JPRS ID: 8614 TRANSLATION BIOGRAPHY OF GENERAL A.I.ANTONOV BY I.I. GAGLOV

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, . A. I. . _
BY I.I. GAGLOV ,

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' JPRS L/86 ~ 4
10 August 1979
~ Transl~tion `
BIOGRAPHY OF GENERAL A. I. ANTONOV
~y ~
I. I.~ Gaglov
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JPRS L/8614
l0 August ].979
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BIO~RAPHY OF GENERAL A~ I, ANTONOV
Moscow SOVETSKZYE POLI(OVODT5Y I VOYENACHAL'NIKI: GENERAL ANTONOV
~.n Russian~ 1978 signed to pregs l. Jan 78 pp 1-134
[Book by r. I. Gaglov,~Voyenizdat, 50,000 copies, 132 pages~
CONTENTS PAGE
From the Author.�~~~~�.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~��~~~~~.�~~~~� l.
The Beginning of the Great Journey 2
Between The Wars 20
In Charge of the Staffs of FronCa 26
On the General Staff 48
In Days of Peace 91
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PUBLICATION DATA �
English title : BYOGRAPHY OF GEN~RAL A. I. ANTONOV ;
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Rusaian title ; SOVETSKiYE POLKOVODTSY. Y VOYENACHAL'NIKI; ~
GENERAL ANTONOV
Author (s) : I. I. Gaglov .
Editor (s) : A. A. Voynov
Publiahing ilouse : Voyenizdat
/
Place of Publication : Moscow
Date of Publication : 1978
Signed to press : 1 Jan 78
Capies : 50,000
COPYAIGHT : Voyenizdat, 1978 -
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FROM THE AUTHOR J ' `
General of the Army Aleksey Innokent'yevich Antonov belongs to the remark-
able gala~y of Soviet military leaders who were reared by the Communist
Party. General A. I. Antonov's personal file contains ~ervice and party
- references that were written at various times and by various peoples. Md
in each one of them is the phrase: "Wholeheartedly devoted to the Lenin-
ist party's af~airs."
Aleksey Innokent'yevich Antonov travel~d thF path from divisic~n staff work-
er to chief of the General Staff of the Sov.~et Armed Forces. '
General of the Army S. M. Shtemenko, who for many years worked together _
, with A. I. Antonov, writes that Aleksey Innokent'yevich "was one o~c those -
~ supervisors of the General Staff wF~io
gave~unreservedly of himself to the
' job assigned by the psopls and the party and shouldered the burden of re-
sponsibility for solving the most complicated tasks of armed conflict."
+ A. I. Mtonov was in the Armed Forces for more than 40 years, devoting
all his efforts and knowledge to strengthening them and to extolling them. '
~ His path as solder, officer and general is an examgle for emulation by
~ those who now stand guard over the achievenents of October and wfio are
ready to march under the banner of the Soviet Armed Forces. '
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Documen~s of ~he Central Party Archives of the Ins~i~ute of Marxigm-Len- ~
inism under the CPSU Cen~ral Comm3~~~e~ ~he Central S~ate Arohive of the
Sovie~ Army, the Cen~ral Arohive of ~he USSR Mi~nistry of Defense, and th~ ,
~Centiral Museum of ~he USSR Armed ~'orces were used in working on ~his book.
Also used were ~he memoirs of marsh~la of ~he 5ovie~ Union A~M. Vasilevskiy, ~
G. K. zhukov and K. K. Rokossovskiy, General of the Army S. M. Sh~emen- ;
ko and Col Gen L. M. Sandalov. ;
Generals and officers who had worked with A. I. An~onov on the Soutihern
Front, in ~he Black Sea Group of Forces and in the General Staff were of ;
great help to the author. The author expressea deep gratitude to them. !
I
THE BEGINNING OF THE GREAT JOURNEY ~
In the ancient Belorussian city of Grodno ~here is a quiet green street.
It now bears the name A. I. Antonov, but formerly it was called Iyerusa--
limskaya Ulitsa. At the end of the last century it was inhabited by ar-
tisans, officials and officers of the local garrison. The family af offi-
cer of the 26th Artillery Brigade Innokentiy Alekseyevich Antonov lived on
this street in a small Wooden house. M emigrant from Siberia, broad-
shouldered and stocky~ he was a man of strong character. Striving to ob- I
tain a higher education, Innokentiy Alekseyevich independently studied
r.~any disciplines and mastered the German and French languages. His wife- '
Tereza Ksavert'yevna, a Pole by nationality--was well matched with hxm.
Her father had been sent to Siberia to take part in the rebellion of 1863- ~
1864. A woman of great and kind heart, she devoted all her efforts to I
educating her ehildren.
+
~ On 15 September 1896 a son was born in this family and was named in honor
of his grandfather Aleksey, an officer of the Russian Army. He was the
second child. The first--a daughter Lyudmila--had already started to walk
by this time. Thc; brother and sister, who grew up together, bore great
love and respect for each other throughou~ their whole lives. Many years
later Lyudmila Innokent'yevna recalled: "The genuine love and friendship
in the family were not broken once by a sharp word or ~uarrel. There were
neither lies nor hypocrisy. We spoke in Russcian and Polish. Both of them
became mother tongues for us. From an earl~ age we became accustotned
to respecting a person of any nationality, and we learned to love our
motherland."
The father told Aleksey about the history of the city and about military ~
battles. Age did not yet allow him to delve deeply into what he heard, (
but the tenacious childish mind remembered much.
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Aleksey remembered tihroughout his whole life the 5unday walka with his
fatiher abou~ ~he ~own and i~s environs. Often, nearly all the boys of
Iyerusalimskaya Ulitsa ~ook part in ~hem. They learned tha~ Grodno is
one of the mos~ ancien~ cities of Belorussi~. They walked especially
_ of~en to Zamkovaya Hill, to the former palace of the Polish kin~. Many
histiorica~. monumen~s were preserved here. Poin~ing them ou~, Innokentiy
Alekseyevich talked abou~ Russian history. F'or the first ~ime the child-
ren heard abouti tihe many wars that tihe Russian and Belorussian people had
waged against foreign inva~lers.
At any early age Aleksey loarnod much about ~he mili~ary service. H~
liked the strict order of the day that was established at home. He was ~
delighted when his father took him with him to the camp, which was in a
~ foresti not far from Grodno.
His love for his native district and for Russia and for its h:.story grew
with age. His mother often read historical stories aloud. The brother
and sister took a liking to reading. They knew many of the poems of
Pushkin and Lermontov by hear~. Later came an enthusiasm for the ~ales of
Gogol' and tlie works of Nekrasov and Nikitin.
In 1904 Captain Antonov was transferred to service in the city of Ostrog
of Volynskaya Province, to the post of battery commander. And here A1ek-
sey continued to becorne acquainted with cultural and military monuments,
which were no less numerous on the city-fortress's territory than at
Grodno. Here was the well-known Ostrog Greek-Slavonic school. The
Russian pioneer printer Ivan Fedorov lived and worked in Ostrog in the
late 70's and early 80's of the 16th century. Monuments of Ukrainian
architecture of the 15th and 16th centuries were preserved in the town.
Aleksey entered the preparatory school in Ostrog. Tall, somewhat
bashful, and responsive to his comrade's requests, he found many things to
his liking. Aleksey was distinguished also by his knowledge: he read
well and solved problems quickly. He studied diligently and had excellent
marks in almost all disciplines. He liked history, geography and litera-
ture more than the other subjects.
~
Innokentiy Alekseyevich saw that his son and his comrades visited the
si*es of bygone engagements with great eagerness and loved military games
above all others. He began to encourage the interest toward everything
military in every way and imperceptibly but purposefully to prepare Alek-
sey for army service. In the summer, when Captain Antonov rode out into
the field with his battery, he took his son with him. In his free time -
- they were always seen together. The desire to follow his father's path
grew in Aleksey each year.
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Tn 1908 ~he Antonov family was struok by great grief--Innokentiy Alekseye- I
vich died. Aleksey tiook this irreplaceable loss very hard.
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The Antonov family's life had not been easy before. Now it beoame even I
more ~ifficul~. The small pension for the father was not enough. In or-
der to make ends mee~, t}ie mother began to tutor atudenta for examina- !
~ions. The sister and brother took upon themselvea part of the domestic
~asks. ~
New experiences came into this diffioult period of life--World War T li
s~arted. The city of Ostrog became a scene of combat operations. The
population hurriedly abandoned it. And Tereza Ksavert'yevna left with
the children for Petrograd, to go to relatives.
- In the spring of 1915 a new misfortune struck the Antonov's: after a
difficult illness Tereza Ksavert'yevna died. With the death of the
mother, payment of the father's pension was disaontinued. There was
nothing to live on.
It was necessary to decide what to do next. In choosing the correct de-
~ cision~ the father's lessons and the whole lifestyle in Grodno and Ostrog
helped Aleksey to choose the right decision. His father's words were
recalled: "Never give up. Weigh events and the situation thoroughly.
Show will power and it wi11 find accurate reflection in actions and be-
havior connected with overcoming difficulties."
After a few days of ineditation, the decision was adopted: to work and to .
study. Rapid completion of the preparatory school and a solid knowledge
of general-education subjects enabled Aleksey to pass the entxance exami-
nations to Petrograd University. Antonov was enrolled in the physico-
mathematical department. Along with two comrades, Aleksey went to work at
a plant and there mastered the specialty of grader. It was not easy for ,
the young fellow. The plant's owner did not consider the fact that Alek-
sey and his comrades were studying. Workers, taking upon themselves part
of the work of the students, came to their resuce, Here, at the plant, he
knew for the first time the strength of the collective and comradely mu-
tual support.
It turned out that he also helped the workers, especially the women, most .
of whom came to the plant from the nearby village. At their request,
Aleksey wrote letters to the front and read the newspapers.
Here at the plant Aleksey felt the approaching revolutionary events of
1917. Daily intercourse with the workers opened his eyes to a great ex-
tent. He began to think more often about the injustice of the existing
order. It was not by hearsay that Aleksey knew about the workers' diffi-
cult life. He saw how the daily heavy work wore the workers out. But
this did not disturb the plant's owner. Only the profits concerned him.
The middle-aged worker Ivan Sizov, limping on his left foot, who taught
the beginners, told them about the programs of the various parties and
about the Bol'sheviks, the Men'sheviks, the S.R.'s [members of the
Socialist Revolutionary PartyJ and the Cadets. Time would pass and
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Antonov would himself learn ~o examine the sub~le~ies of rev~lutionary
events and ~he demands of ~he varioua par~ies~ but he remembered ~hose -
firs~ lessons for a long ~ime.
' In 1916, a~ ~he heigh~ of the war, Aleksey Antonov was called into the
army and sent to ~he Pavlov Mili~ary School. The aocelerated course of �
training was comple~ed in less than a year. In December ~he newly
{;urned ou~ shore-based warrant offioer was en~ered on the rolls of the
Yeger Guards Regiment.
The young officer sympathized with the soldiers, who among themselves
cursed the war and condemned the polita.cs of the Tsarist autocracy. Tn
1917 Antonov was sent to the front.
For 6 days echelons of the regiment moved westward across Russia. They
detrained not far from Stanislav, wl-,ere ~he regiment became a part of the
8th Army of the Sou~hwestern Front. Here the February bourgeois-demo~
cratic revolution found shore-based warrant officer Antonov.
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The workers and soldiers hoped that after the overthrow of the Tsarist
autocracy, peace would follow, and they would receive land, bread and
freedom. However, the Provisional Government promoted the slogan: "The
war to a victorious.conclusionl" Tl~e bourgeoisie considered that con-
tinuation of the war would permit it to grab full power completely in
the country.
The party of the Bol'sheviks under V. I. Lenin conducted a struggle for
peace, against the war, which even under the new government remained
imperialistic. _
Aleksey Antonov did not understand the whule depth of the events that
were transpiring, but he sympathized completely with the saldiers, who
demanded peace and condemned the predatory war and who supported the Bol'-
shevik's program.
Now at that time the armies of the Southwestern Front had been preparing
for an offensive. The Provisional Government had counted on diverting
the masses of soldiers from the revolution.
The regiment in which Antonov served was stationed some tens of kilome-
ters from the forward position. Once at night it was redeploy~~l to a
portion of the division sector that was engaged in defense. On 18 June
1917 the regiment, along with other units of the army, shifted to the
offensive south of Stanislav, after an artillery preparat'_on. The
enemy did not stand up to the blow and began to retreat. By 27 June the
8th Army had occupied Galich and, on the following day, Kalush. However,
the offensive soon came to a halt. And on 16 .Tuly the German Army struck
a counterblow. In one of the engagements Antonov was wounded in the -
' head by a fragment. He was carried away from the field of battle in the
arms of a soldier of the platoon.
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. In ~he hospitial An~onov Found ou~ abou~ ~he collapse of ~he~ offensive~
and more news was aw~i~ing him. He was awarded an order for bravery
displayed in ba~tle. But ~he greates~ award for him w~re the soldiexs'
letters with wishes for his quiekest possible reoovery.
The wound made its presence fel~ for a long time. As demanded by the !
doc~ors, shore-based warrant ~fficer Antonov was evacuated ~o one of the ~
Petrograd hospitals. After his recovery ~hey transferred him to ~he Yeger i
Guards Reserve Regiment. I-
The war hastened the approach of the socialist revolution. In all of May j
and especially in June 1917, strikes occurred continually throughout the !
whole country, with demands for an 8-hour workday and improvement in the
_ workers' living conditions. Abou~ 5A0,000 people partieipated in a mass I
_ demonstration that was held in Petrograd on 18 June. The overwhelming
- majority of the demonstrators walked under the slogan, "All power to the '
Sovietsl" The revolutionary situation built up in the villages. In the -
army,cases of refusal to fight occurred. A worried mood reigned also ~
among the soldiers of the Yeger Guards Reserve Regiment. Aleksey Antonov,
who had taken closely to heart the expectations and concerns of the people, ,
drew increasingly closer to the soldiers. At elections for assistant ad- !
jutant, several candidates were named but an absolute majority of the j
soldiers voted for Antonov. He justified this trust. At the call of the I
Bol'sheviks, Antonov took ~n active part in neutralizing the Kornilov
Mutiny. ;
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Petrograd's workers found out about this mutiny on the evening of 27
August. They replied to the open act of counterrevolution with a powerful ,
revolutionary upsurge. At plants and factories, in the soldiers' bar- ;
racks and on naval ships, a wave of crowded meetings and gatherings surged, i
their participants expressing their readiness to do battle for the defense !
of the revolution. '
A meeting was also held in the reserve regiment. It was a stormy one. ,
Representatives of many parties spoke. But the speeches of the Bol'she- ~
vik orators produced the greatest impression on Aleksey Antonov. They
explained that Kornilov had risen in revolt not against the Provisional ~
Government, as the S.R.'s and Men'sheviks had tried ~o present the matter,
and that this government was a participant in the Kornilov Mutiny. And
the soldiers responded to the call of the Bol'shevks to come out in de- I
fense of the revolution. The meeting adopted a resolution that stated
that the regiment "awaits the call to action to preserve the revolution
from the assault on it~from the treasonous side.~~*
New detachments of Red Guards were being formed at industrial enterprises. '
At the call of the Bol'shevik Party and the Soviets, military units of the
capital garrison began to prepare for combat operations against the Korni- _
- lov forces. Soldiers'coromittees directed this work. In accordance with
*"Okt,yati.ir'skoye vooruzhennoye vosstaniye" [The October Armed Insurrection].
Book 2,Leningrad, 1967, p 150.
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the commii:tee's ir~stru~tions, Aleksey Antonov, togei;her with other com-
rades~ managed ~o obtain weapons and fnrmed oomposite detaohments and
squads for dispatch to positions. Despite ~he faot that there were ele-
ments of a pro-Kornilov mood on the staff of the Petrograd Military Dis-
tric~, t;he Kornilov proponents were compelled to meet t;he troops halF way.
~ During the day, on 28 August, a sentry patrol was posted ttt Pctirograd,
Krasnoye Selo and Ts~rskoye Selo. The city was surrounded by three lines
of wire entanglements. Compositc de~achments, companies and part;ies of oL
the Volynskaya, Yeger, Grenadier, Moscow, Izmaylov and other rcgiments
toolt up positions. Aleksey Antonov was in a composite detachment ~:hat oc~
- cupied a position no{; far from Pulkovo Heigh~s. Along wi~:h the soldiers,
he was r.eady for combat: trenches were dug and barriers were built.
The ~ttempt to smo~her ~he revolution collapsed. A Korni'lov speech was
overwhelmed by workers, soldiers and sailors, led by the Bol.'shevik party.
Units of the Petrograd garrison that were true to the revolution returned
to their barracks. In all, several days passed before the shore-based ~
warrant officer left them. But what days they were!
F.ach day meetings and conferences were held. Antonov recalls especially
the meeting of officer personnel at which Commissar of the Military-Revo-
lutionary Committee I. Ye. Zaytsev spoke. Aleksey, who was not far from
the improvised stand, devoured each word. Zaytsev spoke about what agi-
ta~ed everyone in the regiment: about the crushing defeat of the Kornilov
Mutiny and about the new interrelationships of class forces. The slogan,
' "All power to the Soviets!" again was the order of the day. But now it
signified armed insurrection ag~inst the bourgeois goveriunent and it was
for the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat. The resolu-
tion adopted at the meeting indicated that the "present moment is the -
next stage of the revolution and has to be gone through," and that "Lhe
officers will go tt:ruugh it along with the regiment."*
A. I. Antonov adopted the Great October Socialist Revolui:ion with his
whole heart. He left the regiment before its breakup. On 1 Ma,y 1918
Antonov was transferred to the reserve and entered the Petrograii Forestry
Institut;e. He successfully combined study with work on the Petrograd
Foodstuff's Committee. ~However, he was not in the reserve for long. The ~
young Republic of the Soviets was going through trying days. Foreign in-
terventionists and domestic counterrevolutionaries had unleashed the
Civil War in the country. They had one purpose--to eliminate Soviet pow-
ei� and to plant the landlords and capitalists on the workers' necks again.
The Communist Party, led by V. I. Lenin, organized an armed rebuff agains~c
the enemies. Everywhere Red Army regiments and divisions were formed.
During these troubled days, when the fate of the revolution that the Great
, October had won was being decided, Aleksey could not sit peacefully on the
Ibid, p 301.
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Foods~uffs Committee. He began s~rvice in the ranks o~ the Ited Army. A. I.
Antonov called i~ a first school i.n practic~l ,life, a higher military
' academy. "There my preparation to be a staff officer and a military _
leader began," he said.
Mtionov received his baptism of fire in tihe fall of 1918, a~ Lugansk, in
the ist Moscow Workers' Division. This division's regimentis had been
formed from factory workers in Moscow's Zamoskvoxetskiy Rayon in October-
November 1918. And already in December they had gone into battle in the
Voronezh area of the Southern Front. In a short time the division went
hundreds of kilometers in combat.
In the post of assistant chief of staff of the 3d Brigade~ A. Mtonov
proved himself a capable speciala.st who knew military affaira well and
a modes~ and responsive comrade. Many p~:o~le t~~xned to him for assis-
tance, and h~~ willingly ex~ended it. Mtonov well understood tha~ the
Red Army was ra~iically different from the old Tsarist army. One idea, one
great purpose-=to serve the people and to defend its interests with wea-
pons in hand--iinked the commanders and Red Army members. At Lugansk he
saw with what courage and self-sacrifice the dommunists fought the enemy. _
The division tteld sections up to 20-30 kilometers--from the shore of
Severskiy Donets to the height of Ostraya Mogila, right where a
White Guard column and infantry attacked most furiously.
Q heated battle flared up at one of these heights in April 1919. The
135th Regiment, which had been formed from Moscow workers~ defended i~.
The Whites began the attack when a party m~eting was being held in the
regiment. Division Commissar G. Zveynek was reporting on the decisions
of the 8th RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party [Bol'shevikJ). The communists
went directly into ccmbat from the party meeting. Zveynek was in the
first ranks. He cold-bloodedly directed fire against the oncot~ing White
Guards. He shot one with a rifle and b~yoneted another. The soldiers
took the commissar as an example and fought to the last ditch. �
At another height, the 128th Red Banner Regiment held its position until
there was but one communist left in each company. The regiment broke out
from the encirclement and went to the disposal of the divisian. Ahead
walked the wounded regimental commissar, M. Volkov.
When the division went into battle there were 500 communists ~n its ranks.
After the battle 50 remained. The rest died the death of the brave. And
among them were 20 commissars of small units. Despite the heavy losses,
the division continued to wage combat. In those days, A. Antonov wrote:
"The battles were bitter...the regiments withstood 5-6 attacks each of
. superior enemy forces....Red Army men, inspired by the commissars and
communists, did not leave the field of battle, even when wounded."
In this extraordinarily~difficult situation.Antonov also showed courage.
With a group of Red Army men who found themselves not far from the divi-
sion staff, he came in time to the aid of the ist Battalion of the 135th
Regiment.
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On 21 Apri1 alarm gir~ng were gounded dt Lug~n~k. H'hitc ~uard unitia h~d
~ppro~ched the city. The i~t ~1og~oww'orkei~s' oivi~ion~ su~'fcring gre~ti lagges,
barely withatoad the en~my'~ onglaught. On the orders of th~ division com-
misgar~ A. Antenov went to the ~ity's milit~ry-r~volutiinnary commi~t~e for _
asaigtiunc~. in g few hours the divisidn had be~n augmented by 300 men.
' Und~r tihe l~adership of A~ Mtionov th~y underw~nti a bri~f course of train- -
ing and w~nt into b~titlc. Many of tihem showCd high cnurag~ and bravcry~
platoon command~r G. Orlov ~nnihilated i3 Vr'hit~ Gu~rds, but h~ hingelf
perished in b~ttle. Communf~t machine-gunn~r P. Puz~ndv w~g credit~d
with tiens of enemy cevalrym~n.
_ Having pxh~usted the Whitie Guards units in d~fense battles, Lugansk's de-
fendere on 29 April went over to the offensive. T~.~ igt Moscow Workers'
Uivigian undertook mutual actiong with th~ isti Lugan~k ~york~rg' itegiment
~nd the i~th Inz~ ttif'lc biviKidn in thc brCa of the Ostr~ya Mogila height.
gy th~ ~nd of the day thig height had been txken by starm.
The engagement for Lugansk continued until 27 May~ On this d~y De�ikin'g
men~ After gathering greati foreeg~ took the city. Nolding the enemy in
cherk~ regiments af the ist Moseow workcrs' Uivision went off in the di-
rection o~ the large Cossack village of Liski� In Junc c+ d~cisicn was
- adoptCd to abgorb the remnind~r nf the division into thc i5th inaa ~tiil~
Divigion~ which had been fnrm~d in 1918 from various Red Army unit-s and
partisan detachments. Ir. 5eptember and October 1918 this division
participated as a part of the ist Army~ which y. N. Tukhachevskiy conand-
ded, in the offense at 5imbirsk, Syzran' and 5xmara. In batties at the
- approaChe~ to 5yaran' the 2d "Volunteer" Division of the Whites and three
separute h'hite Guacds infantry regiments were routed. On 3 october 1918
Chasti of ist Ara?y units entered the city. Continuing the offensive as a
part of this army, the Inza division liberated Saratov and, after a slight
- rest, joined the battle for Buguruslan, Buzuluk and Kazan'. At the start
of 1919 it was transferred from the Eastern Front to the Southern Front.
Here it distinguished itself in the January offensive~ where it inflicted
the main blow on the enemy southwest of Novokhopersk.
~special2y stubborn battles developed in the area of Abramovka. White
Guerds, after conceTMtrating large forces~ resisted desperatc;ly. Several
times Lhe enemy went over to the counterattack. 5aldiers of the 2d
Battalion of the Orel Regiment displayed high courage. Inspired by regi-
mental commissar M. Khatskevich and singing the "Internatior,ale~" they
rushed to the attack and repulsed the White Guards.
Being acquainted with the division's history, Aleksey Mtonov h as in-
creasingly permeated with a respect for its past, and he admired its pres-
ent history. 5plendid commanders and political workers served in it. Md
Mtonov strove to be a worthy successor to the combat traditions of the
brigade and the division.
Despite the heroic actions of the Red Ar,ny units, the Denikins continued
to attack. On their side was numerical superiority, and they were better
supplied. The RKP(b) Central Committee Plenum that convened 3-4 July
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1919 wdrked out m~~gureg for ~rganixing a r~buff ~o D~nikin'g goldi~r~. _
The C~r?tr~1 Commit~~e spp~~led to partiy organizatiion~ and to tih~ whola
country witih ~he letitier, "~veryon~ tio the Stiruggle wfth Uenikin~" which
w~a gigned by V. I. Lenin.
Nundredg of ~hougandg of workera, peasantia ~nd representiatiiveg of the
' laboring intelli~entiaia reaponded tio ~his Communis~ Partiy appeal. 8egin-
- ning in July an augmentiation began to arrive ~ti tihe fronti~ among whom were
many communiatia. The n~w augmentatiion reinforced tihe In~a Division~ in-
cluding tihe 3d grignd~. Aleksey Antionov w~g charged witih familiarixing
himaelf witih the arrivalg' militiary training. iti ~urned out to be low.
In a short time training exercises were organized in tihe study of weapons
nnd combat tiraining. It was supervised by M~onov. But this did noti re-
lease him from ataff work.
~articipating along with tih~ division in nwnerous engag~ments~ A. Antionov
persistiently studied military affairs and expanded his political horizon.
He learn~d ~he skill of examining and evaluating the phenomena of social
life from the class standpointi and of drawing correcti practical conclu-
sions on his own.
A. Mtonav knew how to see everything that was new that the Civil War had
introduced into tactics. Unlike the first world war, with its positional
form of battle, the battiles of the Civil War were of a maneuvering nature. '
Divisions, r~egiments and even platoons often acted independently. This
brought out in commanders and staff workers a feeling of great regponsi-
bilxty and the capability not to let oneself be lost during confliet with
any enemy.
In the battles ~gainst Denikin, A. Antonov acquired his first experience
in the processing of staff papers. Among the numerous staff documents of
the 3d Brigade of.the 15th Inza Rifle Division for January and Februsry 1920
were several dispatches about military actions, information about the nu-
merical composition of the brigade, and a scheme for defense. They were
all worked out and signed k~;~ A. Mtonov, who was temporarily filling the :
post of chief of staff of the 3d Brigade.* ~
The Re~ Army became for A. Antonov, as it did also for many others like
him, a good political school, and it pointed out the only correct path in
life--to be always and in everything with the Communist Party. At one of
the meetings~ after having diseussed the problems of an impending offen-
sive, the new division commissar~ Mikhail Petrovich Yanyshev, became ac-
quainted with A. Antonov. This occurred in the fall of 1919, not far from
the Levaya Rossosh' settlement, which billeted the staff of the 3d Brigade. ~
M argumentative talk of Mtonov's was to Yanyshev's liking. After the
meeting he approached him and proposed that they have a talk.
*Central State Archives of the Soviet Army (hereinafter TsGA5A), archive
1250, list 1, document 289, sheet 400.
10
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' They g~ti ati a tiable on which lay a map wftih tihe si~uatiion plo~ti~d. Anto-
nnv b~gan to giv~ a briefing. He dfd tihfg in d~ti~i]. and w3tih competi~nee.
"Wh~re dfd you learn mil~.ti~ry affaira?~~
- "i compl~ted the Pavlov aehool, tihen tihe Soutihwestern ~ron~~ and the June
b~ttile~ of 1917. Righti ndw I am le~rning ~ti tihe Civi1 War fronta."
The converg~tiion lagtied more tihan an hour. Yar~yahev liked very muoh ~he
young gtiaff worker's reasoning abouti tihe natiure of combat and L�he new t~c-
tiicg. They algo spoke ~baut politiieal tiopiea.
The Red Arrt~y division loved its commissar. They loved him for his cryatal
clear h~arti and wholehearti~d devotion to the affaira of the revolutiioa. ~
They kn~w that Y~ny~hev had been occupi~d with revolutionary actiivity since
his youtihful ye~rs in Vladimirskaya Provinc~, in ivanovo-Voxnesensk. He
spenti 10 years in politiical exile. The American journaliat Albert Rice
Williams, in the article, "Ten Months with Lenin," tind in the book,
"Through the Etussian ttevolution~" wrotie witih great warmth about the Rus-
sian comrade who was his fellow traveler in the long ~journey from New
Yark ~o revolutionary Petrograd ~nd on many tirips abou~ kussia'~ centir~l
regians. Ne was M. Yanyshev. in October days he Fought at Moscow's bar-
ricades. After tihe victory of the proletarian revolutiion he worked ae-
tively in party and soviet organs. In th~ apring of 1919 a detachmenti of
Moscow cownunists under Yanyshev defended Petrograd from Yudenich's hnrdes.
Aleksey was grateful tihat fatie had brought him together with this eommu- ~
nist. ,After the firsti meeting there was a second~ and a third. And each
of them brought enormous benefit and expanded his political horizon. On
the recommendation of Yanishev he began to read the works of V. I. Lenin.
Mtonov was especially grateful to the division ~ommissar for support of
his idea: to conduct an analysis of combat operations within brigade
gtaffs.
bt. Yanyshev spent 7 months in the division. Mtonov was imbued with great
respect for. him. He considered him his ideological mentor and instructor~
and he also learned courage from him.
...This was in January 1920. The Inza Division had gone to the northern
regions of Donskaya Oblast. Here, close to the large Cossack village of
Rodionov-Nesvita~yskaya, the division collided with Mamontov's cavalry
corps. This was an encounter whose bitterness exceeded nearly all the
battles in which he had participated until then.
A noisy avalanche, whooping and howling and waving blades, the enen~y caval-
ry bore down upon the regiment's positions. At full tilt~ Mamontov's men
forced their way into the Red Army ranks. Mtonov saw that Yanyshev was
to be found where it was most difficult of all, where the encmy w$s attack-
ing especially doggedly. It was difficult for the Mtsa Regiment--he was
there, it was hard for the Orel Regiment--he was with them. It was not
li
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for notihing tih~t his soldierg nicknam~d him tihe ubiquitou~ commissar. Nia ;
fc~rle~sne~s ~nd eourage inspired and che~r~d ~he waverers on. ~
i
Mtionov ~1so remembered many otil~~r battiles in which Yany~hev's p~raonal ~
exampl~ inspired R~d Atjmy m~r~: tih~ ang$~~~~n~ a~ Rostiov-n~-Donu,, ~h~ ~
Kuban' campaign~ tihe assault on Novorosaiysk. On Z5 June 1920 oownunist
Yanyahev periahed in tihe succesaion of ranks of attaoking Red Army men '
during th~ assault on tihe heighti at the Gokhgeym communitiy. A~ tihe in- ~
atruotiona of V. I. Ler?in~ M. P. Yar~yshev was buried in Moscow, 3n a eom-
munal grave ati the Kreml3n w~ll.
The battilea thati the 15th Inza Rifle Divigion had tio wage ati the ~nd of ~
1919 and the stiarti of 1920 in.~licatied tihati its regiments, like those of the '
whole Red Army, had vanquished the enecqy not only by itis bravery and ~
boundless devotiion to tihe revolution but also tiha.nks to the growing skill ~
of
Red Army roen and their commandern. During th~ years of tihe Civil War ;
they had learned noti only to defend themselves firmly buti also to attack ;
skillfully~ tio use maneuver~ and noti tio become fluetered during temporary �
setbacks. And Aleksey Antonov raised his oombat skill end staff sophisti- ;
cation. He frequently substiitu~ed for the brigade ehief of ataff and
coped well with tihe responsibilities.
~
In battles in the Donbasa [Donets Coal Basin] and then at the approaches J
to Rostov~ Antonov continued to master the skills of organizing the con- ~
trol of brigade units.
During the period of the offensive at Rostov, Bataysk, Azov and Novoros- ~
siysk, much atitiention had to be paid to organizing mutual actions, i
particularly with cavalry. At the Don and Kuban', the ist Cavalry Ara~y ~
operated successfully with rifle divisions. On 2? March 1920 Novorossiysk ~
was taken by the jaint efforts of combined units of the 9th Anqy~ which ~
the Inza Division had also joined. Soon the White Guards were expelled
from the whole North Caucasus. But this did not bring the desired peace. '
The Ententie and the Russian counterrevalutiion had not been checked. New 4
threatening clouds were approaching From the direction of the Crimea. ~
!
The 15th Inza Rifle Division went to the Kakhovka area in June 1920 and
entered battle straight from the march. Exhausted by a month's march
under the scorching June southern sun, the division took to its he~ls
under the incredibly difficult conditions. Wrangel's troops attacked it i
from all sides. A. Mtonov by tihis time was now chief of staff of the ~
45th Brigade. He did much to organize a counterattack that ware out the ~
enemy. ~
i
Augmented by new divisions, the Red Army at the start of August moved over f
to the offensive. It pushed across the Dnepr and took the Kakhovka bridge- '
head, after winning a major role in the rout of Wrangel's troops. The ~
Kakhovka bridgehead was a fortified portion of flat steppe adjacent to the ~
left bank of the Dnepr. Red Army positions covered the ford across the ~
Dnepr and made it possible to break through to the Whites' rear toward the
,
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Crim~r~'~ igthmu~~s. mh~ K~khovk~ bridgehead worri~d Wrang~l oonsid~r~bly
and hn ra~ea~edly tri~d tio elimina~e i~.
On~ nf thege at~empts was undertaken in the middle of October 1920.
Wrangcl tihr~w intio ~he battil~ up tio 7~000 bayonets and sabers, 68 ~ung
and 200 m~chin~guns. Tw~lve tanka, 18 armored cars and 15 airQrafti ~up-
portied tih~ infan~ry and cavalry.* The 51ati itifle Division and part of ~h~
forces oF tihn 16tih Inza ~if1e Diviaion d~fended tihe Kakhovka bridgehead.
SVrangel's offensive Etarted early on ~he morning of 14 Oc~ober. Advancing
in ~h~ fron~ wer~ ~anks and armored aara, a~id af~er them came ranks oF
enemy infan~ry. According ~o the en~my's oalcula~ions, tne tiankt; should
have oaused panic among the Red Ara~y men. 8ut this did not happen. Let-
ting the tanks and armored cars pass, th~ soldiera out thc infantry off
from tihem and tihen, with ~rtiillery fire and grenadea~ they puti the
armored vehieles out of action.
Having routed the enemy in defensive bat~les~ tihe defenders of tihe Kakhov-
ka bridgehead tiransferred tio a decisive offense and inflictied ser~ious
lnsses on General Vitkovskiy's units. Ten tianks, 5 armored oars~ 70 ma-
chineguns and much mili~ary equipment were captured in these bat~les.
Simultaneously bitter battl~s were being fought on the Dnepr. Here Wran-
gel's men also undertiook an offensive, but they lost three cavalry divi-
sions in so doing.
The battles at the Kakhovka bridgehead and beyond the Dnepr in which the
Inza division participated were a good school for Antonov. Ne beeame
better acquaintied with the nature of combat and its forms and once again
was convinced of how important it is not to lose one's self-possession,
even in the most critical minutes, and to weigh the situation soberly
in or~ier to make the only correct deaision. Later, within the walls of
the military aeademy, Antonov made the following notation in one of his
notebooks: "Never lose your self-control and always be military, with a
manly spirit and a careful mind."
As a result of the battles of the fall of 1920, Wrangel's main forees in
5evernaya Tavriya suffered defeat. It was necessary to deal the final
blow to the White Guard troops in the Crimea and to complete the elimina-
tion of the counterrevolution in the south of Russia. However, it was
difficult to conquer the Crimea: using the peculiarities of the geograph-
ical position of the Crimean Peninsula, th~ enemy created powerful defense
structures at the Perekop and Chongarsk isthumuses.
~'The Army of the Southern Front," wrote ~t. V. Frunze in his memoirs,
"having carried out with success the primary mission assigned to it--the
defea't of the enemy's forces surviving to the north of the isthmuses, by
the evening of 3 November was right by the shores of the Sivash, begin-
ning at Genicheski and ending at the Khorla region.
*See "Istariya grazhdanskoy voyny v SSSR" [History of the Civil War in the
USSR], i/ol 5, Moscow, 1960, p 197.
