JPRS ID: 8629 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Sequence Number: 30
• Content Type: REPORTS

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rUR Uf
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JPRS L/8629
21 August 1979
Near E ast North Af rica Re ort
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cFOUO s2i~9~
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21. Auguet 1.979
NEAR EAST/NORtH AFRICA REPORT
(~'OVO 32/79)
~ CONTENTS PAGE
~
Iran Seen on Verge of Collapse
(Jean Larteguy; PARIS-MATCH~ 27 Jul 79) 1
LIBYA
Labor Migration Sustaine Dualistic Development
(J.S. Birke, C.A. 5inclair; THE MAGHREB REVIEW,
rsay-Jun 79) 9
MAURITANIA -
Nation Still in Coafuaion One Year After Ould Daddah's Fall
(Abdelaziz Dahmani; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 18 Jul 79)............ 18
Nation Said To Be Sub~ect to Any Upheaval
(Said Ould Khelifa; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 25 Jun-8 Jul 79)....... 21
Premier Attempting To R~esolve Economic Problems
. (MARCFiES TROPICAtJX ET I~DITERRANEENS, 6 Jul 79).......... 24
Briefe
Chineae Physiciane Demand Salary Increase 26
Co~issariat f~r Food Aid Established 26
WESTERN SAHAR~,
Briefa
POLISARIO Preaka Truce 27
YF.I~N ARAB REPUBLIC
ariefe
Saudi Develo~~nt Fund 28
- a- (III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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TRAN
IItAN SEEN ON VERG~ OF COLLAPSF
Paris PARIS-MATCH in French 27 Ju1 79 pp 36-44
[Article by novelist and reporter JeAn Larteguy]
[TexC] A well-known novellst as well as a great
~ournalist, Jean Larteguy has been shuttling back
and forth across the Middle East. His wanderings
have taken him from Cairo to Tehran, via martyred
Lebanon and a Syria racked ~y an Islamic crisis.
Never has this volatile regi,,n looked so much like
a cauldron simmering wiL�h the demons of war. It
is here that the fate of oil-dependent Europe is
being decided. It is along these borders that
the two superpowers have traced blurred fronLiers
whicl~. the other must not cros~. This week we
publish the first in-depth report from Jean
_ Larteguy on the shakiest of the region's nations, .
Iran, which obviously cannoC long survive the
ruinous follies of Imam Khomeyni, who rules there,
answerable only to God.
Six months have passed since the Pahlavi dynasty was overthrown by Iman
Khomeyni's Islamic revolution.
This half-year has brought defeat for the shah, who strove to go too far
too quickly. It looks very much like defeat for Khomeyni and his
mullahs, as well. You cannot change the temperament of a peopxe in 20
years, any more than you can transport them back a century in the space
oi a few months. Khomeyni and his supporters managed to ~opple a frightened
monarch unsure of himself, but they have shown themselves to be incapable
of governing. There you have the roots of the tragedy Iran is going
through today, and which may well mean its final end. Wherever I went T
found disenchantment, and fear of what the future may bring. Not much is
left of thP heady exaltation of those days in January. Everywhere I:^+md
confusion and disarray. Nobody knows who is in charge, or who is to obey.
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Tehrsn was always an ugly city, n soulless p].ace, but I had not expected to
�ind it so gloomy, with ita frozen cranes poised over buildings th~t will
never be finiahed, with excavationa that wi11 never be ~111ed in, ite
Cheatere charred by arson, ite shaps gutted because they belonged to Jewe
who sold alcohol or gaudy Crinketis. The hotels are deaerted: They aerve
nothing but Coc~-Cola and wretched food, and even eo peop7.e speak in under-
tonea, as if the Shah's secret police, the SAVAK, were still lurking Chere.
to listen.
I took a taxi up Che Avenue Shah Rezah, now known as the Avenue Mosaddeq,
the equivalene of our Champa Elyaeea. IC was 1030 of a Friday evening--
rather like a Sunday evening in Paris. On either side of the etreet, troopa
o� the Guardi~ns of the kevolution were sniping at each o~her with pistols
and aubmachineguns. Other groups could be seen higher up, in combat
fatigues, ready to take a hand in the fighting. Automobiles, to escape
stray bulleta, were driving full speed ahead and crashing inCo one another. -
The air was filled with hooting horns and the sound of crumpling fenders.
Every night one can watch ~hootouts between rival gangs encroac:~ing on
somebody else:'s turf; every night, houaea are searched for enemies of the
revolution, f'or SAVAK agents, or for weapons, and when none of theae are
found, they c:arry off the carpets or the furniture as consolation prizes.
From myatericius cars, equally mysterious commandos use militia barricadea
for target practice.
They have shc~t three prostitutes on charges of operat3ng a callgirl system
for foreigne~ics. Poor girls! I wonder witere in the world they could have
found any cu;stomers! A man who imported pornographic books and films was
executed along with them. He had an ArmPnian name, Begherian, and they took
that as a pretest to call him a Zionist agent, although the charges against
him were of the flimsiest.
- One need on].y take an evening stroll through the southern quarter to
stumble upc~r~ the latter-day equivalent of the Cour des Miracles: Sodom
and Gomorrht~; the hardest drugs openly on sale: Heroin and cocaine, not ,
to mention apium. Reportedly, there are two million drug addicts in the
Province of Tehran alone. The Koran, however, proscribes only alcohol.
_ Nobody believes in the Islamic revolution any more. You see fewer and fewer
chadors. If you make a little fuss, they will serve you vodka in certain
restauranta. The Guardians of the Revolution offer you cases of whiskey
at pric.~s that are still prohibitive, which proves conclusively tha~ not
all the bot:tles were broken.
"If Kho~neyni and his ayatollahs remain in power 3ust one more year, Iran
would cease to exist. Delivered over to anarchy, with no army, no police,
no centra~ gover~ent, it would swiftly lose its outlying provinces:
. Azerbai~an a nd Kurdestan to the north, Guilan and the Turkoman steppes on ~
the Caspian, Khuzestan and its oil to the south, along with Belukestan,
s41e access to the sea for a Sovietized Afghanistan. No matter what the
reltgious zealots may think, they can't do what they did in Cambodia, and
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pack the city-dwellers oue ~.nCo the country to gu bnck ta u~ub~ust~nce
economy when we don'C even have enough to f~ed ourselves ~ir~y mur~. Much
leas do so after the people hnve tas~ed~ ~ven in ir.~ delixl.uu~, e consumer
socieCy which was not al,together repugnent to averybody, pAreicularly to
the workere who profitied by iC." The man who apoke Co ine in auch a voice
of d~.sillusionmen~ has been one o~ Mosaddeq'e closes~ asyoc~.nCes, a leader
of Che National Front. He had experienced prieon ~nd ex~.le. He was a
practicing Mus~.im, but he felt thaC religion, while At times it wight inspire
policy, certainly ought not Co make it.
