up; it was in order to sweat blood. " 1fie motto: "Here, you
won't be bored. " The hope maintained: "To jump. To embark. To fight. "
To which must be added a worship of the chief and of the force, as well
as an old colonial song that is still current: "We are the Africans
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,
Agid~ from this profe~sionalization, which is ~lready enCering ~ dangerous
dcvciopmFnr, one shnuld noCe the recent establishment of ~n "operational
~irborne group" wiChin the 2d Parachute Division, the Gommand of which
h~s b~~n ~ntrust~d to General Guichard, a veteran of Indochina ~nd Algerta,
a specialist in ~trborne and ~mphibtan operations. At any momenC, theee
ht~hly quAlified offic~rs may take over as the head of an army of be~ween
one and rhree paratroop regimenrs, sent into a foreign theater in the space
of ~ f~w hours.
Improvement h~s also been sought in the area of intervention commando
units (special marines or Foreign Legion) as well as in long disCance
communic~tions--in order to expand the possibilities of punctu~l action
and to m~intain a close link between any force in action abroad and the
COA [Armcd Forces Operations Center), inatalled in the baserrient of the
Ministry of Defense, Boulevard Saint Germain, in Paris. The Air Forc~
h~s alsu made an effort, by forming "operational cells" comprised of one
or several "Jaguar" fighters, with "Boeing C135" supply planes and
"Transall C160" transport planes. Interventions are no longer what they
used to be . . . ,
COPYRIGHT: 1978 Afrique-Asie
11550
CSO: 3100
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COUNTItY S~CTION ITALY
NI:W rRIM~ MINI5TEr 1?RESENT5 POLICY ADDRESS TO PA1tLIAMENT
Report on Cosaiga's Address
Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 10 Aug 79 pp 1-2 LD
(Luca Giurato report on Prime MinisCer Francesco Coseiga 9 August addresa
eo parliament: "Cossinga Presenta 'Fully Reapons~,ble' Goverr~??enC to
Parl3ament"]
(Text] Rome--Prime Minister Francesco Coasiga yesCerday presented his
goverrnnent's program to parliamant. Cossiga apoke for over an hour,
in a calm, almost monotonous voice, stumbling from time to time over ry
a word apparently correcCed by hand at Che last moment. He was only
interrupted four Cimes: twice by [PCI directorate member] Gian Carlo
Pa;~etta and twice from the radical benches.
The prime minister's speech to parliament--on which the debate, which
began yesterday afternoon, should end Sunday with the confidence vote--
can be divided into three main parts. The first is a broad political
preamble, in which Cossiga explains the dominanC reasons behind and the
real significance of the acCion which the government intenda to pursue
at such a delicate and complex moment in the country's life. NexC the
premier explained Che relations among tha parties which constitute the
present coaliCion, devoCing special attention to the PCI, which chose
Co stay in opposition.
Cossiga spoke of the communists as "an opposition force wiCh the rights
and duties connected to the democratic role of opposition in a democratic
parliamentary regime--an opposiCion force which democratically represents
such broad sections of the population and which is so closely linked to ~
the history of our national liberation." He also spoke of a dialog
between goverrnnent and opposition "in an open, honest, consCructive
and not pre3udiced manner, as befits a democracy."
"This goverrnnent," the prime minisCer declared, "has been formed in full
awareness of how the process of the political forces' coming to terr,~$
with the country's situation and with each other began but was not
completed after the elections: only a definitive system of rela::ions
among the political forces and beCween the political forces and. the
country can lead to stability, clariCy and full interest and c:emocratic
participation in the nation's leadership.
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"And," h~ added, "th~s gnvernment ia baing formed also eo create opporCun~-
ei~s--l~ss burdened by constiCuCional pr~saure--for a coneCruceive d~alog
amon~ the political forc~s, guar~ntee~.ng th~.s by reacC~.v~tiing can~C~.-
turinnal procedures ~nd Uy means of governmenti actinn which wi11 ntt~ck
the nrost pres~~.ng problems and insure the holding power of the besic
elemeneg of Che inseiCutional and soCial framework."
The meaning of the prime ministier's ramarks is as follows; for 7 monthg
~n enormous "machine," namely the etia~e's institutional and constitutional
apparatus, was first hindered and subsequenely frozen by the republ~c's
longest ever pol3Cica1 crisis. Never had the country been so long withouC
its essential leadership, Chae is, without a govarnmenC en~oying parli~-
menC's conFidence. Now this governmenC does ex~.st and, thougt~ aware of
its "political limit~," aims first Co free and then set in moCion Che
sCate machinery, by "