JPRS ID: 8603 JAPAN REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080004-8
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 93
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/8603
,
3 August 1979
Ja an Re ort ~
p p
cFOUO 23i79~
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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are transcribed or reprinted, with Che original phrasing and
other characteristicg retained.
Headlines, editorial reporCs, and n~aterial enclosed in braciceCs
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or (Excerpt] in the firse line of each item, or following the
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processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
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Unfamiliar names rendered phoneCically or transliCeraCed are
enclosed in parenCheses. Words or names preceded by a q~tes-
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original buC have been supplied as appropriate in contexC.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
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The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
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JPR5 L/8603
3 Augus~ 1979
JAPAN R~PORT
(FOUO 23/79)
CONTEN7S PAGE
POLITICAI, AND SOCSOLO(~ICAL
Tokyo Media Reports on Tok,yo Swmni.t
(Various sources, 30 Jun, 2, 3 Jul 79) 1
~ASAHI SHIMBUN~ Comments~ Editorial
~THE DAII,Y YOMIURI~ Cormnents, Editorial
- 'AKAHATA~ Comments
Opposition Parties Comment on U.S.-Japan Talks
(MEIINICHI SHIMBUN, 27 Jun 79) 7
I'ormer Japanese Foreign Minister, I}ietmen To Visit Hanoi
(THE JAPAN TIMES, Jul 79) 9
'MAINICHI~ Comments on New I3beral Club~s Intraparty Feud
(Edi~orial; MATNICHI DAILY NEWS, 2 Jul ?9) 10
~ DSP Stakes It�s Future on the LDP
(ASAHI JANARU, 25 May ?9) 12
DSP Ambitions, Editorial by Kiyoshi Ebata
Coalition of Conservative, Moderate Forces
Japan's Gensuikyo, USSR Body ~.,,,ree To Normalize Relations
(JP5, 2 Jul. 79) .......a .................o.�a............ 18
'MAINICHI DAILY NEWS?: USSR ~arrier. Off Japan Signif.icant -
(Editorial; MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 29 ~Tun 79) 19 .
Sonoda Says Close ASEAN Ties Basis oi J~pan~s Foreign Policy
, (Jiro Arioka; ASAHI EVEIJING NEWS, 4 Jul 79) 21
Reasons for, Against Diet Dissolution ~utlinQd
(Takehiko Takahashi; MAINICHI DAi,LY NEWS, L~ Jul 79) 22
- a - [III - ASIA - 111 FOUO] -
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CON'I' ~Nm5 (Continued) p~f~~'-
~5coc~nd aenera~;~.on' I}Iet Members Ynareasing 3.n Number
(Takehiko Talcaha~h3; MA:LNICHI DATLY NL'W'S, ~.i Ju~. 79) ~4
~YUMIURI~ Poll Shows Ch3ra~s Popu].arity Up
(THE DATLY YOMSURS~ 2 Jul 79) 26
WW-SI ~Death Ra3.lrottd~ Locomotives Arrive
(Va~rious 30UI'C85~ 25~ 26 t1UI1 79~ �~~~~~~~~r~~~~~~~~~~~� 28
~Symbol of Aggression~
~Disgrace to Japant
Magaz3ne Discusses Enshi~inement of WRr Cr3minals at Yasukuni
(SHUKAN SHZNCHO, 3 May 79) 30
ECONOMIC ~
Exper+~s View Oil Price Iiike, Econom3.c arowth Rate
(MASNICHI SHIl~IBUN, 3o Jun ?9) 37
Various Source~ Report on OPEC Price Hike
(Varic,a~ sources, 29, 30 Jun, 1 Jul 79) 39
~ASAHI~ on Price Hike, Editorial
Busin~ssmen on Price Hike
Energy Policy Review
~YOMIURI~ Criticizes Optimism
Salient Points on Offshore Oil Development Presented
(Hiroyuki Nakahara; NIKKEI BUSINESS, 7 May 79)
~
Gas Pipeline in Siberia: United States, Japan, USSR
Agree on Ol~Ga Route
(ASAI-Li SHII~BtJN, 26 Apr 79) Lt5
Economic Planning Agency Readies Sevpn-Year Program
(THE JAPAN TIMES, 1 Jul ?9) 48
Experts Say Japan Will Survive E~hergy Crisis
(Keitaro Hasegawa; SHUKAN ASAHI, 15 Jun 79) 49 -
Briefs
~lZjitsu Exports to U.S. K9
- SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Liquefied Coal, King of New Energy Thru 1985
(Kitamura; NIHON KOGYO SHIl~~UN~ 20 Jun 79) 60
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L CONT~N'TS (Continuod) p~~c
- MTTI Aims ut nreakthrou~h Stra~egy �or Basia lndustries -
(NTHnN ItEIZAT SHIMBUN, 18 May 79) 6J
Complex Applied Zaser Production System JFY 1979
Program Decided
(NTHON KO(}YO SHIMBUN, 1 Jun 79) 66
- Qverse~s (}enet3c Eng3.neering Survey C}rou~ Files Roport
(KAGAKU, Jun ?9) 68
Patent System Must Match Demands of the Era
(Naoichi Inoue Tnterview; NIKKAN KOC~YO SHIN~UN,
i8 Jun 79) �~~~~~~~~~~~~~~s~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~� 71.