An engineer who was my guide in KhuzesCan had much the sam~ sort of thing _
_ to say: "If Khomeyni and Semoll~h hang onto power for ;Just n few months,
wasCing their time applying the law of the Koran ~o a peo~le thaC has, after
all, emerged from the Middle Ages, we shall slide inCo c~tastrophe. It w.i.ll
be like 1942, when we waCched Iran carved into two sphere~ of. influence:
The north going to the Russians with ita natural ga5 �iel~i:~, and th~ south
to Che Americans with its oilfields, with puppet gover~vn~nts as their paid
agents. Iran had Ueen reunified by Shah Reza Khan, ~ather of Che present
shah, around his person and his army. His son, c~fter some hesitation,
followed in his footsteps. The ehah is gone; the army no longer exi~Cs,
and Iran is back to its ancient tribal and ethnic quaxr~ls. Ie is going to
explode, and iCs explosion will incite such covetousness azound it that a
third world war may we11 break out."
I heard much the same thing from leaders of Arab or ICurdish minorities:
"If Khomeyni does not understand our legitimate aspiraCion~ to autonomy, we
sha11 seize our independence by force. If he remains obsCinate, he wi11
lose Iran, and we shall lose everything."
The rial, Iran's currency, is sinking on every market. tt has lost half its
value. Workers and government officials are still being pald for doing
nothing, and even given raises. The merchants in the bazaars know that this
~oke cannot last long, and that i~ may well be they who are stuck with the
bi11. And yet they were the stoutest supporters of the "revolution." The
middle class is scared, the technocrats are weeping over the goad old
days, and labor is restive. Nobody even knows who holds powe�r. Officially,
it is the Bazargan government, now sitting in Tehran. But that gover~unent
is purely a pro forma outfit. Bazargan, an honest and learned man, repreaents
~ nothing buC himself and a political class with no grass rQOts. He exists
- only because the old man in Qom tolerates him. He goes along with Khomeyni's _
every wh3m. He resigns every morning, and withdraws his resignation every
evening.
It is the Imam Khomeyni wh~, in the shadows of the holy mosque at Qom,
makes all the decisions, who rules on everyChing, advised by a~ecret
committee consisting of a ma~ority of ayatollahs and doctors of the law whose
average age is around 75, all of them extremists living in another era. The
imam gets bogged down in niggling detail, like deciding what sort of clothing -
women must wear when they go swimming in~the Caspian Sea, but pays no
attention to the one essential: A country that is falling to pieces in his
bony fingers.
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Leaderlesa Army
- Of a11 the ayatollaha he was the least open-minded, the least educated~ He
was far behind men l~.ke Talegani, Milani, or Shar'iarm~dari except for the
aize of his following.
He learned noChing, came Co understand nothing, in the yeara of his exile.
A.11 he wanted was to get even with Che Iranian monarchy, which he called a
usurpation that had lasted 2,500 years. He was; though, the most stubborn,
the most determined, the moat intractable of them a11, and he was the one
people followed. The third government ia in the streets, and obeys neither
Bazargan nor Khomeyni. Most of iC ia lslamic, but there are parts of it that
are Marxiat fiefs. Marxist, be it noted, ia a term that includes both the
old-line Tudeh communiat, who are discreet, and the le�tists, who are by no
means so. They would like to go evsn deeper into ferment and sett~jing grudges,
really to mgke this revolution that has thus far only been roughly sketched
out.
CondiCions were ripe for a successful military coup that would restore
order to this rabble and keep Che lefCists and the Islamists from coming to
blowa. There was no longer any real shooting war and, even while there
was one, in the distant provinces, it had lost its leaders. ~en so, I
searched, and i found nothing but stores of abandoned weapone and material.
Lined up close to the azure domes of Esfahan, in carefully aerried ranks,
each one pinned onto its pad like monatrous bugs in an entomology collection,
dead as if they had been pickled in formaldehyde, doomed never again to .
take to the air, I found hundreds of the moat modern helicoptera in the world,
truly fabulous machines. They were the shah's pride and ~oy, and he had
paid billions of dollars for them. There ie no other unit in the world
to be compared with this one, except the U.S. lst Cavalry Division, which
Congress found too expensive. The shah, though, thought that nothing was
too good for his "Sky Cavalry Brigade." All sizes of aircraft, from the
shark-sleek Cobras with their rapid-fire guns to those fighting machines
known as AHIGs, with their remote-controlled missiles, which cost so much
that the shah had to pay the U.S. designers out of his own pocket. Huge,
fat-bellied carriers, to transport 155-mm howitzers, heavy tanks, and an
intervention section of 30 men with weapons and equipment several hur.dred
kilometers from their bases.
This helicopter brigade was not merely a toy for its master to play with: It
was the tool of his policy of grandeur, the supreme weapon of the guardian of
the gulf and all its wealth. The copter-borne commandos of the brigade
controlled the straits of Hormuz and its conveyor-belt for supertankers on
the tiny island of Abu Mussa. They had intervened victoriously against the
communist rebels in the Dhofar. Iraq, with its broad, open plains, dared
not risk its obsolete tanks against such monaters. The Iraqi bowed, and
the shah had helped them to put down the very Kurdish rebellion he had ~
himself fomented. Kuwait, the Emirates, and even Saudi Arabia had to put
up with the moods and ambitions of the man who claimed to be the heir of
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~
- Cyrus and Darius, Che k~.ng of kiiigs, whose sword ru:~t,+ tiow 1.r~ the sand~ o~ ~
Esfahan.
For the pnse 6 months, ever eince ~he U.S. technicians wl~o ~.~sed to maintain
them left Irgn, r,ot one helic;opCer ~a~ Caken to the air, n~t ona blade hse
turned. The pitilese winde, rhe eand, and the schorch�ing eun have eaten i
away at theae magnificent mgchines. There sre now merely empty carcas~es,
~ust capable of crsaking along in the last parade o� a phantom army.
I~o More Fuel, No More Radar ,
Some 30 U. S. experts reportedly came secretly ~ back to l;s~at~an, ~~nd found
nothing to reporC but disasCer. No more than 2 percent ot the equipwent was
worth salvaging.
