JPRS ID: 8625 USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS SHIP ACCIDENTS AND DISASTERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 101
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 26
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4
1
SHIP ACCIDENTS AND DISASTERS

2i AUQUST i979 C~OUO Zi!?9~ i OF 2
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~Ott O~~ICtAL US~ bNLY
JPRS L/8625
21 August 1979
USSR Re ort
p
MILITARY AFFAIRS
~FOUO 21 /79) ~
Ship Accidents and Disasters
~B~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL U5E ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
NOTE
JPRS publicarions contain information primarily from foreign
newspapera, pertodicals and booka, bue also from n~ws agency
tranecnissions and bro~dcasts. MaCerials from �oreign-language
sources are translated; those from Engliah-lgnguage sources
are transcribed ~r reprinred, wiCh th~ original. phrasing and
other characCerisCics retained.
Headlines, editorial repr~rCa, and roaterial encloaed in brackeCs
are supplied by JPRS. Processin~ indicators such as [TexC)
or [Excerpt] in the first line of each itiem, or �ollowing Che
last line of a brief, indicate how Che original information was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unf.amiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark P~d enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
ortginal :.ut have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Oth~~r unaCtributed parenthetical notes within the body o~ an
item originate with the source. Times within ~.tems are as
given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
. ~
For f~~rCher information on report conCent
call (703) 351-2938 (economic); 3468
, (political, sociological, military); 2726
(life sciences); 2725 (physical sciences).
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTKICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE OYI.Y.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~
, FOR OF~'~C~AL USE ONLY
J2~R5 L/8625
2~. Augus~ 1979
USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 2~./79 )
SHIP ACCIDENTS AND DISASTERS
Leningrad AVARSI I KATASTROFY KORABLEY in Russian 1977 signed to
pr~ss 10 Jan 77 pp 1-6, 14-15, 30-45, 84-86, 89-90, 92-97, 105-
145, ].97-205, 230-237, 23g-240, 257.-273, 288-291 =
~ (Excerpts from book by I. M. Korotkin, "5udostroyeniye" Publi-
shers, 50,000 copies 296 pages]
CONTENTS PAG~
AnnoCation 1
Original Table of Contents 2
Foreword 7
Fire and Exploaions on the Carrier "Essex' During the Landing
of an Airplane 11
Consequences and Lessons from the Fire Disaster on Che Carrier
~ " ]2
Forrestal
Lessons From the Fire on the "LafayetCe"-"Normandy" 21
Explosion of the Military TrAnsport "Fort Stikene" 23
Explosion of the Vess~l "Grankam" and the Military Transport
~~High Flyer".........;. 24
Analysis of the Eff~e:ts of Fires and Explosions on Ships and
Firefighting Meas~:res 27
Factors in the Fire and Explosion Danger of Ships and Fire-
Fighting Measures 34
- a - [III - U5SR - 4 FOUO~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL'~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~'OR OFFICYAL USE ONLY
� CONT~NTS (ConCinued) p~8e
Analysis of Damage to Shipa During Collisions 56
SCatisCical Analysis S6
Reasono fnr Ship Coll~,aions and Che Nature o~ their
Damage. Preventive M~ea~ures...e........�...� 59
Co nsequences and Les~one from the Disae~er of a
Squadron During a Typhoon 63
When a Group of Light Ships Ran Aground in a Harbor
During A StOI`in~~~~~~~~~��~��~��~~~~~~~~~��~~~�~~�����~~~~~� 6$
Analysis of Shipa Damage from Grounding and from Effecta of
Storms 69
Reasans and Nature o~ Damage Co Ships, Safety Measurea....... 71
Accid~nt Rate of Ships in ~'oreign Fleeta 74
General Reasona for Accidents and Catastrophea of Ships and
their Consequences 79
The Problem o� Ship Safety and Ways for Ita Solution 83
Conclusion.���.~��.~���s~~.�.���~~~~~~~~��~~~~~~~~��~~~~��.~~~~~~� 87
Bibliography 88
-b-
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ANNOTATION
[Text] The book syaCematizes materials on accidenta and
catastrophes af aurface ahipa of navies of the capiCal-
iat countries which occurred as a reault o~ firea and
, internal explosions, colliaions, grounding, and the
acCion of atorma. Measurea which are conducted to in-
crease the aurvivability and safety of shipa are ahown.
The book ia intended for ahipbuildere and aeamen, can
be uaed by studenta,.and ie also of in~erest for a broad
~ range of readera.
1
FOR OFFICYAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~OR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY
ORIGINAL TABLE OF CONTENTS
Fnreword 3
LiaC of Accepted Conventional Abbreviationa 7
Chapter I. Fires and Explosions on Ships 9
�1. Fires and Exploaions on Aircraft Carriers -
1. Fire on the carrier "Essex" during the landing of a fighter -
2. Exploaion of the hydraulic eystem on Che carrier "Leyte" -
3. Explosion on Che carrier "Oriskany" during the landing of a
fighter 10
4. Exploaion of the hydraulic system on the carrier "Bennington" 11
5. Fire on the carrier "Hancock" during the takeoff of a bomber 12
6. Fire in the hangar of the carrier "Wasp" 13
7. Fire in the pump room of the carrier "Midway" 14
8. Fire and explosions on the carrier "Essex" during the landing
of an sirplane '
9. Fire disaster during the outfitting of the carrier
"Conatellation" 15
10. Fire in the engine and boiler room of the carrier "Saratoga" 23
11. Fire on the carrier "Franklin D. Rooaevelt" during the lan~ing
of a fighter 24
12. Explosion in the hydraulic aystem of the carrier "Intrepid" -
13. Explosion during the conveyence of an airplane to the hangar of
~ the carrier "Randolph" ~ 25
14. Big fire in the hangar of the carrier "Oriskany" 26
15. Fire on the carrier "Franklin D. Rooaevelt" while taking onfuel 29
16. Consequences and lessons from the fire disaster on the carrier
"Forrestal" 30
17. Fire on the carri~r "Victorious" at the quay of the shipyard 45
18. Fire and explosions on the flight deck of the carrier
"EnCerprise" 46
19. Fire on the flight deck of the carrier "Independence" 53
20. Fire on the carrier "Forrestal" while at anchor at the base -
, 2
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
FOR O~FICIAL USE ONLY ,
52. Fires and Explosiona on Cruisera, Deatroyera, and Battileships 54
1. Explosion o� the main-caliber turret on the b~ttleah~.p
"Miss~asippi" `
2. Burning o� inaulation on the cruiser "Emden" 56
3. Explnaion of Che main-caliber turret on Che cruiser
"Devonshire" -
4. Exploeion of a bomb on the cru;tser "Vindictive" 57
5. Fires from lubric3ting oils on the des~royer "Bruno Heinemann" 58
6. Fuel fire on the deatrayer "Anton Schmidt" -
7, Fire in the engine room of the destroyer Z24 59
8. Fire in the moCion picture atorage room of the battleship
"Tirpitz" 60
9. Loss of three destroyera from explosion and fire 61
10. Fuel fire 3n the boiler room of the torpedo boat T1 62
11. Three fires on Che destroyer "Jaguar" -
12. Fire and explosion on destroyer Z37 from a collision 63
13. Explosion of the main-caliber turret on the cruiser "Saint -
Paul" 65
14. Fire on destroyer "Hopwell" when rammed by an airplane -
~3. Fires and Explosions on Small Combatants and Minesweepers 66
1. Loss of patrol boat VMV3 to fire -
2. Torpedo boat S101 put out of action l~y fire in the galley -
3. Damage to M-type minesweepers from the combustion of gasoline
vapors 67
4. Loss of minesweeper M27 to fire and explosion 68
5. Fires in engine rooms of torpedo boats S603 and S604 -
6. Fire damage to three minesweepers 70
~4. Fires and Explosions on Auxiliary Vessels -
1. Explosion of miliCary transport "Montblanc" (Halifax disaster) -
2. Capsizing of the troop transport "Lafayette" while extinguish-
ing a fire 76
3. Explosion of the military transport "Fort Stikene" [as trans-
13teratedJ (catastrophe in Bombay) 86
4. Explosion of ammunition carrier "Mount Hood" 90
5. Explosion of the ressel "Grankam" [as transliterated] and the
military transport "Highflower" (Texas caCastxophe) 92
6. Loss of the military transport "Sirius" while extinguishing
a f ire 96
s5. Additional Data on Fires and Explosions on Shipa 97
�6. Analysis of the Effect of Fires and Explosions on Ships and Fire-
Fighting Measures '
1. SCatistical Analysis ' -
2. Factors in fire- and explosion Mazard of ships and fire-
fighting measures 113
3
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
FOk OF~ICIAL USE ONLY
Chapter II. Collieions ~.47 _
g7. Collisions of Surf~ce Ships -
� 1. Collision o� the battl~z cruisers "Hood" and "Renown" -
2. Loas of the destroyer "Fr~ser" in ~oii~.~son with Che cruiser
~~c~].cueca~~ 149
3. Loss of the fleet minesweeper "Hobaon" in coll.isior~ with
Che carrier "Wasp" 150
4. Accident during co113sion of the cruiser "Swiftsure" with Che
destroyer "Diamond" 151
5. Consequencea of tihe collision o~ the desCroyer "Eaton" with
the Uattleship "Wisconsin" 1S2
6. Loss of the torpedo boat "H~6gen" ~n collision wi~h
the ~orpedo boat "Flyuve�isken" 153
7. Damage to tihe desCroyers "Emmen" and "Collett" during their
col~.ision 155
8. Collision of desCroyers "English" and "Wallace L. Lind" 157
9. DamAge to destroyer "I'icking" during its collision with a
carrier 160
10. Loss of the destroyer "Voyager" as a result of collision
wiCh the carrier "Melbourne" 162
11. Heavy damage to destroyer "Frank E. Evans" during iCs cnllision
with the carrier "Melbourne" 165
12. Destruction of the miasile cruiser "Belknap" as a reault of
collision with the carrier "John F. Kennedy" :168
�8. Collisions of Surface Ships with Submarines 170
1. Collision of the battleship "Resolution" wiCh submarine L24 -
2. Loss of the submarine S4 as a result of collision wtCh the
destroyer "Polding" . -
3. Loss of the submarine F14 in collision with the destroyer
"Guiseppe Missuri" 172
, 4. Collision of the cruiser " Ful'giya" [as transliterated] with
the submarine "B~vern" [as transliterated] -
5. Collision of the destroyer "Norris" with the submarine
"Bergoll" 173
6. Collision of destroyer "Tebberer" with the submarine "Diablo" 174
7. Loss the the submarine "Stickleback" in collision with the
destroyer "Silverstein" -
8. Collision of the carrier "Essex" with the nuclear submarine
"Nautilus" 176
�9. Collisions of Surface Ships with Merchant Ships -
1. Reasons for collision of the cruiser "Hawk" with the liner
"Olympic" '
2. Heavy damage to the destroyer "Shaw" during collis~.on with the
liner "Aquitania" 181 -
4
FOR OFFICIE~L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
3. Conaequences of the collision o� two destroyers with two
tankers 183
4. Loss of tihe cruiser "Curacr~o" in co~.lision with ehe liner
"Queen Mary" 184
5. Colliaion of the carrier "Kearsage" with the liner "Oriana" 188
6. Damage eo the carrier "Bunker Hi11" in collision with tihe
tanker "Sidney 5piro" 190
7. Damage to the destroyer "No~rd Brabant" buring the collision
wi~h the cargo ship "Takoma CiCy" 191
~10. Additional Data on Ship Collisions -
~11. Analysis c~� Damage to Ships during Colliaions 197
1. Co1li~ion statis~ics -
2. Reasons for ship collisions and the nature of their damage.
Preventive measures 200
Chapter III. Ships Aground and in Storms 206
_ 512. Carriers, Cruisers, and BaCtleships -
1. Storm damage to carrier "Valley Forge" -
2. Loss of cruiser "Reley" [as tranaliCerated] when stranded
on rocks 207
3. Loss of Che cruiser "Niitaka" [as translitergted] in an
anchorage during a storm 208
4. Stranding on reefs and loss of the cruiser "Takoma" -
5. Heavy damage to the cruiser "Dauntless" when stranded on rocks 209
6. SCranding on rocks and loss of the cruiser "Edgar Kine" [as
transliterated] 210
7. Loss af Che cruiser "Miguel Cervantes" from effects of a storm 211
8. Damage to the criiiser "Boise" when stranded on rocks - -
�13. Destroyers, Torpedo Boats, and Frigates 212
1. Loss oP torpedo boat S2 in stormy weather -
2. Lessons from the capsizing of the torpedo boat "Tomoduru"
in stormy weather 213
3. Stranding on rocks in stormy weather and loss of the destroyer
"Truxton" 214
4. Stranding on rocks and loss of the destroyer "Jorden" 215
5. Stranding on rocks and loss of the d~stroyer "Baldwin" 216
6. Stranding on rocks and salvage of the destroyer "Frank Knox" 217
7. Stranding on rocks and loss of the destroyer ~"Bache" 224
�14. Sea Forces 225
1. Stranding.on rocks and loss of seven destroyers -
5
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
F~'OR OFF'ZCIAL U5~ ONLY
2. Consequence~ ~nd ~.~ysons from the disasrer of n aquadron
dur3ng a eyphonn 229
3. Wfien ~ group of light ships ran aground in ~ hArbor during
n s Corni 236
~15. Sma11 Ships ~nd Auxiliary Vessels 240
1. Stranding on rocks and rescue of the gunboat "Dudar da la
Gre" [as Cransliterated] -
2. Running aground and 7.oss of the military transport
"Angamos" [as Cratislitierated] 242
3. Loss of eh~~ minesweeper "Petersfield" on the rocks in
s tormy we ather -
4. Destructi~an of tihe transport "Pioneer Mews" when it was
stranded o~n rocks and salvage operations 243
5. A.ccidential damage and repair of the repair ship "Corpus
Christi Bay'' 244
- 516. Additional Data on Che Grounding of Ships and the Effects of
Storms 247
�17. Analysis of Ships Dam~ge from Grounding and from Effects of
Storms 251
1. ~SCatistical characteristics -
2. Reasons and nature of damage to ships. 5afety measures 253
Chapter IV. 5ome Results and Problems 257
�18. Accident Rate of Ships in Foreign Fleets -
1. AccidenC statistics -
2. General reasons for accidents and catastrophes of ships and
their consequences 261
519. The Problem of Ship Safety and Ways for its Solution 268
Conclusion 272
Appendix 1. Ships lost by fire and explosions 274
Appendix 2. Ships lost in collisions 277 _
Appendix 3. Ships lost by running aground and from effects of storms 281 -
Bibliography 288
6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
i
FOIt OP'FICIAL USE ONLY
n
FOREWOFtD
[Text] Sea-going and operaC:Lonal (combat) properties of shipa are usually de--
- termined under laboratory conditions on models, 3n the courae of full-scale
tests of the ships and their equipment, and using calculations. Howev er, Chis �
_ is not enough. The quality of the personnel and the stage of Cheir pr epared-
ness for the use and operation of the ships may not be completely dieclosed
during the development and testing of ships. Errors and favorable aspects of
~ a ship and crew (Che "man-equipment" system) sue learned most compleCely dur-
ing practical sailing and service. The weak aspects of people and equipment
. are exposed and sCand out in bmldest relief during accidents. _
Consequently, one of the most ef�ective methods for discovering shortcominga
(positive aspects) of ships and crews is the study of accidents.
The study of ship accidents permits us to substantiate conclusi.ons for the
improvement of ship technical and design elements, for improving their sea-
going and operational (combat) qualities, and to make useful recommendations
to improve the ability of ahips crews and increase Cheir discipline and or�-
ga,lization. As experience shows, the main reasons for the ma~ority of acci-
denCs and catastrophes of ships are rooted namely in the errors and oversights
of seamen and shipbuilders.
The requirements for the design and construction of ships were improved
as were the manuals, rules, and instructions for their use on the basis of
lessons from accidents and catastrophes. Thus, for example, the capsizing of
the torpedo boat "Tomoduru" served as the impetus for a review of the stability
standards rf the main classes of Japanese ships which were considered in the
construction of new ships for the Japanese fleet prior to World War II and
during the war. Fires on the carriers "Oriskany," Forrestal," and "Enter-
prise" forced the naval authorities of the United States to adopt a number of
radical measures to increase the fire safety of carriers and other classes of .
ships. After the loss of the nuclear submarine "Thresher" much was changed
in the requiremenCs for the design and construction of the U.S. submarine
fleet as well as in ~he manuals on navigation in submarines and their use.
In the commercial fleet, the loss of the "Titanic" was the impetus toward the �
elaboration and adoption of the first "InternaCional Convention on the
7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
- ~'Olt 0~'FICIAL US~ ONLY =
Protec~ion of Human Li�e ~t 5ea," and the "Andrea Doria" c~tt~sCrophe was Che
impetus for a regular review of the convention which was 3.n effeci: and its ~
adoption in new form.
'1'he conclus~.nns which wer~ drgwn from the maCerials on accidents and ~nC~-
struphes became the poinrs of departure not only �or the elaboraCion of
measures and recommendations of a practical nature, but a~.so for Che develop-
ment of shipbuilding theory and other naval sciences.
The study of the accident of Che "Rusalka" marked the atart of S. 0. M~karov'e
many years of study by which lie formed the basis for the study or a ahip's
uns:inkability, while the loss of the "Victoria" served as ~he occasion far
his development of a number of practical scientific methods in the gtudy and
improvement of ship unsinkabili~y.
In his numerous investigations in the theory of shipbuildin$, Academician
~ A. N. Krylov often turned to various instrucrive accidents. It was he who
wrote a number of works especially on the accidents of ships which subsequently
were combined in Che work, "Several Cases of Accidents and the Loss oF -
Ships" [90].
At one t:ime, many theoretical studies were conducted in connection with Che
capsizing of the ironclad "Kepten" [as Cransliterated]. The physics of the
phenomenon of vessels mutual "suction" became a sub~ect for study on the
~ basis oF the case of collision of the cruiser "Hawk" with the liner "Olympic."
Important scientific-experimentar studies were conducted in the field of ship
strength in connection with the break-up of the destroyer "Cobra." There are
a great many such examples. Some ~ccidents and shipwrecks became literary
classics and became part of the literature which discusses various questions in
shipbuilding and navigation.
SovieC literature conCains no books in which a scientific-technical analysis -
of the facts concerning accidents and catastrophes of Coday's warships would
be accomplished. The book by K. P. Puzyrevakiy, 'bamage to ships, Damage
Control, and Rescue Work"[92] describes~events from the period of World ~
War II.
Meanwhile, it is namely during recenC decades that a great number of accidents
ar_d catastrophes occurred on foreign ships (without combat e�fecCs) which must
be studied to extract useFul lessons from Chem. Data on such accidents are
scatCered among various f~reign sources, primarily periodicals which frequently
have a contradictory and ~tendentious nature.
Books on this sub~ect which have been published abroad during the last 10-15
years cannot satisfy the Soviet reader. For example, K. C. Barnaby [97] and
H. W. Baldwin [96] examined only individual cases of accidents with warshipa
~ and merchanC vessels. Furthermore, Chese books contain facts which do not
go beyond the liniCs of World War II. The two-volume publication by C.
- Hocking [102] has a reference-book nature and records (with a number of in-
accuracies and distortions) cases of the loss of ships and vessels during
8
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~OEt O~F'ICYAL US~ ONLY
ehn n~riod af 1g24-1962~ Th~a ine~r~~ring bo~k by F'. Ru~hbrnok [4~ tihrow~ light
an r.he questiona of fire~ and fir~ proe~cC~.on on merchanC ve~~el~ alon~, whil~
I'~ t'adfi~ld r71] ~xamin~d only 3ndividuel accidenC~ which occurr~d durin~
. cnllision~ ~E ~ttipg and Vp~H81g without tih~ir eyetematic gnaly~i~~
'Co n c~rtgin ~xt~:~t , ehig book f il.t~ Che g8p in thie nr~a. It ~yg C~mnt3z~~
~nd g~n~rnllzeg t.1ie ~xperienc~ of ueCid~nts and caCa~exoph~s of eurface ship~
in ~h~ ngvi~g of capit~liyt cauntrie~ which occurr~d a~ g r~guLt of fir~s and
explo~ion~, during nolligic:ns, ~nd ag a re~ult of running aground and the
effecCg of storms.
Using ~pecific ~xampl~g, tih~ auChor analyzea the reason~ for accidants and
tMe naCur~ af th~ dam~~~ to shi.pg, eh~ deaign feature~ which ensure eheir
~urviv~bility, the nctidn~ of Che p~r~onnel in the ~truggl~ for survivability,
and in g~me cas~g the orggnizaClon of ~glvage operations and the r~pair nf
dgmag~d ~hips. Where poggible, in ~h~ anal.yais of each type of accidenc an
evaluation i~ made of ehe ships' design and ~ctions of the crew under emer-
gency conditiona ag we11 gs of the measurea wh3ch are being adoptr~l in fnreign
fl~et~ to inctease ghip gurvivability and safety.
The book invegtigat~s accidentg and ~atasCrophes of all the basic ~lasgeg of
~urfac~ ghips as we11 as nf auxiliary naval veaeels. Chapters I, II, and III
cover individual types nf accidents, while Chapter IV sums up some results
and draw~ ~oncluaions about wnys to reduce the accident rate and increase
ship ~afety; characteristice of 518 accidenta and catastrophes ar~ presenEed, _
on the basis of whose examinatiion an analysis is made. They embrace all rypea
of surface ships of the last several decades.
The analysis of accidents involving aircraft carriers is made for the last 25
years, and involving ships of other clasaes--for 50 years. Individual in-
structive cas~s of accidEnts which oceurred earlier are examined.
The appendices provide brief information about ghips Which were lost from th~
beginning of the century up to the present--individually by type of accident.
Snviet and, primarily, foreign sources were used in writing.
The elements of ships which are pre~~nted in the book were taken from "Jane's
Fighting Ships" and, in individual cases--from other foreign sources (see the
bibliography) as well as from Soviet reference publications which s~rved as
the basis for the Russian transcription of the names of ships and vessels.
In accordance with the information which the author had at his disposal, the
followinv, are indicated: for surface shipa-~the normal displacement, primarily
for ships b ~ilt prior to World War II, and complete displacement for ships
built later; for submarines--the numerator givea the displacement while sur-
faced and the denominator--while submerged. Their year of going into operation _
is shown for all ships. The capacity in regisCer tons is presented for
merchant and auxiliary vessels.
9
FOR OFFICII,L US~ ONLY '
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~dEt O~T~'ICIAL US~ ONLY
'Ch~ g~og~~phic n~m~~ af th~ p1~c~~ o� ~~~id~ntis and c~ta~rr~ph~g ~r~ ~rr.~
~ ~~need ~h~y wer~ ~t eh~ eim~ of th~ ~cci,denti; ehe wr3e~ng ~f plgc~~ fo~.�
- pomtwar ypgr~ i~ raken from d~ea in Soviet reference book~, "Mor~koy ~t].a~"
(Marine At1ns].
Th~ ~uChor ~xpr~~~~~ hi~ profound graCitude to B. A. Koly~~y~v ~nd A. M.
Va~i1'yev who, wh31e r~vi~wing tihe ~anuscr3p~, expr~s~ed ~xCr~m~ly valuaUl~
criCic~l r~m~rk~ which p~rmi~e~d an improvement in ~he qual~.tiy of ehE book.
'Che author expre~~~s hi~ great ~raC~.eude to S. Ya. Lev~.na for g~s3srance in
working on �oreign aource~~
10 ~
POR OFFICIE~I. U5E ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~OIt O~FICIAL US~ ONLY
(~xcerpCa~ R. Fire and Explos~.on~ nn Che Cgrrier "~saex" During the
Landing of an Airplane
The American ateack cgrrier "Essex" (38~SU0 tons) was cxuieing not far f,~om
the co~st of Florida in 1959 when a big fire broke out on 3t.
The pilot of a figheer erred in estimat3ng the moment of landing. Receiving
the s3gnal prohibiCing the execution of a landing on the flighC deck, he gAVe
Che airplane the gas and began to climb but, deviating from the line of the
landing area he grazed an airplane etanding on the deck with the right wing
plane. As a resule of the Blow, th~ airplane which was in the air turned and,
engulfed by flames, tore into a group of airplanes which were disposed on the
fliRht deck along the side of the ship. A fire accompanied by individual
explosions broke out on the carrier--tanks with fuel and oxygen cylinderR
~xploded. The exploaions caused such a high temperature that the metal frag-
ments of the airplanes were welded to the ship's deck.
The tracCora hastily threw the airplanes which were engulfed with flames over-
board. In order to prevent the fire's further spread over the flight deck,
the carrier was turned with its side to the wind. But the fuel which had
ignited flowed into the lo~wer compartmenta of the shi p, including the hangar
and causing new loci of fire. The carrier crew eliminated the fire in several
hours.
Two men died as a resulC of the fire and explosions while 21 men received burns
and in~uries. Many airplanes were destroyed or put out of action. The ship re- ~
ceived considerable damage and it was sent to Norfolk for emergency restorative
repairs which lasted for aeveral months. ~
In ~ustifying the accident which occurred on the "Essex," the American press
referred to the fact that the ship had become "obsolete" and must be replaced
although rather expensive modernization work had been performed on it as well
as on other carriers of this type only several years prior to this accident.
In this case, of course, it is not a matter of "old age," but of poor training
of the flight personnel and the incompetent organization of tak~off and landing
operations of the carriers. For accidents during the landing of aircraft on
carriers, just as during takeoff, are frequently repeated, in which regard on
ships of the latest construction.
11
FOR OFFICI6,L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
,
- ~OIt tl~I~ICIAL U5~ ONLY
16, Cbn~equences ~nd i.e~snn~ frnm ehe ~ire ni~~~t~r ~n ~h~ c~rrier "t~'orr~se~]."
tlnly g~v~ra1 monthe had passed sin~e Chd big f~.r~ on Ch~ "bri~k~~ny" when ~
new fire caraeCrophe broke ouG in the a~me Gulf nf Tonkin~ T1~3.~ e3.m~, iC
wa~ rh~ atrack ~~rrier "~'o~r~seal" (1955, 76,000 cong, ~'ig~ 7 Cnot r~prdduc~dJ)
--the fl.agahir of a C~rrt~r div~.eion ~nd th~ firar of tih~ ghip~ nf Chie cl~ag
ro be bu.tit by eh~ Am~ricdn~ afC~r Wor1d W~r I~.
Ae one Cimp, ehe name of th~.e ship was ~xer~m~ly high-~nunding, egp~ci~lly in
rhe United SCates. ~or ~ rather ~.arge sQri~g of atCack carri~r~ was cnn~eruct~ed
. from the model of ~hp "~orreatal." Eight such sh~.p~ wer~ pue ~nLo oper~tion
in thp U.S. N~vy with ~everal variations du~ing ~ decc~de and ~ h~lf. Thu~,
during Che first postw~r 3ecad~~ the "Forrestal" wg~ a kind df sy~nUdl of Che
gtriking power of Che bigg~ge U.S. gurfac~ ship~ ~nd, re~1~.y, of th~ other
capiCaliat powers.
But at the end of the 1960's, itt connecCion with rhe digasCer whic:h nccurred~
the carrier acquired gn extremely sad repu~ation. During the~~ years, ir hgd
already beg~n to "gymbol~.z~" more naval tragedies and calamities, especiAlly
in ehe i1.S. carrier fleet which, in the postwar years, nbounded in fire~ and
~xplasions which occurred wiChout combat effects oc~ Ch~ ship.
Prior to departure for the shores of Vietnam fram the base at Norfolk to ~ake
part in combat operations, the "Furrestnl" completed an eight-month major
overi~aul and modernization cosring about 50 million dollars, whiCh amount~d
to npproximately one fourth of its construction cosC. After Completion of
the repair and madernization work~ the "Forreatal" was considered a completely
modern ship technically. In the course of ehe repair, special attention was
paid to improving the ship's fire-extinguishing means.