Aerospace Industry Association Research Topics Set
(NSKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN, 1L~ May 79) ?5
Tie-Up With Rolls Royce on Engine Development Explained
(YOMIURI SHIMBIJN, 23 May 79) ?7
Pilot Plant To Convert Heavy Oil to O~eifins Nears C~mpletion
(NIKKAN KOGYO 5HIMBUN, 16 Feb 75') 79
Briefs
Diamond ~VD Process 83
CBN Manufacture 83
Stainless Iron Process g3
Industrial Robot Promotion g~
Gas Injection Compressor g~
Electricit.y Storage 84
~ ~Zel Cell Technology 84
' Hydrogen Tank g~
Maglev Railroad 85
_ Satellite Industry Promotion $5
- F1xel Cell RBcD 85
Heavy Oil Cracking 86
1Vb3Sn Superconducting Magnet 86
- Synthethic ]?iamond 86
~ Technology Assess;nent Survey . 86
Ocean Power 87
Hydrogen Combustion
Maglev Railroa~: g7
Barium Titanr~te Fiber 87
Continuous Goki::g Plant g7
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['c)LI:TICAL ANU SOCIOLOGICAL
I TOKYO MEDIA REPORTS ON TOKYO SUI~iIT
- ~ASAHI SHIMBUN~Comments _
Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 2 Jul 79 p 2 OW
[ASAHI SHIMBUN 30 June Editorial: "On World Economy"]
[Excerpt] Amid the shock from the big hike in the price of crude oil by
Che oil-producing countries, the Tokyo aummit ended on 29 June after adope-
ing the Tokyo declaration which includes goals for a ceiling on oil importe. _
The Tokyo meeting, whicii was held 3n the middle of the "second oil crisis,"
became in effecC an energy summit, altl:ough it was hard to resolve Che dif-
ferences of opinion between Che United SCaCea and Japan on the one hand and
the European community countries on the other. It is important that the
following policies were agreed upon Co cope with the higher crude oil pricea
set by the Organiaation of Petroleum Exporting Countries: (1) Estab~ieh- _
ment of goals for a ceiling on oil imporCs up to 1985 by the United SCates,
Japan, Canada and EC; (2) moderation o~f spot market deals and a register of
internaCior.al oil transactions; and promotion of the development and
use of alternate energy sourcea, beg3nning with coal and nuclear energy.
Global Energy Crisis .
During r:tis time of fast-rising oil prices and an uncertain oil aupply,
' lower economic growth rates, unemployment, inflation and imhalances in
international accounts will probably plague both the advanced and develop-
ing countries. Judging from Che experiencn of the first oil criais, the eco- ~
_ nomic difficulties of the western countries will affect the socialist coun-
_ tries as well. The oi1-producing nations will find that Cheir foxeign ex-
change earnings, which they had thought would increase as a result of the
oil price hikes, will drop in actual value as ~ r.~sult of the steep rises
in the prices of the industrial products they impoit.
The energy crisis we are facing is a global one, and everyone must realize
that he can no longer be a disinterested hystander.
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Ie ia significane Chae tbe leaders the advanced countriea who gaChered
in Tokyo agreed to restrict o~L~. importe as the first step in reaolving this
difficult situaCion. Reatricting importa is the only way the oil-consuming
countr3ea can respond to the oil-pr,oducing counCries who have �ormed OPEC.
If the straitened circumatiances in the world oil supply-demand aituation
can be eased, it wi1~. probabl.y be able to prevent to a certain degree sCeep
rises in oi~. prices. Also, it will anawer the criticisms of the oia-pro- _
ducing c~unCriea that "it is improper for the advanced countries to cri-
ticize the oil price hikea while conauming huge amounts of oil reaources."
North-South Dialogue
Bue the leaders ~~f the advanced countriea who agreed on the need to restricC
ail imports had a difficult time ad~uating differencea of opinion concerning
the specific sCepc; to be Caken. For insCanca, they had disagreed over how
long the reatrictions would be in effect, what would be the standard year
and the goals for a ceiling on oil i.mporte by individual countries. Al.though
it was a meeting of world leaders, the summit proved that the leaders have
to consider their national intereats before global concerns.
The EC countries came to Tokyo with the policy.of keeping the toCa1 oil im-
port volume of the seven countries participating in the Tokyd eummit for
the six years from 1980 through 1985 to the volume in 1378 in order to cut
- oiZ consumption by five percent. They wanted to ahow the oil-producing coun-
tries the determination and measures of the advanced countries to save oil
and to promote during this period the development of energy sources to take -
the place of oil.
But the Europeans had to compromise to take into account the argwnent by
the United States and Japan that import goals should be established for
individual countriea, includiag the EC countries, and by Japan that the
period for restricting imports be made as ehort as possible. As a result,
specific import goals for Japan, the United States and Canada were decided
for 1979, 1980 and 1985, and individual import levels for the four EC coun-
tries attending the Tokyo summit--Britain, France, West Germany and Italy--
were also deCermined.
As for Japan, it was decided that its petroleum import level for 1979 be
held down to the line of the international energy agency's conservation goal,
' that for 1980 be set under the "1979 level" and that for 1985 be less than an
average of 6,300,000-6,900,000 barrels a day.
So long as there are differences in the energy environment of each country,.
we believe that it is reasonable for each country to establish an oil im-
port restriction goal in keeping with its domestic aituation. However, it
is a grim reality that the conservation of petroleum has become an inter-
national responsibility. To prevent tfie declaration from becoming meaning-
less, international cooperation for the development of alternative energy
sources has to be stepped up and a bold reform of the industrial structure
- and the mode o� living has to be tackled with coneervation of energy as
the goal. 2
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On the other hand, to aurmoun~ the energy crisis, there is need to promoC~
dialo~ue with countries o~ Che souCh, ine~.uding oil-producing countiries and
non-oil-producing developing countriea. With the OP~C countries npparently
willing Co aCep up aid Co non-oi~.-producing daveloping countries, the energy
crisis should be resolved consCiuctive~y on tihe wide arena of aettlemenC of
~he North-Soueh problem.
Step Up Curbing of Prices
With the adoptton of the step Co shrink petro].eum imports as a task of ue-
mo~e priority, the time has come when economic managemenC can no longer be
conducted by ordinary means, summit parCicipanta stxessed thaC "although
mensures to counter inflation are impo~eant, inflation muat not be replaced F
by d~flat~.on." However, iC is not easy even for West Germany and Japan,
which are regarded to be camparatively we11 off in Cerms of. prices and the
international balance of payments, to respond Co such voices.