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~'h'CVC~righ work tio pr~p~r~ ~o oxo~s tihe ChongArsk and Perekop iathmuseg
~nd tio conqu~r tih~ Crimea comm~nced."*
On tih~ instiructi3.ons of ~he commander oF tihe Soutihern Fron~~ M. V. Frunze,
by th~ ~v~ning of 2 November r~gimentis of ~h~ i5~h In~~ Rifle Division
had arrived a~ ~he ahore of ~he S3vash. On the evening of e November~ a~
~he invitiatiion of tihe chief of tih~ division, the oldeat peasan~s of the
village me~ a~ tihe division headquar~ers~ whioh was looatied in Stiroganov-
ka. The command had de~ided tio consult wi~h ~hem on how b~sti ~o ~ake
~h~ division acrosa tihe Sivash. A. Antionov took parti in tihe meeting. He
wrotie and no~~d on the map where i~ rtas easies~ of a11 tio cross ~ver the
Sivash. He, like tihe chief of staff of the 45th Brigade, had to know all
the fords: tihe brigade was tio be in the division's lead column. He was
' glad when peasanti I. I. Olenchuk, who knew ~he Sivash well~ volunteered to
go along witih ~he sappers, place the apar buoys and tihen accompany the
column. '
The fording was b~gun the night of 8 November. It was eold. A dense fog
from the sea covered the whole place. A northweat wind was driving ~he
Sivash's watiers into the Sea of Azov. This faeilitated the crossing--the
bottom of' the gulf was uncovered. The 15th Rifle nivision, which at this
time had 10~200 infantrymen and 500 eavalrymen, 120 machineguns and 24
light guns,# made use of these favorable circwnstancPs. Ahead went the
boldest and most experienced soldiers--communists and Komsomol members,
and the best riflemenr machinegunners and scouts. The guide for the as-
saul~ group was peasant I. Olenchuk.
The former commissar of the 130th Rifle Regiment, A. Shkol'nik recalled:
"We managed to get half way across the Sivash, when tihe water began ~o
slow down the crossing, not only of the artillery but also of the maehine-
guns. It became difficult even for people to move. It was especially
difficult for our regiment. A chast of machine guns wound up in the
water, and without them the regiment could not wage battle. The situation
became critical~ My minute the enemy could assemble his forces and throw
us back into the Sivash. At this moment I and the commander of the regi-
ment assembled the machinegun team and proposed thai, ~hey drag the machine-
guns out. Undressing to stark nakedness at a temperature of +5 degrees,
the Red army men plunged into the water and dragged 36 machineguns out on
their shoulders. They quickly cleaned the mud from them and brought them
into combat positiion. Now we met the enemy fully armed."
At 0200 hours a chast of the lead 45th Brigade, after a short-lived en-
gagement, occupied the first line of an entrenched position on the Litovsk
Peninsula. A shoek colwan of the 133d Rifle Regiment, which was part of
~ the 45th Brigade, went across the Sivash under destruetive machinegun and
small-arms cross-fire from the enemy, after having broken thrnugh three
rows of wire entanglements. After it the whole regiment, which went into
*Frunze, M. V. "Izobrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Moscow, 1965,
100.
#~ee "50 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR [50 Years of the USSR Armed Forces]~
Moscow, 1968, p 146.
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b~~~1e ~g~in~~ ~he 2d Kuban' Br3g~d~ of the Whiti~ Guardg, en~nr~d tihc~ gap.
A~ daybreak of 8 November tih~ regimen~ oooupied ~he who~e peninsula ~nd
provid~d ~ brfdgehead for ~h~ deploymenti of our m~3n foro~s. AF~er m~kinR
tihe firat bre~ch in ~he enert~y's fortiifioation, the re~imenti wa~ able tio
inflioti wi~h i~s m~in foroea a fl~nking blow in ~he direo~ion of ~he ~own
of Arrnyansk. The regimen~ oaptiured 724 prisonera of war~ i tank~ two
6-inch naval guns on a platiform and s~veral oarloada oF mili~ary proper-
tiy.* The enen~y ~hr~w a ehas~ of tihe 2d Army Corps ai.d a brigade of ~he
Urozdov D3.vision fn1;o a countieratitiaok. The bi~tier enemy ~~~aok was re-
p~11ed. Soon 8arbovich's cavnlry corps arrived on tihe ba~~~efield; in a
hurried procedure, i~ had be~n tiransported from Dzhankoy. I~ fell upon
- tihe ix7~h blstia it~gim~r?~ of the 15~h Division wfth all itis forces.
The foraea were too uneaual. But the Red Army men repelled a11 the ati-
~ack~ of ~he Whi~es and made for an overall sucoess. ~or tihis fea~ ~he
127tih R~~imen~ was awarded ~he Order of tihe Red Banner.#
M. V. ~runze found ou~ abou~ ~he crosaing of ~he Sivash and tihe joining of
bati~le from disp~tches tliati were in ~he headquar~ers of tihe 6th Army. He
- ask~d Arrqy Commander K. A. Avksenti'yevskiy ~o remain in Chaplinka, while
he himself wen~ tio tihe shore of ~he Sivash, ~o the division headquarters.
...The vehicle stopped near a small wooden house. In tihe crowded peasanti
house there was an unimaginable din~ tihe telephone operator shouted~ staff
chiefs were shou~ing, and everyone was demanding people, carts and
cartridgea.
On seeing the fronti commander, many froze on the spot. Conversations
ceased. ~
"Keep on working, just do not shout so loudly," said Mikhail Vasil'yevich.
Chief of staff of the 15th Division, P. G. Yarchevskiy, reported the situ-
ation to the front commander. In conclusion, he said:
"btatters have gone rapidly the whole day. The Sivash was forded almost
without loss."
~ ~~Who was on shore when the division crossed the Sivash?" asked Frunze.
~'The chief of staff of the 45th Brigad~, Antonov, has just now returned
from the Sivash." ~
A tall, well-proportioned young man with intelligent large black eyes
stood before the commander. M. V. Frunze listened attentively to his re-
port, which was laconic but of utmosti clarity, about the erossing of the
Sivash, about the needs of the brigade that had gone into battle, and
about haw Red Army grenades and bayonets had beaten off the counterattacks
of the Drozdov soldiers and, with light small-arms fire, had put armored
*TsGASA, arc ive 1250, list i, docu~ent 536, sheet 26.
#See "50 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR," p 146.
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c~r~ ~n fl3ght ~nd did no~ ~11ow them~~lv~s ~o b~ ~hrown in~o ~h~ 5iv~gh
or b~ ~h~ ruinatiion o� ~he ~d,jao~nti division. +
~~itigh~ now the si~uati3on ia very diffioulti-~~he oartiridges ~re gon~ and
tih~re is no w~~~r~'~ ~nded A. An~onov. '
"Comrade Yarchevskiy, do you have oommunioa~ion wi~h ~he ?~h Cavalry Di- ;
vision?~~ ~he fron~ ooromander asked. ~
~
"We do." ~
;
~~Tet1 ~he division chief to eome quickly to me.~~ ~
~
Stroganovka did no~ sleep ~hat n3ght. On ~he streets people in poin~ed ;
helmets loomed indis~inotly and torohes blazed. The div3sions tiha~ fought ~
for the Sivash were being reinforeed. This night and the next 2 dqys
Aleksey An~onov observed how wisely and energetiieally M. V. Frunze di- ~
rectied the tiroops and ~ook a number of urgen~ measures that would enable i
the sitiuation to be saved. Mikhail Vasil'yevioh oalled the eommander of ~
~he 6th Army, K. A. Avksent'yevskiy:
"The ~ivash is running. ~o~h divisions on ~ha~ side are cut off~ withou~ ;
ammunition and threatened by the enemy's next counterattack....I confirm i
the order of the 51st Division about a night assault on ~he Perekop ram- I
part. In case of ~he slighest del~}r in carrying out the order, I will not ;
dare to ask for meroy ~or you before the tribunal...." '
He ordered ~he 15th Division chief of staff, who was atanding: ~
"Rouse Stroganovka, Vladimirovka, Ivanovka and Grigor'yevka. Everyone
~ake spades, straw and reeds--to the Sivash." '
The battle was nc?t only against Wrangel's troops but also against the
water. The Red Army men and local residents ahowed mass heroism. For
2 days Antonov did not close his eyes. He did everything to support the
brigade's combat capabili~ies.
For several more days the stubborn battle wi~h Wrangel's tiroops continued.
But the fate of it had been decided beforehand. On 16 November the Cri-
mea became free. On this day V. I. Lenin received a telegram: "Today our
cavalry occupied Kerch'. The Southern Front has been eliminated. Front
Commander Frunze."*
"You know, of course," said V. I. Lenin, "what extraordinary heroism the
Red Anay displ~yed, hr~ving overcome obstacles and fortifications that even
military specialists and authorities had considered impregnable. One of
the most brilliant pages in the history of the Red Ara~y is that eomplete,
decisive and remarkably rapid victory that was won over Wrangel."#
*Frunze, M. V., "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya," Vol i, Moscow 1957, p 425.
#Lenin, V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol. 42,
pp 129-130.
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In~~rvontiion ~nd the Civi1 W~r in ~us~i~ had cnded. The peoplc~ had sav~d
~ ~h~ir 5ovie~ power and ~h~ independenoe of the sooialisl; moth~rland, Mne~-
ings were held ~hroughou~ ~h~ whole ooun~ry. The 15~h Znza ttifle Division
~ reo~ived ~he honorary ti~le, "Sivashskqya," and was awarded ~ha Order of
~he tted Banner.
"Hgroes of ~he Sivasht" the order of ~he Revolutionary Mili~ar~y Couneil of
~ ~he ~epublio said. "The 15th I2ifle Division on ~he night of 8 November
1920 orossed the Sivash in ba~~le and~ in ~he faae of desperate opposition,
condue~ed an offonsive on ~he Litovak Peninsula. Under enemy drumfire, -
~he division's units had by evening occupied the ~nemy's en~renchments on
: the nor~hern ex~remity of Lake Krasnoye, having cap~ured 4 Bri~ish weapons
and o~her ~rophies. On tihe morning of 10 November chasti of the 15th Di-
vision broke ~hrough ~he line of ~he enemy's en~renchmen~s northwest of
Lake Krasnoye, where ~wo cav~lry regimen~a ~f General Barbovich'~ eorps
a�ere surrounded and taken.
~ "Glory to the Red soldiers, to ~he valorous liberators of the Crimea's
workers.
"Depu~y Chairman of the ~tevolutionary Military Council of the Republic
5klyanskiy.~'
~ Many participants of the assault of the Sivash and Perekop were awarded
orders and the Honored Weapon. Aleksey Innoken~'yevich Antonov was also
� awarded the Honored Weapon of the Revolutionary Military Council of the
Republic. In 1923 he was presented an Honnrary Certificate. "This Hon-
orary Certificate,~' it says, "has been issued to Antonov because his ac-
tive participation in the final combat operations on the Sivash, which
ended in the full rout of the White Guard army of General Wrangel, helped
to consolidate the achievements o� the Great Proletarian October and to
provide for the calm and peaceful development of the Soviet Worker-Peasant
Republic."
� Few knew about these awards. Journalists who met with A. I. Antonov said
that it took them great effort to find out from him about participation in
the assault on the Sivash. Aleksey Innokent'yevich usually answered their
persistent requests with:
"I did not p~rform sgecial feats. I did not rouse the soldiers to the at-
tack. I carried out the responsibility of a staff worker. I waged war,
like everyone did."
, During the years of the Civil War, Aleksey Antonov had met many commanders,
commissars and staff workers. And from each he took everything that was
, positive and useful. The meetings with M. P. Yanyshev and M. V. Frunze
especially helped him greatly. Several times Antonov saw the eommander of
the Southern Front. Twice he spoke with him and gave information. He re-
' membered those meetings throughout his whole life. ,
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Af~er tihe oonolusion af ~he ba~~les, An~onov under~ook ~o ar~~lyze tihe _
45th grigade's ao~ions in aooordanoe with ~he fresh evidenoe~ H~ wro~e ~
brief description of his h~adqu~r~ers during the period of combat ~ntiiv-
itiy. The regimen~s also H~ro~o ~heir~ his~~ries. Mee~ings and mili~ary-
theory r,onferences were held at whioh ~h~ brigade's oombat pa~h was in~er~
pr~ted ~nd individual operations were examined.
The years 1921-1929 went into the history of ~he Soviet Armed Foroes as
years when they haci oonverted to a paaoeful situation and were reorganized
as applicabla ~o the e,oonomio and poli~ical situation of ~he Soviet ~oun-
try. V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party se~ forth a great program of
reconstruction work in whioh ~he Red Army also took part. In 1920-1921
the army's large units ~hat did not partioipate directly in eombat opera-~
tions were transferred to a labor status oompletely or par~ially. The
~asks of ~he labor armies were ~o increasa ~he ou~put of fuel and raw ma- ~
terials, to restore clestroyed faotories and plan~s and to do agrioultural
work. The 15th Sivashskaya Rifle Division, in whioh A. Antonov had served
as brigade chief of staff, also was converted to a labor status. Yn the
spring of 1921 he and the personnel of the diviaion partioipated in
conduct of the sowing eampaign. Thousands of heotares of fertile Ukrain-
ian land were then being sown.
Simultaneously the 15th Division waged a struggle with banditry. Rem-
nants of the Makhno band, whi.ch Red Army detachments had pursued through-
out the Ukraine, were scattered.
The coun~ry oF the Soviets, destroyed and depleted by war, could not allow
itself to maintain a large army. By the end of 1924 the manning of the
Armed Forces was reduced from 5.5 million to 562,000 men.* Only those who
decided in accordance with their own inclinations and abilities to dedicate
their whole life to the military service remained in the Red Army. Aleksey
Antonov was among them.
Upon conversion to a peaceful statu3, the Communist Party solved many
questions of military organizational development: it defined the system
for further development of the Artned Forces and organization of the mili-
tary apparatus and reorganized the structure ot' chasti and of large units
of the Red Army. The question of which types of military equipment must
be developed a~rose with special severity. Western military theoreticians
had asserted that the outcome of a war would be decided only by chemical
weapons, or by eviation, or by great mechanized armies.
Disputes and discussions flared up about these and many other questions.
They spread also in Nikolayev--a small city in the south of the Ukraine,
where the 15th Division had been stationed. Antonov, who by this time
had become chief of the operations section of the division staff, partici-
pated in them. He was a proponent of the harmonious development of all
the arms and services. He put his ideas into practice when organizing
exercises with commanders and staff workers. At these exercises he often
*See "50 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR," p 169.
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worked ou~ the mu~ual rela~ion~hips among ~he 3nfan~ry~ oavalry and artil-
l~ry. A. An~onov suooessfully oarried out his servioe obligations~ show-
in~ great tialent for opera~ions work. Yt was noted in efPioionoy reporta
for 1922 and 1923: ~'He is energe~io, effioient, dieoiplined and preoise
in his work. He is experienoed in and knowa operational work. He is pre-
- oise and energetio in the work aea3gned to him~ He knowa how to use his
experienoe in staff work~ and he solvea problema w3thout error.~~
It stands to reason that not all of this oame~eas3ly. He had ~o devote
all his efforts and knowledge to the work. Antonov had a general eduoa-
tion and at that time it was more than most Red Arcr~y oommanders had.
Howevar, he did not have a apeoial military eduoation, and he sensed this.
~ Therefore, he began to prepare himself gradually for the military aoademy.
He had all +~,he potentiality for this. In 1926 an effioienoy report signed
by the oom?;iander of the 16th Sivashskaya Rifle Division~ I. I. Raudemets,
and oommc:nder of the Ukrainian Military Diatriot, I. E Yakir~ it was
stated. that A. I. Antonov poasessed a lively, searohing mind and initia-
tive, knew how to look into ar~y situation, and had great praatioal experi-
ence and knQwledge of staff work. His espeoially important qualities as
a staff worker were punotuality~ preoiaion, effioiency, persiatence,
oonscientiousness in fulfilling the ,job asaigned to him, and exactingnesa
toward himself and toward his subordina~es. It was noted that A. Antonov
took an active part in military-soience work and strove to obtain a high-
er military eduoation. "Persistent preparation for examinations to the
academy," the efficiency report said, "and the good results achieved dur-
ing the period of probationary work in the artillery will aerve as a guar-
antee that he will pass i;;~ academic courae excellently and~ upon conclu-
sion thereof, will be able to apply the knowledge obtained to the job."
Great events had occurred in the Red Army: military reform, and the in-
troduction of one-ms~n command. Measures taken during military reform were
reinforced in the Law of P.equired Military Service that was adopted on 18
, September 1925 by the TsIK [Central Executive Committeej and SNK [Council
of People's Commissars] of the USSR. This was the first nationwide law
about the required performance of military service by all citizens of the
country. Simultaneously it also set the organizational structure of the
Armed Forces. All this created favorable conditions for converting to the
planned combat readiness of the troops. A. Antonov took an active part
in orga.nizing the combat and, especially, the tactical training of person-
nel, which was being drawn up in accordance with the new manuals that had
been worked out to take into account the experience of the Civil War and
World War I.
Changes had also occurred in the personal life of Aleksey Antonov. He
fell in love with the gay black-eyed Mariya Temok, who returned his love.
The young people got married. Mariya Dmitriyevna became the faithful com-
panion of Aleksey Innokent'yevich and shared all joys and difficulties
with him. '
In 1926 Aleksey Antonov submitted an application to the party organization
of the division headquarters, requesting that it accept his candicacy
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I
for membership in ~he VKP(b) [Al1~Union Communis~ Par~y (.Bol'shevik)].
And in 2 years he was a member of ~he Communiat Party and a s~uden~ of ~
the command depar~men~ of the Mili~ary Aoademy imena. M~ V. Frunze~
BETWEEN THE WARS
I~ is easy to imagine with what emotion A~ Antonov orossed the threshold
- of ~he acade~y, at which distinguished military theoreticians and his~ori-
ans taught. The demands on the stu~ents were very high. This was dictat-
ed by the developmen~ of the Red Army. The years of the rirst Five-Year ,
Plan were years of great change in the organizational development of the
U5SR's Armed Forces. Already by the end of the 1920's more modern tank '
equipment, artillery, mortars and amall arms began to arrive in the army.
The combined,arms commander was required to master to perfection the new
military equipmen~ and arms and to raise the art of teaching and eduoat-
ing personnel. In 1927-1929 oertain new manuals and regulations were ~
published that laid down the beginning of a single harmonious system for ;
combat training in the Armed Forces.
,
Of great importance in improving the training of military personnel was
the VKP(b) Central Committee decree, "The Command and Political Makeup of
the RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army]," that was adopted in February
1929. The party Central Cammittee required that a further riso in the
military qualification of commanders and staff workers, and also in ~
their politico-ideological level, be achieved. The academy was called
upon to prepare to perfection commanders who would know modern equip-
ment and the capabilitiea of the forces that are equipped with it and
who would be able to apply it skillfully in war and to orient themselves
_ quickly to the political situation and the tasks of politieal work in the.
army.
In carrying out the orders of the party Central Committee, the acade~y's
oouncil adopted a decision to imp~ove the teaching process. The number of
cycles was reduced to five. The cycles of strategy, tactics, social and
economic sciences, military history and military organization began to op-
erate. At ~he same time there were also separate departments--military
geography, political work and military linguistics. The independent top-
ics of automotive engineering, physics, chemistry and p~ysical training
remained.
Aleksey Innokent'yevich studied with great zeal. But there were among I
the disciplines those to which.he gave preference. He especially liked
exercises in staff service. He liked to make calculations for the move-
ment of troops and to guess the enemy's actions. He did map work with ~
pleasure. He loved probationary training with the troops. He studied
the operations art earnestly. Not one article or book by Soviet or ~or-
eign authors on this subject was left unread by him.
It goes without saying that knowledge about the operations art, as with
other disciplines, did not come easy. He had to study much and do re-
search. By this time there had appeared in the Red Army completely new ,
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large unats that were equipped with mili~ary equipmen~ and weaponry ~hat
were the mos~ modern for those years. It had become extremely oomplicated -
to oommand them. The requirements of the art of leading troops were
greatly raised~
Many of Aleksey Innokent'yevich's fellow atuden~s envied his purposeful-
ness, persistenoe and assiduity. He showed ~hese qualities especially
during ~he study of foreign languages. A. Antonov understood that the
military man should know not only na~ive equipment and weaponry and con-
stantly follow the development of Soviet military science but should also
know in which direction military equipment and military thought are being
developed abroad. He successfully mastered the French language and re-
ceived the qualification of military translator. ,
In addition to deep military and political knowledge the acadea?y armed
A. Antonov with a quality extremely valuable for the military man--ski11
in rapidly.understanding the most eomplicated situation and in fi.nding
correct solutions. At the beginning of service in the Red Army, especial-
ly after the end of the Civil War, Mtonov displayed outstandingly an in-
clination toward scientific research. The academy reinforced and devel-
oped this talent.
Here is how A. I. Antonov is characterized in the graduation efficiency
report: "Volitional qualities are entirely positive. General and mili-
tary education are good. Prior to the acadeiqy he had extensive staff ser-
vice but little combat service. He has served as an example in the acad-
emy. He has developed commander and instructor habits. During practical
work in the field he took an active part in the conduct of experimental
studies and divisional maneuvers. There is an inclination to service in
motorized or mechanized chasti and scientific-research. He is suitable
for the post of chief of staff of a mechanized brigade or assistant chief
of staff of a corps."
After completion of the academy in March 1931, A. I. Antonov left ta serve
in the Ukraine, in the city of Korosten', where he was named to the post _
of chief of staff of the 46th Rifle Division. The division at that time
was being rearmed. Chasti were receiving V. A. Degtyarev's modernized
rifles and light automatic machinegun and other rifle-type weaponry.
Modernized and new artillery systems also were arriving in the armament-
ariwn. In 1930 the tankmaking industry began the mass production of
combat vehicles. Already in 1931 the division had received new tanks.
Simultaneously with reequipment, the organizational structure and the
principles of manning units were changed and control organs were improved.
The international situation having been exacerbated, the interests of the
security of the socialist state required the introduction of the cadre
principle of manning the army. The mixed territorial-cadre system that.
- existed at that time could not solve the tasks of defending the motherland.
In 1931 the USSR Rewoyensovet [Revolutionary Military Council], based
upon the instructions of the VKP(b) Central Committee, converted in the
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_ Ukrainian Milit~ry Districti to the cadrp prinoipl~ for manning sever~l di-
- visions~ including the 46th Rifle bivision.
The measures associa~ed with ~he reorganization required strenuous work by
commanders and by poli~ical workers. A special responsibility 1ay on ~h~ -
_ divieion s~aft'. A. I. Antonov~ from the firs~ days of his stay a~ Koro-
sten', had thrown hi.mself into his work. Fresh knowledge and ~omba~ ex-
perienae enabled him tio do i~ well. ~verything was done s~ric~ly aooord-
ing to plan, wi~hout excessive has~e, thoruughly, and wi~h good quali~y.
An~onov knew the new equipment we11 and more ~han once conduc~ed exercises ,
with chast ~nd sma11-unit coromanders and staff workers. 5everal staff , ;
exercises that approached combat condi~ions to the maxiroum were held under '
his direction. He participated also in developing various themes for ,
district exercises.
A. I. Antonov's leaning toward operations work was noted. Tn tlle fa11 of
1932 he was sent to study in the opera~ions depart-~nen~ that had been cre-
_ ated at the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze. Later this departimen~
was the base for development of the General Staff Academy of the RKKA.
Antonov studied here from November 1932 until May 1933. "An excellenti
operations staff worker, ready for work in higher staffs," was the conclu-
sion about A. I. Antonov by the chief and eommissar of the op~rations de-
partment G. S. Isserson.
After the studies, Aleksey Innokent'yevich again served with troops. For �
a year and a half he was chief of staff of the 46th Rifle Division, and -
from October 1934 to August 1935 he was chief of staff of the Mogilev-Yam-
pol' fortified region. Then he was transferred to the staff of the Khar'-
kov Military District, to the post of chief of the is~ (Operations) Sec-
tion. Now in his 40th year, with a broad political and military horizon,
he was ripe to be a commander. With inereasing frequency he was charged
with developing plans Por large tactical exercises and maneuvers that used ~
various arms and services. They were made up to take into account the new
equipment and arms that had arrived in the forces. ~
i
Successful fulfillment of the tasks of the Second Fiv~-Year Plan enabled
the Soviet Government to equip the Red Army with a large number of new ~
~ aircraft, tanks and weapons. Supported by the economic and soeial trans-
formations that were occurring in the country, the VKP(ti) Central Commit-
tee and the USSR SNK in 1935-1938 executed everywhere conversion from the
mixed territorial-cadre system to the unified cadre principle of building
- up the Soviet Armed Forces that had been started in the border districts
in 1931-1932. The new military equipment had changed considerably
the methods for waging war, for the combat use of the arms and services,
and for the interaction thereof on the field of battle.
An important event in the life of A. I. Antonov, as was true of many other
Red Army, were the tactical exercises that were conducted from 12 to 17
September 1935. They have gone into the history of the Soviet Armed For-
ces under the name of the Grand Kiev Maneuvers. All arms and services
took part in them: infantry, cavalry, airborne, artillery, armored and ~
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~vi~tfon ohag~i ~nd ~arge unft~. Th~ br~~lc~hrough~of ~ fortifi~d d~f~n-
eiv~ ~one by ~ rif1~ eorps, ~ reinfor~~d tank b~tti~lion ~nd RfiK Lhigh-com-
mand r~gerve] artill~ry~ thcs d~v~lopm~n~ of the breaktihrougM of a c~?v~lry
corp~~ the use of ~ hug~ girdrop~ th~ me~r??euv~ring of a meehaniz~d corp~
,jointly wftih a cavalry division for tihe purpose of enoiroling ~nd d~~tr~y-
ing an enemy grdup in itg rear ~rea ~ha~ had broken ~hrough wer~ work~d
out. For the fir~t ~imc~ many th~er~ti~~?~ prineipl~s of Sovf~t mili~~ry
~eience were v~rifi~d~ ineluding tihe th~~ry of ~omb~~ in depth and dpc~~-
tiions in dep~h.*
ThC tirnops h~d ten~ative d~gfgn~tfnn~--th~ "blu~s" ~nd th~ "r~d~." Th~
"bluea" w~r~ 1ed by the commander of the Khar'kov Mili~ary Distirf~ti, i. N.
Dubov. The "redg" wer~ commanded by hig depu~y~ S. A. Turovgkiy. The
comm~nder of the Kiev Military Uigtrict, I. Yakir~ dir~ctied the
exercises.
Chi~f of
tih~ oper~~:iong s~ction of the Khar'kov Militiary Distirfet headquar-
t~rg A. i. Antonov~ tiog~ther witih g~aff worker~ of tih~ Kiev ~?n8 Kh~r~kov
militi~ry digtirictg, participated in d~v~loping tihe concwpt and tih~ plan of
the rxerciseg gnd th~ provigioning nf personnel witih ~nmunitiion~ food and
evcrything nCeded for succesaful ~xecutiion of the combgt training mission~.
The enormous work dane by the staffg and, especially, by operations ataff
personnel to develop the plan far the man~uv~rs was telling from the very
start. Thc artiion3 of the opponentia were played extremely dyn~mically and
took full account of the combat capabilities of tihe arms and gervices,
especially af large mechanized units and airbarne ehasti. All the computia-
tions rroved tio be so realiatic that the forces operatied in a situatiion
thati wag as close to combat as posaible.
During the maneuvers, Aleksey Innokent'yevich became more closely acquaint-
ed with I. E. Yakir~ who had known Mtonov since 1923. The army commander
more than once observed the actions of the operations staff personnel. He
was especially satisfied with the work of Antonov and his comrades at one -
of the most important movements of the exercises--the las~ding nf 1,200
airborne troops.
*Towa t e en o the 1920's~ M. N. Tukhachcvskiy~ V. K. Triandafillov,
i. P. Uborevich gnd K. E3. Kalinovgkiy had advanced ideas of the theory of
combat in depth and operations in depth. V. K. Triandafillov's aork~ "The
Nature of Operations of Modern Armies~" played a substantial role in de-
veloping the new theory. However~ until that time~ this theory had not
been widely developed because of the lack of an adequate number uf tanks
and airplanes. At the beginning af the 1930's this theory Nas already
resting upon an actual equipment base. As a result of the creative ef-
forts of a large collective of professors and instructors of the Academy
imeni M. V. Frunze and in close contact with the centra~ administrationg
of the Narkomat [People's Commissariat] for Defense and with the troops~
the basic principles of the theory of combat in depth and of operations
were worked out.--Author's note.
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Str~nuoug ~'battl~g" ~~~urr~d durfng ~h~ B d~y~. P~r~icip~tin~ ih tih~m
w~re 65,000 men ~nd 3,000 comb~t v~hi~l~s.* A11 ~h~ ch~stii and 1~rg~ unitia
ahowed high comb~t ~r~ining. Many goldi~rs, comm~ndgr~~ politfc~l work~re
~nd st~f~ w~rkcrs, fncludin~ A. t. Ar~~onov, reo~iv~d commendatii~n~ frnm
~h~ N~rkom Cp~np1C's Cnmmi~~arJ fnr nGP~ng~, K. Yc. Vdrd~hilnv.
During th~~~ yc~rg A. i. Ar~t~n~v work~d agp~ci~lly hard and productiiv~:,,.
Theor~~ica1 ~xerci~e~ w~r~ r~pl~ced by praotiical ~x~rci~~~. On ~oin~ in~:o
th~ fi~1d m~,jor ~titientiion was paid ti~ pgrfeetiing ~~e actiiona of oorp~ and
divi~ion staffg under v~rious cnmbat cnndition~ with th~ massed ~pp~.iea-
tion of ~vf~tic,n ~nd i;ar~c~. Noti for on~ da~y did Alekaey Innokent'yevieh
c~ase to ~tudy~ and he per~i~tien~ly perfea*sd hig knowl~d~~. He rec~l~ed
tihe wordg that M. V. ~runxe u~tier~d ati tihe eeremonial meetiing of tih~ Mili-
tary Academy on 1 Au~usti 1924~ which was dedicatied tio the graduation of
gtud~nt~: "Only thos~ of you who fe~l conatiant dissatiiafaction witih your-
g~1v~s, dissatisfaction and incompl~teneas in tihe background of learning
tih~t you tiak~ witih you from the w~11g of the aeademy, who stirfve tia expa~.d
your r~ng~ of intiere~~s and tio ~ugmenti your theor~tifcal ~r?d practii~~l back-
grounds--only thoge who do noti fa11 behind in militiary affaira~ wi11 go
forward and, perhap~, lead tens and hundrede of oth~r people."# `
in 1936 the distirict command senti A. i. Mtonov tio the RKKA General Staff
Academy~ which was then being opened for ~tiudy. The Communist Party and
tihe 5oviet Covernment, conaidering the complieat~d international gitu~tiion
nnd the necesgitiy to have a sufficienti number of personnel highly trained
in strategie operations and capable of leading such large operational
field forces as an anay or a front~ adopted a decision to creatie a new
Sovict Arnned Forces institution for higher military education.
The pick of roilitary-~ff~irs theoreticians then available had been assem-
bled at the Cen~rA1 Staff Academy. Among tihem were V. A. Melikov, D. M.
Karbyshev~ N. N. Shvarts, A. I. Cotovtspv, G. S. Isserson, A. V. Kirpieh~
nikov, N. A. Levitskiy, N. I. Trubetskoy, F. P. Shafalovich, Ye. A. Shi-
lovskiy, V. K. Mordvinov and P. P. Ionov. Aleksey Innokent'yevich new
many of them from previous years of study at the Academy imeni M. V.
Frunze.
Ne who had c~mc to the academy for study was also the subject af study.
I. Kh. Bagramyan~ A. M. V$$ilevskiy, N. Batutin, L. A. Govorov and M.V.
Zakharov and other commanderg Nere its first students. They aere attracti-
ed widely to a discuasion of inethodological and scientific questions,
lectures~ group exercises and War gamea, and to partieipation in instruc-
tional work.
The study process at the C~neral Staff Aeademy is not shaped like that at
other institutions of highcr military learning. A large part of the time
is allocated to independent preparation. Z1ro or three d~ys per week the
*See "Kievs iy rasnoznamennyy" [Kiev Red Banner~, Moscoa, 1974, p 103.
/~~runze~ M. V., "Izbrannyye proizvedeniye," Vol. 2, Moscoa, 195't, p 127.
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~~udentig ar~ busy in ~he ~e~d~my'~ 1ibr~rie~ r,r l~bor~tiorie~. And only
h~lf of tihe ex~rci~e~ were conduotied in stiuc~y groups~ whioh ~dn~i~t~d of
iZ-15 p~r8~n~.
This was explain~d by tihe apeci~l oompositiion of tih~ stiudent body and
tihe s~uden~s' ~~e~ ~r?d service s~a~tus. They were no~ as we11 ~repared for
tihe fortheoming exereig~g f~~ ~~gmen~ing tihe reserve of milftiary know-
l~dge Far work witih tiroopa. ~eca~~e of tihe ~b~ence of ~ 1i~era~ur~ on
modern operatiions arti~ ~he etiudentis used 1;heir own experienee in nolv3ng
s~udy ~asks in tihe conduo~ of army and fron~ opera~iona. The probl~ms
thati A. I. Mtunov worked ou~, tiaking intio account hi~ experienees in tihe
Civil War and in tiroop ~xeraisea, were eva~uatied highly by the instiructior~.
The atudenta of the firat class stiudied oomprehensively arn~y and fronti
operatiiona within the framework of the new theory of the militi~ry ar~.
area~ attiention was paid tio operati?one gamea on mapa. Each atiudenti as-
aumed tihe role of chief of steff of an army or front, and ~hen tihe role of
commander. A. I. Mtionov~ L. A. Govorov and M. V. Zakharov coped ecpeoial-
~y we11 with these reaponaibilitiies. Thig was explained by the facti tihat
in their time they had suceessfully eompleted tihe operatifons depar~ment
course of the Academ,y imeni M. V. Frurize~ and their training in tihe field ~
of the operations arti was higher tihan thati of the other atudentg.
2he academy'$ students gpent the summer of 1937 in fi~ld ~raining with the
n~vy and partiicipated in operationa gamea locally with the use of commu-
nications equipmenti and in troop exercises in the Ukraine.
A. I. Mtonov successfully completed the firs~ eourse of atudy. He did
not actually have to study the second. Once during exercises Aleksey In-
nokent'yevich was summoned quickly to the Narkomat for Defense. This Nas
not a surprise for him. Several days earlier M. V. Zakharov and N.
Bxtutin had been call~d there. The first entered the post of chief of
ataff of the Leningrad Military District~ and the second became the deputy
chief of staff of tt,~e Kiev Military District. A. I. Mtonov Nas named
chief of staff of the Moscoa Military Diatriet, Nhich was eammanded by
Marshal of the Sovieti Union (MSU) S. M. Budennyy.
Everything nerr that appeared in military affairs Nas teated in the eapital
district. It was here that the first mechanized brigade in the Red Army
' was created~ in 1930, and the Norld's firat mechanized corps, in 1932.
Airborne chesti appeared for the first time in the Moaeox Military
~ District.
Soon A. I. Mtonov had to participate in the organization of district
exercises~ at Nhich methods Kere to be rrorked out for the eombat applica-
tion of armored forces. He experieneed enormous sat~sfaction from the
aork, because while still on the academic bench he had not been indiffer-
ent to this branch of the servire.
Of course he paid due attention also to the other arms. The rifle divi-
sions rrere being reorganized in the distric~. Nea chasti appeared Nithin
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tihems ~ second ~r~illery r~~~m~hti, ~n ~ntii~ank ar~ill~ry divi~ion, ~
~an?c b~~tialion and an an~iair~r~fti divigion. Much was being don~ ~t this
~ime algo to furtih~r improv~ th~ air deF~nae forc~g. In Moeoow~ a~ tih~
beginning of 1938~ M~onov par~~oipati~d in he~d~arti~r~ drills and ohasti
and general exero~sea in PVA ~air defense~ At'?d MPVO [~.ooal air defen8~]
t~ee~~ ~nd equi~~~t~t~ a~ whi@h qu~gtion~ of e~utu~l ~etions w~r~ work~d
ou~. Everyon~ who knew ~bouti brigad~ o~mmar?der A. t. Ar?tionov'e work in
the Mos~ow M~~i~ary D~gtiricti notied hia excepti~ona~ ~fficienoy and crea-
tive energy.
in Decemb~r 1938 Alek~~y Innokenti'y~vioh was named aenior in~tiructior of
tihe departimen~ of general taetiies of tihe Mili~ary Acadert~y imeni M. V.