The situation concerning its crew was somewhat different. In fact, during
rhe entire time of its existence the "Forrestal" was noC required to parti-
cipate in combat operations prior to 1967. During 12 years of service it was
part of the Atlantic Fleet and sailed primarily in the Mediterranean Sea,
undergoing only insCructional training. Now it was to participaCe in combat
operations where there was a need for other approaches and oCher training thgn
on Crainin~ cruises. Did the crew of Chis ahip have such training?
In the opinion of Che commander of Che 2d Carrier Division, U.S. 7Ch Fleet,
the personnel of the "~orrestal" did not have aufficient training for the con-
duct of combat operaCions.
However, let us turn to the circumsr.ances of Che fire disaster which develaped.
Gn 29 Juty 1967, the "Forrestal" had been maneuvering in the Gulf of Tonkin
for five days already, being 60 miles from the coast of the DRV and preparing
for barbarous bombing. The day was bright and sunny in the gulf. 1'he carriers
"Oriskany" and "Bonhomme Richard" were near the flagship. The destroyers
"MacKenzie" and "RuperCus"--both Gearing types, were protectin~ the carriers'
zone of action.
12
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
,
i~'OIt tlF'~ICLAL US~ ONLY
th1 th~C morning, an~ grdup af airpl~n8g h~d ~1re8dy be~n ~aC~puit~d fr~m eh~
"~orr~~C~l." A~~cond grnup w~~ now prepgr3ng for i~un~hing;iC wa~ almo~e
compl~te]y form~d up and prepared for takeof�. Thi~ g~c~up in~lud~d ].2 ~~rrier-
baeed ~ircrafr nf Ch~ "Skyhawk" typ~, 7- "Phantom" f~ghtera-~nC~rc~~ptdr~, nnd
2 atr~ck-r~cnnn~i~~anc~ aircr~ft of Che "Vi.gilant" type--al~ogeeh~r 21 ~~re~rafe.
Pr~p~rntiong fdr takpuff hnd be~n compiet~ly a~eompli~hed on 12 ~irp~.ana~ of Chis
group: ehey h~d b~en fu~led, aupplied wiCh ammuniCion, L�h~ p31ot~ wer~ a~
th~ir plae~p in eh~ ~ockp3ts~ ~nd ehe Aireraft ~n~3~1~~ had be~n ~Carted. ~in~l
pr~p~raCory np~reeions were coneluding on eh~ r~ma~ning a~rcr~fe which h~d ~
g1~o b~en fu~1~d and armed w~th ammunitinn. ~v~rything "wa~ t~king it~ .
naCural cour~~.~'
5uddenly, ~ f1am~ f1~r~d up in the gtern portion of the fiigh~ deCk wher~ thp
girplane~ whi.ch hgd p~~par~d for takeoff were 1oc~~~d~ The ~xace mompnt of
rh~ b1~ze wa~ r~cnrd~d--1053 houre. Verioue ver~ione ~xist eoncerning th~
reagon for rhe outbre~k of flgmes. Aacnrding to one of them, the fire ~cdke
nut from ~n unint~ntidnally launched "2uni" gir~to-~eurface rocket which wgs
gu~p~nded b~n~aeh ~"PhanCnm." During it~ mot~on, the rncker gtr~ick th~
suspended fuel eanlc of ~ne of the "Skyhawke" and the fuel which was poured
over the deck ignited from th~ rocker's ~eC. According co anotli~r version--
due to an oversight by the per~onnel, a suspended fuel tank fell on rhe flighC
deck, the fuel from which ignited and gpread over the flight deck; ~ind~r the
influence of ehe flames, the werhead of the "zuni" rocket was sepa~~gted and
the fuel tanks caught fire. One way or another, both versions confi:rm the
facC that a"2uni" rncket exploded and influenced the eubsequent dE~velapment
of the fire. In eome publications the fact of the unintentional lac~nching of
the "Zuni" rdcket is attribuCed to the failure of itg "gafEty mecha.niem."
- The firet meacures which were adopted to eliminate the fire which had broken
out using the main water line and deck foam generatora proved to be ineffective.
Because of the crowded dispoaition of the airplanes on the flight de~ck (Fig. 8)
~not reproduced] the flameg quickly engulfed almogt the entire group of air-
planes. Fuel tanks began to burn and aerial brnnba and other ammun:ition be-
gan to explode. The fire eoon epread over the ent~~re stern portion c~f the
flight deck. Aerial bombe weighing 340 and 450 kg exFloded on the d~ck one
after the other. The exploding airplane fuel tanks gave off a black smoke
which gpread over the flight deck and penetrated into the interior campart-
ments of the ship.
Killed and injured appeared after each exploaion. Many fire-fighter~~ were
ki~led or put out of action as a result of the fixst explosions. Pi~~e-
fighting equipment was damaged by the fire attd fragments. Some of tt~e crew
members were thrown overboard by the wave~ of the exploston while others
jumped off the blazing carrier to save themselves from the raging fla~mes and
exploding bombs and rockets. Seriously wounded and even killed were ~mong
those thrown into the sea since the height of the ship's freeboard exceeded
18 meters. Many of the pilots wece unable to save themselves from the air-
planes burning on the flight deck.
13
FOR OFFICItiI. U5E ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
FC~ft d~~ICIAL US~ ONLY
Ei~C eh~ m~~ority df Ch~ ~rew rem~3n~d c~bnard ehe ghip ~nd, .Er.am ~he very
fir~t minuCer~ eli~ cr~2w~ w~g~d an int~ngiv~ gCruggl~ a~ain~t eh~ i'tre~ nnct
_ ~xplneinnq.
NumE~rc~ui~ prrdt~ rerure~ nae only tn Ch~ Un3t~d Sr~t~~, bue nl~ao i.n ~ ni,mhc~r
nf otti~r ~ountriey includiug CrenC BriCa~.n, ~rance, ~ealy, and J~p~n, canfi.rn~
e1~~e eh~ erew's ~~eions in the cour~e of eh~ catiastroph~ werc~ ~n~Lgetic ~nd,
ae timeg, ~~lfle~~~ 7'h~ ~irplan~s nn tha flight dack wtiich w~re rior engult~d
by f].ttm~~ w~re draggpd from eh~ s~~rn to Ch~ bow o~ ~he shi.p. BamU~ and
missil~s w~re dis~rmed by r~moving ehe fuzea from tihe~n. One o~ Che b~yic
prncedur~g which w~g empl~yed Co prevent surces~3v~ explosiong w.as r.he dtunping
of Che ship'g ~nd aviaeion ammunition ovQrbourd. 7'here w~rc in~L~ac~g wh~re
people de~eend~d ehrough holes in the ~light deck ~.ntd ehe "inne~c he1.1" ta
drag nut Che gmoking bomb~ from in~idQ Mhe sh3p, di~~rm tham, and throw theu~
dverboard. I'~t~p1e eurned Che water hd~~s on nn~ annth~r in ord~r to r.nnl ~cid
pr~vent Ch~ ignition of cloChing and footwear. Mearnohil~, rhe flame pcnFeraCed
more gnd m~re inCo Ch~ sh3p'g cnmpartments. On the hangnr deck, ~eam~n ic~ught
the fire in the darkness, removing bombs ~nd migeilea from the ~irpl~nes by
feel and dropping them overboard.
Sinc~ passag~ in~o th~ h~ngar from abov~ was virrually ~xcluded, hol~~ w~r~
rut out in the flight and p;allery deckg and from the bides to pe~te4rarc intu
the hgngar comparCmenta, �or which oxyacetelyne equipmetit was uged, More
than 10 hdles were cuC in Che flighC deck alone; tii~ opportunity wa~? op~ned
to 1~~d people out of Che interior compartments and uae them to ftght r.he ftre.
Prev~ously, the~?ttempt was made to extinguish ~he fire~ in the lo*aer campart-
ments of Che ship with w~ter Chrough Che holes in th~ flighc der.k. T7~e hot
bulkheads were continuausly cooled with water so that it would be poss3ble
to accomplish urgent work. Many cases where Che injured and the Uurned worked
, with fire hoses to localize the zone of the fire were noted.
The deck becnme slipp~ry from the foam, greatly hampering the fighting ~f the
fire which was spreading through the ship more and more. But the chief di�fi-
culty was created by the smoke which was so dense that visibiliry, even tha~
attainable using a light, was no more than 0.3-0.4 meters. A favorable role
under these conditions was played by respiratory equipment without wt~ich it
would have been impoasible to work in the smoke. Hovever, the l~nses of the
equipmenC frequently fogged over and people could hardly see anyChing. Firc
hoses were shifted from the bow of the ship to the stern, but they were put
out of operation from the effects of fire and fragments. Carbon 3ioxide fire
extinguishers were employed rather successfully to quench Che fire on the
airplanes.
The fire was fought not only with the men and equipment of Che damaged carrier.
The "Oriskany" and "Bonhouune Richard" as well as both escort destroyera--
the "MacKenzie" and "Rupertus"--came to her assistance. Stopping the
launching of their own airplanes, the carriers rescued victir.~s with helicop-
terg. The destroyers approached almosC up to the ve:y sides of. the "Forrestgl"
(up to 3 meters) and directed streams of water at it from their fire hoses.
14
FOR OFFICIl.L U5E ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~OEt d~F~CIAL US~ ONLY ~
In Eighring rhe ~ir~~ many miaCak~~ w~re mad~ which w~r.e aonnecC~d prim~rily
wiCh thc crew's in~xperience. Emergency (~lternate) pathg of evacuaeion w~re
ctoC used: ~ieherChe cr~w did not know tih~n or they had been forgoCtien. 5inc~ a
lgrge pgrt nf the exp~ri~nced fir~ specialiet~ peri.shed ~.n the f~r~C momentis
of th~ fire~ th.a mattier.of g~ving the sh3p was plaaed in the hnnd~ of peopl~
who had gb~olutiely no experience in f~.gheing f~.res~ ]:t was for thie very
re~gnn thaC 13tt1~ was done to 1ocali~e the �ire~which engulfed more and more
bomb~ and migg~.l~a which wer~ on the fl~.ght deck, and npwer and newer explosions
ghnnk th~ ghip.
'Che order to close the dividing doors between the carrier's ~ompartments w..~s
given gfter ~ long delay (eight minut~s after the eCart of the fire). 'I'his
glgo help~d the f~.re to spread through the ship.
One of the big mistakeg was thaC the untrained fiYe teams often reduced eo
naught Che actions of rhe p~ople working alongside them. Thus, for exa;~~,~1~~
while some sprayed protein foam ~ver the flight deck to extinguish fuel fir~s,
othera washed thia foam away with water when working with water h~,e~. Thus,
precious eime wae loat ~nd rhe fir~ continued Co epread through the ship.
The ship's conm~and did nnt organize the fire-fighting properly.
DeApite a11 the measurea which were gdopCed, the fire penetrated into ehe ship
more and more and sprend in the comparCmenta below the hangar deck. Tt~e fire's
development was also furthered by the ignition of bedding and the crew'g
clothing.
After several hours, by meane of exceptional efforts Che crew succeeded in
localizing the main loci of fire on the flight and hangar decks, blocking tlie
fire's path to the middle and fore parts of the hangar where the armed airplanes
were located. But the fire between these two decks raged until the very even-
ing. Ten hours passed before the fire began to die down gradually. It took
more than a day to extinguiah it completely--at 1230 houra on tt~e follocoing
day. However, the fight with Che smoke continued. A large quantity of harm-
ful gases accumulated inside the carrier. They had formed during the �ire and
could be eliminated only after three days. At the same time, ~.he crew was en-
gaged in cooling the hot sections of the decks and other structural elements.
As a result of the catastrophe, 134 men died while 62 were wounded. ~aenty-six
jet airplanes, ~?0* machines together wiCh catapults and arresting gear,
artillery armament, and various ship's equipment received considerable damage.
The carrier's hull especially suffered: 6 of its 10 decks were damaged, es-
pecially the flight deck and structural elements located near it. Seven holes,
some of them of rather large dimensions (Fig. 9) ~not reproduced], were formed
in the armored flight deck (with a thicknesa of 45 tma) from the explosions.
A general view of the carrier after the catastrophe looked as if it had been
subjected to combat action (Figs. 10, 11) [noC reproduced]. One of the
* According to oCher data, these figures fluctuate somewhaC in one direction
or another.
15
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~n~ o~~icrnL usL ~rtLY
"~orr~at~l'~" nfficera noCed tih~e during World W~r xT "lcnmik~ze" r~ilucH
coutd not inElice ~uch d~m~g~ dn a ship.
'1'h~ mnrr.rinl ld~~ from th~ r.~taserophe w~e e~timaCed ~t ~.GO t~it,'L~.i.o� d~11~r~
(eh~ cdge nf emergency repair ~f the ship itself was 14 m311:Lon dollar~).
' Fdr umdunCg nE dAmnge infli.ceed and hum~n loss~~ (gccarding Co the egtimnee _
of Ch~ Am~rican~ rh~m~elves) eh:ts cat~etroph~ was eh~ bigg~et i.n th~ posewar
year~ among�tihe eea caC~~Crnptie~ of eh~ Am~rican fl~et. ~ven th~ dnm~ge frem
the loss of eh~ nucle~r gubmarine "1'hresher" 3n 1963, which ~vas ion~3der~d ag
a natinn~l. d~~ngCer 3n the UnL~ed 5CeCeg, was conaiderably l~ss thAn frnm Che
cneagtrophe of ehe "I'orr~sC~l."
'Co eliminaCe the nftereffec~~ of eh~ fir~y the "ForregC~1" wns fir~t ~~n~ ro
Subic ~gy (in Che philippineg) to which it moved under it~ own pnwer. Ancord-
ing Cd Che ship rommnttder'~ staeementi, rhe c~rr3er could devel~p a~peed or
27 knotg, in go doing using four of ehe eighe main boilery. En rou~e to Subic
Bay, ehe "~'orrestal" trang�erred many in;~ured Co the ho~pital ship "Repos~"
which wa~ dispatched espec~.ally for ehig purpose.
During the pass~ge, aC le~st 20 apecialisCS from variou~ faciliCi.es worked on ~
board ehe "Forrestal." They determined the volume, times, aud cost of resCora-
Cion work even before the ship arrived aC the repair bage.
During the carrier's 10-day stay in Subic Bay, temporary repairs w~re made to
the flight deck in addit3on to several repairs conneceed with ensuring the
passage Co the mnin base sa that, "if neceasary," Che ghip could perform
Cakeoff and landing operations.
The "Forrestal" arrived in Norfolk, where the main repair was envisioned,
only 1.5 months afCer the catastrophe. Thia was rather strange since usually
damaged ships were not held up at sea but, on the contrary, every attempt was
made to berth them as soon as possible to return the ship to action more
rapidly. Why was there such a long delay in thie case? The official version
states that the "Forrestal" was given permisaion to:visit several ports eo pay
tribute to Che victims of ehe catastrophe and call upon their families. But
acCually, they had in mind delaying the ship's arrival at Che base for the
longest pussible time, r.emembering Chat "time is the best docCor." But this
policy of "delays" did little to help its ideologists.
Several thousand persons including reporters, motian picture cameramen, and
representatives ~f the Navy and various authorities gathered on the shore to
greet the carrier. The American prese noted that the tremendoiis ship looked
like a"gray mountain" and that not even a trace of its ma~esty and beauty
remained. Meeting with Che reporters, the carrier's commander praised the
ship's construction and spoke of its crew's bravery--the ship was on the brink
of being lost, but people saved it. However, nothing was said about the
reasons leading to such catastrophic consequences which became a genuine
calamity for many, many American families.
16
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~OR OF'~yCrAL US~ ONLY
The C~rrier cv~s xepa~.red ~t the N~?vy dockyd~rd in Nnrfnik. A con~~der~ble
port.ton of the flighk d~ck wa~e. raplnced (~'ig. 12) jnot rpproduc~d], ~i.ght
hundr~d CdnH nf nrmor eteel w~re required for thie. The aircxufti elev~tor~
wl~t~l~ w~r~~ I~c~nvLly d~m~ged Uy 127-mm art~ll~ry pieees ~nd oth~r Nquipmenr wer~
r~mov~d from ~h~ ship ~nd repaired under pl~ne conditiona~. 'Ph~ n~.rcrafe
armam~ne wa~ c:ompletely replnced. At ttie same time, mndernization wdrk o~as ?
nccomplished nn eh~ ship, in particu~gr on electron~.c equipment ~nd miesile-
~rCillery armnment.
fl~gpiC~ a number of special measures (assignment of n special group of enf3ineere
and workers numb~ring s~v~r~l hundred men, three-shift work, and so fnrth),
the c~rrier's repair coneinued for about 10 monehs and it wene into oper~rion
~ year af~er Ch~ catasCrnphe. Then rhe "~orrest~l" was ass~.gnpd tio the U.5.
nei~ne3a Fleeti and wgs s~nt en pe rform aervice 3n the Mediterranean Se~?. The
~ahip's cr~w was broughe up to strength and iCs commander wae replaced.
- The "F'orrestal" disaster cauaed a great public response. In many areicles and
publicaCions not only were the big human sacrifices and m~terial ioss~es noted,
which were the result of the �ire on this ahip, buC also the 1ow level of fire
safety of carriera in general and the insu~ficiency of ineasures undertaken by
Che Navy to ensure it, Here, other accidenCs and catasCroFhes which occurred
on carriers in recent years were recalled. Political and sCate figuree spoke
of the loss of U.5. presCige in connection wiCh such caCastrophes.
In the diacussion which wAS conducted in the United States in the middle of
the 1960's on how carriers should be constructed--nuclear or conventional--
the "nuclear" viewpoint prevailed and the disputes seemed to aubside. Bue
they flared up anew in connection with the tragic events on the "Forrestal."
Now, voices began to be heard in which doubts of the expediency of the fur-
Cher construction of this class of ships of such gigantic dimensions in
general were sounded.
The new dispuCes did not shake the main course of the U.S. Navy's command, .
however,and Che construction of new, big carriers conCinued even farther. It
was only ad3udged necessary to adopt urgent and effective measures to improve
the fire safety of these ships.
Thus, it was Che "Forreatal" disasCer, which was the biggesC among other
similar catastrophes, that transformed questions of ensLring the fire safety
of carriers into an extremely important state problem since, in the United
States, the greatest significance is aCtached to these ships along with sub-
marines. It was decided to establish a commission on an extremely high level
to work out recommendations on this problem. Its composition included the
highest authorities of the U.S. Navy and Air Force. Admiral J. Russell, who
was called up from retirement for this purpose, was appointed chairman.
Before the Russeil commission began its work the Chief of Naval Operations
of the U.S. Navy, Admiral T. Moorer, gave it the following general instruction:
"When explosion and ~ires occur nevertheless despite all various precautionary
measures, it is important that we have rapid and extremely effective means to
17
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
rOtt n~F''tCIAL USL' ONLY
reduce damage, deetrucrion, and ehe 1n~g. of human 1.ife to tih~ min�lmuu~. '~~e~re-
fore, it is necea~arx tn aee ChaC in comhating explog.ione. and ti~~e ~he personnel
~re ~ub~ected ~o ehe minimum degree of danger" [38~ p 7].
]:t ~hou.l.d lie noted thAt work~ng glong w~.rh thie eCate conuu~.~e~.an wt~s ~norher
which was eng~ged ~.n invesCtgating ~he reasons and c~.rcun~se~nces for ~he
"~'orr~st~l" cneasCrophe iCself.
The xuggeii commissiott nnalyzed tihe s~atus of ~ire safety on U.S. carriers and
ad~udged it unsaCisfaCtory. In this connecCion, Admiral Ttussell wrote: "We
had 32 "Esaex"-type carriers ~n World War zI and 30 of rhem h~d serious damage,
butnone were 1osr, because we had powerfu7. fire-figheing means, buriug rh~
past years, we hgve lost Che abiliCy to �ight large fires in cons:iderr~bYe
measure" [24, p 26].
Th3s ~udgemene by Admiral Russell needs serious corrections,
FirsC of a11, only 24 rather Chan 32 carriers of the "Essex"-type were built.
Of rhese ships, only 17 were put into operation duriug the w~r (and only 12
of Chem took part in coml~~t operations), Che nonstruction of 7 carr3ers was
compl~Ced in the postwar years, and one of them (the "Oriskany") was turned
over to the Navy only in 1950. Thus, 30 "Essex"-type carriere could not have
such serious damage as Admiral Russell stated.
Actually, not one of the "Essexes" was lost during the war. But what was the
behavior of Chese ships with combat effects on them? I.et us Cake sever.al
examples from the last sCage of the war,
On 25 November 1944, two "kamikazes" dove on the carrier "Intrepid" in Che
area of the Philippines. A fire broke out on the ship causing it heavy
damage, and it was out of action for several months.
On 21 January 1945 the carrier "Ticonderoga," also attacked by two "kamikazes"
near the island of Taiwan, was heavily damaged. A big fire broke aut on it
and it was put out of actions for a long time. Losses were 140 men.
On 19 March 1945, the carrier "Franklin" received two medium-caliber aerial
bomb hits in the area of the island of Kyushu. Fires and internal explosions
broke out on the ship, in which xegard the damage proved to be so heavy that
it had to be towed to base, buC restoration proved to be impossible. Losses
on the carrier consisted of more than half the ship's crew: 832 killed and 270
in~ured.
On 6 April 1965 the carrier "Hancock" was damaged near Che island of Okinawa
from the explosion of an aerial bomb and ramming by one "kamikaze." A fire
broke out on the ship; it received considerable damage and was put out of
action for a long time. There were 72 killed and 82 injured on it.
On 14 April, the carrier "Intrepid" which had emerged fram repair was again
attacked by two "kamikazes" in the area of Okinawa. A big fire broke out and
18
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
FOR OF'~ICIAT~ U5~ ONLY
the damage to the ship proved to be ~o aerious that it wa~ necessary to send
it off for repair again under ahipyard condiCions. Losses were 9~ men.
On 11 Mgy 1945, n"kamikaze" Lpre into the carr~er "Bunker Hi~.l," as a result
of which ~.t received consideraBle damage, was sent to the base foY repair,
and took no further p~rt in Che war.
All theae were ships of the "Es~~x" ~ype. The fact~ which are presented were
taken from books by the American historian of World War II, 5. Morison [91],
and a combat admira~. of the American f].eet, F. Sherman [3] and can hardly be
refuted by the admirul of the same f1eeC, Russell. But these facts, the
number of which could be multipl3ed, refute rather than confirm Admiral
Russell's conclusion concerning the high survivability and �ire safety of -
"Easex"-type carriers during Wor1d War II.
By the way, comparing Che "Essexes " with British carriers which operatect in
the Pacific Oce~n at tlie same time, Admiral F. Sherman writes in the same
book: "Although all British carriers were subjected to attack by 'kamikaze'
airplanes, noti one of them was put outi of action thanks to their armored
flight decks" [3, p 284]. This conclusion liy Admiral Sherman concerning the
signi�icance of armored flight decks~ of British carriers, which pertained
primarily to ships of the "Illuatrious" type, was confirmed many times during
the war. And you see, British carriers of the "Illustrious" type had a dis-
placement several thousand tons less than carriers of the "Essex" type. Evi-
dently, for this reason the Americans began to employ armored flight decks on
all their attack carriers which were 6uilt after the "Essex"-type carriera.
Thus, from the fact that noC one "Essex"-type carrier was losC during the war
it does not at all follow that their survivability and fire satety were at a
high level. The facts tell us ~ust the opposite. For the "Forrestal" and
"Oriskany" were not lost from fires either, while their f�ire safety was
evaluated as unsatisfactory by the same Admiral Russell and his commission.
Hence, it follows that the criterion of a shipts survivability in fires does
not have to be its loss. Serious aftereffects are also possible for a ship
in fires even without its loss. A classical example of this is the case of the
"Forrestal." It should be added to this that the dozens of accidents on
carriers of the "Essex" type which were connected with fires which occurred
in Che postwar years and their afCereffects do not tell of the high fire safety
of Chese ships, either.
The commission acknowledged the basic reasons for the low level af fire safety
of the American carriers to be the insufficient capacity of the fire-fighting
equipment on the ships, poor training of the personnel, and insufficient
organization of fighting fires.
Based on Che lessons of accidents and catastrophes of carriers, primarily the
"Oriskany" and the "Forrestal," the commission worked out a number of recom-
mendations to increase the fire safety of this class of ships. The recommenda-
t:~ons included construction, organization-technical, and general measures.
19
FOR OFFICItiI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~OR OF~'zCLAL U5~ ONLY
The basic recommendations ~f a conaCructinn natiure are;
1) to deve~.op ~nd insCall on carrierg more powerFul fire-~:LghCl.iYg ~quip-
ment, especigl~.y on flighC decka, where fire a~a�e~y muet be brought ro the
- levcl of eafety in hang~rs;
2) tn incorporaCe on carriers ~ suffic3ently effective reuiate-control
fire-�ighting yystem, espec3a11y on the f13ghC deck;
3) Co employ highly-effecCive flash-suppreasing materials in fire-extin-
gu:ishing systems on carriers; in particular, the poasibiliry af drenchin~ u -
large parC af Che flighr deck w3th this maCerial should be incnrporated; _
4) Cd incorpornte more effective life-support and individu~l-protecCiv~
equipment on carriers in order Co provide the personnel wiCh the capabiliCy
Co work in any compartments dt~ring fires; in parCicular, Co have more powe~ful
and numerous exhaust ventilnt3on means to remove smoke from comparLm~nCe and
supply Che personnel with individual oxygen apparatuaes and equipment Co pro-
tecC the hands from hot ob3ecCs;
5) to improve the me~hods and means for sCoring fuel and ammuniCion on
carriers;
6) to devote special atitenCion to questions of ensuring the fire safety
of the airplanes which are on the ships;
7) to conduct a radical review of the existing communication and warning
system on sh ips and to improve it in such a way as to bring it close to an
actual siCuation on a ship when fighting fires.
The commission noted that some of the ammunition taken on board the carriers
is not supplied to a sufficient extent with the necessary safety devices, as
a result of which their unintentional triggering and explosion can and actually
do arise. Although the commission did not write down a direct recommendation,
it expressed the desire concerning the necessity to conduct work in the
appropriate direcCion. Concerning this pr~blem and referring to t;te example
of the "Zuni" rocket whose explosion, in his opinion, was the sourc~ of the
disaster on the carrier "Forrestal," Admiral Russell declared at a press
conference in the PenCagon that he would like "ammunition to be made more
reliable." "We need safer armament," he staCed.
The second group of recommendations perCained to training the personnel to
fight fires.
Noting that the fire on the "Forrestal" showed the importance of the "human"
factor to ensure sa�ety with all obviousness, the commission recommended:
1) devoting primary attenCion to safety questions and instructions
everywhere and always, beginning with the first steps in instructing the
personnel;
20
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~'OR nFF'ICIAL US~ ONLY
2) making more etficient use o~ reports o� accidenes on ahipa gnd in-
forming persnnne~. ~h.otit Acci~enta by ~a specially created U.S. Navy safetiy
informAtion center;
3) fut~rre commanders of carrierg ~hould not avo~.d questions of fighting
fLres but enould become acC~.vely engaged in them, for which special, on-ChG-
~ob training ie enviaioned fnr Ch~ir instruction 3n Ch~.s important ma~Cer;
4) all aviation personnel on board g carrier, together with Che ship's
crew, should be involved in the process of ensurtng the ship's safety,
sCrictly delim~.ting the functiona becween them in this regard;
~ 5) introducing r3gid requirements in ehe fleets so that exiating s~f~Cy ,
rules are strictly implemenCed at all stage~ and replacing some of them with
new, more improved ones.
As general recommendatinns, the crmmiasion noted that there is a necessity for
reorienCing minds in regard to the safety o� carriers since sgfety ir: c?f.ten
disregarded at the expense af direct effectiveness. All organ3zations and
_ departments, military as we11 as civi~.ian (3ndustrial, scientif.ic, fire-
fighting, and others), in the opinion of thp commission, should be used fnr
Che atCainment of effective results in thi~ a�,:ea.
Although the Russell commission was not and really could not be a panacea in
Lhe solution of fire safeCy problems of carriers, its recommendations which
are based primarily on a study of the experience of the "Forreatal" catastroplie
were a certain beacon for the U.S. carrier fleet.
