JPRS ID: 8587 USSR REPORT POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

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• Collection: JPRS
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• Sequence Number: 32
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/8587
25 July 1979
I~SSR Re ort
p
POIITICAI AND SOCIOLC~GICAI AFI=AIRS
CFOUO 11 /79)
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JPRS L/8587
25 July 1979
,
USSR REPORT
POLITICAL AND $OCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
cFO~o 11/~9)
CONTE~iTS PAGE
INTERNATIONAL
~ U.S. Foreign Policy Reliance on Nonmilitary Pressure
(G.A. Trofimenko; VOPROSY ISTORII, May 19) I
Formation of Anti-Imperialiat Front Examined
(Jano Berecz; ZA YEVROPU MIRA I PROGRESSA, 1977)........ 25
Gromyko Poreword to New Edition on USSR Foreign Policy
(VNESHNYAYA POLITIKA SOVETSKOGO SOYUZA, 1978)........... 45
- a - [III - USSR - 35 FOUOJ
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INTERNATIONAL
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY RELIANCE ON NOI~tILITARY PRLSSURE
Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII in Ruasian No S~May 79 pp 59-77
[Article by G. A. Trofimenko~ chief, Poreign Policy Department, Institute of
the United States of America and Canada, profesaor in USSR Ministry of
n Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Academy: "Means and Methods of U.S. Foreign Policy"J
[TextJ Nations implement thr.ir foreign policy with the aid of a certain
aggregate of ineans and instruments of influencing the internationnl situaCion
and other nations which are in a direct or indirect interrelationahip with
them (through third countriea and international organizatione). The pr~ncipal
means of implementing the foreign policy goals traditionally employed by a
bourgeois atate xre coercion (puniehment) and recompense (reward, support)
the "whip and horey dc~' ar, as the Americans say, "the carrot and stick." In
other words wa are speaking on the one hand of ineans of exerting presaure by
force in the world arena and, on the other hand, means of gaining the favor
of another nation by satisfying to a certain degree the interests of the -
latter. Operating by metl~~ds of pressure and aayciliation in their various
combinations, a given bourgeois nation seeks to achieve an international
situation which is most favorable for itaelf. Of courae the capability to
influence the world situation depends to a substantial degree on the mili-
tary-economic and demographic potentials of a given nation, the dispoaition
of class forces, political and moral authority, the purpoaefulnesa and
consistency of its foreign policy.
Means of f~reign-policy influence can be grouped into the following types:
military, carried out by means of direct utilization of armed forces;
economic; political, which is expressed in a country accepting various
foreign-policy pledges, in concluding alliances, in actions through interna-
tional organizations, overt and covert influences on political parties and
other mass organizations of another country, etc; political-psychological,
which specifies employment of a broad aggregate of ineans, from foreign-
policy propaganda and other forms of ideological influence (including
religious) to the threat of force; physical nomnilitary action (not involving
utilization of armed forces {such as: one country cutting off a river whi~h
subsequently crosses the t~rritory of anothex country and canstitutes a
vital source of fr~sh water to the latter (recently there has been frequent
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menCion of pos~ibilitieN of controllin~ climute ~tnd weather for ho~Cile pur-
pos~~ so-called geophysicgl warfare culturnl, expressed in inEluence of
the way oE life of one country on othere (it consisCs of a great many diE-
Eer~nt componente both of a material and psychological character and requires
decade~ or even longer perioda of time). All Che above-mentioned Cypes of
influence can bp utilized not only for compulsion (ae methodg of exerting
pressure by force) but also for stimulation (as a means of gaining the
favor of another nation or rewarding a favorable policy).Z For example, Che
armed forces of one country can be utilized both againgt another .ountry and
to support that country. The same thing can be said as regarda the ma~ority
of other Cypea of influence. Also conceivable is a situation where deliberate
encouragement by one country of certain :oreign-policy steps by another pur-
sues not go much~the goal of consolidating its poaition as the Machiavellian -
purpose of involving the 1aCter counCry i n what is essentially an adverse
eituation, which promises a political gain to the counCry which encourages
such behavior. In addition, foreign-policy strategy also specifies a situa-
tion where encouraging influence is exerted for Che purpose of decepCion:
not in order actually to push another country toward the supposedly encouraged
type of action but rather to turn it away from such action, increasing the
degree of its doubts about this excessive (deliberately displayed) interest
on the part of the encouraging country precisely in a given course oE action
by the encouraged country, etc.3 Of course the above typology of kinds of
foreign-policy influence is to a certain degree of an arbitrary nature, for
as a rule none of them ia implemented in pure form. This is connected in
large measure with the peculiarities of the foreign-policy process, when a
given Qxternal political influence may, for example, initially occur only in
the form of psychological threat, and subsequently is expressed in material
action. In addition, as U.S. writers emphasize, "at the motiva~lon level
political and economic factors are frequently so closely interwoven that
they cannot be separated from one another," since politicians frequently
"have more than one set of reasons for their actions and see the internal
relations between diffgrent categories, which often prove to be separated with
a scholarly analysis.i4
In addition, an influence proper, which may be form ally assigned to a given
type specified above, usually exerts a multiaspect influence on the country
against which it is directed. For example, a sharp escalation of the arms
race by one side which is in a confrontation relationship with another at
first exerts ~nly a psychological influence on the adversary, since there is
nothing but an increased threat in such an action as stepping up military
preparations. Subsequently the other party, however, beginning to respond
to an apparent (or even imagined) threat, makes a number of military-cech-
nical c'ecisions which directly influence the state of its economy, its
politica.i relations with the adversary, the attitudes of the public, etc.
Such a policy in turn ricochets back, and a complex foreign-political "ac-
tion-reaction" node is formed, which proves to be especially complex when
not two but many nations are involved in the actions and reactions to Chem.
In other words, the energy of a foreign-policy action ot one kind can, ~ust
as physical energy, transitton to a second and third type: purely psychological
action can be transformed in the final analysis into economic and political
action, and vice versa.
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'~7 Thnrc ~xist speciftc m~ans (instrument~) for c~xerctse of egch ok the nbove-
n~mcd Cypes of infl~ence. ~or example, export of cgpiCal~ govercunent
foreign loans and credit, foreign trade (including various cugtom~ duty ~nd
other restrictiona and encouragemenCe), embargo, various types oE ~conomic,
scientific-technical and manegement ~s~i~tance, participaCion in interna-
ttongl technical systems or progrgma, allowance or prohibition of foxeign
vesgels in coast~l zonea, etc, can be utilized to imple~nent economiC in-
flucnce. h'requently nne and the same means can be utilized ro exer.C different
Cypeg of infl.uence. ~or example, military forces are employed directly for
combnt operations, but alsn Co exert psyct~ological pregsure on another
country; various covert operations mounted trt other countries puraue the
ob,ject~Ive o� exerting dtrect political influence, and cen at th~ qame time
aim ~C creating economic chaos, create a climate of nerv~s, etc.
in addition to means, there exist the ~:hannels through which a means is
transmitted: communication between statesmen, poliCical leaders, ~nurnalists,
tourists, public statements made Chrough the mass information medi~,
demonstrative disp2.ays (for example, concentration of troops along the
'To a
border oE another country), direct employment of armed forces, etc.
substantial degree unification and "crossing" of types of influence and in-
strumenlacefdueftnethe specificrfeatures ofCChe~channelsethroughrwhichnit
takes p
takes place.
Diplomacy is the principal channel.s Diplomacy is defined on the one hand
as the channel of communications proper, that is~ a network of e~tablish-
ments specially organized for establishment of political contact betwePn
countries, and on the other hand the process of implementation of external
political influence through the activities of these establishments and their
represenCatives, utilizing for implementation of a nation's foreign policy
tt~e broadest group of possible types and concrete instruments of influence.
Contacts between nations in our time, however, are not limited to diplomatic
channels alone. Governments have the direct possibility of communicating with
each other and the peoples of oCher countries with the sid of a system of com-
munications which is becoming increasingly diversified and elaborate.6 A
country has a right to undertake demonstrative actions of the nature of
"signals," and it can be assured thaC they will definitely reach the opposite
party (parties? not through diplomatic channels (if the latter are deliberately
ignored) but through the mass media.
The United States from the moment of its birth utilized the entire aggregate
of types and means of external political influence, although naturally dur-
ing the ftrst decades of existence of the American state, when its economic
and military potential was small, in its foreign relations it counted
primaYily on political and political-psychological means of influence. Upon
entering the stage of imperialism at the beginiling of the 20th century, the
United States began more increasingly vigorously resorting to military-
force modes of action in the world arena, which are traditional for im-
perialism.
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At tl~~ end of World Wnr II tkie United StaCeg, which did noC dirQCtly ~uffer
in the courge oE military operations~ found itself in a uniquely favorable
condition in comparison wirh all the other powere. The Unit~d 5tateg came
out of the war with increased economic might. At the same Cime it acquirpd
for a certain period of Cime a monopoly over a totally new kind of mas~
destruction weapon Che ~tomic bomb, a qualitatively new instrument of mili-
tary force~ which presenred the opportunity directly Co accomplish strategic
missione. The new "self-suEficiency of force" of U.5. imperialism also im- _
pelled Che United 5tates to embark ~pon a"cold war," which was a U.5. at-
tempt to resolve questions connected with the historical rivalry between th~
two systems capitalism and socialism "from a position of strength."
The United States essentially seC as its goal not simply to adapt Co the new
postwar international situation, at the same time influencing iC in its own
interests Co the greaCest possible degree, buC to shape the enCire interna-
tiona:. political environmenC in light of its stated hegemonistic goals.
T}iis was a maximal task, which also demanded maximal utilization of all in-
strEiments of foreign po'licy, particularly openly force types of influence.
Under these conditions the traditional art of diplomacy proved Co be
devaluated for a certain period of time, brought down to the level of a
third-degree channel for transmission of so to speak technical, little-im-
portant external political information. The main problems in the
haughty opinion of the U.S. leaders were to be resolved by means of un-
ambiguous, brazen demonstraCions of U.S. strength.
A second characteristic feaCure of U.S. postwar foreign-policy practices
was the joining of economic pressure (on all countries) with a threat of
military force against the socialist nations. What was being threatened
was the employment of nuclear weapons. Both during the brief period of
nuclear arms monopoly and after loss of this monopoly position ir. 1949 (when
the United States viewed itself as possessing a substantial superiority in
nuclear weapons arsenal, and in particular strategic means of delivery),
Washington politicians believed that the mere threat of employment of this
"absolute weapon" would be sufficienC to ensure resolving any world prob~:em
on totally U.S. terms.
