JPRS ID: 8628 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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JPRS L/8628~
21 August 1979~
Wes~ E u ro e Re ort
p p
cFOUO` 4si79~ ~
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JPRS L/8628
2~. August 1979
WEST EUROPE REPO RT
(FOUO 46/79)
CONTENTS PAG~
COUNTRY SECTION
F~iANCE
Armored Division Mecha.nized, Engineer Regiments Described
(ARMEES D'AUJOURD~flUI, Jun 79) 1 -
Armored Division Mechanized Regiment, by Edmond
~ Jea.ncolas
Armored Division Eagineer Regiment, by Rene Soulier
Writer Gives Views on Era of ~Total Strategy~
(Michel Garder; STR.ATEGIQUE, No 2, i979) 11
ITALY
Craxi Interviewed on Pivota]. Role of PSI -
(L~~o~o, 7 J~ 79) 28
SPAIN ~
Move to Ceuter Seen in Socialists' Precongress Debate
(C~zo i6, i2 a~ 79) 34
. ~
;
- a - (III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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COUNT~tY Si:C7'ION FRANCE
I
'i
ARMOREb DIVISION A'tECHANIZED, ENGINEER REGIMENTS DESCRIBED
Armored Division Mechanized Reg3ment
Paris ARMI:ES D'AU.TOURD'HUI in French Jun 79 pp 70~71
[Article by Colonel Edmond 3eancolas, commanding officer, 35th Infantry
Regiment, Belfort: "Mechanized Regiment: Mobility and Firepower"]
[Text] The armored division's two mechanized regiments are its multi-
purpose elements. They each have a powerful array of antiCank weapons,
their own organic reconnai~sance and support units and are capable of
conducting a wide variety of operations.without reinforcement. They are
i always employed as part of the division, That employment uaually involves
; preparing and facilitating the employment of the division's tank regiments
i and completing their action. The mechanized regiments' capability to per-
form this mission was recently substantially enhanced through reorganiza-
; tion and such new equipment as the AI~QC30 [battle tank], AM}C10 [armored
I personnel carrier], VAB [Forward Area Armored Vehicle], Milan [antitank ~
! missile], 120~-mm mortars, 89-mm LRAC [antitank rocket launcher~, FAMAS
, [5.56-mm assault rifleJ, etc. The mechanized regiment's power and its
effectiveness in a meeting engag ~nent with enemy armor stem especially
from its two AI~C30 tank companies~ This means that in coping with the
~ major threat, namely the armored threat, the armored division's cotmnanding
! general will be able to retain longer and more often his tank regiments
' for employment in the more decisive phases of an operation.
Forces Tailored to Missions
The mechanized regiment is organized into:
, a. 'I~ao mechanized companies equipped with AM~C-10's. Each company has ~
four mechanized platoons and one Milan platoon.
I~ ' m an has three tank
b. Two tank companies equipped with AMlC30 s. Each co p y
platoons and one mechanized platoon.
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c. A headquarters, support and aervice company (CCAS) coneisring af a
reconnaissance and intelligence platioon (SER), a heavy mortar platioon (SML)
anc' a aecurity pla~oon.
This variety of equipment givea the regimenC its versatility, in other ~
~,aarda iCs capability of simultaneously combating enemy: ,
a. Tanks: particularly with iCs 20 AM}C30's, 16 Milans and 55 rocket
launchers.
i
i
b. InfanCrymen on foot: with iCs 700 5,56-mm rifles, 44 20~mm guns ;
mounted on VTT~a [Armored Personnel Carriers], attd six 120.-mm mortara. ~
c. AircrafC: with all of 3ta 64 20-mm guns. i
Moreover all of the re iment's ma or combat vehicles have a ~
~ g y good amphibious
capability or can deep ford waterways while compleCely submerged, and can ~
fight at night and in a contaminated environment. I
I
The diversity and effectiveness of the mechanized regimenC's equipment and I
personnel Sive it a broad range of both offensive and defensive capa-
- bilities orienCed most particularly toward antitank and night combat ~
operations ~tn difficult terrain or in an urban area. I
~
~
Enemy armored vehicles are destroyed by the regiment's infantry by means !
of an interlocking system of various antitank weapons having complementary ~
~
effects:
~
a. Dismounted infantrymen are employed in close combat utilizing their
rockets, mines and grenades. ~
' b. The Milan missiles, either grouped at regimental level, or kept at i
company level, or attached to a mechanized platoon, are employed against ;
enemy armored el.ements at greater distances. But the nature of the terrain
and the time required to place the Milan in firing position may still limit .
that antitank missile system's effectiveness. ~
c. By their long "reach," firepower and self~protection, the AM}C30 tanks
add another dimension to the regiment's antitank capability and can ~
conduct sudden, intensive and localized counterattacks, Heavy mortar fire
can be closely integrated with artillery fire in this type of combat
action.
The introducCion of IL (light intensification) and IR (infrared) night
driving and fire control devices means that, in addition to Che tradi- ~
tional night operations by infantrymen on foot, armored vehicles can now
satisfactorily displace or infiltrate along tra~.ls to within 1,000 meters -
of th2 enemy and effectively surprise him in well-prepared attacks on
point targets.
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i Difficult terrain ie the mechanized regiment's preferred combat terrain. -
~ The mechanized companiea open the way for the Canke and reduce entrenched
i enemy troopa.
i When faced wiCh an obatacle such as a stream or river, as soon as the
~ necessary reconnaiesanc:e in cloae liaison with the engineer is completed,
' infantrymen from the mechanized companies cross on inflatable boats or
~ conducC a deliberate crosaing on board the amphibious ArIX10's, and
quickly esCablish a security perimeter on the far side. The supporting
j AMX30 tanks then crosa on pontoon rafta or ford'the atream aubmerg~d '
~ and secure the maneuver space needed to allow the main body of the
I division to crose. _
~
Lastly, in an urban area, the mechanized regiment may be aeaigned the taek
of securing an axia or an important intersection. This type of cumbat
necesaitatea employmenC of infantrymen on foot and with aupporting fire
I from the tanks. But the relatively small number of dismounted infantrymen �
~ the regimenC can provide--about 250--limits ita capabilities in such
~ operations.
I
~ In summary, therefore, the mechanized regiment~ heavily armed with anti-
i tank weapons, can conduct shock-action producing attacks day and night
j against point targets. When it is absolutely necessary to employ the
regiment's infantrymen in a dismounCed role, they are dismounted as close
! to the ob3ective as possible and supported by all available weapons. Thia
~ is the only way to maintain the tempo suited to the armored division.
; Single Mission
' The mechanized regiment, suppor.ted by artillery and usually reinforced
with an engineer unit, is generally employed in the first (attack) echelon
with a single mission. This mission may be:
a. In the offense: gather tactical intelligence, seek and destroy the
enemy's antitank weapon systems;
b. In the defense: slow up the enemy's advance by delaying action,
counterattacks, and if required, establish a defense in place.
- Its scheme of maneuver is essentially mobile and characterized by brief
and repeated atta~ks or swe.eps. The mane~iver develops rapidly while
remaining bound to the terrain as closely as possible. The regiment
engages the enemy on a front of some 5 to 6 kilometers in a zone of
action which often extends from 12 kilometers in width.
In combat, it usually deploys homogeneous units operating within compart-
ments of terrain suited to their weaponry, but it can deploy mixed units
commensurate with the mission and terrain, for instance, on the approach
march and in combat within wooded or urban areas.
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Same 15 ye~rt~ ~fCer Che advenC of. Che AMX 13 �amily of armored vehiclec~,
~ thc mechanized infnntry ia now beg~.nning a new stage in ite h~.~tory.
Yer while attention focuses mainly on its improved mobility and firepower,
rl?e mechanized infanCry doea noC overlook Che fact that iCs effecCiveness
depends mainly on the valor of irs �oot soldiere who must retain Che
3nfanCrym~n's traditional qualities of endurance, determination and
initiative.
Environ ~1000 hommes 20 chars ~A~ M, X. 30
_ dont 250 combattants 44 V,T.T. A. M, X, 10
" ~ pied 6 mortiers de 120mm ,
~ (3) O ~4) (5)
Compagnie ~ompagnies Compagnies
commandement chars ~r~canis~es
appui services ~
(6 ...Sout e ~~ent C � ~ ~ \ � ~ � ~13)
t (10) d ~
~ 1 char t 1 V.T.T.
� ~ � C7 ) - 1 V.T.T.
Rens. -
Eclai~ag ~ ~ ~ (],1~ ~ ~ ~ (14)
3x3 3 x4
~ M rtiers V.T.T.
120
� � � (9) � ~ � (12) � ~ � (15)
Prote~_ 3 V.T.T. 4 V.T.Y'. '
tion ~ 8 Milan 1
[Key on following pageJ
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Key: -
1. About 1,000 men includ~,ng 250 infantrymen -
2. 20 AMX30 tanks, 44 AMX10 VTT~s [Armored Pereonnel Carrier]
six 120-mm mortars
3. Headquarters, aupport and service company
4. Tank companies
5. Mechanized companies
6. Headquarters and support platoon
7. Reconnaissance (scout) and intelligence platoon
8. Heavy 120-mm morCar platoon
9. Security platoon
10. Headquarters platoon: one Cank, one VTT
11. Three tank platoons, three tanks each
12. Mechanized plaCoon: three VTT's
13. Headquarters platoon: one VTT ,
- 14. Four mechanized platoons, three VTT~s each
15. Milan [sntitank missile] platoon: e3ght Milan launchers,
four VTT's
Armored Division Engineer Regiment
Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD~HUI in Fxench Jun 7~ pp 74~75
[ArCicle by Colonel Rene Soulier, commanding officer, 9th Engineer Regiment,
6Ch Armored Division: "Help our Mobility, Hinder the Enemy's"]
[Text] Turning to his engineer officer, the division commander asks him:
"What support can the engineer furnish the scheme of maneuver I have
~ust formulated?"
This question could be viewed as a sign of concern or condescension,
depending on the mood of the division engineer officer~ Actually, the
question would reflect a purely intellectual a~titude which holds that
the action of a combat support element is merely ~uxtaposed with the
action of the infantry-armor combined arms team.
The real procedure is altogether different. In fact, if an optimum
economy of force operaCion is desired, ft is essential to integrate
engineer action into the scheme of maneuver in the same way as the action
of other combat arms, and do thfs during the plann3ng stage.
; The armored division's effectiveness depends essentially on the rapidity
' with which it maneuvers, its firepower and its ability to change posture
frequently. These characteristics cannot be fully effective unless
throughout the period of combat operations the division retains its
freedom of movement while the enemy's freedom is impeded.
Consequently the armored division engineer regiment's two primary missions
~ are: help enhance the division's mobility, and take measures to hinder
the enemy's mobi~i.ty. Its organization was designed on the basis of
~ its equipment which gives it new capabflities fnffnitely greater than
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Chose iC had in the past. Tn addiCion, the highly diversified range of ita ~
, equipment* gives the reg~.menC the flexibility of employment enabling it to be
a f,~11-fledged participant in the different Cypes of divisional combat
operaCions.