Frunze. The tihrea~ of world war requ3red acceleratiion of tihe ereatiion of
large oontingentis of we11-trained commandera of ehasti and am~ller unitis,
and A. I. Mtionov devoted himaelF utitierly to tihis important matitier.
areat experienee in praetical work and deep theoretiieal knowledge enabled
him ~o prnve him~elf r~pidly in this new fie~d. Along wi~h otiher in~truc-
tiors, Mtonov was included in the development of such tiopics as, "~volu-
tion of th~ Tactiic~l Applica~ion of Large Tank and Mechaniz~d Unitis in Ac-
cordance with 8attile Experience in Spain,~' and "Tactics of the Gerrean
Army: the March and the Meeting Engagement." Aleksey Iru~okenti'yevieh
reported at scientifie conferences and helped comrades tio prepar~ digser-
tations. On ii February 1940 the Nigher Certifying Commisaion of the A1~- �
Union Committee on the Affaira of Higher Sehools under the USSR 5NK con- ,
ferred on A. i. Mtionov tihe learned tiitle,of assistanti professor. On
4 June of that same year, by a d~cree of the Council of People's Comrois-
sers of the USSR, the rank of ma3or general was�conferred on him.
i
Beginning in January 1941 Antonov became deputy chief of the department ~
of general tactics and, in addition to instrueting and partieipating in `
the development of real problems of military science, he did much work in ~
the commission for selecting Korks that had been nominated by the depart-
ments or instiructor personnel of the acadea~y for competition for the State
Prize. Documents that were related to the work of thia commission--the
minuteb af inevtings, revieas of works that had been numinated for a
prize~ shorthand reports of the educational council that diseussed the
commission's reports--testified to Aleksey Innokent'yevich's abili~y to
see everything that is new and veluable thet is born in military science.
He enthusiastically atood up for such works and reeommended them for
practical use not only during training of the ecademy's students but also
with the troops.
IN CHARGE OF THE STAFFS OF PRONTS
The threat of a military assault on the USSR Nas growing eaeh d~y. The '
Communist Party and the Soviet Government took measures to strengthen the
country's defensive capability. Combat equipment and arms arrived for the
army. The districts. especially the border districts, rrere strengthened ~
with well-trained personnel. At the start of 1941 Mqjor General A. I.
Mtonov was sent to the Kiev Special Milita~y District. in letters to his
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FOtt tlF~IC2AL USL ONLY
~igt~r, Lyudmila innnkant'y~vna~ whd w~~ wdrlting ~t th~t timc u~ ~n in-
~tru~tor d~ g~agraphy a~ enc of L~eningr~d'~ mfddl~ gch~nl~, Antnnnv wr~te;
"Timdchenk~ ~umm~n~d me ir~ the evening~ tte aonv~r~~d ~U~uti h~lf ~n h~ur
~nd tnld m~ th~ti i ghnuld b~ re~dy t~ 1e~ve in ~ we~k. Kiev wag p1~nn~d.
Th~ ~nnv~rg~tinn 1ef~ ~ v~ry good imprcgsion. So, ~oon i wi11 be on ~
trip. A~r~~~ and s~rious m~~t~r irop~nd~~~' -
In anoth~er l~~ti~r, o~ i~ i~tar~h 1~41, he ~ait~; ~~Th~ questidn ~bout m~ h~~
b~~n d~aid~d fin~lly: tdday, in the evening~ I will gc~ to Kiev~ tio ~he
pd~~ n~ deputy ~hi~f of gtaf~' nf th~ Kiev 5p~oial Milfti~ry Uistricti~ in
Dto~cow I h~d t~ b~ an the ,fnb until midnighti, buti tih~re, prdb~bly, I will
hav~ to work untiil morning."
At th~ mom~nt nf Antion~v'g c~rrival at the pogti, th~ district's eommand
wus developing u plan far protecting the gtiat~ bord~r. Aleksey Innokenti'-
yev~Ch WU5 includ~d in this work. According to tih~ te~tiimony of M5U I. Kh.
Bagrc~myan~ whd in 1941 w~s in ch~rge ~P ~h~ operatiions sec~ion of tihe Kiev
Sp~ci~1 Dtilit~ry Ui~triCt, A. i. Antonnv w~g ab~~ to quickly ti~k~ in the
situ~tinn ~nd ~v~lu~te tih~ whnle impnrt~nc~ nf t1~~ plan for prot~otiing the
border. Nc wes nf enarmdus h~lp td th~ ~omm~nd in the work.
Th~ Kiev Speeial Militiary Uistrict shauld hav~ had tihe traops of four
armi~s to cover th~ sti~~e border on the Vl~d~v~-Lipkany ScCtOr~ a diatanc~
of abouti 1~000 km. prior to m~king up the p1an, Mtonov and a small grnup
nf officers traveled many hundreds of kilometers. A1eks~y Innokent'yevich
saw the wire entangl~ments, the entrenchmentis, the trenches~ th~ observa-
tion pointis, th~ antiitank ditches and the durable reinforced-eonerete em-
piacements. But there were few troopg here. 8asic~lly~ ~h~se were small
separate units that were working on the con~tiruction of thc fortified re-
gions and small groups of soldiers. This worried Antonov most of all.
Aleksey Innokent'yevich repari:ed his th~oughts on strengthening protection
of the border to the district chief of staff, Lt Gen M. A. Purkayev.
A. I. Antonov paid mueh attention to the Lutsk-Rovno sector. The 5th Army
should huve b~en protecting this 176-km section of the border. Together
with the chief of staff of this army, Maj Cen D. S. Pisarevskiy, Aleksey
Innokent'y~vich worked outi papers that defincd the tasks of the troops of
the first and second echelons. The 4th Rifle Division, which made up the
first eeh~lon, w~g given the task: r~lying upon prepared struetur~~ of
~ the forward defensive positions and the defensive centers of the Kovel'-
skiy, Vladimir-Volynka and 5trumilov fortified regions, to a11ow no inva-
sion by en~my forces. Mcasures for the c~se of a~breakthrough of individ-
ual troop formations were called for. They came down to a decisive coun-
terblow of the second echelon within the mechanized corps and rifle divi-
sion.* A plan was carefully worked out for other seetors also.
A plan for prct~cting the state border was made up within the precisely
established period. After thorough study and comprehensive discussion~
the distriet's military council approved it.
*See "Kievskiy krasnoznamennyy~" p 148.
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i
Subordin~~~ to A. An~onov w~r~ org~r?s ~ha~ were oonduoting mobilixa~ion-
org~ni~~tion ~ff~ir~. Thc~ir r~Apon~ibil~.ty inolud~d solutiion af ~u~h im-
por~~nti and compl3c~ti~d probleme ~g tih~ mobiliz~~~an, ~he ~~11-~p ~nd th~ '
~g~i~nm~nt ~f L-rddp~. Aleksey 2nnoken~'yevich wa~ involved daily with ~
tih~s~ que8tiona. Nis atitientiion was rivetied on tih~m alao b~oause on ~he ,
- ~v~ of ~h~ war ~h~ foro~s of ~he Kiev Sp~oial Mili~ary Distirioti were no~
- eompl~tely manned~ in the districti'g ti~tlt f~r~~~, tli~ gh~re bf n~w ~~nnks
was 24.4 p~reen~. The probicm of ~ranspor~ r~mained unsolved. The rifle
diviaiona had no more than 16-40 percen~ of tih~ required number of mo~or
vehiol~s. Moati of ~he divisiona contiinu~d to b~ main~ained acaording tio
peace~im~ ~ables of organizatiion, ~nd th~ir manning did no~ exoe~d 88-70
p~r~~nt.*
With the ~~ar~ ~f th~ Gre~~ P~~riotiio War tih~ distiric~ was r~quir~d to
mobilixe all ~h~ combati forees~ form and send to the front numerous rear-
area units and ~sti~bliahmentis, and develap ~he ~raining of sp~oialis~s in
tihe reserv~ uni~s in a shorti tiime~ Alek~ey innoken~'~?evich ~ook a moat
actiive parti in aolving tihese questiions, es he did mar~y othera~ Witih the
sep~ratiion of ~he fi~1d adminis~ration of the Southwestiern Front from ~he
Kiev htilitiary Distiricti, Ma~ Gen A. I. Antonov was named ehief of ataff of
th~ district. The tiimely ~ppearanee of inductiees and tih~ arrival from tihe
national economy of au~omotiiv~ and horse-drawn tranaporti were ensurcd by
the ~oint efforts of ~he military couneil and the distri~t ataff. During
the first 4 dqys,throughou~ tens of oblastis the plan for ca11-up of per-
, sonnel was carried out by 90 percent and for the delivery of motor vehi-
cles k~y 70-76 percent, of tractors by 81 percent~ and of earts by 83
percent.#
The forming of new chasti and eatablishm~nts was going on full blast. In
June and July more than 20 separate engineering (pontoon) baxtialions and
special-purpose companieg were senti into the standing arn~y. The war had
also brought up several other problems. Thus, it was neceasary to evacu-
ate military warehouses and bases from the front zone and to help local
party and soviet organs to evacuate enterprises to the east.
The successful solution of these tasks d~pended to a great extent upon the
wo~k of railroad transport. Enemy ayiation sub3ected railroad ~junctions,
yards and open railroad lines to continuous bombardment. But it was im-
possible, even under these complicated conditions, to allow interruptions
in the work of railroad transport. Aleksey Innokent'yevich paid daily at-
tention to the work of organs of military communications and tranaport.
During those days, one could often see chief of the Southwestern Railroad
P. M. Nekrasov and his deputy--chief of the railroad's political affaira
section, A. V. 5mirnov--in his ofFice. Jointly they decided how to im-
prove the work of railroad transport and set~a gtrict and accurate sched-
ulp for dispatching replacements, combat equipment, weapons and supply
and equipment resources. Thanka to the measures tak~n by the middle of
July, it was possible to evacuate more than 120,000 inductees, 24,000 :
horses and 10,u00 carts across the Dnepr.**
*i ~d, p 151.
#Ibid, p 186.
**ibid, p 187. 28
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~OR UI~'~~CfAt, U~~ dI~I,Y
V~ry nften ~~mmand~r aC ~i~tricti fara~~ L~ d~n V~ Yak~ovl~v, milit~ilY
- eduneil m~mbCr brig~d~ ~nmmi~~~ar Yc~ Ye? Ka~heh~yev and ehi~f ~~~f~
Mra~ ~en A. i. Ant~n~v m~t tog~ther and ~olved ur~pn~ prdblem~ r~igc~d by
1if~ ~nd thc r~quir~mCnL�~ di th~ front~ ~t ~uch ~nnP~r~n~~~ the gugg~g-
~ion~ ~f tho digtri~t's stc~f`[' ~vnrk~rg algd were dig~u~g~d~ At nn~ di th~m
A1~kg~y Inndk~nti'y~vi~h glllJgt~flt~~CC(~ 1;}ll neC~~gity f~r exp~nding ~nd
gp~edin~ up th~ ~r~ir~ing ~f ,juninr eammand~rg ~nd ~ecl Army ~p~ciali~t~~
A d~ci~i~n wc~~ ~dop~ed tv fbrm th~ 13th ~nd i7th r~g~rvc ri~1~ brig~d~~
~nd ~~v~ral ch~~ti d~ army ~nd digtriCt gubnrdin~t~on. Thig en~.bl~d 7,360
~juninr command~rg ~nd tt~d Army gp~ci~li~tg ~ur v~ri~u~ ~rmg and s~rvio~~
to b~ g~nt to c~mb~t unitg by 5 Ju1y~*
At th~ ~nd ~f 1941 At~j Gen A. I. Ant~nov w~~ n~tn~d chi~f nf' ~taff of tih~
- S~uth~rn t~'rnnt~ }{e r~p1~~~d hta,j Gen N. aomanov ~t this pn~t.
8y thig tiimC the frnnt'~ fnrces had e~nduet~d str~nuoug defensive engage-
ment~. 'Ch~ en~my po~~e~~ed ~ 5llbgt~tl$~d~ ~up~eridrity in comb~ti ~quipm~nt~
e~p~eiplly in ~irplan~g and t~nks~ Th~ G~rm~n ~~~ei~t forc~~ wer~ abl~ tn
driv~ wedges into dur de~ense, tn bre~k through it ~nd nush tn the nn~pr in
v~rinu~ ~reas~ The whdle stccp right bank wtts eav~r~d, ag if by a rurtuin,
with clnuds of gmoke ~nd dust. ~verywhere bitter ~ng~gements were going
on, ~'he Gener~l H~~dquarters (GHQ) of thc 5upreme Nigh Command requtr~d
all fc~rces to defend the Dnepr ~nd to ~irmly pret~~t Uneprnpetr~v~k~ za-
pordxh'yc e~nd Kher~nn.
At this difficulti tiitne A. I. Antonov devoted ~11 his strcngth and organiz-
ing talents to the missinn ns$igned to him. ~xperienc~d staff workera
labor~d with him. 5om~ he knew from joint serviec lfl the Mogcow Military
District. Amnng them wer~ chief nf th~ opcratiions sections Col N. i. Lya-
min end his senior assistAnti~ Lt Col V. I. petukhc~v. Thc ~taff workers
wer~e in gaod st�~nding with the front comm~nder und the military eouncil.
Commissar of the operratians section battalion cammander A. G. Chernyavskiy,
deputy ehief of the operations section Col P. M. Kotov-Legt~n'kov, Col A. G.
Yermolayev, Lt Co1 V. i. Petukhov and many othera enjoyed distinguished
prestige with the troops and the front's staff. On the instructions of
the military council, some of them commanded composit~ forces. At the
start of August 1941 one a~ these forces, under Lt Col V. I. petukhov,
held out for 8 days ~gainst superior enemy forc~s in the Pcska regian~ nnt
far frdm Odess�~, not allowing it tn break through to Nikc~lnyev. ~or a
short intermediate period, petukhov was ~blc to puti together a combat-
capable collective from disorg~nized fragmented forces that engaged th~
enemy heroically~ repulsing ita numerous ~ttacks.
Other staff workers also conducted themselves bravely and knew how to di-
rect when the situatian requixed them to take charge of A CIlU9t1 or small
uni~. Each staff officer strove to carry out his duty as well as possible.
Most of them had had good military training. Suffice it to say that half
*Tsentral'nyy arkhiv Atinisterstva oborony SSSR /Ct:ntral Archive of the
USSR Ministry of Defense] (hereinafter TsAMO), archive 131~ list 113358,
~ document 4~ sheets 124 and 126.
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i
of tih~ work~r~ of th~ op~r~~ion~ 8~etiion had comp~~tied ~h~ Mi1i~~ry Ac~d~my I
im~ni M~ V~ ~~un~~~ And ~1~hou~h ma~yr po~~~ r~main~d vao~r?~~ ~h~s did not j
par~ieularly aff~oti tih~ ~job= dier~g~rdin~ ev~ry~hing e18~~ pc~opl~ werlcr.d ~
dqy and night, ofti~n wi~houti sl~ep or reg~. (
. i
Th~ front'~ f3e1d admini~~ra~ion in 1941 eonais~ed of ~h~ stiaff and mar~y ;
~dn~ini~t~~t~~n~ ~r~d independenti ~eotion~. To organix~ mutiual re~a~ionships ;
witihin ~he field ~dministir~~ion ~nd ~o arrange for i~ ~o work wi~h preoi- ;
sion wa~ one of ~he r@eponeibilitiiea of tihe fronti'e ohi~f of 9~~ff~ The ~
fron~ s~~ff subordinat~ tio him w~~, in mi~sion8 and s~ruotiural or~aniza-
tiion, a complicated organ f~r ~a11~eti~v~ oon~rol of ~h~ troopa of a stratieg- (
ie op~r~~ion~ el~menti. Thi~ working apparatius ~h~~ oommanded ~he troops ;
ine]uded sever~l ~eo~ions ~nd hundreds of ~peoiali8~~. '
i
~
A. I. An~onov had had ~xperience in managing atiaffs. Now~ver, mar~y qu~s- !
~ions had to be ~olved wi~hin ~he Soutihern Front atiaff for the Firet time, ~
in a new way, ~h~ comb~~ ai~ua~ion being complex. And while Alekaey inno- i
kent'y~vieh selv~d them ~uecegafully, Having a knowledge of the ,job, ~
thi8 wa~ po~sibl~ thanks to hi~ ou~gtianding nrganiza~ion~1 ~alen~s, high
sophi~tiea~ion in staff work, and the wisdom to aee through the enemy's ~
d~~igns and then ~o propose m~~hod~ for di8rupting them.
Aleksey innokent'yevich was diatinguiahed by high exaetiingnes~ toward him- ~
aelf and subordinates, ~onatant dissatiafaetion and tirelesa atudy. He ~
took all measures to improve the work o~ each staff aeotion and the oon- ~
trol of the troopa in a short time. For thia purpose~ he put order into ~
the prea~ntation of information to the aommander and diseussiona over the i
"8odo" ~nd ST-35 equipment and made the content of operational eummariea
more preeise. ~
i
Aleksey Innokent'yevich paid much attention tio solving such questiona as
achieving responsivenegs, con~inuity and ~ecreey in the control of troops i
and also stability in con*ro1 organs and posts. i
During his service Aleksey Innokent'yevich had to meet with many commanders. ~
He also ran across those who relied only upon themselvea. He tried to ~
correct such comrades, to explain to them what an enormoua role staffs ~
plqy in modern r~ar. From the first day of his st&y at the Southern Front, ~
Antonov persistently strove to get commanders of armies and the oommanders
of corps and divigiang ta rely upon st~ffs in their activity. Front com- ~
mander Lt Gen D. I. Ryabyshev completiely supported A. i. Mtonov. ~
As a conaequenee of serious loases that were susta~ned by Soviet forees in ~
battles on the Ukraine's Left Bank, the ratio of forces that prevailed on
the southern segwent of the Soviet-German front Was not in our favor. ~
On 29 September 1941 engagements in the south of the country developed
Nith nea force. The enemy's ist Tank Group reneNed its offensive against !
Southerr. Front divisions that had not succeeded in being reinforeed on the ~
nea line. The front was broken through. Lt Gen D. I. E~yabyshev ordered ~
his armies to fall back to the Pavlograd-Bol'shoy Tokmak-Melitopol'-Lake , i
1
30 ~
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Moloohnoy~ ~in~ by ~ Oo~ob~r. Buti ~he fron~'s ~foroe~ oould no~ s~op ~h~
enetqy even on ~ha~ 1in~. Th~ ls~ Qerman Tank Army,* rapidly puahing for-
w~rd in ~~ou~h~rly direo~ion, oreated a thr~~~ oF d~ep ~nvelopment on ~h~
whol~ fron~. Ch~a~i of divisiona of the 18~h ~nd 9th armi~s wera enoir-
cl~d. Ma~j a~n A. I. An~onov wen~ ou~ to ~he area of ~'he 9~h Army ~o help
~h~ commander~ Ma,j Qen M~ Khari~onov~ ~o organize a withdrawal of the
foroeg whioh, by a g~ubborn def~n~e~ had held up ~he enemy~s offensive for
~ days~ The 9th Ar~qy, and tihe 18th Army, whioh had operated ~o the north
of it~ withdrew ~o ~he line be~ween ~he Dneprovak ~'lats (south of Zapo-
rozh~y~) and Lake Moioonnoy~ and oon~ained ~he enen~y'g offensive ~h~r~.
The fron~ headquar~ers was redeployed so ~ha~ oon~inuous oon~rol of the
~roops would be provided for. When Co1 Qen Ya. T. Chereviehenko was named
. aommander of ~he Soutih~rn ~'ron~ on 5 Ootiober, A. I. An~onov quiokly pro-
vided him with a11 tihe datia abou~ the sitiua~ion. In ~he next 2 dqys deci-
sions were adopted: to w3tihdraw ~he forees ~o a prepared defensive 1ine,
tio ensure ~he breakouti of various large units from enoirclement, to intro-
duee reservea intio bati~le, and tio infliot a eounterblow on tihe enemy for-
matiiona tih~t had broken ~hrough. All this indieatea ~he enormoua tension
under whfoh Soutihern ~ron~ s~aff inembers and A. I. Mtonov personally had
to opera~e.
Aleks~y Innokenti'yevich ever more frequen~cly pondered on how ~o better or-
ganize generalization of the experience of ba~tling the German-Fascist ag-
gressors and to put this ma~ter on a scientific basis. Uncorrelated in-
formation about the action of our chasti and small units and about the
enemy's taetics yielded hardly anything.
In September an order was sent to headquarters of the armies that said: -
"From the operations summaries that have been presented it is impoasible
to discover completely the peculiarities of the various engagements and
to teach to all chasti of the Southern Front the best experience in de-
stroying the treacherous enert~y.
"In developing the operational summary, as events transpire, present to
the front staff the charactieristics of individual combat episodes and of
individual operations in descriptive form, noting therein the stubborn-
ness and bravery of various chasti and large units that w~re displqyed in
the struggle with the enemy, and in various cases a description of the
heroic feats of various small units, Red Army men, commanders and politi-
cal workers. Note in these descriptions new methods ~'or fighting with the
enemy's aviation and ground forces, especially his tanks. Add diagrams of
the situation of the sides, various orders and other operations documents
that confirm the data of the situation, episode or operation."#
Soon, based upon a deep generalization of the information that was arriv-
ing at the Southern Front headquarters, definite conclusions were drawn
*On 6 Octo er 1941 the ist German Tank Group waa reformed into the ist
Tank Army.
#TsAMO, archive 228, list 701, document 5, sheet 53.
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~nd reaommendatiions m~de ~o oh~s~i ~nd large unit~. A dooumen~ g3gn~d by
A. I~ Antonov and ohief oF ~he npera~iona gec~ion N. r. Lyamin th~~ summar-
iz~d ~he r~sul~s oF 3 mon~hs of engagemen~s with ~he I~'ascis~ c~erman ag-
gressors w~s son~ ~o ~ha large uni~s.* I~ spok~ in de~~il abou~ the atrong
and weak aspeo~s of ~he enamy's op~ra~ions. 5peoial ~~~ention was devot-
ed tio ~h~ oombat opera~ions experience of ~he fron~'s bes~ ohas~i and large
uni~s during ooun~era~tacka and offensive engagemen~a. The doowr~en~ also
oon~ained reeommendations on reaonnaissanoe, mu~ual operationa~ oamou,
flage and oonoen~ration of foroee.
The aspira~ion of ~he fron~'s s~~ff for a responsive and profound gener~l-
iza~ion of comba~ experience, with a view to using i~ in battles against
~he atrong and ~reacherous enemy, was suppor~ed by ~he front's politioal
~dminis~ra~ion~
The first highly detailed repor~ about the combat experience of ~he 96th
Moun~ain Ftifle Division arrived from the 18~h Ar~y's military council~
A. I. An~onov toolc oare to see ~o i~ that every~hing valuable that thia
division had gained during comba~ with the enemy was taken into the arma-
men~arium of the fron~'s chas~i and divisions. The personnel of this large
uni~ had traveled 1,238 km in combat. In 3 months of combat 6,8?? Hit-
lerite snldiers and officers had been taken prisoner and 13 pieces, 78
tanks, 36 machineguns~ 13 armored vehioles, 238 o~her vehiales, more than
200 motorcycles, 13 mortars and 2 aircraft had been captured.# For tb,e ~
first time on the Southern F'ront, a group of tank destroyers had come into
being in this division. Mutual cooperation among regiments and battalions
was well organized. Thus it is that the 96th Division could serve as an
example for many.
A little later, upon A. I. Antonov's instructions, the battle experience
of the 2d Cavalry Corps was generalized. Over the signature of corps com-
mander Maj Gen P. A. Belov, the document, "The Use of Large Cavalry Units
in the War with Fascist Germany," was distributed. Tt contained many val-
uable recommendations. Much that was instructive also was contained in
the docwnent about the use of the ist Division and 8th Guards Artillery Regi-
ment of the 9th Army that had been prepared by the front staff, jointly
with artillery specialists.** It analyzed experience in applying rocket
artillery in defensive battles and during counterattacks.
The initiative of the front's staff in generalizing and disseminating
experience in combat operations was approved by the Southern F'ront com-
mander Ya. T. Cherevichenko, military council member L. R. Korniyets and
the political administration, where likewise everything new that waa born
on the battlefield was collected in fragments. The generalized experi-
ence was introduced to the troops. Deputy chief of the front's political
administration L. I. Brezhnev was in charge of this large and important
activity.
~ *Ibid, sheets 107-114.
#TsAMO, archive 228, list 747, document 2, sheet 109. ,
**Ibid, sheets 371-374.
32
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~orm~r ltOMSOMOL'5KAYA PRAVllA correspondents on th~ 5ou~hern I'ron~ M. Ko~ov
~nd V. Lyaekovskiy wri~e ~ha~ L~ I~ Brezhnev, 3.n his mul~i~~o~~c~d ao~ivi~y
on ~he supervision of par~y ~nd poli~ioal work e~ ~he ~ron~, never forgot
abot~~ ~he gen~raliza~inn of advanoed experienoe and abou~ prop~gandizing
~he fnai:s of soldiers ~nd oommanders~ Onoo, in ~he he~~ of the ba~~le a~
~he approaohes to Roatov, upon the advioe of Loonid I1'ioh, they wen~ to
~ L~ Oganyan's bat~ery, whieh had dis~inguished itself in bat~les. Af~er .
several days under the fronti's field oondi~ions, ~he ~journalis~s wro~e a
small book abou~ ~he ba~~ery's in~repid Ar~illerymen. In ~he spring of
1942 ~he Ros~ovskaya Obla3~ newspaper published ohapters from this book
for ~he first time under ~he editorial supervision of brigade oommissar
L. I. Brezhnev. On the advice of Leonid 11'ioh, the manuscript of the
book, "Besamertiye~' [Immor~ality], was sent to the Central Commiti;ee of
the Communis~ Par~y of Armenia. Soon the book was published in the Russian
and Armenian languages. T~ was published also at the fron~ with a eircula-
tion of 50,000 copies. A. I. Antonov maintained oons~ant communication
with the front's political administration and consulted with L. I. Brezhnev
on various ques~ions. He repeatedly was a wi~ness when the brigade com-
missar, in conversations with the commanders of armies, large units and
chasti, and with poli~ical workers, sustained the initiatives of the
front's s~aff.
Among ~he numerous responsibilities carried out by the front's staff, one
of the most important was the organization of continuous reconnaissance.
Secre~-a~ent, surface, air and elec~ronic reconnaissance were used for
this purpose. The intelligence section systematieally organized reconnais-
sance in force, nocturnalsearches and ambushes.
The front's headquarters assessed highly the reconnoiterers' selfless work.
Upon the recommendation of the intelligence section, which A. I. Antonov
supported, the front's military council applied to the USSR Supreme Soviet
Presidium for award of the Order of the Red Banner to the 144th Separate
Reconnaissance Battalion of the 164th Rifle Division, which distinguished
itself in numerous battles. '
The Hitlerites' 1st Tank Army attracted the attention of the front's -
staff. It was necessary to find out completely its role and the designs
of the German Fascist command. Additional data were gathered also about
the commander of the army, Von Kleist. This German general's name was
known to A. I. Antonov. In the General Staff Aeademy he had become ac-
quainted in detail with his views on the conduct of war and on the use of
the various arms and services.
For a long time after World War I, Kleist had been a proponent of the cav-
alry, but then gave preference to tanks, assigning them the main role in
war. Kleist participatecl in battles in France and Yugoslavia. The German
newspapers enthusiastically wrote that the dust of all the roads of Western
Europe had settled on the tracks of Kleist's tanks.
Acquainted with the 1st; German Tank Army's operations, A. I. Antonov and
other staff workers concluded that it had been given the role of a mailed
fist in the south of the U~SR.
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In g~n~ral outline, the enemy's design wa~ elear. gut oer~ain da~~ were
missing~ Th3s was no~hing for wh3oh to raproaoh the reaonnoiternrs~ Anto- ~
nov knew tha~ ~hey were doing evary~hing i;o oarry ou~ a mos~ di~fieul~ '
task. Af~er studying this question in detail, Aleksey Innoken~'yevioh ~
could not help bu~ note that ~he intelliganoe aeotion's s~ruc~ure had some ~
substan~i~l deficiencies, whioh were reflected in i~s w~rk. Of the same ~
opinion also wus ~he chief oP this seation~ Col A. F. Vasil'yev. A. I. i
An~onov directed the front and army intelligenoe specialists ~o prepare a ~
document with proposals for ohanging the structure of the fron~'s intelli- !
gence organs. Soon, in accordance wi~h the repor~ of the chief of ataff~ ~
~he Southern Front's military aouncil adopted a deoision to bring to ~he ~
at~ention of ~he People's Commissar for Defense ~he fac~ that the existing ~
organizational struoture of ~he fron~'s intelligence section, which had '
been developed in prewar days, had many defects and did not provide for
the fulfillmen~ of intelligence tasks under wartime conditions. ;
The mili~ary eouncil's proposals were examined in the USSR People's Commis-
sariat for Defense. The appropriate revisions were introduced into the
~ables of organization of in~elligence sec~ions and the ma~erial support
of intelligence organs with transport equipment was greatly improved. ,
The front's staff constantly maintained contact with the troops. Very
often its workers went to the armies, corps and divisions to carry out
tasks for the military council or chief of staff. A. I. Antonov used
every opportunity to meet as frequently as possible with commanders, mili-
tary council members and chiefs of staff of the armies. He repeatedly
went to the decisive sectors. While within the forces' combat formations~
Antonov showed an example of calmness and the ability to behave when at .
the mercy of the most difficult combat situation. His special concern was
communications, the breaking of which involved loss of control of troops.
On the Sou~hern Front Aleksey Innokent'yevich displayed fully +he quali-
ties of a great staff worker. His deep knowledge was reinforced by great
organizing capabilities. He conceived on a grand scale, grasped the es-
sence of matters immediately and was not afraid to take responsibility.
He taught this also to his subordinates. This is how, for example, the
work of the operations section--the central element o~ the front's staff--
was organized. In each area he found a well-trained officer who took full
responsibility upon himself. He studied and analyzed information r~ceived
from intelligence workers, artillerymen, aviators, communicators and rear-
area workers, and therefore always knew the state of affairs in the forces
and could at any moment answer questions that were given and give quali-
fied advice. A feeling of high personal responsibility helped the profes-
sional growth of ~he workers of the operations and other sections of the _
staff, and many of them, as a consequence, were named to higher posts. ~
In October 1941 stubborn battles were raging on all portions of the
5outhern Front. The lst German Tank Army had broken through toward Ros-
tov. It had to be stopped. The GHQ of the Supreme High Command xeinforced
the 9th Army with large rifle and cavalry field forces. The Taganrog Mili-
tary Sector was created, the forces of which received an order to engage
in defense along the Mius River. In the Northern Caucasus Military
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Dist�ric~~ the 66~h 5epara~e Army was formad, ~o innludn 9 divisions and
i~r~nk brig~de~ Thous~nds of Rostov workers wen~ ou~ ~o build def~n$ive
.lin~s.
The Southern rron~ s~aff under~ook ~he development of a new opera~ion. In
aecordance with a GHQ requirement, the commander determined i~s general
concept. A. I~ Antonov, ~oge~her wi~h ~h~ ohief of the opera~ione seotion
and other responsible staff workers, prepared ~he nocessary estima~ed da~a
and apecific recommendations, which were reported ~o ~he fron~ oommander
and refined and approved by him. For working out speoial questions, ~he
ohiefs of ~he arms and servioes of ~he field administra~ion were involved.
On the instruo~ion of A. I. Antonov, a large group of workers of the
fron~'s s~aff under Col A. G. Yermolayev went to the area of ~he 9th Arn~y
and the Taganrog Military Sec~or. They extended assis~anee in the field
~o the commander in cleveloping several variants of operations of ehasti
and in compiling a plan for use of ~he arms and services and of speoial
ahas~i.
The group returned on 12 October. On becoming acquain~ed with ~he resul~s
of its work, Antonov took additional measures to reinforce the combat po-
tential of the 9~h Army and the Taganrog Military Sector. Aleksey Inno-
kent'yevich proposed that ~he commander subordinate the Taganro~ Military �
5ector to the commander of the 9th Army. This was concurred with.
Soon, over the signature of the front commander, Ya. T. Cherevichenko, and
military council member L. R. Korniyets, a combat order was dispatc}ied: '
"The 9th Army, consisting of the 150th, 339th and 31st and remnants of the
51st, 30th and 218th cavalry divisions, the 26th Motorcycle Regiment, mor-
tar companies and what is left of the artillery will firmly defend the
line Uspenskoye-Matveyev Kurgan-Mius River-Mius estuary and the area
oF Taganrog, without allowing the enemy's entry to the Rostov Area. The
Taganrog Military Sector was transferred to the subordination of the 9th
Army commander effective 1400 hours, 13 October."*
Toward the middle of October advancing chasti of ti.e lst German Tank
Army had broken through toward the mouth of the Mius River. They intended
to cross it without stopping. However, the enemy was thrown back by 10-15
km to the west by a counterblow of the 9th Army and the Taganrog Military
' Sector. And although the enemy succeeded, with the approach of the main
forces on 17 October, to cross the Mius, the threat to Rostov was weakened.
At Taganrog the Hitlerites lost 35,000 soldiers and officers.
" The GHQ followed closely the progress of combat actions on the Southern
Front. Each evening A. I. Antonov presented to the commander a message
for the GHQ that was transmitted ~o Moscow prior to 2400 hours by tele-
graph. The summaries contained all the necessary data, which gave a full
representation of the situation on the Southern Front. In October A. I.
Antonov often had to engage in talks with the General Staff by direct wire.
*TsAMO, archive 228, list 701, document 251, sheet 6.
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~ Th~ ~nemy~ disregardir?g lo~sea oF ~ny k3nd, broko~~hrough ~o ~h~ gou~h. A
~ ~hr~a~ hung over ~os~ov--~ha ga~~ ~o the Nor~h Cauoa~us, ~n 1:ha con~rnl df
~ which ~he Hi~leri~e gener~ls a~tiribu~ed grea~ signifio~nc~. A Cr~rm~n ord-
er ~ha~ fell in~o ~he hands of ~he Sovie~ oommand s~~~~d: "Th~ general
si~ua~ion of ~he w~r requ3res ~he rapid o~oupa~~.on of Ros~ov: 3.n ord~r
; ~o make use of ~he poli~3oa1 impor~anoe of ~he ohief oitiy of Itos~ovakaya
Oblas~; b) ~o ou~ off ~ railroad oen~er and an a3r routi~; c) ~o ~~ar th3s
j eoonomic branah aw~y from the 5ov3~~~ (Ftos~ov is a r~ce3vinR ~nd shipping
; harbor); and d) ~o have here a,jumpoff plaoe for fur~hcr advanoes~"*
During these days ~he Sou~hern Fron~ a~afF worked very ~~~orou~iy. All
~he details of ~he defense of Rog~ov were being ~hought ou~. The ~roops
~ occupied ~he sec~ors asaigned ~o them in acoordanoe witih the plan tha~ was
~ developed. A. I. An~onnv and o~her workers of ~he fronti's s~aff went to
~he 9th Army, which was operating on ~he lefti w3ng of the fron~ and had ~he
i mission of holding back ~he offensive of Kleist's army.
! Aleksey Innoken~'yevich noted wi~h sa~isfaotiion ~h~t the 9th Army command-
er, Maj Gen F. M. Khari~onov, and ~he army stiaff had approach~d orea~ivsly
the execu~ion of the ~ask ~hat had been se~. The defense was built in ~wo
; echelons and an Ar~r~y reserve h~d been earmarked. Speoial attention had
been paid to ~he seo~ors ~hreatiened by tanks. But still the experienced
' eye of the fron~'s chief of s~aff observed certain defects in organiza~ion
of the defense. Soon ~hey were eliminated. Organiza~ion of control of
. the troops was carefully though~ out, and additional observation and com-
mand pos~s were equipped.
i The skillfully organized defense helped the Soviet forces to hold back the
~ enemy's first onalaught. In these engagementa the enemy lost about 9~000 ,
soldiers and officers, 146 tanks and much other military equipmenti.
The battles for Rostov were resumed with new force on 5 November. Soviet
soldiers ahowed exceptional steadfastness and the highest courage. The
136th Rifle Division, commanded by Col Ye. I. Vasilenko, and also the 2d
and 132d tank brigades, especially distinguished themselves. On one day
~ alone, 5 November, the division's soldiers destroyed 29 Fascist tanks. M
order of the Southern Front coromander of 15 Novemb~r noted the steadfast-
~ ness, heroism and skillful actions of the chasti and small units of the
field forces.
In 4 days of strenuous battles the enemy managed to constrict the 9th Army,
; but it could not make successful progress at Shakhty and Novocherkassk.
' Kleist was compelled to stop the offensive. The commander of the Arrt~y
Group South, failing in his original intention to envelop Rostov from the
north and the northeast, decided to seize the city by a direct blow from
the north.
~
~ As a result of combat operations at the Novoshakhtinsk area, the Southern
~ Front forces showed their ability to come to blows with the enemy and
;
j *Ibid, sheet 53.
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tih~ti rh~y h~d t,acome h~rder?ed and h~d ~cquir~d rich comb~ti exp~ri~nc~.