One more feature of U.S. foreign policy practices is replacement of
traditional diplomatic talks and dealings with the "potential adversary"
with the language of signals, which did not require direct diplomatic con-
tacts between the two parties. These signals were expressed in shows of
military force and other actions which, it was assumed, should be com-
prehended by the other party without any additional explanations given
through diplomatic channels. Construction of a new military base in a
given country, redeployment of U.S. troops stationed abroad, refusal to
permit: a given trade deal between a Western firm and Soviet organizations
all t~~is was a unique language of power gestures which were supposed to
replace the traditional methods of communicating one's intentions or con-
cerns to the other party via diplomatic channels. But U.S. leaders at-
tached particular importance to so-called political utilization of military
forces. According to people at the Brookings Institute in Washington, who
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made nn ~xtensive study oE thie sub~eCC, "politic~l utilizgtion oE armed
forces t~kes place when one or several componenrs oE regul~r ~r~ned forcey
undertak~ physical actinn a~ a deliberaCe attempt by a governmenC to
exert influence or to prepare Co exert influence on tli~ gpecific beh~vior
~ of indivtdunls in nnother country withour drnwing thexe Eorces inCo n
proCructad confltct."~ .1. F', Dulles characterized preci~ely t?tly kind of
utllir.ntion of armcd Eorces as "balancing on the brink of war," emphasizing _
ErequenC U.S, utilization of pressure of thi~ kind.8 Within Ct~e framework of
thi~ ~pproacli (whtcti does not consider employment of armed forces for pur.ely
military purposes) tt~e authors of the above-me~ntioned study listed 215 un-
ambiguous cases of political uCilization by the Uni.ted 5tates of its ~rmed
forces during ttie period from 1 JanuAry 1946 through 31 October 1975.~ Thu:~
tt~e Erequency of "palitical utilizaCion" by the UniCed 5tates of ity nrmed
forces (nccording to patently undersCated figures)10 comprised during this
period more Chan one incident every two months. The "peaks" in show of force
utilization of armed forces occurred, according to the calculations of these
same nutt~ors, in 1946-1948 and 1958-1964.
Finally, one additional feature of U.5. foreign nolicy of the "cold w~r"
period was the exceptionally high degree oE ideologization of ttiis policy.
Unquestionably an ideological component is always present in ttie Eoreign
policy of any nation, a component linked with t}~e class character of the
s[ate. Precisely the intentiocs of the ruling class (classes) find primary
expression in the principal goals and interests pursued by a given nation
in the world arena. However, in the "cold war" initiated by U.S. im-
perialism, it was a question not simply of national policy in a class l~uc
but rather the fact that foreign policy proper in all its mani[estations
was the handmaiden of anticomnunist ideology. But the fact that the U.S.
national interest does not always coincide with the ideology ot anticom-
munism was graphically demonstrated by joint U.S. and Soviet participation
in the antifascist coalition. In the 1950's and 1960's U.S. policy vis-a-vis
the USSR was determined not by the traditional American doctrine of "en-
lightened selfishness," which presupposes scrupulous analysis and considera-
tion of the long-term consequences of undertaken actions but by petty con-
siderations to the effect that everything which is to the detriment of the
enemy will automatically be to the benefit of the United States. Guided by
this principle, U.S. diplomacy in the 1950's and 1960's committed so many
errors and made so many miscalculations (from the viewpoint of a retrospective
evaluation of U.S. conduct by the U.S. ruling class) that beginning in t1~e
mid-1970's some U.S. theorists went to the other extreme, proceeding to claim
that relations with the Soviet Union allegedly are unrelated to the maj~rity
of problems facing the United States.
The policy of military-force pressure carried out by the United States in
the world arena during the course of a quarter of a century following World
War II as the principal means of influencing other "centers of power" went
throu~h a number of stages. Any general synthesis or "cataloguing'of these
stages is difficult, since U.S. power policy contained specific peculiarities
in each region, and the dynamics of its changes f rom region to region and in
respect to individual countries cannot be reduced to some general typology or
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chronology. IE wn con~ider trend, however, ay wns sCared above, gt rhe
firsC sCage followin~ World War II means oE militAry-power preyyure were Cor
tiiose "d~cision-meking" American ofEicials thn principal and most efEective
means. Conaiderable hopes Chereby were placed on the nuclear arms threttt
in the cnnErontation with the "principal adversary" C}1e Soviet Union.
In a sCudyll based on valuable and until quite recently classified officiel
sources, M. 5herry, proEeasor of history at Northwestern UniversiCy~ demon-
strated that as early as 1943 the leaders of the U.5. miliCary complex began
to place special emphasiy [n the plans thcy were elaborating for postwar
arr.~ed forces organizational development on development of Che Air ~orce, and
particularly long-range bombers, as the principal means of "deterring poten-
tial adversaries," the US5R in particular. Later, at the end of 1945, after
the United States had already dropped atomic bombs on two Japanese cities and
was intending to utilize ~his fact to "deter" the USSR, tt~e U.S. Joinr In-
telligence Committee designated 20 specific Soviet cities as targets
"suitable for atomic bombing."12 "The committee," writ~s 5herry, "recommended
that an atomic attack be undertaken not only in the case of an imminent Soviet
attaCk (on the United States G. T.) but also if the adversary's success in
' the area of industrial development or science gave reason to assume acquisi-
tion of the capability "ultimately ro attack the United States or Co defend
against a U.S. attack."13 It follows from these same classifted materials
presented by Sherry that the threat of a nuclear attack on ttie USSR was to
serve as the principal instrument of U.S. "diplomacy." As the auChor notes,
"cold war" psychology developed in the United States even prior to initiation
of the cold war, and ess~ntially this psychology of "maximum military prepared-
ness served in large measure as generator of that policy of tiostility toward
_ the USSR which engendered the "cold war."14
Incidentally, the psychology of "maximum military preparedness" was not
shared by a number oE prominent U.S. political leaders, including President
F. D. Roosevelt, as has now been shown in many stud~es by U.S. authors.l5
But unfortunately those leaders who held the opinion that it 4!as necessary
to continue in the postwar period a policy of cooperation with the USSR were
becoming increasingly isolated. Roosevelt's death in April 1945 led to a
regrouping in the U.5. political leadership whereby persons blinded by the
illusion oE U.S. omnipotence and possessed by the idea of a global messianic
mission assumed the reins of power. During H. Truman's first term in office
(1945-1948), the task of maximum utilization of the nuclear monopoly for the
purpose of establishing a"world order" unilaterally favoring the United
States wns discussed in detail in a number of government documents. They
strongly stressed the necessity of establishing and maintaining a"position
of strength" which would enable the United States to settle world problems
unilaterally.16 In addition, as it is now becoming clear, during this
period various U.S. Government agencies drew up at least a dozen plans for
military attack on the USSR with employment of nuclear weapons. One of them,
code-named "Dropshot," prepared by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1949,
was recently made public in the United States.l~ The date 1 January 1957
was adopted as the approximate date of initiation of war against Che Soviet
Union. The plan called for mounting massed nuclear strikes on population and
industrial centers of the USSR. The air attack was to be backed up by opera-
tions mounted by ground and naval forces of the United States and its allies.
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~limination by Che Sovlet Union of the U.S. atomic monopoly in 194y by
developing 5oviet nuclegr weapons forczc~ Che United Stares to reviye its
views on nuclear weapons as a probable instrument of pract3cal politics.
The task of sharply increasing the U,S, nuclear arsenal was atated, in order
to consolidate and sCrengthen the "poaiCion of ~tnx13tt~" ~nd to dictate to thc
adverexry tl~e desired conditions of a"world order," This tayk was clexrly
expre~sed in a top-secret sC~dy conducted by U.S. leaders at the end of ~
1549 and beginning of 1950 and formally worked up as a National 5ecurity
Council document. The contents of thi~ document (NSC 68) were declassified
on 27 February 1975 by U.S. Secretary of State H. Kissinger.18 The document
proceeded from the position that U.S, ob~ecti.ves in the world aren~ and even `
the means of attaining them remained unchanged: "Dedication to o~r
fundamental values and to our national security demands that we endeavor ro
achieve them by means of a'cold war' sL�rateg~ci19 It was emphasized thereby
thaC "we cannot expect any lessening of the crisis if changes in the nature
of the Soviet system do not occur and until such changes occur."zn
Document NSC 68 noted that U.S. capabilities in the area of political and
psychological influence are only "potential." Instruments of economic and
military force are more realistic and more usable. "One of the most im-
portant ingredients of power," the document srated, "is military strength....
Without superior aggreg~;te military strength in a state of combat readiness
and rapidly mobilizable., a policy of 'containment,' which in fact is a
policy of deliberate and gradual compulsion, is not more than a policy of
bluff."21 It further emphasized: "If the United States builds thermonuclear
weapon5 faster than the Soviet Union, during the course of a corresponding
period Che United States will be able to step up pressure on the USSR."22
Specified therebyis first-strike use of nucleAr weapons by the United States
under conditions where "there is no alternate method with which we can
achieve our ob~ectives.i23 However, being not fully confident that even U.S.
preemptive employment of its entire nuclear arsenal would lead to defeat of
the USSR,24 the authors of NSC 68 placed their principal cards on a strategy
of pressure on the Soviet Union and the negotiating table from a position of
"new U.S. strengCh," in order not only to force the USSR to accept imposed
terms of an international order but also to achieve change in the internal
order in the USSR. "The ob~ectives of the United States and other countries
in talks with the USSR," the document noted, "should be formal terms which
would promote consolidation and further strengthening of our position, and
Soviet adaptation to the new political, psycholoQical and economic conditions
in the world.... In short, our objective should be to secure... a gradual
retreat by the Soviet Union and to accelerate this process, making (for ttie
Soviet Union) negotiation a more advantageous alternative than the resort to
force."25 In other words NSC 68 proposed a course of action whereby the
"potential enemy" would agree to capitulate without war, under the pressure
of a "position of strength"! ~
Until such a time as the United States wo;~ld make an appropri.ate advance in
building up its armed forces (practical implementation of the recommenda-
tions of NSC 68), that is, approx~mately to the mid-1950's, talks and
diplomatic contacts with the USSR were to be "merely a tactic" (and this was
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stated quiCe frankly), aimed at calming public opinion i.n Che W~stern naCione
(aroused by U.S. and NATO military preparations) and at drngging Chings out
until thaC moment when the United States would be able to dictaCe its own
terms Co Ch~ USSR from a position of incontesCnble superiority. The D.