Judging from publications, this experience of the Americans is also used in
other countries where aircraft carriers are in the inventory, in particular
in Great Britain and France.
[pages 84-85]
1'he followfng lessons were carried away from Che fire on the "LafayeCte"-
"Normandy":
1) welding and cutting should not be permitted on a ship until all com-
bustible maCerials have been removed to a safe disCance or, at least, until
they are sufficiently protected so as to prevent their ignition when conducting
hot work;
2) when a ship is in port, especially when refitCing work is being per-
formed on it, the presence of fire-fighting equipment which is powerful enough
to fight fire and is always ready for action should be ensured. In par-
ticular, it is very important to ensure the standardization of hoae connec-
tions in case the ship is in a strange port;
3) during the refiCting of the ship, clarity in regard to organizing the
fighting of fires should be envisioned, especially in des~ignating responsible
persons and the supervis~ion of actions in fighting fire on a ship;
21
FOR OFFICIl,L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~on nrt~ICIAL US~ ONLY
4) a gp~ci~l nnd w~ll-Cr~ined fire-xighC~.ng tettm ~,hould b.e on eh~ ~hip.
~t i~ nece~s.~ry for pr~ventiv~ pur~oaea ag w~ll ~g for ehe quull.~ied fi~;htin~
oE g f3re which breakg nut;
S) continuoue and etrieC mon~:Coring o� the conduct o� hot work should b~
conduc~ed on a ship which ig being refiCCed;
6) any ship be~.ng refil:ted musti be ~quipped with neCessary gnd r~li~ble
~quipmene �or communica~ion, wgrning, and gignelling;
7) smoke from fire on the upper deck~ ~hould not be xllowed eo penetrgre
into the engine and lioilex rooms, for which the skylight~ and so foreh ~.n eh~~e
rooms should be c~.osed immediately upon th~ outbreak of iire on Lh~ upper
decks nnd a11 sucCion Fan~ ~.eading ~.neo Chese rooms should be stopped;
8) ehose participgeing in �igheing the ~~re ahourd use wx~er to exCingu3gh
n fire exceptionally economically, keeping in mind the danger of the extr~me
Eilling of ehe ship with water and the possibil~ty of its 1o~s n~ sCabili.ty;
9) to reduce the threat of the ship's caps3zing when fires are being
extinguished, 3 system for tfie removal of "~ire" water �ram it should be en-
vis ioned. ~
10) all fire doors around the center of the fire ahould be closed immedigte-
ly after iCs ouebreak and should be opened only to service the minimum needs
of the groups of people which are figh~ing Che fire.
These conclusions, which were drawn on the basis of experience from a fire
which, in essence, occurred on a merchant ship are evidenCly also valid in
regard Co warships for the most part.
One more lesson, which consists of the following, can be carried away from Che
experience of the fire on the "Lafayette"-"Normandy." It is not enough to in-
corporate a high technical level of fire safety in the design of a ship and it
is not enough even to realize it during construction. For the actual ensur-
ing of fire safeCy it is necessary to observe fire safety rules on the ship and
have constnnt readiness of available fire-fighting technical equipment for
action and Che personnel's excellenC knowledge of their ship--its basic
qualities, equipment, the arrangemenC of compartments,and state of preparedness
and readiness of the crew to fight fire.
Comparatively not long before the "Lafayette" catastrophe, ships were lost under
similar circumstances. Thus, for example, in December 1931 in Newport News,
Virginia, the British cargo-passenger steamship "Segovia" (9,500 tons) capsized
at the outfitting quay as a result of the extinguishing of a fire. The flood-
ing of the upper parts of the ship was caused tiy its loss of transverse sta-
liility, and it lay on the right side with a list of 80 degrees at the quay,
not sinking completely due to the comparaCively shallow water. Thus, Che
"Lafayette" almost repeated the sad experience of the "Segovia" on an increased
scale. Another example can be provided by the French liner "Paris" (34,570 tons)
22
FOR OFFICItiI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
,
~OR O~F~CIAL U~E ONLY
which ~~nk und~r ~imi.lnr circumgt~nc~~ in Le Havr~ in Apri1 1939; ~11 peoplp
nn board p~ri~h~d. Unfdr~unati~l~?, thaa~ ~nd other m~~~ur~~ w~r~ noe con~id~rpd
by eh~ Ampric~n fire-fighe~r~ who ggnk the b3ggest mil3e~ry tirgn~pnrG in eh~ir
~wn w~e~rg, th~r~by inElicwing consid~rable loag on ehg military pot~nei~idi th~
Al1i~H during tin~ war.
CPgg~e g6, ~5-90]
3. Exploeion of ~h~ Milie~ry Transport "Fort SCikene" (Cata~trophe in Bombay)
In Apri1 1g44, Hombgy w~g dv~rcrowded with ~hipg. Many of them were load~~,
wieh ~xplo~iv~g which oft~n wera etor~d tog~Cher with neh~r explo~~.v~ ~nd i.n-
flammabl~ c~rgoes. At Ch~r t~.me, three warehips of thP Indinn I~leat werp
Algo ar dnckgide~
dn bnard rh~ ~ritigh ~team~hip "~ort SCikette" (th~ xhip w~g ~~riei~h
verBion of th~ "Libprty" ~hip~, 7,142 tons) which ~ad b~~n moor~d $t ona of
rhe gombay pierg, 3,000 tong of coCton were etored ~long with 1,400 ton~ of
~xploeives ~nd gmmuniCinn. In addition, 155 ~ngota of go1d, whoee v~~ue wae
egtimated at 5 million dnllars, wer~ loaded on the ship. The gold wa~ in-
tpnded fc+r Indig tn sCabilize itie currency. The "~ort ~tikene" arriv~d in
Bnmbay from Karachi nn 13 April. Its unloading was begun on th~ morning of
the followinR day.
The total mat~rial losa from th~ catastrophe wae estimated at 1 billion dollara.
As regards human losses, according to official daCa the dead and missing num-
bcred 1,500 while 3,Q00 people were in~ured and burned. It is difficult to
estimate the total lose inflicted on the Allied war machine and the effect of
the caeastrophe on the courae of the war: ammunition, exploaives, and varid~ss
itemg of weapona and equipment which were deatroyed during thie calamity gnd
which were intended for Burma and the Allied troops which were operating in
the Pacific.
The commission which inveatigated the reasone and circumatances of the catas-
trophe ad~udged the aCorage of cotton on the ehip together with exploef.ves
incorrect. A burning cigarette was adjudged to be the most probable reason
for the atart of the fire.
Among the factors which contributed to the development of the fires and the
outbreak of explosione, the comm~ission noted the following:
1) the absence of unified and firm centralized direction in organizing
the fighting of the fire and Che coordination of all its participants' actions;
2) the inab ility of responsib le personnel to understand the entire serious-
neas and danger of the situation with the start of the fire's outbreak and
subgequpntly with iCs development;
3) the delay in sunnnoning the city's fire department;
23
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~OIt d~~IGIAt, US~: I~NLY
4) e}i~ db.~~nc~ af ~dnGet~e~~e~d nnd pu~po~e~ul ~GCion~ by tt~e ~i.r.e
fi~h~~r~ in ia~~ii~ing th~ fire;
S) l~c~vin~ th~ h~teh~~ nf hc~ic~p No ~4 nnd 5 op~n gfe~r t~i� tire brc~ke
oue in hdid Na 2, 1~~ding td ~ fir~ i.n hold No 4 wh~r~ the ~xplo~ive~ w~r~
1oe~~pd;
6) eh~ ~b~~t~e~ af a~?~~~~yl~n~ eutting equipment in good working arder
which did n~e p~rmi~ cuC~ing h~l~~ in Ch~ ~id~ of ~h~ dam~~ed ,~hip at eh~
r~quir~d m~m~n~.
In nddition, eh~ ~eeidn~ of eh~ po~,i~~ who fail~d eo warn ~hip~ ~nd v~s~c~1~ in
the h~rbdr ~bn~e eh~ n~vig~tioii e~ea~troph~ aer~ ~d~udged incdrre~e. ~'inally,
ie wag ndr~d th~t ehe ~b~enc~ nf ~ign~l d~viees for w~rnin$ whict~ cnuld h~ve
h~en u~~d Co el~ar ehe pi~r~ af p~ople who had gatherpo l~d to diffiaul~iea
in orgt~nizing th~ fight ~g~in~~ the d~.aa~ter.
~P~g~~ 92-96]
S. ~xplo~inn of ehe Ve~gei "Gr~r?k~m" and the millt~ry er~neporC "High ~lyer"
~'C~XAg CataBtroph~)
Ammonium nitrnC~ i~ widely u~ed in military affaire, for ex~mple, p~i~t~ of
high expln~iv~s in ehe grnup o~ ~mmonium-niCric ~lE (amcnonite~) ~ Amtt?onit~s
~pp~ared for the first Cime in the 1860's-1870'g. At firsti, they were ~m-
ployed almn~t exclu~ively in pe~ceful rechnology as $afeey exploaives suie~
~bl~e for work under und~r~round conditiions, for exemple, in eoal. mines. During
World War I emmonites received exCr~mely wide disCribution and w~re u~ed to
fill ammunition, especially in the field ~rtillery and aviation. Mixtures of
~mmontum nitrate with varioug nitro coumpunds, primarily with TNT, found em-
ployme~t for Chese purposeg firgt of all. As r~ rule, in their explosive ef-
fect ammonites are somewhat weaker Chan TNT, e~scepe for annnnnal whici~ is not
inferior to TNT in its overall explosive effect. Thus, ammonium nitrate h~s a
~ertain explosive potential wi~ich has heen widely kt~awn in the world 3ince the
last c~ntury. But, isn't iC strange, at least Cwo big caeastrophes were ~
necesgary in our century in order to become better "acquainted" with the ex-
plosive properties of acnmonium nitraCe.
The first of them occurred on 21 September 1921 in Germany when more than 500
people were killed and more than 2,000 buildings were destroyed during a
catastrophe aC the Opau (ag transliterated] plant. It was established that
this catastrophe was caused by the following reasons.
To break up the rock-like mass of gmmonium nitraee, about 4,500 tons of
which had been formed in the factory's warehouses, it was decided to use dyna-
mite, dekonating it in small charges. In the course of these explosions, the
entir~ mass of ~he ammonium nitrate was detonated and an explosion of tremen-
dous power occurred which caused a great disaster for the local population.
24
POI~ OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
,
FOlt O~~ICIAL US~ ONLY
Wh~n two v~~~Gl~. b.1pw u~ ~.n Apri~. 1947, as a re~.ule of wh~ch on~ o~ ~he b~ggegt
CaCn~Crnphe~ of tih~ century occurrad~ "thg exploaive po~~ib,3li~iea" o� ammonium
niCrttee wgr~ e.onclueiv~ly cleaYed ~ap. .We are ap~aking of the caC~~tiroph~ which
occurr~d ~.n Ch~ port o~ Texag Ciry, Texae,in which chemical and peCroleum p~ants
pr~domin~~~d. Ie~ circun~tigncee were ~he following.
On tha morn~.ng of 16 April, eh~ ~rench vessel "Grankam" (1942, ~,176 Lons)
c~as ~t p~.er "0" in Che nor~hern s~ip oppos~~.ee ehe ch~m~nal planr of tihe
- Mongantio Comp~ny ahi~e Ch~ Amer3can mil~.eary tranaport "High Flyer" (1944,
6,214 tong) wa~ moorad in Che main slip not far from ~.t. AnoCher American
milieary Crgnsporti, the "Wilson Kin~~' [as tratteliterated] (1944, 7,176 eong;
stood alongaide the "High ~lyer." A11 three vessels were comparatively ema11
and of Amertcan wartiime cans�truction.
Ammon3um nitrate ~n 40-kilogram peper bags was being loaded on the "Grankam"
which hgd already been in pore for several days. About 2,300 tons of thi~i
subgtanc~ had already been loaded on the vessel, of which i,400 enn~ went into
hold No 2 and 880 Cons in hoLd No 4~ Boxea with spare parGs, pean~:te, and
geveral admin~gCratiive cargoes were in the t~aeendecks of tihese holds. S3nce
Che enginea were being overhauled, Che veasel with wiChout propulsion.
At 08d0 hourg the port longahoremen appeared to continue the loading operationa
in hold No 4 and, when Che hatich covers had b~en removed, there were no traces
of fire to be seen. Everything seemed to be normal. But 15 minutes later,
smoke began to be noticed coming from the open space of the hold. The Attempt
was made innnediaCely to extiaguish the fire using fire extinguishers and canis-
ters of drinking water but the fire and smoke became so intense that the
longshoremen and crew were forced to leave the hold. The hoae from the
fire main was prepared for action but the first mate did notpermitits use for
fear of damaging the cargo. Instead of this, he ordered closing the hatch
wiCh ribbands and feeding steam into the hold to extinguish the fire. This
continued for several minutes because the hatch covers were torn away and the .
- flame and smoke began to emerge from the hold even more intensely. ~inally,
Che city fire department was summoned; it soon arrived at the site of the
accidenC. The crew left the damaged vessel ~ust before the arrival of the
firemen. The crew members took off for the quay and 3oined Che crowd of ob-
servers. The firemen were unable to develop any actions before the "Grankrim"
blew up and was completel~ demolished. This happened nt 0912 hours, almost
an hour after the start of the fire.
The entire fire crew, ship's crew, and the observers were killed instanCaneous-
ly while burning fragments caused fires in many places in the port. Buildings
on a large part of the port's territory were destroyed or heavily damaged.
More Chan 400 people were killed. A large tidal wave flooded the port. The
"High Flyer" which was eorn away from the mooring lines with great force
struck the "Wilson Kini" and ~ioth ships were pressed against one another. A
barge 150 meters in length which was locaCed 100 meters from the shore was
thrown up on the shore.
25
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY "
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
I~'OTt d~~TCIAt, US ~ ONt.~Y
`Ch~ Mntt~nnCn ch~miCtt]. ~1~ne r~~eived rh~ gYe~t~ge d~mxge, It.~ ~u~1di~~Yy w~~re
d~~Crny~d ~nd ~~u~ht fir~ onc ~fr~r th~ nCh~r. M~t~y oi1 ~nd ~uHOline ~~t~ke
caughe firp~ r1CCeH~ to m~ny ~l~r~ wa~ cloa.~ad by frggtn~nt~ or �~.re~~ '1'h~
port'p w~t~r ma~n~ w~rp pu~ out c~f d~~rat~on. Many firemen ~rdpp~d w~~rlc�~
ing gnd fire deparCm~nC~ from orh~r cfCi2~~, for exampt~, Hou~to~ which t~ 1~-
~at~d 50 m3.1~~ from ~'~xas C3Cy, began to arrivg Co replace them. T100~ u~ik~
aleo ~rriv~d to he1p, 71an tug~ whi~h had srr.ived ~rom G~].ve~t~n ~e hc~1.p (~~v~n
mil~s from Ch~ ~~.C~ df eh~ ~n~n~treph~~ could noe make th~ir wgy ehrou~h to th~
harbor becau~e of tih~ d~nse ~moke ~nd fragment~.
M~anwhile, rh~ haeCh nover~ on th~ "High ~'ly~r" fi~w uff, exp~ging ies c~rgo
congigCing of ~mmanium nier~ee nnd sulfur. Tn thig r~gard, z,n00 Con3 nf gul-
fur were conea~.ned in holds No x~nd 4 while 300 Cons of nmmonium nirr~e~ w~r~
in hold No 3. The sulfur in ~ wr~rehous~ on ~h~ ghnre caught fire and ~olumns
of guffocaC3.ng gmoke poured auC. Attempr~ ware made to tow boCh trnnsp~r.ts--
eh~ "High Fly~r" and Ch~ "Wilyon Kin~."--ouC of th~ hArbor bur tih~ ghip~ w~r~
~tuck eogeth~r so gtrongly th~t there was no pos$3bili~y d� s~par~eing them.
They began eo mnve Chem oue together. Midnigh~ nrrived. Th~ CteWg re~~i.v~d
rhe order eo gb~ndon the ships since it wag exCremely d~n~erous tn rpmain dn
rhem. And actunlly, ~?fC~r ~ shore tnterval of Cime the "High Ftver" blew up,
'Chis w~s nr 011Q hours on 17 A�, cil. The ex~~loding trnnspore way i.r:~r.antaneously
de~troyed. The "Wilson Kini' was al~o deeCroy~d. The seCOnd expld~ion wn~
ehe source of ndditionul d~mnge on the ahore~ The number ~f fire:i increaaed.
~ven buildings of reinforced concreCe were damaged.
The governor of Texes declared a stttte nf emergency in thc city. Juirit actions
of the pulice and rescue t~ams cont3nued and the firee were controlled only on
18 April.
According to offtcial data, the number of Icilled reached 468 while mor~ than
100 disappeared an.: about 3,000 were injured. Many were left wiChaut sheltez
and food. There were more thnn 15,000 such people.
The material loss from Chis caCastrophe was estimated at 67 million dollars,
approximately twice that in L'n~ Halif,~x c~~u~~ru~i~u. .
The following basic lessons were learned from Che catastrophe in Texas City:
1) ammonium nitraC~ which is stored in the hold of u veasel in bulk
possesses.tremendous explosive potential and packaging iC in paper bags alqo
presents a certain danger. Consequently, it ig recommended that thig sub-
stance be loaded and transported on vesselg in metal drums and wooden barrels;
in this case, in the event of damage when loading a drum conCaining ammonium
nitrate it should be removed from t'~ie ship immediately;
2) ammonium nitrate must be stored abs~iutely insulated frow any oxidizing
effect of inflammable or explosive material, Chis requirement pert~ining to
the entire hold space including the tweendeck;
26
- FOR OF~ICItiL U5E ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~
FOft ~F~~CIAT~ U3~ ONLY
3) ~?m~dni.um nit~gee ~hou~8 b~ Ator~d ~e a~a~~ di~e~ne~ ~rom ~e~~m eonduie~
and ~l~ctric ~~.bl~~
4) it i~ r~e~tmn~nd~d that a~o~i~n ~itrare not transporeQd on fiuah-
d~ek VEH~pLH since condieion~ cr~~ted on ~hem which ar~ mor~ favorabie
for eh~ ~hiftin~ ~E ffr~ from one hold Co anoth~r;
5) dei~y in gummdning th~ �ir~ brig~d~ may prove faeal for a burnin~
v~eg~1; th~r~for~, ~uch a~ummons ehouid b~ made immediat~ly in rh~ c~~~ df
~ny fir~ which br~~k~ ~ue on ~~hip ~.n por~;
6) wi?en ammonium nitr~t~ is burning, in no ca~e ~hould the hoid b~ rlog~d
and, eo exeinguiBh rt~~ fir~ undar th~ge eonditiona neither sCegm, e~rbon
dioxid~, nor fo~m ~hould be u~ed; this ia connected with th~ oxidizin~ ability
of ammonium nitrat~ whieh l~~d~ to inten~ification of thp fire and th~ p~~~i-
bility of ~xpioginn;
7) eo extingui~h ~ fir~ of atnmonium nitrat~, it ie n~cee~~ry to ~mploy
water ~lone end in 1arg~ quanCity (looking ouC for ehe seabiliey of th~ ~1~ip).
'Therefore, wae~r hogea on ~hipa w3th ammonium ni.trat~ ~hould alwayg b~ re~dy
for u~e.
'Th~ c~rrpctnege of the ronclusione ahich Were drawn was confirmed in the ~ame
yenr by the e~erience of nne more cata~trophe.
On 28 July 1947, the Norwegtan veesel "Ocean Liberty" (1943, 7,1~6 tong) which
had t~ken on a mixed cargo including more than 3,300 tons of ammonium nitrate
wag in the port of Br~gt, ~ranc~.
When a fire broke out on the vessel, despiCe the well-known "Texas lesgons"
steam was again used to extinguish it and Che veesel exploded and sank ap-
proximately five houra after the first fire appeared. in thie case, 21 were
killed and more than 100 were in~ured. Fires broke out in the cicy. The
materi~l loss was estimated at 2 million dollarg. Logses could have been
con$iderably greater if the vegael had not been led out of the harbor wh~re
there were a great numb~r of ~hips and ve~aels.
(Pages 97, 105-145~
�6. Analysia of the Ef.fects of Fires and Explosiona on Ships and ~ire-
fighting Measures
1. SCatistical Analysis
The analysis was accomplished on the basis ~f an examination of 193 instances
of fires and explosions-Whose disitribution by classes of ships and types of
damage is presented in Table 2[not reproduced]. Of 137 instances of fires
~ithout fatal consequences, 82 arE contained in the book. A list of 56 in-
stances of fires and explosions on ships with a fatal outcome is presented
in Appendix 1[not reproduced~, 13 of Which are described in this chapter.
27
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~'dR U~~'ICiAL U5~ ONLY
in vi~w di th~ ~p~~i~i~ n~tur~ ~t ~ii~~r~~e C~rri~r~ g~ r~g~rd~ the e~fece uf:
fir~~ dnd ~xpld~idn~. dn them, ehex ~r~ ~nuiyx~d ~ep~rnr~iy. '1'he~~ f~11ow c~
g~n~r~1 ~n~1y~i~. fnr ~hip~ nf dtih~r cln~~~~~ ~nd ~ eotup~r~tiv~ ~n~1y~1.~ b!'
~~rri~r- ~nd non-~arri~r dhip~. An analysie of 45 c~~~~ af dan?g~~d C~rrittb
prdvidpd ~he �ollowin~ r~~u1~a.
'1~~~ main r~e~g~n~ far fir~~ ~nd exp~.o~imn~ ar~ ~rro~g ln et1~ ~ctiuu~ ui. p~r~dnnel
~24 p~rc~nt) ~nd ~pnn~~n~ou~ ~nmbu~C~.on of fue~. ~nd Ch~ ~xpJ.o~ton o~ it:~ vxpnrs
~19 p~r~pne); ~ nneic~gb~e porCinn i~ occupied Uy ~xplosiong df hydr~uliC by~-
e~m~ (12 p~rcent~; th~n come malfunctiions of electrical ~quipm~nti (7 p~rC~ti~)
and m~~h~nic~1 damgg~e, ~1~ceric wplding, ~nd th~ he~ting of ~team ~nitduit~
(3 p~rC~nt ~~~h)~ Unkn~wn cause~ ~ccount for 29 perc~nt.
Among rhe r~a~on~ whi~h w~ know, u signifiC~ne rol~ i~ p].ay~d by r~~ynns of ~
~tru~eur~1 n~eur~.
~nr d~gr~e df d~m~~~ tc~ ~hipy, he~vy and m~dium dgm~g~ en~ailin~ ~xpeudi~ureas
c~1GU1~Ce~1 in mgny million~ df dol~gr~ occupy ~he m~in plac~ (gbauk bn per.cenL)
while tnsi.gnific~nC damage provid~s ~pproximaCely 30 p~rcent. 7'he gmount df
d~mage i~ nde indiaat~d in 1d per~pnti of th~ c~~~~.
A~ a rule, fir~s ~nd ~xplnsiotts an C~rrierg l~ad en lttrg~ humnn s~crifir.cs.
'The grentese share (35 percent) here consistg of from lU to severnl rldzen
killed and in3ured; then come$ the number of victim~ up to 10 (31 percQnt)
- ~nd more thnn 100 killed and injured also provides an i.mpresstve ftgure (7
percent). Un1y geven percene of those recorded are wirhout victim~ and 20
percent are unknown.
Analy~is of th~ aftereffecte from fires and explosiona st~ows that in nor. anp
uccident, nnd whr~C what ig more, in noC one ca~astrnphe did carrl.exs remnin
in gc[ion, thnt ig, they could not cnnCinue the normal accomplishment of their
missions. Ships were put ouC o� action for aeveral days in 42 percent of the
cases, for several weeka in 37 percent, and for aeveral montha in 16 percent.
Unknown cases comprised five percent. Thus,inatances where carriers wer~ pur
out o� action for a nonsiderable perind--from several weeks eo several months--
comprise more than half the cases. Here, iC should be considered thar tu-
gether wit~~ the carrier~ the screening nnd auxiliary ahipA which took part
in ~xtinguishing fires and eliminating their aftereffects, in towing ehe
carriers to ba~es, and other types of supporC often stopped the accomplishment
of rheir dir.ect functions.
On the whole, for material loss, victims, and overall ~feereffects fires and
explosions inflicted extrecaely perceptible losses on carriers even though they
were not lost in this case. Catastrophes on the carriers "Constellation"
(I960), "Oriskany'' (1966), "~orrestal" (1967), and "~ntarprise"(1969) led to the
grpatest human and material losses and to significant aftereffecta. It wns
[1?ese catastrophes which were points oP departure in the development of recom-
mendations for incrensing the fire safeey of American carriers in the 19b0'K.
28
~Olt O~~TCIAI. U5E ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~0~ O~FICIAL US~ ONLY
Ac:cnrJing tn "~g~" o~ eh~ dnmaged carrier~, Ch~ "1~ading" po~iCinn (S8 p~rc~nt) ~
i~ nCCUpied Uy ~hip~ ~cl.th a pex3od o~ s.~rvic~ o~ ~rom 1 eo 10 y~arr~ whi1~ a
c~n~id~rnbly emaller ghar~ (33 p~re~ne~ cone3s~es of e,hips wieh a period of
~ervlce Erom li to 20 year~. More than 20 yeare o! sarvice provida five per-
cent n~ ehe cgse~ and during conetruction--four percent. Thie mean~ that Fir~e
~nd explo~iong� occur ~n c~rrier~ of vir~ually ~any per3odg of service. This is
~xpl~in~d, ~vid~ntly, noti only Uy the natiure of the ~ccidentg ~nd ~ae~sCroph~~
on Ch~~e gh3.p~, but a1~o liy th~ f~ce tihae atrucCur~~ �ire-preveneion measures
on carri~rs ar~ introduced boeh during ehe cons~ruction of new ~hips and ~.n
ehe course of tiheir modernizaeion eo which th@y are sub~ecti~d rather ofeen~
'I'h~refore, new ghipg, de~pit~ Che ~.mprovement 3n their equipment, are not
~videnely and favorably di~Cinguished ftiom th~~.r predece~sors. ~'urthermnre,
it is nnmel.y on riew ship~ ChaC acr~denCa gnd catiastrophes 1.ead to exCreroely
serious consequences as n reault of ehe sometimes unsucceseful aelection of
people ("F'orrestal;'1967).
Of c~rtgin inrerese are ehe ~3tuationa under which fire~ and ~xplostnnq hruak
our. Analyeis showg Chat Chey are connected moat of a11 with worl~~ iti~i.~ie the
ship (62 percent); ehen follow accidents during the landing (19 p~rcent) and
eakeoff (14 percent) of airplanes and unknown cases--5 percene. Perhapa,
these figures can be corrected "in favor" of takeoff-1~nding operations since
the press, especially the U.S. Navy, often publishes daCa on a conaidernble
number of flying accidents in American naval aviation. But regardless of
this, it can be concluded that the possibility for the outbreak of fires and
explosions on carriers does noC have to be linked with stress situations.
Extremely ofCen, fires break out as a result of haste in accomplishing the
urgent missions of the command (in particular, in preparing for combat opera-
tions) withoue consideration of the actual situatioc~ on *.he shipa, especixlly
the state of training of the personnel for the accomplishment of these
missions.
From the cases which we have examined, it follows that fires on aircraft car-
riers are accompanied mosC often (43 percent) by explosions, either preceding
them or being a consequence of them. Firea alone (without explosions) were
recorded in 40 percent of the cases and explosiona alone (without fires)--in
11 percent of the cases. Thus, about two-third~ of the gccidents on carriers
are connected with explosions which were caused by the large concentration of
ammunition and aviation fuel on them.
~ires break out most often (44 percenC) on the flighC and hangar decks, in
placea where the aircraft are refueled and armed with various ammunition.
1'wenty-one percent is the share of other decks and aervice compartments, 21
percent also in the engine and boiler room, and 2 percent in the fuel tanks.
The place where fires tireak out was not esCablished in 12 perc~nt of the cases.