Thi~ con~lugion~ whioh tih~ fronti'8 g~Off dr~w~ refleo~ed tihe high mor~J
~nd oombati ~tate of tih~ fora~~ and tiheir readinesa ~o resolvo tihe moati com-
plic~~ed oombat tasks.
In eonsidering tihis~ tihe eortunand of the Southwegt 8eetor tiurned ~o the aHQ
~ of the Supreme Nigh Command wfth a requea~ thati iti be Quthorixed tio pre-
p~re for and eonduet an offensive operatiion far tihe purpose of defeating
tihe pn~my grouping at Roatiov. On 9 November, the GHQ approved thie
initiiatiive.
Preparatiion for the firat ma,jor offensive operatfon of tihe Sovi~ti forcea
began. A. i. Mtionov pergonally prepared or c~r~fully monitnr~d ~
ulmdst evcsry doownenti. The operationa plan with the varioua 8ti~gea was
work~d outi in detail on maps. The do~uments refleatied such importianti
questiions as assessmenti of tihe enemy~s foreeg and of our own foreee, tihe
purpoge and scheme of the opera~ions~ the tiasks of the front~ the armies,
the ~arge unitis and aviatiion, the organization of mutual actions among the
forces and tihe control thereot'~ and the organizatiion oF tihe varioug tivpes
of combat logfatics.
The operationa section of the plan laid down in detail the sCheme of the ~
operation~ and it contained inFormation about the ratio of the forces and
the concentiration of the front's main attack forces on the flanks of the
enemy's ist Tank Army. The conclusion was drawn at the end: "With cor- -
rect organiza~ion and skillful leadership of the troopa, it fs possible to
count on the success of the operation." On the dooument were the signa-
tures: "Chief of Staff of the Southern Front Ma~j Gen Mtonov, battalion
_ commissar Chernyavskiy acting for the ataff's militiary commissar, and
chief of the operations section Col Lyamin."*
Md other documerlts were worked out with gr~at thoroughness.
At the atart of Nov~mber 1941, at Kamensk-Shakhtinak, where the headquar-
ters of the Southern Front was lo~ated, the commander of the Southwestern
Sector, M.SU S. K. Timoshenko visited. He was aecomp,anie~l.by the sector's
- chief of the operation~ section, I. Kh. Bagramyan. Front commander Ya. T.
Cherevichenko reported the situation. Chief of staff A. i. Mtonov took
part here.
After listening to the report, the marshal asked:
"How is preparation for the offensive operation going?"
A map was on the table. A glance at it was sufficient to see the scheme
of the operation.
"Your work?" asked Timoshenko, turning to Antonov.
*Ibid, sheet 9. '
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~
"Min~ ~nd tihati of offfcerg of ~he ~~afF~~~ tih~ answ~r follow~d. i
Th~ nex~ day S. K. Timoehenko wen~ ~o tih~ large Coegaek village of (3undor-
dv~k~y~~ the laa~tion af ~h~ h~adqu~rtere of ~he recen~ly fcrm~d 37~h
At~y, which w~s egsigned a ehief role in the impending operatiion~ He in-
vitcd A. Mtonov tio ac~ompar~y him and tio ar~novnco ~he plan for the
forthcoming offensiv~ bati~l~s.
Af~ar ~ conf~reno~~ whioh Timoshenko led~ Mtionov and the ataff workers of
the army cheeked on how conc~ntr~tion of the large unita was going and how
its ~~~recy~ upon which the sueaesa of th~ forthooming operatiion~ would de-
pend in no small degree, was befng observed.
Pr~para~ion for th~ coun~eroffensive wenti on during th~ period of activ~
~per~tiions of tih~ enemy, who had broken through tio Ros~ov from the nortih.
A. i. Antanov h~ld conversatiions each day over a direet wfre wftih Gener~l
St~ff representatiive Ma,j Gen P. P. Veehr~yy. These w~re tiaking plaee on 14
Nov~mber~ during the heati of ba~tl~ in tihe Rostiov ~rea. Aleksey Innokenti'-
yevich answered all tihe questiions put tiQ him with exhaustive ~ompleteness.
In ending th~ conv~rsation~~ P. P. Vechnyy said:
"Av~iling myself of tihis opportunity~ i think I musti tell you that th~ Gen-
eral Staff has had a good opinion of the work of the Southern ~ront staff~
despitie the many difficultieg in maintaining communications with us and
some difficulties in peraonnel manning."
~ "Having receive,i this flat~~~:ring eva~uation of the ataff's work from you,
we shall try to work stil]. be~ter," anawered A. I. Antonov."*
~farshal 5. K. Timoshenko returned to Southern Front Headquarters on 16 Novemb~r.
The situation up until this time had be~n very complicated. The Hitler-
ites had intensified the pressure on the Rostov Sector and in the Donbess.
Additional measures had to be taken quickly. in reporting to the marshal
on progress in preparing for the operation, Lt Gen Ya. T. Chervichenko
sa~d that concentration of the main forces of the front's main attack had
not been completed in the jumpoff area for the offens:fe.
"What measures have been adopted for cuncentraing them most rapidly?"
asked S. K. Timoshenko.
"5taff workers under Gen Mtonov are engaged in this right now~" answered
the front commander, and he added: "But it's not all up to them."
"I know. But I think that for Antonov it is po~sible to do the impossi.-
ble," said the marshal.
That day S. K. Timoshenko went to the 37th Army, in order to check on its
readiness for the offensive. 4
*I id, sheet 124.
38
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Th~ ~aeei~~ G~rm~n oomm~nd w~~ confidcsnt ~:hat ~"lightining blow" ati Rostiov
would open up tih~ gaties n~ the Cauoasug tio i~. Chief of the general s~aff
of tih~ ground foroes N~1der wrotie ~n his diary on 19 November: ~~=n gener-
Al, ~ga~n ~ favorable d~y, and KleiBti'g tiank group i8 8t1QQ@88~t1~1y A88&t11~-
ing Ros~ov."
On ~i Nov~mber ~h~ a~rman ~a~nk army entiered Rostov~ But m~anwhile~ ~he
~ountierattack o~ ~he sorrie~ fora~s tiha~ began on 17 November was develop-
ing gueeesafully~ A blow w~a inflie~ed in tihe soutihweati and westiern eee-
tiors a~ tihe rear ~nd f1~nk of tih~ lati aertnan Tank Are~y. On 24 November
ehasti of tih~ Southern Fronti liberatied th~ large Cossa~k vi~lage of Akeay~
On the n~ghti of 28 November Soviet troops burati into the southern outskirtia
of Roatov and tihe nexti day eomple~ely liberatied tihe oity.
Ni~1~r oa~~goric~lly forbade tihe re~reati of the lati Tank Army, buti ~he
~a~cis~ unitia were foro~d ba~k ~o the westi under the blows of Sovieti
troopa, abandoning tianks, guns and ammunitiion. On 30 November ~ommanfl-
er of the Arn~y Group South itundatedt reported to the supreme eommand of
the German ground forces thati the combat eapabilitiy of the large mobile
formation had dropped aharply because of the phyaieal and mental exhaus-
tion of personnel and the ma3or losses, espeoially in tanks, and the ist
Tank Army was not in a conditiion to carry out Hitler's order.*
During the Soviet forcea' counteroffensive tihe ~ascist Gercnan forcea loat
30~000 soldiers and officers killed or wounded, 275 tenks~ 359 guns, 4~438
motor vehicles and 80 aircraft. The Hitlerites' main attack foroe lo~t
its offensive atrength in the stratiegic aouthern aeetor for a long time.
Little known is the fact that A. I. Mtonov wrote an artiele about the
counteroffensive of the Soviet forces at Rostov. Unfortunately~ it re-
mains unpublished. Meanwhile, this article is of great research intereat.
The author identifies ~nd examines in detail the three stages of the op-
eratiion: the preparation for and conduct of the blow in the direction of
Bol'shekrepinskiy, at the rear of the motorized corps of Kleist's ist Tank
Army; the organization and conduct of the counterblow at the main grouping
of this army by chasti of the 3?th, 9th and 56th armies dur_ng the 27-29
November period with the mission of liberating Rostov; and, finally, the
pursuit of units of Kleist's army, which was retreating from Roatov in a
~ westerly direction~ and the battle for the Mius River line.
At the conclusion of the article A. I. Antonov wrote: "The Rostov opera-
tion will go into the annals of Red Army victories as the first front of-
� fensive operation~ laying the start for a new stage of the Patriotic War.
; Southern Front troops, hardened in the struggle and having obtained exper- -
ience in 5 months of stubborn defensive battles against superior enemy
forces, were able as a result of the offensive battles at Rostov, with `
smaller forces, thanks to skillful maneuvering, to strike the powerful
*See "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II~,
Vol q, Moscow, 1975, p 121.
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army of ~h~ Fasoisti G~rman foroe~ of a~n~ral Kl~iati ~nd tio liber~tie Rostiov
from tihe Fasoist aerman oaeupiers who had penetir~tied tihere."*
`~hes~ ~am~ ~huu~hte found refl~o~ion in the ~heses of a r~porti abou~ ~h~
reaultis of ~he Ros~ov operation in the Soutih~rn Front's mili~ary aouncil.
As ~o the aignffioano~ of th~ operation, iti haa been said tha~ this was
_ tihe firati ma~jor defeati of th~ Qerroana~ iti being tihe d~feati of a ratirea~ing
assaulti ac~n~y~ and tihati tihe viotory at Rostiov exertied an enormoue moral
eff~eti on ~he whole Red Arrt~y, having shown brillfantly the s~rengtihening
of itis foroea and itis r~adin~sa for wide offenaive operationa.#
in i972~ in a telegram tio partioipanta of the unveiling of a memorial to
tihe heroes of the battile for Rostov, CPSU Central Commititee General Seore-
~Qry L. I. Brezhnev wrote: "The battles for Rostov in the fall of i941
were historic: here our ~tefl Army ahifted from ~he defensive tio tihe offen-
~ive. The monwnent that we are er;~etiing will reraind new generationa of
Soviet people about tihe wholehearted heroism of their fatiiiars and grand- ~
fatihers~ and the envoya from all the fraternal peoples of our countiry who~
at tihe ca11 of Lenin'~ partiy, rose up to tihe defense of tihe motherlttnd from
the eneaqy. Never will ~hoir feati, the importance of which was enormous for
our country and for all mankind, be erased from the memory of tihe people."
After the rout of the Fascist German forces ati Rostov came ahattering
blows at Tikhvin and Yel'yets, in the Crimea, and, finally, ~he rout of
the enemy at Moacow.
The Communisti Party and the Soviet Governmsnt assessed the Rostov opera-
tion highly. Many soldiers were awarded orders and medals. A. I. Antonov
also was awarded the Order of t:ie Red Banner by an ukase of the USSR Su-
preme Soviet Pr~:sidiwn of 13 December 1941. Soon comrades congratulated
him also on another great event: on 27 December, by decision of the
Soviet Government, the rank of Lt Gen was conferred on A. I. Antonov.
...There are events that leave an unforgettable imprint on a man's life. .
There were mar~y such events in Aleksey Innokant'yevich Antonov's life.
Bu~ still~ the Rostov operation occupied a special plaee among them. It
became a great step in making him into a~reat staff worker. To high stra-
tegic-opexations training were added practical knowledge and the ability
- to plan the work of a large staff. He shared his joys with the comrades
and relatives with whom, prior to that time, he had begun to exchange let-
ters regularly. The faat is that Mariya Dmitriyevna had been evacuated to
Chelyabinskaya Oblast, and Lyudmila Innokent'yevich to Kirovskaya Oblast,
and for some time A. I. Antonov had not had communication with them. -
After lengthy searches, he found his wife and his sister.
On 14 October 1941 Aleksey Innokent'yevich wrote his wife: "For a long
time I could not obtain information about where you had gone. Just now I ~
have received your address. The last time I spoke with you by telephone
*TsAMO, arc ive 228, list 701, document 251, sheet 130.
#Ibid, document 870, sheets 3-10.
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~ox o~~zcraL crs~ or~.Y '
w~~ on 21 July; 1~tier i rAng ~~v~ra1 tiimes buti reoeiv~d ~he rnspone~ ~h~ti _
no on~ ~n~w@r~d. Writie in d~tiail abouti how you are living. 1 am now work-
fng witih p~ople with whom ~ served~~.in 1937. Th~re are few of ~he old
comr~des lefti. There ia much work �~r?d abgolutiely no free ~ime. i ge~
1i~~1~ ~l~~p. 1 f~~1 w~11. Winti~r ig beginning ~lready. Do you have
. warm clotihes? itow is tihe food? How i~ your health? t oannot write often~
but do noti worry abouti me for a minute, everything is all righti.~'
And here are lines from a let~er tio hia sis~er on 9 Apri1 1942: "You ~an
congratulatie me on tihe Ord~r of tihe Red Benner; i received i~ for the
ttostiov operatiion ~nd tihe defeat nf General Kleist'a ~ank army. They wrote
abou~ i~ in tihe newapapera at one time. This was the firati ma,jor defeat
for the aermana."
Aleks~y Innokent'yevich always did a lo~ of work and he worked a~renuous-
ly. Thig ~ffecti~d his h~al~h. Sometimes~ moat frequentily a~ night~ he
fel~ indisposed and h~d a bad headache. Buti no one ever heard a oomplaint
from t~im.
~ The new year of 1942 found A. I. Antonov summing up the results of the
Rostov offensive operation. Documents on the planning and execution of
the operation were prepared and sent to the General Staff and to the Peo-
ple's Commissariat of Defense, and proposals for improving ~he organiza-
tional structure of the forces were introduced. The fa11 and winter bat-
tles indicated that it was difficult for ~rmy commanders to control a _
large number of large uni.ts and reinforced chasti. Staff workers and the
military council came to the conclusion that it was neoessary to restore
the corps system. The satne suggestions also came from other Pronts. Soon
the corps system was reestablished.
A suggestion also was introduced about improving the use of PVO resources.
"The experience of the war indicates," it was said in a document sent to
the People's Commissariat for Defense, "~hat the organization of PVO bri-
gate regions that are intended for the defense of fixed facilities of the
country's interior did not justify itself under the conditions of front
operations."* It was proposed to establish separate mobile PVO brigades.
A little later, on il April 1942, the front's staff prepared a decision
to concentrate the conduct of all organizational measures in one set of
hands, and, at the suggestion of A. I. Antonov, it was adopted by the mili-
tary council. This decision said, in partieular, "Ten months of experi-
ence of the war with the Fascist Germans has indicated that all the organi-
zational measures conducted in the front should be concentrated in other
hands and an assistant commander for organizational matters should be re-
sponsible to the military council for timeliness and quality in conducting
them. During the process of war it was found necessary not only to estab-
lish new units but also to re-create whole large formations, to man them
flexibly and rapidly, to supply them with materiel, and, most important,
to put them together militarily.
*TsAMO, archive 228, list 747, document 2, sheet 290.
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"How~v~r, ~a a consoqu~no~ of ~he diapcrsion of funotiiong for tihe various
~dministir~~3ons and ~~ations, tiher~ is a~ ye~ no uniform flexibil3~y in
qu~stiions of oonduatiing th~ m~a~ures contiempla~ed by tihe front's mili~~ry
oouncil, which ia ~lso tielling on ~he atate of ~he Forcea and the3r oombati
~ctiivi~y.
Witih a vi~w tio elimina~ing ~he ahortoomings disoovered, ~he mili~ary coun-
ci1 aubordinated ~he se~tiion for manning ~he fron~'s s~aff and ~he seotiion
for oombat ~raining ~o tihe ass3s~ant front commander for organiza~ional
mat~ers. Aftier this, organixational measures, deapi~e tiheir vast seope~
were conduotied completiely satiiafaetorily. The oomba~ ~raining oF young
soldiers improved greatly~ and ~the large units and ohas~i were manned
rapidly.
The work of ~he fron~'s a~aff ~o generalize combat experience was no~ed
by the General 5~aff and ~he Commander of the Soutihern Front, R. Ya.
Malinovskiy, who had relieved Col Gen Ya. T. Chereviohenko ati this pos~ at
the end of December 1941. Back in Deoember 1941 he approved all the
staff's measures ~hat were aimed a~ equipping the forees and command and
politiical personnel with the war's experience, oonsidering them to b~ use~
ful and necessary. The coromander ~ook steps to introduce ~his valuable
experience in~o the practice of instructing the troops. For thia purpose,
exercises with supervisory personnel of front and army staffs were organ-
ized. A. I. Antonov conducted many of them. Thus, the requirements of
the party Central Committee and the Supreme High Command to master the
experience of the war and to teach tihe art of smashing the enemy and of
being prepared for decisive defeats of the Fascist German invaders were
carried out.
Along with the generalization of combat experience, the front's staff was
preparing for the Barvenkovo offensive operation. Aleksey Innokent'yevich
and his closest assistants again sat down at the maps, to prepare opera-
tions documents and to determine the forces and resources necessary for
conducting it. Reconnaissance of the enemy's formatian was conducted more
actively. Combat training under winter conditions was being promoted
everywhere in the forces. A rigid sch~dule of traini.:~g for the operation
was made up. Aleksey Innokent'yevich did not allow the slightest depar-
ture from it. Proceeding from the general situation, the GHQ of the Su-
preme High Command planned to promote the offensive for the purpose of de-
feating the southern troop formations of the enemy and moving Soviet for-
ces to the line of the Dnepr and its lower course.# This design was to be
executed by troops of two fronts--the Southwestern and the Southern.
The Soviet forces' offensive in the southwestern area began 18 January and
continued until 31 January 1942. In the course of the battles, the South-
ern Front's staff, and A. I. Antonov in particular, acquired the experi-
ence of planning and executing troop operations on two fronts. The value
of this experience lay in the fact that it was acquired under complicated
*Ibid, sheets 433-434.
#See "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny, 1939-1945," Vol 4, p 319.
42
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oondi~ions~ ~vhen offene3ve opera~ions wer~ be3ng oonduo~ed in an absenoe _
of a genoral superiority in foroes over ~he enen~y, eapeoially in the
equipping of the foraas.
Eaoh opera~ion enriohed A. Antonov wi~h knew knowledge and findings.
One of ~hem was no~ tio disperse foroes bu~ ~o oonoen~rate ~hem on ~he
ma3n axis.
The ba~ti1~ for the Caucasus, which g~artied a~ ~he end of July 1942, was ~
developing witih ever,ir~creasing intienaity. Army aroup A~ using ftis ttu-
merical superiori~y, pushed in ~he aeoond half of July to the lower oourae
of the Don. In the Rostiov region tihe fii~lerite oommand undertook an at-
~empt tio enoir~le Southern Fron~ foroes. But the latiter roanaged to esoape
the enemy's enoiroling blow and by 24 July had gone beyond ~he Don.
During ~heae dqys the fronti~s staff prepared d~~a for tih~ commar~der about tihe
enemy's groupings of foroes and resources~ the statius of our own ~oroes
tha~ were olose to the defenaive line, and ~he forming of reservea.
A few large formations of the Southern Fronti did not withstand tihe on-
slaught of the enemy's large tiank forees and began to go to the south and
southeasti. With a view tio atrengthening leadership over the forcea in the
North Caucasus, ~he GHQ of the Supreme High Command on 28 July united the
forces of the North Caucasus and the Southern Front into one North Cau-
casus Front under the command of MSU S. M. Budennyy.~ A. I. Mtonov was
named chief of staff of the front. Almoat all the seetions and administra-
tions of the former Sou~hern Front made up the new staff. Aleksey Inno-
~ kent'yevieh had worked witih Marahal S. M. Budennyy in the Moscow Military
District, so they knew each other well.
With the formation of the new front, the staff's work was complieated.
F'or cnnvenience of control, two operations groups were ereated within the
front: the Don Group under the command of Lt Gen R. Ya. Malinovsky~ and
the Primorskaya Group under the command of Col Gen Ya. T. Cherevichenko.
The first protected the Stavropol' sector, the second the Krasnodar see-
tor. T!:e front's staff had to provide command data for the decision$ to
be adopted under the eomplieated conditions of eontinuous eombat. One ean
judg~ the tenseness of the work durfng this period by A. I. Mtonov's let-
ter to his wife. In September 1942 he wrote: "Reoently there has been
very much work. As a rule, I lie down to sleep no earlier tha~n 0500 hours
and by 0900 hours I am already up. During the dqy you make a mental note
to write, but you are no longer in a position to do so. Therefore, do not
worry if I am not always punctual."
The battle for the Caucasus occupies a prominent place in the Great Patriotic
War. The combat actions between the Black and Caspian seas continued for
about 15 months and have gone down into the history of the Soviet militery
art as a complicated set of defensive and offensive operations. To A. I.
*See "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945,"
[History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945~,
Vol 2, Moscow, 1963, p 457� 43
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Antonov'~ 10~ Ch~ was n~m~d ohi~f of s~~ff af tih~ ~1~ok 3~~ areup of ~nr-
ce~) f~11 ~n ~normous ~rtrt?oun~ of work. H~ re~i~d upon hi~ ologa~~ h~lp~rs:
~hief of ~h~ ep~r~~~on~ s~c~#.on Ca1 P~ M. Ko~ova-L~~~n~kov, his depu~y L~
Co1 N. N. 3mirnov, ~h~ ehi~f of ~h~ in~ellig~no~ e~o~ion, ehi~f of the
~eati~n f~r fdrtiFi~d r~gidng C~I D. M~ Ma,~lyuk~ and ~thar~. tn th~ 81~~k ,
- 9ea aroup of Forees Alekaey ~nnoken~'yevioh followed ~h~ aus~om he had
worked outi long ago of eompr~4h~ns~vely and deeply ~nalyzing ~he aotiiong of
~h~ ~n~my ~nd hig forc~~~ g~neralixina th~ experi~noe of batitilea and~ pro-
c~~ding ~herefram, r~oommending ~o ~he oomm~nder~ of ~~rge form~~iona and
chas~i the moat ~ffeetiive m~thods for fighting tihe Fasefs~ Oerman invadera. '
On ~0 November 1942 an informatiional report abouti eertiain t~otiical-opera-
tiona ~onolusions ~ak~n from the experienca of the Black Sea aroup of For-
cea' opera~ion~ frdm S~ptemb~r ~o Oo~ober i942 was sen~ ou~ ~o ~he troops.*
Thi~ doeum~nti gave th~ eharaeti~ris~io~ no~ only of the ehas~i and large ,
fore~~ bu~ ~1~0 ~hog~ of rhe ~m~11 uni~a. Exampl~g ~f ~he skillfu~, ini-
~i~~fve-filled ao~iong of ~h~ Sovi~~ for~~s wer~ ~xamin~d in detiail. De-
fieienci~g were ~nalyxed tihorou~hly.
On tih~ basis of tihe eonclugiong drawn by the atiaff~ tihe military counoil
adoptied two importianti decisions: to ~~rengthen dominatiing heighta, and to
cre~~e a moun~ain ba~tery of RS's [rockets) on handcars.
During this period A. i. Mtonov, like other stiaff workers of the group~ ;
studied the peculiarities of the combat actions of troops in mountain ~
conditions. `
l
The absence of etrategic reaerves on the part of the Faseist Geridan com- i
mand a~ the end of September did not a11ow it to organize an offensive si- $
mt�ltaneously nver the whole Caucasus front. By virtue of this it decided
to inflict several successive blows, one after another, on Tuapse. In '
_ case of succeas, the Nitlerites planned to push to the shore of the Black
Sea~ cu~ the Black Sea Group of the Soviet forces off from the main for- ~
ces of the Caucasus Front, deprive the Black Sea ~1eet of bases and ports~
and free part of their own forces for transFer to other parts of the
front. In order to execute this scheme~ the Nitleritea enlisted the ser-
vices of their main forces--18 of the 26 divisions that w~re on the Cau-
casus Front. "The Fascists," wrot~ General of the Ard,y I. V. Tyulenov, ;
"concentrated several of his picked mountaineer divisions on a narrow
front. Using the amallest mountain passes and disregarding losses, they ~
broke out towards Tuapse. The front's staff faced a diffieult task--that
of working out within a shorti time an operation for defeating the enea~y. ~
Aleksey Innokent'yevich himself conducted thoroughly all the caleulations
of combat actions that were impending, planned the necessary regrouping of
forces and planned the centers of resistance and the directions of the
counterblows."#
The Tuapse defensive operation began 25 September and continued until 20 ~
December 1942. And all this time there Were continuous battles. The ,
*TsAMO, arc ive 276, list 811, document 98, sheets 8-23.
#KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 June 1962. `
44 ;
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g~~ff nF ~he ~1~ck S~~ 4roup of forc~a work~d und~r m~ximum tiunsion, Doau- I
m~nt~ nrc~ssary for oontirolling th~ ~roopg were pr~par~d on tiim~. ;
~
- During ~h~s~ di~~ioul~ days Alek~ey Innokenti~y~vich manag~d ~o r~s~ only ,
~n liour or tiwo in the morni,ng. H~ stqyed besid~ ~h~ ~~l~phone, oovering
hims~lf witih a gr~a~oo~~--goldier fashion.
During tihe Tuapse def~nsiv~ opera~ion, A. i. An~onov diaplayed new quali- ;
~i~s of a mili~ary leader who is ~ble to personally analyze deeply and ~
~~lf cri~ically his own ac~ions and ~hose of ~he staff.
~
Th~ GHQ of the Supreme High Command directed ~h~ main ~ffor~sof the Cauoas- ~
us Fronti tio atop ~he ~nemy offensive and tio hold ~he lines oocupied a~ '
~ny price. In ~o doing, tihe General S~aff pointed ou~ in good tiime the ~
main are~s, on ~he holding of which depended tihe stiabili~y of ~he whole i
defense sygtem of tihe Caucasus. Depgnding upon the aotiual threat, tihe im- i
porrance of tihe sectiors ch~nged constian~ly. Thus, while in Sep~ember tihe
m~in effor~s of tihe Fron~'s forces were concen~ra~ed in warding off tha
enemy's blows in tihe Groznyy sector, in October the Tuapse sec~or acquired
decisive significanee. At the end of October and the beginning of Novem- ~
ber tihe enemy ag~in mad~ ~n a~temp~ to break through in ~he GrozTMyy and i
Makhachkala areas. ;
~
I
It is characteriistiic tiha~ each time the Hitleritea inflicted two blows in j
succession--one on the line of the Northern Group of Forces, the other (
against the Black Sea Group of Forces, stiriving thereby to deprive the
Soviet command of the potential for maneuvering forces. ,
i
The advance of the enemy on each of these sectors created a great threat ~
to the whole Caucasus. An underassessment of one of them led to serious {
errors. This is what happened in the course of the Tuapse defensive op- ~
eratiion. After starting the offensive on 25 September, the enemy had !
by 1 October driven a wedge 10-12 km deep inta the 5oviet For- ~
ces' defense. In order to restore the situa~ion, the GHQ ordered the ~
Caucasus Front commander to create a formation from the reserve and to in- ~
flict a blow on the enemy's forces. In implementing this requirement, the
commander of the Black Sea Group of Forces adopted a decision to inflict i
a counterblow by a formation created at the expense of forces that had I
been drawn directly into the difficult defensive battles; this led to a ~
weakening of the defense in the sector that led directly to Tuapse.
;
- The GHQ did not approve this decision. In an order of 2 October it di-
rected ~hat the enemy not be allowed in any case to break through to the ~
shore of the Black Sea, either at the Tuapse sector or at other sectors. '
M allocation of forces for an operation to defeat the enemy group that ~
had driven the wedge was to be done without weakening the troops that were ~
defending the Tuapse sector. After this directive, the main attack forces i
were created through chasti and large formations that were operating in
plaees other than the Tuapse sector.
!
45 i
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The ~imely in~erfer~nce of ~he GHQ in direo~ing ~he opera~iona ~ver~~d
muoh h~rm. And altihough, as ~he direo~ive emphasized, ~he main cause for
the partial auooessea of ~he Hit~erites was an underasaessment by ~he Cau-
casus ~ron~ commander of ~he role of ~he Blaok Sea Group of Forcea and
~he s3gnif3.oanae o~ ~h~ Blaok 5~~ aeo~or~ neither the military counoil~
~he oommander, nor ~he group's s~aff oould be relieved of responsibili~y
for ~he error. I~ is known that ~he s~aff ob~ains and prepares da~a for
th~ adop~3on of decisions. Cons~quently~ in ~hia oase ~he staff had no~
done everything for correo~ and substan~ia~ed oonolusions. A. I. An~onov
realized ~hat bo~h ~he s~aff and he himself were guilty of the error oom-
mi~~ed. He took measur~s to eliminate ~he blunders ~hat had been oommit-
ted in the work.
Commander of tihe 81ack 5ea Group of Forces Lt Gen Y. Ye. Petrov took
measures that enabled conditions to be oreated for inflicting a oounter-
blow on tihe enemy. A grouping ~f forces was created, and, on shifting to
the coun~eroffensive, forced ~he enemy to retreat.
Because of tihe difficult situation at the Tuapse sector, staff officers
of the Caucasus Front and the Black Sea Group of Forces went out into ~he
field more often than usual to help org~nize control and mutual operations
there. When it was learned that not all ~he commanders had had experience
in ba~tles in the mountains, the group's staff prepared and distributed a
manuul for commanders and ~ ins~ruction booklet for soldiers about the
peculiarities of combat actions in the mountains. A. I. Antonov edited
these docwnents. On the recommendation of the group's staff, regiments.
and divisions began to dispatch to the enemy's rear small detachments that
destroyed Hitlerite points for supply and control.
Measures taken by the GHQ, the front command, and the group of forces
yielded their results. The steadfastness of Soviet troops was intensified.
Cnunterblows followed one after another. The enemy, sustaining enormous
losses, was compelled to shift to the defense. The offensive for Tuapse
was broken off. ~
The Hitlerite forces were severely in need of respite. But they did not
get any. The group's staff was preparing all the calcula~tions and did the
appropriate regrouping of forces for f lank blows. On 26 November, over-
coming the bitter opposition of the enemy� and under the complicated con-
ditions of a wooded-mountain locality, the Soviet forces slowly but surely
advanced. By 1? December the wedge that the enemy formation had driven
in was completely erushed.
. An exceptional stage of the Tuapse operation occurred in the absence of
A. I. Antonov: at the beginning of November 1942 he had been named chief
of staff of the Caucasus Front. Aleksey Innokent'yevich replaced in this
post Lt Gen P. I. Bodin, who had worked on the General Staff for many
years and who died 2 November at the Nal'chik sector.
From the first days of his stay at the new post, Lt Gen A. I. Antonov had
to decide several problems simultaneously: to complete the transfer of
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chag~i and large forma~ions ~o ~he Tuapse geo~or, ~o reinforoe ~he Nor~h-
ern Group of Forces, whioh was oonduoting s~ubborn ba~~les. Here is what
former oommander of the Cauoasus ~'ront, General of the Army T. V. Tyulen-
ev~ wro~e abou~ tho~e strenuous days of work of the headquarters and of
Antonov personally; ~'He spent more ~han one sleeploss night at tna~ t3me
on developing ~he plan for defsnae of the Cauoasus. Md here was some-
thing ~o think abou~. The front s~retohed from the Caspian to Novoros~ -
siysk. The moun~ain passes and ridges and ~he laok of roads made opera-
tional movements and supply of the groups of f'oroes difficult. The enen~y
was pressing. In addition to the oil, he was striving to cap~ure Blaok
Sea ports and ~o localiza ~he Black Sea Flee~. At that time Aleksey Inno- ,
ken~'yevich was alwqys to be ~ound bent over the map with measuring instru-
ments and penoil in hand. He had a speoial style of work oharacteristio
only of him. Aleksey Innokent'yevich knew how ~o ohooae, out of all the
queations, the mos~ important ones, to concentrate on them, and ~o seleot
exactly ~hat solu~ion tha~ would best answer the interests of the
situa~ion.
The defensive period of the battle for the Caucasus lasted 5 months. So-
viet soldiers, after displaying exceptional steadfastness, forced ~he
enemy to shift to the defense and did not allow him to drive to the Cau-
casus or to the Black Sea shore. The Fascist German invaders from Army
Group A lost more than 100,000 soldiers and officers, and the prerequi-
sites were created for the complete expulsion of the occupiers from the
North Caucasus.
Many Soviet soldiers were nominated for government awards for heroism
shown during the defense of the Caucasus. A second Order of the Red Ban-
ner was awarded to A. I. Antonov.
The end of 1942 found Aleksey Innokent'yevich involved in the develop-
ment of offensive operations. As a result of the victory on the Volga,
favorable conditions prevailed for inflicting a blow in the North Caucas-
us. New chasti and large formations were required for the offensive.
All the Caucasian republics readied them. At the call of the communist
parties of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia and of party organizations of
the North Caucasus, many thousands of people took part in the construction
of defensive structures. Everywhere general military training was being
promoted, destroyer battalions were being created, and chasti and large
formations made up of the nationalities were being organized. The Caucas-
ian republics created 19 divisions of the nationalities and 211 destroyer
battalions.#
In the performance of duty, A. I. Antonov often had to appeal to the Gen-
tral committees of the communist parties of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Geor.gia
and the North Ossetian, Kabardino-Balkar, Dagestan, and Checheno-Ingush
oblast committees of the VKP(b), and everywhere he found support. The
*KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 June 1962.
#See "Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyura"[History of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union]r Vol 5, Book 1, Moscow, 1970, p 332.
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republ3ca ~oo1c ~1~. s~eps ~o inorease ~he output of ammuni+ion and mo~or ~
vehioles and the delivery of raw ma~erials for indus~ry and foods~uffs for I
the troops. Questions of milit~ry produc~ion wexe kep~ on ~he agenda of ~
oonferences of the oentral oommittee bureaus of the oommunis~ parties of i
the Caucasian republios. ;
ON THE GENEItAL STAFF I
Once in December 1942 a regular conversation was being held wi~h ~he Chief ~
of the General S~aff. Tt was begun, as usual, with A. I. Antonov's re- ~
port about ~he operational situation on the Caucasian F'ront, but now it ;
ended ra~her unexpeotedly. A. M. Vasilevskiy suggested to Antonov that ~
he transfer to work on the General S~aff as ohief of ~he Operations Di- (
rectorate. Aleksey Innokent'yevioh did not answer right away, but asked
for some days for reflection. He experienced ambiguous feelings. It ;
goes withou~ saying that to work on the General Staff is a grea~ honor.
At the same time, Antonov understood we11 what ~n enormous responsibili-
ty would ,fall on him. Would he be able ~o cope with his obligationa on
the General Staff, and could he justify the faith put in him?
The next day A. M. Vasilevskiy phoned: ~
~~The Supreme Commander has concurred in your nomination,~' he told An-
tonov. "Come quickly."
On li December 1942 A. I. Antonov was named to the post of chief of the ~
Operations Directorate and Deputy Chief of the General Staff. I
...Wartime Moscow met Aleksey Innokent'yevich with abundant snow. He !
recognized it and he did not recognize it. On many streets defensive ~
structures that had been created in the fall of 1941 were still retained. ~
He felt order and discipline in everything. ,
A. I. Antonov met the deputy chief of the Operations Directorate, S. M. '
Shtemenko, at the station. The destiny of these two military leaders had ~
much in common. Joint service on the General Staff continued from the end ~
of 1942 until the end of the war. Their paths came together also in
postwar years. They understood each other's meanings at onc~. Arguments i
and differences in views on various questions also occurred between them,
but they always were businesslike and based upon principles, and they ;
ended with the adoption of a joint decision that met the situation most
completely. ;
The General Staff was a complex military organism with tens of director-
ates and sections and many hundreds of people working in them. It was a
friendly, close-knit collective of knowledgeable and experienced generals
and officers. They did an enormous amount of operational and organiza-
tional work. Not one significant event of any kind at the front got past
the General Staff. Here they gathered the necessary information, processed
it and prepared recommendations an the basis of which the GHQ adopted de-
cisions and then issued directives.
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i,xoellen~ training in mili~ary ~heory~ a olear mind, grea~ self-pogeesaion
and an ou~s~anding oapability for opera~ions work aoon enabled A. I. Anto-
nov ~o prao~ioally run ~he General Staff~ a3noe A. M. Vaeilevskiy was wi~h
the opera~ing armiea a ma,jor portion of the ~ime as a representative of
~he axQ of the VGK [Supreme Command].*
In his first days a~ his new posi~ion, A. I. An~onov go~ aoquain~ed wi~h
the various funotions of ~he Opera~ions direotora~e and wi~h the business
of other direotora~es and seo~ions. He found out tha~ the people with
whom he was ~o work were in conoer~.
Aleksey Innokent'yevioh knew mat~y of the workers. Among them were Chief
. of ~he Main Organizational Direotorate, L~ Gen A. G. Karponosov, I. I.