Ei~enltower Administration, when the President Craveled to Ceneva in 1955 Co
a conference of heads of government of the USSR, United States, Great BriCnin,
and France, in fact aCtempCed Co implement all Chose same recommendations of
NSC 68, as the United States was hoping, with the help of its Western ~llies, ~
psychologically ta exert pressure on the Soviet Union from a position of _
"pe~lc of power," thaC is, until such time as the balance of ~ower between
the United States and the USSR became less favorable to the United StaCes. -
Since c?othing came of this strategy Che United StaCes failed to obCain any
unilateral concessions Erom the USSh the U.5. leaders decided to re-
examine~the arsenal of U.S. insCrumenCs to exerC influence in the world
arena. The r~sult was publication oE the so-called "Gaither Report," which
was prepared for the U.S. Government by a highly prestigious commission of
prominent representatives of business, political~circles and the scientific
community, under the chairmanship of R. Gaither, then president of the Ford
Foundation. This report, which exerted considerable influeace on the
strategy of the U.S. leadership in the 1960's, remained highly classified up
to January 1973, when it was final?v declassified (witt~ one deletion).26
This reporC was sent to President Eisenhower several weeks after the Soviet
Union launched the world's first artificial satellite in October 1957, an -
event which could not help but point up the recommendations cuntained in the
report. The report dealt primarily with the problem of antimissile defenae
of the United States under conditions where U.S. ruling circles recognized
the fact that U.S. territory was vulnerable to a response nuclear missile
strike in case of initiation of aggression against the USSR. Implementation
of the report recommendations (after the change of administration in the
United ~tates when J. Kennedy became president) Ied, as we know, to a mass
psychosis whipped up by off icial propaganda and expressed in feveristi con-
struction of backyard fallout shelters by private citizens. As regards in-
struments of U.S. influence in the world arena, Che reporC in fact recommended
as a means of strengthening the U.S. "power position" in the struggle against
world socialism the spread of nuclear weapons by giving them to U.S. NATO _
allies (although l~gally remaining "under U.S.. safeguarding"). The authors
of the report, continuing the line pursued in NSC 68, were of the opinion
that the next advance in the area of increasing the invulnerability of U.S.
nuclear systems (in particular, placement of a substantial portion of total
strategic bombers on advanced-stage combat alert) would give the United
States concrete military, political and psychological advantages prior to
the time Soviet deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles would
nullify these advantages. This period (the authors of the report specified
it as 1959 and the beginning of 1960) was to constitute "the best time to
negotiate from a position of strength, since the military status of the
United States iu respect to Russia may never again be as strong.i27
As we know, it was precisely in this period Chat there occurred a number of
U.S. displays of military force, beginning with the landing of U.S. Marines ~
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FOK U~'~'ICIf1L ItSL ONt,Y
in I.ebnnon in Ju1y 1958 ~?nd ending with the flight of Ch~ U-2 ypy plxne
over Soviet territory in rtav 1960. buring that s~me period thc Liyenhow~r
AdministraCton also began planning intervention againyt Cubg, u pl~n wtilcl~
wa~ t~ctu~lly implemented by the following, Kennedy AdmtniyCrnCton ln Apr.tl
1961. Artempts tu utiltze tlie alleged "position nf strengtl~" tn ~pply pr~y-
sur~ an tlie U5SR in txlks wtiich were held in 1958-1961 failed to produce tl~e
desired result, wfiich in the Einal analysis forced the Kennedy AcimintsCrnrion
Co conduct a thorough review of instrumenCs of external politicnl influence
_ and to establish a new hierarchy of such instrumenty. The U.S. ytrategic
nuclear missile system cuntinued to plny the role of cenCr~l Eorce background
for vigorous action. However, under condirions of gn altered bfilance oE
power, a direct ("central") clash with the USSR began to be conyidered un- ~
desirable in view of its potentially suicidal consequences for Clie United
_ States.
The developing countries, which were emerbing from the control oE the old
co:.onial powers, were becoming Che field of struggle for consolidFition of the
position of U.S. imperialism, wh~le economic and politicnl-psychological
devices were becoming the principAl implements of action. Kennedy's prin-
cipal innovation was a strengthening of the role oE ~uch mettiod5 oE exerting
. influence on developing countries as covert operations and cultur~l in-
fluence. From 19b1 through 1976 ttie United States carried nut ~lpproximately
900 large-scale covert operations,28 such as ttiat whicti ended in defeat
of an invasion force of armed Cuban emigr~s in Cuba's Bay of Pigs, the
sCruggle against the partisan movement in a number of Latin American co~ntries~
_ the murder of the head of the Saigon regime Ngo Dinh Diem, involvement in tf~e
overthrow af the presidents of several L~tin American republics, the secret
war by CIA mercenaries in Laos, CIA operations to bolster opposition to the
S. Allende Government in Chile, operation "~'hoenix," aimed at killing the -
leaders of the South Vietnamese resistance movement, etc. In addition,
several thousand sma11 operations were mounted. All these subversive and
political-psychological operations were not simply improvi.sations by in-
telligence or the military, but were gro~nded on a solid "theoretical
foundatiun." As early as 1965 information appeared in the Chi.lean press,
and suhseyuently in U.S. newspapers, on a research pro~ect financed by the
U.S.~~Army. This project, code-named "Camelot," atmed at "study and predic-
tion of revolutions in developing countries and "finding ways" to combat
revolutions and iasurgencies. Although following these scandalous revelations
the U.S. secretary of Defense was forced publicl y to declare that this
proje.^_t was being scrapped, it was subsequently continued under other names.29
The main emphasi~ in the area of p~litical-military operations during the
Kennedy Adninistration was placed on so-called counterinsurgency operations.30
Direct U.S. intervention in Vietnam began in 1961 with utilization of special
U.S. counterinsurgency units "Green Berets." Another Kennedy innovation
_ was the dispatching of young Americans to developing countries for t}~e pur-
puse of strengthening U.S. cultural-psychological influence on the peoples
of thes~ countries. Kennedy skillfully utilized the idealism and enthusiasm
of tl?at segment of American youth wtio were disenchanted by the eternal chase
� after material prosperity at~d who sought to devote their energies to some
hoble cause, such as assistance to the poo:. in America~ On 22 September 1961
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th~ praaid~nt di~npd inCn lnw ~ bi11 ~~tubli~hing a speciel "P~ac~ Corpd"
(whieh sub~~qu~ntly b~cgme a component of a broader organization "Action"),
which r~cruitcd volunteerd ~o trav~l to thQ countri~~ of Africa~ Aeia a*d
Latin Am~rica for a dpecified period of tim~ to eQrv~ ae doctorr~ nur~eg~
agronomie~e~ t~~rher~~ pCC. 'Phe principal task a~digned rheec volunteere~
how~vc~r~ did not involv~ th~ir profeeeionel activitied but w~~ determined
by th~ v~ry fac~ nf their pr~eenc~ in the ramoCe areae of varioue dietant
councrie~ and th~ formation there of a certain poeitive image of the
Ampri~an. _
The ~trpngth of thie progrem lay in the fact that duch an tmege wad created
not grtif{cielly but ep~nteneoualy, since during the firat year~ of itu -
_ ~xiatence it wg~ primarily genui~ze enthueiaste whd went to work in the
P~ace Corpr~ p~r~on~ d~giroua of doing "good de~d~." This Wae unique
mi~~ion~ry gccivity~ but in a docial rather than religioud vari~nt. At the ~
height of the peace C~rp~ operatione, in 1967~ e~proximately iS~00U Peace
Corp~ volunte~re (epproximately 90X of them 30 yeare of age and younger)
a~rp ~erving in 70 countriee in Aeie~ Africe end Latin America.31 in epite
of the high cort of thi~ program (15,000 dollara per volunteer per year)~
the U.S. Covernment vig~roue~y promoted it~ believing that these expenditur~e
weuld be repaid many rime~ nver by creation of center~ of American cultural-
p~ychological influence in thoee parte of the s+orld ahich are reached by
practicaliy no U.S. propaganda in ite atandard forss. More than 100,000 per-
, gone Went through the Peace Corpr ia lb yearg, peraons who ae a rule left
behind e poaitive i~npresaion of the United Statea. There is much informa-
tion indicating that in a number of countriee the CIA attempted to uee the
Pe~cr Corpa for its oo+n purposee. However~ such utilization of the Corps
merely diecredited it and in principle led to undermining the ver; idea of
auch an undertaking cultural-educational influence in the intereste of
improving the U.S. "image" in the developing countries.
A certain new accent was also acquired during this period by such a tradi-
tionAl insttument of U.S. fareign policy ae the economic lever. The U.S.
Covernment~ frightened by the scope and depth of txansformatione in the
developing countries~ began mo re and more vigorously linking economic aid
to their governments with pledges by the latter Co institute reforms
directed toward etrengthening the private sector and development along
precisely the capitalist road. A typical example of thie policy aae the
"Allience for Progress" program for Latin America~ announced by Kennedy
in the spring of 1961. This program Was elaborated by Washington in large
measure under the influence of fear that the victory of the revolution in
Cuba ia January 1959 would cauee a"chain reaction" in Latin America With-
drawal of more and m~re countries from the system of U.S. dominance in the
~lestera hemisphere.32
The change of administration at the end of the 1960's and the coming to power
of the Eiecub~ican Party led to further strengthening of Washington's utiliza-
tion of foreign policy implements. This was connected with a number of
circumetances. As early as 1969, on the eve of hfs assumption of the post
of foreign affairs advisor to President R. Nixon, Kisainger formulated the
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the~id eh~t in the nuClear m~~~ile ar~e milftgry mighc i~ ndt tran~leted
gutomatically into politic~l influenc~. "'Thi~ ddes not gignify~" he addpd~
"thnt impotence increa~e~ influ~nce,but merel ~ignifieg that ~tren~th
do~e not automatic~lly guarant~e influpnc~."~~ 5~rom~rizing th~ le~ennd of
th~ pnd of the 1960'~ for U.5. foreign pnlicy~ Kiggin~~r wrot~: "Our cxcernal
politicaL diffieultieg ~rp fr~qu~ntly d~~cribed aa a l~g~ey ~f Vi~tn~m. gu~
thgt moe~ difficult ordeal of ui~tnem w~d not the rau~~ but merely a aymptom.
'Th~ ~nd of th~ 196n's, which cnincided with the Vi~engm epic, gignifird an
end tn th~C period when Ameriea way incompergbly more powerful th~n gny ~ch~r `
cnuntry, when we cduld gettle problem~ unilat~erally. 'I'he end of the 196U'g
marked fir~t gnd focemost the end of ~n era wh~n we could imagin~ thnt any
probl~m cgn be golved once end for all gnd that t}ie solutiong, once react~ed,
would ~nabl~ us to c~gge our ~ffort~ in the arene of internatinngl politiCg."~4
Cleurly indic~ted in thig gtetement ia gcknoWledgement that todc~y the United
5tate~~ in connection wieh chang~g in the wortd arena~ must play g more
mode~t rnl~ in the world community of nationg.