I asked around:
"Where are rhe pilots? The mechanics? There used to he thousand~ c~f them, ~
competent men, trained at great expenae in the United Sl�aCes, and well paid?"
People shrugged:
"Ratsl" They're gone. Some of them went home, others go~ j.nto trouble and
are in prison. Still others were kicked out of the arn~y. The mechanics have
found 3obs that 1et them hide in the garages. 'rhe sold:[ers' and non-coms'
commitrees can't get such machines as these to oDeraCe w~~tyour their
officers. Some of them tried, and they fell flat on their Eaces. No more
spare parts, no more fuel, the radar systems and the con~ral towers don't
work any more. Since the shah left, nobody has touched a. ~t~ing. There was
no sabotage, no destruction: Everybody simply walked off and le�t. You can
see how neat everything is, but it's not good for anythitig but scra~.
When it came to the outskirts of Mahabad, ca~ital of :trani~in Ktirdistan,
there was a kind of market set up at the foot of a hi11. Si.nce a lot of
gunfire seemed to came from there, I thought there was a fight going on,
and I went closer to see. All they were doing was sell:ln~; weapons. Every
would-be purchaser, before making his cho3ce, would try a weapon by shootii~
at a row of tin cans that had been set up as Cargeta against the nearby cliff.
There were Kurds in huge, baggy breeches with festoons of carCridge belts
over their shoulders, fierce moustaches, and silk scarves wound round their
heads, sitting on packing cases and offering fellow-Kurds their choice of
complete assortments of weapons and ammunition. There were pistols, rifles,
and automatic rifles, mainly U.S.-made and acquired from the shah's army.
And there were some brand-new Kalashnikhovs 3ust out of their cases, still
thick with grease, that had arrived that very day. And the prices would
stop any competition cold in its tracks: For a few thousand riai, a few
hundred francs, you could turn yourself into a walking arsenal, with
revolvers, assault rifles with five clips, and your choice of grenades.
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"If you're shopping, we'va got assault tanks, too," offered Ghassen Lou, the
leader of the Kurdiah Democra~ic Movement, in impeccable ~rench. Sentenced
to death by the ahah, he managed to get away, and surfaced later as a professor ;
at Vincennes Univeraity.
"Genuine ChiefCaina~ we have," he went on. "Excellent Britiah-made atuff.
We also have a few cannon, aome heavy mortars, eome machinegune and Cons
of ammunition. You can find anything in the camp on the other aide of
Mahabad, where there used to be ~n armored brigade. The officers left first,
then the troopa, and they lefC ua a11 this stuff. We know what to do with
~t.
, Kurdistan is, for all practica3. purposea, 3ndependenC. People drink wine ,
her e. Nowhere will you see a picture of Khomeyni, and the only bearded
ayatollah I saw, taped to a shop-window, was Karl Marx. ,
Kurdestxn and a few other outlying provinces, taking advanCage of the power
vacuum, are demanding autonomy, u:rging that Iran be made a federal republic.
"We Kurds," Qasemlu went on to explain, "have an unfortunate habit of asking
for too much and geCting nothing. This time, we are determined to be
reasonable, and ask only a little bit so as to get a whole lot," bursting
into laughter as he concluded. "We are demanding sutonomy, whereas we are
already independent."
There is nothing left of the Iranian army except for a few unita strung out
in Reza'iyeh, Piranshahr and Shapur, along the Turko-Iran3an border. It
still has some tanks that can move and some he~icopters flying. But the
off icers, suspected of having served the shah and still being secretly
loyal to him, are no longer obeyed by the troops, who have formed committees.
Some leaders still manage to maiYitain a semblance of authority. They owe
what succeas they have only to their personal prestige, or to having given .
themselves over totally to the demagoguery in etyle at the moment.
There are some units still capable of mounting active intervention for
maybe 24 hours. Against guerrilla fighters as well trained and well armed
as the Kurds a.re today, and as the Khuzestani Arabs will be tomorrow, if
the war were to ~ast any longer than that, they would simply melt away.
The army is paying for the shah's military policy. Fearful of military
coups, he chose military leaders who were mere courtiers, and have suddenly
disappeared from the scene.
Amateurs Slaughtering Each Other
There are two picturesque charactprs involved in this, more gang leaders than
generals, not at all above dealing with their troops as if they were mer-
cenaYies: In the south, there is Vice Admiral Madani, who believes he can
count on the Gulf Fleet and the Navy commandos--between 5,000 and 6,OOO:mEn.
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~o~: o~rxcraL us~; om,x ;
Tn Tehran Chere iy General Rahl.mi, who he~da L�h~ ml.1.1G~~.ry ~~u:LJ.r.e au~i canuuanda
6,000 to 7,000 nien, many ut them veterau~ of sliuclr-tru~>~~ ~~:~l,t.N. Hec~u~e
he had clashed with the soldier~' commiCCee.i, he war~ r~~~r+.l ~~~cl by Yr:ime
Minister Bnzargan, who quickly perceived him as a~or_~nCiraL r.ival. liowever,
Im~n Khomeyni resCored him to hie command on lea~x~ing ot th~~ matter and
beginning to d3scover Che importance of having an army r_h~~t: obeys its
le~dere. Neither Madani nor Rahimi, though, witti the c:oup:L~ of handfuly of -
men who wi11 fol.low thetn, ttnd over-dependenC on the m~.:l.la1~~3, c~n. hop~ to
seize power, although there are those who s~y both oE t.h~an~ ar~ l�.hinking
about it.
The same applies to the gendarmes (naCional const~bu:l~lry; ac~> tr~ the r~xmy:
They are nowhere ta be seen. Acting in their plsce t~r~: ~_or~ami.ttee~ which,
according to the region in which they operate, are macic~. ~~k~ c~F Muslims,
leftists, or autonomists. The gendarmerie's mission wF~~, t:o puC down
s~eparatist movemenCs and keep the tribes in ht~nd. 7L- ~.s c{tzJ.te incapab7.e of
performing that mission and is trying, by lettin~ peap.~e l~or~,et nboul- iC~
to wangle a pardon for hn,ving too zealously and bruLal.ly ~c:i.tormed the taeka
assigned it.
- The police! The way to spot a policeman is to watch 1-~~.~n run away when an
accident occurs. Iran, in Chis month of July, is a shJ.p ~~drlf t. At the
helm is a stubborn old man, squinring at the Koran to tlnd t?is course,
ignoring such inventions of the devil as maps, charts, or c:om~~asse:~. His
crew: Army, police, gendarmerie, civil servants, have van:Lshed, their
places taken by amateurs from the militia, by committees wlio ci~ whatever they
feel like doing, and who sometimes kill one anoCher over ~;c~r.cli.ci personaJ.
interesCs. The terrified passengers huddle in their cab~_ns, as the cont:rary
winds drive the ship onto the reefs. The scavenging w.reckf.rs have lit great
bonfires on the beach, waiting for the ship to break apart so that they can
divide up Che plunder.