I1'ichev and many o~hers. He had become aaquain~ed with some of them dur-
ing service in the Ukraine or during exercises and maneuvers, he had
studied with o~hers at the Academy imeni M. V. Frunze and the General
5taff Academy, and he had served with still others 'in the Mosoow Military
Distric~.
Aleksey Innokent'yevich wanted very muoh to meet Chief of the General
~ Staff A. M. Vasilevskiy, to find out about the peculiarities of the work
on the General Staff and at ~he GHQ of the Supreme Command. But at the
time he was a~ the Stalingrad seotor. One question worried him most of
all: how did mutual relations with the Supreme Cotnmander take shape?
A s~rict procedure for reports existed within the General Headquarters.
The Supreme Commander did not stand for general phrases and discussions
but always required clear and constructive conclusions and recommenda-
tions. A. I. Antonov found out that I. V. Stalin decided military ques-
tions in skilled fashion, listened to specialists and treated the General
Staff well.
For a report, the chief of the Operations Directorate or his deputy us-
ually went to the General Headquarters together with the Chief of the Gen-
eral Staff. This circumstance imposed great responsibility upon them.
They were required to know not only all the information that was at the
disposal of the General Staff about the enemy, the situation at the front, '
operational movements and the status of the reserves but also to have
prepare~ recommendations on a number of questions. The situation for
each front was reported on maps spread out on a table. No previously
prepared papers of any kind were used. The person reporting was supposed
to know everything by heart.
"Besides the Supreme Commander," wrote S. M. Shtemenko, "the reports, as
a rule, were heard by raembers of the VKP(b) Central Committee Politburo
~ and of the GHQ. When necessary, the commanders of the arms and services
of the Armed Forces, the Chief of the Rear of the Red Army, and so on
were sent for. They reported and gave information on their own special
questions....
*See "Akademiya General'nogo shtaba" [The General Staff Academy], Moscow,
1976, p 95.
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~~The report be~an with the nature of ~he t~c~ions of one's own foroos
during ~he preceding days. Fronts, armies and ~ank and meohanized c~orps
were designated with ~he family name of the oommand~.ng generals and com-
manding offioers, divisions by numbers. Stalin es~ablished i~ this way."*
Aleksey Innoken~'yeviah prepared himself in every way for his trip to ~he _
Gtneral Headquarters. His firat meeting wi~h 5~alin went formally and
s~iffly.
At the beginning of ,Tanuary 1943 A. T~ Ar:tonnv was sen~ to Bryansk and
then to the Voronezh and Central fronts as a representative of the GHQ,
where he met the Chief of the General Staff A. M. Vasilevskiy, who had ar-
- rived from the S~alingrad vicinity to organize the offensive in the area ~
of Voronezh and Kastornoye.
"Several days before the stiart of the operation," wrote A. M. Vasilevskiy,
~'I decided to send Lt Gen A. I. Antonov to lend a hand to the commanders
of the 18th Separate Rifle Corps. Tn December 1942, he, at ~y request,
had been named chief of the Operations Directorate and First Deputy to the
Chief of the General Staff. I was then at the Stalingrad sector and eould
not present Aleksey Tnnokent'yevich to Stalin. At the atart of January,
A. I. Antonov reported to me at th.e Voronezh Front that he :~ad arrived for
work at the Operations Pirectorate. But, apparently, this activity did
not give him satisfaction, and he had not gone to the GHQ since all the
business of the General Staff was reported there by the Deputy Chief of
the General Staff for Political Affairs F. Ye. Bokov. Naturally, A. I.
Antonov felt uncertain in such a situation and asked me to do everything
possible to return him to the front. I called Stalin and again, after _
characterizing A. I. Antonov as an exceptienally valuable worker for the
General Staff and the General Headquarters, asked that he be allowed to do -
the work directly connected with servicing the GHQ with respect to
operations.
"I. V. Stalin...did not promise me anything and recommended that Antonov ~
be used as my deputy for the Voronezh Front.
"',Tudging by your characterization,' he remarked, 'Antonov will be far
more useful at the front in that period than here, in our offiee work."'#
A. 1. Antonov went to the area of the 18th Separate Rifle Corps, which was
commanded by Maj Gen P. M. Zykov, not long before the offensive. First of
all he decided to check the readiness of the troops for the forthcoraing
battles and to convince himself personally of how well everything had been
thought out and studied beforehand. And there was much that had to be
considered: the -25 degree cold, as well as the frequent snowfalls, the
locality, which was completely open, with gentle hills, and cut up by a
*"Polkovodtsy i voyenachal'niki Velikoy Otechestvennoy~' [Troop Commanders
and Military Leaders of the Great Patriotic War], Moscow, 1970, pg 21-22.
#Vasilevskiy, A. M., "Delo vsey zhizni" [The Job of an Entire Life], Mos- -
cow, 1973, p 282.
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l~rgc numbar nf gullics ~nd rivcre~ th~ et~tug of L�hC enemy'~ dafcnge and
thc availability of' hfg reg~rv~b, ~nd, ~he m~in tihing~ ~hc political and
mor~le stutu~ of' the tronpg~
I~~ the nv~r~ill eone~pt ~f ~he dC~~nsiv~ by ~rdops nf th~ Voronezh ~ronti~
tihe 18th 5~~~rati~ [tifl~ Carps with ~ti~~ch~d ~h~~ti m~da up onc~-thfrd of
th~ main ~ttack fnr~ee. mhe 40tih ~ic1d Artqy and the 3d T~nk Arn?y made up
thc othCr twn-tihird~. Thn formatiiong infliet~d simultianeou~ b1ow~ in con-
v~rgcn~ dir~ctiions.
Prep~r~tior~5 w~nt nn for the aff~nsive b~~ed upon tihis sch~m~. The ar-
tillery w~~ assigned an importient rolc in bre~king ~hrough th~ enetqy de-
fenge. it was to suppress enemy battieries, destiroy tihe numeroug weapon
emplac~ments ~t tih~ forward line of resisti~nce and in tihe depth~ of tihe
deFens~, blind cnemy obg~rv~tfon~ pr,sts and disrupt; eontrol. Therafore,
- A. i. M tonov ~l~o broughti tio the corps commander's atitiention an intensi-
fication of target reconn~issance. Artiill~ry chagtii tihat were intended
for counterbattery struggle reconnoitiered for a bri~f tiime and zeroed in
on enemy ar~illery positions.
Questions of mutual actions among the arms and services were worked outi
with specinl thoroughn~ss. Preparations for tihe offensive were conducted
in the strictest secrecy, with the use of modes o~ camouflage and decep-
tion of thc enemy. The commander of the 3d Italian Alpine Division later
confessed: "We were very poorly informed about the status of the Russian
forces, abouti their fighting strength~ about the quality oF their defense--
more properly~ we knew nothing at all. We had not supposed that the Rus-
sians wcre preparing an offensive and therefore did not pay special at-
tention to these ~mportant questions."*
The offensive bagan successfully. Chasti and large units of the 18th
Separate Rifle Corps, supported by well-organized fire from artillery
and aviation, broke the enemy's resistance and, by the end of the day, on
15 ,lanuary, after a night battle at -25 degrees, the task had been
fulfilled.
~ Subsequcnt battles also were of a fast-moving and decisive nature. After
16 January troops of the 40th and 3d Tank Armies continued to develop the
offensive, embracing, from north to south, the enemy's whole Ostrogozhsk-
Rossosh' formation. The 18th Separate Rifle Corps ground it up into dis-
persed units. By the end of day on 18 January encirclement of the
enemy's large formation had been Completed.
The enemy made despairing attempts to break out of the encirclement but
, was repu:sed. In these engagements the 40th Army and the i8th Separate
~ifle Corps, whose actions had been coordinated by GHQ representative
A. I. Antonov, again distinguished themselves. The large units and ehasti
of the corps and the army swiftly went out to the path of departure of the
enemy and cut off his retreat routc.
*A ci a ion rom: "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovietskogo So-
yuza 19~11-1945" Vol. 3, Moscow, 1964, pp 99-100.
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i
Th~ Nitleritieg were flung from one ooromunitiy tio ano~her~ bu~ ev~rywhere ~
shatitering blows ov~rtiook tih~m. The rem~ine of the enemy foroes b~gan tio
capitiulate. On 27 ,lanuary tihe ~~aciati formatiion had oeased ~o exis~~
FiFti~en divisiong were comple~~ly crushed~ and aix auffered largs loases~
After st~rting on 24 J~nuary, ~he Voronezh-Kas~ornoye operation thus had
gon~ suac~~afully and ended 17 ~ebruary 1943.
Aleksey Innokent'yevich wag ~ti tihe Voronexh ~ron~ untfl the end of Maroh
1943. His aotiivity was highly evaluated by Chief of ~he Qeneral Staff
A. M. Vasilevgkiy and 5upreme Commander I. V. Stialin.
Soon after retiurning tio Moecow~ A. I. Mtionov was summoned to ~he GHQ for
a reporti. I. V. Stialin listiened ati~entively to him. The reporti contained
a corre~t, aomprehensiv~ evaluatiion of th~ situatiion : Isting at tihe '
fronta~ whi~h helped tih~ GHQ tio plan eombati operatiiona in the Orel and
Kursk gectiors, which wore mosti importiant ati that tiime, and, latier, in April
and May, to develop a plan fox opera~iona ati the Kursk salienti.
A. i. A.ntonov began to go to tihe GHQ several times per day. Nis report,:
did not provoke special questiions by the Supreme Commander~ membera of the
VKP(b) Central Committee Politburo, or the Stiate Committce for Uefena~.
Before leaving for tihe GHQ A. I. Antonov did an enormous amount of work.
He tihoroughly analyzed the information that came from tihe fronts and
listened to many generals and officers. The moat important questions were
conrdinated with front commanders. Creative collective work was going on.
it was accumulated in oral reports to the GHQ and in those doouments that
were received there. The GHQ determined the strategic tasks, planngd tihe
combat activity of all the arms and services and diatributed troops and
resources among the fronts. It funetioned from the first days of the
Great Patriotic War under its Supreme Commander, I. V. Stalin. The GHQ
subsequently included the post of Chief of the General Staff, which was
occupied successively by B. M. Shaposhnikov and A. M. Vasilevskiy. This
provided for close working contact between the GHQ and the General Staff.
G. K. Zhukov, an experienced military leader, who was :n charge of the
~ General Staff before the war and in its initial stage, worked for a long
time as Deputy Supreme Commander. In his memoirs, he wrote: "After the
5talingrad operation, direction of the combat operation4 of all command
elements of the Soviet Armed Forces, up to the Supreme Commander, reached
a high level of perfection."*
B;~1943 a definite procedure prevailed for the activity of the GHQ and its
working organ--the General Staff. A. I. Antonov often thought about how
to improve the General Staff's work. First the precision of the opera- .
tions personnel had to be made more precise.
*Z ukov, G. K., "Vospominaniya i raamyshleniya" [Reminiscences and Reflec-
tions]. Vol 1. Moscow, 1974, p 321.
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Th~ workday ~t ~h~ Op~rati~ng Dir~etor~te bag~n ati 0700 hourg. Ati tihis
hnur th~ ~cGtdr ehf~fg~ e~~h of whom h~ndl~d th~ ~ff~irg nf one front~
und~rtioolc tin g~tihcr in~drm~tiion abouti tih~ ~ituatifon durin~ tihc~ pr~c~ding
nighti. Lt G~n V. M~rnnv~ :vho h~d be~n chief of ~h~ westigrn s~atior of
th~ 4p~rratidns nir~ctior~ti~ during tiho~p ycars~ reealls: "We ~eo~or work-
h~d ~ 10~ nf wortc ~~ch day. '~h~ situ~~ion ch~nged rapidly. Th~
enemy did one r~groupin~ ~f~~r anotih~r. And ou~ ch~s~i ~1~o w~r~ in mo-
~ion. On ~rriving ~ti work w~ ~irst refinCd th~ gftiu~tion for th~ preeed-
ing ni~h~; fvr ~ach ~f ua tiher~ w~g ~n inticlli~~nc~ r~pres~ntiatiiv~, and
tog~th~r we r~fined tih~ info~m~tinn ~bauti ~h~ en~n~y ~nd plotited iti on the
map. Th~n w~ cnll~cted ~nd g~ner~liz~d the inforroatiion abdu~ our own for-
ceg. ~vCry~hing w~a don~ rapidly ttnd aocuratie~y. We w~11 knew th~ high
exactingn~sg of ehief of ~he Op~ratiions Directoratie A. I. Mtionov~ his
deputie~, S. M. Shtemenko, A. A. Gryzlov, a,nd, a littl~ latier, N. A. -
Lome~v.
"While w~ warked ~n the dati~ witih tihe repr~sentiatiives of oth~r seotions,
A. I. Antanov convers~d witih the chiefs af' ~taff and personally r~fined _
the ~itiu~tiion. After preparing all th~ d~t~ ~nd plotitiing iti on tihe map,
we went with the reporti to the Aperations Directioratie chi~f. The report
was brief. Antionov disliked wordir.rssa intiensely. With his arrival n~ the
General 5teff many lovers of debate~ quickly began tio refrain fz~om this
custam. 5ome~imes we, the seetor w?~Nkers~ did not say ~ word ~t all--we
checked our map with the map of the c~=rectorate chief that was laid out on
the table. In these cases Aleksey Innokent'yevich sometimes threw a rapid
glance in my direction~ and I answer~d with a nod of my head~ s~ying
everything was in order, with no disagreements of any kind. Md only in
case differences were observed, he said, is it necessary to add anything.
"After assimilating all this work proePdure~ Aleksey Innokent'yevich ~x- -
pressed dissatisfaction with the conduct of the map set-up. It was done
- differentily for each sector, and at times he found it impossible to read
the map without the help of the originator. A. I. Mtonov suggested the
use of unified conventional colors and signs for a definitie time and type
of combat actions. Now it was possible to read the map for any sector
without explanations. This avoided much nonproduetive loss of time for
the generals and officers, and, the main thing, it guarded against
mistakes."
A difficult and rigid but necessary work regulation for the General Staff,
which was observed until the end of the war, was established by the Su-
preme Commander, not without the help of
A. i. Antonov. Thus, Deputy
Chief of the General Staff A. I. Antonov was supposed to spend 17-18 hours
per day carrying out his obligations, with rest time allocated from 050~-
Q600 to 1200 hours. Reports to the Supreme Commander were made, as a
rule, three times per day by personal telephone. At night A. I. Antonov
and S. M. Shtemenko went to the GHQ for the summary report for the day.
They returned at 0300-0400 and gave the necessary instructions.
General S. M. Shtemenko noted that joint work with Aleksey Innokent'ye-
vich was a good school for staff service. Despite the fact that Mtonov
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~
kn~w tihe si~uatiion a~ ~he fron~ ~horoughly~ h~ spen~ 2-3 houre ~o prepare
~ach routiine r~porti tio ~he~aHQ.
All tihe oomrades who knew A. Z~ An~onov f.rom ~join~ work~ deteo~ed exoep-
tional exaotiingness in him, no~ only fn the prooessing of map work but
also of all otiher documen~s. Col Qen N. A. Lomov, who worked in respon-
sible pogi~ions on ~he General Staff's Op~rational Directorate from 1942
un~fl 1962, gaid ~hat Alekaey znnoken~'yevioh's exactingness was apeoial.
He never raised h3a voice, never ordered, but simply said what mus~ be j
done, and, in so doing, often used the expreseion: "I ask youl~~ He ~
lis~engd at~entively tio repor~s witihout interrup~ing. General An~onov al-
mo~t never wrote f~ down, but at ~he same time he remembered i~ a11.
Aleksey Innokent'yevich posaessed an even temper and composure tihat had ,
no~hing in oommon, however, wi~h softiness. He oombined hia oomposure and �
oordiality witih rare firmness and persistence, and a certain ehilliness
in offieial mattiere. A. I. Antonov nev~r tolera~ed superfioiali~y, haste,
incompleteness or formalisms. Promotiona were sparse, and only those peo-
ple who thought and showed ini~ia~ive, precision and irreproachableness in ~
their work could earn them. He valued time greatly and planned hia own '
carefully. Obviously, therefore, his speech was marked by laoonism and '
~larity of thoughti. He held conferences only in exceptional cases and al-
weys briefly. Someone even ealled him a pedan~ in business and in conduct.
But this ,judgmen~ was superfioial. An~onov aotually was principled and '
exa~ting. ' j
. ~
A. I. Antanov did not permit the slightest indulgence toward himself or , i
his subordinates and was a model of self-discipline and maintenance of a ~
high state of discipline. MSU A. M. Vasilevskiy noted thia important
trait of character of A. I. Antonov: "I spent a large part of the time
outside the General Staff, carrying out responsible missions at the fronta ,
for the Supreme Command. But wherever I was, wherever I went, thanks to
Aleksey Innokent'yevich and thanks to his irreproachable state of disci- :
pline, exemplary tactfulness and modesty, and the most amicable mutual re-
lations that were established between us and were preserved until tihe last ~
days, I was always informed in good time and completely about all the main ,
events that were occurring at the front and about the uctivity of the GHQ~ !
the General Staff, and the People's Commissariat for Defense as a whole, '
not to mention also the fact that not one essential question that was pre- ;
pared for the General Staff was reported to the GHQ without preliminary
examination and approval by me....A. I. Antonov's telephone calls to me at
the front and from me to him were made daily."*
iron military discipline in the full sense always existed in the General `
5taff. A disorderly and undisciplined person could not work there even a '
.
day '
Chiefs of sectors and senior officers came to the chief of the directorate,
_ reported the situation and left. A. I. Antonov inculcated in the generals
*"Osvo oz eniye Belorussii. 1944." [The Liberation of Belorussia. 1944]. ~
Moscow, 1974, p 51.
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and oFfic~rs of the~ Op~ratifons Dir~otiora~e ~ lova for ~na~.y~i~ ac~ivi~y
and requirod tha~ thoy makQ deep an~lysas ~nd aubmi~ their reoommendation~~
And such roaommendationa were made inoreasingly. They were considered in
the development of a routine op~ration, but for ~hose ~hat were of great
impor~anc~, creative collectives for de~ailed developmenti were established.
~ormerly the op~r~tions p~rsonnel h~d b~en greatly involved in organiza-
tiional ques~inns. The facti is ~heti at ~h~ s~~r~ of ~he war tihe organs
tha~ were direoting organiz~tional ma~~ers were excluded from the composi-
~ion of ~he Ceneral S~aff, wi~h ~ view to a~fording it relief. They were
transferred ~o ~no~her direc~ora~e, However, i~ soon bec~me clear ~ha~
tihe G~~ieral 5taff could not manage without an organizational direc~ora~e.
Its absience was especially fel~ in ~he spring of 1943, in the period of
prepar~ation for the Kursk ba~tle~ when ma,jor organizatiional measures were
executed, and rifle, avia~ion and artillery divisions were being formed~
and much work to improve ~he organiza~ional s~ruc~ure of the Armed Forces
was being performed. A. I. An~onov invitied his assis~an~s and ~hose who
had made ~u~ges~ions about regularizing tihe organization of ~he staff's
work ~o write out a de~ailed reporti. Then he studied it attentively and,
tiogether with the draft of an order, reported it to the Supreme Commander.
The order was signed. A Main Organizatiional Directorate was created under
the GenerAl Staff.
The chief of the Operational Directorate had many obligations. Bu~ among
them was one, a chief one, upon the solution of which depended the progress
and outcome of the war--that of strategic planning and ~he preparation of
documents for the adoption of decisions by the GHQ and the Supreme Command.
A large group of military leaders participated in the preparation of
these decisions: commanders and members of the fronts' military councils,
workers of the central military organs upon which the GHQ relied. And,
finally, the General Staff and, in particular, its Operations Directorate.
Beginning with the swnmer-and-fall campaign of 1943, A. I. Antonov took a
direct part in planning all the important campaigns and strategic opera-
tions of the Armed Forces.
The first great strategic operation in the planning of which A. I. Antonov
participated was the Kursk battle. He had been well acquainted since the
end of February 1943 with the Kursk area, which the Hitlerite Army had
ravaged. He had been there with the offensive forces of the Voronezh
Front. In February, upon the order of the Supreme Commander, A. I. Anto- -
nov temporarily replaced the GHQ representative in Kursk, A. M. Vasilyev-
skiy. The Supreme Commander ordered Antonov to extend help in the most
rapic~ i;toration of the railroads in the liberated territory of Voronezh-
skaya, ..urskaya and Khar'kovskaya oblasts and gave him the right to cyall
directly to the GHQ.
In February and March, Aleksey Innokent'yevich, as a representative of the
~ GHQ, was in the combat area when the Soviet forces were repulsing enemy
counterattacks. In trying to take revenge for the defeats at Stalingrad,
the North Caucasus and the Upper pon, the Fascist Gc:rman eommand had or-
ganized a rather powerful blow at the Southwestern and Voronezh front
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foreos~ A. I. An~onov speeded up ~he mov~men~ of ~he 2ist Ar??~y to the
Nor~hern Don, ~o `:ake up ~ s~rong defense ~here.
By ~he end of Maroh the fron~ had been s~abilized. Sovie~ forces ~empo~
rarily shif~ed to ~he defense, preserving the initiative for themaelves~
A oalm ae~ in on the Sovie~-German front. On 23 Maroh 1943 A. I. Mto-
nov returned to Mosoow.
The CHQ of the Supreme Command and ~he General S~aff were oonfiden~ that '
the ~'ascist German command would under~ak~ a new a~temp~ to seize ~he
stratiegic initiative from the Sovie~ fo'rces. Y~ was sugges~ed ~hat, for
tihis purpose, ~he Hi~lerite command would try to conduc~ a major offensive
operation in the summer on ~he Soviet-German fron~ against the forma~iona
of Soviet troops tha~ had been deployed wi~hin ~he Kursk salient.
Subsequent events confirmed this. The enemy set himself the mission of -
' changing the course of the s~ruggle on the Eastern Front, of holding onto
the Ukraine, and, especially, ~he Donbass, and of strengthening the bloo
of Fascist states, the cracks in which were making themselves inoreasing-
ly felt. The missions of the Fascist German troops and tho measures for
supporting them in the new offensive operation, which had received the
provisional designation '~Citadel," were l~id down by Hi~ler in an opera-
tions order of 15 April 1943. The content of this order indicates what
importance was attached to this operation: "Decisive importance is at-
tached to this offensive. It should be completed with rapid and decisive
success. The offensive should put the initiative for spring and the sum-
mer of this year into our hands....Each commander and each common soldier
is obligated to become imbued with a consciousness of the decisive import-
ance of this offensive."*
In accordance with a GHQ task, the General Staff back at the start of
April 1943 had issued an instruction to the fronts to use the impassable-
roads season in the spring to prepare a defense of the lines being occu-
pied, to create reserves for the main sectors, and to train the troops.
Main concerns of the party Central Committee, the St~'~~ ~ommittee of De-
fense and the GHQ of the Supreme Command during this perii?~ were the crea- ~
tion of powerful reserves and the accumulation of tanks, aireraft, artil-
lery and ammunition. During these days the chief of staff of the artil-
lery of the Red Army,Col Gen F. A. Samsonov, the chief of staff of the ~
armored and mechanized forces,Maj Gen of Tank forces P. A. Markov, and the
chief of staff of the WS [Air Force],Col Gen of Aviation F. Ya. Falaley-
ev,often visited Aleksey Innokent'yevich in his office. Certain measures
for equipping the forces with new combat equipment and weaponry were dis- _
cussed. Now A. I. Antonov, in daily reports to the Supreme Commander
about the operational situation on the Soviet-German fror.t, told in more
detail than usual about the creation of reserves and about the buildup of
*"Sovershenno sekretnol Tol'ko dlya komandovaniyat" [Absolutely Secretl
Only for the Command!] Dokumenty i materialy [Documents and Papers],
Moscow, 1967, p 502.
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w~~pong and oombati equipm~nti~ 9y 1 April th~r~ wera up tio nine arm~.es in
~h~ r~~arve. mhc~ GHQ m~d~ ~ d~o3sion tio n8~~b13sh ~he R~scrve S~oppe
~ron1;. The aeneral S~aff prapared and th~ General Headquar~er~ adop~ed ~
plan for a Red Army aummer offensive that o~lled for infliotion of the
main blow in ~he sou~hwes~ern seo~or. Soon oonsiderable amendmen~s had ~o
be in~roduced 3ntio tihia plan. Soviet sooutg had managed ~o dieoover ~he -
Hi~leri~e Army'~ pr~p~r~~ion for a huge offensive on the Kurek ~~li~nt~ and
la~er, even ~he ~im~ 3~ was ~o s~ar~. I~ was posaible ~o ea~abl3sh tihe
general 3n~ent of ~he Fasois~ German oommand, ~he mos~ probable axis of
the blows, the format3ona of the foroes that were intended for ~he offen-
sive~ ~he mili~ary and numerical oompos3~ion of the large formationa ~ha~
composed i~, ~nd tihe potien~ial reaerves and ~he datea of ~heir arrival.
~~The Sovie~ Command," wro~e A. M. Vasilevakiy, ~~faoed a di~emma: tio at-
tack or ~o defend itself? A11 ~he posaibilitfea were analyzed 3n the mos~
attien~ive fashion, and all operatiional optiona were studied. The collec-
tive mind and the crea~ive labor of experieneed mili~ary leaders and
ati~ffs from ~he fron~ level to ~he Supreme Command, made wiser by 2 years
of war, helped to make ~he only correet decision."*
Before adopting that deoision, the GHQ asked ~he opininn of the high com-
manders and military councils of ~he frontis, and of Depu~y Suprem~ Command-
er G. K. 2hukov, who, at that time, was at the Kursk 5~lient,with tiroop~ on
~ ~he Voronezh Front. And the General Staff worked hard and responsively.
"All day on 12 April," wrotie G. K. 2hukov~ "Aleksandr Mikhe~ylovieh Vasi-
levskiy and I and his deputy, Aleksey Innokent'yevieh Antonov,prepared new
information for the reporti to the Supreme Commander. From early in the
morning all three had sat down tio ~he worl: asaigned to us and, sinee
there was complete mutual understanding among us, everything was reac~y by
the evening. A. T. Antonov, aside from all his otiher merits, possessed a
brilliant mind for formulating papers, and since both A. M. Vasilevskiy
and I had sketched out the plan of the report to I. V. Stalin, he quickly
prepared the situation map and the plan-map for the operations on the
fronts in the Kursk salient."#
G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevskiy and A. I. Antonov got together several
times to work out ~he details of this plan.
The Supreme Command had decided to oppose the powerful offensive at the
Kursk saliant that the enemy was preparing with a deeply eeheloned, insur-
mountable defense, to weaken the Fascist German forces in defensive bat-
tles, and then to complete his dcfeat with a counterattack. This task was
charged to the Central and Voronezh frontis.
It was planned, after this, to start a counteroffensive with the forees of
five fronts, to rout the enemy's formations that held the richest econom-
ic regions of the Ukraine's Left Bank and the Donbass. A second blow by
the troops of three fronts was to be inflicted on a western axis. It re-
moved the threat to Moscow and to the Central Industrial Region.
*Vasi evs iy, A. M., "Delo vsey zhizni," p 309.
#Zhukov, G. K., "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya," Vol 2. Moscow, 1974~
p 147.
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~~iti i~ difFicul~ tio d~sorib~ ~h~ who~e group of ma~or m~~suras~~~ A~ M~ V~gi-
1~v~kiy r~e~11~d, ~~th~~ w~r~ aonductied by tihe aKO [s~a~e Commititi~~ for D~-
f~n~~]~ tih~ (1HQ~ ~he O~n~r~l S~~fF and directioraties of tihe People's Com-
mi~~~ri~~ Por Def~n~~ during ~he prepara~~,ona For b~ti1;1~ ~ha Kursk ga-
li~nt. 9peoial work was requ~red for thig purp~se. T}1~8 WA8 ~ru1y titanio
- ~tiat~ work. ~ti 3noluded, in par~ioular, suoh measures as the orea~ion of
a multiple-zone d~fen~~ the Kursk ~ee~or wi~h a~ota~ depth of 2~0-~00 j
km; ~he advance of a pow~~ful stra~~~ic r~serve of ~he aNQ--~he 9tieppe
Fron~--intio ~ r~gion ~~s~ of Kursk; a oonoentira~ion a~ Kursk of ma~er3e1 ~
and ~roops tihati was th~ larg~sti for ~he whol~ w~r; tih~ organizatiion of '
speo~,a1 air operatiions tio des~roy enemy communicatiions ~nd to win sup~r3-
ori~y in tihe air; a s~irring up of partii~~n ao~ivi~y w3tih a vi~w to exeouti- ;
ing large-aea~e divergiona 3n the enen~y's rear and ob~ain3ng moat import- !
ant intelligenee datia; ~nd ~he eonduoti of a m~jor seti of ineasurea for the , ;
politioal suppor~ of ~he Red Army's impendi.ng aotions~~~* ~
i
D~y and night, atiaff work~r~ l~boriously co~.leotied and analyzed informa- '
tiion abouti ~he ~nemy'g force~ and tiheir oapabilitie~ and intien~ions. aen- ~
eralixed datia w~re reported tio ~he command for adoptiion of the main deoi- . ~
sions. Not especially lavish in praise, ,A. I. Antonov repea~edly expressed ;
gratiitude ~owards many workerg. Ati one of tihe party aonferenees ati whieh
Aleksey Innokent'yevich delivered a report, he oalled the aituation in the I
Opera~ions Direc~ora~e~ as well as in the whole Qeneral Staff~ ~~exception- ~
ally creative and capable of solving ar~y task that the GHQ of the Su- ,
preme Coromand places before us."
The GHQ and the General Staff paid great attention to the organization '
of intielligence. The disposition of the enemy's chaeti and large unftis
was refined~ observation over the regrouping of his forces was eonducted,
and data about the intientiions af ~he Fasoist Qerraan command and its near-
term and long-range plans were obtained. ;
~
Reports from organs of agent and troop reconnaissance and from partisans
came to the General Staff. This inFormation had to be processed, deeply
analyzed and the proper conclusions drawn, without committing any kind of
mistakes. Fdr the enemy, in preparing for the offensive, was condueting a
whole sygtem of special measures to aereen his intentions: he organized
false regroupings and took many other deceptive measures.
But intelligence is only one part, although a very importFU?t part, of the
work, and there were tens of them in the General Staff, and they all re- -
quired tireless attention and skilled direction. And Aleksey Innokent'ye-
vich Mtonov knew how to direct the collective.
It happened~ of course that great difficulties were encountered in proces-
sing documents. There were divergencies in views ~nd in the strategic
plans for the summer campaign between the General Staff and certain front
cammanders. The Supreme Commander wavered on a number of questions. For
example, on the basis of data received about the enen~y, on 20 Mqy the
*Vasi evskiy, A. M., "Delo vsey zhizni," p 311-312.
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O~noral Stiaff s~n~ tio th~ fron~s~ wi~h I. V. S~a1in'g ~u~horixa~ion~ a
w~rning ~ha~ th~ ~asciat off~nsive was expeo~ed no la~er th~n 28 May.
Thig wr~s now ~h~ seoond warn3ng. mhe Piret, ~o expeo~ an offensive 10-12
May~ w~s noti confirmed. In this oase ~he mili~ary oounail of ~he Voronezh
F'ronti obg~rved ~h~ enemy'a refusal ~o shif~ ~o ~he o~fensive and asked the `
~uprem~ Comm~nd~r ~e ~e~olve ~h~ que~~3.on of inflfQ~3ng on ~he enemy an
anticipa~ory blow. "S. V. 5~a1in was very seriously in~ereated iri this
proposal~ and we--Zhukov, I and Antonov--had ~o make oer~a3n efforts ~o
persuade him no~ ~o do iehis,"* wrotie A~ M. Vas3levskiy.
Varioua npinions exis~~d also abouti the plan for the coun~eroff~nsive.
And ~hese ques~ions provoked disputes: when and at just what momen~
should the operation shif~ to the oounteroffensive? It was impossible to
~ allow the enert~y to infliot great harm on our defending troops. But it
should noti be rushed or emerge prematurely, wi~hou~ bleeding the eneany
whi~e. No few such problems arose for the fron~s and the General Staff.
The direc~ion of the main blow also had no~ been sele~ted right away.
The recommenda~ion of ~he Voronezh Fron~ oommand to concentra~e the main
forces south of Kursk and to atitack in the direction of Khar'kov and Dne-
propetrovsk, wi~h a la~er push to the Kremenchug-Krivoy Rog-Kherson line
interested many at first. This would enable the Army Group South ~o be ,
put out of action and would deprive the enemy of a foodstuffs base and
many important industrial regions, such as the Donbass and Khar'kov. More-
over, Soviet forces would approach the borders of Romania and Bulgaria and
thereby speed up the exit of these countries from the war.
After examining this plan attentively, Opera~ions Directorate workers S. M.
Shtemenko, A. A. Gryzlov, and N. A. Lomov, under A. I. Antonov, came to
the conelusion that it was impossible to adopt it. This opinion was
shared by G. K. Zhukov and A. M. Vasilevskiy. In justifying the conclu-
sions of the General Staff to the GHQ, Aleksey Innokent'yevich said that
the Voronezh Front recommendations had many defects. The proposed plan
did not touch on the center of the Soviet-German front, did not neutral-
ize the enemy's main formation--the Army Group Center, which, with a blow
against the Soviet troops in the southern sector, would threaten the
flanks of the large attacking formations. Moreover, the Kiev sector--
which was important from the political and military standpoints--had been
shunted aside.
.
"The General Staff," reported A. I. Antonov, "is inclined to the idea of
defeating the enemy in the Khar'kov, Poltava and Kiev sectors."
~~Why do you prefer that plan?" asked I. V. Stalin.
"In the first place, as with the offensive at Dnepropetrovsk, the Arcn,y
Group South is eliminated," answered A.I. Antonov,"second,the enemy's front
is dispersed, especially if Soviet forces pusn towards the Carpathians,
*Ybid, p 316.
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and mu~ual ac~3on among his mos~ impor~an~ forma~iong is made di~fioult.
And ~hird, enormous posaibilities are opened up for la~er operat3ona by
Sovie~ foroes."
The GHQ approved the axis of ~he main blow during the ooun~eroffensive I
_ that was proposed and aubstantfa~ed by the General Staff.
Antonov did espeaially much work during those dqys. He did no~ leave the
office even during those hourg ~ha~ had been set aside by order for res~. i
He gr~w ~hin and ~his made him seem ~a11er. To aarry out two funotions-- ~
acting chief of ~he General S~af~ and ohief of the Operations Direotorate-- ~
was becoming increasingly difficul~ for him. The Supreme Commander did ~
not even want ~o hear ahout releasing A. M. Vasilevskiy from his trips ~o ~
the front as representative of the GHQ. There remained only one ~hing: ~
to release A. I. Antonov from his obliga~ions as ohief of ~h~ Operations
Direc~orate, so he could occupy himself only with managing the General
Staff, and to make him ~the First Deputy ~o ~he Chief of ~he General
5taff. A. M. Vasilevskiy proposed this op~ion at one of ~he rou~ine mee~-
ings with I. V. Stalin. The Supreme Commander, after listening atten~ive-
ly to all the arguments of the ohief of the General Staff, concurred with
him and asked: ~
~
Whom do you recommend to be chief of the Operations Directora~e? I
"Lt Cen Shtemenko."
~~Agreed," the answer followed.
This conversation took pl~ce 19 May, and on the 20th Col Gen A. I. Anto- i
nov--this was the regular military title that had been conferred on him on '
- 4 April 1943--congratulated his deputy S. M. Shtemenko for his promotion
in position.
Now A. I. Antonov was enabled to pay greater attention to the other di-
rectorates and sections, on the precise operation of which the General
Staff depended.
Meanwhile, at the Kursk salient,both side~, finished preparation for a deci-
sive encounter. The decisive events broke out at the start of July. The
Soviet command, attentively following all the preparatory actions of the
enemy, on 2 July notified the front commanders: the enemy offensive should ~
be expected between 3 and 6 July. Everything was brought to complete com- ~
bat readiness. And when, on 5 July, the enemy began the offensive, the
Soviet forces met him fully armed. The Kursk battle had begun. I
The defensive battles of the Voronezh and Central fronts continued until ;
23 ,7uly. One tank army and one combined-arms arm,y from the Steppe Front
- had been introduced into combat while it was in progress. rrom the first
moment of the engagement, the GHQ and the General Staff followed closely
the progress of the combat operations and extended the necessary help to
the fronts in time. The GHQ's representatives--Deputy Supreme Commander
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ro~ n~,ric~nL us~ orr~Y -
C. K~ zhulcov and Chief nF ~h~ Gen~ral S~aff A~ M. Va~il~vskiy--w~re con-
stantly to be found in ~hc battle regions~ A. Z. An~onnv, who w~s in Mos-
cow, maintained communica~ion wi~h ~hem ~11 the ~3me~ All ~hree in ~heir
turn communiea~~d from ~ime ~o ~ime wi~h the Supreme Commander and respon-
sively solved ques~ions ~h~t came to a hee.~.