Ueveluation cf military strength as a megng of achieving U.S. foreign pollcy
aims did not occur gpontaneously or due to any gubjective element~ (for
example, the coming to power in the United 5tate~ of lesx gggreH~ive leaderg)~
but ratt~er under the influenCe of the obj~~tive proce~ss of ct~unge in tt~e
balance df poaer betueen cepitelism and socialiem~ che United 5tatea nnd
che US5R. This proce~g, in the quarter of a century since World War II, hae
led to a situation where it is now unde~irablc for U.5. imperiali~m (on the
bagi~ of purely selfi~h consideratione of aelf-pregervation) to initiate a
conflict in which it cannot be aseured in advance of victory. It i~ impog-
~ible to initiete a"tegt" of military forcee in conformity with c~~e clgKyic
Napo~~onic pr'nciple ("firat engage in a major battle~ and thrn it Will becort~
evident") in the nuclear missile age due to the exceptinnal destructiveneeg
of strategic weapons systems. Such a"test" (in the past ehreatening only
the loas of a small part of the civilian population and a portion of territory
for the losing side) can today, as U.5. Government leaders acknos~ledge~ end
catastrophically. Precisely for this reason Kissinger'g fonnula chat force
cannot be converted into political influence should be viewed as a self-
~ynthegig of the experience of U.S. imperialigm under concrete historical ~
conditions. failure of the policy "from a position of strength," implemented
by the United 5tates during the "cold aat~" yeare led them to the acknowledge-
ment, using Kiasinger's own terms~ of the "imperative of peaceful coexistence"
of the two systems and the gigning of 5oviet-Aiaerican documents formalizing
and concretizing the principles of peaceful coexistence.
Under conditions where U.S. capability to employ military force in the aorld
arena is fettered by the might of the Soviet Union~ U.S. theorists seek to
elaborate ways and methods of more active utilization of "nonmilitary factors
of strength~ for fmproving or at least maintaining the qlobal position of U.S.
imperialism. In principle the so-called strategy of interdependence, about
which these theoriats have recently written so much and ahich government
leaders have been discussing, if it is reduced to the "bare essence" of the
int~rests of Washington, is an intensified aearch foc instruments of economic
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~nd oth~r nonmilitary influenGe nn ~he eurrnunding worid (p~rtirul~rly nn eh~ ~
dpv~loping countrip~) gnd maximaliaat~on of th~~e in~~rum~nt~ of influ~nc~,
WiCh a eimultan~oug ~ndeevor to reduc~ to g minimum U.5~ d~p~ndenc~ on other
eountri~~ or alliane~~ op@rating in th~ wor~d ~r~nn~ at 1ea~t to a degree whc~r~-
by foreign nations or blocg of ountrie~ cannotiti7i~e itto ~xert "coercive in-
fluence" nn th~ Unit~d Statee.~~ U.S. political rci~n~ietd ~And ~vid~nt~y
government official8 a~ w~ll; prosn@d more and mor~ frequently from the
th~ory of "inequ~lity of nariona~" expiained not eimply by th~ nonuniformity
of th~ir d~velopm~nt but a~l~gpoly by int~rnally inher~nt, organic fgctore.
Am~ricAn thporietg att~mpt to place thi~ conc~pt formally ie th~ cont~mporery
eydtpm of international relations, thue autom~tically placing th~ Unit~d
5taceg (and th~ pntire group of developed capitaliat countri~e) in g
privilrged coamiunity, Which ie "not obliged" to eubmit to the "tyranny df ~
n~a mg~drity" of natione which have only recently activ~ly 8nt~r~d the arena
of world politie~.36
in addition to the traditionel economic inetrument~ of influ~nee realia~d in
the form of export of cap4ta1,37 economic "eid" from governm~nt to government,38
etc, such inetrumente of po~+~r es indirect utiliaation of economic influenc~
on other countrieg ar~ occupying an increaaingly morp prominent plac~ in U.5.
foreip~n policy, that is, through internationel economic and currpncy-financial
in~titutions which are under U.S. control. '~he r~sult is the eame: gtrengthen-
ing of the U.S. position in the werid~ Whereby the one-gidedly American
character of foreign-policy influence with the aid of t~chniques of thie kind
is concealed~ b~ecoming lese appareet. Md it ie~ not aurprising that under
conditions of broad international condemaation in recent yeara of th~ raciet
Smith regime in ~hodesia~ the Vorster regime in South Africe, che Pinochet
dictatorship in Chile. etc~ the United Stetes h~ officially curtailed its
government gubgidie~ and assistance tc~ tI1E8p countriee, ahiie at the same
time broadening aid co them thraugh the International Reconstruction and
Development Bank, the tnternational Monetary Fund and other international
organixations under its con:ro1.39
Vatious public organiaacions~ univeraities, foundationa~ sociocultural
establiahmente, etc are elgo Widely employed by the government to implement
the goaig of U.S. foreign policy. These organizations frequently penetrate
areag in which activity by the U.S. Covernment or foreign-policy edific~ is
in Wa~hington's vie~+ undesirable. The follo~+ing fact indicates the scope of
action~ by U.S. nongoverna~ent organizations in implementing U.S. foreign
policy: in 1974 just 90 U.S. private and public organizations gave as-
sistance to 133 foreign countriee and territories, apending 1 billion dol-
lars on these activities, with t~+o thirds of this amount obtained from
private eources.40
Another inqtrument of influence which is being utilized on an increasing
scale by the United States in regard to developing countriss ia the instru-
ment of managerism. The United States is able very effectively to in-
fluence the economy and policies of these countriea by adoption of American
mpthods and principles of management and extensive participation by U.S.
cansulting firms in lending organizatioual-technical assistance to the
various countries as vell as increasingly more extensive training of native
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per~onnpl (in th~ United 5tet~~ ~nd ldc~ily) in Am~ricgn mgn~g~ment t~rh-
niqu~~."t+~hi~vpm~nt~ in th~ ~reg of man~g~emen~ and nrganixaeion h~ve ~
e~e~ntially becomc~ ~ n~w indtrument of U.5, expan~ion abro~d, ~conomic ~nd
politie~l ~ubjug~tien df dther countriee."41
Sub~tantial opportunitie~ for ~trengthpning U~3. external politicgl in-
flu~nc~ on m~ny cnuntri~~ (including dev~lop~d counCri~~) grp npening up
by invdlving the latt~r through ~nonomic n~ceg~ity in th~ lgt~gt U.S.
techntc8l pro1ects, perticulerly in ar~ea where the United St~r~~ occupi~~
g dominant po~itinn in the capitaligt world: in th~ erea of uti~i~ation of
gpac~ h~rdwur~, including communications~ navigetion~ locating n~~urel
re~ourc~~~~2 in th~ area of egtabllahment of an international computer data
bank, exploration and mining of ~eabed reeources, etc.
An impnrtnnt ingrrum~nt of U.S. pconnmic influence ig export of prnductg
and it~rt~ which repr~sent the lat~gt adv~nc~~ in th~ acientific end tech-
nologicel r~volucion. Th~ee good~ are cla~gi.fied in the United 5CaCe~ e~
"tpchnoingically inC~ngive" iteme. They include cnmputerg, varioua robot
machin~ tool~, civilian airplaneg and helicopterg ae well ag ~pare parte
for them~ n~w chgmical product~ and drug~~ equipment fnr nuclear generating
p~ents, gcientific ingcrument$~ t~lecommunicationg ~quipment~ equipment for
offghore drilling, plus a number of others. The fnreign trade bglance in
these itetns ig stpadiZy increasing in favor of thp Uniced 5tateg~ in epite
of the chronic U.S. trade deficit in recent year~. U.S. domination in the
"techno~ogically intensive" goods market gives it an important additional
tnstrument of external political influence on its partners, including
dev~loped captteliet countrie~. The ~ame thing tg indicaced by trade in
~ci~ntific-technical and management knowlpdge. In 1960 the fgvorable U.S.
balance in thi~ trade ran 575 million dollarg, While in 1974 it reached
3 billion 400 million dollars.43
A special instrument of U.S. external political influence is export of
erms and milit~ry equipmpnt. From the end of World Glar II to the end of
1978 the United 5eaceg sold 13S billion dollars r+orth of ~rms to 136
courtrieg.'44 More than 1~000 U.S. companiee are engag~d in the manufacture
and eale of aeapon~, ix~cluding all the giant~ of the military-industrial
complex. In the chase after profits end influence the latter sometimes
even sell~ ocher countries new aeapo g systems which have not yet berome
operetional in the U.S. armpd forces.�S Ueliverieg to other countries nf the
neti+est aircraft, electronic and missile eyatem~ lead to a sharp increas~ in
the dependence of the purchaser countries on the United Statea, for learning
to operate, and frequently utilization and servicing of these syatems re-
quir~ a continuous mass presence of U.S. technical experts (alongside the
fact that �~livery of spare parts and sp~cial lubricancs remains a U.S.
monopoly).4 At the same time, as Was indicated by the events in Iran~ the
policy of imposing large ocrnignments of the latest weapons on other
countries can lead to highly unforeseeable results. The Iranian people
rose up against the Shah's regime in large measure because at the same tia~e
as that regime was apending immense sumg on purchase of arms (20 billion
dollars in a period of S years),47 the niasses Were continuing to live in
poverty, and all their social needs were being ignoredl
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'~h~ United State~ in turn, a~ g cduntry which int~n~ivply congume~ energy
raw material~, heg prov~n to be, ae wag graph3cally demnnstraCed by the
19~3 oil embargo~ vulnerable in face of unification of oil exporter~ and
their utilization of deliveria~ of thie raw msteriel to exerC pressure for
political purpose~. The eituation invalving the oil embargo and the eubqe-
qu~nt fourfold ri~e in otl prices frightened U.S, ruling circlee. in con-
naction with thi~~ feveriah ~fforte were undertaken to diminieh dependenc~
on foreign aources of energy, particularly oil, efforte which hav~ nor yet
produced any effective resulte. In addition, U.S. dependence on import of
oil ha~ in recent yearg noC only failed to decreaee but has become even
greater.48 A~ an emergency effort against the occurrence of unforeseen
evente, efforte are being undertaken to amass oil reaerves in salt dome
cavities along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico (by 1985 the United States
plans to have stored 1 billion barrels of oil~ in order to make up from
thia source if neceseary the loes of SOX of oil importa for an entire year).49
Recently~ under conditiona of aggravation of the world fnod problem, U.S.
strategiats and politiciana have been incregaingly more frequently consider-
ing the export of food ae one of the most important i�struments of external
political influence. In the summer of 1975 *here appeared in the U.S.
press a etatement from a special CIA study on world food gupply (prepared
in August 1974) to the effect that "as holder of the bulk of the worlds grain
export reserves, the United States can once again acquire that primary role
in world affaira which it possessed during the period immediately after
World War II."50 Numzrous plans have been discuased in the United States
on creating a cartel a"grain JPEC" consisting of the United States
and Canada, as the two countrieas?d~ch in recent yeare have accounted for 90X
of world grain exports,sl in order with the aid of grain to influence more
actively the policiee of other countries, particularly developing countries.