In Japan's case, it is inevitable thE~C Che rise in the cost oi products due `
t~ the increase in the price of crude oil is passed on to the consumers, but
it wi11 be terrible if this triggers a chaotic si*uation with regard to prices
as a whole. tde believe that for the present, it is neces~ary to cure overall
demand somewhat. As long as this is nat done, it is unlikely thaC the goal
to save energy will be achieved. We believe that the time has come to con-
sider the deferment of public works and the raising once more of the official ~
~ discount rate.
However, the previous oi1 crisis has taught us that merely tightening the
financial reins will eventually bring about a grave recession. Even if the
economy shows a sign of cooling down in ~he future, much cannot be expected
as the state's finances are already on the verge of bankruptcy. This only
~ makes it more important that the government's financial policy be as flexible -
as possible.
Significance of Tokyo Declaration
At any rate, the Tokyo summit has ended. Here, we would like to think about
� the sig~~ificance of the Tokyo declaration. Since the decline in the posi- _
tion of the U.S., there is no country that can control the world. The eco-
nomic future is not clear, and there is no certain wav Lo escape the present
confusion. In ~uch an age, the importance of international agreements in-
creases. A dec.laration is not sufficiently cotapulsory and there may be loop-
holes. That is why, to the world economy and international politics, the
assessment of the latest summit depends on whether the advanced countries will
fairhfully execute the declaration ss they look to the next summit in Venice.
~ It can be said that Japan has b~en burdened with double and triple obliga-
tions. They are: Its responsibility to lead the world economy toward
stabie growth without inflation. Tts duty as a ma~or petroleum importer
- to conserve energy, and its role as a bridge between countries of the south,
including oil-producing nations, and the advanced nations of the north.
These are all difficult undertakings. It seems that there is no time for
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Prime Miniseer Chira, who has sCepped down from Che chatrmanship of Che
summit, to bask in an aura of saCiafacCion.
, ~THE DAILY YOMIURI~ Comments
Tokyo TH~ DAILY YOMIURI in English 30 Jun 79 OW
[~diCorial: "Summit and OPEC"]
[Text] The Tokyo summit, which adopted straCegy to cope with the s~cond
oil crisis, iasued a declaraeion containing boeh long-term and short-term
measures �or the age of "$20-a-barrel crude,"~~'iggered by the Organization '
of PeCroleum Exporting CounCries.
Though these steps are aimed at reveraing the balance between the conauming
nations and oil-praducing countries, now in favor of the producers, by con-
ducCing strong oil-saving steps and developing other e~iergy sources, the
declaraCion's w~rding is mosC obecure.
The ~rganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, Caking advantage of
the shortage ~f oil supplies, has triggered off the second oil crisis by
- carrying out the latest increase in the price of their product, and the
world's indusCrially advanced nations have been unable to do anything about
ic.
If no proper steps are taken, the :oorld economy faces the prospect of a
crisis, simultaneously dominated by inflation and a business recession.
World leaders parCicipating in the Tokyo summiC conference should have
stood against Che challenge posed by OPEC with a firm resolve by overlook-
. ing the minor differences in their national interests in order to keep the
impact of the latest oil price hike to the minimum.
Now the most important task for the developed and developing countries is
to implement in earnest the agreement reached by the Tokyo summit.
Shortage of Oil Supplies
The current world oil shortase of about two million barrels a day is equi-
valent to five percent of the total global demand. If the major advanced
nations can reduce�their oil consumption by that amount tae tight supply-
~ demand situation will be eased and the oil prices will be stabilized for ~
the time being.
Since the Iranian revolution, the oi.l-producing countries have turned to
the policy of conserving their valuable oil resources and it seems the
world will have to suffer from "oil starvat3on" until alternate energy
sources can be found. The energy problem is expected to remain at the top
oE the agenda of all economic summits for years to come.
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'rhe firsti important rask of the ma~or industrialized counCrias is how to
sC~bilize the oil prices, and the aecond is how to keep to Che minimum
the damage resuleing from the second oil crisie. They will have Co adopt -
such economic policiea that wi11 keep inflation under check withou~ re- ,
stricting the businesa acCiviCy.
U.S. Oi1 ConsumpCion
In this regard we would like to stress Chat the econom:tc trend in
the U.S. atill greatly influences the world ecoaomy. As for the oil problem,
Che U.S. will have to curb its lavish oi1 consumption in an ef�ort to help
~he world to find sol.ution to the energy problem.
According to Che 1978 annual report of the Bank o� International Settle-
ments, the world economy wi11 be able to avoid a vicious stagflation if ehe
U.S. adopCs the policy of a gradual buainess recesaion, cures iCs galloping
inElation and subsCantially reduce its oil imporCs. ,
~AKA~iATA~ Co~~.~nents
Tokyo JPS in English 0921 GMT 3 Jul 79 OW
[Excerpts] AKAHATA says oil producing countries' arguments of OPEC coun~ries
on the General Assembly [as received] indicate that the deciaion was made =
as a policy based on the need not only to cover the decrease in their pur-
chasing power caused by new atage of inflation in developed countries, but
also to call on the oil consuming countries Co curb their oil cons��mption.
"This also means that the oil producing countries are stepping up the policy
of reserving resources based on national sovereignty on resources," the paper
added. The OPEC is also decreasing its supplies to M.a~ors, [as rec~t~;:d] so
that the oil wasting atructure of the developed capitalist countries muet
be reviewed," the paper also said.
"We cannot overlook the fact that the soar of oil price in spot market by
M a~ors and some governments of oil consuming countries formed the direct
backgro+~nd of the decision of the OPEC conference to raise sharply oil
price. It is clear that the decision of oil producing countries means that
these countries followed the policy pursued by M ajors. Therefore, Che re-
sponsibility of M:~~ors and related oil consuming countries' is very serious,"
AKAHTA said.