In the overwhelming num6er of cases.(72 percent), fires and explosions occur
when the carrier� are at sea which, unquestionably, is conriected with the in-
tensity of their use. Next come fires when the sfiips are anchored in their
bases (16 percent) and at~the yards (12 percent) in Che course of building
and overhauling the ships.
29
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
FOR O~FICIAL US~ ONLY
Thg dur~~ioh of fir~~ w~s,; up Cn 4 hour~-~4Q pQrcen~~ up tio ld f�ur~--7 ~>~r-
npnt, ~nd up Co g dgX--2.5 perc~nt. In ind~.v~du~l c~ap~, fire~ 1a~eed up ro
eevargl daya~ ("Forr~e.~~1," ~.Q6~�~-~2.5 pexcent) ~ W~ were un~h~.~ to ~~tab.l3~h
the durarion o~ tih~ ~3r~e,in 48 pexcenC o~ Che'cases. 'Here, fdr ehe mo~t p~rr
(43 percent) ~he fires.were pue ouC aith ttie ~nvolvQmenti of the men and equ~p-
ment of o~har ~h3.p~ ar baees~. Fire,~ cdu~.d tie put out by th~ forces' of. the
damaged ah~ps a~.on~ in 37 percenti o� the caeQS. tJnknown ca~~s numbered
20 pprcent. Ay.1. theee data eeii of th8 s~er~oue nature of th~ firee which
occurred on carr~:ers.
In conclusinn, ~.e should be no~ed Chat most of ehe accidenes connectied wi~h
fires and explosiona~ on carr3ers belong to ~he firet of the decades examin~d
(1950's--43 percent) while somewhat fewer cases (39 percent) b~long Co the
following decade. The first decade of the 1970's provides a~i~ure of ~8
percent. Thus, it can 6e eaid that no obvious reduction in the intenai~y of
nccidenta and cataserophes~ on carriers is obeerved ae regards eime.
The 92 cas�e~ of damage �ram f~res and exploaiona on non-carrier ships wh:tch
we examined showed the following in ehe analyeis.
One of the basic reasons for acciden~s�(23 percent) is the ignitien of fuel
and the explosion of its vapors; next aome explosiona of annnunition (~.4 per~
cent) and steam boilers and steam conduits (10 percent)~ Short circuits attd
defects in electrical equipment in general also provide 10 percent af the
accidental emergencies; the same portion ia made up of incorrect actions by
ehe personnel and careleasness in handling fire. Such causee of ftrea as
heated surfacea of inechanisms.and pipes (5 percent) and fires from adjacet~t
burning ahips (2 percent) were noted. The causes of fires were unknown in 26
percent of the ~ases.
Fire emergencies on non-carrier ships, as a rule., cauae aignificant (47 per-
cent) and average (45 percent) damage to ships while damage of an insignificant
nature is noted in only 8 percent of the cases. In accordance with this, fires
and explosions cause extremely aerious aftere�fecCs. As a result.of the acci-
dents, ships were put out of action for several weeks (54 percent) and aeveral
months (13 percent). In individual cases, being out of action lasted for more
than a year (2 percent). Thus, ships were out of acCion for a long time in
more Chan two-thirds of the cases. In the other accidenCS, the shipa were
out of action for several days (23 percent) or were repaired by the efforts
of the personnel (6 percent). Unknown cases comprise two percent.
Fires and explosions on non-carrier ships lead to large human losses. Thus,
several dozen people periahed in 7 percent of the ~ases, up to 10 in 33 per-
cent, and various numb ers were in~ured in 5 percent of the cases. Forty per-
cent of the fires were without.victims and 15 percent were unknown. Relatively
large loss~es result from the explosions of turrets of the ma~or caliber on
gun-firing ships (the battleship "Mississippi"--1924, the cruiser "Devonshire"
--1929, the cruiser "Saint Paul"--1952).
30
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~OR OF~ICIAL USE ONLY
In a large numb~r of c~~.en (45 percenC), th~ pl~ce wher~ Eire~ hreak oue on
ehipe i~ the ~ngine gnd boi~er roomg, and the~.r holde; th~n follow varioue
eervlc~ compartments (~g percent), arCi~lery mounts# and open deckg (10 percenC).
FewQr fire~ br~ak ouC in fuel eank~ and living quarterg (.from 1 to ~ p~rcent).
Unknown ca~e~ compris~ 13 percent.
'I'he ~xe~.n~u~.ahing of fire~ by the e�fort~ of the damaged ahip alone was euc-
ce~aful 3n a comparativ~ly small number o� cases (28 percene). There are many
more gccidents wher~ Ath~r sh~.ps or tihe f3re bri:gadee of ci~iea and pl.ant~ were
called upon tn ~limin~te f~res~ (43 percent). ~n 29 percent of Che cases, rhere
is no informatinn on Choae who participaCed 3n ellminating fireg an ships~
According to clasaes o� eh~.ps, accidenes with f~res and explosions are dietrib-
uted ~uec~eaively in the following manner: light ahips--44 percent, armored
ships--26 percent, sma11 combaCan~ ships and mineaweepers--15 percenC, r~+.ixil3ary
ehips--12 percent, and ~.anding ships--3 percenC.
As regarde Che "age" nf ships, a large portion of the fireg (47 percent) broke
- out on ships with a period of service of up Co 10 years, then (28 percent) on
shipa whose period of aervice is from 11 to 20 years and, final~.y, on ships
wiCh a period of service of more than 20 yeare--in 15 percent of rhe cases.
On a number of ahipa, fires occurred while they were atill under construction ~
and test (10 percent).
Fires and exploaions on non-carrier ships occurred more often (44 percenC) on
voyages at eea. A small number of fires are noted when the ships are in the
bases (29 percent) and at the yarda (21 percent). Unknown cases comprise ~ix
percent.
The firea Which were examined broke out on the ahipa of 12 of the world's fleets.
Among them (in order of decrease in the relative number of cases): Germany*
(41 percent), United States (18 percent), Great Britain (16 percent), Frsnce
(12 percenC), Japan (4 percent), Italy and Roumania (2 percent each), and other
countrie8--1 percent each.
A comparison of the circumstances of accidents on carriers and non-carrier
ships may be of some intereat.
The reaeons for firea and exploaions on carriers were most often errors in ac-
tions of personnel, and on non-carrier ahips--exploaions of ammunition in
artillery mounts, the ignition of fuel, and explosions of its vapors.
In accordance with the degree of damage to ehips as a result of fires and ex-
plosions on non-carrier ships~, conQideraTily more heavy and medium damage is
, diatinguished in comparison with similar damage on carriers (92 percent to b0
percent) and, accordingly, there is substantially more insignificant damage
* Here we have in mind Germany prior to its division into two parts. The FRG
is included among other countries.
31
,
FOR OFFICIE~L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~'dtt O~1~ICIN., US~ ONLY
nn cnrr~l~rg Ch~n nn nnn-c~rri~x e,hip~~ Th~.s. cnmpl~~el,y ~und~i~~eund~bl.e s~.nce
nc~ cerrier �i~,. ~ s~~gn~ixi.cnntly mora ~urvivab,le ah3p i~~ compax~l~~:on wieh l~~ht
nnd un~rmored ah:tp~ nf v~xious clgsses, ~r.hich compri~e the ma~nri.i:y ~mnng ~I~e
dum~ged ~h:tp~ cnn~.ider~d.
Up to 10 vicrima nre encauntered in gn almose equal r~tio on ehip~ ~f both
group~ (aboue one-third of ~he oases) , wirh the numlier o� cus~~ of lc~.lled nn
th~ order o~ sever~l dozen men on carriera cons�iderably more (35 nnd 7 perceat).
AccidenCe and carastrophES wte~ more than 100 men ki~.led are encountered only
on carriers. There are cone~iderably Eewer� f~:reg ~:n which ehere nre nn
vicrims or where ehe victims ~re few nn ~~rezafC car~iers in nnmpar:[enn
wiCh non-carrier ships. 'Thie is �u11y explainable if we consid~r that with
big fires and explosione �or which a large number ot victim~ 3s typica~, the
carrier will wiChatand them where g 1ighC ehip wi11 lie losC, And th3s 3s al.so
connecCed with the r~1c~Cively great survivaliility of the carri~r in comparison
with non-carrier unarmored ships.
A comparison oF the aftere�fecCs from fires �or the two ~roupe of ships shows
that non-carrier ships go ou~ o� acCion for a long time more often thnn cnr-
rier~ (67 and 53 percent). This is the direct consequenEe rf ehe degree of
their damageabil~ty; for a short period, on the contrary, a smaller percenCag~
belongs to non-carrier ships.
The "age" of the ships does not provide subatantial differences between shipa
of both groups. Thus, for example, damaged ehips with a period of service of
up to 10 years are encounCered in both groups in a rather large number of
cases (about half), differing in the somewhat larger dir~ction for carriers
and in a lesser dir~ction for other ships. The relative number o� dama~ed
cases with the ships' period of service of 11 to 20 yeare is also close in
both groups of ships and flucCuaCes with limits of 1/3. The diffeience be-
comes noticeable on ships with a period of service of more than 20 years.
Here, there are substantially more accidents among non-carrier ships, which
is explained by the ships' periods of service. Fires during the consCruction
and testing of ships occurred more often on non-carrier ships.
A comparison of ships locations during accidenCs and catastrophes is inCerest-
ing. Whil~ fires and exploaions occurred on carriers more often at sea and
considerably more rarely in bases and yards (correlation--72 and 28 percenC),
on non-carrier ships this correlation contains al:nost equal data and is even
smaller for sea (44 and 50 percent). Perhaps, this is the result of the more
intensive use of carriers in comparison with ships of other classes.
The analysis of the loss of ships from fires and explosions differs from the
analysis of their damage without disast~ous consequences. While a certain
statistical sample in which, naturally, all cases of fires and explosion
which are available.c~uld nc~t find reflection was used for Che analysis of
damaga, all cas~es of the loss of ships as a.result of fires-and explosions
which are known to us were used in the analysis of disastrous cases. Further-
more, for the analysis of disastrous cases it was found expedient to expand
32
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~o~ n~rzczat~ ~s~ ortLY
ttle time r~ng~ ,of Ghe ~~udy aomewhaC a~nd ~ cas,ea o~ ehe ~.oss nf ~hip~ were taken
which occurr~d from the st~rt of ehe cen~ury up eo.the pxesenti. ~A1~. rhis w~3
done Co obCain the most�.genernl conclus,~.ong~ ~oas~hle ~xom the etaCietinal.
analy~is of cases of ghip 1.oas.es. At the ~ame tiime, as was indicaCed'above,
ehe comparative~y small numher of cases of 1os~ea could be deacribed in
deti~?~.1, 'Phe ~h~.ps wh~ch survived provided more materiaYs for deCails and th~y
found r~fleceion in rhe t~ook. These apecia~. features were reflected somehow
in the ur~a~.ysis~ which was~ performed'.
The statistic~l proces~ing of cages where ships were lost to �irea and expln-
giona 1.ed Co Che following results.
Among Che shipe which were lost, a considerable share (39 percent) is ocCUpied
by armored ship~; ttien come auxiliary vessels (27 percent), light ahipa (18
- percene), and a group of small comliaCt~nt shipe and mine sweepers (14 percAnC).
During the 1.ase p~riod, ehe loss of only one carrier was recorded (2 p~rcenC).
The large share of the loss of armored shipe can be explained only by Che fact
- Chat the explosions of ammuniCion magazines ofCen occurred on Chem. ln Cheae
cases, the ships rarely remained afloat but were los~ most often. Here, Che
loss of ships occurred so rapidly that no effective measures to save them could
be undertaken. For example, some big ships were losC in 20-45 minutes
("Leonazdo da Vince--1916, "Tsukuba" [as transliterated]--1917) and others in only
~ 4-5 minuees ("MaCsushima"--190~, "Kavachi" [as transliterated]--1918~). The
relatively high loss percentage of auxiliary ships is explained by ehe fact Chat
that explosions of ammuttttion and explosives occurred raCher often on them.
It is paradoxical., but a fact, thaC only one carrier was lost to fires and ex-
plosions during such a long period of tiime (we recall--non-combat action).
This was the British carrier "Desher" [as tranaliterated]. The explanation of
this fact can be soughC in the idea that, for a number of reasons, explosiona
of ammunition magazines did not occur on carriers as on other ships. During
fires, as a result of their design features they went out of action most often
but were not lost as, for example, light ships.
Of inCerest is the circumstance that the overwhelming ma~ority of ships (86 per-
cent) were lost in bases and only a small portion (12 percent) were lost at sea
while unknown cases comprise 2 percent. This should only be explained by the
facC that at bases vi~ilance on ships (especially as concerns fires) is con-
siderably lower than aC sea.
The main reason for the loss of ships is the explosions of ammunition magazines
(41 percent); then follow internal explosions (20 percent) among which there
may be explosions of ammunition or steam boilers and the explosions of steam
boilers proper (11 percent). Thus, in three~fourths of the cases the loss
of ships is connected with various explosions which occur on them. Other
reasons such as� a malfunction in electrical~equipment, electric welding, the
spontaneous combustion of fuel, mechanical damage, and fire on ad~acent ships
provide 3-5 percent each,comprising about20 percent in sum, while unknown
reasons comprise 8.percent.
33
FOR OFFICItiI. USE ONLY _
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~'OR OFFICIAI, US~ ONLY
AttenCion ig nCer~Cted hy Che tr~m~ndou~ s~cr~.f~.cse wh~.ch ~r~.rhe con~~quences
of fir~~ and expln~~.ons. on sh~.p~, w,3th. a diaa~troug nuticom~. Coming loreh eo
eh~ fnreground h~r~ (34 pgrcen~) are cgseg o~ ahip lasges on wh~.cil th~ vi~tiims
numbered hundred~ of prople. F'or example; on the Jap~ne~e b~Gtileghip "Knv~chi"
more rhan 500 men were kil~.~d whi~e 608'and 736 men were lose r~spene3vely on
Che nritish bgCtl~sh~.p~ "Bulwark" and ""Vnnguard." Tn 2~ percenC of ehe ~~s~y, -
th~ victims numbered dozene whi1~ in 12 per~enr they numbered up eo 10 m~n
or there w~r~ nn vice~.m~ ~t g11. U~known ca8eg~ compriaed 31 pexcent, Alto-
getiher, up to 6,000 men were los~e on tReee shipa�. Buti enine exp~.or~iong ~f
ships, primarily military eransporCs~ were gources of a coloysal numb~r ni
humnn vicrims~ nn ad~acent sliipa and vesselg as w~~.1 a~ on the shnre. zn four
carasCrophes alone (Halif~x, Bomliay, "Mounti Hood," and Texas) 6,570 killed and
missing were recorded, rhere were 15,500 in~ured and burned, and about 40,000
left without shelter (witihout Bom6ay).
The geography of Che lost ships' countries embraces 16 f1~et~. Here, 23 perCent
belong to ehe United SCaCes, 16 pernent to Great Britain, 14 percenC eo Frt~nce,
9 percent each Co Germgny and Japan, 7 percent Co ICaly, 5 percent to Swed~n,
und 1~ percent to tihe remaitting counCriea~
In general, this is Che aCatis~ical picture of fires dnd explosions on ahips.
Let us now examine some of the qualttative characteristics of the prublem and,
at the same time, Chose measures which are lieing undertaken or are contempla`ed
in foreign f~eets to increase the fire~ and explosion safety of ~hips.
2. Factors in the Fire and Explosion Dnnger of Ships and Fire-~'igliting
Measures
A qualitative analysis of accidents and catastrophes permits us to asc~rtal.nthe
bas~ic factors of fire and explosion danger of ehipa and the nature of the
effect of fires and explosions on ships of various classes as welJ. as the
behavior of ships and people in the presence of such effects.
On the basis of the analysis and study of a number of publications, tC also
became possible to determine several, perhaps the main, trends in the develop-
ment of ineasures to increase the fire and explosion safety of ships in the
navies of foreign states, especially of the United States and Great Britain.
It should be kept in mind that fires and explosions are extremely widespread
types of accidents which occur on ships as a result af the effect of enemy
ammunition on them as well as with non-combat effects. These accidents can
be arbitrarily called "universal," in contrast to, lee us say, the collisions
of ships or their grounding--accidents which, as a rule, are not connected
with comb.at effects. It is namely by considering the "universal" nature of
fires and explosions that the problem of the fire and explosion safeL�y of
ships is solved with consideration of the�experience of combat and daily
service.
34
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
F'OR 0'~~'ICIAL USC ONLY
The experi~nce of Wor.ld W~r :[I ~howed [$9] tih~~ Che fire- and~exp.lne~.nn d~nger
nE Hhips in f;nr~J.~n fleet~a i~. Ch~ir weak poiz~ti. Thie perraina QapecLr~y]y r.o
uirernfC nnrr~ter~: tlte dumdge ro aircraft carriera in the period ot the war
(for a~.1 fleeCs) wae connected With fire~:and exp~os~ons in appzoximately 3Q
percent of the capes. ~'ires broke out on carriers wtien they were hit with
virtually ~ny types~ o� ammun~[tion--aerial bombs, tiorpedoes, artillzry shelle,
or "kamikaze" a1.rp~.aneg. The loss o� almost all U.S. carr~.ers during the
war wae gccompanied tiy firee- and exploelo~B�.- Fires and expl~sions on the
flighe decks ~nd 3n the hgngars also serv~d ag the main reason cohy Che heavy
Americ~n carrters "Franklin," "Saratoga," and "Ticonderoga" and a number oi
oCher ships~ iahich were hit by ~?erial bombs and '!kamikaze" a~rplanes were pti~t
out of ac~ion (without disa~~rnus consequences). Therefore, even in the
course of the war measures were undertaken in the fleets of the UniCed St~tes,
Cre~t Br3tain, nnd Japr~n Co strengthen the fire safety o� carriers.
The acuteness of the protilem grew substantially in the postiwar ye~1:s. The ab-
soluee and relative weight of aviae~.on ammunition and aviaeion fuc:I. (I'ig. 19)
[noe reproduced]--ehese two main fire- and explosion-hazardous componenta on
ahips--increased several-fold on carriers~ Postwar accidents and catastrophes
nn American carriers~ indicat~ that not only old and modernized carriers, but
t~lso Che biggest newly consCructed U.S. carriers proved to be insufficiently
secured as regards f ire-fighting capability even under the comparati.vely simple
service conditions wittiout the enemy's combat effects. The acutenesa o.f. the
problem is intensifying with the ever-increasing dimensions and cost of these
ships. Thus, f.or example, the total displacemeflt of a contemporary nuclcar
carrier of the "Nimitz" type reaches almost 95,000 tons and its construction
cost is 1 billion dollars (including the airplanes). The cost of maintaining
" carriers is also increasing continuously as a result of the constantly increas-
ing complexity of their equipment and the growth in the size of the crew
which comprises more than 6,000 men. A considerable increase in the cost of
ships is caused by the natural striving to increase their safety and keep Chem
in acCion under various emergency siCuations, especially with fixes and ex-
plosions. Therefore, special attention is devoted to questions of ensuring
the fire safety of carriers.
These questions also pertain to ships of other classes to one degree or another.
In recent years, fire on a ahip has been declared "enemy No 1" in the United
States. That great significance is attached to this prob lem is shown by the
numerous instances of its discussion in the press, at symposiums and conferen-
cPS, and in various discussions. The flow of publications has intensified es-
pecially during the last 10-15 year~ in connection with events on U.S. carriers.
Various studies and tests which were~ conducted to clarify individual specific
questions of "fire" subject matter, actual measures already. adopted and being
adopted on active ships, and the urgency in'executing all orders in this field
point indisputably to~the serious s~.gnificance which is attached to this prob-
lem.
The fire safety of ships is ensured by a camplex which consists of three groups
of ineasures--structural, organizational-technical, and the crew's actions in
35
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~Olt OFFICIAL US~ ONLY
Eighting firea. Meas,u~res.,ot a1l,three ~nd~.caCed groupa. ~re con~~.dered impnr-
t~nt for the ~ull~fledged ens~uzance of ahiR f~.xe saf~ty. However~ ~tadg~.ng
from data in,the foreign pre~a,, main atten~ion is qeing d~vo~ed Cu kh~ grnup
of constiruc~ion meaaures mh~ch are c~11ed upon to provid~ A w~arning r~nd the
localizing,of firea and explos�iona and to incorporate Cechn~cnl meai~e �Qr
Pighting fires.
In examining ~.nd~.v~dual fire-hazardoua factiora and metihods for. fight3ng them~
we w31~. consider where pos$iti1~ measurea o� a~.~. three of the ind3c~ted groups,
/~'~.rea in ~he engine and boiler rooms/. Experience ~hows tihat a raCher frequent
kype of acc3.dent on s~hips of a number of classes consists of fires 9.n the eng~ne
and bo3.ler rooms.
AccidenCs for Chese reasons occurred and are occurring unti]. recently on
ships of various �leets and clasaes (the battle cruiser"Reknown"--ig27, the
destroyer "Anton Schmidt"--1940, the torpedo boaC T1--1943, the heavy cruiser
"NewporC News"--1956, the carrier "Kitty Hawk"--1973). Work [?.6~ poinCs out
that during the last three months of 1940 alone and an ships of. Che Gern~Fin
navy alone there were 60 fires as a result of Che spontaneous combusCion o�
lubricaCing oil and liquid fuel. According to other daCa, Chere were several
hundred fires in tfi e engine and boiler rooms of battleships, cruisers, de-
stroyers, and ships of other classes on German warships in the period of World
War II.
rires in engine rooms were the result of the ignition of lubricating oil (from
the bearings of Che main and auxiliary mechanisms) when it fell on the tiot
surfaces of turbines or conduits. To prevent this, iC was recommended that
the design of inechani5ms be incorpor~ted which would exclude the possibi'lity .
that the oil from rhe 6earing5 would leak through and spray, that heat insula-
tion which does not perrnit oi1 ro pas$ through be used, and that use be made
of noncombustible protective coatings which would protect the surfaces from
the spread of fire over them. Paints should possess 1ow heat conductivity ~o
ensure the slow rate of the fire's spread. Among the recommendatioris of. an
operating character it was pointed out that the personnel of engine rooms must
systematically check and tighten the packing of the mechanisms' oi1 lines.
Accidents in the boiler rooms were more serious. Many accidents and catastro-
phes were noted whose causes were the explosions of steam boilers on ships.
In the majority of cases (about two-thirds), such explosions led Co the loss
of the ships while in the other cases they only caused damage (sometimea seri-
ous) but they ships remained afloat here. Interestingly, awong the non-
� ~disastrous. in~.tances. of hoiler explosions, ~o~~ which ~six were record~d, half
occurred in Che 1920's and the other hal~ in the 197U's. The guided missile
destroyer "Goldstiorough," the escort destroyer "Basilone"(both of the United
States),and the landing ship, dock "Candido De Lasala" (Argentina) on which
explosions of the steam boilers occurred (respectively in 1970, 1973, and
1974) were heavily damaged as a result of this although they remained afloat.
36
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~'Oli C1F~~CIAL USC ONLY ,
'Che r~~~dn f~r ~h~ ~cpln~i~n ~t a b~iler ig usually eh~ nv~r~training o~ it~
w~1.1 ~ r~~uie nf whicll eh~iz int~~rity i~ de~rroyad. 7'hi~ mgy b~ ~h~
r~~~~Lt of ~xc~~~ive ~e~~m pr~~~ur~ in th~ boil~r (wh~n ehe ~~f~ty vaiv~~ nr
nre~~urc g~~tge~ f~ii), ~ lnc,~~rtng o~ Che mati~r lev~]. in ie (b.ee~U$~ of eh~
per~onn~l'~ nv~rgight) ,�.horecnmtng~- in th~ de~i~n of th~ boi.ler ~du~ Co
~rrer~ in a~lculc~tion~, 1nw quality of m~CQrial~, or d~f~2~tig in m~nufdctur~),
nnd it~ incorr~ct q~rvi~ing ~nd maint~nanc~. A~ ~vid~nt, th~re ~r~ boeh
d~~ign ag well ~g op~r~tidn~l r~asons. To avoid explnsinns in boil@rs,
eh~se point~ should be cdneid~r~d in the procc~s of de~igning, m~nufacruring,
teHeing, ~nd nper~tien af boilers nn ehip~~ -
In bniler room~, mc~ny fir~s w~r~ caus~d by eh~ ignirion of fu~i oil. N~r~,
" hilge fire~" o�ten ac~urred when w~t~r ~ccumui~t~d in Che b ilge~ ~nd th~
remngnrs nf ni1 floating on its aurfac~ ignited if they proved tid be cld~e td
the hoe secCions of ehe boiler~. T~ exc~t~da such fireg which, gg e rul~,
- ncc~rr~d us g resulC of omission~ by the pergonnel (infrequ~nt checkinY ;.ud
cleaning of the bilges), it wag directed that ehe boiler room bilgec. be kept
dry, ch~cking their condition ~ysCemaCically. Furthermore, it aa:: :ecdmmended .
thaC bilge-waCer oil purifiers be employed on the ehip~.
Snme fires had as their source the burning of ~oot in Ch~ amokestacks. 'i'his
occurr~d either due to the use o� too grQasy a mixture of boiler fuel or ~s a
result oE the infrequent and late cleaning of soot from the ~moke uprakes. In -
rhege cases, it wag sufficient for sparks to land on the soo~ which had accumu-
lnted to cause 8 fir~. Such firea can be eliminated by conducting the syetem-
atic ~nd thorough cleaning of the boiler smoke uptakes.
/~ires from the ignition of light types of fuel/. Considerably greater damage
to ships is linked with the effect of fires and explosions on them which are
caused by the ignition of light types of fuel.
Thus, for example, on torpedo boats and minesweepers where gasoline engines are
employed, rather frequent fires and explosions occurred as a regult of the
gasoline's ignition and Che explosion of ita vapora. Frequently, the gourceg
nf such fires were leaks in the gasoline systems, because of which the geso-
line spread and, landing on the hot surfa~ea of inechanis~ and conduits,
caught fire. These fires and explo~ions led to the ships' going out of uction
and, sometimes, to their los~ (German torpedo boata and minesweepers). They
werc one of the basic reasons for the change to diesel engines in place of
gasoline engines on small combatant ships and minesweepers.
"Gasoline" fires and explosions occurred on cruisers in the areas where gasoline
tanks were located hecause the Canks, in particular, were left empty and were
not refillcd with water (the cruiser "Goritsiya" jas transliteratedJ, 1959).
5uch accidents led to local damage on ships.
However, noted most often were fires and explosions connected with the combus-
tion of aviation fuel on aircraft carriers whict~ occurred un~er tne most di-
verse conditions. A nwnber of fires and exploaions were connected with the
leakage of fuel from defective fuel tanks and its ignition ~;"Indomitable,'
37
FOR OFFICI!'iL U5~ ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~'OR n~'~'ICIAL US~ dNLY
~ 1953) whil~ oth~r~ w~rp ehe r~~.ul~ o~ Che ung.aCi~fgcCory cnndieian n.f. ship~
~1~etri~~1 ~quipm~nt, a~~~cig11~? Ch~ high-~oltag~ n~twork ("R~ng~~" ~ncl
~~ndolph," 1959). Sueh ~xplosion~ l~d ~o the dam~ge o~ ~hip~ ~~d humnn victim~.
~ Mnny aceidenes, o~eurr~d on fligtit d~eka during unsucc~~~ful t,~keo�~~ and ]and~
ing~ of ~irpl~n~g ("~~~~x," 1951 and 1959, "Ori~kany," 1954, "Hgn~nak," 1958)~
'1'h~ Fu~t fir~ c~C~~trophe~ on the "P'or~aotal" (19b7) and "~nt~rpriAe" (1969)~
whiCh nl~o bpg~n from thp flight dpcks, liecam~ sadly we11-knnwn. In el~p ].~l�C~r
eg~~~, eh~ fir~~ were accompani~d by thg explo~3ong of bnmbs and rock~t~a which
inC~n~ifi~d ~ignificanCly ~he efPeec of their dasCruCCiv~ action on eh~ ghipg.