Highly Efficient Equipment
The regimenti's ma3or iCems Qf equipmenC are asaigned to either iCs combat ~
unirs or grouped within Che specialized platoons of the supporC company.
Each section of the ~rmored combat pl3toon is authorized:
a. An armored combat engineer vehicle (EBG) derived from the AM}C30 family
and equipped with a power shovel, a winch, a mine and demolition charge
launcher and a slewing crane.
b. A forward area armored vehicle (VAB) serving as a peraonnel carrier~
Each section of the mechan3zed combat platoon is auChorized:
a. A mulCipurpose engineer vehicle (MPG, model F1) designed to clear routes
not sub~ect to direct enemy fire, maintain lines of communicatian, and
prepare approaches to crossing sites at rivers and other obstacles~
b. A VAB personnel carrier. -
The support company has Che following special-purpose equipment:
a. In Che obstacle crossing platoon:
1. Four self-propelled close support bridges (PAA) capable of launching
eight 20-meter spans, or 38~meter spans under exceptional conditions, and
capable of carrying 40-ton tanks, hence the AP'I}C30 battle tank.
2. Light bridging equipment (.N~F): eight rafts capable of carrying
- Class 14 loa~ds (i.a., armored vehicles of the VAB or AM}C10 category) or �
90 meters of bridging capable of carrying Class 20 loads (i.e., vehicles
of the i55-nnn self-propelled artillery category).
b. In the equipment platoon: earth~moving machtnery, trench~d3gging
veh3cles and material~hauling vehicles. '
c. In the obstacle construction platoon:
1. Four drills capable of boring 6.~meter deep holes for demolitions in
less than 1 hour.
* The greater part of this equipment wf11 be in service by 1981.
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2, 1'wo lnnd mine "buriers" and four land mine "dispensers," e~ch with the
capabiliey of L~yin~ 500 mines per hour.
CapabiliCies TAilored Co Missions
While the regimenC's organic obstacle-crossing capability is limited to
, small obstacles (heavy equipment is maintained at corps level), on the -
; other hand, the regiment's route clearing and repair capabiLities are
I substiantial in that Chere are 28 ma~or items of equipment capable of doin~
~ such work: 16 EBG's, four grader tanks (with bulldozer blades), and
~ eight MPG's.
The high~speed drills~ the mtne "buXie~r~'" ~nQ "dispensers," are all highly
i efficient machines which give the regiment a most satisfactory obstacle
consCruction capability.
y~~ Although the engineer regiment allocates all of its resources to helping
; enhance the division's mobility, it can also operate simultaneously:
a. In the forward area: to clear the six to eight routes necessary to Che
advance of two to three armored or mechanized regiments.
b. In the rear area: to repair or maintain Cwo to four main supply
i routes within the armored division's zone of responaibility.
i
With its obstacle crossing capabilities, the regiment caii restore Class 40
crossings over eight short gaps. This class of bridging is sufficient
to carry all the div'ision'sauthorized equipment. The regiment's crossing
capabilities are greater for lower class vehicles. The authorized
I MLF equipment allows some 50 Class 14 vehicles to cross within 1 hour.
' Employed as a bridge over an obstacle with a maximum width of 90 meCers,
it can handle an average traffic flow of 150 Class 20 vehicles per hour.
As for impeding the enemy's mobility, the engineer regiment can attach its
' two armored companies to the lead regiments. These companies can then
assume responsibility for construcCion of point obstacles (mined road
blocks, abatis) on eight routes simultaneously. It can establish obstacles
' in line or in ~rea patterns toward ~he rear for a defense fn place or on
~ a flank to cover the division. As an example, in 1 hour, the mechanized
company, reinforced with the six mine-laying machines, can lay a 2,000-meter
strip having a density of 1.2.
Lastly, the regiment's earth-moving machinery can perform certain organiza-
tion of the ground tasks of limited scope, such as preparing field
~ fortifications and gun emplacements on the final protective line, for
; example. The regiment can also form assault teams armed with special-
, purpose weapons (flamethrowers, special explosives) trained to participate
. in attacks on strong points or in street combat.
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c~rrrit I~ lex lbi li.ty oF i~.mployment
Uecisions on employment of the regiment fa11 within the province of the
division commAnder who is kept conetantly informed of the operatiion~l
capab il~.ties of the en~inePr Croops by a liaison deCachment. The
_ regimenCal commander personally remains cloae to the commanding ~eneral
whenever ma~or planning and operational decisions are being made. Tn fact,
it is of vital imporCance to have the engin~er regiment's operational
capab ilities Caken inCo c.onsideration and incorporated in the scheme of
m~neuver.
One example will suffice ro illuatrate this principle. Assume that the
scheme of maneuver adopted by Che division requires holding an aggressive
enemy on a final protecCive line for a definite period of time and that
Chis operation necessitates the employment of two armored or mechanized
regiments. By improving the defensive strength of the area wiCh the �
mechanized engineer company reinforced by obsCacle building and earth~
moving personnel and equipment, it is possible, providing there is
sufficient time, to employ only one regimenC, and the second regiment
can thus be assigned to another operation. Hence the engineer regiment's
work makes a greater economy of force possible and, thereFore, constitutes
an importanC component of the division's scheme of maneuver~
The engineer commander deploys his troops and equipment in conformity with
the priorities assigned him. It must be realized, however, that the
regiment's units are "preoriented" because of the very nature of their
equipment: Che armored companies will be chiefly employed in direct
support of the forNard re~iments whereas the~mecfiRn~zed company will
raCher operate farther back in the division area.
To give a quite simple illustration, the following deployment and missions
of the regiment's units are highly conceivable:
a. One armored company is attached to the leading regiments with the
mission of :
1. In the offense: facilitating Cheir advance by clearing routes;
2. In the defense: supporting the delaying action by emplacing point
obstacles. -
b. The mechanized company is told to await further orders and will most
likely be assigned such missions as:
1. Repair and maintenance of divisional lines of communication;
2. Establish obstacle areas (barriers) in the division rear or on a
division flank;
3. Support an obstacle-crossing operation.
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~ c. The sec~nd ttrmored company intensifies the engineer effort in the scheme
~ of maneuver;
i
~ 1. Either in the forward area, by increasl.ng the mobility of the leading
~ units in the offensive phase or by strengthening the delaying action in
the defensive phase;
2. Or on A flank, by participating in the division's covering force;
3. Or again in the rear area, by increasing the defensive strength of
- final protective line established on a position vital to the scheme of ~
maneuver.
The support company is generally assigned the mission of reinforcing the
combat un~ts.
The armored division engineer regiment's action is largely forward-area
oriented in support of the division's scheme of maneuver. However, the
division cannot be entirely self-sufficient.
In particular, for the crossing of large obstacles, the corps will have to
either reinforce the division with the necessary troops and equipment or
take over all or part of the crossing mission.
Furthermore, Che corps will often have to coordinate its barrier plan with
those of the divisions ~oncerned so as to keep the overall scheme of _
~ maneuver coherent.
~
The gathering of terrain intelligence is the responsibility of all arms
and services, and the corps of engineers ~n particular. Exploiting that
intelligence is one of the responsibilities of the engineer commander
; at each level of command. The synthesis of such intelligence will enable
~ the combined arms commander to take the terrain factor into account in
! fozznulating his scheme of maneuver.
i
The task of gathering technical intelligence is assigned particularly to
~ the three DLRG's (Engineer Liaison and Reconnaissance Detachment) deployed
; as far forward as possible.
~
The continuous effort to obtain greaCer efficiency, and the priority given
to the support of forward units made it necessary to extensively mechanize
, the armored division engineer regimenC's units. In a brief, sudden, and
~ hard-hitting engagement, the regiment's action will always be governed by
' the principle of rapid reaction snd execution at the expense of the
lasting character of whatever it builds, repairs, emplaces, etc.
i
With the advice of his engineer officer, and by employing the engineer
~ regiment's capabilities to their maximum, the commanding general of the
armored division will be able to retain his freedom of action as far as
~ mobility is concerned, while at the same time thwarting his adver~ary's
mobility.
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~o~ o~~ictnL us~ ornY ;
~
;
,
I
~
DES 51p~CTURES SIMplES cl~ ~
~ ,
~
COMPAGNIE DE COMMANDEMENT(2
ET DES SERVICES
~~l,~ � ~ ~
.
,
~ 4r.:'
COMPAiGNIE D'APPUI (3)
:
~ ~
~
m
COMPAGNIES BLINDEES (4}
y~~
COMPAGNIE M~CANIS~E (5)
~
k~y:
1. Simple organizational structure
2, Headquarters and service company
3. S..~port company
4. Armored companies
S. Mechanized company
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Revue des forces armees francaiaes "Armeea d'Au~ourd'hui"
8041
CSO: 3100
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~OIt d~~ICIAL USC tlNLY
COUNTltY S~CTInN ~ItAiVC~
Witl'~ER GIV~S VI~W5 ON ~itA 0~ 'TOTAL STItAT~GY'
Parie STRATEGIQU~ in French No 2,1979 pp 61-81
~Article by Michel Garder]
' (Text] In his historical novPl, "August i4 " Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn quiee
properly notes that, unknown t~ the belligerents, the beginning of the Great
War marked the advent of a new zodiacal era.
Setting agide ttie reference Co the xodiac, ~ae venture Co share Che view of
the great writer, wiCh the clarification that for us thia era is one of
total strategy.
As a matter of Pact, 64 years ago the leaders of the two camps thought they
were confronting a classiEal war for which they congidered themgelvee to
be normally, intellectually and materially ready. It could not occur to
them that "the goin~, to extremes," described by Clausewitz and accepted by
the varioue war colleges, was not going to be limited to voilence in the
purely military sector and that the conflict was to degenerate rather
quickly into a total war. No one--not event the strategisCsiof the Germaa
General Staff--was in a position, in 1914, to imagine the essence of this
inexpiable confrontation which ignored all the prohibitions and set its
sights on the annihilation of Che enemy as a"collective self" by striking
at (civilian] populations in the same Way as at his armed forces, by under-
mining national cohesior and by reopening the question of Che foundations
of his political-administrative order.
How could it have been foreaeen at the time that this total ~ar, among other
things, was going to facilitate the appearance of an original phenomenon:
Leninist-Marxist totalitarianiam which, building on the rubble of the former
Russian Empire, was to formulate and implement a total strategy imposing upon
the rest of the worid a permanent conflict whose most dramatic episode is
probably World War II and upon which the nuclear reality was subsequently
to confer a new and agonizing dimension.