"The leaders who took part in the Tokyo aummit, however, aCtacked the OPEC
decision with str~ng hostility. `i'he summit became an occasion of the strug- -
gle to get more share in. oil i+~port among mem6er countries. Tt eventually
reached an agreement to cur~ oil imports to some extent.
"But, the Japanese govermnent has taken no measure to reexamine the oi1
wasCing structure of Japan's economy, the oil stock in private level at
the end of March rose to 82 days' use and incxeased hy 83 days' use as
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of June, and the oil companies are relucCant from ael~.ing oi1 to market,
thus 'short~ge' of oi1 has been broughC abouti in many districts. The
policy of curb ing oil imporC based on hasCility toward the OPEC, will in-
creasingly press the people's living," eaid the paQer.
COPYRIGHT: ASAHI SHIMBUN, Tokyu, Honaha, 1975
CSO: 4~.20
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I'OLI'1'TCAL AND SOCIOT~OCTCAI~
OPPOSITTON PARTTES COI~IENT ON U.S.~JAPAN TALiCS
Tokyo MAINICHI SHIMBUN in Japanese 27 ,7un 79 p 2 OW/TK
[Article: "Oppcsition Parties Tssue SCaCementis on Japan-U,S. Summit Talks"]
, [~xcerpt] Various opposition parties issued their respective statements, ~
with the following cot~tents, on the Japan--U.S, summit talks, on thc 26th: -
The JSP and the JCE voiced strong criticism, noting that "tt is a f~llin~
in l.ine with ~he U.S. strategy, which is exerting adverse effects on tt~e
wu~rld econ~my." As against this, the Komei Party and the DSP showeci gome
amount of appreciation, saying Chat "they had their due me~ning, ~ust
beEore the Tokyo summit,
Japan Socialist Party (Tnternational Bureau Chief)
The results of the Japan-U~S. summit talks clarified that Japan will fall
in line with the U.S. strategy toward the European natioas, at the Tokyo
summit.
As regards the energy problems, the task is to ahve the United States, which
is causing ad~~erse effects on the world economy through its unlimited
im~orts of crride oil, promise concrete import-curbing measures, showing
clear�-cut targets. However, the government fell in line with the U.S.
strategy oF taking away the actual substance from this.
On the Middle East problem, Japan promised cooperation with U.S. policies. -
- If this should incur the resentmenr_ of the oi1-producing nations, the
responsibility for this lies with the Ohira cabinet. As for the Korean
problem, it made clear the direction for unity among Japan, the United
States and the ROK.
~
Komei Party (Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman)
The attempts of the top leaders of Japan and the United States for the
communication of views with each other, ~ust before the Tokyo summit,
have due meaning. The problem of Indochinese refugees was also discussed.
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~~nk n~~~'ICIAL US~ d~tLY
- 11ur ~~arty u~ulrYyLc~c~d thc Ficeual ~itu~Ciott, thrrni~;h thr ~ecnnd mia~i~n {C
~~rnt tc~ 5~~u~.henKt A~1n, ~na nrdr~~ea drn~tir men~urr~ tn r.arr wtth thc?
~,r~+hlrm th~ ~~rlm~ minlt+trr. 'Ct ~l~ liopcd thnC thi~ rrdniCm wtt~ b~
t~~~~kl~d fn c~ puKttlve way ~t Che ~ummir, Coo.
'l'he J:?p~~n~g~ G~vernment ghould ~~tablish itg nwn ind~pendent Middl~ ~d~r
pnlic:y nnd purgue it, in~tead of following Chp United Statpg' Middl~ ~asC
p~~ticy. It ig re~rettEible ehae th~ Cop lcaderg df J~p~n and Che Unie~d
� ~tates stiil eoneinue to ndher~ ed argumpnC~ for a milieary balgnc~, in
re~;~rd to ehe Asinn giCu~Cion, including Koreg. _
Uemocr~tic S~ci~il.ist i'arty (YnC~rnaCional $ur~au Chief)
tt is ::mpn rtnnt for th~ advanced natiion~ tio ke~p in pace in reg~rd to Ch~
r.urbing nf dil imports, tlowev~r, the tgking of ~ direction which wi11 rome
tn a sh~~wdown wiCh OP~C should b~ abeolutely nvoid~d~ In thnti respeCe,
it wag proper that the Cop leaders of Japan ~nd the Unieed SteCes reached
nKreem~nC nn short-term curbittg measures.
A~ for tl~e problem of th~ Korean Peninsvla, ehey ehoyld have emphasiz~d
mccisures which would promote talks between the North and the 5outh nnd which
will bring peace to the Korean penineula. As for policies Cow~rd the
Mtcldle C~st, efEores s}iould be made for the realization of pence.
A~ reg~rds the refugee problem, concrete measures must be taken, includinR
me~7sures for ehe pence and atability of the Indochina Peni7sula and the
ncutrglizaCion nf Cambodin.
COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Shimbun, 1979
CSO: 4105
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i~Uk UN't'i:t,tAL U~+I~a ~N1.~Y
liULi'('tCAL nNn sncr.oLnGtcn~ -
~O1tM~it JAPAN~5~ ~OIt~IGN MINISTEtt, DIETM~N TO `~ISI'T HANOI
'~akyo Ttl~ JA~'AN TIM~S in ~nglish 4 Jul 79 p 1 OW
['T~xtJ ~orm~r ~or~ign Mini~ter To~hio Kimura dieclo~~d ~u~~d~y ehae h~ -
gnd neh~r Tnry Ui~C mpmb~r~ wi11 vi~it H~noi 1~C~ Chi~ month dr in ~~rly
Augugt for t~1kg with Vieen~mese 1e~ders on the Indochin~ge refugee problpm
nnd the recettC 5outh~~gt Agign giCueCion.