Av;~eion fuel fireg alsu occurr~d ~.n the hangars during th~ r~~ue~ling of rhe
nirpl~n~s when prep~ring ehem for Cakeoff ("Wasp," 1955, "Orisk~ny," 7.96G),
'Cher~ w~re al~o fir~~ when Caking fuel on ~he carrierd ("~ranlc.lin ll, It~og~velt,"
196b). A big fir~ on the c~rrier "Congtellgtion" (1960) also had ehc~ cnmUuHtian
of fupi on on~ o� the ship'~ dQCks a~ its source.
M~ny uf Ch~ aviaCion fu~1 fires and exploeions ~ed Cd lar~~-:,c~le cutagtropheg
which were discu~sed e~rlier. In a detailed s~eudy of Che c~rcum~tnnce:~ oE ehe
nccidenC~ gnd Cati~strophes cottnected wieh fires of Chis type, ir coas est~?b:li.shed
th~e in the ma~oriry of c~sag ~hey were the result of incorrect actions ~nd
omissions by the ship's p~rsonn~l. But ehere also were reasons of a design
nature and an insufficiency of fire-fighting means was especially noted.
'Che consCant and considerable growth in aviation fuel supplies on carrier~ ia
cau~ing alarm for their fire safety in the future, Coo, fn the fnreign flee~e.
Aviation fu~l whlch i~ less fire-haznrdaus than gasoline is now being used in
the navies of Che United States and oCher countries. Thus, Che henvier ~viu-
tion fuel mark JP-5 which has a flash paint of 50�C is used on U.S. carriers
instead of the gasoline with a flash point of 10�C which was formerly used. '
For fire-prevention purposes, the storage of gasoline on carriers was accomp-
lished in "~addle-shaped" tanks surrounded by cofferdams with an inert gas
(F'ig. 2b) [not reproducedJ. Here, the transportation of aviation gasoline by
ship is accomplished only in double pipes wiCh externnl filling with inert gas.
This system was adopted, for example, on French and American carriers. The
storage of fuel for ,jet engines is much simpler. In this case, Che cofferdams _
are eliminated and the placement of the fuel in tanks protected by armor which
was employed earlier is abolished. A schematic diagram of aviation fuel's
placement on ~ carrier for 3et engines is given in Figure 21 [not reproduced].
The frequency of fires on flight decks and in the hangars of carriers, the
speed of a fire's spread through A ship, and the nature of its destructive
action--all this dictated the urgent necessity to adopt imperative measures
to reinforce the means for fighting fires on flight decks and in hangars.
And~ actually, such measures were adopted, especially in �:2cent years. The
future will show the practical effectfveness of these me~ssures, but the scales
of work accomplished and planned are such that, in all probabilitS~, they will
correspond to the assigned task of increasing the fire safety of ships and,
first and foremost, carriers.
38
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~O~t 0~'F~CIAL US~ ONLY
Prim~ry atCenCion w~e d~voted to the oxganization~]. fnrmulgtidn ~f the m~tite~.
And ae the ~nd~.of ehp 1960'~. the MTO jlogiatic guppore~ of the U.S. Nc~vy
cr~~t~d ~ Hp~cial group to conxd3n~te r~11 work:on tha developm~nt and ug~ o~
n~w meang eo Eight fires. Importiant ecien~ific-~r.esear~h and~industrial
org~nizaCtons a~ we11 ag ~lpmenCs of the Navy were drawn into Che accnmplish-
menC nf ehe wnrk. '~he direct development,of f~:re-exeinguighing sub~tanc~a wa~
nsgigned Co Ch~ Nava1 It~aearch Laboratory (NRL) wh~.le supervieion of quesCion~
~oncgrning ~ire-f3gheing equi~nnent aas -a~~i.gned to the connnand o� the M'T0.
Uevelopmene of new fire~~xtinguishing aubntiances was considered to be one of
Che primary migsions.
Such ~ubetances were d~veloped for the naeds of the U.S. Navy at ehe beg~nn~.ng
of the 1960's. They included Che foaming agent "light water" and the powde~
of poeasaium bicarbonate (purple K). It wae also decided Co use them on ships
and~ first of all, on carriers. "Light�water" is a liquid mixture with n
deneity of 1010 kilograms per cubic meter of a surface-active subg~ance from
syntheeic carbon fluoride. This foaming agenC, however, mixes well wi.th fresh
waCer as well as with ser~ water. The latter circumstance is extremely impor-
tant for ships which have limited auppliea of fresh water. It was eatablished
that foam with an expansion multiplicity facCor of 7-11 can be generaCed from
a aix-percent solution of the mixCure with the use of regular foam monitor~.
It has an important property--it spreads over the surface of burning fuel creat-
ing a thin but srrong and cohesive (compactly coalesced) film which inhibits
the emergence of combusCible gases from Che center of Che �ire, increaging
conaiderably the flame-damping effect and mgking it~sCable.
Experiments have shown that C}ie effectiveness of extinguishing burnin~ fuel,
(in particular of the JP-S-type) is Cwo to five times higher with tne new
foaming agent ("ligl:t water") than with the ~ormer protein foam generator, and
wiCh potassium bicarbonate--three to four times greater,~han with the previously
used powder on a sodium base and with carbon dioxide which is also widelys used
to e:ctinguish fires on ships. Here, it wae found that with the high effective-
ness of these flame dampers they are also more economical since they require
relatively less consumption of materials per unit of fire area than former
substances.
The method of extinguishing burning fuel wi~h these substances consists of ehe
fact that first a flame-damping cloud is created from poCassium bicarbonate
to reduce the temperature and suppress the flame and then rhe center of the
fire is covered with foam on a base of "light water."
These substances were tested comprehensively under range and ship conditions
and, in 1968, were accepted in the U.S. Navy as the basic means for extingttiah-
ing fire on ships, primarily on aircraft carriers.
The self-propelled units of the airfield type (motor carts) with which carriers
began to be equipped at the beginning of the 1960's (four per ship) had
~ two fire-extinguishfng substances (tWinned agent unit)--"light water and po-
tassium carbonate. These carts had~a "light water" feed of 189 liters per
minute and a potassium carbonate feel of 2.1.6 kilograms per second. As was
39
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
I~'Ott d~'~ICtAL~ US~ dNLY
reporeed in Che U.3. pr~g~, one ch~rg~ a.E �ir~-a~teingui~hing nuhaea�~~~ c~n
an~ur~ ~xtinguishing ~ kir~ on an are~ o~ S3Q ~qu~r~ met~re wieh ~ ti~~ nf
continuou~a op~r~ei.on ~f 1.S minut~~. `N~r~, Ch~ r~~exve on Ch~ e~rt i~ ~~.0
literg of w~t~r gnd foaming ag~nr~and 90'kilogram~ o� potae~ium ~icarbon~?t~.
mh~ u~e of two s~ch c~rC~ tio ~xtingu~.sh:Cfie fire on th~ cgrri~r "~fleer~ri~~"
ghow~d th~t thei.r fe~d i~ too 1ow for such cae~s. In addition eo ehi~, rhe
proximity oE the cartg tt~ rh~ point o� tA~~accid~nt led to wh~r~ bnmb fr~~g-
ments destroyed Ch~ ~ir-tigHCn~g~ of thp~cylinder~ wieh gir nnd thp adneain~re
wirh rhe fir~-extingui~hing gubgtanc~g, as a result of which th~y w~nt out of
oper~tion. Therefore, it was decided to equ~p big c3rri~r~ wiCh mohit~ ~nd
fa~t fire engines (a1~o of th~ ~irfi~ld Cype) wh~.ch po~~ess a cnn~id~r~b~y
grearer fe~d in romp~ri~on aith Ch~ carte~ 2'hese were eh~ M~-5 m~ciiir~e~
(~ig. 22) (noC r~produced).
'She fo~m moniror feed of ehe M~-5 engtne ig ~boue].,U00 liter~ p~r minute nf
fngm generating solueion ~nd up ~0 2.25 kilograms of powd~r. 'Th~ png:ine hag
waeer tanks wiCh a capaciey of 1,~10 liters, tank~ for "light ~aater" wirh a
capacity of 113 litera~ and a pump to f~ed the solution of "light waeer" to
the foam monitor which i~ insCglled above Che driver'g cab, 7'he ~ngine i~ glso
equipped with a container eo gtore~the potassium bicarbonate powder~ ~ epraypr,
c~nd a fire hose. The engine's total feed is approximately ~ix times greatei
than the feed of the carr and ehe fire can be extinguished from a di~tgnc~ of
ttbout 30 meters, that is, from a safer dietance. The "Enterpri~e," for example,
is equipped with five such engines. They are considered as temporary frdm now
on unril the development of more improved fixed fire-figheing gyatems.
A system of water protecCion (SVZ, American designation NBC) lius been adapted
to extinguish fires on the flight deck. ICs baeic purpose is to wash away
radioactive deposits when nuclear bursts occur. The possibility of using ~he
SVZ to extinguish fires on flight decks was confirmed by apecinl tesCS in which
the conditions for the fire on the carrier "Enterprise" were reproduced. On
these tests, with the use of a six-percent solution of "light water" as the
fire-extinguishing substance, the extinguishing time was abnut two minutes.
The test conditiens were the following: the amount of burning gpread JP-5
fuel--13,000 liters, burning area--864 square meCers, wind velocity--30 knots,
and time of free combustion--60 seconds.
The SVZ sprayers are installed on the flight deck by zones, the length of each
of them being about 38 meters. A zone with an area of about 930 square meters
is served by an independent SVZ main. Control by zones is accomplished remote-
ly from eon,trol panels located in the pilot room and in the aircraft flight
control post.. The system can also be controlled from the sh ip's control post
for takeofi aad Ianding operations.
The sprinkler system for the hangars is controlled from fire atations located
on the hangar deck. It is planned to put this system into operation auto-
matically from fire-detection notification equipment.
40
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~'OR O~~ICIAI., US~ ONLY
At th~ ~~m~ ~in~e, Fo~m gen~r~~or~. o~ ~h~ prot~in ~yp~ w~r~ r~pl~~~d by "iigh~
w~t~r" in ~ ~i~c~d ~hip~ ~.y~e~m~ `~hi~ remoeely controii~d ~ire-~ceingui~hing
~yge~m nn big c~rri~rg CnnaiQe~~of 17 ittdep~nd~nt q~et3ono. b~~ie ~1~m~~e~
~Cig. 2~) Cnot r~pradu~~d~ ar~s a tank with Poam g~n~raeor ~wirh a cspaCiCy
dE 1,135 iie~r~), ~ foam mix~r-Uateher (ou~pur for the foam-generaetng aolu-
eian 3,7~5 1ie~r~ p~r minuee), r~noe~ly. contro~l~d f3t~in~~, pipe~ine~, fir~-
~nd manu~i fo~m monieor~~, ~nd Eir~ ho~~s, driv~g, ~nd ~tgn~i ~qui.pm~ne. rh~
r~nk wieh foam $en~rat~r, fo~m mi~ter, and rdmoe~iy contrdll~d firting~ arp
locae~d an eh~ ~~cond deck. Gontrol o~ ~he foam-~xGinguishing ~ygt~m ~,a
ac~ompli~h~d f~om th~ fire po~ts of ehe fiight deck, hangar, and plac~~ where
~h~ fo~m mixer~ ~r~ in~e~li~d.
~t~ conn~eeion wiCh Ch~ f~~e that rh~ fixed fogm-extingui~hing ~y~rem whi~h w~~
int~ndpd ~~rlt~r to ~xtinguigh fir~s in h~ngar~ began to b~ ~mployed tn ~~r-
vic~ eh~ fligilt d~ck, eoo, and, in addition, it ~Ci11 h~d to gupport the SVZ
~nd firQ-~xCing~ishing unit~ in ~hg MKO ~~ngin~ and hoiler room~~ as well ag
ehe cnmp~rtmpnte for el~etrical engineering and elecCron~c equipmene, rh~
n~c~~sity aro~e to increa~e the number of foam g~neratorg on each indQp~ndenC
gection of th~ carrier. Th~ former tank with the foam generator wa~ replaced
by andther whoe~ cap~city wae t~rice as great as the former tank. Supplying
ehp fire-extingui~hing sygtem Wieh sea water required an increage in the number
df pumps for th~ water fire-exeinguighing sys~~m ~nd their tot~l digcharg~
whicl~, in turn, led~to ~n ineregse in the outpue ~f electric-poWer sourceg.
Accdrding to datn in the Americaa presa, the feeding of foam to the fllght
t~BC{t or hangar ia provided for 30 s~cond~ from the moment that th~ fire signal
is received. These are the technical capabilities of the system. But there
are data which indicate that thege capabilities cannot always be realized.
Thug~ for example, a g~neral inspection which Was conducted in the U.S. Navy
in 1973-1974 ehowed that the fire-fighting equipment on ehipa, in particular
on carrier~, was in an unsatisfactory condition. On one of the carriera whiah
underWent an inepection, for example, the sprinkler system on the hangar deck
was not working. The "light water" foam generator on thi~ same ship could not
, b~ used. Other shortcominga in the ship'g foam-extinguiehing system were also
diacovered which reduced iCs designed technical capabilities. Since this sysC~m
is coneidered as one of the most important, especially in the complex of carrier
fire-fighting equipment, great atCention has been devoted to its technical con-
dition on the ships.
Poam extinguishers which serve the engine and boiler rooms and the compart-
ments for electrfcal engineering and electronic equipment are used on carriers
(16 per ship) and on other (non-carrier) ships. Such units include: a fixed
fire extinguis~er with potassi~nn carbonate powder, cylinders with compressed
= gas, paired hosea with sprayers,and a pipe to feed the "liquid water" solution
from the foam mixers of the independent sections of the ship's fire-fighting
system.
It is planned to employ the new fire-extinguishing substances on ships of all
basic classes in the~U.S. Navy.
41
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~d~ ~~~rcin~, us~ ortt~Y
Cigur~~ ~4 ~nd ~4 [no~ r~produced~ pxe~ant Cype~ of fi.r~-fi.ghCing monitnr~
whiell ~r~ ~mploy~d on Ch~ h~ngar d~eks of Auterican carri~rs a~ ~rel]. xy iii
~ng3n~ compartm~nt~. ~nd compgrtm~ntia for.~l~ctric~~ ~rigin~~ring ~nd electrdnie
~ryuipm~nc.
Daring ~~~C~ of ~he w~ti~r pr~eec~ton r~ys~C~m~for exeingui~hing fir~~, eh~ in-
~ufficienC ~ff~cCiv~n~~~ of the ~pr~yerg in a~trong w~.nd w~~ ~~ti~b~.~.sh~d.
~n tih~ ~pinidn of Am~rican ~peciali~ts, ~-new ~ype of ~pray~r wh~ch hus be~n
develop~d (~3g~ 26) [noe reproduc~d] engure~ ehe uniform covering of flighC
deek s~~Cion~ witih the foam-genexaCing solution. U.S. carriera ar~ ouefitted
wirh the new aprayera dUring repai~r.
~n addiei.on ~o eh~ fo~m extingu~.ghing sysCems which have b~~n ~~nti.oned,a war~r
tire ~xtingudahar ~yetpmwhich i~ uged inv~.reu~].ly all ehi~+~ .o~rarem~nts remaing on
Ch~ ship~ �ormerly~ And, ~g_indicared gbove, Che cap~c3.Gy o~ thi~ sygCem
ig eontinuou~ly growing: for example, 1$ fire pumpe with ~ rotal feed of
100,000 lieers per minuCe have b~en ingtalled on Ch~ nuclear carri~r "Nimitz"
whi~h, by the way, ig apprnximately three times greater .~han the c~pacity of the
wat~r ~xCl~n~uisi~ing ~y~Cem ~f "Essex"~type carri~rs. Ten pumpg with A CbtA1 fO~tl
of 34,000 lit~rs per minute have been inetalled on carriers of ehe "Essex"
Cype. 7'he difference in the capaciCies of rhe foam exr3nguishers on thes~
rarriers, the correlation of which is 10:1, appeare even more striking.
While the total ouCput of the foam ex~inguisher on "Easex"-type carrier~ is
GSO liters per minute~ it is 4,500 litere per minute on the "NimiCz." 'fhie
correl~tion ie explained not only by the difference in the size of the ships,
but al~o by the consider~bly increased requirements for fire safety on the
carriers.
The following list of technical fire-fighting equipment which is employed on
large U.S. carriers has 6een developed up Co now:
1) waCer-type fire extin~uisher system--for all ship compartments and decks;
2) fixed foam-extinguishing system-Tfor flight decks and hangar;
3) fixed foaca-exCinguishing units--for engine and boiler rooms and com-
partmentg ~or electrical engineering and electronic equipment;
4) water protection system with foam extinguiehing--for flight decks and
superstructures;
S) fo~m extinguishing sprinkler system--for hangars and individuAl sections
of the msin deck (in the area of the atern);
6) MB-5 fire engines and self-propelled carts with foam extinguishing--
far flight and hangar decks.
~ FurChermore, all interior compartments of ships are equipped with powder fire
extinguishers.
42
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~OIt OFFICIAL US~ ONLY
~'h~ ~ygC~m~ wt~ich ltav~ b~en indicaeed ar~ ~1so emplnyed on ships of o~her
clase~s wiCh differ~nt vuri~Cions.
Alnng with tt~e improv~menC of fize-fight3ng equ~.pment~ a number of ine~~ure~
far ~arrucCural protecGion are being acCOmplished on fllght decke and i.n ef~e
h~ng~rg of carYier~. When pr~par~.n~ for ~akeoff, to protect eh~ airrlane~
~nd per~onn~1. in eh~ ~rea of the cae~pule from ehe dangeroug heae nnd
dynamic effecr~ of ehe gag ~ete from the ~et eng3nes of ~~.rplanee on the
caCApult a epecial d~vice �or their deflection ie incorporated on the fllght
deck. The construction of the device, usu~lly in the form of deflecting ~~anels,
mueC provide the reliable deflection of the jet flow in the r~quired direcr.ion
in accordance with the b~~ia purpose and in auch a way Chat it do~s not have
~ a harmful ef�ect on the tgil assembly of the airplane being caeapulted.
~ire-rpaistanC screena (shuCCers) made of rein�orced asbeatoa nre used in
hangars to localize Che effect of fires and exploaions. U~der normal. coi~d3-
tiang, ehege screens are in the rolled-up condition beneath the han~ar deck-
head. When neceesary, they can divide Che hnngar into a number or s~:lf-
contained compartments, as a rule, into Chree, in 30 seconda.
Because cnnsiderable flooding of the hangar may occur with the oper~tion of
the sprinkling system, drainage holea are installed along ita aides. Similar
ho].es are also bui1C on the flight deck.
/AmmuniCion explosiona/. Let us now examine the nature of damage to ships
as a result of the explosions of ammunition which occur on them (of course,
not from the effects of combat) and the me~sures which are directed toward
their prevention.
The experience of accidents and catastropl-~es ahowa that at least three types
of explosions occur on ships. The first is the explosions of individual
pieces of ammunition, the second--explosions of ammunition rooms, and the
third--explosions of HE being transported on m{litary rransports.
Explosions of the first type occurred primarily in gun turrets and deck gun
mounCs (the battleship "Missisaippi"--1924, the cruiser "Devonshire"--1929
and the cruiser "Saint Paul"--1952~ the destroyers "Bak" [as transllCerated]
and "John Pierce"--both 1956, and the cruiser "Newport News"--1972).
Such explosions were usually connected wiCh incorrect firing procedures or
~ with carelessness in the conduct of fire, and with Che poor maintenance of
the gun systems, in particular the tubes. This question was examined in
rather great detail in analyzing the case of xhe turret explosion on the
battleship "Mississippi." The consequences of such individual explosions were
damage to the ships and a certain number of human victims but, as a rule, the
ships were not lost in this case and remained afloat. Explosions of this
type also include the explosions of individual mines (the minelayer "Tokiva"
(as transliterated]--1927) or depth bombs (the destroyer "Sepoy"--1930) and
other ammunition. They did not lead to the loss of the ship, either.
43
FOR OFFICIE?L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~OR O~~ICTAL US~ ONLY
Exploe~.nn~ df ind~vidual. p~.~c~e oE ttmmuttit~.on occurred on cerrinr~ when n~.r-
planeg war~ landing on the sh3p. The carr~.er "Saratoga" (1964) Can c~~~ve r~~a
an exampl,~~ Th~ c~rri~r receiv~d h~avy damage but tha number nf c~~gun7.tie~
wae relatively amA11. Thie caee did not pnt~il auch dieas~rou~ conn~qu~r?cc~e
ne Che expingion~ on the "Forrestal" and "~n~erprise" g~.nc~ th~re wa~ no
crowding nf airplanes in the landing zone, ehe numb~r of ~xplogion~ w~~ ~mgll,
and th~ ceneers o~ fir~ whiCh broke ouC could be ~l~.m~.naeed ~pi~e~.~eiy nutCt~iy~
The ~ource nf an explosion of Ch~ second type may b~ tihe ~pontan~aus comb~~g~ion
of powder in A magaxine ur the carelese handl~.i~g of powder and fire wtChin eh~
magazine or~ finally~ gabotage~ SponCaneoua combustion of powder may be ~he
resulC of ite failure eo meet standards (for reaeons of powder composie~.an,
de�ects in manufacture, or dur~tion of etorage) or vio].aCion of armnunil~.on
atorage condi.tiona, in particulnr, tihe rieing of the tempera~ure ~.n L1~~ mag~-
zine above Ch~ allowable. In thig c~se, Che decompogieion of ehe powder be�~
gins, leading to itg igniCion and Chen to ~n explosion.
Carelessness in handling powder may be manifested in Lhe insufficient ventila-
tion of the magazine~ as a result of wh3ch the formation and accumulat~.on of an
explosive mixtiure may occur ~n 3t which is dangerous in reg~rd to the ign3tion
of rhe powder. The preaence of an open fire in the magazine wag the sourcc of
powder ignition and the explosion of the magazine many Cimea. As is eviden~,
Chere may be many reasons for the exploaion of an ammunition room and rt~ey
actually occurred. The reasons for.this are frequently of an opera~iona'1
natur.e but, at the eame ~ime, they are linked with the quality of Che anununiM
tion used and also depend on the construction of the magazines, Cheir fi.re-
fighting equipment, and its condition.
In practice, exploaions occur not only in individual magazines but also in
groups of magazines (the iron-clad cruiser "Natel"--1915, the batitleship
"Tsukuba" [as transliterated]--1917) ~nd even of ~11 the ship's magazines
(the battleship "Leonardo da Vinci"--1916, the battleship "Vanguard"-~1917).
It should be mentioned that it is evidenC from the materials at our disposal
that such explosiona occurred in all the main fleeCs of the world except the
German fleet. Is it the result of "keeping a military secre~" or the result
of a more"careful" and thoughCful attitude toward these questions~ in the former
German Navy? Perhaps, boCh are observed here. But if we consider the be-
havior of German ~hips under combat conditiona, ir :an be assumed with great
confidence that Che German fleet worked with powdeY more seriously because
even with combat effects on shalps, the powder charges rarely exp~oded but
burned more often without exploding. Let us recall the case of the German
battle cruiser "Doerflinger" at the Battle of Jutland. Fires broke out on
this ship as a result of hits with heavy shells (381-mm) in turreta Nos 3
and 4, and the ignition of the powder in the powder magazines occurred. The
powder burned, but iC did not explode, saving the ship ~ince ~here were no
explosions of the magazines. In the Britieh fleet, on the contrary, tl~e
powder magazines often exploded, leading to the loss of Che ships. Here,
a large quantity of cordite was quickly ignited and, after it burned for a
short time, the magazine exploded. Lost in this manner in the same BatCle of
44
FOR OFFICIA:. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~O[t O~~ICYAL U5~ ONLY
Juel~nd w~r~ the nrit~.sh baCtl~ cruisera "TndefaCigabl~~" "Que~n M~ry,"
and "Invincible." Th~ Brit~.sh b~?ttle cruiser "Hood" w~s 1.ost in thi~ m~nner �
in World W~r
mhe nverwh~lming ma~ority of ammunieion-room explo~ion~ l~d to rhe deetirun-
eion of Ch~ ship and ire loss and were accompan~.ed by large human losses.
Therefore, de~pit~ the fgce th~t in racent years explosiong of gmmunieion
rooma gre obecrved r~ther rar~].y, gpecial attenCi.~n ha~ b~en paid to the pre-
vention of sudh exploe~.ons. This will be even more understandable if wa con-
sider that on many conramporary ehipa there is ammunition with which the ex-
plogion of the room may lnad not only to the deatruction of the ~hip itseL;
but aleo Co innumerable calamities and loeses around the ehip and at a great
dietance frnm it.
Just what measureg can be adopCed Co prevent such exploeions? ~i~st of a11,
of course, they are mc:asures of a structural nature aince it is they wh.i~:;h are
dir~cred toward preventing Che possibility of an explosion.
We will begin with the fact that on large shipa the attempC is made to locate
the magazines in Che most protected placea poasible. For example, on the
contemporary carrier the ammunition rooms are locaCed in the cidatel, in iCs
bow and stern sectians, beneath all armored decks, and behind the underwater
protection belt (Fig. 27) [not reproduced]. The placemenC of the magazines
as far as possible from one another reduces the probability of detonaeion of
all the ship's ammunition as a whole. Other generally accepted measures on
ships are: the storage of pyrotechnic material in places where their chance
combustion will not cause damage t~ the ship's vital parts; the presence of
automatic alarm systems concerning the inerease of temperature in the magazines
~nd the detection of ignition in them; the employment of automatic spr�lnkling
systems (sprinklers), the actuating of which ia based on various physical
principles (Cemperature, preasure, light, and amoke).
In recent years, epecial attention is being devoted to the structural fire-
prevenCion protecCion of missile magazines. Foreign specialists believe Chat
the probability of an outbreak of f ires and explosions in them is higher than
in gun magazines. This is because of Che possibility of instances of closure
of the electric circuit which connects the on-board equipment with the pre-
launch checkout instruments or of the landing of fragments or small-caliber
shelle in Che booster or sustainer engines on light ships. To avoid the
chain ignition of all ammunition in Che missile magazine, the U.S. Navy has
begun to employ a special automatic system for the forced injecticn of water
into the nozzle of the PRD [powder rocket engine] in the ZURO [antiaircraft
guided missile] magazines of ships [45].
On range tesCs of "Terrier"-type antiaircraft missiles it was established that
the ignition of one of the PRD's causes the ignition of adjacent missiles and,
eventually, of all ammunition in the magazine. In this case, extremely high
temperatures and pressures of the powder gases are developed in the course of
the enttines' burning. Referring Co the resslts of the tests which were
45
FUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
t~'OIt OF~ZCIAL USE ONLY
Concluctad, U.S, ap~nialisC~ age~r~ thae when u~ing a~yseam of forced w~tcr
in~ent3on the booeCer engina which i~as beQn ignited from ~ ch~nce short r~.r-
cuit m~y, in the ma,~ariCy of cagee, be ~xCinguished befnre tih~ comUu~~~ot~
~ncompa~gea ~ considerablQ number uf tubu~.~r propel~enC grain~ wltla which ehe
rock~t enginee ar~ ~tarted~ In tliis regard, an ~u~oma~ic d~vice can engt~re
the actuat~.ng in geveral m~.llieeconde~
When g rocket eng~.ne ig ~.gnited by a fragment which hiC~, xtie nynt~m'~ effective-
nesa is reduced and the time f.or actuating the ttutiom~ei~ devic~~, 1.B ~.ncreaned
to aever~l ~econds. Hnwr.ver, the injection of waeer inLo the cnmbust:~on
chamber decregaes the inrensiey nr combusCion in Ch~.s cnge, Con, to a c~egree
wirh which ehe ignirion ~f ad~~c~nt mig~ile~ is prevenred.
The in~ention gysCem ig ~ component pnrt of ehe ehip's m~in Ei~'~ :L.tric and
communicntes wiCh iC thrnugh n check valve. A greater pr.rvsure is ma:int~ined
in it than in Che �ire main. This is aCtained with the ~id oE ~n pneuinAtt~
rressur~ tank--a water accumu~.ator which is connected wi~h ~ con~press~d ~ir
unit.