The fact of the matter is, unfortunately--for reasons that we will aet forth
later--there is very little interest in our timea in the nature of this total
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~er~C~gy, wh~n tihpr~ i~ noe quir~ gimply d~nial of Che r~~iiey gnd eh~
influ~n~~ ie could ~x~re upon rhp course oP pvene~ ehrough ehe eiCuaeinn ;
o~ con~lict which ch~racr~riz~g our ~r~, tn ~ddiCion eo Chat, w~ h~v~
_ hecomr ~ncu~Com~d Co u~ing the g~lf~ame t~rm of eCraCegy for any purpo~e
whar~v~r--nnd quiC~ ofC~n in Ch~ wrong w~y--while at Che eame Cime 1imiCing
- et~e gtu~ly of go-called dePenge problems to the military sector~ `~hgti is
~11 th~ mor~ r~greeeable b~can~~ knoaled~~ of eh~ weapon~ of this original
are, whict~ toeal geraeegy r~pre~~nes, Bupplies a valuabl~ key boeh for khe
Und~r~eanding of the dyn~mism of coneemporary hi.eCory and for e~e eleboration
of an ineeresting m~~hod in ehe secCor of global fututiology.
It is for this r~agon, cdntinuing ehe w~ork. begun under th~ dir~ction of
G~neral Beufre, tha~ ~he e~am of re~P �chpre of the 'Total Strategy Study
Group proposes eo pnbli~h a geries of ~,3i~s on this sub~~ct, beg3nning ae
preg~ne wiCh a bri~f ov~rview of CAe ~~3~, ~voluCion and characteri~tics
nf eotal strat~gy.
~rom TeCal War to Leninigt-Marxise Totalitarianigm
Today, iC is obvious eo a serious hisCorian that, withoue the unleashing of
totul war from 1914 eo 1917, efie Bolshevik putgch of November 1917 would
have been unChinkable in Russia~ On the oCher hand, it is less obvious for
u lgrge nvmber of apecialists tliar ~t was equally tfie total cliaracter of
World War I which, in great measure, influenced the specific characteristica
" of Leninist-Marxist totalitarianism, facilitated rlie victory of the Reda in
ehe civil war and conditioned the elaboration of the Bolshevik total atrategy.
In support of these staCements, let us recall first the easential characteris-
tics of total war. The passing of clxssical war into total war was effe~ted
at one and the same time thanks to the cumulative utilization of the various
aspec[s of technical progress in the military sector, properly speaking, and
the incorporation in the strategic package of all the other resources:
psychological, economic, financial, scientific and technical, envisaged
henceforth not only as auxiliaries of the armed forcea but also as weapons
per se.
A double process was to resule therefrom, in appearance a contradictory
process of diversification of multiple forms o! war, each having its own
characreristics, and of integration of the latter in a totality to the degree
that a total wgr was involved. Thus it is that in the military sector we see
added to the classical concepts of ground and naval warfare those of air and
sub;narine warfare, not Co mention the subdivision of ground warfare into
categories which at times are questionable, such as trench, movement, atCri-
tion or even "gas" warfare. As for the nonmilitary means, they give rise to
psychological, economic, etc. warfare. From another standpoint, the integra-
tion of all these forms of warfare, required by the mandatory on~nesa of
purpose of the very notion of total war--variously achieved, moreover,
according to the countries--implied a new approach to tfie phenomenon which
was summed up by Clemenceau's jesC: "War is too serious a matter to entrust
to the military." Of course, within this totality tending in tfie direction
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of in~epnrnbiliey, Che sr.r~r~~i~e mgineaLned ~ preeminene pngiL�ion~ with
rhe title df ~ommander in chief; however, contrary Co rhe Clgusewieztgn
view, ehe gupreme pol3rical auehority--cht~f of srate of government--~uperimpoq~d
him~elf toe~lly ovpr Che straCegier in the n~w and unformulnted funetioni of
~uper-sCrnC~gy,
= Thus toeal war wa~ no long~r lik~ clae~ic~t1 war, "tbe pursuie of poliCice
by otheti~ megns"; bue ie became "ehe radi.calizaeion o~ all m~eng~~including
rhos~ o~ th~ nrmed forces�~and th~ir utilizaeion by the polieical sector to
attain ob~entives." Long b~fore Man zedong's lot7nalaCion, wp a?iCnessefl the
Cotal gubordinarion of Che mtlitary eo the political take place and, 6y way
of consequence, ehe polieicizaCion of atraCegy, in tAe high~eC ~enee of th~
term.
Moreover, it wae the lack o� knowledge about thie new rnle of total war
which was ro pr~cipieaCe in ltugsia--followtng Che abdication of Empero~
Nicholas II brnughe abnue by politically myopic getterals and politieana
with no nozion whatever of stratQgy--the proceae of dieintegration of a
country which was far from being ae the end of its reaonrces.
After that, it was the use, by the total German strategy, of a poliCical
weapon, subversive par excellence, in the form of the dispatch to Itusaia of
Lenin and tiis compan~ons with the following conseqnences: acceleration of
Chia disintegration~ the precnraors of a civil war against the rear of a
demoralized army and linally tFie putsch of 7 Novemfier 1917 carried ouC, I
might note in pagsing, not by the "revolntionary maeaes" bnt by part of the
Petrograd garrison.
'The beneficiaries of this putsch, Len~n and his team of professional
revolutionaries, did not underatand immediately, however~ the nature of the
phenomenon whicFi had permitted them to seize power. Lenin in particular,
who had read and annotated Clausewitz, still conaidered the conflict in
progress to be a classical imperialist war wfiich he hoped to transform into
a r~volutionary war. He had to fiave tFie lesson of Brest Litovsk gnd 3 years
of civil war in the capacity of super-strategiat with the benefit of the .
best brains of the former General Staff and the ef~ective assistance of
special services, which officially were revolutionary but animated by
renegades from Che Tsarist Okhrana and specialists from the former Russian
SR [Socialist Revolutionaries] to lorm an explosine synthesis between the
revolutionary dialectic and the precepts of total war. -
The "proletarian" state for which he established the bases after the victory
over the Whites and the "anarchic-leftists" was totalitarian from the outset
as a revolutionary bastion taking on tfie conducting of the class struggle
on a worldwide scale and by virtue of this fact incurring a capitalist
encirclement preceding an almost inevitable general attack.
Later, this totalitarian aspect was strengthened even more to the degree
that, with Stalin, the system was transformed into an integral idolocracy,
with a living god at ite head Whose absolute power reposed first and fore-
most upon three pillars: the party apparatus-rot6erwise knoWS as the
"clergy"--the police and the army.
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Genegi~ and ~volutinn o~ Che Toea1 Bol~h~vik 3erae~gy
As we have ~aid, witih the aynthesia of Che Leninisti revoluCionary 8ialeceic
nnd i'1e pr~cepe~ of toeal war, Bolatievik straCegy arene through ehreQ
. digeinct pAae~g before ~ecoming ehe ~001 par excellence of a totaliCar3an
sup~rpdwer.
'Tt~e Pirse ph~m~, ahinb wp nan cgiL romaneic, ~.asted barely 2 years:
1919-1920. Ir corresponde~ eo rhe illusions wh~ch the BolaT~ev~ke had
- ndnpe~d with respecC eo ehe reWOlutionary sitnaCion thae developed ~n
Germany and Hungary afeer the 1918 defeat.
Con~equently, a veritable total strategy general staff was esCablished in
, Moscow, in the form of the Comintern; and there were plans to lavnch a vast
offengive eoward ehe West at one and the same time pyschological and military,
"passing over ehe dead body of ~.mperigl Poland, to light the torch of world
revolution." This offensive eook plgc~ even before the end of Cfie civil war
in Ruggia and ended in de�eat at the gates o# Warsaw. "We vnderestimated
Che national factor," Lenin, the tnternaCionalist, observed. It is a fact
ChgC Che Po13sh proleearians did not see among Che combattants of the Red
, Army of workers and peasanCs anythir,g other than their traditional enemies:
Itussians who had come to their country not to li6erate them bnt to sub~ugate
them.
In the Kremlin, this plan to extend the Russian civil war to the rest of
Europe and the ill-considered vse of the Red Army as the vangard of the
r~volution on the march was abandoned. A totally new etrategy was developed.
'Cl~is indirecC revolutionary atrategy was placed in operation from 1921 to
1929. It was based on the following view of the a~orld:
--the capitalist countries are not ripe for socialist revolntion because of
- the fact of their colonial empires. The plundering of colonial wealtfi
furnishes super-~enefits permiCting tfie capitalists to gi've small increasea
to the workers, the better paid of whom become middle cl~ss and lose their '
class consciousness.
Consequently, it was a question of aiding the colonial or dependent countries
to free themselves from tFie impeYialtst yoke to restore the will to struggle
to the proletariat.
Moreover, the very existence of a proletar~an state constitutes for world
capitalism a danger which it cannot tolerate, aBove all if the state is
successful in delivering appreciaBle blows against tfie i~rperialist system.
Because of this fact, an attack by the forces ot capitalism aimed at
destruction of the proletarian state is irevitable over tfie ~aore or less
long term. It is important tfiat this evencuality be delayed as long as
possible by undermining tfie foundations of the enemy's system, by thoroughly
exploiting its contradictions, by demoralizing its armed forces and by
mobilizing the proletariat so that on the day the inevitable attack takea
place, such an attack will be nothing more than "the reflex of a mortally
wnunded beast," the prelude to tfie ~inal victory of the proletarian canip.
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The Coea1 revulurion~ry ~Crgtegy ima~itted by Lenin with a view to gCCa~n-
ing eh~ gbove-meneioned ob~pceiveg was cligracCerized by ehe following
oriBinal ~lemcnts;
--iC will pl~ce in oper~Cion a11 tAe peycFio-polieical~ economic, diplomatic,
Cechnical, etc, meane,excluding direct recourae to the Red Army;
j --Che principal effore wi11 be appLied Co ehe colonial or dependent
countries in Asia, Africa and Latin Amer~ca~ In each of ehese count~ies,
in Che nbsence of proleCarians, bourgeo~s nationalisti movements wi11 be
used as "gellow travelers." Thus iL ia Chat in China there is disdain for
, tlie young CommunisC party, whicA wae establiehed without the support of
; the Kremlin by a group of inxellecCuals, to seek the alliance of Sun Yat
~ Sen's Kuomintang;
i
-i --vis-a-vis rhe capitalist countries, a"defensive-offensive" aeeitude is
~ adopted which Lenin described as "peaceful coexietence." In these countries,
thanks to official and clandestine communist parties, there are available
~ detachments of "devoted and active partisans," not Co mention the ultra
~ secret networks of Komintern agents. At the same time, Chere 33 ski11fu1
; exploitation of the resentments o~ these defeated in 1918, first and fore-
! most Germany. Thanks Co Che Rapallo treaty, Germany will be able Co
~ circumvent the prohibitions of Che Versailles "diktaC" by building arms
~ factories in rhe USSR wiCh instruction of the superior cadres of the Red
~
~ Army by Reicl~swehr officers in repayment.