- Kimurg ~~id th~t h~ hgd r~cently r~c~ived ~n official invit~tion through
Che Vietn~mes~ ~mbgsey in Tokyo. -
"Vietnam ~hould ghow eplf-reeCraint gnd curb the ~xodu~ of itg peopl~. Bur
it geema to me thgC it'g mc~st importgnt for the counCri~g conc~rned to find
Che true cause of Che refugee g~tu~tion;' Kimur~ eaid.
N~ nl~o said thaC the refuge~ problem ehould not be alloaed tn cau~~ con-
frontation b~twe~n Indochine~e communiet countri~a and ch~ A~eociation of
SouCh~89C Agign Natiang (A5~ANj.
Kimura said he hopes to discuss the refugee problem aith Vietnamese Premier
Pham Van Dong and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh.
He ig scheduled to he~d a 10-man migeion of the Asian and African Affair~
Study Cr~up of the Rnling Liberal-Democratic Pgrty (LDP). ie ehe chi~f
representative of the LDP "Doveg."
Kimurg expressed the hope that the misaion's vigit to Henoi [will~ help the
government's policy toaard Southeast A~ia, especially ita efforta to eolve
ehe refugee probl~n.
COPYRICHT: THE JAPAN TIMES, 1975
CSO: 4120
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I
l~Ult U1~~'ICTAL U513 tlNLY
pOLI`CtCAL ANU S~CIOLOGI~AL
' MAINI~HI' COMM~N'r5 ON N~W LIB~ItAL CLUB' S INTRA~'ARZ'Y 1~~UU
Tnkyn MAINIClt2 UAILY N~JS in ~nglieh 2 Jul 79 ~ 2 OW
(~dieori~l: "New Liber~l Club"~
[T~xtJ The New Liberal Club (NLCj (pnrty), organized in June 1976, is ~n-
_ ~oying ieg foureh ypar, at leaot on rhe ~urf~ce~ wiCh ite member~hip incregeed
~o gome 40,000 and ie~ lli~t gtrength expanded threefold in the meantime. Ie
ig ndw ~ full-fledged poliCical party in itn own right, but the preaent eiCua-
tion in ~nd out of th~ p~rty da~e not varranc ~?ny opCimi~m for the party.
We nre in a way disgu~ted with the NLC's intraparty etruggle that cgme into
tl~e limelight r~cently. ~'h~ antipathy existing between party repreaentg-
cive Ynhei Kono a~n~ Secretary Ceneral Takeo Nishioka has given rise to
gp~eul~eion th~t the other~+i~e fresh and new pnlitical perty is eaddled
r~ieh intraparty ~truggleg as ha~ often been Witne~s~d Within the Liberal-
_ UpmnGratic Party from ahich they bolted three year~ ago.
What has eauged ~uch a schism betWeen Kono and Nighiokn in thp~e three years?
+ It said that they dieagree on policy matters, but that is the very point We
r~nnot understand. Kono and five other liberal-dmwcrats defected from that
pgrty three yearg ggo criticizing the plutocratic nature of the party, as
a�11 ag the "politics in camera" domi~ated by party elderg. They called
for a"d~parture from dirty politice" and the establiehm~nt of ~"ne~r
liber~ligm" but this doee not mean that they had a c~ear-cut policy as a
political p~rty.
Th~ ~cK? Liberal Club is delinitely a coceervative party. The nati~n es
a~ll ag its eupportera have recoani=ed the party within the frames~ork of
eonsetwatism. They made a great advance in the prtvioue general election,
primarily b~cause their enthu~iasn to rejuvenate canoervatism and root out
th~ ~vilg of money politics appealed to the voters.
The defeceion nf the si~c vas in itaelf a political gamble. Nobody Ma~ cer-
tain to what extent the new political group ~+ould 6e able to make inroads
into the political arena. They had little time to deliberAte on policies
prior to the formation of the new party, but by now~ they could havs estab-
lished their o~m policies ie the couret of their daily acttvities in and
out of the Uiet during the past three years.
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'~her~ ig nn knaw~.ng whpeher d~ nnr Che 1~ti~~e FiggCO wg~ mneiv~eed by ehe
gtrug~le fdr pnrty l~nderghip ratih~r rhan by ehe differ~nc~~ of npininng
ConCerning eh~ pgrCy policie~. In any ce~~, tih~ N~w Lib~r~]. Club h~g gpdil~d
ieg fr~~h imng~ gmong ~h~ people through tihe a1~.e~ad gntip~ehy bgtwe~n iC~
twa edp l~~d~rg. A pgrey pr~~idanr eleetied by th~ edng~ngug nf th~ p~rty
shauld demonsGr~te hig lendership and ie b~hodveg tihe p~rty'e secretary
gen~rgl en suppnrC Ch~ pregid~nr~
The rdw w~~ rapore~dly ~~rtled wiehin ehe party. Th~.~ i~ nnly n~Cur~l.
A pnrCy ~p1ie wgg ~vereed in ~nCicipgtiion of Ch~ di~edluei~n nf Ch~ houge
of repr~~~nC~Cives ~nd eubgequ~nC genera]. ~1~cCinn in the near fuCur~. Thig
doeg nnC megn ehaC ehey have seCtled the bagic probleme eince th~y fgiled to
, probe inCo the bone of contenCion. Now that the ineraparCy feud has surf~ced~
th~ New Liber~l C1ub ehould have reshuffled the p~reonnel setup drasticaLly
end m~d~ g freeh seart for the pgrty'~ healChy groweh, W~ r~gret thae ehe
NLC 1e~dership ghied aw~y from d~aling wiCh the mosC imporC~nC igeue.