As experience indicates, however, attempts to "exert pressure with grain"
prove for many reasons to be much leas successful than the oil embargo. In
19'I3, for example, the United States decided to organize a"food counter-
embargo" againet the oil-producing Arab countries undertaken in reprisal
for Washington's support of Israel. On special instructions by the U.S.
House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, tte Crngre~sional
Resenrrh Service quickly prepared an analysis which indicated that these
countries were not sufficiently dependent on the United States so that
utilization of this ingtrument could produce any effective results. As a
result of this analysis~ it was decided to refrain from employing this in-
strument of influence on that group of countries.52 But this does not sig-
nify that an instrument of this kind cannot be utilized by the United States
in a different situation more favorable to that country.
Finally, we must mention in the list of instruments of U.S. economic in-
fluence which have recently been more and more vigorously utilized, so-called
transnational corporations (TNC), Which conduct business operations in many
different countries. The ann~ial volume of goods and services produced by
TNC reached S00 billion dollars in the mid-1970's, and three fiftha of this
sum was generated by U.S. TNC,53 which comprise approximately half of all
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inCernational mnnnpolieg. Th~ U.S. Covernment increasingly regorCg to
~ Cheir gervic~~ for exerting economic and political influence on other
counCriee, utilizing th~'I'NC nnt only gg an inetrument of influence but
also ae a highly effective channel for making ite demands known Co in-
fluential circles in oth~r capitaliat and developing countriee. In recent
' yearg there have been instancee where American TNC functioned almo~t in-
dependently as partie~ to international politics, of cnurse relying there-
by on support by the ~tate.54 The best kn~wn inetance of this kind ig the
subveraive activity by the U.5. 'TNC International Telephon~ and Telegreph
(ITT) in Chile (carried out in close contacC with the CIA), aim~d at over-
throwing the Allende government.55
Nevertheless, in spite of the gtrong po~ition occupied by Che United States
in the capitalist economy, in particular as regards developing countries,
here as well the relative strength of the United 5tates has become less
than 15-20 years ago. In comparison with the 1950's there has been a gharp
decrease itt U.5. economic weight in the world capitalist economic sysCem.
All Chis complicates to a cerCain degree Washington's utilization oE eco-
nomic instruments to achieve "positive" goals, that is, to influence the
formation of a new structure of "global interdependence in such a manner .
that U.5 interests are taken into consideration to a maximum degree
(although these instruments have in recent years been utilized by the
United SCates in a highly intensive manner as an implement in the purely
~ economic struggle in the capitalist world).
All these circumstances are one of the reasons why the administration of
J. Carter, who entered office in January 1977, has decided to place special
emphasis on instruments of ideological influence. The shift by the United
States toward more vigorous utilization of ideological instruments began
under Nixon. Appealing "for ideological unity" of the West, Kissinger and
other theorists and practitioners of U.S. foreign policy at that time in
fact were attempting to play on the sharpened class sensitivity af the
ruling elite in the capitalist countries undpr. conditions of atrengthening
of the position of leftist forces i-; those countries. Turning to the
ruling circles of the Western European countries, U.S. politicians frankly
told them: if you continue attacking the United 5tates, in the fin~~ _
analysis the forces of ~he left will defeat you; let us be united.
At the nongovernment level the idea of "unity of WesCern civilization"
began to be developed by a"tripartite co~nission" established in 1913 and
made up of businessmen, scientists, politicians and civic leaders in the
United StRtes, the countries of Western Europe and Japan, financed by
Rockefeller funding and functioning as the "brainchild" of 2. Brzezinski.
President Carter and at least 19 members of his new administration received
their"ideological conditioning" on this cormnission.
The theorists, however, who were elaborating long-term U.S. strategy, were
aiming their sights not only at like-minded persons in the bourgeois
countries of Europe and Japan. They proceeded from an analysis of the broad
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r
gocial trangfnrmation~ which ~re taking plac~ in rhe world, from th~ situa-
Cion of d~tente~ and endeavor~d to fiC a new strategy nf ideologin~l
~truggl~ to the changed aituation~ first and foremost to Che increased
weight gnd aignificance of the developing countries in the world arena~
U.5. atrategists were aware t'.~ereby that rhe path of gocialiat devel.opment
ia atCractive Co many of Chese countries~ involving exCensive neCionaliza-
Cion of national reaourcea and centralized economic planning. Zt Wge
acknowledged in the United Statee that no exhortaCinns on the part of ad-
vacates af "free enterprise" would compel many developing counCries to
depf.~rt �rom the road of accelerated modernizaCion on the basi.s of planning
and state mobilization of resources. U.S. theorista asserted ChaC there-
fore the United States ahould not frontally attack these elements and
trends, planned economy, etc, but aeek to place in conrrast to the ideag
of nationalization, centralization, and state planning the psychology of
individualism, "freedom of the individual," etc, and from this poaition to
undermine as much as possible the aocialiet elements in the policies of Che
develcping countries. By stifling collecCiviam wiCh individualism, mani-
festationa of inCernationr.l solidarity on the parC of various cuuntriea and
movemenCs by extolling the praises of separatism and nationalism, etc, U.S.
theorists claimed, "the United States will in Che final analysis regain its
moral leadership among the nations of the world not through the force of
its economic might or57y force of arms, but by virtue of the merits of its
ideological example. This was a new philosophy of ideological atruggle,
a strategy applied to the situation of international d~tente, and Cherefore
replacing primiCive and negative anticommunist stereatypes with, so Co say,
"positive" ideal~ of individualism or, as U.S. theorists put it, "anti-
authoritarianism."
The Carter AdminisCration considered all these recommendations by ~he
ideologists of the "tripartite commission" and the Foreign Affairs Council
and began vigorously implementing them. In addition the Democratic Party
is traditionall~y distinguished by more vigorous utilization of the ideologi-
cal component in foreign policy, while a specific feature of the new ad-
ministration was that its leader entered office on a platform of alluring
humanistic declarations, in the spirit of traditional American individual-
ism. This is why the ideological component received, when the BaptigC
President took up residence in the White House, such an "honorad" place in
U.S. foreign policy. While under Ford-Kissinger the Unit~~d States in its
foreign-policy propaganda placed principal stress on the "positive" values
and individualist ideals of "Western civilization," under Carter-Brzezinski
more attention began to be focused on the negative attitudes in socialist
countries toward many bourgeois values of this kind~~ In the opsuchnanf
those U.S. strategists who direct the "human rights campaign,
ideological offensive should help them overcome the Watergate trauma,
drawing attention to "shortcomings" which occur in other countries, and thus
not only diverting the attention of the U.S. people away from the flaws of
the American system with its bribery, corruption, violence and lack of
worker socioeconomic rights, but also to make the masses more aware of the
official foreign policy, sowing among the masses illusions of the "influence
of the conmon man' on the shaping of U.S. foreign policy.
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Thig Chaoretical pogiCion wa~ bol~tered by a number of practical gctions,
such a~ increaeing financing for the ~ubvereive Radio Liberty and Itadio
~re~ ~uropQ, in order to expund their Euc:ilitiey,58 reorg~n.iz~- _
tion of tlie ofEicial propaganda pdifice, gtrengthening of support for eo-
called'bissidenCs" in aocialist countriea, etc. At the same time thp
"hum~n rights" campaign aima at undermining Che ma~s support of Communist ~
and oCher pgrriee of Che left in Western Europe, Japan and oCher countrie~
belonginq to the world system of capitaliam.
P~ying c~.use attention to "nonmilitary f~ctors of atrengCh~" the U.S. Covern-
ment at the same time is continuing to bring to bear immense efforts in
the area of military organizaeional development, in particul.ar increasing
strategic arms. Between 1967 and 1977 the U.5. Defense Department spent
115 bi111on dollars on new atrategic programs, including 81 billion on of-
fensive weapons sygtems.59 According to approximate figures, one-fourCh of
the 750 new military systems in the process of development in the UniCed
StaCes are strategic.60 The approximate end coat of all major weapons
systems, miliCary reconnaissance and communications syatems presently in
production or in the process of development exceeds 300 billion dollars
according to our calculations. I the future the U.S. military budget is
to grow at a rate of 9X annually.~l All this attests to rhe fact that U.S.
~eaders have by no means relegated the instrumtnt of military force to a
back seat.
Initiating a new round of escalation of the arms race, certain U.S. leaders
hope to draw the Soviet Union into this escalation and thus to diminiah our
country's capabilities in the area of implementing a program for boosting
the people's living standards. Of course ,~uat as in past years, plans by
. U.S. sCrategists to weaken the Soviet economy in Chis fashion will fail,
because its planned character ensures much greater freedom to maneuver
resources and incomparably greater efficiency in their utilization. In ad-
dition, U.S. economic potential is far f~~am limiCless. Revival of the con-
cept of "economic exhaustion" of the Soviet Union and attempts to utilize
arms escalation in order to exert psychological pressure on the Soviet
Union are capable only of undermining Che cause of d~tente, of increasing in-
ternational tension, of aggravating socioeconomic difficulties in the United
States, and thus proving to be "counterproductive" even from the standpoint
of the long-range, r~ot interests of the U.S. capitalist society.
At the same time such a policy undermines elements of cooperation (and cor-
responding inscruments) of Soviet-American, and on a broader level inter-
national relations which have become expanded in recent years. And it
is precisely broadening and deepening of these aspects of intergovernmental
relations the path of d~tente which coastitutes one of the main hopes
of mankind for ensuring peace and security of peoples on a global scale.
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FOOTNOTES
1. An awarenes~ by nationa of the gen~inenesa of a dangar of thig kind led _
to the signing in 1977 of an international convention banning military
or gny other hostile utilization of ineane of influencing rhe naCural en-
vironment (for the te~C of this convention aee "Sovetskiy 5oyuz v
bor'be za razoruzheniye" [The Soviet Union in ehe Struggle for Uiear-
mament], a collection of documents, Moecow, 1977, pp 64-70.
2. K. Knorr, an American scholar investigating the problem of "the power
of nations," specifies two Cypes of influence: "coercive influence" and
"noncoercive influence." He defines the latter as the "ability of a
society or its membera, by means of acCions either through the govern-
ment or through various trananational channels, to exert infl~ience on
the behavior of another socieCy without resorting to any hoetil~ uCiliza-
tion of superior force, military or economic" (K. Knorr, "The Power of
Nations," New York, 1975, Fage 311.
3. Such complex types of influence, which take int~ consideration not only
the possible impulsive, natural ("normal") raaction of "players" to
various stimuli but also the {nfluence o� the latter on the psycliologi-
cal motivaCion of the opponent (this process can be repeatec~,y 1L'Y7CCCE'(I~, are
now being studied by the science of reflex control of the behavior of
conflicting structures, baaed on general theory of adoption of opCimal
soluCions.