When, in ~he gelgorod seo~or, the enemy, wi~h a foroe of lnss than z00
~anks and infan~ry, mnved close ~o eh~s~i of ~he 69th Army and, by the
end of 11 ,1uly had push~d ~o ~he Kisilev-Mazikino-Sheyn region, ~he Gener~
al S~aff prepared a GHQ direc~ive to S~eppe F'ron~ Commander Col Gen I. S.
Konev. It was signed by I, V. 5~a1in and A. T. An~onov. The fron~ forces
were se~ ~h~ combat mission of des~roying the enemy's formation tha~ ~~vas
advancing in the Koricha seetor wi~h a join~ blow by ~he 47th Army and the
3d Guards Meohanized Corps from the southeast and by the ist Mechanized
Corps from the north~ The direc~ive defined the time and areas for the ~
concen~rt~~ion of ~hese field forces and large uni~s. At ~he foot of the
documen~ was the pos~scrip~: "Transmit~ed personally to Comrade Konov
12.7.43 ~ti 1.45. An~onov."*
Simul~aneously the GHQ ordered ~he forces of the left wing of the Western
Front and ~he forces of the Bryansk Front to shift on the morning of 12
July ~o the counteroffensive, wi~h a view to defeating the enemy's Orel
formation. The offensive operation ~'Kutuzov" had commenced. The Central
Front shifted to the offensive on 15 July. Its right-flank army received
the mission of defeating an ener~y force that had driven a wedge into the
defenses of the Soviet forces. In pursuing this task, in developing the
offensive to the northwest, it was to envelop the Fascist German forma-
tion from the south and to destroy it in mutual operations with troops of
the B'ryansk and Western fronts.
In striving to hold on to the Orel bridgehead at all costs, the Fascist
command sent new reinforcements to the Orel region. However, the Soviet
Supreme Command had introduced large strategic reserves into the engage-
ment and did not allow the enemy to stabilize the front's line.
At this time the General Staff warned the commander of the Central Front's
troops about a possible withdrawal of the enemy from the Orel-Kromy sali-
ent. On 22 July, an order over the signature of A. I. Antonov was trans-
mitted to the front's staff: "Prepare the 48th and 13th armies for pur-
suit of the enemy, for which purpose: a) have army reserves with attachsd
tank chasti, self-propelled artillery and combat engineers Yn each army,
in addition to creating mobile detachments in the divisions. Experience
has indica~ed that some mobile detachments from first-line divisions are
insufficient, since the main forces of these divisions can organize pur-
suit only in the second half of the day; b) intensify observation and re-
connaissance of the enemy and conduct aviation reconnaissance at
'night more widely, since the enemy begins withdrawal, as a rule, at night;
, and v) in case of a withdrawal, call for parallel pursuit of the enemy
with the wide use of aviation."
*TsAMO, arc ive 132a, list 2642, document 13, sheet 190.
#TsAMO, archive 48a, list 2, document 16, sheet 341.
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The Sovie~ foroes' ofFensive oon~inued suocesefully. On ~he firs~ of i
August Bryansk Fron~ ~roops appruaohed Bryansk, and the Wea~ern and Cen, ;
tral fronts orea~ed a threa~ ~o ~he oommunioa~ions of ~he enemy's Orel
Forma~ion. The same serious danger hung over ~he enerqy'g formation tha~ ,
were concentra~ed on ~he Belgorod-Khar'kov axis. Having been ~hrown baok
by 23 July to the original positions, it reoeived on 3 August from ~he ~
Voronezh and S~eppe fronts, which had commenced offensive operation "Rum-
yantsev," a blow from which i~ could no~ recover for a lotig ~ime. This ;
opera~ion was a component part of the general s~ra~eg3o plan for the aum-
mer campaign of Sovie~ forces. Tts oonoept and purpose oame down to joint ;
' ac~ions of troops of the Voronezh, Steppe and, partly, Sou~hweat fronta ~o !
defeat the enemy forma~ion in the areas of Belgorod and Khar'kov and, eon- ;
~inuing the offensive toward the Dnepr, to cover ~he fords there and to
prevent ~he withdrawal of the Fasciat German forces from the Donbass to ~
~he west.
~
At the ~ime af execution of ~his operation, in August of 1943, A. I. Anto- ~
nov observed that the principle of maxiraum concentration of forces was be- ~
ing violated on selected sectors. On the fourth d~y of the offensive it ~
toas revealed that the 5th Guards Army of A. S. Zhadov and the 1st Tank
Army of M. Ye. Katukov were operating in violation of the prineiple of
massing forces. In the situation report for the night of ? August A. I.
Antonov called the Supreme Commander's attention to this. An instruation
, was quickly sent to the Voronezh Front commander, N. F~ Batutin~ about
the impermissibility of dispersing forces. On the night of 10 Auguat
A. I. Antonov, in the name of the GHQ, sent still another telegram, this `
time addressed to GHQ representative G. K. Zhukov. The subject again was ;
the necessity for concentrating tank army troops on definite axes. i
However, the situation received an unexpected development. The enemy in-
troduced reserves into action, mainly tank divisions and struck fairly ~ i
powerful counterblows. From 11 to 20 August, bitter battles were conduct- i
ed in the region of Bogodukhov and Akhtyrka. Voronezh Front forces suf- ~
fered substantial losses.
. ;
In the situation report to the Supreme Commander on the night of 22 . ~
August, A. I. Antonov drew the conclusion that the potential for pushing
to the rear of the enemy's Khar'kov formation had worsened. This oceurred
because the command of the front had overlooked the impending threat. The i
- advance of the attacking forces had been continued without adequate rein- ;
forcements of the lines that had been won and without support o� the '
flanks.
~
i
After listening to the report, I. V. Stalin right then dictated a direc- j
tive to the Voronez Front commander, N. F. Batutin. The main thought of i
the directive was that an advance during the course of the offensive i
should not be transformed into an end in itself. An offensive without a j
consolidation of a success and firm support for the flanks against assault ;
formations would lead to a dispersal of forces and resources and enable
the enemy to inflict blows on the flanks and the rear of the Soviet forces
and to defeat them chast by chast. j
R
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An enemy a~~emp~ ~n h~lt ~he 5oviat foroe~' o~fensive had appexred~ and a
ooun~erblow was w~rded off. 13u~ ~he lesson it presented was oonsidored
for ~h~ fu~ure.
The opera~ion on the Delgorod-Khar~kov seator also was oompleted with the
full defeat of the enemy and the liberation of Khar'kov~
As a r~su1~ of ~he Kurak ba~~le, ~he Soviei: Armed F'oroes inflicted on the
enemy a defeat from which the F~'ascis~ army could no~ recover. -
The ~'ascis~ German command was compelled in rapid order to undertake to
throw ground forces and large aviation forces from ~he Western Front to
the Soviet-German front.
The Red Army's victory in ~he Kursk battle created a strong basis for pro-
moting an offensive in the Ukraine and for broad offensive operations over
~he entire front for ~he purpose of complete expulsion of the enemy from
Sovie~ terri~ory. The GHQ of the Supreme Command had increased the might
of blows on the enemy and was increasingly expanding the frant of the of-
fensive. A. I. Antonov and 5. M. Sh~emenko began to visit the Supreme Com-
mander more often than usual. Ever newer and newer instructions went to
the troops. They were transmitted by telephone, telegraph and or~lly. In
August 14~3 Aleksey Innokent'yevich twice had to fly to combat areas of
the Voronezh and 5teppe fronts. Here he met with the front commanders and
with GHQ representative G. K. Zhukov. A. I. Antonov reported amendments
that had been introduced by the Supreme Commander into the plan for com-
pleting the offensive operations of 1943 and the General Staff's prelimi-
nary outline for the winter campaign. "It was pleasant to hear our Gener-
al Staff's strategic-operations considerations in his expositions," wrote
G. K, Zhukov. "With maximum precision and persuasiveness he analyzed the
status of the German forces after their defeat at the Kursk salient."*
The Hitlerite command still had at its disposal substantial forces for
continuing the war with the Soviet Union. The fact that Great Britain and _
the United States of America had not gotten ready to conduct wide offen- '
sive operations in Europe helped here to a substantial degree. The land-
ing of Allied forces in South Italy did not introduce essential changes in
the deployment of German forces in the strategic sectors.
By virtue of all this, the General Staff considered, and this was con-
curred in by the Supreme Commander, that Fascist Germany, although no
longer in a position to introduce major offensive operations, still had at
its disposal enough forces and materiel to conduct active defensive opera-
tions. The experience of the defeats in the Akhtyrka and Poltava regions,
where the enemy had inflicted strong counterblows on Soviet forces, was
especially indicative of this.
A. I. Antonov drew the conclusion from all this that the Fascist German
command required a stubborn defense of their forces, with a view to holding
*Zhukov, G. K., "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya," Vol 2, p 195.
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the Donbass and ~he Lef~-Bank Ukraine. Under ~hese oircumstanoes i~ was I
necessary ~o promote an offensive by 5oviet foroes on all fronta in tho ~
western and southwestern sectors, wi~h a view to pushing into ~he eastern ~
regions of Belorussia and to the Dnepr and to seizing a bridgehead for sup- ~
porting opera~ions for the liberation of the Right-Bank Ukraine. ~ ~
Soon ~he GHQ, based upon a strategic plan previously developed and refined ;
at ~he scene of battle, set missions for the troopa of the Central, Voron- ;
ezh, S~eppe, Southwestern and Southern fronts: to defeat the enemy's main ~
forces on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, to liberate all oF '
the Left-Bank Ukraine, the Donbass and the Crimea and to push to the Dnepr
and to seize bridgeheads on its right bank. Simultaneously, the main for-
ces of the Western Front and the left wing of the Kalinin front were to oon-
duct the Smolensk operation, to push the front back from Moscow and to cre- ~
ate conditions for liberating Soviet Belorussia. At this same time, the ~
forces of the North Caucasus Front, in a joint operation with the Black Sea
Fleet and the Azov Naval Flotilla, should clear the Taman' Peninsula of the !
enemy and seize a bridgehead on the Kerch' Peninsula. ~ ~ ~
The Soviet Armed Forces shifted to the general strategic offensive with~ut
pause. In August 1943, participating in it were 11 fronts, long-range avi- � i
ation, the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Naval Flotilla. The enemy's front ;
was shaken under the blows of Soviet forces over a vast expanse, from Smo-
lensk to the shores of ~he Sea of Azov.
~
The strain under which the General Staff had to work reached its highest ' I
limit. Each day hundreds of problems were decided. The armies, with mil- I
lions of inen and thousands of guns, tanks and airplanes in motion, required
precise and organized direction. I
'~A great toiler and brilliant expert on staff service, Aleksey Innokent'ye-
vich held strongly in his hands all the threads of responsive direction
over the combat operations of multimillion-man armies," wrote S. M. Shte-
menko. "Through his most rich erudition and, at the time, youthful forces,
he coped with this beyond reproach.... '
~~The high general and, especially, military sophistic~tion of Aleksey Inno-
kent'yevich was shown absolutely in the breadth and depth of his approach
to all questions of General Staff work...."*
One can judge the nature of the activity of A. I. Antonov and the General
Staff at that time by one workday--7 Sept~mber 1943. He began, as usual,
with a study of the changes in the situation on the fronts that had oc-
curred during his absence. Then he met with many of his assistants and
talked with front chiefs of staff. The headlong offensive of Soviet forces
was developing successfully. But still it was necessary to iiltroduce var-
ious changes: to establish new demarcation lines between the fronts, to
reassign certain armies, to make a partial regrouping of the forces. To-
gether with chief of the Operations Directorate S. M. Shtemenko, his depu-
ties and chiefs of sectors of the appropriate fronts, Supreme Commander
*Shtemenko, S. M., "General'nyy shtab v gody voyny" LThe General Staff in
the War Years], Book 1, Moscow, 1975, pp 186-187.
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~ dir~ctiiv~g war~ pr~p~r~d and r~p~rov~d; ~L- 1540 houra ~nd 1645 hours--
, about cstabli~hing ne~w d~mara~~ion line~ betiw~~n front~ beo~use nf ~h~
3UCCCJ~PUL nf~~nsivn n~ 5ovieti tiroops in ~h~ Konotiop sc~otor and in ~he Don-
bass; a~ 1730--about the trangfer of ~he 3d Gu~rds T~nk Army from the GtiQ
regcrv~ tio tihe Voronezh ~ron~ fore~s ~nd coneentiratiing iti by 16 Sep~embQr
in tihe 5umy city ~r~a; at 2200 hnurs--abouti tihe ~ransfer of ~he 61s~ Army
from tihe GH~ r~s~rv~ to Centir~l F'ronti forc~s; and ati 2230 houra abouti ~he
~ transfer of tih~e 5~h Gu~~rda Army from ~h~ Voronexh ~ron~ tio tihe Steppe
Fronti beoause of change in the dem~r~atiion lines between them.*
it is known tih~ti any stiaff, ~ti~rtifng witih ~he batitialion staff and endin~
witih the Ganeral Staff~ p~rforms two funotions. One ig work for the com-
mander~ in ~his cas~ for the Suprerne Commander, and the seeond is work for
the troopg~ th~ satiisf~cti3on oF ~heir needs in accordance witih tihe demanda
of w~r and tiaking in~n account the poasibilities. A. I. Antonov knew how
to enlist all the central and main directaraties of the People's Commiasari-
at CorClofense in the fulfillmenti of thes~ funetiions~ but in so doing he
did not restrict their independence. He emalgamated all tihe efforts of
these dir~ctors through tihe General 5taff. This brought enormous benefiti.
~verytihing operated in one direction, in the interestis of those fronts
which at a given momenti were solving tihe main tiagks or should be solving
them in the near future. This greatly facilitated the Ceneral Staff's
work: the operations p~rsonnel always knew what they had and would have at
their disposal.
Thc selfless toil of G~neral 5taff workers, which was invested in prepar-
ing for and conducting the 1943 operatiions at the Kursk salient, tihe libc:ra-
tion of tihe Left-Bank Ukraine and tihe Donbass and the crossing of the
bnepr, were highly appraised by the Communist Party and the Soviet Govern-
ment. Many generals and officers were awarded orders and raised in rank. ~
A. i. Antonov was awarded the Order of Suvorov, ist Degree, and the Order
of the Ptttriotic War, ist Degree. On 4 April 1943 the title of General o
of the Army was conferred on him.
His c~mrades in service and commanders and chiefs of the front's staffs
congratulated him, reflecting deep respect for Aleksey innokent'yevich.
The summer-and-fall campaign of 1943 was completed with the liberation of `
the Left-Bank Ukraine, the isolation of enemy troops in the Crimea, and
the smashing of his defense at the Dnepr. The vaunted rampart ceased to
exist. The prerequisites for the liberation of the Right-Bank Ukraine had
been created.
By the end of 1943 General of the Army A. I. Antonov had acquired great _
experience in work on the General Staff, especially in planning operations
in which several front participated. The strategic ofFensive of the
Soviet Armed Forces that had been developed at the end of tite summer and
in tiie falr of 1943 for a broad front, from Velikiye Luki to Novorossiysk,
gave enormous food for thought, particularly with regard to sueh problems
*TsAI~10, ~rchive 132a, list 2642, document 34, sheets 210, 212, 224 and
215.
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rhe choicc of direotion o~ ~ha mafn bldw ~nd tihe ~im~1y aonoentir~tiion i
of stirat~gic re~crves in tihe nec~asary geotior. He h~d oome to ~he conelu-
~ion th~t i~ w~a n~e~gsary ~o pl~n mor~ carefully no~ only ~he various
str~~egic op~ratiinng buti ~1gn whd1~ ~amp~ign~ ~nd ~o generalixe ~he exper-
i~nce of militiary'actiiong more deeply. The See~ion on ~h~ Uge of War Ex-
perienc~ ~ha~ existi~d on ~he General Stiaff had a fu11 workload and d3d
much tihat wag ugeful. However, i~ was diffioulti for tihe section ~o oop~ ;
wi~h ~h~ misgiong aseigned tn it. A. I. An~onov m~d~ a proposal ~o or- I
g~nize ~ dir~ctioratie based upon tihis sectiion. A. M. Vasilevakiy and I. V. ~
S~~lin supportied him. Ati tihe beginning of 1944, tihe direetioratie set I
~bout tio develop aids for officers and handbooks for soldi~ra. Coll~c-
~ions of theore~ic~l ~rtiicles on varioug problems were publfshed that ana- ;
lyzed ~verything tihat Soviet goldiers had improved. Special atitention was
d~votied tio generalizing experience in dir~eting tiroops and the mosti effea-
~ive use of tihe rising stiriking and fire power of chastii and large forma- ;
tions. The aids~ handbooks and eollee~ions were published in vast quan- ,
tities, becoming tihe propertiy of generals and officers. Maj Gen P. P.
Vechnyy was in charge of this directoratie.
In accordance with experience that was gained, the struetures of otiher ~
directiorates and sections of the General Staff also were perfectied. A. I.
Antionov supported all the recommenda~ions ~hat would help to improve the
work and to achieve more rapidity and better quality in the solutiion of
tasks. In the summer of 1943 a group of officers of the General Staff
who were in the field was converted into a corps of officers--representa-
tives of the G~neral Staff, with subordination directly to the Operations
Directorate. In the course of the battles at Kursk and the Left-Bank
Ukraine and during the crossing of the Dnepr, Aleksey Innokent'yevich was ;
interested in how this corps of officers was operating and what assistance ~
it had extended to representatives of the General Headquarters. Offi-
cers of the corps were monitoring the precise execution by staffs and
troops of the directives and orders of the General Headquarters, its repre-
sentatives and the General Staff, and they extended assistance to the
troops.
By tihe end of 1943 the question of a third military w~..ter eampaign had
come onto the agenda. Preparation for it commenced in November and Decem-
ber. The GHQ of the Supreme Coromand and the General 5taff, along with di- ~
recting offensive operations at the front, were oecupied with developing
plans for operations for the comin~ winter. I. V. Stalin conversed re-
peatedly about- this over the telephone (in A. I. Antonov's presence) with
G. :C. Zhukov, who was with the troops of the 1st and 2d Ukrainian fronts,
and with A. 61. Vasilevskiy, who was coordinating the actions of the 3d and
4th Ukrainian fronts. He discussed this problem also with the front
cort~manders . !
Back during the struggle for the Dnepr an opinion about a forthcoming
wint~..-r campai~n had prevailed in the General Staff, and on the part of An- ,
tonov in particular. Aleksey Innokent'yevich had written down its prelimi-
nary outlinesin a notebook and had plotted it on a map. They rested on a
firm, realistic base. These outlines considered both the great victories ,
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susti~in~d by ~he 5nvi~~ Armed ~dr~~~ during tha gummer and fa11 nf 1943~
tih~ ~v~r-in~r~asing ~rrival of oomba~ ~quipm~nti and we~pong from tiho n~-
tion~l ~~onomy, ~nd th~e ~v~il~bility ef pewerful ~~~~~~g~e r~~~rv~~ ~ha~
wer~ at the dispog~l a~ tih~ aHQ. Wh~n a~ K~ Zhukov and A. M. Vasilevakiy~
' who had been awmm~n~d by ~he Supreme Commander for the adoption of a final
deeiaion an the win~er eamp~ign, arrived in Moaeow by the middle of Deoem-
b~r, A. I. Antionov pr~senti~d ~o tih~m preliminary draF~s of a plan ~hat had
been d~veloped in tihe G~ner~l S~aff. A11 his b~sio ideas had been dis-
cus~ed here also, 3n ~h~ G~neral Staff.
In making ~l~e final deciaion, as alwqys, members of ~he VKP(b) Central
Commi~tiee Politiburo and ~h~ 5tiatie Committee for Defense took part. In De-
- eemb~r 1943~ ~ti a,jointi a~saion of the VKP(b) Central Comm3ttee Politburo~
the St~~e Committi~g for Def~ns~ and the GNQ~ questiong of tihe oountiry'e
militiary and politioal gitiaatiinn were examined comprehensively. A. M.
Vasilevskiy and A. i. Antonov delivered reportis of progress in the atirug-
gle ~he fron~s and prospects tih~refor. N. A. Voznesenskiy reportied on
questions of militiary ~~conomics. Problemg of an internatiional nature were
analyzed by I. V. Stalin.* The general opinion on tihe tasks for the near-
est futiure came down to the following: tio promotie offensive operations
over a broad front~ from Leningrad to the Black Sea, during the win~er of
1943-44. I~ was proposed tihati the offensive be conducted not in one or
two stra~egic sectors~ as was done in 1943~ but in succession, over the
whole fronti, so that each blow would coroplete the defeat oF a large enemy
formation. The main atten~ion was paid to the flanks of the Soviet-German
front. It was inti~nded to liberate the Right-Bank Ukraine and the Crimea
- and push outi from there in the spring tio tihe state border of the Sovieti
Union. In the north--to defeat the Army Group North, lift completely the
blockade of heroic Leningrad and begin the liberation of the Baltic.
Details of the plan were carefully worked out in the General Staff, where
G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevskiy and A. I. An~onov met daily. They dis- -
cussed for a long ~ime each problem, each detail. They spent the evening,
as A rule, with the 5upreme Commander, where all questions of the plan
were worked out finally.
As is known, the military and political aims of the Communist Party and
the 5oviet Government during the Great Patriotic War were achieved succes-
sively by the conduct at each stage of the war of a number of simultane-
ous and successive combat operations. Those operations that were closely
interrelated by one strategic plan of the Soviet Supreme Command made up a
military campaign.
While in World War I the duration of a military c~mpaign was defined by
the framework of the calendar year, in the Civil War it was eompleted in
a few months. During World War II the content of a military campaign had
changed essentially. Its scope had increased, and the forms and methods
of combat operations had become complicated. A campaign began to include
*See "Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza,Vol 5, book 1,
p 509.
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~ substiantiially larggr numb~r of differen~ op~ratiions ~han had been tihe '
CdS~ it1 tih~ pas~~ Its dur~tiion was s}:orti~n~d~ buti ~he framework of mili-
tary oper~~ion~ h~d incr~~~~d. Th@ oontient of eaoh milf~ary oampaign was ~
detiermined by ~h~ miss3.ona and na~ure of ~he military ac~iong againati tihe ~
~asci~ti German foroes.
In tihe wintier e~mpaign of i944, ~he liberatiion of Sovie~ territory from �
~h~ ~asci~ti German aggr~saors eon~inued. A~eries of opera~ions aesooia~-
~d witih a single stira~egic coneep~ w~s planned and executied. Their purpose
was the defeati of enemy forceg on the whole southern wing of the Sovieti,
German fronti.
Operations were oonductied by several frontis witih tihe aequisitiion of long- ;
range aviation and~ on maritiime se~tors, of naval forees. A atra~egic
operation by a group of frontis was a new phenomenon in tihe Soviet military
art of tihe period of tihe Great Patriotiio War. G. K. 2hukov, A. M. Vasi-
levskiy and A. I. Mtionov had a great role in its development. ~
A s~ratiegic operation in which a group of fronts participated did not ~
emerge all a~ once during the Great Patriotic War bu~ as the extent of
the might of the Sovieti Armed Forces and the acquisition of combat experi-
ence inereased. Its birth can be a~tributed to the coun~erattack at Mos- ~
cow and Stalingrad. During tihe battle at Kursk it had entered firmly into i
the practice of Soviet forces with the execution by them of a strategic '
offensive. '
The GHQ and the General Staff followed the progress of the winter campaign
operations attentively. A. I. Antonov eaeh day deeply analyzed the combat
actions on the active portions of the Soviet=German front and reflected
the changes in the situation on the map. Since the maps of the Supreme
Commander, the Chief of the General Staff and the chief of the Operations `
Dir~ctorate and his deputies were identical, these changes were noted on
all of tl~em simultaneously. The identicality of the four maps enabled ~
the supervisory workers of the General Staff to report to the Supreme
Commander all the changes in the situation by telephone and to react re-
sponsively to decisions that had been adopted. Here i~ what former Col
Gen N. A. Lomov, former worker of the General Staff's Operations Director- ~
ate, said about this: ~
"It was 12 January 1944. Routine reports of the staffs of the ist and 2d
Ukrainian fronts arrived in my offiee. I rapidly plotted the situation.
Antonov came in at that time. Spreading out the map before him, I re-
ported the situation. However, he said little. Aleksey Innokent'yevich -
knew well how to read a map. ~
;
i"Thc front's offensive is developing along parallel lines,' he said. 'And i
it is better to strike like that,' and here he drew two arrows that con- ;
verged in the area of Zvenigorodka. He asked: 1Your opinion, Nikolay
Andreyevich?' '
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~~i glanoed onoe more ati ~he map ~nd ~he arrows. Th~ nex~ oauldron for ~h~
E'agcis~ Qerman forces had been outlined clearly. H~ ~o1d abou~ iti. The
t~leph~ne r~ng. A. I. Ari~andv repor~ed to the 5upreme Comm~nd~r the ~itu-
ati3on ~hc~ is~ and 2d Ukrainian fron~s and our id~as~ I, V, Stalin or- -
dered a direotive to be prepared and ahown to him. The direct~.ve was '
aigned and sen~ a~ 2200 hours, 12 April, ~o the eommanders of tih,g ist and
2d Ukrainian fronti~ and to GHQ represen~at3ve G. K. Zhukov. I~ eaids
'The enemy's groupiiig, which con~inues tio go~on in ~he regions of Sveni-
gorodka, Mironovka and Sme1~ rel~ties ~o ~he opera~ions oF the eontiguous
Flanlcs of ~he is~ and 2d Ukrainian fron~s and is hampering their advanoe
toward ~he Yuznyy Bug River.
"'An offenaive of tihe main forma~ions of bo~h fronts is being developed in
para11e1 diree~ions, buti decisive meagurea for eliminating the enemy's re-
maining salien~ are no~ being ~aken.'* Concrete ~asks were set for the
front tio envelop and destroy ~he Fascist German forces."
The winter campaign of 1944 ended with a brilliant vic~ory for the Red
Army. Many large enemy units were beaten. During the liberation of ~he
Righ~-Bank Ukraine, 26 March 1944 became a his~oric day when Soviet troops
drove on an 85-km section of the Prut River to the USSR frontier with Ro-
mania. When A. I. Antonov reported ~his to ~he Supreme Commander the
latter approached the map, looked closely at the portion of the border
that the Soviet ~roops had crossed, and said:
- "This has begun the liberating missiQn of the Red Arrqy in Europe. Think
with Sheherbakov about our measures."
Then I. V. Stalin proposed to include a short-term task in the ist of Mqy
order: the liberation of the peoples of Europe from the Hitlerite yoke.
A. I. Antonov and S. M. Shtemenko expressed confidence that now, beyond
the border, all difficulties would be rapidly overcome. I. V. Stalin did
not agree with them. He said that the enemy right now is reminiscent of
the wounded beast that has to crawl away to his lair to heal his wounds.
But a wounded beast is even more dangerous. It is necessary to pursue and
finish him off in his den. The Supreme Commander cautioned the General
Staff supervisors against carelessness and said that on the other side of
the border we will meet with kind friends and with enemies, especially
from among the classes that previously ruled and those strata of the popu-
lation that supported them. All this had to be considered in the planning
and conduct of the new offensive operations.
The Red Army's push beyond the USSR border was the start of a new stage of
the war--the stage of the liberation of European states. The Soviet Armed
Forces were to solve new and complicated missions, the essence of which
Aleksey Innokent'yevich understood especially well after a study of the
papers of the conference of the military council members that was con-
vened by the VKP(b) Centra?~ Committee Politburo in May 1944. In these
papers a deep analysis was made of the new political situation that had
*TsAl~iO, archive 132a, list 2642, document 36, shee~~s 8 and 9.
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been added in oonneotiion wi~h ~he arrival of tiha Red Arrt~y on the ~erri~ory I
of frr~ign s~a~eg. ' ~
~
~
H'rom that ~ime, ~he Gener~l Stiaff was oocup3ed no~ only witih military ques- ~
tions but~ ~oge~her with the Main Poli~io~1 Adm3nis~ratiion, also with pre- ;
paring tihe Sovie~ soldier for h3s speoial aituat3on beyond the bordera of ~
hi~ native land. In planning offensive opera~ions in more deta3l~ ~he po-
litiical foroes that were at work 3n ~he region of ~he for~hcoming bat~les '
were considered. ~
;
The successful offensive on the Righ~-Bank Ukraine and into tihe Crimea ;
broke ~he old ~heore~ioal notiiona about the influence of winter and ~he
spring season of impassable roada on military opera~3ons. The main f~roea i
of tihe Ukrainian front were aimed ~t Iasi and Kishinev. The rou~es to ~
Lyublin, L'vov and Bucharest had been opened. The Red Army ocoupied an
advantageous position ~hat enabled i~ ~o bring pressure ~o bear on ~he ~
flanks and rear of tihe enemy's main formations. All this was evalua~ed
posi~ively by ~he General Staff. i
Aleksey Innoken~'yevich was occupied with the development of options for ~
the summer campaign operations of 1944. By this time the amount of his
work was inordinately great, since he had to carry out the obligations i
that entered into the functions of the chief of the General Staff. This ~
was explained by the fact that A. M. Vasilevskiy was absent from Moscow f
increasingly frequently. Like Deputy Supreme Commander G. K. Zhukov~ i
A. M. Vasilevskiy was at the front as a representative of the GHQ. Alek- ~
sey Innokent'yevich maintained cons~ani; communication with the chief of ;
the General Staff and consulted with him on the most important questions. !
At ~he same time, he well understood that he frequently could not divert ~
A. M. Vasilevskiy from the fulfillment of the difficult and responsible
obligations of GHQ representative. Through his richest learning and with ~
the help of experienced General Staff workers, Aleksey Znnokent'yevich I
managed to execute all the basic work. ~
~
The general operational concept and then also the plan for ~perations in ~
the summer and fall of 1944 were worked out in the General Staff under the '
direct supervision of A. I. Antonov. The Decisions of ~he Central Commit-
tee of the Communist Party and the State Conunittee for Defense and the
proposals of the fron~ commanders, who knew the situation in detail, made
up the basis for the plan. At the end of April 1944, at a joint meeting ;
of the session of the Central Committee Politburo and the GHQ, a decision '
about the conduct of a mighty summer offensive was adopted.* The politi- ~
cal aims of this offensive were formulated in the lst of May order of the ~
Supreme Commander. They were: to clear Soviet territory of the Fascist ~
aggresso~rs, restore the state borders of the USSR over the whole line, ~
from the Black Sea to the Barentz Sea, and rescue the fraternal countries ~
of Polar.d, Czechoslovakia and other countries of Eastern Europe from ~
Fascist bondage.
*See "Istoriya K~mmunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza," Vol 5, Book 1, i
p 520. f
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The ~ampatgn w~s conc~iv~d in ~ha form oP ~ ays~em of op~r~tiiona, ~h~ larg-
cgti in ~h~ hi~~nry ~f war~ ov~r a v~gti ~xpanse, from tihe ~altiio ~o ~h~
- C~rpatihians, Sev~ral fron~s wero tio be involved in aotiive operatiions ~i-
mul~anQOUSly. Ati tihe ~am~ tim~ it was reeognized ag d~airable to oondueti a
1F,rge indep~ndenti ope~~~ion in ~he L'vov ~~o~or~ ~nd also ~n operatiion a~
tiho Vyborg and Svir-Pe~roxavodak se~tora. The aummer-and-fa11 oampaign of
1944 wag drawn in de~~i1 in tihig aequ~nc~: a~ ~he s~ar~ of June the Lenin-
grad ~'ronti a~~~cks a~ Vyborg~ and ~hen tih~ Kareli~n Fronti ~join~ in for
th~ purpose of d~feati3ng tih~ enert~y'~ Svir'-P~~rozavodgk forma~ion. ~'inland
should be puti outi of ~h~ stiruggl~ as a resul~ of ~hese operati3.ons. During
the Karelian 1'ront offenaive, tihe offenaiv~ in 8Qloruasia~ which is 3n-
t~nd~d for surpr3~e, should starti witihouti delay. Aftier ~hnti, when ~he
Fascisti Cerman command moves his reserves ~here, ~h~ isti Ukra3.nian Fronti
conducts ~n oper~~ion in ~he L'vov se~tior. I~ was proposed tio conduot ae-
tiive comb~~ operatiions also witih tihe forceg of ~he 2d ~altiic ~ronti~ in
order ~o pin down tihe ~rdops of ~he enemy Nortih grouping. And finally,
wh~n, ~s ~ result of ~11 ~hese blows, the enemy will b~ bled white, ~he ~
offensive intio Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, as well as Hungary, Aus-
tria and Cxechoslovakia, should begin. Th~ defeati of tihe enemy's Belo-
russiAn ~nd L'vov formationa comprised ~h~ main efforts of tihe Soviet
Armed H'orces.
Soviet forces were to inflic~ ~he main blow in a westierly direc~ion with a
view to defeAting the enemy's Center and North Ukraine army groups, the
full liberation of Belorussi~, part of Li~huania and the Ukraine's western
oblusts, and the restoration of the USSR's state borders over the whole
Soviet-German front.
Aleksey Innokent'yevich and his closest helpers undertook ~he difficult
work of developing the bases for the plan fQr the decisive offensive of
_ the summer campaign--th~ Belorussian operation. The commanders and mili-
tary councils of the 1st Belorussian and ist Ukrainian fronts sent their
ideas about front operations.
The Ceneral 5taff saw as one of its first-priority tasks that of convin-
cing the Hitlerite command that the Red Army's main blows in the summer of
1944 would be aimed at the south and the Baltic. On 3 May 1944 the Gener-
al Staff sent an order to the commander of the 3d Ukrainian Front, Gen R.
Ya. Malinovskiy: "For purposes of deceiving the enemy, you are charged
with conducting measures for operational deception. It is nece~sary to
show a concentration of eight or nine rifle divisions, reinforced by tanks
and artillery, beyond the right flank of the front....The re~?ion of false
concentration should be lively, after the movement and disposition of various
people, vehicles, tanks, guns and equipment of the region has been shown."*
A similar directive was sent also to the 3d Baltic Front. Also, the de-
parture of tank armies for the southwest sector was a sort of misinforma-
tion.
*TsAMO, archive 132a, list 2642, document 36, sheet 338.
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~t~uaur~s ~l~o w~re ~~k~n ~o inaur~ e~or~cy of ~h~ Sovia~ oomm~nd's intien- ~
tinng. 1~'nr example, only five p~opl~ on ~he O~n~ral ~~aff w~re 3nvolv~d ,
in d~veloping ~h~ plan for tihe sununer aampaign as a whole and for ~he B~lo- ~
ru~~ian op~ratiion in p~rticular. The operatiional oons3derationg for ~h~ ;
fron~s' st~fFs ~lso were developed by ~wo or ~hree people.
The meagures for mieinforming ~he enen~y achieved tih~ir purpose. Quo~a~ions
from German reconnaigsance reportis abou~ the Sovie~ command's probable ~
pl~ns confirmed ~hig, On 21 M~yr 1944; "The enemy is preparing his future ~
operatiions for galkan d~oisiona wi~h special oare." On 30 May: "The pre� i
gumed operatiion of the enemy in ~he Balkana is oonfirmed anew." On 2 June:
"Signa of an impending large offensive agains~ ~he Arrt~y Group North Ukraine i
are befng observed." ~
gy tihe middle of June ~h~ Hitil~ri~e r~cnnaissanae had ati itis disposal cer-
~ain datia abou~ tih~ conoentiration of Red Army forces in ~he Beloruasian !
sectior, bu~ tihe Sovieti command was able to sereen its prepara~ions for ~he '
offensive so skillfully that Gelen [tiranslitera~ed]~ who was in eharge of ;
Hitler intielligence on the ~astern Front, came to ~he conclusion tha~ anly i
an auxiliary blow would be inflicted against the Center armies.* ~
By 14 May, development of the plan for the Belorussian opera~ion had been I
completed. All the concepts and computations occupied but ~ few pages. I
Gen A. A. Gryzlov wrote the text by hand. A. I. Antonov had worked on the I
maps for about a week. (
On 20 May a new stage of planning for the operation began. Now, this was ~
with the participation of the Supreme Command GHQ, the military councils i
of the fronts, and the commanders of the arms and services. "On 20 May~" ~
writes G. K. Zhukov, "the Supreme Commander summoned A. M. Vasilevskiy, me ~
and A. I. Antonov to the GHQ in order to refine finally the decision of
the Supreme Command on the plan for the swnmer campaign.... I
"After examining the 'Bagration' plan in the GHQ, the Supreme Commander
direated that front commanders I. Kh. Bagramyan, I. D. Chernyakhovskiy and j
K. K. Rokossovskiy be summoned, in order to hear thei~� ideas and to give
final instruetions about developing plans for the fronts.