In retro~pecC, Che NLC made a miscue in thaC the balance o� power between
th~ ~on~~rv~Cives and progr~sgiv~ wae not toppled in the House of ~ouncillors
electiong ehree yeare ago and thae the ebbing tid~ o� the Libpral-Uem~cr~eic
Party w~g ch~cked as a reeult. The emergence of the Chirn cgbiner nlso pue
the NLC in a rather difficult position since the new cabin~r i~ goc~d at
"pirching curv~ ba11s" whereae ite pr~cedegsor, the Fukuda Cabinet, wa~
hawkish gnd good at throwing straight balls. Against euch changed circum-
stances, it is now believed next to impossible for the NLC to expect ~ re-
currence of ehe explosive boom it once enjoyed.
It i~ gmall wonder that the party'a rank and file entertain gnxiety ag to
the future of ehe party. They have engaged in hegted debates on the party's
raison d'etre and differences of opinion have come to the fore. The New
Liberal Club is certainly at a crucial crossroad.
The New Liberal Club must conaolidaCe ite party aCructure and embark on
n new course as a flag carrier of the nation's new conaervatives.
C0~'YRIGNT: MAIIJICHI DAILY N~WS, 19~5
C50: 4120
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1'U1~11'ICAL ANi) SUCtdLOGiCAi.
USI' STAK~S ITS F'U'I'UI~~ ON TH~ LDP
DSp Ambitione
Tokyo ASAH~ JANA~tU in Japaneee 25 May 79 p 3
[~diCorial by Kiyoshi ~b~Cg, ~diCori~l coneultant, ASAHI SHIMBUtd]
(Text~ A"new policy of the DSP" th~t hag paved Che way for a coalition
government with the LDP may, in a s~n~e, resulC in the DSP criCically sC~k-
ing its future.
It xs suggeated that, shonld Che LDP lose its ma~ority in Ch~ Diet, Che DSP will
join a policy-centered coalition government with the LDP and will attcmpt rn
chnngc the quality of government and traneform the politica of the LDp govern-
ment frcm within. The logic is that auch a change is the very misgion of a
"responsible opposition party," gnd thaC the very adoption of this approach
would let the nation feel confident in the post-LDP era, while drawing
votes--the votes o:herwise would be cast to the LDP--to the middle-of-the-
road political parries, thereby inducing the loss of LDP majority. By adopt-
ing this strategy, Che DSP apparently intends to put an end to the conser-
- vative-radical two party dominant system aince 1955 and to fo:tow the
successful experiment of "a grand coalition" concluded bet~~een Weat Germany's
DSP and the Christian Democrats in 1966.
The ambitions of the DSP are grandiose. However, what the D5P should foresee
is that even if the LDP were to lose its majority in the early 80's, the
LDP Will still remain, by comparison, the leading party, and its influence
will still be overwhelmingly greater than that of any of the opposition
parties. And while others may have a different point of view, one can suggest
thar there is even a danger that the LDP-allied DSP centurists may only be
playing a marginal role in supplementing the conaervatives. The DSP had
held a belief that the LDP has been able to keep its unity because it has
had a tight grip on the reins of government, yet in an "era of coalition"--
- that shnuld come after the post-1955 system has been done away with--the LDP
will lose its dominance over the government and this will result in that
party's disunity. Also, the bipolar system of the LDP-JSP will collapse,
giving birth to a new coalition with a responsible "middle-of-road" opposition
party as its pivot.
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- r~~ nr~zc~~ us~ ortLY
We cnnndt h~geen Cn c~nclude ChnC the regult of ehe n~eion-wid~ 1dc~1
elecCidn signifieg nn end Co eh~ ern~ion of Ch~ LUP influence. ~e mc~y we11
br_ i~aid ehnt ~h~ LUr m~n~g~d Cn reC~in tihQ ~tgCue quo by druwing suppnrt
~ram Chr. rc~mbin~d fnrceq nE ehe moderae~~ xnd ehe bur~nucr~ry. tn light af
r~c~nC pnllCinal Crpndg, Che DSP~gdvnc~e~d no~liCion gnvernmenr wiCh th~ LUP
m~y ~v~n hnvc~ a rend~ney to cre~te g rightist-orienC~d 1980'~ ~di.tlon nf Ch~
1955 gysrem, One cnnnd~ digr~gard th~ f~c:C ehat sev~ral eeat~g in G~rmc~ny
hnd snCinl-democr~Cic governm~ntg b~for~ Ch~ exp~rimene nf ehe grand nllianCe
by Che Sncini bemncr~tg sunceeded.
The er~nd nf l~bnr uninng ~lso preg~nes big problems. ~oLlnwing ehe spring
offensive, labor uniuns h~ve acCively stepped up Cheir acrivity Coward g =
united lgbor front in ehe 1980's. A repre~enCative of Che ~'ederaCion of
Indep~ndent Uninns cnsC his doubC ~C Che DSP pgrty conventinn, enying, "Hge
the middl~-of-Che-ro~d influ~nne been stabilized?" A repre~entaCiv~ from ehp
Jnpan Confederatiott nf L~bdr eimilarly expreaged some r~~ervation ngking,
"Are we free from being drngged inen g sitiuaCion along with ehe LUP eh~e may
show its decline in the diatant future?" "The emerging general direcCion
among the Crade unions is thaC, in arder eo form a uniCed labor front, Che
nation~l center should reEr~itt from suppc,rCing a specific parey and thaC, in
principle, the anti-LDP line should be adhered to. Will the new policy oE
the USP noC prevent the labor front from being united?
One should not confuse realiCies wi~h expecCationa.
Coalition of Conaervative, Moderate Forces
Tokyo ASAHI JANARU in Japanese 25 May 79 pp 6-7
[Text] "Let's bring rhe party to the dominant force in an age of coalition
by drawing 100,000 party members," so concluded the declaration of the DSP's
24th regular convention held between the 9th and llth. As part ~f the
strategy of coping with the Cime of coalition, Che DSP decided on its parCy
activity guideline for 1979 including a policy plan toward a coalition govern-
ment of the conservatives and the middle-of-the-road parties. ICs aim is to
realize the loss of LDP's ma3ority in the Diet, either by the next general
election or the House of Councilors election to be held next summer~ and to
change the LDP politics within the coalition government. However, the tacrica -
of initially bringing down the LDP from the dominant rein of the government
and of establishing alliance with it subsequently have caused by no means
a minor mixed feeling both wiChin the party and even from the Japan Confed-
eration of Labor (JCL).