~
It is in this "theatre" of the capitalist countries that the Bolsheviks
i are attaining their best results, thanks Co tfieir strategy whicR at one and ~
the same time is disconcerting to the civilian lea3ers and the military
~ chiefs: too "military" for the former wfio persist in calling it "political," _
it is too "civilian" for the latter who call it "subversive action."
Both of them have stuck by Clausewitz and continue to distinguisfi peace-
time from wartime, without understanding that the Kremlin is seeking to
transform "peace" into a new kind of total war. In the psycho-polttical
sector, this "war" gives rise, however, to a strange phenomenon: the
appearance here and there of ultranationalisC movements "of tfie left" which
will subsequently be dubbed "of the right" for the purposes of the cause.
In Italy, a movement of this kind went so far in 1922 as to se~ze power
and radicalize the ICalian monarchy. In Germany, on the other hand, an
attempted puCsch fomented by the small party of one Adolph Hitler failed
in Munich. In the meantime, in the other "tfieatre," the offensive against
colonial and dependent countries--after a few successes--produced a series
of setbacks the most spectacular of which, in 1927, was due to the about-face
of the new chief of the Kuomintang: Gen Chang Kai-shek.
In Moscow, after the death of Lenin in 1924, the power struggle absorbed a
great part of the energies. It was not until 1929--at the instigatian of
Stalin wfio had emerged from the field of aspirants--that a new revolutionary
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seraeegy wns ndopeed. This sCraregy was plaeed in operation �rom 1.929 to '
L95G, Based on the princip].e ehae the economic crisis afflicting the
UniCecl 5eaCes durin~ Chis period would unfailingly spread to Europe, a
d~ci5~nn wc~g made to direcC Che principal efforC o~ Che proleCarian '
Htrnregy agninst rlie c~pitAlist countries while seteling for mAintenance
of medium level of agitation i:~ Asia and Africa. Beginning in 1930, Che
"revolution" finally seemed possible; and it was in Germany thaC Che Kremlin
looked for decisive aceion. Howe~�er, Sral~n gav~ ehe order to Che powerful ~
German Communiat parey Co secretly support Adolph Hitler'~ NSDAP [NaCional
Socialist German Workers' Party] againsC the Social Democratic Party, '
pending a laCer change in tactics. This error in ~udgment permitCed the ~
NaCional Soc3alists to accede to power by legal meana and Co insCall them-
selves in it afterward by other methods of which the German aocialista and ~
communists were ehe first viceims.
~ollowing rhis setback which in no way compromised his presCige, Stalin,
who in thp me~nCime had become absolute master of the world communist
movement, finalLy came up wieh ehe definitive formula for a total strategy ;
which was much more that of an empire with universaliaC aspiraCions Chan
that of a revolutionary proleCarian state.
Stalin, ~ust Che opposiCe of Lenin, was much more a monomaniac of abaolute
powerz than of revoluCion. The USSR, of which he was at one and the same
Cime the god, pontifical sovereign and emperor, was noC for fiim "the bastion
of tlie revolution" but the empire which was called upon, at the end of an
inevit~ble world war from which it was to come out victorious, to impoae
its total hegemony upon the rest of the world.
The sPtback suffered in Germany--the responsibility for which, I might add,
no one dared impute to him--confirmed for him the idea that a revolution
could only be Che result of a lost war. It was at the state level and not
_ that of the communist parties that the princ~pal thrust of total strategy
was thenceforth to be directed. Total strategv would seek its fellow
travelers among nations and not among political movements. From the Qutside,
the Soviet Union would have to be seen as a stat~~, if not a classical state
at least one which totally accepted international rulea. Hitler's Germany
on that occasion served as Tiis rationale. In countries where they officially
exist, communist parties--while remaining totally subordinated to the
Krer~lim--are themselves to play the parliamentary game also. Moreover, the
Comintern was no longer the General Staff. of the preceding phases. Its
prerogatives and resources had been traiisferred to the Secretariat of the
Central CommiCtee and the Soviet Special Services. Its agents were, more-
over, reduced to the role of agents of these special services.3 Action in
colonial countries was practically abandoned. Tfie civil war in China was
arranged by Stalin. The USSR parsimoniously aided the Cfiinese communists
and mainCained discreet contacts with Chang, while w.aiting for Japan to get
bogged down in a deadend war in China, to tfie great satisfaction of the
Kremlin.
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In 1935, rhe toCat StalinisC eCraeegy could be de�ined ae ~ollows: "Iti is
the arC ~E imposing one's truCh upon any enemy whatever Uy all posaible
means,inc].udinR th~ ~rmed forces as a lase resore while ~eeempCing eo
prevcnC Cl~e enemy from being Che firse to resort Co arme~"
Naturally, ir was up ro Stalin himgel� to de~i.ne the "truth" of Ct~e momene.
It was in Spain wtiere the Franco couneerrevolution firsC gave him Che
opportuniey of intervening on behalf of a legal government supported by a
"popular" parliamentary fronC. Once again, he made sev~r~l mistakea in
~udgment for which the republicans paid the price; however, the aelfsame
civil war permitCed him to season numerous cadres of his army and conduct
interesting experiments in the aectors of operational sCrategy and military -
tactics.
His earlierhope of seeing Che outbreak of a war berween the French-Britiah
and the Germans over Czechoslovakia having 6een dashed in Munich in 1938, he
, decided in the spring of 1939 Co opt for Hitler against the bourgeois
democraciea. The German-Soviet agreement o� 26 August 1939 surprised the
latter and seemed to confirm the excellence of Stalin's strategy. The
Soviet empire became larger, while the USSR remained on the perimeCer of
, the Europe~n war.
The Cerman attack on 22 June 1941 surprised Stalin and seems to have once
again brought the toCal strategy inCo question. The enemy was the first to
resort to arms and, what is more, the myth according to which Che proletar-
ians would never agree to participate in a war agafnst the USSR vanished.
' In order to come ouC of the total war victorious, Stalin found himself
reduced to the invocation of the "bourgeois" clickes--which were scorned
by Lenin--of Russian patriotism, to reestabl~sh the patriarcby of Moscow
and accept massive material aid from the capitalist countries wfiicfi had
become his allies. Fortunately for him, his former ally, Hitler, made
mistake after mistake; and abetted by the unheard of heroism of his soldiers,
the citory caused Stalin's initial errors to be overlooked. Moreover, the
"generalissimo" did not wait for German capitulation to take up at Yalta,
in February 1945, the next battle in which his allies of the moment--if not
, fellow travelers--were to become enemies.
The appearance of the nuclear weapon in 1945 was to stregnthen even further
the deterrent aspect of the Total Strategy by keeping the current conflict
at the level of "peaceful coexistence," and occasionally aC a harsher level
from which derives ttie term "cold war," occasionally somewhat more relaxed,
which explains the world "detente."
That said, this confrontation at the world level over the last 34 years has
involved t6ree phases characterized by different configurations, each with
a basic antagonism. Also, after the fashion of the Balkan wars at the
beginning of the century, we can number these veritable World Wars as III,
IV and V .
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t~'rom Wor1d War II eo World War IV (1945-1969)
'1'o undergtand ehe preaent situaCion, it is important Eirsti to briefly
congid~r World Wars II and IV from which 3.t derived.
Wor1d War III (1945-1969) was essent3a11y an East-WeaC confroneaeion wiCh
the SovieC Empire and the United StaCea as Che pr3ncipal protagonisCs. IC
consisted of three princ~pal phases:
--the firar phase, which we can call the "Sta11n phase," lasted 8 years:
1945-1953, and can be divided into two periods: '
--from 1945 to 1949 we can summarize the confrontation by means of the
following equation:
(R + S ) U . S . + E
' Soviet Empire United Stares Noncommunist part of. Europe
plus saCellites
5talin direcCed the principal effort of his strategy against Che developed
countries of North America and Western Europe, while engaging in diversions
in Greece and Che Middle East. These two diversions, moreover, were to
result in setbacks. The diversion in Greece was to fail because of the ;
Yugoslav "beCrayal" and the Middle East diveraion because of the spirit of
independence of the young state of Israel which Stalin wanCed to make a
tool of his strategy.
--beginning with the fall of 1949, China became the ally of tfie Soviet thus
the equaCion: I
(R + S) + C U.S. + E
Soviet Empire-Cliina United States Europe ;
Stalin profited from this sitnation in 1950 to unleash a bloody diversion
in Korea. The phase ended with the death of Stalin...anu Che interminable '
armistice talks in Korea. ~
--The second phase was that of the Collegial Directorate [Direction Collegiale] '
(1953-1957). It was marked by a bitter power struggle in the Kremlin, the
emergence of China as the moral leader of the communist camp, the change in ,
the principal straCegic direction imposed upon Moscow by Peking and involving
the Middle East, Africa and Latin America (whence the Suez crisis),
"de-SCalinization," with its repercussions inside the USSR and within the
Empire (explosions in Poland and Hungary), finally, a series of tactical ,
Soviet pullbacks: recognition of West Germany, release of German prisoners,
peace treaty with Austria and the consolidation of the Empire on the basis ,
of the Warsaw Pact. '
~
--Finally, the third phase coincided with Khrushchev's rule and ended 1 year '
before the inglorious fall from power of the latter (1957-1963).
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Uuring these 6 yeare, Khruschchev' vainly sought to impose Soviet rule
upon Che Chineae,to coneolidate tihe Empire~ to extend ~Ce influence in
the Third Wor1d and~~cr;~bre~k up Che Aelantic Alliance by presenting the
United 5tatias and iCs par~ners wiCh a series of irrevereible conceasiona.
To aCtain thie lase-named ob~ective, he attempred to arrange a deciaive
auAnniC conf~rence, using ae leverage firet the Berlin pr�~b1em (1958-1961)
and Chen Cuba (1~62).
This package of maneuvers resulted in a aeries of setbacke, tfie moet serious
of which was that of Cuba in October 1962 and in a"de facto" armiatice
between the USSR and the Un~ted States in the form o~ the Moscow accords,
in August 1963, and the definitive break between China and the USSR.
World War IV (1963-1969) esaentially set China againat the two auperpowers~
This led to a certain amount of East-West "detente" and increasing tension
between Peking and Moacow. At the outseC, China directed ita strategy
toward the developing countries of the southern hemisphere, to draw inCo
its camp the revolutionary nationalisms of the Third World. At Che eame _
time, Japan--up to then under U.S. influence--adopted a poaition of some
aloofness and 6egan an extraordinary process of economic penetration while
waiting to become a great political-strategic power.
~ The conflict equation became:
_ C + N (U.S. � E) (R � S)...J?
China Revolutionary (Japan)
nationalisms of
the Third World
~ The symbols appearing in the two sets of parentheses indicate growing
i misunderstandinga, on the one hand between the United States and its
j European allies and, on the other hand, within the Empire where a
i satellite--Romania--was attempting to preserve its relative independence.