'The pneumatic pressure ennk and all piping of the sysGem are filled with fresh
water under normal condiCions. The magazine is serviced by an ~nnu~.ar pipe-
line wiiich brancties off from the sysCem. Thia line has nozzles to i~jP~t
waCer into the PRD nozzle. Pressure sensors and special Cast-open:ti~~ stop
valves are instnlled on the in~ection nozzles. The number of noz~lea corres--
ponds to the number of missi~es in ehe magazine which are stored on ~ special
conveyer. This cot~veyer provides for the feed of the pro~ectiles to ehe li�t
to a position for loading the launcher. When the conveyer moves, the misslles
occupy certain oriented positions in turn in which an in~ecting nozzle is
located beneath the nozzle of the booster engine of each misaile. The pneu-
maCic pressure tank maintains a constant pressure in Che system afCer the
. nozzles are opened unCil the moment when the fire pumps are put into action.
The pumps are rurned on automatically with the start of operation of one of
the in~ection nozzles and maintains the assigned pressure in the main fire
line, beginning from the moment when Che pressure in the pneumaCic pressure
tank drops to a certain value (in existing systems, for example, about
4 kg/cm2).
On Che whole, American specialists consider. this system to be sufficiently
effective and employ it in ZURO magazines on sircraft carriers, missile car-
riers, and other surface ships.
The schematic diagram of a fire-fighting system for the ZURO of the U.S. missile
cruiser "Canberra" is presented in Figure 28 [not reproduced].
Over a period of 60 years, a number of technical devices intended for the pro-
tection of missile and artillery magazines against explosions were patented
in Che United States.
Thus, for example, the design for an impenetrable steel shutter as a means
for protection against flame in missile launchers was patented in 1962. It
is expected that the shutter will be installed at the ~unction of the magazine
for expendable ammunition and the prelaunch station or the launcher.
46
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
FOlt U~"FTCIAL USL ONLY
Twn ye~rs later, eh~ U.S. Navy wn~ iseued a patent fnr a sprAyer heud having
a n~w d~sign fdr ~n autom~tically operaCing gpr3nkl~r ~ystem and arti~.ler.y
mag~zines. According to tihe auChore' sCaCemenC, its employment will eneurc
obtaining a pow~rfu~. �lame-da~mp~ng screen in the shorteet eime which r~li~bly
prevenCe Che explosion of ammunition 3n Che magazine. A patent for An im�~
proved design of n shl.p'~ 1AUncher for the launching o� ant~.aixcraft missileg
wga iseued Co rh~ t1.5. Navy in ~.g66~ The degign incorporaCes rhe emplnym~nt
of spec3al. fire-fight~ng equ:tpment ~s we11 a~ means for loc~lizing a fire and
wiChdraw~.ng thE red~hor gas ~et ~.n cgse one of the mieailes located in th~
drum is ignited. 'The means employed in thr devi,ce which has be~n patenCed,
~ccording to eh~ ~uChors' ehoughts, will parmit ehe auComatic isolaCion of
the burning compArtment from ehe other comp~rtments in which the miesil.es ~re
stnred. The el.iminaCinn of a f~re which has broken out and the removal of
the ga~es which are rel~ased outside the ship are envisaged w3th Che use of
this equipmenC.
Searches for new means and m~thods to protect missile magazines fram explosions
have been continuing recently. Thus, in 1972 the description of a device
intended to provide the explosion safety of rocket engines stored in mag8zineg
located in the deptih of the ship was published [4y]. One of the versions of
this device which was tested on the engines of the "Sparrow" missile i~ shown
in Figure 29 [not reproduced]. This device envisages the automatic bursCing
of the rocket engine housing with its chance ignition which, with the equali-
, zation of pressure in tt~e engine's combustion chamber and in the m~gazine,
~hould exclude the explosion of the magazine.
A new system for Che storage and feeding of aviation ammunition [9~ with the
maximum use of inechanization and automation of the control and monitoring of
its flow which was installed at the end of the 1960's on the carrier "John F.
Kennedy" and adopted for other U.S. aircraft carriers has been called upon to
provide not only the acceleration of the processes for the reception and feed~
ing of ammunition, but also great reliability and safety in operation which
- reduces the possibility o� accidents eo a minimum.
In analyzing the catastrophes on the "Forrestal" and the "Enterprise," it was
established thae soon after the ouCbreak of the fire the bombs which puC
the crew members who were fighting the fire out of action began to explode.
In this connection, a special fireproof coating which protects aerial bombs
from explosions during fire was developed and tested in the United States.
According to data of the Americans [13], this coating increases Che explosion
time of the bombs to five minutes. The coating was tested for aerial bombs
weighing 113 kilograms.
As regards preventive measures of an operational nature, here the main role
is played by the ships personnel's firm and specific knowledge of the ammu-
nition's physical-chemical properties and the degree of its danger as well
of the rules for its reception, storage, and feeding and knowledge of the
design of magazines and technical systems which provide their fire protection.
Great significance is had by firm procedure on the �hip and strict discipline
as regards the observance of rules and instructions on handling ammunition on
47
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
l~ntt OF~ICIAL US~ ONLY
a ahip w~ll g~ ~cce~a n� only u certain group of indiv~.duulg e~e~i~J.~~h~d
by the ghip's Comm~nd to Che mag~zine.
Expld~idng ot the tihird typ~ arise mogt dfeen on milie~ry ~r~ngporta, As
regardg Cheir phygicul nature, they are connected with thQ detionatiion nf
~xplosiv~~ which ~re b~ing tranaporCed by eransporG~, fraquenel.y ~.n exCremely
large quanCiCi~g which reach gev~raL ehousand tona nf TNT equivnl~itt (rhe
"Moneblanc," "Mnune Hond"). Cottsequ~nr~y, Ch~ d~seructiv~ ~ffece of gUC}1
explos3nng ig equal ~o the de~eructi~ve effect of a sma11-y3e1d ~romic Uomb
w3Ch Che only difEerence ehat; in thie case only ehe mechanic~l ei~ecC of the
explosinn occurg withoue ehe other casualty-produc3ng fantors ~vhich are in-
herent in a nuclear explosion.
~ Mose o�een, the sourc~ o~ guch ~xplosion~ ig Che ignition of ittfl~nun~b~.E ~ub-
st~nces which ~r~ nfe~n er~nsported togeth~r with the high ~xplosiv~~. In
thig c~se, Ch~ "incompgtgbiliey" and danger o� such shipments, the rulea of
the "InCernational ConvanCian on the Protectiion of Human Life dt Sea," and
the requiremenCS of military and naval organs in accordanCe with whose orders
these shipments are accomplished are often ignor~d. F'nr ex~mple, the source
n� the ~xplosion in Bomb~y was a burning cig~reete from which cotCoi~ c~uglit
fire and which led tn the explosion of a eremendous mass of H~ which was being
transporCed together coith ~he coCrnn. Exploaions nf this type led not ~nly ta
t'he cnmpleCe deserucCion of their ship. Since Chey occurred in ports, their
consequence was the destruction or heavy damage to the ships and vesselg located
there and to the port and shore structures in gener~l which suffered from
the burse shock wave, fragments of ships, their equipment, and heavy cargoes
which disintegrated, and from the fire with the formation of large conflagra-
tions which, as a rule accompany these explosions. Such explosion:~ always
had large human and material losses as their consequences. The number of
victims, with consideration of the people who were left without shelter,
reached several thousand people nnd, sometimes, tens of r}~ousands.
It should be said that in a11 the cases of explosions on military tr~nPports
which we examined, fires began as a result of neglect by the ships' personnel.
The develnpment of the fire and the iniCiation of ~the explosion were connected
with tlie low level of training of the ships crews who did not know the basic
properties of Che combustible and dangerously explosive ma[erials and did not
have even elementary notions of the possible consequences to which ehese fires
and explosions mighC lead. No small adverse role was pl~yed by the irresPon-
sibility of the damaged ships' command personnel who someCimes abandoned thg
burning ships at their most dangerous moment ("Montblanc") and Che indecisive-
ness of their actions and the incorrectness of the decisions which were made
in fighting fires, especially at the initial stage of their development
(Bombay), which led to the spread of Che fires and, �inally, to catastrophes
and national calamities, not to mention the purely military loss to the warring
side. The insufficiency of port support and the lack of clarity in actions
by the military organs in these cases were also factors which contributed to
the possibility of outbreak of fires and explosions and their development
(Halifax, Bombay).
48
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~OR OFFICLAL US~ ONLY
There were ~lso shorteomings of ~ erructurai ngture, Th~y cons~.sred of ehe
f~cr ehnt a shnrCage of Cechn~.cal ~qui�mene to fight fir~s wag �eJ.t on a
number o� ahipg and, in some cases, ~uch equ~.pm~nt was exCremely deficient.
As becomes apparent from Ghe lessong which were drawn on th~ basis o� a
review of the circumst~nces surrounding the catiastrophea which were Che con-
g~quene~ of powerful explos3nns on mi1.~.C~ry trnnsports, the prevention of
such exploeiona or., at least, ~ reducCion in the probdbiliCy of the~r outibrenk
may be atrained through rh~ elimination of sh ortcominga 3n organizational
and Cechnical support wtii.ch occurred on the parC of the command personnel of
ships and vesaels, milit~ry and naval organs, and port a~thorities. Crewp
having special tr~ining should be seleceed on sti3ps and vessels which trans-
porr explosives. ~inally, ships and vegsels intended for th~ shipment of HE
should be equipp~d with Che appropr~.ate fire-fighting equipmenC. Here, both
the rules of Che "Internutional ConvenCion on Che Protection of Human Life at
Sea" and the requirements of� the milleary and naval org~ns of staCes wr::~~h are
inCerested in various shipmenCs of HE should be considered.
/Explosions o� high-prpssure systems/. One of the varieties of accidents wl~ich -
occurred on U.S. aircrafC carriers consisCed of explosions of hydr~ulic sys-
tems. Such explosions on the carriers "Bennington" and "Leyte" in Che catapult
hydra~lic systems were nccompanied by many human casualties. Explosions of
hydraulic systems were also noCed on surface ships of uther clasaes and un
submarines.
To explain the reasons for such explosions, broad experimental studies were
orgac~ized in which various scientific and industrial organizations and organs
of the Defense Department were invnlved.
The studies showed that the basic reason for exploeions was a sudden increase
in air temperaCure in dead-end sections of pipes as a result of its instan-
taneous adiabatic compression. In this case, the flame which breaks out ae
the end of the pipe is able Co spread over the oil film which is presenc on
the wa11 along the pipes of the system's remaining portion. It was esCab-
_ lished experimenCally that the flash point of the pressure fluid in such sys�
tems may prove to be dangerously low with an increase in pressure. The
graph in Figure 30 [not reproduced] ~hows the change in the value of the
temperature for spontaneous combustion of the pressurefluid for one of the
marks of those which are common on U.S. ships depending on pressure. It fol- _
lows from the graph that the temperature at which the combustion of this fluid
occurs drops from 350 to 180�C with an increase in pressure from 1 to 210
kg/cm2 (the operaCing range of the temperatures and pressures of the most
common types of air compressors on ships of the U.S. Navy).
But the studies were not only to explain Che reasons for explosions; it was
also necessary to find ways to eliminate them in the fuCure. This task w~s
accomplished by a comparative study of the characteristics of pressure fluids of
various types-~the path which leads closest to the goal. But unexpected
and rather significant difficulties arose in the accomplishment of the task.
49
FOR OFFICIE+L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~Olt Or"T']:CZAL US~ ONLY
~C Curned ou~ Ch~?t ehe eneire maLLet contradicted tt~e v~riaus requirem~nts
fnr rhese flu3ds and it cvas d:tf�icult l�.o find ~ pressur~ f�1.~~i.c1 wtiicli wot~~.d 111pP.t
simultaneously such requiremeuts ~s high fire �res~.stance, SUFf:~Cl~llC lubr:lcF?t-
ing abi~.ity, liydro~yC3c stnbility, non-Cox~.ciCy, anticor.rostveness~ ci~~cl
durnblliey .in operution. 1'or exgmple, ~~~.u~d on a b~Ae oL- aqu~~~uq gl.ycol,
pogsessing satisfactory fire reaiatance, ~emonetr~tes low l.ubi,ir.ar:tr?~ ~ibi.'L tty
under condittons of heavy loads while some mel:als wh3ch are widcl.y used in
l~ydraulic systems corrocle in I:hese fluids. The same "incompntabil:Lty" WQS
demonstrnted Uy phosphatie esters, oil emul~:tons, and other .E:luid~. Publ~tr.a�-
eions available on tliis sub~ecC [1Q, 16, 55J show thaC despitp many ycar5
study, no unambiguous and rell.alile solution of the problem had bet~n f.oun~i up
Co recenC times.
At the end of tihe 1960's, explosions of high,�pressure nitrogen syst~~ma (210
kg/cm2) beg~tn Ca occur on U.S. carriers. Four such explosions wer.e nuCcd nn
three carriers. One of Chem, which occurred in the compressor cha~ib~r,
led to the serious in~ury of Chree men and to serious damage t~ r.h~ hu11
and mechanisms. Here, Che explosions occurred at Che exiL oE Ci~e n~.trogen
from Che nitrogen compressor and they had a raCher direct~.anal naturc.
LaboraCory studies showed [27] that the reason for these explasions, ol~vious-
ly, was Che increased oxygen content (above 3 percent) in the nitrogen
which coas caused by a mllfunction in Che oxygen analyzer ~nd the I.anc3in}~ aE
oil from the compressor cylinder lubrication system in the nitrogen. _
It was recommanded that the condition of the oxygen analyzer be checked u~ore
often (several times per day) to prevent such explosions. AleY~ougl~ th.:ts re-
qulreinent is written in the instruction, it was not carric~d out by the servic-
ing personnel. The remaining requirements are similar to those wh3.ch are
imposed on other high-pressure systems to ensure the safety of their oper~t-ion.
/Other types of fires and explosions/. Short circu~ts and the ma'lfuncC:loning
of electrical equipment in ships in general were the reasons for a number of
accidents, and even catastrophes.
There were several instances of the loss of. ships fot these reasons. True,
the ships had a small displacement (patrol boats, torpedo bo~ts, and mine-
sweepers). But there was a ra~her large amotint of damage tv shi.ps for. these
reasons. We have already mentioned the cases of damage ~o the U.S. carr:~ers
"Ranger" and "Randolph" which occurred from the malfunctioning of tlze hi~h~-
voltage system on the ships, as a result of which ff.r?s and explosions broke
' out on them and they went out of operation. Similar accidents also occurred
~ on many other ships, among wliich were fihe German destroyer 123 (1942 and 19G3),
the heavy U.S. cruiser "Newport News" (1956), the Bri~ish carrier "Hex-mes''
(1963), and a number of others.
Fires and explosions for Chese reasons led to damage which entailed putring -
the ships out of action for various periods of time. The majority of elec-
trical equipment malfunctions r~ad an operational nature and were the consequence
49-a
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~Ott ~F'~'tCtAL ti5~ dNtY
oP ~i~g~~ct by th~ r~hip'~ ~exennr~el. Con~equ~nCly, Ch~ pr~v~n~idn df ~uCh
ACCttI~t1CH ~hduld prda~ed nlnng the p~th of be~t~r .~~~~.mil~eion nf th~ ~hi,p'~
elertrtc:~l ehuipment ~nci m~niedrittg ies condiCion~
Another grnup c~f "etiermnl" r~ngnn~ for ~CCid~ntg enngi~t~d of dp~n fir~ ~nd
Nparkw dUring rhe p~~rf.ormnnee of welding work on ~hips und ehe hdt gurfac~~ of
thc mernl duri.ng wplcling, tJe ~xamin~~l g~v~r~1 guch accidentg ~~rlier. The
r.nraatroph~y on the c~rri~r "Constellation" and tih~ lun~ of the mitiCnry
tr~nspnrt "L~fnyettp" wpre elgn cnnneCt~d with w~idi.ng wnrk. AceidpnCg for
thes~ regynn~ ncc~uxr~d nn rh~ ~renCh light cruiser "Uyug~ 'Curen" [ag translithr-
ntcd~~ on Ctie Gcrm~n degeroyer "Fridrikh In" [ag tranglieer~Ced] (1940), en
th~ U.5. milieary tr~?nsport "53riu~" (1972), and on oeher ghips. Welding on a
ehip wr~s nfCen erangfarm~d intn pvil which 1ed to great digasterg. A numUer
nf inea~ur~eg h~ve now be~n wnrked nur whieh ere directed tnward rhe pr~v~neion
nf nccideney fnr thig re~son. Amottg ehem are: enclosing and keepin$ cnmbug-
tible m~terial~ ~t a di~t~nce Erom ehe we].din~ place, monitdring th~ air
temper~ture in ehc wclding area, venCilgtin~ ttie cnm~grtm~nts, and n number
~f nthers. In th~ fin~?1 analygis, Chcse megaures d~pend on the Commari~l of ehe
~hips nnd their crc~os ~s w~iL ~s on the administr~Cion gnd warking ent~rpris~s
performing the wnrk.
Above, in a stgtisticg]. gnalysis of fires and explnsions on ships, we poinCed
, nut ehat a number of accidents had occurred as a result of neglect by the
pprsonnel. T}~is proposition requires some refinement.
'fhe fact is that almost all types of fires are connected in one or nnother
measurc with omission~ by the ships' crews. As we have seen, ehis ~lso per~
t~ins to fuel fires, Co the exploaion of ammunition, to malfuncCions in
elecCrlcal equipment, and ~ number of oCher accidents. But with all these
� accidents oversigt~ts by the personnel~ as a rule, were accompanied by short-
comings of another type, for example, of a structural or other nature. But
there ~~re shortcomings of the personnel of ships which stand out clearly, so
to say, "in pure form." As example of this is the U.S. c~?rrier "CroCnn"
~ (1965) whose damage due to the personnel's neglece led to many human casual-
ries.
Unquestionably, ttie majority of the accidents in the Cakeoff ~nd landing nf
;itrpl~lnes on carriers, of which there were a great number, are the re~ulc oE
the incorrect acCions and omissions by the airplane and carrier personnel.
Many fires which occurred in various storerooms of shipa such as, for ex-
ample, the fire in the film library of the baCtleship "Tirpitz" in 1944 or
the fire in the tire storeroom on the carrier "Forrestal" in 1969 or, fi�-ally,
the fire in the electronic equipment storeroom of the Iranian destroyer
"Arremis" in 1974 and similar fires were most often the result of oversighta
by the ships' personnel.
In the investigation and technical analysis of all such accidenCS, conclusions
have been drawn concerning the necessity to raise the qualifications of the
appropriate groups of ships specialists and to inCensify demandingness toward
50
FOR O~FICIlw USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
1~'Ott Ut~~TC2AI. U5L ONLY
th~ ob~ervgn~e nf fire-~,revenCinn d.tgciplin~ nn ship~. Tn a nutubr_r of ct~HC:~,
lt LK ncc~gNi~ry Cn r.onduct vAriou~ me~~ure~ al' ~n org~nir.ntio~~al.�-ter..lmic~?J.
naCur~ nr ~lruCtur~1 nnture ed ~xClude ~h~ pos~ibility oE reptc~Cin~ ~hccirlenl:~
through tlle ~~ul.t df ~hipn persottnel,
Vpry nften, fir~y ai.ya engulf eh~ livin~ quart~r~ of ~hj.pe wi~v~ae c:r~mbu~Ci.b1E
mnCcirinlg Cont~ribuC~ to Che spr~~ding df ehe fir~ Chrnu~h thn :~hi~~. '[n thL~
ConneCCion the prnblem di' "hnbit~biliey ~nd �ire ~~f.eey" i.~ in ehe f~e].~ nf
visinn df roreign f1e~t ~pec~.nli~es. Yn a number of. c~ses, ~heye tcao ciualiC~i~s
whirh nre imp~regne ~or ~ ship ~re contrndintory und rh~ r.equirementy for rhem
~rc fnr from ~1w~y~ cnmpatibl~:,
'Che mai.n dir~ction in ehe :~nluCion of thi~ probl~tn is ehe ~~1iroi.t~ar.i.un or sig-
nific~nt r~duCtiott ii~ combu~tible ~hipbuilding mat~ri~ls in ehe ~.ivl.ni; qu~rterg
nf ship~. And c~lthou~;h this probl.em is be3ng snlved for many yeara already,
the eff~Ctiveness c~f the m~u~ure~ in Ch~ senge of their re~liz~~tinn on ships
i~ neverthelegs not too hip,h.
In recene yenr~, a speci~.l program has b~en ConCemplgtcd in ti~is area i.n ehe
U.S. N,~vy wiio~p comptetion i~ plann~d in 1976. 'This pxogrnm envi;~ages the
com(~].eCe el iminntion of wood ~?nd wooden covering~, combuseib].e cur. t~ai.ns,
drape~, rubber carpets, und other combustible materials from ships. T~ is
planned to replace fo~m plusxic matCresses wiCh neoprene mattxeqxes. 'To de-
~ termine Che de~ree of combustibility of materials, a certain criterion has
been Mdopted in accordnnc:e with whiclt the wood of red oak receives a valuc of
1.00 r~nd nsUestoa slabs--0. A materinl which has a valuc of 2~ ur lower i~
considered noncombustible. Vi�yl tiles which nre u5ed in civili.an skructures
h~ve ~ value df 65 in accordnnce with this criterion while the eiles used in
the navy have a value of h. F'iberglass rugs for living and service spaces
will have a criterion value close to zero. IC is intended to make curtains
and drapery on naval ships from nomex--a material with a criterion value of
8-9 .
The criterion values for vnrious materials are determined by special r_ests.
The impregnation of matertals wiCh noncombustible subsCanceR is widely em- _
ployed. ~abrics and wooden materials, except for those w}~ich com~~ -I.n cont~ct
witt~ food, are impregnated. Tn tiie British fleet, such impregnation is per-
formed every six montt~s. ~lectric cables ~re insulated using natural or
silicone rubber or fiber.g.lass with a prntective ~acwet of neoprene. A~iumbex
of requirements are being imposed on placement. For ex~mpl.e, th~ 5pace above
the waterline, to include the upper decks, should be as free as passj.ble u~
combustible materials. CombusCible materials should be kepC at a distance
from intake vent holes of engine rooms. When storing important combustible
materials below the waterline, it is important that ti~ey be ]ocatecl at a
certain distance from watertight bulkheads.
Inflammable medical materials such as ether, alcohol, and so forth (excepC for
daily supplies) must be stored togeCher with fuels and lubricants below the
waterline in compartments which are equipped or supplied witt? carbon dioxide
51
~OR OF~FICIAL USE ONI.Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~Ott nF~'ICTAL US~ ONLY
gyaremg. A decreage in the danger of f~.rps ie.furthered by th~ pluc~mene o�
Che cLothing, b~dding, nnd personal property of the crew memberg in metal
lock~r~. Tr gtore maCerials which gre capablp of entering 3nto chemiCal re-
action~ with o~her materia~.s, epeciel storage plac~g which meet certain r~-
quirem~nte should be incorpornted on al~ipe~
- A number nf org~nizaCiongl-t~chn~.cal shortcom~nga are notipd on ~hipa. In
parCicular, ir is considered that th~ syeCem for the gtorage end con~umpC~.on
of fuels and lubricgnCs often dnes nor corraspond Co the requir~menGa which
are in effect and doeg noe eneure ehe �ire ga�ety of the ships in eufficient
measure.
- In order to reduce to n m3n3mum the dangers which may arise ~ohen handling
maCerials gnd with Cheir seorage on boaYd ahipa, the U.S. Navy hag worked out
several general requirements:
1) areas for the storage of dangerous mater3als should be con~tantly dry
and clean and provided with sufficient ventilation;
' 2) only people having special permission ahould be permitted to enter
rhe places for the storage of dangerous materials;
3) the movement of inflammable materials from one place to another should
be accomplished with the mandatory presence of the appropriate safety signs;
4) the use of plastic containers should be avoided it there is no con-
Eidence that the contents and the plastic are compatible from the viewpoinC
of fire safety;
5) the containers should be checked periodically for leaks, tightness of
closing, storage period, and marking rules;
6) the performance of regular and the moet frequent inepections possible
to ensure the fire safety of ships as a whole;
7) the systematic conduct of fire-fignting lessons which are as close as
possible to maximum conditions and with the use of respiratory devices in
compartments filled with smoke;
8) ensuring the constant presence of damage-control parties on ships
which are manned with specialisCs in fighting fires;
9) ensuring continuous and high fire-prevention vigilance on ships.
/Fire-fighting training of the personnel/. Great attention is being devoted to
the training of crews far fire-fighting on ships. A system of schools and
courses for the fire-fiRhCing training of officers, petty officers, and sea-
men exists in the navies of the leading capitalist powers.
52
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
rdn n~~~cz~L us~ c~rrLY
In eh~ Unie~d Sr~e~a, guch 2d~~~rional in~eitiuei.ong. pr~ l~cne~d in l~hil~del-
phi~, Norfolk, Ch~rl~ge~n, Sgn Ui~go, gnd oCh~r b~g~~. In n numb~r df c~a~~,
trgining n~ pergonn~l 1.n d~mgge Cdntral op~r~C~~n~ on ~h~ ship in gencral
ie cdnducted simult~neeu~ly in ~uch educ~tidn~l 3ttgtitutibns. '~'ire~~3~htin~
rrgining u~unlly ~ncomp~~~~g four cat~gori.e~ of fir~g s A-Mthr~~e ~+xCinguieh-
~blp by waC~r; B�-combugi:i~n of fuel; C�-fir~~ due tn ~1~cericity; U-~ti~~
burning nf phn~phnrou~, m~gnpgium, and high explo~iv~g. 7'h~ 1nt~pr ~~eeg~ry
of fire~ h~~ b~en ineroduc~d inrd eh~ course of ingeru~tian in reGent y~~r,a,
Ski11e which encc~mpa~~ bdCh the individual pr~~e~.c~ in u~in~ carbon didxid~
and powder fir~ ~xtinguigh~ra ag well ae ~he ~ninti aceion~ n� Cc~n~ ar~
bping w~rkect oue, Th~ ~xe{.~~guish~ng o~ burning oi1 Cnnkg wieh fdam i~ demnn- -
~rr~t~d on Che la~t gtagr:. The gtregs in the fire-fightin~ tr~inin~ ig p].c~c~d
on th~ uge ~f th~ laC~e', achi~vemente in ehis field wiCh us~ di the 1~~song
from fighCing fireg .,n ghipg r~~:~fltly.
The entire cr~w r~c~iv~~ gklllg 3n extinguiahing fireg, but Che deck f~rrc
undergnee increaged trnining in ehis ar~~. ~'urChermor~, there are apeci.~l.
gubunitg o� qualified fire fighCer~ ~n the ships~ On big ships, mc,de~.~ ~~re
used to ingCruct ehe p~rsonn~l in figheing fireg. CnndidF~tes foi rhE~ pd~e
nf ship napCa,in undergo er~in3ng in Che new course on dnmage c.oiltrol, tn which
there ig a~pecial aecrinn an fighting fir~s, before bnginntng to pprform eheir
dutiera.
In ti~e British Navy, schnnls in fire-fighting tiraining are f.uncCioning in
Portgmouth and Plymouth. A11 officers, peety officers, and s~~timen und~rgo
training and, after d cerCain time interval, retraining in the area of fire
eaf~ty.