Goal: Coalition of the Conservative and the Moderate Forces
DSP's policy plan is discussed in the second part of the party's 1979
activity guideline. Its framework of analysis reveals that "the political .
reality re�lects a situation in which the 1955 system (in which the LDP and
the JSP played dominant roles) has collapsed and th~ middle-of-the-road
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forr~g--~qu~h u resp~ngible opposition p~rCy as ehe DSP--will ~ccelern~e eheir '
inFluenc~." Tt~ rop prinritiy is to drive th~ LUP from Che pngir~.on of
mn.~ority by qtr~ngthen~ng USP'g independence ~nd by consolidgting Ch~ in-
fluenCe nE re~ponqible nppogiCion pnrtiea. In theory, a situaCinn in which
pc?wer altern~tes between ~he can~ervnCive pgrty nnd the responsible Oh~A3~- -
ti~in pcirty .t:~ de~irAble. ~'nr th~ time being, howaver, even if th~ LDp lose~
ir:~ maJoriCy, responsibl~ ouCs ar~ no match as far ag the representaeion
Eigure is concerned. ~'urehermore, hoping to realize Che formaeion of a
n~tional governmenC of ehe reformisCs cnalition centering on the Sociglists,
Komeito (Ch~ Cle~n F'arty), DSP, which is the basic policy of the DSP, is ~
b~ynnd reach under rh~ presenC circumatances since there still remain Crai~s
~f communistii~ chargcCeriseics within Che JSP. Herein liea the origin of ~
cn~7lition gnvernment centering on the LDP--a single dominant party on cnm-
pgri~on.
Ther~~ore, it is auggested that the issue of coalition with the LDP will be
- tnken up once nr, inter-party agreement (polirical assnciation centering on
policies) on a:~;ix-poinC program including mid-term economic planning has
been reached ac~d thnt the prospect for government thaC the DSP aspires for
has been assured.
In ;.he campaign guideline, a government is simply referred to as a coalition
gover~~ment centering on policy." In Che light of the following informa~~ion,
it is, in brief, a coalition government of the conservatives and the middle- :
of-Che-road forces:
1) In his convention speech, Chairman Sasaki denied that the DSP would uni-
laterally participate in the coalition government; 2) For the time being,
the JSP has been placed outside Che realm of administration, while seriously
~ considering the unity af responsible opposition forces; and 3) the "respon-
sible outs" are labeled as the "middle-of-the-road."
- In 1973 the DSP embarked on a"national reformists coalition government."
Later, the label was changed ta "an associaCion transcending the framework
of the conservatives and the reformists" (1975) and to "the JSP, Komeito,
DSP plus Chose fellows who share the same ideology" (part of the conserva-
Cive forces) (1977)--a trend toward what is being called a coalition of the
conservatives and the reformists. Furthermore, it went, last year, so far
as to "accept Che room for discussing the question of government with the
conservaCives based on several propositions. Viewed from this historical
perspective, the policy plan ~ust announced is nothing more than a logical
course of action.
During the question and answer period of the convention, Chairman Sasaki
stated that "unless we can participate in the government of all opposition
parties including radical forces, we have no choice but to follow the govern-
ment concept including the LDP." This explains why he opted for the coalition
government of the conservatives and the middle-of-the-road forces. Where
the DSP stands today may be accounted for by its previous unsuccessful
attempts to gain influence over the government. The JSP-Komeito-DSP line _
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- ~~r~~vinur~ly ~~dvc~cntad hy Mr SriHnki rn~C irs core ~upporr followi.ng Subur~
~'dri'y Nep~rn~ion trom rlie JSP ~nd his de~th. The Socinl Democraeic Le~gue
~ [SDLj coneiste of thnse who have lefr Che JSP Cotaling only ~ix memb~rs
wieh bnth Upper and Lower Houae combined. The JSP itself hgs noC been
succea~ful in "clparing up the Marx3sm-Lenin3sm" �rnm ehe purty, which the
DSP hnd hoped for. On ~he other hand, there was expectaCion tha~ (~s ex-
Ch~irm~n Kasug~ put ir) "some members ~re preparing Co leave by Che eecond
and the third bus" when members of the New Liberal C1ub including Chairm~n _
Mr Kono first decided ro leave. Currently tihere are no signs of dxas~ic
outElow wi~hin the LbP factions. When one anticipates an approaching age
nf coalitlon, the DSP can'C very well not think of coaliCion with the LDP
as n whole. So Che more LDP acceptance of the DSP policiea wi11 mean "one
more seep toward poLitical reform," so logic dictaCes. In explicaeing his
current policy ob~ectives, Mr Sasak~ argues Chat "RealisCic policies are
what the public demands from politics. The nation will be r~lieved by thc
fact that politics is noC getCing worse, even in the absence of the LDP's
dominance over the government. By advocaCing it now, Che Loss of the LDP's
ma~ority could be further accelerated."
In a summit discussion held in early March among Che three leaders of the
LDP, the C1ean Government Party, and the DSP over this year's budget pro-
posal, Mr Sasaki disclosed that he would go along with the proposal if
certain provisions including their demands are met, a statement made in
connection with a 3oinC Komei-D SP demand which included pension increase.
Apparently Mr Sasaki ofCen had in mind a belief that successful revision
could pave the way toward a policy agreement and an eventual coalition
government. Due to the facC that Premier Ohira did not accept the sugges-
tion, the DSP ultimately decided to voCe against the budget proposal. The
= DSP is not unhappy, believing that "a rehearsal had been made." (key
official) An analysis of the nationwide local election by tlie DSP also
suggested that "as Che victory ana?ysis continued, the LDP began to realize
that it was a joint victory with the so called middle-of-the-road forces.