_ Only a miracle can save her. Only a competent, able man, ~ man unrained with
the stink of o:Ll like the shah, who is not God's fool 13ke lmaxn IChomyni,
could take the helm, get the crew back to duty statior~:~, and pack the militia
and the committees down into the hold. But where is th1.s ~nari to be found?
Where will he come from? Shahpur Bakhtiar could ha~re done it. But,
because he underestimated Islam and because he tried to ~pply the laws of
the constitution, because he was too Western, he was sent back ro his tribe.
Sha11 we see him again, riding at the head of a troop of Iiakhtiar horsemen?
Reza Khan managed to take over Iran with one brigade c~f Cossacks. Thoee
days, though, are gone forever.
After long hesitation, the Russiatis have at last decided tu intervene, playing
both sides very cleverly against each oCher, the separatist movements they
encourage and arm, using various intermediaries ~uch as t3~~: Palestinians
in the South; and the army, which they are helping to fa17, apart through the
soldiers' and non-coms' co~ittees. And all the while r.h~y reassure the
officers, praising their nationalist sentiments, their love of order and
discipline. Khomeyni has finally extended amnesty to al.l who served the
shah.
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The Tudeh communisCa, merely a conveyor-belt from the Kremlln, offer
infiniCely mnre ro that army: ltehabilitation, a chance to ~ake over the
government, to ~ettle Cheir grudgeg againet the prieate and the le�tis~s,
on condition, of course--the Ruesiane will see to Chat--Chati they faithfully '
play Moacow'e game. Just like A�ghanistan, the Americans think. This
time, though, the Americans have made up their minda not to let the Rusaiana
havs it all their own wuy, and, i� the army slipe away from them, they
will concentrate fu11 pressure on the priesta, and never mind how many
sins the mullahs have charged them wiCh. Events will force thzm to ~oin
ay a111ea. The Americans are caming back on litCle cat feet; they are
being discreet; they will awallow any insults, but Chen, what would one not
do for a f ew mi111on barrels of oil? '
The moeques have been transformed into weapons depots by the Islamic
militia. CommunisCs and leftiaCs have turned the universities into bristling
arsenals. In Tehran alone, 300,000 guns of all calibers are lying there, ,
waiting to be used.
A11 is in readiness for civil war.
COPYRIGHT 1979 par Cogedipresse S.A.
6182
CSO: 4900
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~,Z~YA
L~BOR MIGRATTON SUSTAINS DUALISTIC DEVE~,OPMCNT '
London THE MA~GHREB R~VIE4d in English May-Jwn 79 pp 95-~02
~Art3cl.e by J.S. Birks and C. A. Sinclai~
~e~, - . . . .
_ . . -
Intrucluction
The popular tendency to regard thc Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya as unique is not justificd; examination of
tl~e Libyan economy shows it to be similar to the otl~cr
Arab capital rich oil exporting states, and as having
experienced an almost identical pattern of devel~,pment
to that of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In commor~
witli othcr major oil exportcrs, Libya has been througl~
a transformation of economy and society (First, 1974).
The pace of change can be illustrated by the increasc
in estimated per capita income, ln the early 1950s,
when Libya was judged by the World Bank to'be one
of the poorest nations in the world, per capila income
~vas estimated at $40. A significant contribution was
made at that time to Libya's foreign exchange earnings
by exports of esparto grass and exports of scrap metal
- collected World War II wrecks - so low were other
foreign exchan~e earning capacities. By 1977 per capi~a
income had exceeded $6,000, placing Libya as fourth
wealthiest of the Arab oil exporters in per capita ternis
(World Bank, 1978).
This profound change in Libya's circumstances has
posed for Libyan planners almost identical problems to
those faced in other oil expo~ting states of the Arab
world (Mallakh, 1979). Of especial importance is tlie
resolving of tensions within society, and contradictory
aims in social and economic policy.
The trnnsformecl economy
Oil was 6rst shipned from Libya in 1961. By 1968,
Libyan exports of oil had risen to 7 per cent of the
World's total, a levcl of production which it had takcn
Iran 40 years to reach.
Throughout the 1960s, Libya benefitcd from the
gcographical proximity to Europe and the high quality
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df h~e nil, Aithough s~ics di thi~ uil w~n: n~~t, in muny
. rc~pcCtq, nn gond terms fdr tho Libyun~, pn~tu~~ti~+n
inCreased rupidly; betwrcn 1963 and 1~)6~, kr rapj~~r
gr~ss domrstic product rose from 55~13 t~ ~~057, un
averugu unnual inCregso df over SS pcr �nt (UNI[~,
1976), t"olinwl?ig tho cnup ot Septemb~r, 1~1d9, an~ th~
o~tablltihment of tho Rovc~lutiunury Canu�un~l C~un~il
(nnw replu~rd by tht ' Oenar~l Pc~pl~ ~ C~m~r~~y')
under Mu'qmm~r O~dali, Libya fentur~~f n~ I~;idar rf
} tho Arab oil produccr~ in discuuiuny uvcr tha priro uf
nil, Thc suc:ccss nf thcsc negotintinns i~ wcll kn~a~n,
Uc.rpita oerusinnut r~sh flow probi~^m3 ~~??u~in ~ligl~t
- trimmings in the sai~ price of Libynn ail t~ ~nrr~:~s~
saleg, thc post�ty70 poliCy nf reducing oil lifting~ nnd ~
exports contemp~ranenusly with n~~;uliating nn
inarensed take pcr barrel has bcen a m;irk~~d su~r~u
overall, It berame less effective only in 1976 nnJ 1977
with the world ' oil glut', and incrcas~~1 ~~~mpctiti~m
Ernm th~ North Sea sourccs.