The Chinese offensive bore fruit in 1964 and culminated on 14 Octuber of
' that same year in the fall from power of Khrushchev and his replacement by
~ a new collegial directorate. However, in 1965, Peking in turn experienced _
a series of aetbacks whicfi were in part rooted in the "Cultural Revolution."
At the beginning of 1966, Soviet strategists resumed the initiative on the
! occasion of the Havana Conference. The USSR got a foothold in South Yemen
; and Somalia. The Black Sea fleet assigned a permanent squadron Co the
Mediterranean and utilized the port facilities offered to it in that area
~ by Syria, Egypt and Algeria.
~ The symbol � also appear~ between C and N; however, the cultural revolution
plunged China into semi-chaos Iiordering on a generalized civil war. But the
USSR demonstrated its inability to exploit these difficulties and, on the
contrary, in 1967, had a series of serious setbacks: stirrings among the
satellites, defeat of its Arab allies in the June 1967 war, refusal of
~ Romania to break diplomatic relations with Israel and, finally, the fall
; from power of Novotny, in December in Prague.
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'Phe year 1968 t~egan very bad7.y for Moacow. In Czechoslovakia, the procegs
of liberation inCengified and resu].Ced in "t~e Prague 5pring." In I'oland,
there was a veritable srudent revol.ution; finally, in the USSR iCse1E
"diss:lents" from all aides rime and aqain defied the regime.
However, the 5oviet oligarcfiy profited from the fact Chat all of these
dtfficulCies coincided, on the one Tiand, with the "cultural revoluCion" in
China, and, on ehe oeher hand, with the American stalemate in Vietnam and a
difficult presidential campaign in the UniCed States~ Thus Moscow was free
to settle the studenC problem in Poland--thanks to Moczar--to strike a heavy
blow against its own dissidents and to pnt an end to the "Prague Spring,"
in August 1968.
The Passage from Wor1d War IV to World War V(1969-1978)
The year 1969 was a watershed beginning the passage from World W~r IV to
World War V. It was marked in particular Fiy tfie coming to power of President
Nixon, the unsuccessful attack on Leonid Brezhnev in January in Moscow, a
dangerous escalation of Sino-Russian antagonism and the Libyan revolut~on.
Having come Co power, Richard Nixon established a veritable atrategic general
staff in the White House and, for the first time in the history of the
United SCates, drew up a veritable total ~trategy which was to disconcert
both the USSR and his own alliea. Ais straCegic plan can be summarized in
three points:
--to give the United States complete freedom of action at the world level ,
and, to this end, to progressively witfidraw U.S. troops from Vietnam, while
at the same time reinforcing the South Vietnamese, and Co also make an ef�ort
to settle the problems o~ the Middle East as soon as possible; � '
--to set up the United States as Che arbiter of the world situation by
profiting, on the one hand, from the dependence of Western Europe and Japan
upon the military might of tiie United States and, on the other hand, the
Sino-Soviet antagonism;
--to this end, to create two triangles of which the common apex would be the ~
United States: !
E
\ / '
U.S.
~ ` I
(R S ~ C
The Criangle of the allies: U.S. - E- J was to assure the hegemony of ,
Washington over its own camp in exchange for tfie protection given the
Europeans and Japanese.
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'Co Form Che hriangle of adversarie~: U.5, (R ~ S) ~ C, it was necessary
to get a fooehold in Peking (rhis w~s done in 1y72) and then to prevent the
Ci~ines~ ~nd Snviets from fighCing one anott~er~ by lannching U.S. business
in aearcli of rlie m~rke~e of Che tao communist powere.
'1'I~c~ iitl:nck ou 'L3 Jnnu~ry 1969 againyt the pereon ot Leonid I~r~ttinev--~~~rpeCrnec:d
by Lieueenant S1lyine (who was found eo be insane a short Cime laCer) had
important repercussiona: on the one hanfl, an appreciabl~ sCrengChening of
the role of the KGR within the Soviet system and, on the orher hand, the rise
of the secreCary general himself above his colleagues in rhe "collegial
directQrate."
At the same eime, the escalation in Soviet-Chinese antagonism was accentuated
and culminaCed in rtarch 1969 in highly exploaive aiCuation. For the first
time, in rtoycow as in Peking, there was really Chought of a toCal war between
the two former allies. Only discreeC preasure from the U.S. administraCion
prevenked a caCasCrophic soluCion to their differences~
However, with the Libyan revolution, tfiere appeared in the person o� Colonel
Qadhdhafi a leader of a new kind on Cfie international scene. At the beginning
an unquestioning disciple of Colonel Nasir, after the disappearance of his
masCer in the fall of 1970, he utilized all Che resources of his country to
reestablish, under the aegis of Libya, a pure and hard Islamic line designed
to sweep modernism liberalism and atheism out of all Muslim countrtes. The
passage from the equation of World War IV to that of President Nixon's
strategic plan lasted 3 years and culminated in a situation of equilibrium
in the spring of 1972, as the result of the trip by the chief of the White
House first to Peking and Chen Co Moscow. Thus what was to become "World
War V" got its start with a vision quite close to real peace.
World War V
Of course, at the time President Nixon managed to progressively construct
his system of the two triangles, the war in Vietnam had not yet ended; ancl
, the situation in the Middle East continued to be highly explosive--despite
the disappearance of Colonel Nasir.
However, in the spring of 1972, the beginning of a reconciliation between
, China and Japa.n was observed. Encouraging talks took place between the two
Koreas and, in Vietnam, progress was made toward a peaceful solntion.
Thus, what we are calling "World War V" started with a short phase of
equilibrium; and, in January 1973, President Nixon felt that he conld speak -
of an "era of peace."
i However, his illusions were of sfiort duration. The Watergate scandal, a
few months later, shattered the Wh~te House general staff and forced the
i president into a hopeless fight against Congresa, the press and the public
opinion of his country.
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In ehe meaneime, in Che Kremlin, ehe mllitary~~w~Ch MarsTial GreCchko--and
ehe Cheki~ts--wi:th Yuri Andropov~~found tfiems~elves represenCed ~.n the
Pnlitbura. However, reacCivation of ehe ~oea~. Soviet seraeegy did noe
i?nmedi.~tely fo].low. Apparently, it was even againet the wiah~e of Moscow
rt~ae a f~w montha larer a new Ulow was atruck againse rhe "Pax Americana"
on rhe iniriaeive o# Co~.onel 5ada~ who, ~n concert with the Syrians,
unleashed ehe October 1973 wa~r, wieh ehe corolla~y use of "the oil weapon"
by the Arab couneries.
".d plan devised by President Nixon was in toCa1 flisarray, Europe was
divided; Japan was groping.
The year i974 was catasCrophic for the United States; and World War V, ~n
full evoluCion, did not lend itself to convenient equaCion~. The ~rreconciliable
5ovieC-Chinese anCagonism alone remained.
T}~e Arab counCries, unir.ed for the time being, took ,~dvantage of the situa-
Cion to mobilize rhe Third World with a view to ha~;ing the "Palestinian
realiCy" recognized in the UN~ For iCs part, NATO ~ound itself affected by
two simultaneous crises: on the one hand, the dramatic events ~n Cyprus
culminaCing in a serious Greco-TurRtsh crisis and the withdraa?al of Greece
from NATO and, on the other hand, the PorCuguese revolut~on.
It w~~s in a depressing atmosphere of general incompreF~ension Chat President ;
Nixon was forced to leave the Wh~te House and turn over the retns of power ~
to his vice president, Gerald Ford. It seemed that everything would fall
apart; and thus the first 6 montiis of 1975 were no less catastrophic for
tiie Western world, and that without the total Soviet strategy playing a
predominanC role,
In the Middle East, Secretary of StaCe Henry Kissinger was not able to
achieve his goals. In the meantime, in Southeast Asia, the communists '
scored victory after victory by definiCively ove~whelming Cambodi~a, Loas ;
and South Vietnam. However, tfie Kremlin concentrated its effo~ts on the ;
preparation of the Helsinki conference wh~ch was field at the end of July 1975 ~
and from which the Politburo e~pected we know not what m~raculous results. ~
This interlude permitted the Americans to geC their second wind. Under the ,
aegis of General Haig, a general staff for total strategy was reconst~tuted
in the White Hoase. In the M~ddle East, Henry IC~ssinger's efforts were
finally crowned with success. Saudi Arab~a, Egypt and Jordan openly
supported U.S. policy.
The Kremlin's Strategic Error
These modest U.S., however, conld not turn the situation around. At tfie
end of 1975, the USSR found itself in a position of strength, all tne more
so because China, where Chou En-lai was living out his last months, was '
the scene of a bitter power struggle for tlie succession of a Mao wfio was
nothing more than the shadow of the former great Helmsman.
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F'ollowing Cl~eiz llelyinki "victory" wf~~cFi su6sequently gnve ehem mnre
headaches ehan s~Cis~acC~on, tiie Kremlin serategists~ unYeashed a large~scale
maneuver deriving from an overr~ll plan responding--iC seems-~Co CTie following
cottcerns:
--to rake advantage o� ehe weakenfng of the UniCed States whic~i was shaken
by Che repercussions of Watergate and paralyzed by Cne 1976 presidential
campaign, ttie divisions af�ecting Western ~urope and Che 1aid~bacCt poliCical
role of Jnpan on the international scene in order:
--to win back and consolidaCe tfie positions lost 6y Che USSR in the Third
World, particularly in Asia, the Middle East and Africa;
--to continue Ctie isolaCion and encirclemenC maneuver vis~a-vis China;
~ --to disassociaCe Curope �rom the United 5taCes and, at the same.Cime, to
; prevent the formation of a poliCical and mil~Cary Evropean community;
I --to react~ A series of agreements with the United States on strategic arms
officially assuring parity ~ietween the two superpowers, but in fact
culminating in sufficient Soviet supremacy to insulate Moscow from a
situation like the Cuban missile crisis in 1963~
; In ttie meantime, within the Empire, it was a question of maintaining Moscow's
hold on the "sister countries," of reestablisfiing the psycho�-political
monolithism of the toCaliry and of conCinuing Che strenthening of the military
and economic potential of the USSR, thanks in part to the technological and
~ Etnancial Support of the capitalist countries attracted by the prospects
; of the Soviet market.
Q
This overall plan was, of course, perfectly logical. It was still necessary
to correctly determine the principal direction of the new strategic maneuver.
~ In our opinion, it is Chere that the Soviet strategists made a serious
' mistake by settin~ up the combination "Middle East-Africa" as tfie principal
theatre, while being forced to take massive action in Asia.
; The origin of this mistake in the first place was tfie fact tfiat Moscow was
not always able to accept the idea--and this in spite of the 1969 events--that
the principal enemy of the USSR was China. Prisoners of their legend of
champions of anti-imperialism, the Soviet oligarchs, steered in this
~ direction, moreover, by Fidel Castro and their progressive Arab clients, were
' thus induced to take priority action in a tfieai:re wfiich was of much greater
interest to the United States and Enrope than China.