4. "World Politics and International Economics," eciited by C. F. Bergaten,
L. ls. Krause, WashingCon, 1975, page 5.
5. "Of all the factors which c~~mprise the might of a state, Che most im-
p~rtant, in spite of its instability, is the quality of diplomacy,"
notes H. Morgenthau, "patriarch" of American political scientists, in
a study which has now become a classic in the West. "All other factors
which determine a nation's power are essentially raw material of which
the power of a nation is produced. The quality of diplomacy of a given
country unites all these diverse factors into a unified whole, gives
Chem direction and weight and awakena their slumbering potential....
ImplementaCion of inteYnational relations of a nation by its diplomats
constitutas for a natiods strengtii in peacetime the same as is con-
stituted for a nation's strength military strategy and tactics carried
ouC by its military leaders in time of war. It is Che art of utilizing
various elements of a nation's strength to exert influence with maximum
effect at those points in the international siCuation which most affect
national interests" (H. J. Morgenthau, "Politics Among Nations. The
Struc,gle for Power and Peace," New York, 1967, page 135).
6. Direct "hot" teletype and telephone communication lines are presently -
in operation between many countries, which enable the leaders of these na-
t3a~ o~ communicate with one another immediately in crisis situations.
A direct line of communication between th~ governments of the USSR and
the United States was set up in 1963.
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7. B. M. Blechman, and S. 5. Kaplan, "The Use o� ehe Armed ~'orceg ae a
Political InsCrument," Washington, 1977, pp 1-4.
8. See LIFF: ~ 16 .lanuary 1956.
9. Blechman and Kaplan, op. cit., pp 1-6. U.S. aircraft carrierg Cook part
in 50X of all Chese actions; on the whole naval forces pgrCicipated in
80X of a11 instances oF this type.
10. As the authors stress, Chis figure fails to ~.nclude not only cases of
direct milltary utilization of U.S, armed forcea but also Cheir "routine"
employment permanent staCioning at overseas bases, prior-scheduled
military maneuvers and visiCa, and asaiatance and support by such forces
in various non-crisis situations (Ibid., pp II-7, 8).
11. M. 5. Sherry, "Preparing for the Next War. American Plana for Postwar
Defense, 1941-1945," New Haven and London, 1977.
12. Ibid., page 213.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., pp 235-236.
15. A study by D. Yergin is particularly important in this regard. On the
,basis o� a wealth of documentary material, he argues that F. U. RoosevelC
followed the so-called "Yalta axioma," which postulated the possibility
of continuing fruitful Soviet-American cooperation after World War II.
Roosevelt believed thaC the genuine U.S. national interest was by no
means in conflict with the interests of ensuring the security of the
USSR, particularly since the principal efforts of the Soviet state were
concentrated on postwar rebuilding of the nation's economy (see D.
Yergin, "Shattered Peace. The Origins of the Cold War and Che National
Security State," Boston, 1977).
16. ~or more detail on this see G. A. Trofimenko, "SShA: politika, voyna,
ideologiya" [USA: Politics, War, Ideology], Moscow, 1976, pp 156-181.
17. "Dropshot. The United States Plan for War With the Soviet Union in
1957," New York, 1978.
18. See "Top Secret. NSC 68. Note by the Executive SecreCary to the Na-
tional Security Council on United States Objectives and Programs for
National Security," "Foreign Relations of the United States," 1950,
Vol 1, "National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy," Washington,
1977 (henceforth "FRUS 1950"), pp 234-292. Kissinger ev~dently had
special motives for publicizing document NSC 68, and particularly the
complete, uncut text. This move by the then U.S. Secretary of State com-
prised one of the aspects of hia efforts to defend himaelf against the
criticism leveled at him in 1974-1975 in connection with the Watergate
scandal. Representatives of the U.S. political elite connected with the
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Democr~tic Party, ae we11 as vaYious publlcationa accueed K~s~inger of
excessiv~ "improvisations" in the area of foreign pol3cy and of deperture
from Che traditions and princ3ples of a biparCiean fore3gn policy. By
declassifying a fundamental document prepared by the Democr~tic Party'e
think tank, Kt~Ainger wanted to show that hie foreign policy wa~ not in
ConCr~dicCion to Che baeic principles pertaining Co U.5. ob~ectives in
the world arena, including in relation to the USSR, and the inetruments
of their implement;ation, which were apacified by the Truman Adminietra-
tion as early as 1950.
19. FRUS 1950, page 242.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., page 253.
22. Ibid., ~age 267. These hopea, however, were not to come Co fruition.
The USSit beat the United SCates in development of a thermonuclear weapon. -
23. Ibid., page 268. Specially emphasized in connection wiCh Chis was the
undesirability of the United States pledging to refrain from firet- :
strike employment of nuclear weapons.
24. "It is doubtful that such an attack, even if it led to the total
destrucCion of designated targets, would compel the USSR to seek a
truce or hinder the SovieC Armed Forces from oc~cupying Weatern Europe"
(?bid., page 265).
25. Ibid., page 274.
26. "Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age (the Gaither Report of 1957)."
Printed for the use of the Joint Commi.ttee on Defense Production, Con-
gress of the United States, Washington, 1976 (although the document was
declassified in January 1973, we do not know of any earlier publication).
27. Ibid., page 26.
28. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 21 November 1977, page 37. Of course the
overwhelmi~ng majority of covert operations mounted by the CIA and other
U.S. Government agencies since World War II remain classified. An -
attempC undertaken by 1974 by (R. Grimmet), a member of the Congressional
Research Service staff, to compiYe a catalogue of all CIA c~vert opera-
tions which had become known, both in the United States and abroad, led
to determination of only approximately 50 such operations during the en-
tire postwar period (see "The Intelligence Community. History, Orga-
nization and Issues. Public Documents Series. Compiled and Edited by
T. G. Fain in Collaboration with K. C. Plant and R. Milloy. With an In-
troduction by Senator Frank Church," New York and London, 1977, pp 695-
706).
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29. In particular, aC the beginning of the 1970'~ the American Iteaearch
- ProspecCa Agency (AItpA) planned a pro~ecC code-named "Nimble," Go ~tudy
- counterinsurgency technique~,. This pro~ect was one of Che new veraion~
of "CameloC" (THE DFFENSE :10NITOR, 8 SepCember 1972, paga 2).
30. "The irony of the state o� affaira in th~ WesCern Hemigpher~," wrote
U.S. scholar I. L. Horowitz, "11es in Che face Chat the establishment
of counCerinsurgency units precedes in time the organizari,on of any in-
surgenC unit." In facr, he emphasized, the organizar3on ,f "counter-
insurgency" units, based on U.S. supporC, comprises gn addiCional fgctor
which causes popular diacontenC (I. L. HorowiCz. "The Ideology of
Hemiapheric Militarism," "Sociology in Action. Case Studiea in Social
Problems and DirecCive Social Change," Homewood, 1966, page 346).
31. "Peace Corps Authorization." Hearing Before Che Committee on Foreign
Relations, U.5. 5enaCe~ 95th Congress, 1at Session, May 6, 1977,
Washington, 1977, page 18.
32. Presidential aide T. Sorensen wrote about these apprehensiong on Che
part of Kennedy. Kennedy was constantly thinking about a new document
which would modernize the "Monroe Doctrine" "as a declaration againsC
further Communist penetration into the (Western) Hemiaphere." However,
according to 5orensen, Che President realized that "the greatest
dangers to Latin America... do not involve Cuba." "I11iCeracy, poor
housin~ conditions, unequal distribution of wealth, difficulties with
the balance of payments, plunging prices on their raw maCerials, as
well as local Communist actions have no relationahip to Cuba," stated
Kennedy in Miami on 18 November 1963 (Th. Sorensen, "Kennedy," London, "
1966, page 592).
33. H. Kissinger, "American Foreign Policy. Three Essays," New York, 1969,
page 60.
34. THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 7 October 1977.
35. "Idea1" relations of "interdependence," in the view of U.S. politicians
and businessmen, are U.S.-Canadian economic relations, where the volume
of sales of companies in Canada which are not less than 50% American-
owned, comprise almost SOX of tha~ country's gross national product,
while the share of companies with participation of Canadian capital is
barely 0.3y~of the U.S. gross national product (figures for 1975) (see
T. V. Lavrovskaya, "Integration Processes in North America: General
Patterns and Specific Features," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA,
No 3, 1978, page 33). ~
36. See, for example, D. P. Moynihan, "The United States in Opposition,"
COMMENTARY, March 1975; R. W. Tucker, "The Inequality of Nations," New
York, 1977; H. Morgenthau, "The Pathology of American Power," INTERNA-
TIONAL SECURITY, Winter 1977.
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37. Erom 1g46 to 1974 the magnitude of U.5. foreign investmenC roe~ �rom
18.7 bi111on Co 235 billion dollara (SShA: vneshneekonomicheskaya
~Crategiya" (USA: ~oreign Economic Strategy~, Moacow, 19~6, pp 90-91).
38. 'I'h~ Cotal amount of economic assi~Cance given by Che United SCgtes
from 1946 thro~gh the 1975 fiecal year to 134 countrieg and eighC ter-
ritoriea comprised, according Co official figurea, 170.3 billion dollars~
not including the 161.4 billion dollara spent during thia period by the
U.S. Uepartment of Defense on military assistance to South Korea, the
5aigon regime and other U.S. allies in Southeast Asia and the Far EasC
(Congressional Record~ March 23, 1976, page 54088).
39. South Korea, for example, received 1.6 billion dollars in aid in 1g76
(credita, guarantees, aubsidies, etc) through 12 agencies, primarily
internaCional agencies (U.S.-controlled)~ but only 22X of this amount
was aub~ect to debate in Congress; Chi].e received 357 million dollars
(only 21~ through Congress); SouCh Africa recived 310 million dollare
(nothing through Congress) (aee INTEItNATIONAL BULLETIN (Berkel~ey),
Vol 4, No 4, 28 ~ebruary 1977, page 3).
40. "Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1976." Hear-
ings Before a Subco~nittee of the CommitCee on Appropriations. House of
Representatives, 94th Congress, lst Sesaton, Part 2, Washington, 1975,
page 14.
41. "SShA: ~neshneekonomicheskaya sCraCegiya," op. cit., page 147. For more
detail on tt~is instrument of U.S. influence see ibid., pp 146-159.
42. Fifty countries (as of August 1976) have participated in the U.S.
program eo study earth resourcea with the aid of Landsat satellites;
92 countries (among which the United States is dominant) participate in
the Intelsat international communication satellite consortium (Worldwide
Space Activities. Report Prepared for the Subcommittee on S pace Science
and Application of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House
of Representatives, 95th Congress, lst Session," September 1977,
Washington, pp 92, 95).
43. SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, December 1973, December 1975.
44. PRAVDA, 4 Octob er 1978; THE INTERNATIONAL HERALA TRIBUNE, 12 February
1976.
45. For example, in 1977 the United States contracted to sell to Iran seven
of the latest and most advanced electronic reconnaissance and fire con-
trol aircraft (AWACS) for the sum of 1.2 billion dollars (AVIATION WEEK
AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 17 October 1977, page 20).
46. According to U.S. figures, in 1977 there were 30,000 U.S. military and
civilian specialists in Iran, and 28,000 in Saudi Arabia (FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
October 1977, page 102).
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47. TH~ INT~RNATIONAL HERALD TRIHUNE, 5 January 1979.
48. In 1972 the United St~tes was importing 29X of its o31 cona~mption
requirements, and approximaCely 50X in 1977 ("inCernaCional ~conomic
tteport of the President," ~'ebruary 1974~ Washington, page 107; WEEKLY
COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, 31 October 1977, Vo1 13~ No 44,
page 1662).
49. THE CHRISTIAN SCIENC~ MONITOR, 17 May 1977.
50. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 2 June 1975, page 50.
51. Ibid.
52. It was determined that U.S. food exports (including meat and grain)
to Arab countries average 1-SX of their toCal foodetuffs imports, with
the exception of 5audi Arabia and Algeria, wl~oae importa from the
United States comprised 12 and 16X reapectively of their total food im-
ports in 1972 ("Data and Analysis Concerning the Possibility of a U.S.
~ood Embargo as a Response to the Present Arab Oil Boycott." prepared
for Che Committee on Foreign Affairs by the Foreign Affaira bivi~ion,
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 29 November 1973,
Washington, 1973, page 6).
53. L. P. Bloomfield. "Toward a Strategy of Interdependence." The Depart-
ment of StaCe Special Report, July 1975, No 17, pp 5-6; J. Diebold.
"Multinational Corporations. Why Be Scared of Them?" ~OREIGN POLICY,
Fall 1973, No 12, page 80.
54. For more detail on this see I. Ivanov, "The Trananati~nal Monopolies
Threat to Sovereignty," MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA,
No 1, 1978. -
55. For more detail on this see "Vneshnyaya politika stran Latinakoy Ameriki
posle vtoroy mirovoy voyny" [Foreign Policy of the Latin American
Countries Since World War II], Moscow, 1975, pp 490, 491. According to
a statement by Senator F. Church, Chairman of Che SubcommiCtee on Multi-
national Corporations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, during
investigation of ITT activities in Chile "it was determined that the
tie between ITT and CIA was so close that it was in fact impossible to
establi'sh where oae began and the other ended" (FOREIGN POLICY, Fall
1973, No 12, page 102; see also I. Grigulevich, "U.S. Imperialism
Against the Chilean People," VOPROSY ISTORII, No 11, 1978).
56. Employment of this instrument of influence, alongside realization by the
ruling circles that Western Europe (as the energy, monetary-financial
and economic crises developed) of their relative economic weaknesa in
comparison with the giant across the sea (in spite of an overall
sCrengthening of the economic position of Western Europe and Japan in
respect to the United States), led to intensification of centripetal
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_
- FOit dN~iCIAL U5~ t~NLY
t~nd~nci~a in tt~p c~pit8li~t world in r~cant yaarr~ ae i~ indiCetad
by c~rt~in nuancc~~ in th~ Atlan~ic poliey of France, Itaiy~ Spain~ and
otfi~r W~~Cern ~uropean countriee.
57~ g. Manning~ "Coald~ ideology and ~oraign Policy~" FOEtEICN AFFAIRS~
January 19~6~ pp 2~3-284.
58~ Esch y~ar th~ U.5. Congreeg appropriatee 60-TO million dollars for
rhe activi~i~e of these radio etationa ~ee~ Congres~ional R~cord~
29 March 1976~ pp N2465~2470). in 1977 Carter granted a requeat for
a eupplecaental appropriation of 45 miilion doliare~ "which would help
them double their broadcaet capabilities" (THE NEW YORK TIMES~ 1 April
197~). According to official governmgnt figuree~ each year th~ United
5totes ellocetes more than 300 million dollars in the feder8l budget
for foreign propaganda ("Th@ gudget of the United Statea Covernment~
FiACnl Yeer 1977," W~~hington~ page 73).
S9~ THE PROCR~S5IV~, Mey 19~7, page 22.
6n. 5ee "Fiscal Year 1977 Authorixation for Military Procurement, Etesearch
and Oevelopment and Active Duty Selected iteeerve end Civilian per~onnel
5t;ength," Waehington, 1976~ part 4. Research and Uevelopment~ pp 2479-
2495.
61. See CONCRLS520NAL RECORD, 29 April 1976~ page N3621.
COPYRIGHT: IZdgtel~8tvo "Pravda", "Voprosy iatorii"~ 1979
3024
CSO: 1800
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NOR OFPtCIAL US6 ONtY
IIVTERNATIONAL
FORMATION OF ANTI-tMPERIALIST FRONT EXAMINED
Mo~oow ZA ~VROPU MIRA I PROaRBS3A in Ruaoian 19?? ~i8n~d to
pr~~s i? Oot Chaptet 12 pp 296-31?
~haptsr 12 "Surope4n Communi~t Movement 4nd the World R~volu-
tS~onary Proosos" by Jano Herecs, Hungarian Peopls'o Repablic~
lrom book "For a Europs o! P~4o� ~nd Progra ss," MoocoM 19??--
t'or previouoly translat~d portions oY thi4 book 0e� JPRS L/?811,
5 Jun 78, No 9 of this series pp 10-5~
~ex~ The worldwide socfal traneforau?tfon which is being aar-
ri~d out both within nation4l bouadarieo and on a global scale
i4 a charact~ristic leature of the conteoporary epoch. Ao 4 re-
eult oY the victory of indepsnd~nt national social revolutione~
govornmental poMOr fe pasaing tro~ ths hands of capitalfsts to
ths hands of ths rrorking ciass and its alliss. A global aon-
ilict is thus being waged bet~rsen ths worid eysteas ot oocial-
f~m and capitaliem. The power-holding working claes of �ocial-
ist countries stands in opposition to the bourg~ofafe whiah
holde the position 4f power in capitalist etatee. Ths world-
wide sooialist syetem~ the labor movement in capitalist countrie� ~
and the national liberation moveaents in all of their manifseta-
tfons are natural allies in thie atruggle. Thus~ the worldwide
revolutionary procese of our epooh is befng oarried out via th~
btru~e of thr~� baefc revolutionary force~ with their oppon-
ent, mperialiai.
The Great October Socialiet Revolution inaugurated the epoch of
change from capitaliem to socialisa in ths history of m4nkind.
The contributfon of the USSR to the cause of general human pro-
grsss will remain forever in the oemory of workere throughout
the world. Socialist countriee having arieen ae a result of
national democratic revolutfot~s have created, with the Soviet
Union, a world socialist syste~ deteraining to a significant
degre� the late of mankind and have altered t~e ali~ent of
forceo in the Morld. The political, econo~ic~ oultural and
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I~OR UFFtCtAL US~ ~NLY
eociai achiavements of eoaialist countriea~ which p~reuaoiv@�
ly and opecifically demone~rate the advant4gao of Q oocialist
otructure over that of capitaliam~ are undeniable.
The prooese of ravolutionary regrnsration of the world issuas
into conorete int~rnationsl aonditions with which it is found
in olose interaommunication s~r~d int~r~etion. Its development
direc~ly fnflu~ncea changa in the r~14t1.onship of oooial and
politiaa]. forc~a in the worid~ and this as a matter of couro�
er?tails changee in inte rnational relatsons. In ite turn~ in~
ternational oonditione exert influ~nc� on the world revolu-
tionary prc~ceeo and on ths d~velopment of 1ibQr~tion movemente
withfn national fraseworko. Tho working ciaas and its Marxiet-
Leniniet parties~ in determining specific ways and fornis of
aocompiiehing revolution in individual Qountriea~ there~ore
- carefully consid~r both national and international conditions
in addition to the etatua of olase forcee within a country,
hietoricsl treditions and othsr characterietice.
The various developmental ete~ges of the world revolutionary
process ~learly reflect the close interdopenden~e of thfs pro-
cess and international conditione. The areat October Social-
i st Revolution representing the height of the firat etage broks
the common imperialist system at~d extracted from it one oountry
in which there began the buildit~g of socialism. Along with
internal conditione in Russia in 1917, t~t?e need for acoomplish-
ing the revolution by force of arms was aleo occasioned by in-
terr?atior~al factors. Then, in the period following the victory
of the revolution~ it wae namely imperialiet intervention which
brought the firet proletarian goverru~e nt to the necessity of
carrying on ar~ned conflict. Intervention and the biockttd~ or-
ganized by imperialian and directed against the firat eocial-
ist country created a condition of such nature that tha defense
and continuance of the revolution plus the annihilation of the
internal enemy's oppositfon were possible only by giving first
priority to a suppre esed function of the dictatorship of ths _
proletariat.
The second stage in the Morld revolutionary process came dur-
ing the course of the formation of the rrorld system of social-
iem and the disintegration of the colonial system of imperfal-
iem. Tharilce, primarily, to the over-all influence of general-
ly favorable intarnational conditions creation of a national
democratic structure was accomplished not by force of arme but
by relatively peaceful meane, ar~d the dictatorship of workere
and peasante similarly developed through peaceful means into
the power of the working claes and of the working people. This
peaceful route fe the basic feature of eocialist revolution in
the countries of central and eastern Europs. In contraet to
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thie~ in sevorai Aeian countrieo the victory of socialiet revo-
1u~ior? could be onoutyd only via nrm~d ~~ruggle for nationai
ind~pend~nae and oocinl progr~os.
=n th~ oont~mporary world eituation ch4raatori~od by profound
qualitative ohang~ a in th~ ali~unent of forae� between aoei4l-
i sm ar~d imp~ r~41 S s~ ~ th~ i nts raonno Qti on of th~ r~ voluti onary
proo~es with internntsonal conditiona haa a numbe r of p~ouli-
4ri tia o.
During "coid war" periods ~he worid aapitalist sy~tem haa been
characteri~�d by relative at4bility. The forefgn polioy of ~m-
perialism hae first and foremoet been determined by etriving
towards milit4ry superiority over sociali.et countriee and by
aiming for poasible ehange of ~heir social etructur. by for-
Qible means. In gueh Qircumetancse the world ~ocialiet eys~
trm had to, and did demonetrate its vit4lity--the ability to
defend iteelf against forefgn rsa~tion snd internal oourlter-
revolution. btoreover~ the "cold war" situation exerted an ob-
structive and destruct~ve influence un tha international work-
ing-claes movement~ Qontributing to disaeneion in trade unfon
and other maea movements and promating the growth of antf-com-
munism and eocial opportunism in capitaliet coun~riee. Thie
~iraumstance was on the whole also unf4vorable for national
libsratfon movements. It created for imperialiem broad poe-
eibilities !or their forcibls euppression.