This realization has induced an uneasi-:eGs for the long-lasting, single-
party administration.
Drive the LDP Out of Majority
The foregoing analysis does not demonstrate that the DSP convincingly pre-
dicts, in a detailed fashton, how a coalition governmenC may be worked out.
Included in the policy agreement are:
1. the mid-term economic planning and employment stabilization plans without
unemployment and inflation; 2. the social security plan meeting the.needs of
the elderly, especially reforms in the pension program and guaranteed -
housing; 3. the organizational and financial reform and the review of profit
sharing; 4. approval of the SDF, continued recognition of the U.S.-Japan
security treaty; 5. the elimination of international economic frictions;
and 6. the development of new energy sources including nuclear power. Will
the DSP go along with the LDP only on part of the agenda on which there is
mutual agreement? Is it going to enter into coalition caith the LDP if the
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glx points nn Che agend~ cnn be accep~ed? Or wi11 it merely provide ~upport
whil~ r.emni.ning ouCside Che governmenC? Concernin~ the cnmbination of
~c~.li t Lr.nl p~r. t:t~e~, w�111 iC be g group~.ng among the LUI', the Cleun Government
1~;iety, and tkie USP? Ur will lt go so far as to include various forcpe af
ehe moderates? Conaidering a ttumber of cases, the aceivity guideline
emphasizeg a common denominaeor--"a policy-center~d political coaliCion."
' ltesponses eo Chis policy plan from the various moderate politica~. parties
h~ve not been enthusiasCic. 'The New Liberal Club ia indifferent, saying, `
"We are noe interested." (5ecretary General Nishioka) The SDL is not re-
cept3ve to the coatition with the LDP. 'I'he Clean Government Party, which
has jusC decided to estsblieh a review committee on polirical trends and
~ the security treaty ~nd Che SDF question, lacks coordination. 'I'he summie
conference among Che four leaders of the moderaCe political parties, pre-
viously proposed by Mr Sasaki under his peraonal iniCiative, remains to be
held on the issue of selection of candidates for the Tokyo gubernational
election. The New Liberal C1ub hae not favorably responded Co the DSP's
proposal r~ set up a 3oinr forum discussing the Diet Policy matters.
Currently the DSP has only 28 seats in the House of Representntivea--a mere
10 percent of the LDP's. Though 56 candidates have been listed for Che
next general election, and even if over 40 members are elected--a targeC of
the DSP--such a small force could very well be absorbed and merged by Che
LDP, once allied with the latter. ~
Iiesides, even within the party, a sense of uneasiness and reluctance remains. -
In the convenCion strong voices have been heard, saying, "Shouldn~C Che
party's own political power be st,:engthened in the first place before speak- -
ing of coalition with the LDP?" Even~some executive members of the JCL--a,
so to speak, close ally of the SDP--has expressed dissatisfaction, stating,
"Without the anti-LDP slogan workers wi.ll not follow us. The prospect for
coalition with the LDP should not have been publicized, but the matter
should have been kept to yourself." The JCL went so far as to request a sub-
stantial deletion of the word, LDP from the latest draft campaign guideline,
for the JCL thought the word was repeated too many times.
The real goal of the DSP for. the time being is to drive the LDP out of
majority. The target is the Hcuse of Councilors election to be held next
summer. Coupled with the trend toward the united labor front, the strategy
has been established so that the LDP seats may be drastically reduced, by
drawing~election support for the local electorates of the House of Councilors
election not only from the various moderate political parCies but.also from
a part of the JSP. The plan, in shnrt, is to forcefully drag the LDP into
"an age of coalition."
Viewed from this line of tactics, the age of coalition is ~ust around the
corner. While consolidating moderate political forces and generating con-
sensus within the party may noC be quite complete, however, these issues,
strengthening the mod~~rate forces' unit}~ and expanding the power of the DSP,
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= could ~ventunlly b~ we11 orchestr~ted ittCn ehe gon~. oF e~e~?bl.ishing a coc~li-
; t3c~n governmcnC by exclus~.ve focug on the very gon1.
Mr SasAki himself cn11g his pol3cy design as "a stake." One may wondc~r 1E
Mr S(lgn~t~. ~.S truly a lpader with gond foresight in an age of coalition.
COPYRIGHT: Asahi Shinbun~ha 1979
9371 -
CSn: 4105
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POLI'I'LCAL ANll SdCIOLOGICAL
JAPAN'S CENSUIKYO, USSR IIODY AGREE TO NORM~I~IZE RELATIONS
Tokyo JP5 in English 0907 GMT 2 Jul 79 OW
[TextJ Tokyo, 2 July, JPS--The Japan ~ouncil Against A and H Bombs (Gensuikyo)
and the SovieC Peace Committee released a~oinC communique on 30 June on the
conference of d~legations of both organizations.
The joint communique "confirmed the position of mutual independence and
equality, and the position of non-interference in internal affairs, Uy tak-
ing inCo account Che process of the anti-nuclear weapons movement in ~he
past," and called for normalization of relations between the two organiza-
tions. Both delegations "sgreed to develop ~oint actions based on the basic
aim of the anti-nuclear weapons movement, and immediately urgent tasks, even
though there may be differences of opinion about individual concrete issues."
The Soviet Peace Committee positively evaluated Gensuikyo's stand, which con-
sistently worked for a naCional unity of the movement against A and H hombs,
and said that it is ready to participate in the '79 United World Conference
against A and H bombs.
The communique confirmed that the effectuation of an emergency step for a
complete ban on nuclear weapons, and banning the use of them, is the common
task of the Tnterttational Peace Movement. The communique underscored the
importance that "the negoti