Today, Libya is well plneed to negutiatc Eurtl~rr
price incre~ses, despit~ the competitive m:?rk~t in whi~h
her gr~dc of nil sells. The DovernmenC~ in~~+mr, ~vith
but smnll decline.v, has been nble tn fin7nCC d~~mc.ti~
growth on as a rapid and sustaincd n scatc ns tha
~duntry Could rensonably have maintain~~L 1nJecd, nut�
put of oil, according to the Sccrct~riat tor Oil (Liby~n
Nutinn~il Oil Co� 1978) ' will rcmain b~law J,S ntillian
bnrrels per day for cnnsnrvutiun rc~~~~~nx'. Tl~i~ is
im~~c~rlaint tu t.ibyn, with rclntivcly mu~lcvt r~s~rv~~,
" a~limulc~l ut sumc 2p ycurw nr so nt cur~rnt r;~trr ut
cxtructi~m,
The trunsF~~rmation of thc cconomy ir w~ll dcmnn�
stratcd by Tublc 1, which shnws the acrrlrr:tting gn~~~~tl~
' of the 1970s, in the Threc Year Dcvclupmcnt Plan,
which ended in 1975, seve~l optimistic gniw~li t~rgcts
TABLE 1 ~
INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN OF (31tOSS DOMEST(C PRODUCT AT CURREfY'1' FACTOR COST (000 L.O.) 196d, I')7~ and 197d
Scclor 1964~ 1973 1974 �
Ch:~a~;r
197J� I 9~.1
nRricullurc 16 14.0 60.0 2.7 64.7 1.6 7.8
Atining and Qu~rrying 196 54.0 I,136.8 32.1 2,894.4 61.2 III.I
Mnnuf,~clurin~ 11 3.0 50.8 2.l 74.5 1.9 46.7
C~?n~frur~iun 22 6.0 261,2 12.0 401.6 10.) S.I.tl
I I~~c~rici~y, Gn� und Wn~~r I 10,8 O.S 12.4 0.~ 14.8
('rnmp~~~r, Cl~~rngu t~n~)
Cummunirnliun~ IS 4.0 129.J S.9 192.4 4.9 49.=
Whulr.,ilu nnd Rctail 'I'rndc 2Q 6.0 124.8 5.7 184.2 ~1.7 47.6
1'uhlir ndministrali~?n ond Olher
(invcnunrnt Scrvic~~ 26 7A ~43.8 13.9 4y4.7 12.7 ~1.1
~~ivirrr Sfi 16.0 62.N 2.9 9~.4 2.4 ~g.3
~~63 IOO.A 2.182.2 IOO.p 3.908.3 100.0 79.1
~ fi~~un~ n~un~IcJ in original ~ou~cr. -
tiOUlt~'f's: Mini~try of Planning and Scirntiflc Rctcarch.
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art~` l'\ri'i'~~i't~, clllt~ ~9.5 ~1~P r~111 ~I~t~~i~1 111 t1Uft~i11) 1~1C Iti+l1 ~illt~ ~Icr~ ~~~In~~~i~J~ iIl i~~1rUt~11A (~tl i1 1'~~rl
~n~~Ju~�ti~nt ~~�ci~ ~i~~l~iul~tian i~ t~o ~mall to provide either an TABLE3
hdequhlc �~~~rkA~rcc, ar cvcn a substanti~l domestic ~NE (31tOW7'H O~ NON�LtDYAN EMYLOYMGNI'
m;irkct f~~r n~:inuf;irlurin ~ rrnducts. t972�1975
M~~rc~?v~r, ~hc levcl caucati~mal auainment of the
I.ib~an ~~~~~~ulh~inn ix law, Lib~~a cxpericnced thc rc� Year t9~~ t9~3 ~97a ~9~5
pl~ccmcm ~~f hcr ~iaditi~,nat K~ranic sys~cm of cduca- Numbcr of Non�Libyans 81,000 118,345 f69,765 223,000
tion b~' n riil~mi7) ~I~~le of sch~~~ling under the Italians. SOURCE: Ministry of Planning and Scicntific Rcscarch, Un-
Yct cnrolmcnl c~~cn at primary lcvcl remained low: pubtished Data.
in 19t2 7 t1NIitiCO m~.si~n faund that over 90 per ~
TABLE 4
1)ICTR114UTION OF TOTAL AND NON�LIBYAN EMPLOYMENT BY SE.CTOR, 1975
Tolnl Non�Libyan Non�Llbyan
1?cooundc ANi~ll~� Employment Employment
000'~ . 000'a (All Employmcnl)
Agrieultun, l'~~n~~~t~�. Fishinp nnd Hun~init 133.1 19.7 17.6 7.9 13.2
P.~rolcum t~nd (irs 10.7 1.6 2.7 1.2 25.2 ~
I?lining and (?u:~rr~ii~t 6.9 1.0 2.8 1.3 40.6
1~1~nuf.ututing 32.9 4.9 13.8 6.2 41.9
[kclricii~. (i:~s und ~1'nlcr 13.0 1.9 3.6 1,6 27.7
C~m�in~:~i~~n 152.6 225 118.0 53.0 ~7.5
7tadc. Rr.l:wnn?t. nnd Ilalrls 48.5 T.2 7.~ 3.5 15.9
Tr~n~~~~tl. Cl~u:~~. nnd Cummunicaliartm 53.4 7.9 6.2 2.8 11.6
Fin:~n.c. 1mur:~n.ti� nnd Rrid f~trtc 7.T 1.1 1.6 0.7 ?A.8
Public .~ldminisir:uian 71.1 10.3 5.2 2,3 7.3
[dura~i~mal ~rr~�ins SB.O 8.6 14J 6,3 ?A.3
Hrnlth C.t~�i~ti~ 30.5 4.5 9.8 4.7 32.1
nthcr 38.7 8.6 19.6 8.8 33.4
T~~lal 677.1 100.0 2227 100.0 32.9
SOUltCE: Afini.~n� af 1 ~h~n~r, 1~tini.~~y af Planning nnd Scientific Research, Demography and Manpowu Section, Mime~grophed
Rrp.~tt in Arahic, n..1.