- "On 22 May the Supreme Coromander received A. M. Vasilevskiy, A. I. Anto- ~
nov, K. K. Rokossovskiy and I. Kh. Bagramyan and, on 25 May, I. D. Chern- I
yakhovskiy, in my presence. The front commanders, informed by the Gen- ,
eral Staff about the impending operations, arrived at the GHQ with drafts ;
of plans of actions for the forces entrusted to them."# j
~
The GHQ greatly augmented the fronts. The makeup of four fronts--the ist, ~
2d and 3d Belorussian and the ist Baltic fronts were reinforced by 3 com-
� bined-arms and 2 tank armies and 8 rifle, mechanized, tank and cavalry '
~
*See "Proektor, D. M., "Agressiya i katastrofa" [Aggression and Catastro- , i
phe]. Moscow, 1972, p 639.
#2hukov, G. K., "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya," Vol 2, p 245. ~
~
I
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corps~ The armies were augmented by 11 c~rps and 5 avia~ion divisions.*
This whol~ enormous mass of ~roops had ~o b~ redeployed and conoentrated
imperceptibly in areas oF combat operations. It ia no~ difficult to guess
what labor this oos~ the workers of the Opera~ione and Organiza~ion direo-
~orat~s and tho chiefs who headed ~he variaus arms and servioes and the
Seetion for Operations Hauling. A. I. Antonov required of them the atrict-
es~ monitoring over the performance of a11 organizational measures. Alek-
sey Tnnoken~'yevich's right hand in solving all organizational matters in
the Belorussian opera~ion was Lt Gen N. I. Che~verikov, who was in oharge
of the Organization~l Direetorate and knew General StafP work excellently.
He had served more than 26 years at various posts there,
In prepara~ion for the Belorusaian operation, as for operations ~hat had
preceded i~ and those tha~ followed, ~he organa that made the plans to
- supply ~he troops with arms, ammunition, combat equipment, fuel and lubri-
eants, personal equipment and foodstuffa played an enormous role. At the
firsti request they gave all the necessary information. Aleksey Innokent'-
yevich always valued their work highly.
Four fronts were aimed at a breakthrough of the German defense from Po-
lotsk on the Zapadnaya Dvina to Mozyr' on the Pripyat'. For this purpose,
' the Soviet eommand created a mighty grouping of forces: more than 1.43
million men--166 divisions, more than 31,000 guns and mortars, more than
5,200 tanks and self-propelled guns and more than 6,000 airplanes.#
Operation "Bagration" started early on the morning of 22 June 1944. Dur-
ing 6 days of the offensive, Soviet troops defeated the enemy's flank
formations at Vitebsk and Bobruysk. Large tank and mechanized units, on
entering into the gap, advanced 110-115 km. The front, which had been
fortified by the Hitlerites in the course of 2 years, began to collapse.
By 27 .1une large Fascist troop formations had been encircled in the areas
of Vitebsk and Bobruysk.
Soon still another enemy formation, which numbered more than 100,000 sal-
diers and officers, was encircled. This became possible thanks to the
skillful actions of the 3d arid 1st Belorussian fronts, which had joined up
east of Minsk.
In evaluating the existing situation and the blow of the Soviet forces, as
a result of which the main forces of the Army Group Center were encircled
and defeated, Gen V. Muller, who at that time commanded the 12th Army
Corps, wrote, "But even after the Russians broke through the front unex-
pectedly rapidly at several wide sections during the offensive, we did not
_ draw the only correct conclusion from the situation that existed. Because
of the lack of reserves, it was necessary to break away from the enemy as
rapidly as possible. We, on the contrary, received an order to maintain
*See "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945,"
Vol 4, Moscow, 1964, pp 160-161.
#Ibid, p 163.
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posi~ion, despi~e ~he fact ~ha~ enemy units ~ha~ had broken through had ~
already enveloped us on the flanks." '
However, the decisive factor that occasioned the sucoess of ~he Soviet ~
tiroopa were not thoso errors but primarily the advanced Soviet military
ar~ and excellent training of the soldiers.
During the Belorussian operation the responsibilities of representatives
of ~he GHQ of the Supreme Command had been changed somewhat. They were ;
granted the right of immediate direction of the operations of the front,
which aided in the flexible and responsive control of the forces. Deputy
Supreme Commander G. K. Zhukov supervised the operations of the 2d and
ist Belorussian and the ist Ukrainian fronts, and chief of the General
Staff A. M. Vasilevskiy--the 2d and 1st Baltic and 3d Belorussian fronts.
During the offensive bat;tles, def~cts that prevented execution of the GHQ
directive were being revealed. The General Staff and, especially, its ~
workers who were located directly at the operating armies, did everything
to insure that the errors would not be repeated. A. I. Antonov applied '
himself very attentively to the messages that were sent from the front. '
This is how it was in July 1944, at the height of the Belorussian opera-
tion. At the start of the month, messages began to arrs.ve about serious
deficiencies in the control of the forces, especially during pursuit of
the fleeing enemy. Aleksey Innokent'yevich ordered the Operations Direc-
torate to prepare a GHQ directive, and when it was ready, he and S. M. ;
Shtemenko edited it, introducing essential araendments, particularly about ,
the necessity for the skillful use of radio communications in the offen-
sive and about the intolerability of diverting main forces for the solu-
tion of secondary missions. I. V. Stalin read the directive closely and
signed it, making only one ehange. The directive was addressed to the ~
commanders of the ist Baltic and the 3d, 2d and ist Beloruss~ian fronts.
The Supreme Commander suggested that it be sent to the commanders of all I
fronts.
By the middle of July Soviet forces had driven to Neman, having liberated I
part of Lithuania, and was advancing swiftly toward Brest. The offensive's
front was expanding. In August it already embraced vast territory, from
the P'innish Gulf to the Carpathians. The enemy intensified the transfer
of forces to the Sov~.et-German front. From Germany, Poland, Hungary and
Norway ever newer and newer divisions began to arrive. The enemy managed
to restore the front at the price of enormous efforts. But now he passed
not into Belorussia but along the Narew and Vistula rivers.
"In glancing at the path that was traveled," wrote K. K. Rokossovskiy, "we
saw, with a great sense of deep satisfaction that the group of fronts
under the supervision of the GHQ had executed the Belorussian operation
brilliantly. As a result, the Army Group Center was defeated and a major
defeat was inflicted on the Army Group No rth Ukraine, and Belorussia,
the major part of Lithuania and substantial portions of Polish territory
east of the Vistula had been liberated. Soviet troops had crossed the
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Neman and Narew and approaahed ~he bnrders of ~ast prussia. The F'ascist;
German forces h~d suFfered a major defeat."*
The majeatic summer offensive of ~he Red Army, which concen~rated all the -
enormous experience that the Savie~ had aoquired in the difficul~ s~ruggle
with F'ascism~ was a brillianL�page no~ only in the Red Army's history bu~
also in the biographies of those who ~ook part in it. I~ also remained in
Alekaey Innoken~'yevich's memory. Those were difficul~ bu~ unforge~table
days. He was in a state of creative inspiration the whole time. "Bag-
ration" was developed by the collective forces of the GHQ, the General
S~aff and ~he military councils uf the frants. Bu~ all ~hese efforts had
to be brought together into a unified plan that expressed the scheme with
utmos~ clarity. And A. I. Antonov did this in mar?y cases. During prepa,
ration of the final variant of the plan, he again and again checked all
the calculations, weighing all the pros'and cons. And only after he was
convinced ~hat everything was correct did he sign the document.
~ In developing operation "Bagration," A. I. Antonov showed himself to be a
bright representative of the advanced Soviet military art. Joint work
with G. K. Zhukov and A. M. Vasilevskiy brought him great benefit. He got
much from the daily meetings with Supreme Commander I. V. Stalin, whom
Aleksey Innokent'yevich considered a distinguished authority.
During the Belorussian operation Antonov revealed the organizational
capability of a military leader. All the directors and sections always
knew the deadline and what it was that had to be done. The staffs of the
arms arad services and the rear acted in close contact with the General
Staff. Enormous work was conducted in the General Staff in the prepara-
tion of the GHQ's directives and instructions. Beginning with the memo-
randum that was transmitted to the GHQ on 20 May 1944, in which the scheme
% of operation "Bagration" was laid down and the grouping of Soviet forces
was determined, and ending with the directives about crossing the Narew
, River on 21 August, more than a hundred GHQ directives and instructions
~ were prepared and dispatched to the fronts that took part in the Belorus-
~ sian operation. Many General Staff generals and officers were awarded or-
i ders. In February 1944 A. I. Antonov was awarded the Order of Kutuzov,
ist Degree, and, in ,1uly, the Order of Suvorov, ist Degree.
~ The Belorussian operation was an important landmark in the life of A. I.
I Antonov, in the development of his organizational capabilities and in the
recognition given him for outstanding strategic talents. The troop com-
i manders who came to the GHQ went to A. I. Aritonov prior to going to t~e
~ Supreme Commander and consulted with him on their plans and all the ques-
~ tions about preparation for combat operations. GHQ representativ~es, when
~ sending their reports to the Supreme Commander, unfailingly addressed a
~ copy of them to "Comrade Antenov," knowing that Aleksey Innokent'yevich
j would take all the necessary measures for these reports and on time.
I
~ *Rokossovskiy, K. K. "Soldatskiy dolg" [A Soldier's Duty], Moscow, 1972,
i p 277.
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It happened tha~ he came into conflict with cotnmandars and chiefa of ;
staff oP the fron~s, especial'ly when they asked Antonov ~o allooa~e them ;
additional forces and resources. Aleksey Innokent'yevioh knew how the Su- ~
preme Commander would react to such requests. When A. T. Antonov reported ~
a request of some kind from commanders, I. V. Stalin severely asked: "And
why doesn't he phone me himself? I want to hear how he subs~antia~es his
request." Knowing well ~he nature of ~he Supreme Commandex, ~hat he did
not like to repeat his instructions, Aleksey Innokent'yevich would reoom-
mend additio~~al help for a fron~ o.nly in exceptional cases, when the
situation actually demanded it.
The Belorussian operation strengthened even more the working relationships '
of A. I. Antonov with the Supreme Commander. Here is what the well-known
aviation designer, A. S. Yakovlev, who repea~edly met with Aleksey Inno- ~
ken~'yevich in the State Committee for Defense, writes about this ~opic:
~'Antonov was very close to Stalin, who took his opinion into aceount and
entertained a manifest sympathy toward and faith in him, and he spent long ~
hours with him diseussing the situation at the fronts and planning future
operations.
"Antonov behaved simply, without haughtiness or cor;ceit. He was always
modestly dressed, a khaki soldier's blouse, breeches and boots, and only
the general's shoulderboards betrayed his high position in the army." ,
It was during this period that the Supreme Commander charged A. I. Anto- '
nov ever more frequently with responsible missions and listened closely to .
him, especially on operational questions. Much oftener I. V. Stalin began ,
to turn to him on numerous problems of mutual relationships with the
Allies. The Soviet forces were approaching the borders of European states.
The war was entering that stage when there was a requirement for closer
collaboration with the Allies on the organization of joint military opera- ~
tions. And in this case, the General Staff followed the concept developed
by Marxist-Leninist scie~nce about war.
Theoretically, Soviet war science permitted armed struggle against blocs
of imperialist states, even as a member of a eoa~;tion. This
emanated from V. I. Lenin's instructions about the possibility of "mili-
tary agreements with one of the imperialist coalitions against another in
those cases where this agreement, not violating the bases of Soviet power,
could strengthen its situation and paralyze the onslaught on it by some
kind of an imperialist power...."* V. I. Lenin also taught that, in order
to win victory over the strongest enemies, it is necessary to use every
potential, even the slightest one, to obtain an ally, "even if a tempo-
rary, shaky, unstable, unreliable and tentative one."#
These Leninist instructions were made the basis of many rules for the con- .
duct of coalitional war that were developed by Soviet scientists in the
1930's and 1940's. Literally from the first days of the war, many new
*Lenin, V. I., Poln. sobr. soch. [Collected Works], Vol 36, p 323.
#Ibid, Vol 41, p 55.
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tiasks on interrela~ionships with the Allies arose before tihe General 5~aff,
By the time A. T. Antonov had arrived a~ the General S~aff, defini~e ties
with them had already been developed and an exchange of information ar-
ranged. Iti is true, this qommunication was somewhat rela~iva. The Allies
searcely conduoted actiive combat operations in Europe, no~ coun~ing the
insignificant operatiions in Italy. Beginning with 1944, these ties were
streng~hened, and the General Staff fel~ ~ha~ they must be implemented more
solidly. The ~oreign Etelations Sectiion was gasping under the weight of
the work that was falling on it. In Sep~ember 1944 a diree~orate was cre-
ated, based upon the section. I~ carried out many tasks connected with
the Allies, and it directed questions of the foreign political activi~y
of the General Staff. No dqy passed but what A. I. Antonov handled some
kind of questions connected with mutual relations with the Allies. And
even he himself had to know everything about ~he actions of the Allies.
- During a routine report about the operational situation on the Soviet-Ger-
~ man Front, the Supreme Commander could always ask: "Md what is the Gen-
eral 5taff's opinion of the Allies' operation?"
The Soviet Union was extremely desirous that its military partners partici-
pate actively in the struggle against the common enemy and extend the Red -
Army effective help, primarily with operations on the European continent.
In the spring of 1942 an American plan was prepared for landing forces on
the French shore between Calais and Le Havre. But even the existence of
this plan, which bore the code name ~~Roundup," and then "Overlord," was
intended only for the spri~~g of 1943.
In the summer of 1942 the Soviet Government again posed the question of ~
the necessity for speeding up the invasion of Western Europe. A Soviet-
American communique signed 12 June repeated the formulation previously
coordinated in Washington, namely, "full agreement was reached in rela-
tion to the urgent tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942."*
But the Western powers did not carry out its commitment. And only in
1943, at the Teheran Conference,was the question about opening up a sec-
ond front finally decided.
A. I. Antonov especially concerned himself with the decisions of the Tehe- _
ran Conference, especially the work there of the Soviet military experts.
In ~he second half of 1944 it had become clear that the Supreme Commander
would put him in charge of the Soviet military experts at a forthcoming -
conference of the heads of the three governments. The question may be
asked: just why did th~ Supreme Coromander settle on A. I. Antonov's nomi-
nation? "Stalin knew whom to choose," wrote S. M. Shtemenko. "Aleksey
Innokent'yevich was then, perhaps, the military leader best prepared for
this purpose. He had been, in the course of events, at all the fron~s and
the Soviet command's plans, and, to the extent possible, the Allies' in-
tentions, and all the problems of mutual actions with them, were well
known to him. In addition to this, as has already been said, Antonov was
Vnes nyaya po i i a Sovetskogo Soyuza v period Otechestvennoy voyny"
[The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union During the Patriotir,. War]. `
Vol 1. Moscow, 1946, p 285.
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a very precise man, he expounded hia though~s well or:':y or in writing,
and he possessed ~he gift of saying li~tle and of listening more, which
is an indubitable virtue in any negotiations. In general, he was suited
to ~his job in the best possible way."*
I. V. S~alin sti11 had not said what had to be prepared for~ or what spe-
cific papers he had to take with him, and, naturally, at first, all the
preparation oame down to a study of the situation, and what gone on at
the preceding Teheran Conference. Aleksey Innokent'yevich often con-
veraed with S. M. Shtemenko, who at the Teheran Conference had executed
the daily communications of the Supreme Commander with the General Staff
~ and the fronts and with K. Ye. Voroshilov--a member of ~he Soviel: dele-
gation. From the accounts and the documents that rela~ed to the Teheran
Conference it became clear to A. I. Antonov how carefully he would have to
prepare himaelf for the forthcoming trip to Yalta. He should be ready to
answer any question of the Soviet delegation, give the necessary informa-
tion, and, possibly, also advice.
In the summer of 1944, when the Soviet Armed Forces had begun the libera-
tion campaign in Europe, the Allies opened up a second front. They under-
stood--further delay in starting aombat operatians in Europe would lead to
the Red Army's defeating Germany. And this did not enter into ~;heir plans. ~
With the opening of the second front the General Staff's work increased.
It had to inform the Allies systematically of the relative positions on
the Soviet-German front, coordinate targets for bombing raids by Soviet
and Allied aviation, and determine the dates of operations and the direc-
_ tions of the efforts of the troops and fleets. A. I. Antonov and chief
of the Directorate of Foreign Relations N. V. Slavin began to meet fre-
quently w'.th the chief of the USA's military mission, General ,T. Deane,
and the c:iief of Great Britain's military mission, General Burroughs.
The necessity for more precise coordination of strategic plans also was
felt. And this could be solved only by the chiefs of the states, and
many other problems of enormous political importance, such as, for exam-
ple, the development of a join policy on the German question for the
members of the anti-Hitler coalition, also required solution.
Preparations for the Yalta Conference,-which was held 4-11 February 1945,
had been started long before its opening. These went on at all levels,
from the Supreme Commander to the manager of the Livadiya Palace.
And A. I. Antonov scrupulously prepared for it. He understood that the
Allie~ would be interested primarily in the progress of military actions
on tr.e Soviet-German front, and the Soviet command's plans for the future.
Other responsible General Staff workers, who prepared such information,
were assigned to help A. N. Antonov.
*"Po kovodtsy i voyenachal'niki Velikoy Otechestvennoy," p 34.
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~oK dr~icrni. us~ o~,~
. The Y~lta CnnferCnc~ began it~ worlc with ~ diecug~ion o~ militi~ry qu~stiian~.
Thc chief~ ~C the gnvernmen~s nf the USSR, U5A and Gre~~ griti~in examin~d
the situ~itiion on the Gurdp~an f'rnnts. neputy Chinf o~ tihe Gan~ral 5tiuFf
- ~f' th~ Ited nrmy~ Gensral oF the Army A~ I, An~onov gav~ ~hc informatiion =
~bout th~ ~i~u~ti~n en the Soviet-C~rman fron~. He r~ported ~bout tihe ma-
,j~qtic ncw nfi'~nsiv~ of' tih~ 5ovieti forcea ~ha1: h~d e~ar~ed 12 ,lanuary
15A5, It had originally bQ~n pl~nned for 20 J~nuary bu~ tihe si~uation h~d
introduced am~ndm~nts. A, i~ Antionnv gaid this had oocurrCd by vir~ue nf
- the wnrrigome sitiuxtian tihat had been creatied on the Westiern ~ront by the
nFf~nsiv~ of' tha ~'ascist German forcc~s in the Ardennes~ During tihose dayg
the Prime htinister oF ~;ngl~nd h~d appealed tio tihe Sovie~ Governmenti for
assistance. Tru~ tn i~s duty as an ally, th~ Sovie~ 5upreme Command, de-
spitr incompleto readiness of tihe forces, deoided ~o accelerate tihe shift
tio thc ~Ffenac.
Giving a condcnsed buL comprehensive description of the Soviat foraes' of-
fensivc, A. I. Antonov indica~ed both i~s enormous aeope and great effee-
tiveness. t~or 3 days befor~ ~he op~ning of the eonference, large Red Army
units on L�hc central stratiegic t3erlin axis had pushed to tihe Oder Ftiver
in the !tustrina area and occupied the 5ilesian industrial r~egion. A 500-
km puth in an ~nvironment of bittcr battles had been traversed in 18
dciys. The average pace of the offenaive was 25-30 km per day. The main
routes that connected the enemy's East I~russian formation with tihe central
regions of Germany had been cut ofF. F'orty-five divisions of F'ascist Ger-
m~n troops had bcen defeated.
A. I. Antnnov expressed conjectures about the enemy's probable actions.
Most likely L�he enemy would stubbornly prntee~ Berlin, defend Pomerania
and proteat the Vienna s~ctor. The deployment of ~roops from Germany's
cen~rul regions and from the Western F'ront that had started would be in-
tensiEied. A. I. Antionov reported where and in what numbers the Fascist
German forces could most likely redeploy on the 5oviet-German front.
~ "On our front," he said, "35-40 additional divisions can appear."
Soviet ,ic~~ires as follows were expressed to the chiefs of the American and
E3ritish delegations: to speed up the shift of the Allied forces to the
ofFensive on the Western Front; tio prevent the enemy from redeploying for-
' ces to the Esstern from the Western front, by air striltes on his lines of
communicatians, from Norway to Italy; and to prevent the enemy from remov-
ing his foi~ces from Italy.
In conclusion, A. I. Antonov answered questions of the chiefs of the dele-
gations, of F. Hoosevelt in particular.
in accordance with the desires of the chiefs of governments, the represen-
tatives of the military staffs of the USSR, USA and Great Bri.tain met
daily during thc conference's work, at meeting at which military informa-
tion was exchanged and joint strikes against the enemy during tbe conclud-
ing stage of the war in Europe were coordinated.
,
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The militiary g~affs oF tih~ ~hree A11i~d powerg agreed on tih~ mu~u~l oper- ~
~~inne of stira~~gio av~.a~ion. Coordination of ~he opera~iona w~s oharged '
~o ~he General S~aff of ~he Red Army and ~he nhiefa of ~he Allied migaions
in Mogcow.
Uuring the oourae of ~11 ~h~~~ ~~lka~ A. Z. Antonov displayed enormous
~act and exoeptiional diplomatic ~alen~s~ I. V. S~~?lin wttg ea~igfied wi~h
' A. I~ Antionov's work in ~he group of representa~ivea of ~he s~affs of ~he
USSR, USA and Greati Bxitiain. He espeofally liked Antonov's perai~tently
obtaining a gtiirring up of Allied forceg ao~ivi~y from ~he represen~a~ives
oF ~he American and Sritigh commanda. ,
The mili~ary deoisions of the Yal~a ConFerence played a ma~jor role in the
final defeat Of Fa8C18t GeIfi1R11~r. "Our ~ointi military plans," the commu- ~
nique said~ "will become known only when we exeou~e them, bu~ we are as-
sured that the very close working collaboration between our three staffs
tha~ was achieved at tihis oonferenoe will lead to an aeeeleratiion of the
end of the war."*
5ti11 another military question was discussed and was solved during the
confcrence. A gecret agreement that was signed 11 February 1945 called
for tihe entry of the Sovie~ Union into the war with Japan 2-3 months after ,
the capitulation of Fascist Germany.
Before naming ~he date precisely, General Staff workers and, espeeially, ~
A. I. Antonov, had to do much work and determine what forces would be re-
quired for the defeat of the Kwantung Army, and where and when to redeploy
them.~ The calculations made were so precise that only insignifioant
changes had to be introduced during preparation for the Far East oampaign.
The leaders of the three great powers discussed the questions: of the
occupation of Germany and control over it, reparations from Germany, a "
United Nations conference, and so on. As a result of the consistent posi- ~
tion of the USSR, agreements were signed on the German question that were i
appropriate to the anti-Fascist and liberating nature of the war. ;
I
Other decisions of the conference also respo�ded to the just nature of the
war. Among them were the important position occupied by the Declaration
of a Free Europe--a document about a coordinated policy in the matter of
assistance to peoples liberated from th: Fascist yoke. . +
I
The Polish and Yugoslav questions were discussed at the conference. A. I. '
Antonov, who had had to be occupied in the General Staff with many problems
of the countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, took part in the I
preparation of documents for the Soviet delegation. During the liberation i
of these coun`ries the local partisans and civil population had extended
help to the Soviet forces.
's
~
*"Tegeran-Yalta-Potsdam. Sbornik dokwnen*ov" [Teheran-Yalta-Potsdam. A '
Collection of Documents]. Moscow, 1970, p 186. I
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Th~ comb~~ oollabnratiinn nf ~he Arm~d ~orneg o~ th~ USS~ w3.th ~he ~rmi~a
nf Po1~nd ~nd Yugoslavia h~d be~n born und~r A. I. An~onov'g eyes. Toge~h-
er with tihe work~re of a ap~oi~l staff of a pl~nipotienti~ry of ~h~ GHQ of
the 5upreme Comm~nd nn ~or~ign Military Formations on the Territiory of the
USSR thati was oreatied in a~oordanoe wi~h a GKO decision of 1943, he took
~n ~c~iv~ part in forming ~nd supplying oombet equipmen~ and weapons ~o
chasti and l~rge units of thea~ countries' armi~s. By ,Tune 1944 tihe lat
Polish Army, whioh had b~en eatablished in tihe U5SR, numbered abou~ 78,000
soldierg and officers~* Aleksey Tnnoken~'yevich, who had been ocoupied
witih stiratiegic planning, mc~re ~han onoe had ~o oonsider the fo~oes and po-
ti~n~ia1 oF ~he frati~rnal ai^mies and the operationa of par~isans. In Sep-
tember 1944, when direct ec>mmunioations of Soviet and Yugoslav forees had
been estiablished, questiion~; tiha~ touched on mutual relations between them
had been solved successful~.y.
In displaying cons~~nt conc:ern for ~he People's Libera~ion Army of Yugo-
slavia and in atriving tio f'acili~ate to tihe maximum its stru~gle for ~he
liberation of itis countiry t'rom ~he Hitlerite occupiers, the 5tate Commi~-
tee for Defense adop~ed on 5eptember 1944 a decision to ext~nd substan-
tial militiary assistance tc~ i~. A. I. Antonov took a most active part in
preparing this decision. ~?n aviation group of two divisions, which num-
bered ~bout 350 combati aircraft, piloted by Soviet fliers, were ~rans-
ferred to the temporary ope:rational subordination of the Main Command of
~he NOAYu [National Liberat:ion Army of Yugoslavia]. Aviation schools on
USSR territory and an aviat;ion group of A. N. Vitruk trained more than
4,300 pilots and other avi~ition specialists from the ranks of NOAYu ser-
vicemen, and tank schools f~nd specialist-training institutions trained
500 tank drivers.
Beginning in October 1944, NOAYu began the transfer of enough armament
and equipment to supply 12 infantry and 2 aviation divisions. At the re-
quest of the NOl~Yu High Cotnmand, a large group of Soviet officer instruc-
tors was sent to the Yugos:Lav forces.
During the Yalta Conference's work, Soviet troops continued the offensive.
In February and March of 1945 they waged battles for the Berlin axis and
executed operations against the enemy's flanking formation on the land of
East Pomerania, Upper and Lower 5ilesia and East Prussia.
A. I. Antonov's arrival in Moscow coincided with bitter battles in East
Prussia, where, for the first time, not everything had gone as intended.
This disturbed ~he Supreme Commander, and he recommended that A. M. Vasi-
levskiy go to the area of combat operations. "After the recommendation
- that I be sent to work in East Prussia was adopted," wrote A. M. Vasilev-
skiy, "I asked that I be i~eleased from the post of Chief of the General
Staff, being motivated by the fact that since 1943, I was directly at the
front a major part of the time, carrying out GHQ tasks, and I was in Mos-
cow only when summoned. I made the suggestion to confix~m in this post my
*See "Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo 5oyuza, Vol 5, Book 1,
p 572.
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~
firs~ depu~y, A. I. An~onov, who had actiu~lly been doing ~he work, leaving ~
me only tihe pos~ of depu~y o~ ~he People'~ Commit~ee for llefens~. T re- ~
oell tihati S~alin asked with surprise; !
"'And won'~ ~his deoision harm you?"' ~
"After hearing my ~nswer, he turned to An~onov, who was ~here~ and wanted +
~o know wha~ he though~ of my proposal~ Aleksey Tnnoken~'yevioh said tha~ '
he did not share i~. 'Stalin promised to think i~ over~..."* ~
. i
On 18 February, in the area of the ci~y o~ Me?'zak, ~he oommander of the ,
3d Belorussian ~ront~ I. D. Chernyakovskiy, was wounded mor~ally. A. M. ~
Vasilevskiy was named commander of this front, and A. I. Antonoy was named '
Chief of the General Staff. I
Aleksey Innokent'yevich had actually been carrying out the responsibili- ~
~ies of Chief of the General Staff for a long time. He was not afraid of ~
the responsibili~y, and he solved many queations independently and success- i
fully. But each time, when some doub:a arose, he ~urned for advice to
Aleksandr Mikhaylovich, and, if he was not in Moscow, he phoned him at the ~
front. j
The work on the General S~aff and the direct links with Soviet state and i
party activities di~ much for A. I. An~onov. He saw how party and state
organs solved the most important economic and political problems and how
supervision of the armed struggle was being executed in the State Commit-
tee for Defense and the GHQ~ and it taught him to think on a large scale ~ ;
and to examine evpnts against the large plan, from the point of view of '
the state's interests. Antonov got much that was useful, participating in '
negotiations with the Allies on certain problems of conducting the war. ~
He obtained invaluable experience in this regard at the Yalta Conference.
But still, doubts overcame him. The same question that arose at the time I
of the first appointment: "But will I be worthy of the renowned galaxy of
General Staff inembers, mainly of such a Chief of the General Staff as was
B. M. Shaposhnikov, of whom A. M. Vasilevskiy had bee:. a pupil?" It was
Shaposhnikov who laid the basis, along with other prominent Soviet Gener-
al Staff inembers, for all the efforts to put into practice the behest of
M. V. Frunze about the creation and development of a"mi.ghty and flexible
military-theory staff for the proletarian state." The Great Patriotic War
showed that the Soviet state had such a staff. It solved successfully all
the problems that the war posed. Characteristic in this regard was the
pronouncement of Halder, who in September 1938 to September 1942 was `
Chief of Staff of the i~erman Ground Forces and was considered one of the I
greatest German war specialists: "It is not without interest historically ~
to study how the Russian military leadership, whi~h suffered ruin with its ~
principle of a rigid defense in 1941, developed into a flexible operation- i
al leadership and conducted, un~.er the command of its marshals, a number ~
~
*Vasilevskiy, A. M., "Delo vsey zhizni," p 483.
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of operations whioh, aooording to German ~oales, deserves 0}I1~}1 a89@gg-
men~, at ~ tiime whan the German command, under the influenae o~ ~he mili-
t~ry leader Hi~l~r, dispensed witih the opera~ional art and consumma~ed his
rigid defense~ which was insipid in idea~ and whioh in ~he final analysis
led ~o,oomplete defea~. This gradual change of German s~ra~egy, during
the course of whiah individual capable m3li~ary leaders sucoessfully oon-
ducted in 1943 and la~er in 1944 a series of partial offensive opera~ions,
canno~ be examined in detail. A word expressed by ~he Russian side in a
sharp criticism of .~he German command in ~hat period s~ands as a sort of
verdict on tiha~ period: a fallacious stra~egy. This is imposaible ~o
refute."*
It is no~ easy ~o con~inue and to augment a prevailing tradi~ion. In
each case he had to toil and, by his own example, inspire the collective
tio new successes. The General Staff well understood what a heavy burden
lay on A. I. Antonov's shoulders, and ~hey did every~hing ~o lighten his
work.
A decree of the 5tate Committee of Defense of 17 February 1945 included
A. I. Antonov in the composition of the GHQ. Because of partial changes
in the GHQ's activity, A. I. Antonov had to solve problems that arose
during engagements at the fronts. The fact is that in the concluding
campaigns of 1945 there was no GHQ representative at some fronts. Direc-
tion over the actions of Soviet forces in such operations as the East
Prussian, Vistula-Oder, and certain other operations was accomplished di-
rectly by the GHQ from Moscow. It is true that Marshal S. K. Timoshenko
stayed wi~h the 2d and 4th Ukrainian fronts until the end of the war in
Europe, and the commander of the Leningrad Front, Marshal L. A. Govorov,
~ was (in a case of dual assignment) GHQ representative to the lst and 2d
~ Baltic fronts. -
The necessity for GHQ representatives at the front fell off for the fol-
lowing reasons: the strategic front of the conflict had been cut to less
than half, and the number of front field forces had been reduced; command-
ers of the fronts had matured into prominent leaders; and the staffs had
acquired experience in the organization and direction of opF~rations.
Because of this, the role of the General Staff and its chief increased
in the erecution of operations and the preparation of GHQ directives.
Aleksey Innokent'yevich and his closest assistants worked out the initial ~
design of the concluding campaign.
During its planning, consideration was given to the country's growing
military and economic potential and to growth in the might of the Soviet
Armed Forces. By the end of 1944 their logistical support had reached
the highest level of all the war years. Soviet strategy during this cam- .
paign also was distinguished by exceptional clarity of purpose and deci-
siveness. The purposes ~f the campaign were set by the VK~`(b) Central
*Citation from: Vasilev;akiy, A. M., "Delo vsey zhizni," 538.
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Commi~tee politiburo~ tihe S~a~a Committee for Defense and ~he Supreme Com- '
m~nd's GtiQ. The tagk beoame tha~ of defea~ing ~he larg~s~ enemy form~- i
~ions, seizing tihe regions thati were eoonomioally and poli~ically impor~- I
- anti, libera~ing ~he ~erritory and population of ~uropean ooun~ries from ~
Fascist ocoupatiion and, finally, ending the war in Europe~ I~ was in~end-
ed, simultianeously~ to eonduo~ ma~or strategi~ offensive operations in ~he ,
m~ritiime~ B~rlin, Prague and Budapes~-Vienna seotors and, later, to devel-
op them in depth until ~he final defea~ of Hitleri~e Germany. ,
The Soviet Armed forces had at its disposal rich experience in preparing ~
for and conduotiing operations for the libera~ion of Poland, Romania, Hun-
gary and Czechoslovakia. In September~ Bulgaria had b~en completely
libera~ed.
The general scheme of the concluding campaign began to take shape back '
during ~he swnmer offensive of Soviet forces in ita44. Tt was discussed in ~
preliminary fashion by A. I. An~onov. In addition to Aleksey Innoken~'ye- j
vich himself, chief of the Operations Directora~e S. M. Shetemenko,his `
deputies A. A. Gryzlov and N. A. Lomov, and the chiefs of the appropriate ~
sectors took part in this work. All the considerations expressed during ~
the discussion were then refined in the Operations Directorate. There the '
forces and resources necessary for conducting the operations were figured i
- out. The plan for the concluding campaign, with all the ealculations and '
justifications, was plotted on the map. It was discussed again before
presentation to the GHQ for approval.
I
It was planned to conduct the East Pomeranian, Berlin and Prague operations i
after the Vis~ula-Oder and East Prussian strategic operations. without ;
interruptions or short pauses. This was the most decisive and effective ~
method for conducting military operations. Zt led to the enemy's strateg- ~
ic front being cut deeply into several sectors, depriving him of the oppor- !
tunity to maneuver reserves, to take countermeasures, or to restore the ~
situation, and, in the final analysis, it speeded up the enemy's defeat. i
i
It was decided to inflict the main blow on the central sector of the So- i
viet-German front, on the enemy's major strategic for~~~tion, after the de- ~
feat of which the prospects for seizing Berlin would be oper,~ed up.
i
The General Staff, and A. I. Antonov in particular, paid special attention ~
to coordinating the operations of the fronts in the interests of support- ~
ing the grouping of the forces ~;hat were attacking on the main axis.. The ;
progress of the campaign and the precision in the interaction among the i
fronts testified that the General Staff had coped brilliantly with the so- ~
lution of this complex task. During the January offensive this interac- !
tion was exnressed not only in the coordination of the ~fforts of the
fronts, which had shifted to the offensive simultaneously, but also in the ~
establishment of special tasks for the 2d Belorussian and 4th Ukrainian ~
fronts to provide support from the north and the south of the forces that
were executing the Vistula-Oder operation. In February and March the GHQ i
linked up the conduct of operations in East Pomerania, Silesia, Czechoslo- ~
vakia and Hungary. Not only were major military and political aims
~
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aohi~ved by ~unoesaful solu~ion of ~he migaions of ~hese operations, bu~
favorable oond3~ions ~1so were provided for inflia~ing a blow on Berlin.
In April and Mqy 1945, in ~he intereats of aohieving auocesa along the
main direotion, ~he GHp ooordina~ed the e~forta of the fronts ~hat were
participa~ing in both the Berlin and 3n the Moravian-Austrian and Brati-
slava-Brno operationa.
A map of Ber],in and ~he regions ad,jaosn~ to i~ had appeared on Aleksey Tn-
noken~'yevic'r~~s ~ab1e in the aummar of 1944, during the oonduot of the
Belorussian opera~ion. Having learned to look far ahead, he had made no-
tations in a working notebook about a proposed course of further military
operatiuns on the Soviet-German fron~. These were the firat drafts of
the operations of the concluding and most important oampaign--the Berlin
campaign. By November 1944 its scheme had been defined and estimates had
been prepared. Refinements were made during the Vistula-Oder, East Prus-
sian and Pomeranian operationa.