It is very possible, moreover, that the KGB, whose decisive role in the
system we pointed out above, was the origin of both the questionable
; strategic choice and the type of actions taken in connection therewith.
As a matter of fact, these actions were to be different from the previous
operations at one and the same time as regards their scope, their incisive-
ness and the fact that at times they involved direct recourse to the Soviet
; armed forces.
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tn ~h~ M~antim~ China.~~
[ly ed?~ccntraeing Cheir ~ffort~ on a eh~aCr~ ahieh ehould have r~main~d
~eCdnu~ry, Sdvi~t gerge~gi~e~ h~d grave~y sinned agaittst the bagie imp~ra-
cive df ~v~ry ~CraCegy~ Added eo ehig ~in was a gubsequenC gnd no leeg
yeri~us error in rhe psy~ho~political sector, namely ehat, in Cheir hatred
Far tt~~ Chin~~~, tih~ Japan~~~ wou].d never dar~ eo ~~gn an accord wieh them
which would upgeti Mngcow. WhaC is more, Che diplomat~ and Cheki~C
~tuscoviCe~ ~n Clt~g mate~r w~re goi.ng eo cumulaee faux pae and gaf~es by
i�~d1~~~1y humiliaeing eh~ Japatt~~e and litierally puebing Chem inCO Che
.~rm~ af rh~ Chinesp~
At eh~ ~~m~ time, eitese s~lfsame specialiges showed that they we~.r~
incMpnble of ~xploiting th~ poge-Maoist geirrings of rhe fall-ainCer 1976
to the ben~fiC af ehe USSit~
tn eh~ meaneim~, China, which wae able Co recover a cerGain degree of
equilibrium, h~d in 1977 sCarCed a vast psycfio-political and diplomatic
co~mteroffensive culminating in series of tangible resulte, auch as
Sino-indt~n rgpprochement and ~ veritable triendehip ereaty w3Ch North Korea~
'Chus thc eysential pieces in Che isolation and encirclemenC maneuver against
China were transform~d in neighboring couneries inCo friendly intentions.
5ince Bangladesh had already normalized iCa relations with China; and
Pakisean had no reason to Fireak its ties of friendshtp with the latter,
while Burma was not hostile to China, there no longer could be talk of
encirclement.
itowever, embarked on their great African adventure supporting Neto in Angola
and p3rCicipating in the imperialist campaigns of Che crnmnunist armies of
- c;olonel Mengistu and obsessed 6y the course of events in the Middle East,
the Soviet strategists were unable to compensate for these setbacks except
for a coup d'etat in Afghaniatan and consolidation of their posit~ons in
Vie[nam and Laos.
What is moet asronishing, however, ia the fact that these strategists were
successively surprised on 12 August 1978 by the tfiunderbolt of the Sino-
Japanese peace treaty, on 17 September 1978 by tfie Camp David accords, and
on 16 Uecember 1978 by announcement of the diplomatic recognition of Cfiina
b;? tt~e Uni~ed States, with the corollary of the triumphal trip to the _
United States by Deng Xiaoping.
'i'f~e Iranian Interlude
Ftowever, this series ot setbacks was to be otfset for the Kremlin by the
sudden acceleratior.of the revolntionary process in Iran. There, too,
initially Moscow fiad been taken by surprise; however, that surprise was of
short duration. Havin~ a large snbversive and well-structvred organization
at its disposition on site, the USSR Was in a position to benelit from the
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dppnrtunity afF~r~d ~nd nteempCed to itt~lu~nce eh~ r~volutinn~ry prnc~~g t~
it~ adv~nl~ge, tn ~ceordanc~ witt~ prev~n m~thod, ehe m~neuv~r w~g eo t~ke
pl~ep nt two l~velg,
Ui~carding itg Clunde~Cinp op~r~Cian, eh~ Tud~h wa~ abl~ to pr~g~nr iCself
~ regpdngtblp poliei~al pnrty offering its ~upport Co Ch~ buiLu.~ng of en
I~lgtniC tt~public wiehin whi~h it int~nded eo play a part, At ehe sam~ timp,
~he KC,B benefited frnm the placing of Ch~ "SAVAK" and eh~ gpeciel military
~ gerviceg hors d~ ~nmbaC ~nd frnm ~n almo~r Coeal freedom to infilCrat~
~v~rywher~--including the ~rm~d forc~g "in eh~ proc~g~ of demoGratixaCion"
~nd Ch~ n~w "Islamic poliee."
Thug, in Che p~riod of 3 monCfis, the impoging pro-We~eern bastion represenC~d ~
by the iraninn ~mpire wa~ moving in the direcCion of eransformaCion inCo a
, neueral Muslim sCate in th~ procesg of falling enCirely wiehin Che Soviet
~pher~ df influ~nCp. How~v~r, ehig unquestioned succe~s,~obtained at one
~nd eh~ ~nm~ time ~t rh~ ~xpens~ of ehe Wegeern countiri~s and China~ seemed
also tn includ~ ~evpral poe~nCia1 d~nger~ for ehe USSR itself. Among Chese,
we might noCe in the firse p1aCe the rigkg dg a gpread to the Soviet Muslim
; repu6liCS of Iran's religious conflagraeion or rhe possible development of
generalized chaos in the Iranian-Afghan situaCion with contagious effects
for the nonnative populaCions o� the USSR nnd~ finally, the economic
consequences for the Cgucasus of a prolonged halt in Che deliveries of -
' Iranian nt~tural gas.
~ The Chinese Reply
This 5oviet success in Iran, combined with VieCnam's challenge to China,
caused i'ekin~ to Cake direcC action against this inveteraCe ally of the
USSR. This time it was no longer a question of a quick-strike operation,
as against India in 1962 but of a real war--that is, of a new approach to
total strategy, which had up to now excluded "gambles." By taking the risk
on this occasion or resorting to force, the Chinese strategists apparently
were aiming at a triple ob~ective:
--to take their revenge on the Vietnamese leaders who had caused them to
lose face by invading Cambodia;
--to sCrike a blow at the prestige of the USSR which reportedly was
dissuaded directly by the Chinese nuclear potential and indirectly by the
United States;
--to precipitate the evolution of World War V in the direction of an
- equation in which the Soviet Union would finally find itself isolated,
to wit:
C + J + U.S. + E (R � S)
As we write these words, the situation still has not been clarified. Of
course, no country openly supports China; however, condemnations of its
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~~~inr? are Cnming princi.p~lly grom th~ aii~~~ of the U5SIt. Japan do~~ noe
wi~h en ~~p iti~~lf pull~d itteo ~ faeal siCuaeion by ie~ n~w g11y. Th~
~ Unitpd 5eaCps ia ~rill hdlding tio ies pr~viou~ ecripe, even Chough ehe ~v~ntis
in Irati, are inciCing iC eo etiffen ies po~iCion vis-a-vie ehe USStt. Europe,
nue b~ing a politiicel ~neiey, cannoC Einglly hav~ any aer~ous influence.
1lowever, nne m~y w~11 wond~r wheCher, in eime, tihe riek Ca'~en by Peking
will nn~ permiti the Chi~neae to attain tiheir ob~ectiive~ by 8ri.ving the Sovi~C
Unidn inrn ~ dramaric cho~.ce:
--tio effecCively re~ore to force;
--or eo attempt ~ regl opening tnward Che Wese, and Chat in a position of
weakness.
Of courae, ie is no legs pog~ible ehat China will not be a61e Co aCtain
tlie reeult~ expeceed and that, Under the combined pressure of iCa nea
friendg, e~he Unieed 5CaCes and Japan, and ita "communiat enemies," it arl.11
be forced Co withdraw, thus giving Vieenameae propaganda an opportuniCy to
claim viceory.
In such an eventuality, which would be effectively equivalent to a serious
defear, China could very we11 experience a new domestic crieis with
consequences that are difficult to foresee.
That said, whatever the ouCcome of thia Sino-Vietnameae war, one tbing seema
certain to us, namely that World War V has now enCered an excessively
criCical phase. As a matter of fact, Moscow ia convinced that since the ~
end of the last year a real alliance existe bet~aeen the Western countries
and the Sino-Japanese pa:i.r and that the total Chinese atrategy is manipulat-
ing the totality against the USSR. For lack of ability to repudiate ita own
view of the world, which would have permitted it to deCacfl tfie United States ~
and Europe from their disturbing Asian allies, the Muscovite oligarchy can
only intensify tbe struggle at tfie world level.
Without speaking of Asia where Che sitnaCion can only worsen, we must _
because of this fact expect a renewal of tension in the Middle East, new
pockets of conflict in Africa and, above all, a serions crisis in Europe
where it is highly proba6le tfiat Che USSR will be induced to take Romania
~ back in hand and perhaps to even intervene in Yugoslavia. This would pro-
duce complicaCions of the most dangerous kind to the point that the
possibility of a Soviet power strike against Western Europe cannot be excluded.
Even though, at thisjuncture, that is an extreme hypothesis, it is not so
improbable as it might seem at first sight--a1L the more so becauae th~
Western alliance is far from constituting a coherent deterrent entity.
Of course, a dramatic development in the conflict now in progress could be
modified by the consequences of a possible power strnggle in the Kremlin,
in tbe event Leonid Brezhnev and other leadere are forced to resign, for
one reason or another.
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t~dx drrtc;~AL USL dNLY
~00'CNOT~S
Mi~hel Gnrder, born in 191G, former guperi~r offi~er of the U~MS (?Bur~au
nf 5uperidr Milit~ry Srudi~s] dnd a close cdllaboraCor of G~neral B~~ufre
gr Che ~'rencti In~eitute of SerntegiC Srudi~~~ Now pr~eident of eh~ Toenl
SCrnC~gy Study Grnup (CCSTC) ~nd vice pre~idettC ot Che Cpnrpr for Ch~ SCudy
d@ ~~st-~Jegt Problem~ iri rtunicTi. Author of :"HisCory of th~ Sovi~t Army,"
"Mao zedong," "A W~r Unlike tE~e OeA~re," "Tfi~ G~rman~Sovi~t War" (a work
whiGh rec~ived ~n award from eh~ Ac~demi~ ~'rancaise), "Th~ Agony of the
it~gime in 5nvier itus~ia" and "The S~creC War of Chp Freneh Spe~ial S~rvic~~~"
1~ Thig was done in ehe USSttne~r eh~ end nf Ch~ 19~0'~ by n fnrmer t~gri~t
general, Sveechine, who moved ineo th~ service of the Bolsheviks. Cone~dered
one of ehe best Itussian military thinkers, he atas liquidated in 193~.
2. Th~ consolidation of Chis power wae accompliehed lik~ a war. The
country wAS transformed intio an int~rnal Ch~atre of th~ total ~trat~gy wieh
itg hecatombs and itr d~ath campg.