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. .r, V~IYI~
~
rnn~.~ s
, I 411'I ttl ~11i~'f' 11Y Ut't'UI'A t tUNAL til'A't'IIS, I.IIlYAN5 ANU N(~1~~1.IU1'AN5, 1h7S
Lib~w~~ uiid Nnn�i,iby~uiu N~?u~l.ib~uu~ Oniy Nun�l.lbyun
C;n~pinyuicnf
~r~~i~~i r~~~ri~~~~inanl Nun�i.itiyun "/o u~ u pcrcrul~i�o
ooo~s ~?r u~~ i~~i~~i
r~�r,~t~t~,~?~~i nn~l Mtuuigurlnl tl.i 4,1 iG.l 7,2 58,1
'T'rrltulriiutr nn~l Su~xrvianrs SN,1 N,6 20,4 9,1 33,1
('I~~i irni \Vurli~r~ 37,5 5,5 6,2 2,7 16,5
Sl,illr~l ~inil \rmi�~t,illcd 1VurAcre 146,6 51,2 95,2 42,7 27,5
\~n.{,ill~~~l ~V~n~,iia 2U7,2 ;~t),6 NS,1 ;i8.3 41,1
G77,1 1U0,0 223.0 tUU,O 32.9
~Ot11ti'li~ Mini~tr) ot 1'Innning ond Scicnlifln R~senreh,
ln 1971, Ili~ u~~rrsill sh,~rc of the wurkforcc Comprised frnm which Libya draws hcr expulri~+tcs. '1'hc jii~ulysis
by thc I1N,U(~) rx~~atriulcs was 28 pcr ccnt, By 1975, nnw turns to thc pa~tcrn of n~lion~litics Ihat arc rcprc�
Ihi~ pr~~~~c,r~i~~n had incrc~scd to 33 pcr ccnt, Aspccts senlcd in Libya's cx~atri~te romm~u~ity,
c~f Ihc y~iali~;i~ivc ~lc~~c~idcncc upnn non�ncitic~nal lnbdur
nf ~hc Lib~~;in c~unnmv nre sh~wn for 1975 in Ti~bl~ 4. Thc orfgins nf expntri,itc l~~bour in Libya
'T'hr highc~l ~h;irc nf ~hc lab~ur m.?rkct absorbed by Tttblc 7 shows that ovcr onc half (alm~st 57 pcr rcnt)
~x~~alria~~s i~ in ~~~n~tructinn, whcrc nvcr thrce workers of non�Liby~n ti~orkers dcrivcd from ~gy~~t in 1975.
nut af fnur ~vcrc n�n�n,itiona) in 1975. 'fhc labour in Less thxn one quarter dcrivcd fram Tunisia, thc iicxt
Ihc manuf~irlurin~ s~~clur, sa significant to 1.ibya's futurc mcst important exportcr ot labour to Libya (FincIl3iY,
~ilan~~in~, ~~~;i~ almusl onc hulP cx~~atriate in 1975, Public 1978), Of the rcmaining lnbc~ur sup~alicr~ c~nly Syri~
a~lntini~lrali~m in ~+~hich pcists ;~re specifically ra ~upplied morc than 10,000 (scnding 4,8 pcr ccnl ~~f Ihc
~crvcd f~~r I.ihran nati~mnls hs~s thc lowcst dcpend� tntnl expatrintc l~bour fnrcc). Tagcthcr, Ihc Arab w~rld,
ci~cc ur~m c~~rilri;~lcs, ~ccording to thcsc figures, uccnunts fur RS,S pcr ccnt
lm~~~?rlunl I~~ Ihis nnalysis erc thc numbcrs in agri- labnur importcd by Lib,ya. Pakistan sunplics ovcr 4,500
c~il~urc. nnly 13 ~~cr ~enl of wcirkers in agriculture are workers, and Yugos~avia over 7,500.
n~m�nali~~nal, 1~~~~~~c~~rr, it is thesc workers who represent TABI.E 6
mnst ~t Il~c labc~iir in modern scclor bgricultural gXpECT'ED SHOR'1'~ALLS 1N LAt10UR SUhPL1~S AT
~~r~?ducti~~n, '1'he 13:~,(1O0 Libyans in egriculture are VAR)OUS 5KtLL t.EVELS 1976�1980
larFcl~~ in Ir;idilirna) acclor farming, with 1ow levcls of Occuplionul Croup bcmund 5upply 5liertfnll
~tt~,ducli~in, l~~w cash rcturn, low levcls of investment
~nd fcw .i~;ns ~f m~~dcrnisation, 1f these traditional profcssional and hianagcrial
scctur ~~~rrk~~r~ ~irc cxcluded, thcn Libya's reliance upon Pcrsonnel 1R,170 9,360 BAto
mierant ~~~,rl,~rs appcars grcater: 38 per cent of the Tcchnicians ao,69o 29,900 10,790
m~dem srct~~r l;~h~ur force was nnn-national in 1975. Clericat Workers t5,e8o 15,090 790
Othcr f;irels ~f Libya's depcndcnce upon expatriate SkWorken Scmi-Skilled 157,145 84,350 72,793
~~~~rkcr. arc drm~,n.t~atcd in Table 5. Ovcr 58 per cent Unskilled Workcrs 71,615 4,300 67,315
of profc.�i~~nal and managerial manpowcr is non�
nali~mal, urc ~vcr onc third of tcchnicians and super- Toial 303,600 143,000 ~60,000
~~isors. Onlv in Ih~ cnse of clcrical workcrs does the -
exr:?tri;~~e rlrment i;ill below once quarter. Dependence 50URCE: Economic nnd Social Trnnsfotmation Plan.
u~~~m n~,n.n;ili~,n;i1 17b~ur increascd in all occupational '
rnle~~~rir~ I~~~I~~~crn 197~ and 1975. Since 1975, this trend Examinatinn of the ~riqins of Arab wc,rkers by
h~c c~~nlinnccl ~~ct mrrc ~Iccply. nationality makcs chan~zinq pattcrns apparcnt. Tahlc 8
Tahlc G.h~,~~�a rrcdiclcd sh~rtfalls in labour, of shows thc chanainq cc~niributi~n ~f vari~~us Ar:?b ~i~~ct
~~,~ri~wc .I,ill lrvrls. ~~�hich ~re expected to accrue by to the Libyan labc~ur force fe~r the period 1972-197G.