We have examined strucCur~l and organizational-technical measures to ensur~
the fire- and explosion safety of ships. Let us now trace the acCions of
ships personnel in fighting fires which have broken out. -
/Methods of fighting fires. The problem of evacuation/. The following
meChods of fighting fires were employed in the accid~nCs and catastrophes
which we h~ve examined:
1) Chrowing burning aircrafC and various ammunition overboard;
2) disarming airplanes and moving them Co fire-safe places on the ship;
3) rendering ammunition harmless by removing their fuzes;
4) cooling ammunition with water from fire hoses;
5) flooding ammunition rooms and compartments which nre ad~acenC to
burning ones;
6) making cut-outs in decks with an autogenous welder to break through into
ad3acent compartments;
53
FOR OFFICIEu. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~0[t O~~LCIAL US~ ONt,Y
7) u~ing wg~~r ~o ~xt~,ngui~h f~.ree 3n the lower co~ap~rCmenC~ rhrough
hol~~ i.n th~ deck~ whieh ~re located abov~;
9) ~~c~iing r~d-hat bu~kheadg and d~cks wieh waeer;
9) making comp~rements uirtight and turning off th~ mechani.sm~ of th~
boiler and engin~ ro~m~ from thc~ upper decks;
i0) inv~stig~ting comperrm~nt~ whieh ar~ ~d~ac~ne eo burning one~~ ~nd ~o
- foreh~
Virtunlly a11 of th~ fir~-Eigheing equipm~nt ava3lable on the ehips wa~
u~ed here: the main fir~ main, th~ waCer protect~on syet~m, mobile fire
~g~~mblie~, fir~ ~xtinguigh~ra ef var3ous ~ygCems, autog~noug ~pp~retuaes for
cutting structur~l ~1~mene~ of hu11~. Respiratory apparatugeg, to incJ.ude
diving g~ar, wer~ u~~d ro work i.n amoke�~filled comparements.
Wat~r-cooling from fir~ hoges was employed to protect people duriug fir~~.
Helicopter~, nCher combat ships, and reacue vessels rescued people from
burning ehip~. There were cgges of transferring people frdm burning ships
to the shore using hoisting cranee (the "Con~Cellation").
The basic difficulties in fighting fireg were:
1) smoke in the interior compartments and on the upper decke of burning
ghipa;
2) failure of illumination during fires;
3) sliding on decks When using foam to extinguish fires;
4) a shortage of fire-fighting equipment and the unsatisfactory condi-
tion of the equipment available;
5) damage to the equipment for fighting fires~ exploaions, fragments,
and conflagraCions and the absence of a sufficient reaerve of equipment;
6) nonconformity of fire hose connectiona of shipa and bageg;
7) unsatisfactory designs of respiratory apparatuseg which possess a
poor protective capability aed do~not permit working in smoke-filled com-
partments for a prolonged period of time;
8) in a number of cases, the absence of devices and equipment to remove
the "fire" water from the ships;
9) the melting of bulkheads made of light alloys, and a number of others.
A reduction in thc effectiveness of actions by personnel in fighting fires
was also caused by: decentralization of the direction of fire fighting in
54
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~~x ~~~~ciaL us~ orrt~Y
cann~Ceian with Ch~ failur~ df ~ommunic~eion ~quipm~tte; th~ ldw 1~ve1 of
~~rvice org+~nizgCion on ~ number nE d~m~ged ~h3pe; ~nd~rp~Cim~Ci~n c~f. ~he
gieugtion'~ d~ng~r ~nd ind~~i~i~n in th~ aeCionB of Ch~ p~rgunn~L dir~cein~
eh~ fir~ fighti.n~; CArdin~~~ oE ~cti,one on s}iips gt~d in bn~eg; and po~r knc~w-
i~dge of eh~ ~hip~ and eh~ir communications~
Tn ic~er~~~~ th~ ~~f~ty df gh3pg perdonnel during fir~g, ~ n~?mber of m~F~gur~g
gr~ b~in$ und~rt~k~n en ~n~ur~ th~ evacua~ion of p~op1~ frnm camp~rrm~ntg
~n~ulf~d by fir~ ~nd ~mok~~ ~'hi~ problem i~ con~id~r~d egpeci~lly ~cue~ far
C~rri~rg and their num~rou~ rduees of communication ~n horiznne~]. end verticgl
dir~~Ciong which ar~ gn extremely compl~x labyrinth in which iC ~e di,ffl.cult
tn find on~'s way und~r nnrmal conditione, not to mention during fires w}iich
are accompani.~d by amok~~filled compartmentg and (frequently) tailur~ df ~h~ps
illumination~
IC ~an b~ ~olv~d using th~ empl~c~menC of apecigl m~rk~r~ which fgcilit~te
ehe c~ri~nCatinn of Ch~ p~rgdnnel as eh~y mov~ gbout the ~hip. Such markers
ghould be provided on exir routes to open sections of deckg, prim~rily to the
flight, gallery, ~nd hAnggr deckg.
Teets which wpre specially conduCted ehowed that under cnnditiong of heavy
smek~ in ~omparCments ~v~n gtreng 1i~ht ~ourc~~a ~re vigible ~n1y for shnrt
di~tancea. ~c was egtabli~hed that even with moderatc_ .,mok~ the 11ghe nf
flashllghta of 21,000 cgndles is viaible at a distance of no more rhan 2.b
m~t~rs whil~ Che light of ryuartz lamps of 45,000 candlES is visible at g dig-
tance of ~bout 2.5 meters. In this connection~ other (n~nlight) methodg of
orientarion were also atudied. In particular, touch systems for marking
evacuation routea were tested but they did not provide the proper ei`fect.
Tests showed that under conditions of light smoke and in the absence of il-
lumination combined orientation systems are most acceptable. They consist of
luminescent (luminous) and well��reflecting exit markers with the deaignation
of evacuation routes and the locations of doors and hatches which are set
out frequently (at a distance of about 1.5 metera). In individual, most dif-
ficult cases, it is recommended that lamps be set out to illuminate the
markerg and diagrams. Principles for the arrangement o� markers on ships have
been worked out ~5, 56].
In addition to the markers, complete deck plans are provided which show the
configuration of team routes of movement and the locations of entrances and
exits (Fig. 31) (not reproduced]. Here, the deck plans must be made individual-
ly for each ahip since even ships of the same type have a number of differences
in ti~e overall arrangement.
Realization of the new marking system on U.S. carriers is planned for the
1975/76 fiscal year for the carriers "Enterprise" and "Constellation" first
of atl. American specialists believe that the new marking system will attain
its goal only if the crews have good knowledge of their ships and with sys-
tematic drilling under conditions as close as possibl~~ to emergency conditions.
55
~
FOR OFFICItiI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~Ott n~~IC2AL US~ ONLY
I.n thiH >>rngrc~m, ~~Centinn i~ u1~ turned to Che individudl prnCect3on nf th~
ppr~nnn~1 ~ggin~e fir~~. A n~w re~piratory apparatu~ hag been d~va~npad and
adopt~d in ehe ~.nventory. Iti i~ ad~udged considerabiy mor~ improved in com-
parison wiCh th~ form~r one which wa~ re,ler.tiQ~i on the bae~.s of the expQYience
~f BCC~.CI~flC9 and ~aragtrophes which took place wh~r~ many p~np1.~ d3~d from
smok~ ("Ori~kany" and "Frank].in n. ltonsev~lti"--both in 1966, and oth~ra). The
new respiratiory gppar~eu~ which hgs undergone comprehengive teae~ cone~seg
of a plaseic f~cepiece and cy~inder w3Ch cumpre~~ed air whoga ~upply ig in-
t~nd~d for 8 minute~--a e~me suff3cient to emer$e on the flighe d~ck of ~
carrier from any compartment~ The apparaeus may be donned and put into
npergtion in legg eh~n ZO seconds while its we3ghr ia about 2 kilogramg~
'The development of the new r~spir~tory epparatua was preceded by a study of
the productg wh~ch are r~legsed during firea on ah3ps, their toxicity, ~nd
other properti~g~ Ttie effent of carbon monoxide and oChpr gasea on humans
wag sCudied (38, 42~.
(Png~s 197-2n5]
511. Analysie of bamage to 5hips During Colliaione
1. SCatistical An~lysis.
A statisticnl an~alygis was performed on the basis of an examination nf 163
cases of collisions whose distribution is presented in Table 4[not rQpYOducedJ.
Of 93 cases of collisions without disastrous consequences, 61 ~r~ conrained
in the book. A list of 70 cases of ship collisions with a disastrous out-
come is given in Appendix 2[not translated], 6 of which are described in
detail in this chapter.
Instances of damage to ships during collisions encompass a period of about
50 years. Exceptions are the "Hawk"-"Olympic" (1911) and "Shaw"-"Aquitania"
(1918) collisions which it was important to include because of their instruc-
Civeness. Disastrous cases are presented for Che time period since the Ue-
ginning of the century as was done for ahips fires and explosions.
An analysis of ahips damage without disastrous consequences showed the fol-
lowin~.
Three-fourths of the incidents of ship collisions occurred on the open sea
or in gulfs, 13 percent occurred during collisions in bases and on approaches
to Chem, while 9 percent took place in straits and rivers. Here, 44 percent
of Che collisions occurred during maneuvers and exercises while ~ust as many
took place under cruising conditions while executing various missions assigned
by the command. Six percent of the collision cases occurred during participa-
tion in combat operations, and just as many during mooring and transferring
fuel at sea from ship to ship.
The ship's period of service plays virtually no role here, as is shown by the
following figures. Forty-seven percent of the cases involved the collision
of ships with a service period of up to 10 years, and 41 percent involved
56
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
I~di~ dl~~'ZC~AL U5~ ONLY _
~hip~ wiCh ~ p~riod d~ y~'YV3C~ n~ from 10 to 2n y~~r~. Al~nu~ 12 percent nt'
Ch~ c~~c~ invnlv~d ~hip~ which h~d b~en ~.n gervice �or mor.e rhnn ZO ye~tr~.
Unfnrrunarply, nc~~re ~ire no guffici~n~~y re1~.aUle daC~ nn eli~ condir.:Lon o�
th~ g~a and w~aCh~r nr Che rime nf dgy aC wh~ch thp colliy~nny occ:urred,
~'rom ehc~ factual dnCa which w~ fi~v~ ~ti our disro~~l, iC fo].low~ rh~C n rath~r.
large ahgrp nf th~ C011~5~Otty oecurred during d~yl~ghe (rnor.e eh~n 20 p~rc~nti)
while 15 p~rc~nti of rh~ cas~g wgre co113s~.nns whirh oc~urr~d in eh~ dgrlc; tt?ere
i~ tto informaCinn ~n eh~ rpmAtning cnses. Tnst~ttc~~ df qh~p cuJ.~ihioitg under
~aCigf~CCory ~~g ~nd weaCher Cnnditions were raCh~r fr~quene.
CL1585 nf collisinns which ocGUrred with ships o� 20 cnunerieg are disCr:tbuted
~s follow~: UniCed Seates~-49 percent, Grpat Br~Ga3n~-~25 p~rc~ne~ J~?p~n--
11 p~rcPne, Fr~nce~-7 perCenC, Ita1y-~-5 percenC, ~nd Che rem~ining counCriesY-
ebouti 3 percene.
'Phe scale o� damg$e to ships during co~lisions and ehe~.r afterefteCts ~rc~ of
c~rtain inter~sC. Accid~nCg show that in two ~ra~~uHA 8 4 12 24 10,0
~11~ rC(fMa11H11 ~ 6 0 9 1 ~ 4,6
(12) AnonNA 6 4 6 IS 6~2
(13) NTn~wn � 4 3 4 I I ~.'4,b '
~(14) Apyree chnorw 12 13 ly 42 , 17,4
(6) d c e r o 68 70 I 1G 242 100,0 ~
(15) ~ �r6 23,2 29,0 47,b 100,0 ~
, j
Key:
1. Fleets 9. Great Britain
2. Reasons for loss of ships 10. France
3. Fires and explosions 11. Germany
4. Collisions 12. Japan
5. Grounding and effect of storms 13. Italy
6. Total 14. Other fleets
7. Ships 15. In percent
8. United States
An analysis of damage to ships without disastrous consequences was performed
on the basis of an examination of 276 cases of which fires and explosions
occupy about half the cases, collisions about one-third, while the remaining
cases (less than 17 percenC) are grounding and the effect of storms. Thes e
- figures evidently reflect the frequency of types of accidents on surface sh ips.
At the same time, if they are compared with cases of loss, they indicate that
surface ships remained "alive" more often with fires and "survived" least of
all during grounding and the effect of storms. Just as in cases of loss, here
collisions occupied an intermediate position.
Without presenting all the statistical data obtained here, we will only note
the following. During the last 10-15 years all three types of accidents and
77
FOR OFFICItiI, USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
rOR UFFICIAL US~ t7NLY
~6
~ Qo
.
ao
e
70
f0 ?4,d'/ 4~?'!~ p t1,Q%
04% ! ,0,09'e '
Sh ips , .
F'igure 61. Relative DisCribution of Casea of Loss by Groups and
Classe:s o� Ships: 1- Carriere; 2- armor-clad shLps
(excluding carriers); 3- lighti shipa; 4- combat Uoats
and minesweepers; 6- auxiliary veseels
Table 10. Distriburion of Cases of Loss by Groups and Classes of Ships
C, lipMaNnd rN6enH p c e r o
2 Kop~6nel1
~DY Kop~OriA~ec~ ~ e
4~ ~9yaO ~
(1, ~r: Fi~ ~i"s.C~d ~ ~
3 )
~8~ ~p~neiiocH~e KOp86JIN (6e3 22 7 31 GO 24,8
B
, ~9~ A11NAlI0Ctil1 1 ~ - 1 0,4
' ~10~ IIC('KHC KO(186JiN � IO 44 ~ 43,~
GocnweKerepaNMNituo�Tpanb� 8 10 4 22 9,0
( ~11~ HW0 KOpBMIH ~
~ (12) BcnoKOrarenbHwe cyAa IS 9 31 55 22,G
t
~
I .
( 6) B c e r o 56 70 I 16 242 100,0
- i In o6 43,2 4~J,0 47,8 100,0
, .
Key:
1. Croups and classes of sRips 7. Ships
Z. Reasans for loss of ships 8. Armor-clad ships (excluding carriers) -
3. Fires and explosions 9. Carriers
4. Collisions 10. Light ships
5. Grounding and storm effects 11. Combat boats and minesweepers
6. Total 12. Auxiliary vessels
78
; FOR OFFICI~?L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~OIt d~~'ICIAL US~ ONLY
c~ea~trdph~~ ~f surfa~~ ~h~.p~ ~cCUrred w~ehaue di~~~ernug con~equ~nc~g. ttnw-
ev~r.~ Che deCermining Cyp~ nf gncidenr cnngiseed o~ fir~~ ~nd ~xpld~3nny, eg-
pecially on r.arri2rg df eh~ U.S~ Navy,
2~ C~nerul R~gsnns for Accid~nr~ gnd CaCagtirophea nf Ships ~nd Ch~ir
Cdnsehu~nces
DsspiG~ the sp~c~.fic natiure uf each eype of accidenti and 3ndividual. breakduwn
incidentis, gomething common ~.g obaerved wh~.ch is inh~rene ro m~ny ~CC~.dptlk5
gnd n~tngCrdph~s r~gardl~se of their Cypes gnd gpecific mani�esCaC~.ons. Th:t~
cnmmnn fgetor congigts o~ bas3c ghorCCOmings which, ~.n the fin~r analys~s,
givp rig~ Co thes~ accid~ntg and fr~quently lead Co serious consequences. 'I'he
shorrcnmings being discuseed can be divided into two groups.
One group includes shortc~minga of a atructural-technical naCure which bCCtl~
in ehe proGeg~ of cr~aeing a ahip, during ~.es design and conatrucCion. In ehe
course of designing A ghip ~s a whole and ite individual componenCs (weapnns,
mechanisms, devices, systems) mistak~s gnd omissions are nommitted which nr.e
eonn~cCed with the failure of the plans to correspond to Che condiCions of ehe
mission and the rules far des~.gning and building ahips as well as with failure -
= Co consider ahips sailing pracCice and condiCions. In executing the p1~n,
eechnical decisions may be made which are not sufficiently substantiae~d by
calculations and experiments. But it would be incorrecr to consider all errors
aC this stage of a ahip's creaeion as the fault of Che designing organ3zations
alone. There are omissions which follow from the nonconformance of missions
assigned by the Navy's organs to the ship's conditions of service or from the
unrealiry ofthe missions which contain incompatible requirements. As a result
of errors and omissions in designing, Che ships which are built possess insuf-
ficient stability, unsinkability, maneuverability, and serengeh or tliey have a
low level of explosion- and fire safeCy and are not provided wiCh sufficient
damage control equipment.
In building ships, mistakes are also commitCed which may lead to various
accident incidents. In Chis case, errors are encountered which are conneceed
with Che nonconformance of the ship which has been built Co the plan, with the
employment of poor-qualiCy materials, with Che performance of substandard work
by the buiJ.ding yard or its contractors, with the employment of incorrect
technology in building the ship, and with failure to observe building rules.
Insufficient monitoring when building a ship and the absence of necessary fu21-
scale tesCs conducted at the shipyard itself and under sea conditions are ad-
ditional sources for the occurrence of accidents in the course of a ship's sail-
ing and service. And here, it should be noted that in addition to industrial
organizations responsibility for construction errors and shortcomings is also
borne by the naval organs which are observing the course of the ship's construc-
tio~~ and are participating in its tests.
It will be appropriate to mention that the incorrect organization of construc-
tion work and repair-modernization work led to accidents and catastrophes which
occurred at shipyards and in docks and, consequently, to material and human
losses as well as to more or less prolonged delays in puCting the ships into
service.
79
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY -
~
i
_ ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~bR b~'~ICtAL US~ ONLY
Shar~cnmingg whieh ~re nneed in the coura~ of ehe ahip'~ serviae unde:r r~gular
~ailing cnnd~ridns ag Weii a~ under emerg~ncy cond~.C~.ong belong Co Che oChe~ ,
group. Und~r regular (standard) sailing ~onditi~.ong ~crid~nr~ could gppexr gs
g rpgulr of: Che in~ufficiQn~ state of trgining of Che crews bo~h in regard
eo knowl~dge nt Ch~ properC:Leg of Cheir ship gnd the envirdnmenti aa we11 ns in
ehe mgtCer of maee~ring the ship's equipmenC and meChods for 3Ca operat~.on; -
ehe unsgtis�~~Cnry nrganizat~.on of s~rvice on sh3,ps, espenially in regard tn
plgnning rhe inseruceinn and diseribution of tihe personn~l and ehe clenr ~sCab-
lishment of th~ir �unct:Lonal dutieg; the ldw state of discipline of a11 cr~tie-
gories of pergonnel, u C~relesy ~nd irresponsibl~ aCCiCUde toward Che Accomp-
lishment of their official dut3.es, and violation of the requir~mentia of gu:tdance
_ and regul~ting dncuments; careleagness in Che performance n� service and tile
absence of the proper vigilnnce, foresight, and precaution; fnilure Co cnnsider
the environmenCal conditiiong.
A large role in accid~ntal incidents and Cheir a�tereffects wns played by the
unsntisfacCory hydrometeorologic~l and navigational-hydrographic support of
nhtps cruises. These were expressed in the tardy and, at times incorrect
~ 1'orecasting of the sea's condition and the movement of the winds; in failure
t~ plot uttderwater obstacLes and various reference points on charts and 3r.
navigaCional aids and manuals; and by failure to provide the necessary hydro-
graphic markers of waCer areas and ships rouCes of movement.
In emergency siCuations, the increase in material and human losses and, at
times, the losses of ships were furthered by the personnel's lack of knowledge
of a ship's properties and equipment and damage control methods; the crews'
low morale and discipline and a panic attiCude which reigned on stiips and
vessels at times; unpreparedness and insuffiency of damage control equipment;
insufficienC consideration of the danger of accidents on the part of ships~com-
mand and the unsatisfactory organization of damage control operations; and
nonconformance of the measures adopted to the conditions of the developing
emergency siCUation.
The general.,shortcomings which were the basic reasons for ships accidents and
which led to serious consequences are presented in the diagram (Fig. 62).
In this connection, it seems of interest to present some data here concerning
the accident raCe of ships of the U.S. Navy which hat^~ been published recently
(106].
Table 11 contains information on the reasons for accidents on ships of the
U.S. Navy which occurred durl.ng the 1970/71 and 1971/72 fiscal years. It
follows from the tables that almost t~alf the accidents occurred due to the
personnel's incorrect actions and ~missions, about one-fourth occurred for
reasons of a structural nature and, if we exclude indefiniteness, then the
remaining reasons account for 17 percent.
The absolute data of the table wt~ich indicate the la~:ge scales of accidents
on ships of the American fleet are also interesting. If we consider here
80
FOR OFFICItiI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~o~ o~~zci~. usE oNt~Y
that (ng Che Am~ricgng Chemse~.v~s ~gsert) the acCug~. numb~r o.E gccident~ :L~ cnn-
sider~bly lc~rg~r elnne aboue one third of the Navy's ships d~.d not repore ~b~uC
nccidentg which occurred ~t a11, Lhe ecales of tihe accident ra~e 1.ncreas~
~ignificantly.
Table L1. [teasons �or AccidenCs on Shipa of the U.S. Navy (L970-~.972)
Re~sons Number of ~ df Tota].
Acc~.denCs Nu~nber
In~orrect actions ~nd nmissions by personnel 1880 49.7
Seructural shortcomings and ma~erials 881 23.2
Cffect of the environment 304 8.0
Dangerous condit~.ons and ob~ecCs 168 ~i.4
Cmployment of incorrece meChods 152 4.0
Consequences of preced3ng accidenCs 139 3.7
Undetermined 263 7.0
Total 3787 100.0
As regards the aftereffecCs of accidents, according to official da~a in 1972
alone maCerial losses in the U.S. Navy as a result of ship accidents were
1.1.5 million dollars and, in this connection, the ships lost more than 4,300
days for the conduct of repairs. The actual figurea which characGerize the
losses are many times greater noC only becauae ships and forces do not always
report accidents, buC also because far from everything known reaches the press.
This is indicated by another source [104] which points ouC that in 1972, in
cases which "did not land in newspaper headlines;'the U.S. Navy lost about
700 men in acciuents while about 5,000 were in~ured. Despite the fact that
the war in Vietnam still continued, 15 times more seamen were lost outside of
combat circumstances than under combat conditions. A curious stutistic is
presented ir~ this work which indicates that altogether during the period 1961-
1972 noncombat losses in the U.S. Navy exceeded combat losses by a xatio of
more than 6:1.
This, in general, is the picture of accidents and catastrophes of ships in
the capitalist fleets.
Let us now see what ways are planned to reduce the accident rate of ships and
to increase their safety.
81 `
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
F'0[t n~A'ICIAL USE ONLY
During Ship's Development
; '
~ Dur~.ng Deeigning bur3ng Constiruction
.
Nonconformnnce of Nnnconformance ~o ship's
miseion to ship's plan
Aervice condirions
Nonconformance of plan Employmenr of low-qualiey
Co mission materials
Nonconformance of plan Low-quality performgnce
to designing rules of work
Nonconformance of plan EmploymenC of incorrect
to ships sailing prac- construction technology
tice
Groundlessness of de- Insufficient monitoring
cisions made with cal- of work accomplished
' culations and tests
Unpreparedness af ship UnsatisfacCory test of
damage control documen- ship and its mechanisms
tation
Figure 62. General Shortccmings--Basic Reasons for 9hips Accidents
- and Catastrophee [figure continued on following page]
82
FOR OFFICItiI. USE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
ro~ o~FicrnL us~ ornY
(rigure 62 continued]
During Ship's Service
~
Under normal conditiona In emergency situation~
Insuf�icient training Unpreparedneas of ship im
of the crew damage contirol
Unsatisfactory organiza- Unpreparedness of damage
tion of service on ship conCrol equipment
Low discipline of ship's Unpreparedness of ship's
personnel peraonnel for damage con-
trol work
Absence of accident- Low personne7. morale and
prevention measures discipline. Panic atCi-
tude
Lack of sufficl.ent Incor.rect organization of
vigilance and caution damage control supervision
Unsatisfactory hydro- Insufficiency of ineasures
meteorological and tA eliminate aftereffects
navigational-hydro- of accidents
graphic support of
ships cruises
�19. The Problem of Ship Safety and Ways for iCs Solution
The growth in the accidenC rate in the navies of the capitaliat countries,
which was accompanied by extremely tangible human and material losses, led
to where it was necessary to devote more and more attention to questions of
increasing safety before they grew into a state problem, in particular in the
United States.
83
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~'Olt nT'FYCrAL USE ONLY
This problem acqu:Lred special urgency in Che 1960's when ~ greaC fire disastier
broke nut nn the alrcrafC carrier "Constiellation" (1960); tihen,when rhe "first--
clgas" nuc~.e~r submarine "Thresher" was lost under "secreti circumsCances,"
and when large car,asrroph~s occurred several years later on the carrierg
"Or~.skgny," "ForresCal," and "Enterprise" (~.966-1969). These evenCs coere
accompanied by a 1~rge number of accidenta and catastrophes in navnl ~ir forces~
The numerous commissions which funct3on~d during the "period of accidents and
catasCr~phes" examined and resolved Che problema which pertained to e~ch ac-
cidental incident, and same o� them were charged with the development of recom-
mendations of a broader na~ure which already pertained to a class of sh3ps as
a whole (submarines, carriers). But a11 these were ind~.vidual tasks of the
fleet safety problem. In the course of the commisaions' work, 3~ began Co be
learned Chat the origin of a number of accidents was cauaed noC only by the
oversighCs of individual people and ships, buC siso by the command of forces,
fleets, and the Navy as a whole.~ Since struc~ural ahortcomings of ships were
the source of many accidenCal incidents, industrial enterprises and .fi.rms
~nd scientific and other organizations which support the Navy began to be
drawn into tha orbit of rhis problem. A number of catastrophes received a
- great public response, and their results became a sub~ect for discusslons in
public organizations and sCate organs. Thus, they ceased to be the Navy's
"inCernal matter". The circumstances which developed forced the Naval com-
mand to adopt certain radical measur~s with the goal of reducing the accident
rate and increasing the safety of naval ob~ects, in particular, shlps.
Also in this connection, in 1969 a special "Naval Safety Center" was organized
in the United States. Its goal is "the establishment of an effective and ener-
getic program to prevent accidents in order to raise operat3.ona~. readiness and `
reduce the number of human victims and in~ured as well as the material losses
of naval units and forces from random aauses" [106, page 56]. The center's
goal was for.mulated in Chis form in 1970 by the Chief of Naval Operations of the
U.S. Navy. Norfolk was selected as the center's base and its strength was
established at 300--servicemen and civilians. Its structure consists of four
directorates--surface ships, submarines, naval aviation, and coast defense--
and several departmenL�s. A special safety program was worked out for the im-
plementation of which naval units and forces as well as "external"Gas regards
the Navy) ~ersonnel and equipment are widely involved in addition to the
center's forces.
One of the basic types of activity is the prevention~ of ships accidents through
sysCematic and "surprise" inspections to eliminate dangerous conditions. Here,
a dangerous condition is defined as any condit3on in which the occurrence of an
emergency or accident is most probable. For example, poor maintenance of
materiel� the absence of protective and preventive systems, the cluttering of
compartments, insufficient illumination, or the unsatisfacrory condition of
the atmosphere--all this falls under the concept of "dangerous condition."
The inspection is carried out by the newly formed safety inspectorate.
84
FOR OFFICItiL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
, FOit OFi'ICIAL U5~ ONLY
Here, we ~hou]:d indic~te a new, bro~der interpreeatiinn nf an ~1CC~.C~Otlt wh~.ch
has now been adopted in Che U.S. Navy. Now, att accident or accident~:l incidenti
is defined a~ any unplanned ~ct or event as a resu~.~ of whick~ damage occurs Cn
rhe equipmene or cargo of a ship ns a whole or personne~ ar~ ~n~ured or lci'l1ed.
Thus, an accidenC inc~.udes ~11 unforeseen cases "from po~.nC Co poin~" which
are connected witih a ship's personnel and equlpment. This "new concept" ia
subsennCi~ted primaril.y by economic cons3.deration~. In ehe optnion
of U.5. naval apecialists, it is important not only to preventi rhe failure of ~
ships and their crews, but there should a~.so be the stLiving to elimin~re the
necessity for rep~?ir or, in any case, to reduce the cost o� repair s:tnce vir-
tually all "unplanned events" which 3mpair the "m~esion" of the ships lead
to financial expenditures in the last analys3.s. A"viable safety program"
and iCs implemenCation should lead to an effective reduction in the probabil-
ity of the outbreak of accidents and, conaequently, to a savings in budgeeary
resources released to tihe Navy.