3. The comintern was di~eolved in 1943.
4. W~ propose to deal wiCt~ Chis problem in a apecial study on miliCary
straCegy wittiin the framework of total strategy~
COPYRIGHT: 1979, Strategique
814 3
C50: 3100
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FoR oz~icint, uas ornY ~
COUN'i'~tY ~~C~I'~ON ~TALY
CitAXI INT~RV~EW~D ON PIVOTAL ROLE 0~' PSI
Mi.l~?n L' ~UROPEO in Ztalian ~ Jun 79 pp 8-11 '
~mex~~ In tihi~ ~xclu~~.v~ ~.nterv3e~v tihe Soo3.~1-
isb l~~der expla3.n~ how ~he pSI can become the
cri~3c~]. �ulcrwn in the power relat3onsh3.ps
be~ween Chris~~.an Democrats and Communis~s. '
Th~ Social3.st Party Secr~tary has been the eye of ~he polemical ~
storm 3n tihia elecbion c~mps?3gn, a hard one for tihe PSI which '
reporbedly did not want early elecb3ons, and~ fail3ng postpone- '
men~, fs s~3d to h~ve wanted them to be held along with the Eu- ~
ropean elect3ons, at the very lea~t. Commun3sts and Christ3an -
Democrats have char~ed Cr~xi with purposely witholding commit- -
ment on h3g poat-election pol3cy plans. Pannella tried every '
w~y he kn~w to encroach on his turf. It looked to many politi- ~
ca1 observers as if Craxi, except for repeating hia demand that f
Mdreotti must go after 3 June, were trying tA leave both his !
options open: either a government with aupport from tlie Com- j
munists or a deal with the DC ahould the PCI choose to stay in {
the opposition. In this interview~ granted to EUROPEO practi- '
cally on the eve of the electiona~ Craxi takes his first clear-
cut stand on the government: "We do not have the requisite con- ;
ditions~" he says, "or if we do~ they are not yet ripe for an ;
- overall alternative to the DC.'~ '
~
[Question] You have suggested a"contract" wit}: all the voters ,
to guarantee $ years of governability and stability. It has been ;
argued that this was your way of announcing your candidacy for
the office of prime minister. Should the PCI fail to get DC ;
approval for its entry into the cabinet and~ at the same time~ `
~the DC wou].d not allow the PSI to head the government and offer ~
~uarantees for the reforms the PSI calls for~ what position would ~
you take? ~
[Answer] I suggested a"contract with the voters'~ so that one I
of our greatest parties could be made part of a serious aearch `
F
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~
~ ~nt~ un~i u s~ri.nu~ con?m~.~mnnL ~o ~~~bi~~.~y ~nd ~nvarn~b~.1~.t,y.
I a].~o ttddc;d bh~ti, as 3s only n~~ura1.~ no~ every~h~.ng dopdnds on
i mn~ n~ cnurs~.
~ We ~r~ nnt going ~o s~u~f a11 ~he vo~es 3.n ~ drawer, and we ~re _
no~ gu~.ng to w3.badr~w ~o ~he Avent3ne H3.11 and w~~ch Italy dr3ft
rudd~rl~ss. ~ hav~ no~ ~nnounc~d my candidacy �or pr3.m~ m3.nis~er.
'rhe bC h~s not o~�erod me the post~ and I th3.nk 3.t wi11 be very
~ careful nob bn do so. ~f bhe voters �a3.1 bo respond ~o thn DC~s
plen ~or conf~.rmati3on 3.n ~ po~3.~3on of primacy ~nd h~gemony ~h~t
h~s lt~s~~d 30 y~~rs, ~hen w~ c~n r~ise the 3ssue o~ A non-Chris-
~3~n D~mocr~t ~.~~derahip in governmen~. It is more 1ikel.y~ in
; any c~se~ ~h~~ ~ non-DC oandidecy wi~.1 emerge from ~he conflu-
~ enc~ ~nd agreement of the non-DC parties.
i
, Shou~.d ~lie +~ituation af~er the elecb3ons remain rig3.d~ as Z fear
~ 3.ti W~.ii, ~t~en we gn~?ii trY to opera~e and to ~ake an ac~3ve part
; ~ust tih~ same, know3.ng ~h~t th~ margins w3.11 be n~rrow. I� ~he
' voters cnunt us outi of the game, then we shall be ou~. But in
that event, tihe s3.tuation wi11 sti11 be ungovernable. If on ~he
; other hui~d the balloting reflects a significant 3mprovement over
tihe curren~ situation, then we sha11 move to the ini~iative. In
any case, ~nybody who wants our votes wi11 hnve to give us~ gua-
rantees oF changes changes in men, in direction, in domestic
and international policy and in socio-economic policy and of
verifiable consist-,ency in government.
In a diff icult situation, we can negotiate for our support in
' Parliament.
If the paths to broader cooperation should open up again, we can
promise our direct participation in the government. The Commun-
ists are locked into a cut-and-dried position. We are not of
that opinion. The Socialist pledge to make Italy governable and
stable has been approved by the Party, and is not just a gimmick
I invented for campaign purposes. The Party is also on record
as refusing to ~o back to the center-left coalition, and as ask-
ing for a commitment from the entire left against the DC. No-
where is it written that this commitment has already become an
utter impossibility. It will be facilitated by a Socialist af-
firmation.
[Question] The PSI seems to be caugh-~ in a vise, with the PCI
squeezing it from one side and the DC from the other. I know
you have already been asked this question many times, but don't
you feel it necessary to spell out once more, in a few very clear
points, your position toward the DC and the PCI, so as to avoid
any accusation or suspicion of ambiguity?
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i
CAnr~w~r~ ~n tho ~~a~.3.an po~.3.t3.ca~. sys~em, a b3.po~.~r trend and a ~
bipo~.~r s~ruc~;ure have emerged. was no~ th3.s way a~ �:i.r~~~ _
in ~hn ~�berma~h o� WW ther~ were sp~.3.ts and errora w3.thin the ~
Soc~ a~.i~~ mov~men~. Tha~, ~hough, is sp3~.t m3.1.k~ and now we are ~
~.n u cnmp~.e~e~.y di�ferent situat3on~ but one which can neverthe~
lnss be ch~ng~d, ~.eas~ 3n ~he direct3.on it w3.11 ~ake.
Tt 3s posssiblo ~o rebu~.~.d a Soc3.a1.3.s~ force, a th3.rd �orce in re- ~
~.ation to the rul3.ng bipolar3sm~ thus substantial~.y alter3ng the ~
~ermss of ~he democrat3c dialectic.
Tho PSZ has defended and w3.1~. continue to defend its own identity I
and autonomy, and is mak3.ng every ef�ort not to alide~ or slida
b~ck into a subordinate role in relation to the major parties. ,
A11 this is o� course very dif�icu7.t. The major parties oppose
any possible growth of the PSI. On thia score as a ru1e~ aside ;
�rom differences of weighting to be found in both UC and PCZ
r~nks~ ~hey are in complete agreement. They want to have the PSI i
alongside them 3.ri an auxiliary poaition. The PSI, on the con- ~
trary, is pressing within the left through a clarifying ac~3on
to hasten the PCI~s process of revision and international autonomy i
and is asking, �or th3.a reason too, that we begin working toward
a new balance of power; �rom a position on the left it is mov- ~
ing to build up a force that can challenge the hegemonic role of ~
the DC, the prevalence within its ranks of crippling contradic- !
tions amd 3.n many instances of strictly conservative poaitions, '
and moving to exercise effective influence on the relative majo-
rity party. We do not have the requisite conditiona or, if we do,
they are not yet ripe for an overall alternative to the DC. Ours
is a democratic strategy, a strategy of progress. With a weak ~
PSI, there will be in the long ruri destabilization not only of
the PSI unable to maintain a policy of autonomy and of social.ist
initiative without broader support in the nation, but there will
in fact be destabilization of the system itself. That would be ;
a disastrous road to take. The only people who would drink to
such an event would be those in the law-and-ord~r bloc and those
who can think only in frontist terms. Then again, a shaky majo-
rity behind a narrow government, such as the Social Democrats
advocate, would merely heighten the tensions and turbulence in
the nation a thousandfold.
Little by little, as we increase our capacity to look at issues
with a broader view, a European and international view, we shall
understand much better the anomaly of the Italian situation and
the need to restore to the socialism movement the atrength and
the ability to influence it once had, but failed to use in the
right way.
[Question] Pannella claims to have the same concept of the PSI
when he says he wants a big Socialist Party to fight the hegemony
of the DC and the PCI. Doesn't it seem to you that, once again,
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the PSr t?n~ p~zvnd ~h~ way i,o suoc~ss ~or obhnr piart~.c~s ( a~ 3.~
d3.d fnr th~ PC~, Cor ex~zmpJ.c~ in ~.q'76)~ in v~.ew nC bhn ~uc~ tiha~
the Radic~ls~ picking up Sdci~~.3.~t arguments, suem now ~o be
compebii~b m~iii~.y wi~h ~he PS~7
~AnswGr] Wc; ~r~ mor~c concerned with the major p~r~iGS tihan w3.~h
!'~rin~llu. We arc IlOt l~st~in~; out ~t ~hem~ exc~pt 3n lagi~:tm~tc;
sc'li'-dafer~se. ~hat dofense beoomes spirited wh~n ~h~y ~end td
1ay claim to values and ~chievemen~s that belong to us~ a~.bei~
not excl.usively.
In this country, on issues o� civil. righta and women~s rights,
the Socialisbs have b~en the pioneers and ~he le~ders o� the
bat~~.e. The Radical Party also makes use of non-Socialisb argu-
ments. There wi11 be a greab Socialist Party in Ztaly, too~ and
it wi11 be centered first of a11 on the stren~h And momentum of
the drivc for renewa~. sparked by the PSZ.
[Question] Zn Genoa you said that Andreot~i mus~ go and that you
would reveal the reasons why he cannot be prime minister again
a�ter the elections, should the DC insisti on backing him. Can~t
you tell the voters wha~ those reason are right now?
[Answer] I don't have the file in my drawer; since the DC is
no~ pusl~ing it, I'm not pushing it either. I shall tell the
voters what I think in political terms. It is not true that, in
a democracy, power erodes those who do not have it. This is
true in a sick democracy, one that is depressed, bogged down in
the sticky mire o� patronage.
I think that the new government must have new leadership. The
current leadcrship .is clearly tired and worn outy There is no
punitive intent here. There is a need for change which we call
attention to, as others have as well. Nor is it true that a name
is indissolubly linked with a political line. Andreotti has lent
his name to many different formulas and different political lines.
One need only read the history books from 1947 onward and think
back over the political events of recent years.