19Rf1. Thr�r .h~~r~:i~c. nrc widaran~ing and substantial; The numbcr of E~vptian wnrkcrs has hccn ri~inF
~nl~ h~� im~~~~r~ii~~ c~tra lab~ur can Libya's dcvclopmcnt propnrtionally, as wcll as in abs~lutc tcrms, incrcasin~
rl:in~ hr mrl, l~ i. cxrcclcd Ihat by 1980, n~n�national from less than 50 pcr ccnt in 1972 to c~vcr tw~ Ihirds
~~ill h. run~ribu~in~ s~~me 41.3 per cent of tcilal employ- of Ihe intal numher of Arnb exnatriate wc~rkers in Lihya
mcnt. Th. srulc ~~f im~uirts can bc illustratcd by thc in 1976. As a result of Ihis incrcased Egyptian xharc,
n~~cd t~~r ~~mu 4.1;~0 tcachcrs, togclhcr with 800 medical most other Arab nations have contributed a rr~i~rc~� ~
d~ki~~n. sively declininR proportion. The exceptions to Ihi~
lm~~rt. ~~f l;ih~~ur ~~n this scalc and of this quali6ca- appear to be thc Siidanese, whc+ only started arriving
ti~~n rc~rr�rnl n ~ii:ij~~c call on the suppliers of labour in significant numbcrs in 1976, and the Moroca~n~, who
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, ~oR oF~iczn~. us~ ornY
'~'~It1,1; 7 nunth~r ~~f I,eh?u~~~.~c f~~ll b~ ;ilm~~~l Stl ~~~r ~rnl I~~~I~~r~~n
'~1 ~II~I Itti t11~ I\I'A'IItIAIL 1Vt~ItKI~.ItS IN I.IIfY~ IIY 1y7~ und 1~~7f,, ~trr~~utt;il~l~' h~~~'siu~~ uf ih~ ~~~lur~1 ~?f
~;111f1N;~1.111' IN UL'( I.MIIL'It 1~I7S nli~ny l.c:b~inc~~: lu Ihcir h~+nt~ r~~unlry f~~Uu~~~in~; Ili~
~,~iiuu~~llly Numh~r I'cr rcnl Cu~ittg n~ CUn~.llliun~ II~CrC,
~'E)'p~ 14g,07U 56,7
37,674 14,4 Glsindestisin lubnur ~i~i~;ruliun fu Lil~yu
tivrin ~Zd~ng 4~g llloodi migrnlinn dc~cs nnt nlicct nu?nbcrti uf ull
1~~rd~~n ~~g~~9 2~6 naliun~lilics und ~kili lcvclti who migr~le inlc~ Lih ~si f~~r
p,,~,,~i~i,~ G,570 2.s cm lc~ mcnt, but it swclis tllc n~imbrrs nf unskil~cd in
L~~h,ni~m 5,563 2,1 t~ Y
- ti,,,l,,,, 4,2SO 1,6 11~c c~~untry bcynnd thc dim~ilsions sug b~~~ted by ~I~u
~,~,,,,,~ru t,yso s c~iTiciul Ilgurc~ t1unlcd hc:rr. ln ~arlicular, ~lic ~lan~ic~~ina
~22~,5~4) (dS.3) n~nvrmants oE ~'unisiun, ~gyptiNn and Sudnncxo
~+�~~~i,,,, 4,Sat 1,7 lnbdurer5 is ~i ~ni(icant,
1'u~t~~tluvir, 7,G41 2,9 b
U.F. 3,633 t,4 In thc CH5C of Tunisians, fc~r CXilt11plc, tils~tix~i~r
~tu~~wniu 2,2I4 su~;cst thut numbcrs cnlcring Libyd dnublcd csich yuir
l?.~.~. 2~13 hctwccn 1970 nnd 1973, whcn 11,519 migrunl~ cmigr;ilcd
2~~~~ undcr Cnntri~Ct (I~indl~y, 1y78), O,C.D.i:, stnli~tirti
iiiiyuria 2~073 � su ctit u total ot 45,000 Tunixians in Lib a b 1973,
'1'ur~~y 1,923 S~' Y Y
t'r;~ncc 1,8g~t a very ditTcrcnt figurc frum 34,000 in 197G, shown in
~ c~rn,nny t,376 Table 8, Genrge estime~cd 80,000 Tunisians in Libyn
(;~.cce ~~ogs b the end nf 1974 (C'indla , 1978; Genr e, 1976
(2S4 214) ~ y~yith Cstimatcs ns vttricd as thcsc, i g is dift'icult to
(1~hcr ~,054
gssess thc lcvcl nf illcgul migration. liowcver, in 1971,
~r�i~~ 261,266 1~.~ for 2,984 Tunisian migrants wl~o entcrcd Libyn lcgnlly,
some 40,665 werc prcvcnted irom crossing thc bnrdcr
tiOUkC.G: r~~ni~ir~ ~~t t.~~bour, lmmigration Dcpartment, becuuse they t~nd no authorisation, 'I'h~t numbcrs living
, t,~c~~~inri7t uf U,r niarior, illegnlly in Libya nrc high is beyond dispute (rindluy,
wcrc nlsa nal pr~.cnt in largc cnc~ugh numbcrs prior to 1978), in 1976 LibYa cxpcllcd 13,700 Tunisi,~ns who
197G tu fc;~hirc in tlte '1':~ble. Betwccn 1972 and 1976, were clandestinc migr~nts, Thcrc urc nrobably s~haut
tlic numhcr ~~f '1'unisians working in Libya almost 40,000 tn 45.,000 Tunisians in Libya. Almnst s~ll nf ~hcsc
~I~~uMrd. ~Vhil~~ ~~arlly n rcltcctinn ~imply of employ nre workers. Very few are w~~mcn nnd clcrcndcnts,
mrnt ~Irmand in l.ihyn, ~ho rcturn of Tunisinn workcrs Eslimates of thc numbcro af F.gyptians wnrking in
tnan 4~uru~~c, a~hcrc thc dcmand for cxpatriate labour Libya are xs hard to asxcss and make. Thcrc arc morc
in (~rcinrc ix ;:~llin~, is also significnnt in raising this than the 153,000 cconomically activc otTicially rccordcd
numbcr (I"indl:ry, 1y78). ('1'able 8). The prescnt authors estimate that, at Ihe
TA~[.E 8
NU1~1llEFtS nF NON�LI~YAN ARADS 1N TNE WUttK~ORCE, 1972�1976
Decrcase or
1972 1976 , lncrcase o[
~,i~i�~~.~~i~~. Each Nationallty
Number Number Number %
rg~ ~~;;,~s 44,764 ~ 49.3 153,284 66.8 -F 108,520 242.4 ~
Tumsc?ns 17,252 19.0 34,650 15.1 -h 17,398 100.1
S~~rians 4,812 S.3 13,029 5.7 + 8,217 170.8
)ur~l~ni~ns 4,358 4.8 7,253 3.2 -h 2,895 66.4
Pale~linians 3,266 5.8 6,913 ' 3.0 + 1,647 31.3
~.~~~~~~�i, 11,441 12.6 5,771 2.S - 5,670 - 49.6
tiudanc.r n.a. n.a. 5,004 2.2 5,004
~1~~~~KCan n.a. n.a. 2,466 1.1 2,466
pthrrs 2,~)06 3.2 1,015 0.4 - 1,891
'1'~,tnls .90,799 100.0 229,385 100.0 138,586 ~F 152.6
ti(ll~lt('1': Alini.~iy �f Lahaur infiumnlinn.