Tn rhis connection and corisidering Chat the system of inform~tion on ships _
accidents which existed until recently was ad~udged complex and not meeting
contemporary requirements, the center worked out and pu~ into efFect a new
procedure for the collection and processing of data on various accidents. The
data are stored in the memory of ~he compuCers with which the center is
equipped. Rear Admiral Nelson, r.he chief of the Naval Safety Center, called the
computer system the "watchdog" which stores and analyzes data on the Navy's
safety, guarding its installations against dangers.
- The center revisea and r~publishes manuals, instructions, and rules from the
standpoint of increasing the safety of the personnel's actions. And again,
any deviaCion from the generally accepted method of work which increases the
probability that an accident may emerge is called a dangerous action (working
without sufficient knowledge ~r training, working at a dangerous speed, the
use of substandard materials, structural elements, or equipment, clistractions,
and so forth). -
The center is conducting important propaganda work. It publishes a number of
journals. Six such publications which published d3rective and educational
materials were counted in 1975. The center publishes books and prepares and
~ distributes films connected with safety qu~~stions.
In 1973, the center developed and proposed a"new" approach Co ensuring ship
safety ~allec~ the "safety system." The authors employed a systems approach to
the designing of ships and their equipment with emphasis on accident preven-
tion. Here, the "system" was intended for the ship`s entire period of service.
This system was employed in the design and construction of the submarine
SSN-688 (of the "Sturgeon" type), the destroyer DD--963 ("Spruance"), hydro-
foil guided missile boats, and oth~r ships.
Consider~d to be most difficult is the elimination of accidents caused by per- ,
sonnel of the ships (the main reason for all accidents on American ships)
which was indicated above. It is proposed that biorhythmic records which
establish those who are guilty of accidents be used in the analyses of acci-
' dents on ships to solve these problems.
85
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~OIt 0~'FICIAL US~ ONLY
Such Are snme of rhe new ~pproxches to sol.ving ~he problem o� ship sA~ety,
the expediency and effcctiveness of which wi1.1 be able to be ~udged after
checking rhem in practice. At the same t~.me, "rraditional" merhods which have
been modernized wiCh consider~tion of the experience from recent shipa acci-
dents and catAStrophes are noti being discarded, eitiher.
On rhe basis of th~.s experience, certiain recommendations, requirements, and
measures have been worked out which are directed toward reducing the accident
rnCe and increas~.ng the securiCy of ships under any sailing conditions. They
are reduced ~o cerrain measures---structural, organizational-techntcal, nnd
actions by the personnel.
5pecific measures as applicable to varioua acc:tdents were examinsd in the
corresoonding ch~pters. For nll typea of accidents, they are direcCed toward
the elimination of the general shortcom3ngs which were discussed above nnd
toward a further improvement in a11 fields which eneure ship safety.
In this regard, we should dwe11 briefly on some general measures fur ensuring
ship survivability. Especially as much more attention has begun
to be devoted ro this question abroad than formerly. This pertains especially
to the training of ships crews for damage control. For example, in tihe United
States a considerable number of various courses and schools on training the
personnel in damage control and fire fighting are functioning. IZow 78 such
educational insCitutions which are located in bases on both coasts of the
United States--on the AtlanCic and Pacific Coasts--are counted, of which 33
are for damage control, 27 are for fire fighting, and 18 are for antinuclear
defense. The center for. damage control training is Philadelphia where there
are 6 officer courses and 13 for training seamen and peCty officers.
The tasks are continuously b~coming more difficult to improve the training of
the personnel, approaching an actual situation.
Under ship conditions, attenCion is devoted to improvin~ the cooperation of de-
partments in damage control ar..td concentrating the attention of the commander of the
damage-control organization (on big ships) on his own problems, freeing him _
from secondary functions, on studying the experience of accidents and ships
damage, and on stabilizing the composition of repair parties.
A number of publications on questions of ship survivability have appeared in
recent years. Some specialists [100] believe that many accidents and catas-
trophes result from the fact that proper attention is not paid to questions
of ensuring survivability and they pose the question of the necessity to
organize a special survivability service whose functions should be: coordina-
tion of aystematic preventive measures; technical servicing and repair of
ship damage-control equipment; the conduct of exercises on damage control and
the creation of effective damage-control organization; coordination and dis-
tribution of requisitions for repair work; and the maintenance of documentation
on structural changes which occur on a ship during its operation and repair.
Here, reliance should be placed on preventive measures which prevent an acci-
dent and not on eliminating its aftereffects. Such statements are not individ-
ual statements and they agree with the line which the safety center is con-
duct~ng.
86
/ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
FOIt UF~'ICZAL US~ ONLY
Concluyion
Accideiits and' cakastroph~~ ~ccur as s~ resu~.t o~ �J.re~ and expln~i~c~s ~n ekl:lps r
cn1].isinns, the e~fects of srorms, and Lhe running of ship~ r~grnund ~nd at~ Che
rocks, rhe afteref.fects of which are of~en commensu~aC~ with t.l~e ~fter,e~tieces
from combat effects on ships andy in a number ~f C8618sr ~h~y surp~3s tl1~m
coneiderably.
The basic reasons for accidents and catasCrophes wh~.ch QCCIl'~' fram noncombat
e�fects on ships or are concealed ~.n ~tructural.-~echnical ~ho~~tcom3.ngs o~
ships are the consequence of errors Attd miscalculatiox~~ Wtl~.C11 are co~~i~mitted
during designing and construct3.on or are conn~cted wl.~h errox~ and ov~~-.~ight,~
which occur in the course of us~.ng ships under their normal service ~:on--
di~ions as we~.1 as 3n emergeucy situations. .Analysis sliows rhat As ap~licabl.e
to surEace shtps and auxiliary ve~sels of the fleets o~ cgpita.7ist co+anCrte3y
reasons of an operational nature pr~dominate substr~ntia].~,y uvex rer~sons af a
structural-technical ~_ype.
These ,:onc~usions, which were drawn on the Uasis ~~f an examinntinn of accj.dent~
and catastrophes thar occurred ovex sever.ml decades, have a r~ttier. sl�.a1~1e
nature and also remain vatid for contc~mporary conditions. 7fia rap:id and ~
qualiratively new develapment of naval equipment has had a con.r..rad~r.tor.�y~ ~~fer.t
on the accident rate of ships and on e~suring their nurv:ivabil.ity ancl saf.e.C,y.
On the one hand, the development of new equi�pment led ~o Che poss~.bil~.r.y of
creating new means and methods ~to prevent accidents and r.omUai; L'}l~'.Ill~ ltav~.Y:~ r:i
beneficial e.`fect on ensuring their survlvability and satety. Qn i:he cth~r
hand, ~his development was connected with the complicatit~n of. equl.pment: :~n1
the incomplete work on iCs individual assenil~lies and, with t?~~ breakd~~r.a of
Che "man-equipment" system under new conditions, was the reasc,n f.or. a riiuubQr
of accidental incidents. Overstraining of ~~he crews under. co~cli~Cl.ons where
che sh.ips were on operationalservice (or when conduct:~ng combaC op~ra~J.on~)
~ was an additional reason for the outbrealc of acciden~s.
The totality of all these ractors was the reason why, i.n a numoe.r, of .~i~ets
and especially in the U.S. Navy,cases of accidents and catastrophes be--
came more frequent during the last decade L�o such a degree tl~iat que~tioi~s er
ships safe`.y (surface and submarines) deve~.oped lnto a problam of Stu~e sig-~
nificance. Here, in the United States special attention bc:gan to be pniu
to ensuring the safety of carriers and submarines as the leading classes uf
_ ships.
A number of radical measures have been implemented 3n the U~ited 5tatPS in
recent years to increase ~afety;� A special Naval Safety L`enter has been
organized wiCh a staff of several hundred people. A broad grogr3m has been
worked out to ensure safety for the implementation of wnich bu~:h n~.~~i organs
as well as scientific and industrial organizations which 1re ~lot part or thc
Navy have been involved. In addition to intensit�ying tradit:Coaal measures of r~
structural-technical and organizational-technical nature, new methods are
- being evolved to increase safety which are being employEd in the designiak ~ar
87
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
FOR OFF'YCIAL USE ONLY
ships. They env~.sage ensur~.ng the safety of a ahip over a]~1 stages of ics
service. Great atCention is being devoCed to reducing the accidenti rate
of ships personnel who are, according to the Am~rican data~ ~he main
reason for nccidental incidents~ A new syatem of information hns been de-
veloped for this purpose on the basia of which accidents are analyz~d com-
prehensi~Vely ~o generaCe recommendations for Che continuous improvement of sh~ps
~ safety service.
According to data in ~he U~5. nava~ pr~:ss, the totality of the measurea being _
conducted is providing noticeable results. At the same time, the Americans
acknowledge that the degree of their effectiveness may be established with
t3me as experience in new directions is accumu~.ated.
[Pages 288-291]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
For Chapter I
1. Korotkin, I.M. "F3res on Carriers," MORSKOY 5BORNIK, No 5, 1973,
pp 93-108.
2. Rybnikov, B. "It Happened in Halifax," MORSKOY SBORNIK, No 1, 1974,
Pp 72-74.
3. Sherman, F.S. "Amerikanskiye avianostsy v voyn~ na Tikhom okeane"
[American Carriers in the War in the Pacific.] Translation rrom the
English, Mo~~::ow, Voyenizdat, 1956.
G. "The Age of Aqueous," FATHOM, Spring 1973, Vo1 4, No 4, pp 6-9.
5. Barboo, S. "Unsafe Three Ways," FATHOM, Winter 1974, Vol 6, No 3,
pp 11~13.
6. Barnard, R.E. "Arresting Gear Cylinder Explosion," BUREAU OF SHIPS
JOURNAL, Vol 12, No 7, 1963, p 29.
7. "B1aze Contained Aboard Forrestal," NAVY TIMES, Vol 18, No 42, 1969, p 33.
8. Boisseau, P. and Guyot, R. Problemes actuels concernant les installa-
tions de carbu~rant aviation a bord des ports-avions," LA REWE MARITIME,
No 202, 19b3, pp 1031-1046.
9. Breikner, J.I. "Aircraft Weapons Stowage and Handling Systems in Car-
riers," NAVAL ENGINEERS J.OURNAL, Vol 80, No 3, 1968, pp 435-442.
10. Brown, C.L. and Halliwell, H. "Fire Resistant Fluid Development,"
NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAI~, Vol 75, No 3, 1963, pp 543-552.
88
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
r~~ox or~zcr~. vs~: ~NL~
11. Carter, L.G. and Hogger, H. C. "Nava1 Procedure ii~ R~l,ai;~.on Cn ~'~.re
Org~nixaCton," THE INS7.'ITUT~ OF MARINE ENGIN~~RS TRANSAC7.'TONS, Val 68,
No 12~ 1956~ pp 485-495.
1~. Caskey, 12.G. "~'orxes~a~. Under Repair," NAVAL AVTA'~'ION N~WS, Vo1 49 ~
No 12,.~1967, pp 24-25.
13. "Cook-Off Time �~r Bombs Tncreased," NAVY 'T:[MES, Vol 19, No 10, 1569, p 30.
14. "Destroyer Mishap ICilla 2, In~uxes 2," NAVY TIMES, Vol 20, No b, 1970, p 3.
15. Ennis, J. "Officer Aboard Both Blazing Carriers," NAVY TIMES, Vo~ ~.6,
No 45, 1967, pp 4-5.
16. Faeth, G.M. and White, D.r. "Ignition of Hydraulic I~"lu:tds by Ttapid
Compreas3on," JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETX OF NAVAL EI~Gxt~ERSq Vo1 73,
No 3,, 1961, pp 467-475.
' 17. "F'~re-Fighting Development," NAVAL RESEARCH REVZEti1, Vo1 25, No 'l1, ~.972,
PP 28-29.
'18. "Fire Aazards in Ship Machinery Spaces," BUREAU OF SHTI?~ JOUIt~TALy Vo7. 11,
No 4, 1962, pp 25-26.
19. "Fire in the Hole!" FATHOM, Winter 1972, voz 4, No 3, pp 4-�50
20. "Fire Trucks on Deck," ALL HANDS, No 631, 1969, p 35.
21. "Fire Watch!" FA'rHOri, Spring 1973, Vo1 4, lvo 4, pp 4-5.
22. Cibbert, K. "Fire in Y.angar Bay One," ALL HANDS, No 601, 1967, pp ].2-1Se
23. Gile, Ch. "The Mount Hoc3 Explosion," USNIP, Vol. 89, No 2, 1963a pp 86-93.
24. Helfcr, H. "Navy Firefighters," OUR NAVY, Vol 62, No 12n 1967n p 26.
25. Jacobs, R.N. "Fire Fighting and Prevention in the Royal Navy," NAV1~.
ENGINrERS JOURNAL, Vol 78, No 5, 1966, pp 917-919.
26. Jentzch, H. "Grossraumgefahr und andere Gefahrenquellen bei Schif.fs�-
br~nden und Explosionen an Bord," SCHIFF UND HAFEN, 1956, Heft S. b21-
630; Heft 12, S. 1104-1111; 1957, Heft 3, S. 229-234.
27. Kraut, H. "~xplosions in Nitrogen Compression Systems," NAVAL SHIP
SYSTEMS COMMAND TECHNICAL REVIEW, Vol 16, No 9, 1967, pp 28--29.
28. Larkin, W.N. "Texas City Disaster," MARINE NEWS, Vol 43, No 2, 1956,
pp 16-20, 46. ,
89
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
~OR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY
29. "Machinery Space Fire-Fighting ~quipment," BUREAU OF SHIPS JOURNAL, Vo:l 14,
No 5, 1965, pp 18 -19.
30. Manceau, li.~. and Hart, C.M. "The Salvage of the USS Lafaye~te,"
JOURNAL OT~' THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NAVAL ENGINEERS, Vol 55, No 4, 1943,
pp 648-697.
31. De La Mater, C. "The Questions of Survivability of Aircraft Carriers,"
NAVAL AVIATION NEWS, No 13, 1972y pp 54-57.
32. McCann, R.B. "New Fire-Fighting Developraents," NAVAL SHIP SYSTEMS
COMMAND TECHNICAL NEWS, Vol 16, No 11, 1967, pp 8-11. -
33. McDonald, H. "The Salvage Attempt on the Sirius," MARINE NEW5, Vol 23,
No i, 1974, pp i4-is.
34. "NAVMAT--Fire Protection Action Group," FATHOM, Summer 1973, Vol 5, No 1,
pp 30-31.
35. Oliver, E.F. "The Bombay Explosion," USNIP, Vol 83, No 3, 1957, pp 273-
277.
36. Polmer, N. "Aircraft Carriers," N.Y., 1969.
37. Polmar. E.L., Adams, J.M., and Holt, C.O. "Equipment Salvage on Constella-
tion," BUREAU OF SHIPS JOURNAL, Vol 10, No 10, 1961, pp 3-6.
38. "Public Enemy No. 1--Fire at Sea," ALL HANDS, No 677, 1973, pp 6-11.
39. Roberts, J.W. "The Aircraft Carrier and Fire," NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL,
Vol 81, No 1, 1969, pp I43--146.
40. Rushbrook, F. "Fire Aboard," London, 1S61.
41. Russel, J.S. "Panel on Safety in Aircraft Carrier Operations," USNIP,
Vo1 94, No 10, 1968, pp 131-133.
42. Saalfeld, F. "NRL Investigates Shipboard Hazards," NAVAL RESEARCH RE-
_ VIEWS, Vol 24, No 12, 1971, pp 16-19.
43. "Safety Device F~ilure Blamed as Forrestal Disaster Cause," NAVY TIMES,
Vol 17, No 3, 1967, p�54.
44: Schultz, Mort. "Fire on the Flight Deck," POPUL�AR MECHANICS,~Vol 142,
No 3, 1974, pp 82-87, 155.
45. Seeger, B.F. and Lapp, R.H. "Water Injection: A New Protective System
for Missile Magazines," JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NAVAL
ENGINEERS, Vol 7.1, No 4, 1959, pp 719-722.
~ 90
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084426-4
,
FOR OI~'FICIAL USL' ONLX
46. Shaclcel~ard, A. "USS isnterr,r:tse; l3nclc into Action," ALT~ ~iANUS, No 67:3,
1)69, pp 16-19.
47. Sherman, M.M. "ProtecL-ion of Deep Stowage Nlissile Ma~aztnes: A New
Approactl," NAVAT, ~NGTNE~RS JOURNAL, Vol SG, No 1, :19'/2, pP 55-5~.
48. "Ships Can 13urn!" rATHOM, 1J:tnter 1973, Vo1 5, No 3, 1973, pp 24-15.
49. "Simulated Ship Wi11 Aid T'i�re Trnining," 5HxPI3UILDING AND 5IiIPPTNG
1t~CORD, Vo1 118, No 18, 1971, p 29.
50. "Surf~ce Chemical Salvage of Warer-Damuged Electrical Equipment," _
NAVAL RrSEA12CI~I REVT.FW, No 2, L96~., pp 1-3.
51. Terzib~schitz, S. "llie Situation der Amerikanischen 1~lugzeugCL3ger-
waffe," rfARINE RUNDSCHAU, 1974, Ile:Et 2, S. 69-72.
52. Tuve, R.L. "New Methods of Protecting ,Am~rican AircrafL- C~rri~r~,"
FiRE INT~RNATIONAL, Vol 3, No 25, 1969, pp 30-37.
53. Wassilieff, A. "Alarm Incendie," LA REWE MARTTIME, No 276, 7.970,
pp 563-580.
5G. Wells, R. "Fire and Death on the USS 'ConstellaCion'," OUR I~AVY, Vul Sb,
Nu 2, 1961, pp 6, 55.
55. iJenger, N.E. "Safety Fluid in High Pressure Hydraulic Sys~ecns," ]iIJRI',AU
OF SrIIPS JOURNAL, Vol 11, No 1, 1962, pp 14-17.
56. "Which ~day Out?" I'ATFIOM, Winter 1974, Vol 6, No 3, pp 1G-18.
57. Wilson, T.B, "Ship and Aircraft Fire Fighting on Combatant Vessels,"
NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL, Vol 75, No G, 1963, pp 745-761. -
For Chapter II
58. Berg, A. "Accidents and Raising the American Submarines S4 and 55:1,"
MORSKOY SBORNIK, Nos 8-9, 1929, pp 97-117.
59. Bogoslovskiy, A.M, and Kostyukov, A.A. "Yavleniye vzaimnogo prisasyvaniya
sudov" [The Phenomenon of Mutual Suction of Vessels], Morskoy 'Transport,
1960.
60. Cerasimov, V.N. and Droblenkov, V.r. "Podvodnyye lodki imper.ialisticheskikh
gosudarstv" [Submarines of the Imperialist States), rioscow, Voyenizdat,
1962.
61. Korotkin, I.M. "There Was No BaCtle but There Are Losses," r10R5IC0Y
SBORNIK, No 3, 1974, pp 53-55.
91
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R00010008002fi-4
~
SHIP ACCIDENTS AND DISASTERS ~

2i AUtiUST i9?9 C FOUO 2il79 ~ 2 OF 2
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100084426-4
l~olt r.)~'t~'I.c;1At, UyC c)NLY
, Ii".'. Sliv~dc, 1'~~, Yc. "~~tilim:.~r(ue ~ccf.dec~t~ itt [~drei~ti I~.1ceLN I)utln~; tlie 1,75t
'l'~~n Ye~tr:a (197.1-19;f.1) r10l2SKUY 5130kNIK, Nd 5~ 1.93.1. ~ pp .1~4-~14.`"i.
b3, t~~~rry, A,~;, "'Ch~~ "5haw'-'~lquitani.7' Col]i~t.on, U5Nii', Vol. 52, Nc~ ,
l9; r,~ hl, : 2.7r~-~'l'17H.
t~4. Cr~itF;, 1).ft, "Rei>air oi: Cu1.llst.oci Dmm~ge," nuliLn~1 OI' S]iII'5 J~~UltNAI~,
t'c~l 10, No 1~)G:l., p~~ ~-'i,
~,~i, 1)tckt.ls~n, It.td. "W.?r:;hip ttnmq, 5inlce> 5ub; 82 Aboard 5nved c~if U~hu,"
`JAVY, Vc~l ] 1, N~~ 1, l~~hfi, pp 1.0~14.
Fti(,, uicr.lorf'f, K,A. "7'ne nay the 5ecn~v'y 5tur~ ~i1ew Off," USNiP, Vol
1, 195G, ti~p 7oo-�7n9. .
h7. i'~�edtriksen, �J.b. "I;ierninge~t of MoCOreorpeJob~den 'I~lyvefi:~kt:~' c~fr.~~r
det~nes kc~l 11 y tnn med moCortarpedob8den 'H~g~n' : Store B~~?ele dc~u 4 Sen-
r ~mber .1997," 'CIU5KItI~"I i~OE~ S~VA~5~N, VI, :1958, pp 7.57~272.
68. Heiscei�hexg�-rlttder.~ett, F'. "Knlltsion mel.len H.ri.5. 'Curqcoa' 7g it.rt.S.
'Queeci Mary' 2(~~tc~her .1942," TIUSKRII~T ~OR S~VA~:S~N, V, ]968, ~p 225-2G0.
69, titckinh, 1i. "tdarstilps in Collision," NAVY, Vol 71, No 4, 1y66~ pp 1'?2-123.
~U. Luckwood, C.A, und tldamson, li.C. "l~ell ~t 50 Fathoms," Nc:w Yc~rk, 19f?.
71. P.idfield, P. "An Agony of Col.lisions," London, 19fi6.
72. "'Queen rt~ry' C~llision Action," SHIPBUILDING ANb SHIPPtNG R~CCIRD,
194G, Vol 68, No 25, pp 693-69G; No 26, p 727.
73. "The 'Quenn Mary' and H.M.5. 'C~iracoa' Collision," SHIFnUI~DING ANn
SNIPPINC l2ECORD5, Vol 70, No 6, 1947, pp 169-170.
7~~. "U5S Pir.king--Collision Itepairs at Subic Aay," BUR~1U OF 5HIi'S JOUFJvAI.,
Vol ].U, No 5, 1962, pp 13-14.
For Ch~~pter III
75. 13ochek, A. "Safer.y rieasures at Anchorages," MORSKOY SBORNIK, tic 3, 19h5,
r 2~�
76. Ptotrokhov, A. "Navigational-Hydrographic and liydrometeorological 5upport
c~f Ships Combat Activity," MORSKOY SBOR,vIK, No 1, 1973, pP 26-28.
J7. ivtmftz, C. and Potter, E. Voyna na more. 1939-1y45" jWar At Sea. 1939-
1945]. Translated from the F.nglish, Mnscow, Voyenir.dat, 1965.
78, f{adaway, R.B. "Course 7.cr.o (~ine Five," USNIP, Vol 83, No 1, 1957,
pp 40-48.
9'l
FOR OFFICI~I. USE 0`'LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100084426-4
ro~ nrr~cinL us~ dN~,~
79~ K~1n~ingkt., 1~~ "SnLvgg~ dp~ra~iong of USS H~~dwin (Dn~~24)," IJSNIP,
Vc~l ~8, No 'l, 19~i2, pp 138-1~~1,
Nf), "Miahty Mtdg~td af. Cli~ F~'1~~t," ALL NANDS, No 556, lgG3, p~~ 6-7.
gl. Mi1w~~, W.I~ "Corpu~ Chr3~ti Bay--An ~xampl~ uf r4~nagemene nf ~m~rgcncy
Rapa~r~ i.n RamnC~ Ar~ge," NAVAL ENGINE~ItS JOURNAL, Vn~. 86, Na 2, J.97G,
pp 36-40.
82. Ni.mitz, C.W. "Pgci�i~ ~1~eC Confiden~ial Lat~er~ Sub~ect: Dn~nage in
Typhoon, Le~sons of," USNIP, Vo1 97, No 6, 197~., pp 7~+-76.
83. It~ed, K.S. "'I'he Wreck of the Tacoroa," USNIP, Vnl 97, No 6, 1971, pp 74-76.
84. Se~r1y, W.~. nnd Rynecki, A. "SaLvag~ nf th~ USS ~'r~~nk Knox," NAVAL
CNGIN~ERS JOURNAL, Vol 80, No 5, 1968, pp 735-'I50.
8S. Se11r1y~ W.~. "USS B~che," NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL, Vol 80, Nn 4~ 196$~
pp 529-531.
86. SmiCh, A.~. "Iteflogting USS 'Missouri," USNIP, Vol 77, No 2, ~~51,
pp 180-195.
g7. Web~ter, H.O. "Berth 124, Destroyet i'ier One," USNIP, Vol 83, No 5,
1957, PP 489-497.
g8. Winer, A. and Munger, M. "~oam in Salvage," NAVAL ~NGINE~RS JOURIVAI.,
Vol 79, No 3, 1967, pp 465-474.
T'or Chapters I-IV
89. Korotkin, I.M. "Bdyevyye povrezhdeniya ~~advodnykh korabley" (Battle
Uamage to Surface Ships], Leningrad, Sudpromgiz, 1960.
90. Krylov, A.N. "Nekotoryye sluchai avarii i gibeli sudov" [Several Cases
of Accidents and the Loss of Ships], Leningrad-Moscow, Oborongiz, 1939.
91. Morison, S.E. "Bitva za Atlantiku vyigrana" [The Battle of the Atlantic
Won]. Translated from the English, Voyenizdat, 1959.
92. Fuzyrevskiy, K.P. "Povrezhdeniye korabley, bor'ba za zhivuchest' i
spasaCel'nyye raboCy" [Aamage to Ships, Damage Control, and Rescue
Work], Moscow-Leningrad, Voyenmorixdat, 1942.
93. Rosko, T. "Eskadrennyye minonostsy SShA vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne"
(U.S. Destroyers in World War II]. Translated from the English, Moscuw,
Voyenizdat, 1962. `
94. Skryagin, L.N. "Po sledam morskikh katastrof" [On the Track of Sea
Catastrophes], Moscow, Morskoy transport, 1961.
93
FOR OFFICIt+L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100084426-4
i~'Ol~ OFFICIAL USE ONLY
95~ Shv~d~, Y~. Ye. "ACCid~nC Rate in ~'or~~.gn F1e~C~~ 1922-1932,"
MORSKOY S1101tNIK, Nu 9, 1932, pp 137-144,
g6. B~ldwin, H,W. "Spn ~li~he and Shipwrecke," N.Y~, 1956.
97~ Barnaby, K~C. "Some Siiip nisaaters and Their C~uaee," Londnn, 1968.
98. "Comb3ned Cese InatrucCinns~" Washington, 1963,
99. "Coursea in Uam~ge Control end Firefighting," ALL 1~ANUS, No 623, 196A,
pp 52-63,
lOb. ~igher, C. "D~rnage ConCrol: Before, NoC Aftierl" USNIP, Vol 9$, No 4,
1972, pp 44-48.
101. Fulton, W.L. "Leaderahip and Damage Conernl Readinees," NAVAL T~AZNINC
BULLETIN, Spring, 1971, pp 24-29.
102. Hocking, C. "Dictionary o� DisasCerg at Sea During the Age of Ste~m,"
voi i-2, Lon~ion, 1969. -
103. Hoet, N.G. and Clemitson, F.E. "Notes on the Behaviour of H.M. Ships
During Che War," TRANSACTIONS OF THE INS'TITUTE OF MARINE ~NGINEERS,
Vol 60, No 10, 1948, pp 207-216.
104. Howell, W.H. "In Hnrm~s Way: Navy Safety Programs," SEA POWER, Vol 11,
No 2, 1974, pp 29-34. '
105. Young, R. "Navy Damage Control and Firefighting," OUR NAVY, Vol 66,
No 11, 1971, pp 2-6, 55.
106. McCinley, E.S. "Preventing the Preventable Accident," USNIP, Vol 99,
No 6, 1973, pp 56-65.
107. Simon, P.C. "Dnmage Control: Ready or Not," USNIP, Vol 93, No 1,
1967, pp 33-39.
108. Whiteside, H.N. and Mech, F.J. "Marine Sa�eCy," THE INSTITUTE OF
MARINE ENGINEERS, Vol 81, No 12, 1969, pp 405-409.
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Sudostroyeniye", 1977
6367
CSO: 8144/1394 E~
94
FOR OFFICItiL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080026-4