[Question] Felipe Gonzales was forced to resign from the Spanish
Socialist i~orkers~ Party (PSOE) secretariat because the Party ~
congress had reaffirmed the mass, class, and Marxist nature of
the Party. The NEW YORK TIMES has stated that Craxi~s grand de-
sign is to make the Socialist Party socialdemocratic. This is
the very thinly veiled charge the Communists are levelling at
you, and the one that cost Gonzales his job. Aren~t you afraid
of ineeting a similar f ate?
[Answer] Gonzales chose to resign; nobody asked him to do so.
I do not believe that the differences that have srung up within
the PSOE are purely ideological in substance. European Socialism
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i'UK Url'.LI..LHL U~~ UNLr
I
cunno~, ~.n any country, sea~. it~e~.� 3n~ide a she~.~ of dogmat3.c
~.d~ology. There 3.s no one ~rue achoo~. and there can nnver bo
orio of'�3.cia~. idno~.ogy. rn ~h3s sense, Gonza~.es 3.a r3.gh~. As '
~'ar we ~r~ concerned, Marx3.s~s and non-Marx3.sts coex3.at 3n
tho PSI. The same th3ng 3.s happening ~.n Franco, in Germany, in
Englnnd, and 3n the o~her European countr3.ea. There 3.s a dia~.oc~
t3.ca1 plura~.3.am that als the hallmark of European Soc3.al3.st Par- ~
t3.es.
7.'he appella~3.ons o� Social3.st and Socia]. Democrat3.c have some
h3.s~or3.c value. They re�lect a di��erent path beaten by the
~.~bor and workers~ movement 3.n thoae European countries~ and
~heir d3.verae doctrinal 3.nfluences. Today we are witnesaing a
marked rapprochement a~ the level. of pr3.nciples and programs
atriOI~'~,* ~'.~'10 various components o� ~he great �am31y of European
SOC].A1.].S1ri.
The "Social Democx~atic~~ appellation is foreign ~o Italian trad3.- ,
tion. Even Giuseppe Saragat~ when he �ounded his party back in
~.947~ called it the Sociali~t Workers~ Party~ and d3d not adopt -
the present label until ~.ater. Thia is why we have to ].ook and ~
see just how much� concret~e~ practical. significance there is in
these disparate denominations. There 3a no question but that we ~
set out to build a modern Socialist Party in Italy, taking its~~
ins~iration �rom re�ormism and democracy, and its vocation from
internationalism and Europeanism. Upon those foundations we !
have begun the course of renewal and modernization of the PSI. � i
I have heard this and other accusations before. ~
I
In a world moving toward the 21st century~ some forms of secta- ~
rianism are �rankly ar~haic. It is water that has passed, and ~
it will no longer turn the millwheel. For that matter, even the ~
PCI, behind its "communist� label~ is no longer quite sure what ~
communism it espouses. It has no shortage of orthodox old-liners ~
that make the same charges against it aa it does against us.
i
Within the Party the platform I presented and defended at the !
congress and which I defend before the voters is at once ideolo- I
gical, political, and programatic. and it is backed by a far '
greater consensus than superficial or ill-intentioned observers ,i
would have you think. ~
[Question] The PSI is taking strong positions against the con- ,i
struction of new nuclear power plants. Is it ready to make an ~
anti--nuclear commitment a criterion for participation in possible ~
majorities after the elections?
+
[Answer] In 1977, the PSI did not aupport the vote of approval i
in Parliament an the energy policy motion. Since that�time, 1
a number of important events have deepen~2i our reservations and i
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~
~ hui~;~htonad our conoc;rn. ~~1.~n s~har~ s~me vicws recen{;ly stu~ed
by our comradc~ Man~.io Itossi-bori~. ~n a~.mos~ c;very coun~ry,
i
; nuc~.ear prngr~ms h~ve s~.nwed down.
; "The gravest problems conncc~ed w:i.th ~he safe~y o~ these p~.~ntis
i h~ve yet ~o be so~.ved. ~'he rising opposition to them among the
; peoplns conccrned is visiblc on cvery side. I'ur~thermore, the
~ vasti d~ve].opr:~ent oF research in~o u~i:1.3.zat~.on o~ c~ther energy
~ sources m~k~~t it possible ~o ~.ook a~ ~h~ energy supp~.y problem
~ �rom a dif�eren~ vi~wpoint. w~ii, as even ~he d:ied-~.n-the-woo~.
proponents c~~ nuclear power h~ve ~dmi~ted, we kiiow ~ha~ ~he ~irst
I po~r~t, from new nu~~e~r sources wi~.1 not come until somet~.me a�ter
~ 1g9o. The governmen~~s proposed energy program, ~hough, gives
~ nucle~r power top priority. We be~.ieve this program must be
; drast3ca11y revised. Befor~ we go ventur3.ng off onto shaky ground
i we must devise and 3.mpl.ement a broader-gauged stra~egy that will
give us immedia~e returns, one focused on careful planning o�
j cons~unption and on al~ern~tive energy sources.
In whatever negotiations may arise~ we shall maintain a clear
' and very firm position on this issue.
( COPYRIGHT: i979 Rizzo~.i Edi~ore
6i8z
CSO : ,3~.04
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C0~ ~'~1tY S~CTION SPAIN
i
MOVE TO CENTER SEEN IN SOCIALYSTS' PR~CONGRESS DEBATE
i
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 12 Aug 79 p 24 LD ;
[Unattributed report: "Socia~.ists Seek Their Center"] ~
[TexC] The Spanish Socialist Workers ParCy's [PSOE] debate leading up to ~
its exCraordinary congreas in September ha~ now enCer~d the home streCch. '
We are now a long way away from Che clashes, criticisma and even ineults ~
in the press by represeneative~ of tha two wings--"moderate" and "radical,"
accordfng to the perhaps too approximate and hasty classification of many !
aectora of the media--which repreaent the two opposing atances which emerged
from the 28Ch PSOE Congress in May. ;
i
Several observers both inside and outaide the party point out ChaC the
climat�~ of "moderation" apparent in the three [as publiahed] groups will ;
facilitaCe aomething which these circlea now regard as inevitable: ~
Felipe Gonzalea' quintesaential and unqualified triumph. j
The clash between the radicala--represented mainly by Francisco Buatelo, ;
Luis Gomez L'lorente and Pablo Castellano--and'tha moderates who apparently ~
supported Felipe and the members of his last executive took a surpriaing ~
turn at the 21 July assembly of the Madrid Socialist Federation which is ;
perhapa the most influenCial in the state because of ite ability to .
"impregnate" other peripheral federationa. �
,
The surprise was apparently the defeat of the report called "The 59 theses"
whose apparent leaders are Joaquin Almunia Barranco and Enrique Baron by '
Bustelo's radical report as a result of the pact among aupporters of Che
"third way,"--a report presented by the Madrid municipal section, including
Alonso Puerta, second assistant to the mayor, and national council
chairman Cnrlos Revilla.
The resulting report was a document of synthesie comprising elements from ;
each of the three reports presented at the debate, during which all the
former radicalism of the 28th congresa were considerably reduced. ~
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,
~ox or~~cinr. us~~ ort~:~t
- mhug A1on~o Pu~rta ~nd hig collabor~eore in drafCing nnd pre~enCing rhn
ehird p,~th hnve, as u r~~ulr oE the import~nce of their ~Cgnce~ becnmo
mi~~~c~r~ o~ th~ ~~1tunCinn nnd cnpnble oP eh~ftinq the h~lanca ~tn Madrid
un~: w~~y ar Clie~ oehc:r~ 'L'ha ~nme appliee Co the re~C oE Spnin where,
uletiougl~ 27 aepurate reporta have been praBent+ed by the vurloug federa-
tiong, ehey a11 center on the three geances discussed.
Whil~ Bustelo, Castellano and Llorente's "radicals"--"hardl~nere" in the
party's intern~l elang--have euffered considerably, this also conatituted
~ binw for the repreaentativea of Che "59 eheses"--the "Palmar de Trnya
people," as they are nicknamed in a clear reference to the ChriaCian
' bnckground of some of their leadere, former membere of~the workera
~ syndicul union--whose documenC wae re~ected or subgtantially modified
et numerous meatings of provincial federations.
i H~lfhenrted Rndicals
NeverCheless, in the opinion of all the socialist observers coneulted by
! CAMBIO 16, it seeme thaC the Chesis which euffered most was the "radical"
i thesis, represented apecificnlly by Bugtelo. Although they have announced
Chat they wi11 present a list of candidaCes for the executive and have
' srated that the essential conCent of their criCical report still atande,
many snurces are pointing out the "sudden moderaCion" affecting the
radic,lls of the 28th congress. "I believe," Deputy Enrique Mu~ica, who
represents ~he most moderaCe aector, Cold Chis paper, "that from now on
the so-culled critical sector should be called 'self-critical' becauae
after all the noise they made at the 28t1~ congresa and after the holy
crusade which they are conducting Chroughout Spain, they have so watered
, down their theses that there is nnw practically no difference between
them and the so-called moderates. I have not altered my stance at all.
They are the ones who have changed. They have observed none of their
famous report to the 28th congress."
Enrique Baron, representative of the "59 theses," told CAMBIO 16 that
, "nobody defends the theses of the 28th congress anymore. The radicals
have abandoned their toughest stances. They no longer talk about Marxism
in exclusive terms or about tha claes party; they do not criCicize
the monarchy or consensus and they do not talk about the popular front.
When they saw that they were forced to provide an alternative, they
signed Alonso Puerta's ideological postulates and in the fields of
culCure, autonomy, strategy, tha alliance policy and the economic
program, they accept our postulates. They have gradually espoused our
theses while lowering the level of their radicalism."
With regard to the setbacks being suffered by the "59 theses" report in
some federations, Baron added: "We are satisfied and we believe that
we are winning a great victory. Primarily because we were the firat to
face the consequences of our actions and this involves an element of
risk, a weakening. We were aware of this. But we had a political and
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niornl obl~.ggeion tn come out inCo the open and we were the firse to do so
qu9Ce clearly--nor like oehers who are kaeping gi~.ent and waiting unti~.
tt?~: end. There are many party leaders and parl~.amentariane who have eC~.l1
nor cnmmieted Chems~lvea.,."
Convergence Toward Center
Felipe, among others. The former eecretary general indicated some Cime
~go rhaC he d~.d noC supporC any of the reports, Chough many socialists
s~e his influence in several points in ehe "59 theaes."
The socialisC debate is producing a certain convergence toward Che cenC~r
in stanceg, wiCh ~ moderation among the radicals and a modification of ehe
moderates' moaC uCCr~cCive aspects. As one aociallst deputy told this
p~per, "This shift eoward the center in the etances will make it posaible
for Felipe Gonzalez Co triumph at Che September congress. There is still
one important aeep that must be taken and iCs characteriatics will decide
the outcome of ehe congress: this is the election and appoinement of
delegates, a step which will be eaken in the firs~ week of September."
COPYRIGHT: 1979, INFORMACION, REVISTAS, S.A. '
CSO: 3110 END
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