'11~~ numt~. r uf S~~ri;~ns working in Libya ncarly end of 1975, thcrc wcrc almost 230,000 ccunomirally
tr;~~~~Ird; ~wmlxn a~ Syrian cxpatriate w~rkers nctive Egyptians living in Libya (Birks and Sinclair,
cl.~al~rrc ~ha~�. nal ri�~n rapidly this teflects a 1979). Numbers of Sudanese in Libya have bccn fluxing
~~~ial rclati~~n.hi~~ building up between Syria and rapidly. 7"oday_ thcrc are over 8,000 ecunomically active
Lib~~h, Ilu l:ul~~r Ikz~~min~ a ma~or donor uf a~d and Sudanese in L~bya, and in 1975 there were more than
milii:~n� a~ui~m~cnl tu thc Syrian Arab Republic. The the 5,000 recorded officially.
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I~ihl~' 'i ~�I~,,~~~ Ihr r~,ti~~'l~~~l I~~lals nl ~`r~~u~viti~'~~Ily li~n ti;iid ' l,lbyu li,~~ ~,~.~,ut~'i~'~ (ur '?~l?,UOQ f~~r~i~:n
;i.�li~c .~~i,il~ r~~~,iliiulr~ iit I.ib~~i~, Il it~;ikrs tli~ i~nn� ~~nrkrr~' ;ii~d Ilicil I.il~~~a '~+~~ul~l like Ilic~c~ fillcil h~
n,iti~~n.~l ~~,nliil,uli~~i~ In Ili~ ~~�~~rkf~ir~~ l~u~k rcilhcr 'I'urks' (~1ini~,tr~ ul I'I,~uuine. 1'I7(~), I';i~t~~in I~ui~~~,,�;~ii
i~i~~,i~ri ~li,in Ili~~ I.il~~nit li~;urr~ ai~~I~nc~~vl~J~c.'I'tihl~ J;ilsc~ I~ib~~ur i~ ~iltiii ~~;i~uriii;; iiirrra~in~ly.
.liu~~~ ~I~c ~+~~~~r,ill ~i~r~ uf ~hc i~~~ii�I.ih~an cummui~ilics
~~liirli air li~~iiil; iii I.il~~~~i, rul~~ul~ilal hy sipplyiiib crudc '1'I~e in~plicaili~~ns u1 Ihr~c ~ni~?uri~ ul' I~il~uur
~t;ll'lll'1~~;111~~I1 I'~IIC~ ~Ullllt~ 111 l'\~)1111'Ii1lC l'U111I11Ut11lll`S `r~1CfC Cillt ~)l`. Itt~ ~~c~ll~~l 1~1111 I~1C II11~h1P1y tl~~ ~i111~1111'
~I~~~~I?rrr, ~~I~ri~~ ~I~,riin~ri~lnli~~n is ~upcricir. 'I'hi~ is not, huvc cnhcuirrcl ~I~c in~li~~rn~iuti Lihuur f~~rcc cuii,idrr~bly
li�~~~~rr, ;i ~li;ii~:lil~~~r~~~;irtl ~~r~,~cys; ~rutl~ ~~nrlirip;itic~n in tcrnt~ of butli ~iunihc:rs ;iiicl ~kills, 'I'his hris f~irili~.it~:t1
rn~~~ uf r~~,;i~ri;il~ rumii~unilic~ ch~uib~ ~~vcr limc, ~utd u tic~ilc .ind ~~acr. ~~f ~Ic~rlnpiucnt ~~I~ich ~vuul~l u~lirr~~~i~c
~~;iry ~~i~lrly, li~ I ih~~?i, ~~~,lilir~~l r�ii~li~uiiils ;ind Il~c h;ivc; bcci~ yuitc iii~~,u~,~,iblc,
~,,illrrn r:ui~~nni~ ~~errl~~~,m~~i~l suEt~;csl Ili;~f rcluli~~cl)~ A~,?imt Ihis riiu~~ hc ,cl a~crics cif in~lir~~ct r~,�~~
fr~r ~I~~~~~~n~lrul~ ~~rrrnit~ruty Ihc rr~,iic~iiii~~~lly ~+cti~~c (riu~~l~~, 1')7(,). C)f ~~,iiii~~ul,ir int~:ir~,t in II~~~ t ihp;in r~~tic
r~~~,ilii;i~r~. A rru~l~ ~ritli~'i~~aliun r~itc ~~C 70 ~~cr ~:enl is iiicrc~ncd iiii~~~,i~~ ~,f r~,nruiiicr Ziiotlti hc~:,iusc ti(
I~;is ~lirrrf~,ic hrri~ u~r~l t~, c~,n~~~ulc thc Ic~tnl ~~o~~uln� c.~~~siU~ic~lc~' ~iur.lic~sr ~,f ~t~~ucls t~, I,ikc lu~inc ~vilh ~I~em.
ti~~ii~ �f Ilir ~~;iriuu~ Ar;ib ~~�mi~iiinilics in '1';iblc 9, 'I'hi~ is ~ru~iicul;~rly i~u~~ ~~f, ~ur cx,iii~~~lc, Su~l,inc,c, wli~~
I'hr i~ui>>h~r ~,f ~rniic 110,UUU n~,n�n,~li~mal Arabs find it vcry clilticult t~, ~,urrh.i~c cun~un~cr ~;u~,~1s i~t
~~url,in~ ii~ I.ih~~ai r~~m~~ri~c~ pc?rt nf .+n inuiiigr;u~t Arab hc~mc. 'I'hcir ~,urrh;~~c` uf lu~,ury .incf ~:uii~uuu~r g~u~d~
c�mmuiiil~~ uf u~~ I~~ 4KO,OOb ~~cr~uns in 1y75. '1'his is u sirc b~~uncl tc, ~,ut cY~~,~ ~~rc,surc c~n thc i.ib~,~n bal,ir~cr,
murh I,~r~~r n~~i~�n;ili~,ii;il Arab cc~mmunity tlian otfi'ici,~l uf paymcnts, an~i ur,~in Iha furcign curr~ncy rescrv~s,
figur~~x .irl~ii~,~~1~~1~c, M~irc~~vrr, tiincc that timc, both W{~ilst Lib~~a 1~;~~ rn,~na~;a~d tn r~~iuain in sw~lus, Ihc,c
nur~hases riF r~~n~;iuncr Zc~ocls arc ~igni(irant bc~;iu~~
'1'Altl.~ 9 thc~ sirc hcinl; ~n,,~lr ~~I~cn invcatmcnt cx~~cnditurc, u~,c>n
which thc ~~rc~cnt ~~I