At the beginning of March 1945 the Plan for the Berlin operations had
been confirmed by the High Command's GHQ.
The attention not only of the Soviet Supreme Command but also of the
Allies, especially the British, were fixed toward Berlin. Neither the
political nor the military leaders of the Allied countries abandoned the
desire to be first to enter the German capital during the whole conclud-
ing stage of the war. The qu~stion of seizing Berlin by Allied forces
was withdrawn conclusively only when the powerful strike of artillery,
mortars and aviation and a decisive attaek by tanks and infantry of So-
viet forces on the Oder and Neisse shook the defense of the Fascist Ger-
man army to its foundation.
But before that the actions of the Allies and their plans had worried
the General Staff and the GHQ. The General Staff, from the time of the
Allies' landing in France, had regularly received from the chiefs of the
American and British military missions in the USSR information about the
deployment of enemy forces. Similar data were sent to the Allies by the
~ General Staff. However, as the end of the war approached, the General
Staff began to receive information extremely far from the actual state of
affairs. On 30 March 1945 the chief of the General Staff, General of the
Army A. I. Antonov, handed, over his signature, to the chief of the USA's
military mission to the USSR, Maj Gen J. Deane,a le~tter that said, in par-
ticular: "On 20 February of this year I received a communication of Gen-
eral Marshall to the effect that the Germans were creating on the Eastern
Front two formations for cc~anterattack: one in Pomerania for a strike at j
Torun and the other in the Vieruia-Moravia-Ostrava area for an offensive ~
in the direction of Lodz. In this case, the southern grouping should have
included the 6th SS Tank Army. Similar information was received 12 Fe;bru- ~
ary from the chief of the army section of the British military mission,
Col Brinkman." After thanking them for the information, which was t~o aid
the common victory, A. I. Antonov wrote further: "At the same time, T
consider it my dut-�y to report to General Marshall that the ;;ombat opera-
tions on th~a Eastern Front during the month of March did not confirm the
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inform~tiion given by him, fnr ~hese battl~s ind3oa~ed tha~ ~he main forma-
tion of th~ German foroes, inoluding the 6th SS Tank Army, had been oon-
centra~ed no~ in Pomeran3a nor in the Mor~via-Os~rava area but in the re-
_ gion of Lake Balaton, from wh~,oh the Germans were conduoting en offensive
with a view to push3ng ~o the Duna and orossing it nortk~ of Budapest.~~*
New instanoes of at~empts ~o save the sinking ahip o� the Fasois~ s~ate,
particularly the meeting of General K. Wolf, chief plenipotentiary of the
SS foroes under ~he ~'Ts" group, wi~h A. Dulles--ohief of American intelli-
gence in Europe--beoame known to t2:e General Staff.
An analysis of the military~situation in the Wes~ and the East 1ed the So-
viei; command to ~he conclusion: the German front on the West had com-
pletely collapsed, and the Hitlerites did not wish to ~ake measures to
stop the advancing British-Amerioan forces. Meanwhile, they were streng-
thening their formations against Soviet troops at all the most important
sec~ors. Under these cireumstances there could be only one decision--to
s~ep up preparations for the Berlin operation.
At the end of March and the beginning of April several conferences were
held in the GHQ at which the plan fc: the Berlin operation was reviewed.
On 29 March, in I. V. Stalin's office in the Kremlin, organizational ques-
tions were decided. On 30 March G. K. Zhukov and A. I. Antonov once
more closely examined the plan for the strategic Berlin operation together.
It completely met the strategic-operations situation that prevailed at
the time. On 31 Mareh the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front I. S. Ko-
nev, who had arrived at the GHQ, was included in the examination of the
plan. On 1 April the Supreme Commander heard A. I. Antonov's report about
the general plan for the Berlin operation, and then the report of the com-
manders of the ist Belorussian and lst Ukrainian fronts about the plan for
the offensive of these fronts' forces. It was decided to begin the offen-
sive for Berlin 16 April, without waiting for the 2d Belorussian Front to
complete the elimination of the enemy's formation in the Danzig and Gdynia
regions. According to the calculations, troops of this front could be in-
cluded in the Berlin operation no earlier than 20 April. On 2 April 1945
the commander of the lst Belorussian Front was sent r+ GHQ directive that
began wit'e'~ the words: ~~Prepare for and conduct an offensive operation
with a view to seizing the capital of Germany, the city of Berlin, and,
no later than the 12th to 15th day of the operation, push to the River
i:lbe.'~ Later, the main blow was defined, which the front's forces should
inflict with the forces of four combined-arms and t~vo ~ank armies.* The
forces for two auxil~ary blows also were set. The next day a dir~ctive
was sent to the commander of the ist Ukrainian Front and on 6 April one
was sent to the commander of the 2d Belorussian Front.
And now the morning of 16 April 1945 had arrived, "The Hitlerite forces
were literally deluged in a solid sea o;f fire~and metal. An impenetrable
wall of dust and smoke hung in the air, and :.n places even the powerful
~TaAMO, archivr 40, list 11549, document 292, i~heets 10-11.
#TsAMO, arehive 132a, list 2642, document 13,!shcets 229-230.
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rays of antiairaraf~ searchlights oould not pieroe i~.~' Thus did ~he
Berlin operation begin, in the words of M5U G. K. Zhukov.
Sovie~ troops~ overcoming ~he enemy'a bit~er reaistance, broke through the
defense on the Oder and Neisse on the 6~h day of the offensive and on 21
April entered the outskirts of Berlin. By that time, on the northern seo-
tion of the front, ~he enemy's East Prussian formation was defeated.and
Konigsberg was taken. The same fate befell the Hitlerites' East Pomeran-
ian formation. Simultaneously, troopa of the 4th Ukrainian Front~ joint-
ly with a Czechoslovak corps, conducted an offensive on Czeohoslovak ter- -
ritory.
On 25 Apri1 troops of the 1st Belorussian,and 1st Ukrainian fronts encir-
cled the Berlin formation of enemy forces. On the outer front of the en-
circlement, Soviet forces advanced relentlessly to the west, from where
the Allies had attacked to meet them. The meeting with them occurred 25
April in the center of Germany, on the River Elbe in the area of the city
of Torgau. ~ �
The offensive against Berlin was still going on, and Prague, which was
waiting for its liberation, inereasingly attracted the GHQ's attention.
The preliminary plan for the Prague operation was worked out by the ~ener-
al Staff back at the start of 1945. Now the time had come to be engaged
in its execution in earnest.
Having learned about the Soviets' troops reaching the Elbe, the Supreme
Command said that it was time to inflict a blow on Prague. The situation
was complicated, since the main strike force should have been troops of
the ist Ukrainian Front. The headquarters of this front had been ordered
to present its considerations on the Prague operation, and the General
Staff had received the task of preparing its own recommendations on the
' basis of this report.
And again, undex the direetion of A. I. Antonov, a major and strenuous
task was started. Within a short time the plan for the Prague operation
had been perfected in all details. Two tank armies of the 1st Ukrainian
Front were turned from the streets of Berlin to Dresden and aimed at
Prague.
The last days of the war were going on. Soviet soldiers werea.pproaching the
Imperial Chancellory and the Reichstag in earnest. Meanwhile, in the
West, an unseemly fuss about the capitulation of Fascist Germany was be-
ing intensified. On 7 May in Rheims, a temporary act of capitulation was
signed.
In the West the war was conside:~ed to have ended. On this basis the West-
ern powers prcposed that on 8 May the chiefs of the governments of the
iJSSR, USA and Britain would officially annour.ce the victory over Germany.
The Soviet Government rejected this proposal. There were weighty bases
for this. In the first place, combat operations were still continuing on
t;ze Soviet-German front. In the second place, there was no assurance that
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the Hitlerite forcea were surrendering on al]. portions of our fron~.
~onitr, ~he new head of ~he governmen~ oF Germany, having sanc~ioned tho
signing nf the Rheims protocnl about unconditional surrender on all
fronts, at ~he same time required Kesselring, Sherner, Randulich and Lehr,~
the commanders of the German-Fascist forces in various parts of Europe--to
draw their troops off from the Eastern Front to the West as soon as possi-
ble, wherever possible, and, in case of necessity, to break through the
5oviet lines with combat. -
The General'S~aff followed these maneuvers closely and simultaneously in~
formed the Supreme Commander about all the changes on the fronts. On 7 May
A. I. Antonov sent the chief of the American and British military missions
in Moscow a letter which contained the requirement that a document of
unconditonal surrender be signed in damaged Berlin on 8 May 1945 instead
of the temporary document signed in Rheims. In his answer to this letter,
D, Eisenhower on the same day expressed agreement to the arrival of A11ied
- representatives in Berlin on 8 May to sign the final document.
The Soviet Government did not select Berlin as a place for signing the
document of the German forces' unconditional surrender by accident. It
was here that German militar:sm should confess its full defeat, the bank-
ruptcy of its doctrines, and its military and political ignominy. This was
correct also because the Red Army, which bore the main burden of the war
on its shoulders, took Berlin.
On 8 May 1945, representatives of all the Allied armies arrived at the
outskirts of Berlin, at Karlshorst'. MSU G. K. Zhukov represented the So�- .
viet Supreme ComrrZnd.
At first D. Eisenhower� intended to go to Berlin for the ceremony of signing
the document of unconditional surrender of the Fascist German forces. How- F
ever, because of the objection of W. Churchill and his closest coworkers,
he re~racted his decision.* This clearly demonstrated the striving of the
British Government, and also of the new president of the USA, to deprecate _
the military and historical importance of the document that recorded the
victory over German Fascism and the decisive contrib~�tion that the Soviet
Union had made. The Supreme Commander of the Expeditionary Forces of the
Allies presented Eisenhower's deputy, Chief Marshal of Aviation A. Tedder.
On 8 May 1945 Germany signed the Act of Unconditional Surrender, and in
a few days the Soviet forces completed its last operation--it defeated the
Fascist German army formation that encircled Prague, the capital of Czech-
oslovakia, and entered the city, which had already been liberated from ~
its occupiers by the population, which had revolted. .
In the middle of May 1945, upon the instruction of the Supreme Commander,
A. I. Antonov was included in the military representatives at the forth-
coming new r~nference of leaders of the three powers. With the conclusion
*See Pog'yu, F. S., "Verkhovnoye komandovaniye" [The Supreme Command],
Moscow, 1949, p 499.
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of the war in Europe, people were worried about oonsolidating ~he peaoe.
Postwar cons~ruction of the world was conneo~ed with ~he question of the
fa~e of Germany.
The conference opened 17 ,1uly 1945 in Potsdam, olose to Berlin. The Soviet;
delegation firmly defended the oorreo~t and demooratio prinoiples of rela-
tions with defeated Germany~ and, thanks to this the plan for dismembering
it that the USA advanced faded away. The leaders of thr~e powers oeremoni-
a11y oommitted itself to see to it that Germany would threa~en peaoe no
more.
Soviet military representatives c~id much work at the conference during
, preparations for and during the discussions about the question of the ~
German Navy and German merchant ships. The German surface navy, as we1J,
as the merchant fleet, was to be divided equally among the USSR, the USA
and Great Britain. At the insistence of the Britisn delegation, the con-
ference agreed to sink a major portion of the German undersea fleet.
The discussion at the conference of many other questions also required the
participation of A. I. Antonov in one degree or another.
At Potsdam the Allies again posed the question of the entry of the USSR
into the war against ,Tapan in accordance with the agreement concluded by
the chiefs of the governments of the three powers at the Crimean Confer~
ence. Upon arrival in Potsdam, H. Truman announced that one of his main
aims was to achieve the entry of the USSR into the war in the Far East.
No special efforts were required for this: the government of the Soviet
Union had always carried out its Allied commitments precisely. The So-
viet Government announced that it would corae out against ,Tapan at the
established time. ~
A. I. Antonov informed the military representatives of the USA and I?reat
Britain in great detail :~,i~out the progress of preparations for the i''ar
Eastern campaign. Representative of the GHQ of the Supreme Commander A.
M. Vasilevskiy was already in the Far East. "On 16 ,Tuly," he recalled,
"I. V. Stalin phoned me, while I was at the headquarters of the Far East
forces, which was located in the Chita area. He asked how preparations
for the operation were going, and he wanted to know whether it could be
speeded up by 10 days. I reported ~hat the concentration of forces and
the transport of all the most necessary things did not permit this to be
done, and I asked that it remain at the former date. Stalin agreed to
this."*
The Potsdam Conference was concluded successfully. This was a serious
blow for those reactionary forces in the countries of the anti-Fascist co-
alition that wanted to wreck the conference.
Devoting its main attention to the Soviet-German front, the GHQ and the
General Staff never forgot about the threat of an attack by militaristic
*Vasilevskiy, A. M., "Delo vsey zhizni," p 513. _
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,1~p~n~ which had more than ~ million men in the Kwantung Army~ Th~ Japan- ~
ese Govermm~nt was waiting only for a favorable ocoasion to a~~~ok the ,
USSR and seize i~s Far Eas~ern regions.
Back in 1942 the General Headquarters founded the pos~ of Deputy Chief of
the General S~aff for the Far East. In the Operations Directorate thdre
existed a special Far ~astern Administration, which Maj Gen N. A. Lomov
headed in June 1943.
At the end of 5eptember 1944, A. I. Antonov, S. M. Sht~menko and N. A.
Lomov began to prepare preliminary estimates for the case of war with
Japan. I. V. Stalin made use of them in negotiations with W. Churchill
and A. Eden, who visited Moscow in October. These negotiations were con- ~
ducted without the participation of ~he mili~ary, but, when the matter
touched on the Far East, they were invi~ed. General of the Army A. I. An- ~
tonov and Lt Gen F. I. Shevchenko who, by this time, was occupying the
post of Chief of Staff of the F'ar Eastern Front, participated in the
~
negotiations. '
,
The General Staff' undertook the detailed development of a plan fox the Far
Eas{;ern campaign shortly prior to the Potsdam Conference. The GHQ exam~
ined the final draft of the plan in the middle of June 1945, and by the
end of the month it had been prepared.
The rich experience accumulated by the party's Central Committee, the i
State !..,mmittee of Defense and the GHQ of the Supreme Command during the ;
armed struggle in the West permitted them, while preparing for and con- ~
ducting the campaign in the Far East,to interpret creatively and to solve '
the many problems that arose because of the great distance of the Far i
Eastern theater of military operations from the center. After a compre-
hensive examination of this question in the General Staff and then in the ;
State Committee for Defense, a decision was adopted to create a High Com- ~
mand for Soviet Forces in the Far East to execute strategic direction
over military operations. A. M. Vasilevskiy was named the commander-in- ~
chief. "The existence of such an organ enabl~;d the instructions of the
Supreme High Command to be conducted responsively, all the changes in
strategic operations and the military and political situation to be con-
sidered and reacted to in timely fashion, and the necessary help to be ,
extended to the fronts in the field."*
Under the difficult conditions of the Far Eastern Theater of War, the Red
Army inflicted a shattering blow on the Japanese armed forces. On 1?
August the high command of the Kwantung Army appealed to Marsh~l A. M.
Vasilevskiy with a request to cease combat operations. It was proposed
to the Japanese Command that it cease every kind of combat operation ,
against the Soviet forces on the front at 1200 hours, 20 August, and
that it lay down its weapons and surrender to captivity. On 18 August, ,
on some sections of the front, the Japanese forces undertook to fulfill
the surrender requirements. Chief of the General Staff A. I. Antonov
;
*Vasilevskiy, A. M. "Delo vsey zhizni," pp 509-510.
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, prepared and, after conourrenoe with Marehal A. M. Vasilovskiy, sen~ a di-
rec~ive to T~ V. S~alin for signature. The GHQ of the Supreme Command or-
dered: "Cease oomba~ aotions at ~hose sections where Japanese ~roops are
laying down their weapons and surrendering as prisoners of war.~'*
By the start of 5ep~ember ~he ~asks set for the Sovie~ Troops in the Far
~ast had been completely narried out. On 2 September ~he Sov3et repre-
sentative put hia signa~ure on ~he document abou~ the unaondi~ional sur-
render of Japan, in ~he defeat of whioh the Soviet Armed Foroes played a
decisive role.
Under the supervision of the Communist Party, our coun~ry and its famous
Armed Forces gained still another brillan~ victory, which ended the Great
Patriotic War and the whole second world war.
~
IN DAYS OF PEACE
The long-expected peace set in, Consciousness of it gladdened and in-
spired the Soviet people. The soldiers who had won the victory yearned
for those who were near and dear to them and for oonstructive work.
The Soviet people set all their efforts to the restoration and development
of the s.ocialist people's economy. Tt was necessary to eliminate the se-
vere consequences of the war, to provide millions of people with housing,
to shift the country's economy to peaceful rails. All these problems were
discussed repeatedly in I. V. Stalin's office in the presence of VKP(b)
Central Committee Politburo members and certain ministers. When questions
of demobilization of the army and the navy were examined, A. I. Antonov
was invited to the conference.
Back in May,at one of the meetings in the General I~eadquarters, I. V.
Stalin had asked A. I. Antonov:
~'Has the General Staff undertaken to make up a plan for demobilization?~~
~ "We are making the preliminary calculations," the answer followed.
~'In demobilizing the Armed Forces, consider the needs of our people's econ-
omy, the new political situation in the world and the aggressive policy of
imperialism," said I. V. Stalin.
A little later he again returned to the same topic, particularly when the
question of the first postwar session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, at which
it was intended to adopt a law about demobilization of the ~rmy and the
fleet, had been decided. The demobilization plan was made up in such a
way as to preserve the combat nucleus of the Armed Forces and to provide
reliably for the security of~the So~iet Union.
All these circumstances were thus considered during preparation of the law ~
about demobilization of older servicemen from the army and the navy t;zat
was to be adopted at the 12th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Chi~f
a *TsAMO, arc ive 210, list 3116, document 308, sheet 115. ~
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~he General S~aff General of ~he Army A, x. An~onov was ~zpproved as ~ho
person ~o repor~: the 1aw.
This was ~he first session of ~he U5SR Supreme Sovie�t to aonvene after ~he
victorioua completion of ~he Great Patriotic War. ~veryo.~e was exci~ed,
A. I. Antonov more than o~hers. He had calmed himself a bit when he went
to tihe tribune and ar~icula~ed: -
~~Comrade deputiesl"
He spoke slowly, pronouncing each phrase and each word with precision.
Writer Boris Polevoy eonveys the atmosphere on that historic day this way:
~~And although the document itself was written exclusively in official
language, although the reporter set it forth in an everyday tone of voice,
it sounded like a poem, and his reading now and then was broken by storms
of applause."* ~
On 23 ,1une 1945 the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted a law on the demobiliza-
tion of soldiers from the active army, primarily those of ~he 13 older
classes. The law reflected outstandingly Lenin's concern for people--it
called for measures for material support of former soldiers.
The discharge of millions of persons from the army and the navy was accom-
plished in short periods, without harm to the troops' combat readiness. .
A. I. Antonov reported to the government on the progress of demobilization.
All this helped the organized discharge of soldiers from the Soviet Armed
Forces. About 8.5 million people poured into the national economy.# Man-
ning of the Soviet Armed Forces dropped to 2,874,000 men in 1948.**
General Staff workers under the leadership of A. I. Antonov were occupied
by still another problem--the redeployment about the USSR's territory of
Soviet forces from some foreign countries, where they had been located at
the end of the war. In September 1945 Soviet troops were withdrawn from
Norway, in November from Czechoslovakia, in May 1946 from Manchuria and
Northern Iran, in December 1947 from Bulgaria, and at the end of 1948 from
Korea.
Because of the eonversion of the Armed Forces to a peaceful status, chan-
ges occurred in organs of higher military supervision that were executed
~ by decision of the party Central Committee. On 4 September 1945 the State
Committee for Defense was abolished. The GHQ of the Supreme Command ceased
its activity. The Higher Military Council--a collegial organ that existed
prior to the war--was established in its stead. In accordance with the
USSR SNK decree of 25 February 1946, a reorganization of the people's com-
missariats ror defense and of the navy was conducted, a single People'G Com-
missariat of the Armed Forces was established, and in March it was trans-
formed into the Ministry of the Armed Forces.
*PRAVDA, 24 June 1945.
#See "50 let Vooruzhennykh Sil USSR," p 479.
**Ibid.
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~ ' GENERAL A~ I. ANTONOV
. eY I.I. -GAaLOV

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A. I. Antnnnv work~d in ~h~ p~st of hief' of th~ G~ner~1 St~fF un~il 26
M~rah 1948~ wh~n A. M~ V~~ilevskiy w~g r~~tiorhd tn thi~ pnsti. H~ rhm~ine~
~iret d~puty until Nnvember 194~. A. I. An~nnnv w~~ ~ng~g~d in mobili~
z~tinn organiz~ti3nn qu~~t~nn~.
in Nc~v~mb~r 1948 A~ t. Antidnov w~~ named to acquir~ c~mm~nd ~xperfence as
e firgt d~puty r,ommander~ ~nd in 1960 a~ commander~ of the tiroop~ of tihe
C~ucasi~n Mi?itary nistrict.
in ~he C~ue~sus Aleks~y Innokent'yevich met many friendg and eumrades witih
whnm he had gerved in theee pl~ces in i94z. Partiy ~nd soviet workers of
Axerbtti,jan~ armeni~ and G~orgia who had known A. I. Ar?tionav well viewed
his appointment with satiisfaction.
A. N. Antonov got cammanders of chasti and large units to use widely the
- rich eombati experience gained in th~ encountiera of the Gr~ati P~ztiriotiic W~r
to train and educ~te snldierg. The main atti~ntion was paid to tieaching
troops m~n~uv~ring and ~~tiv~ combat oper~tiions~ to tr~ining chasti and
large units fbr struggl~ with ~arge merhwnixed and tank formatiions~ and to
masL�~ry of cnmbat operationr~ at an acceleratea pac~, ~ti night, and during
limited visibility.
In the middle oF the 1950's a new er~ in combati training af the forces set
in. Personnel of the 5oviet Armed F'nrces undertook stuly of atomic wea-
pons and methods of combati operatiions during their use. ~ach year new
- equipment and armament were arriving in increasing quantities in the dis- ,
trict's forces. Large rifle units were equipped with more effectiive wea-
pons and were compl~tely motorized. Their makeup included tianks and
self-propell~d artillery installations. The other arms and services also
were rearcned.
Aleksey Tnnokent'yevich spent a long time with gpeeialists ati proving '
- grounds and in training classes. He studied new combat equipment and wea-
pons and methods nf applying them on the field of battle, and he required
- this study also of all officers. All this bore fruit. From year to year
the combat training standard of chasti and large units in the district was
raised.
~ Aleksey Innokent'yevich in his free time studied thoroughly the history,
culture and nationality characteristics of the peoples of the Caucasus,
and he attended the theater. Letters from Tbilisi to his sister in Lenin-
grad were filled with admiration for Ceorgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.
In the 1950's the anti-Soviet activity of the imperialist forces was
greatly stirred up. Clear signs appeared of the imminence of a military
hazard and the threat of a new world war. Monopolistic capital of the USA
emerged as the advanced detachment of imperialism and inspirer and organ-
izer of the policy of a new "crusade" against socialism. Especially dan-
gerous to the matter of peace was the emergency in 1949 of the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization (NATO). With the ereation of this aggressive
bloc, direct preparations for war had started. In 1952 Turkey and Greece
were drawn into NATO. The militarization of West Germany was ~ntensified.
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Ruling circl~g n~ ~h~ USA ~dd~d !'~verig} ~fFor~~ tio cr~~te ~ gy~ti~m a~
milit~ry bloc~ nn o~her con~in~ntis also~
~h~ Communis~ Partiy and ~h~ Soviet Gov~rnmen~ cduld nn~ byp~gs th~~e f~ct~.
A s~ri~~ of ~~eps was tiaken ~hati were ~im~d ~ti atireng~h~ning th~ defen~iv~
capabilitiieg of our s~atie. A. I. Mtonov~ who was nam~d Firgti Deputy Chief .
of th~ Gener~l 5tiaff and m~mb~r of' the llssit Minis~ry oi' b~fense Board in
April 1954 tiook par~ in developing them.
In May 1985 a Pacti oF ~'ri~nd~hip, Coop~r~tiion gnd Mu~u~l Aasistence among
~ ~he USSa eu~d the ~uropean countries of people's democracy was gigned in
Warnaw. Warsaw pacti members were obligated, in c~se of armed ~titieck on any
cnuntry tih~t signed ~he pact~tio immediately render iti gll-round assistance.
in itis missions and orientation tihe Warsaw Pact is an organization of a
completely new type.' Ir is of an exclusively defensive nature. "We cre~t-
ed tihis collabnr~tiinn," said L. i. Brezhnev~ "primarily in o~er tio oppose
the ~hreati of imperialism and the aggressive military bl~cs created by i.ti,
in order, by com~non efforts~ tio defend the affairs of socialism in the
world."*
The Command of the Joint Armed Forces, which operates on the ba~is of joint-
ly e~~ablished principles, became an important m.litary organ of the War-
s~w Pact Orga.~ization. The com~ositiion, functions and authority of this
organ were def'ined in a special charter th~t was approved ati a s~ssion of
the Political Consultative Committee in January 1956. According tio the
charter, this Command consisted of a Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed
Forces and his deputies from each country that detailed its troops to the
Unitied Armed Forces, with the rank of deputy minister of defense, or other
military leaders. Under the Commander-in-Chief was created a Joint Armed
F'orces Headquarters, with station in Moscow. Its composition included
standing representatives of the general staffs of the countries belong to
the pact. Upon the recoaunendation of the CPSU Central Committee and tihe
5oviet Government, General of the Army A. I. Antonov was named Chief of
Staff of the Joint Armed Forces in 1955.
Aleksey Innokent'yevich managed to create a supervisory staff and to organ-
ize its work in a short time. Col I. A. Yeneyev, who has worked in the
Joint Armed Forces Headquarters since its first days, has told with what
energy A. I. Antonov did all this. He knew many of the workers personally,
and he conversed at length with those with whom he was not acquainted
about the nature of the impending work. It was reeommended that some of-
ficers continue their education, particularly to undertake the study of
foreign languages.
A new and complicated~matter was the ~rganization of training of the troops
for joint eombat operations in war. It was necessary to go to the countries
_ that belonged to the Warsaw Pact to converse with the ministries and chiefs
*Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stati'i" [By a Leninist
Policy. Speeches and Artic:.es~. Vol 4, Moscow, 1974, p 68. ;
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nf tih~ g~ner~l gtia~Fa ~nd tha principal sti~ffg~ tio organize s~aFf games
and tio cnnducti exercis~~. A~ I. Antionnv personelly partiicip~ti~d in ~he
conducti o~ exercrg~g on anmb~ti tiraining~ communicatiing tio our figh~ing
fri~nds the pricelc~ss experienc~ that the Sovie~ Armed Fnrces gafnad in
the battles nf tihe Great Pa~riotiic Wer.
In J~nuary 1955 A. I. Antonov ~uffered ~ ma,jor sorrow: hie wife~ Mariya
Dmitriyevna~ who for 30 years had been his faitihful helper ~r?d frfend and
shared with him all joys and misfortunea, pasaed away. -
Al~kaey Innok~nti'yevich devntied himself Pntirely tio work. A letter to his
sistier that was sent from Warsaw on 3 Merch 194? tiestifies to how diffi-
culti and tiense it was: "4ur work has been very prolonged. We will con-
swnma~e it this week. Moscow h~s tiold me tihat in the first half of March
i will hav~ to go to Bexlin, in the second half of March to Bucharest~ and
in April i will still be in Buchareati. Thus~ the trip will be almost
- 3 mnnths without a break."
Gradually, with the efforts of all pacti participanta, the principles of
militery collaboration of the socialist states and the forms and methods
~f joint operational and combat readiness and personnel tr~ining were
worked out step by step. They were based upon the same principles that
govern the relationships between the socialist states in the political,
economic, scientific and technical areas, namely: proletarian internation-
alism and full equality of rightis in the Warsaw Pact Organization; and con-
stant direction by the communist and workers' parties over the matter of
defense of the allied nations~ the buildup and development of armies and
the strengthening of the Joint Armed Forces.
The combat collaboration of the armies of the Warsaw Pact member countries
was a practical embodiment of all these principles. It was not ~imed
against any kind of states or peopl~s. Its chief purpose was to provide,
under the conditions of existence of the capitalist world, full safety for
the countries of soc:alism and a reliable defense of them against encroach-
ments of ~he imperialist aggressors.
These characteristics of the Warsaw Pact countries' combat collaboration
was emphasized with special force in an article by A. I. Antonov that was
published in a military journal in 1962.
"in contrast to the imperialist aggressor blocs," he said in it, "of the
NATO and SEATO type, the Warsaw Pact was permeated with the spirit of
peaceableness. It was based upon the principles of equality of rights,
respect for sovereignty, and nonintervention of some states in the in-
ternal affairs of the others. This organization is not closed, it is open
to entry by other states if they desire it. Along with questions of
joint defense, the Warsaw Pact considers the necessity for further streng-
thening the economic and cultural ties of the countries of socialism."
Fundamental problems of strengthening the defensive capability of the
. allied countries and developing the Joint Armed Forces were examined by
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tihe Political Consulti~tiiv~ Committi~e of tihe s~ate~~ thati pgrtifcipatie in tho ~
W~rsaw Paoti. Solutiong tin problems of defense of tihe W~rsaw P~?cti oountiri~s , ;
were worked osti ati its a~ssions. , ;
In additiion tio sessiona of the highest organ of the Warsaw Pact ~ountries~
,joint meetiings of ministries of defense w~re held. On~ such mee~ing, in the
preparation for which A. Y. Antonov took a direot part~ was held in Septiem-
b~r 1961. Iti was devo~ed to a discusaion of question~ associatied with a '
aharp intiensificatiion of NATO military preparatiions and the threat of ~
unleashing a new world war. As a consequence~ a atianding ogerational I
organ--the Committee of Defenge Ministiries--was estiablished. ;
A. I. Mtonov devoted much time and efforti to perfecting the operatiional +
and combat readiness of Warsaw Pact country forces. Based upon the re-
quirements of military scisnce and the development of mili~ary equipment~
the headquartera, under his direction, planned long-term and ~nnual ,joint ~
measures for operational und combat readiness~ generalized the experience ~
of instructiion of troops and fleets, and worked out recommendations for !
using this experience. Aleksey Innokent'yevich devoted especially much '
effort and energy to developing and eonducting jointi maneuvers~ ex~rcises ~
and war games. Many years of multifaceted experience, especially in stra- '
tegic planning, that was acquired during the Great Patriotic War permitited i
him to solve the tasks of the operational readiness of troops and f~.eets
thati had been defined and were characteristic for that time. ~
i
In 2961 the Joint Armed Forces Headquarters, under the direction of A. I. '
Ar~tonov and with his active partieipation, developed a plan for operational !
command-and-staff exercises named "Storm." These exercises had no equals ~
in their missions and tasks. They embraced the territory of several j
countries: the GDR, the Hungarian People's Republxc, the Czechoslovak So-
cialist Republic, and western parts of the USSR. The operations staffs of
the Army of the German Democratic Republic, the Polish Forces, the Soviet ,
Army and the Czechoslovak People's Army participated in the exercises. :
At meetings that were conducted in the ,Toint Armed Forces Headquarters, ~
A. I. Mtonov inevitably stressed the need to generalize and transmit ex- ~
perience in combat readiness as one of the most important prerequisites to
raising the combat capability of the army. He himself many times went and
helped the general staffs of the fraternal armies to plan for and conduct
the operational training of troops. ~
lEach year such a most important field of military collaboration of the al-
lied countries as mutual assistance in training highly skilled personnel
for all branches of the ax~ms and services of the armed forces also was ex-
panded. Officers and generals of the frater~al armies were taught at So- `
viet military academies and schools. The Soviet Union extended assistance
also in tihe establibhment of national military educational institutions. ;
In noting the enormous eontribution of A. I.Antonov to the matter of de- ,
veloping the combat collaboration of the Warsaw Pact armies, Chi~f of the
General Staff of the Polish Forces General of Armor Ye. Bordzilovski said: i
;
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~'Ale~kgey Innokenti'yevich inveatied much oreatiive labor and his exaeption~l
organizing capab~.lities and great mili~ary talent i.n the mattier nf tihe
buildup, training and technical pr~~oisioning of ~he armed forces of the
sooialiet camp. ~
"he repeatiedly wenti to the Warsr~w Pact countries and personally aeeooiat-
ing himself with politioal~ state and military ao~ions~ and he ren-
dered us much assistanc~ directily on the spot in atrengthening the might
and combat ~apability of our Armed F'orces.
''ny using his rich exp~rience and knowledge~ Aleksey Innokent'yevich
helped us greatily in solving complicated military problems."*
Deputiy Ministier of the National Defense of the GDR Maj Gen Z. Reidel also
gave a high assessmenti of A. i. Antionov's activity as the Chief of Staff of
the ,Toint Armed Forces Headquarters. He wrote: "General of the Army
A. i. Antonov displqyed great conee:�n for tihe training of the command per-
sonnel of our army, understood well our needs, and always reaoted sympa-
thetieally tio our requesta.
"Aleksey Innokent'yevich paid greati attention ~o the fi~ld training of the
- tronps and the staffs of the National People's Army. With the great tact
that was characteristic of him, he knew how to suggest in time the oorrect
solution to a question and to aim at the main thing."#
Military figures of Caechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hurigary and Romania who re-
peatedly met with him ~t work have pointed out A. I. Antonov's services
in the matter of establishing and developing the Armed Forces of the War-
saw Pact countries.
~
For services to the motherland, Aleksey Innokent'yevich Mtonov was award-
ed three times the Order of Lenin and the Order of Victory, four times the
Order of the Red Banner, twice the Order of Suvorov, lst Degree, and Order
of Kutuzov, ist Degree, once the Order of the Patriotic War, ist Degree,
14 foreign orders, and many Sor+iet and foreign medals.
Service matters took up much of his time, but still Aleksey Innokent'ye-
vich never forgot public affairs. He was deputy of the USSR Supreme So-
viet and member of the Communist Party of Georgia Central Committee. As a
deputy he frequently met with electors and behaved sympathetically toward
their recommend~*~ions and requests. He neve.� turned down young workers
and students' reauests t~ come to clubs and auditoriums to tell about the
Civil War, the Great Patriotic War and about eneounters with party and
state figures.
Aleksey Innokent'yevich was a cheerful person and loved to joke and have a
laugh. Everyone who kr.e~ him closely and had been in his apartment a few
*KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 22 June 1962.
#KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 Jun~~ i962.
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l,imo~ s~id: "Ati home and at tihe table it wns kind of emp~y and boring with- ;
out him." But when when he was at home~ laughter dfd not cease. He lovcd !
his family. He h~d deep reapect for the memory of hig fath~r and mother i
ar~d carefully preserved tih~ir pho~ographs and lettiera. ~
Reading, tihe theatier~ chess, photiography, skiing, rowing~ volleyball~ walk-
ing in th~ woods, and tiravel were his favorite recreation.
~
~
Being very punctual and knowing the value of time~ he also required punctiu- '
ality of othera. Cruditiy~ lack of intiegrity, lying and disrespeet toward .
human digni~y on the part of people always dis~urbed him. He liked child- '
r~n very much--he had none oF his own. Aleksey Innokenti'yevich always was
glad to be wi~h childr~n~ and despite all his busyness, on days off he ~
could not refuse Pioneers who came to his cottage to ask him to take part ~
in an assembly. He paid much attention tio the nenhews of Mariya Dmitri- i
yevna, Lyud s~nd Dim Baykalov. j
Aleksey Innokent'yevich died in the prime of his creative forces ati the ;
age of 66. This happerted 18 June 1962. The day before he had returned ~
from a routine tirip. Sunday he rested at hi~ cottage. The next day in i
the morning~ as usual~ he went to the Headquarters c~f the ,~c,int Armed ~
Forces of the Warsaw Pact countries. He held a aonference and at 1100
hours fel~ so bad that he had to stop work. Unfortunately, all the doc- ~
tor's efforts provtd futile....General of the Army A. I. Antonav was buried ~
in Red Square in Moscow, at the Kremlin wall. ~
I
A. I. Antonov lived a comparatively short life. HP has remained in the
memory of the peopl~ as a great and talented military leader who combined
in himself a high party sparit with deep competency, a high state of
� d~scipline, initiative and a crEative ap~nroach to the job, and as a man ~
he loved life in his motherland, service to which he considered the high-
est duty.
COPYRIGHT: Voyenizdat, 1978 i
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