At the end of the eixties 4nd �tpecially at the beginning of
the seventiea the failure of the imperialist "cold war" polioy
beaame evident. As a r~esult of the ~ofnt activity of eocial-
ist countries and other progreesive foraes, and ae a reault o!
the euccesstul realizatfon of the Peace Program advanced by the
24th CPSU Congrees~ there came a period in which the internation-
al eituatf on is ~aore and mors being characterf zed by detente and
peaceful coexietence ~ and by cooperation amorig countries of dif-
ferent social structures. :hesa cnar~ges were conditfond, first
and foremost~ by changes in the relationship of forces having
several determining factore in our time. First~ there is the
w~interrupted growth of the eaonomfc and defense capability of
- �ocialist countries and the intluence of their active peace
policy on the international situation. Second, there ia the
rise of national liberation movemente~ and there f o the anti-
imperialist policy of progreesive national democratic atatee.
Third~ there is a deepening of the g~eneral crisie in capital-
fem appearing in all areas of life in bourgeofe society and
fostering consolidation of the laboring maseae' eocial and
political etruggle.
The relaxation of international tension~ ae an ob3ective neces-
sity in the relations of statee with diflerent aocial structuree~
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exerts aoneiderable influence on ths world revolutionary pro~
c~oe~ revealing for its edvancement new possibilities~ the
utili~ation of whi~h in large meaeure depends on further ex-
teneson of the interaction betM?e~n all o~ ite currente and parts.
It ie natural~ tharefore~ that revolutionary foroes of the e n-
tire world attach great importance to the struggle of � uropean
working peaple for peace and aocial progreeg and to the influence
of thoir e~truggls on the over-all alignment of wnrld forces~ on
anti�imperialiet movementa in other regiona and on the interH
national situation as a whole.
The European working-elaea movement is an integral and extreme~-
ly important part of the world revolutionary process~ in whi~h
it always played and continues to play a leading and most ac-
tive role both be~auee of ita organization~ milf tan~y, ideolog�
ical and political development ar?d likewise on account of the
fact that it functione in that ~one of international relatione
and socfal contradictione wherein evente largely determin~ the
character of procesaes in the development of states and the
claes struggle on other continents.
The unification and coordinatfon of effort~ by all ~uropean
communist and working-claea parties and the development by
them of a eingie program of actfon. for ensuring security in
Europe are an important contribution to the over-ali struggle
againet the aggressive tendencies of imperialism. The Euro-
pea~n continent is a region where the two c~a3or social and eco-
nomic systems come into cloes contact with~ and oppose each
other. Therefore, reducing the danger of an outbreak of war
in Europe meane introducing a decisive contribution towards
averting a third world war and means limiting the poesibility
of European capitalist countrie~' being involved in the poli-
cy of aggression~ conflicte and increasing tension in other~
parts of the world. "Needless to eay~" as believes~ for ex-
ample~ General Secretary of the Peruvian Communist Party~
Jorge del Prado, "the fortunes of Europe--in epite of the fact
that thie continent is experfencing realities different from
thoee of Latin America--exert a vitally i~portant influence an
our own destinies. If the likelihood of war in the Old World
become8 remote, there will be more possibilities for inflict-
ing defeat on imperialism in Latin America."1
It wae, namely~ in Europe that world socialism~ having at its
disposal powe rful basea~ achieved the most favorable correla-
tion of forcea. and it wae precisely there that it created an
effective ayatem for coordinating the actions of fraternal
. nations for the purpose of supporting revolutionary and demo-
cratic movements throughout the world. Especially strong there
are the poeitions of the international working class and of
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revolutionary for~ea carrying out a constant nffeneive on mon-
opolistic circles and ueing not only the we Eur~pean prole-
tariat but also workere of many developing cou,ntriee. A weak-
ening of these ~ircles' influenoe within Europe means a simul-
taneour narrowing of posaibilitiee for their economic expansfon
outeide Europe.
Of grea~ si~gnificance for all currents of the world revolution-
ary procese is the fact that in the European work3ng-class move~
ment--more than anywhere else--the in~ernational solidarf ty of
laborers~ whoae action is not ieolated by regional limitatione
but embraces all democratic~ anti-imperialist and peace-loving
forces on th~ planet, fa well-developed. Any sort of Eurocen-
triam ia forefgr~ to the European working claee and its revolu-
tionary $vant-garde. They do not separate their interests from
the in~ereste of workers throughout the world, nor their struggle
for the transformation of Burope in~o a zone of peace and pro-
grees from the gtruggle of all natione for w~rldwide soc,ial pro-
gre s s.
This poaition found vivid expression at the Berlin Conference
of Communiet and Working-claea Parties of Europe. In its Con-
cluding Document and in speeches by delegates it wae dynamical-
ly emphasized that the eolution to European probleme cannot be
ieolated from the eolution to all mankind'a problems. Suropean
communists thereupon expressed their heartfelt gratitude to
nations of other continents which are eupporting the struggle
of nations of the European continent f.or peace and eocial pro-
grese. In turn, they presented a wide range of requirements~
the realization of which would lead to a democratic reaol~ution
of problems troubling people of developing countries--in partic-
ular~ to the final elimination of colonial and raciet reg3mes
and to the ternaination of neo-colonialist exploitation of these
nations by monopoliatic capital.
European communist and working-clase parties are unanimous in
their appraisal of the historical significance of the union of
three fundamental revolutionary forces of our epoch--worldwide
socialism~ the international prole tariat and the national libe r-
ation movement. They thus regard their struggle for European
peace, cooperation and social progreas as a contribution to
worldwide social progress. In the Concluding Document of the
Berlin Cornmunist Conference~ it is explained~ "Communist and
working-class parties participating in the conference are con-
vinced that t~e struggle for European peace~ cooperation and
social progresa is an important contribution to the solution of
political, economic and social p~oblema throughout the world--
a solution which requires equal participation by all countries.
Positive changes on aur continent are creating favorable condi-
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tions for nationaJ. liber~tion efforte~ for anti-war efforte~
for relaxation of tena3on--and in other parta of the world, for
national struggle a~ainet neo-colonialiem and al~ forms of na-
tional oppreesion."
The progra.rn of etrugg1 e advanced by tho oonference hae con-
~feten~ly anti~imperialigt character. It includes both general
democratic aime of etruggle answering intereste of the broades~
national maeses and also the olase aime of the proletariat~
whoae defenders communiate represent. Th~s is a document oon-~
forming to the aspiratione of all forcee oppoeing imperiali ~a
. and advocating peace~ democracy and social progresa. It repre-
sents an organic part of the general platforia of basic currente
in the revolutionary and liberation etruggle--the oonstructive
activi~ty of nationa building eooialiam and communiem~ the clasa
etruggle of the worldwide proletariat~ and the national libera-
tion movement-�which have all merged into a single world revo-
lutionary procese bringing manki�d a tranaformation of ita en-
tire life.
Commur~ist and working-clasa parties in Europe are devotirig much
attention to ensuring the unity of working people's activities
both within national and continental limita and also an a world
scal~. Opponents of proletarian solidarity actively oppose thie
aspiration~ attempting to "refute" the Marxist-Leniniet concept.
of interaction of the fundamental currents of the world revolu-
tionary proceae and to counter it with all manner of Eurocentrist
and gsopolitical schemee put forth by bourgeois and aocial-refo~
theorists~ and similarly~ by ideologiste of "leftiat" opportun-
iem. Characteristically~ thg main motive in this is an attempt
to divide the international communist movement. It is well
known~ for example~ what a great ballyhoo was raiaed even over
so-called "Eurocommunism." It ia a fact that bourgeois propa~
ganda invented this expression for inciting conflicts by exag-
gerating differenceg between parties. Communists must repulse.
this maneuver also. Communist partiee' natural policy differ-
ences confirm the need to strengthen solidarity and ~ointly ex-
pose the divisive maneuvers of bourgeois propaganda. The situ-
tion of international communist movements is characterized in
our time~ abov~ all~, by the development~ rise and etre ngthen-
ing of the drive towards unity . Testifying to this is a con-
stant increase in number of bilateral meetinge and an entire
series of successful multilateral forums as~ for example, com-
munist party conferences of Arab countries and of countriea of
I,atin America and the Carribean region. At theee, communiste
3ointly analyzed the moet important features of the economic
and social situation in countries of the given region and to-
gether defined goals. Aa~ong the many multilateral mee tings~
the Berlin Conference of European Communist and Working-claes
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~OR OFFICIAL U5~ ONtY
Partieg~ which diecuseed not only continental probleme bu~ a1~o
~ook no~e of general ob~ectives through queetione influenoing
the destiny of all mankind~ w~e of particular eignificanee.
Bilateral~ multilateral meetinga and reglonsl~ oon~inentnl co~-
ferenoes have proven that in the ooures of friendly diecu~eiona
a~nd talkr delegatea of communfet partiea can corae ~o agreemen~
on all fundamental questfone. Debate smong fraternal partisg
does not exclude this.
At the iith Congrese of the Hungarian So~ialiat Workere' Par~y
our party advocated friendly~ creative exchange of opinione
among partiea of the international communfat movment. Fra-
ternal partiea of other eocialiat oountriee, alao working un-
der different conditione, apply general principlee of socialiat
revolution and eooialiat construction. Confrontation oonditiono
for parties laboring in the capitalist world are dfaeimilar and
specific. Therefore ~ pra~ticai experience ia different on in-
dividual ieauee~ apecific problems awaiting solution similarly
differ~ and opinions on methoda of achieving a planned ob~ect-
ive also do not always coincide. Their comparieon aide in the
indapendent development of atrategy and tactice and in the deter-
mination of~ and effective solution to national probleme. The
tried and true weapon of the international co~muniet movement
~s, however, solidarity and ~oint action~ the foundation of
which ia fosmed by a single world outlook~ common intereets of
the international working clase~ and congruent ideas and goala
of fraternal parties. First Secretary of the Central Committes
of the Hungarian Socialist Workera' Party~ J. Kadar~ declared
at a press conference during hie vieit to Rome in June 19??s
"I am poeitive that mutual and ~omplete eolidarity~ whfeh no one
will be capable of destroy?ing, muat and will be achieved among
all communist and working-claes parties of Europe regardless of
whether they are working in a socialist or in a west Buropean
capitaliet country."
Individual parties also have common tasks in addition to their
own specific taske. Only through ~oint actions can they pro-
vide the requisite international conditions for eucceasful ei- -
fort. Creative debate is likewise essential for their precise
determination. In the intereste of effective effort~ develop- ,
ment of international correlation of forcee and international
conditions must be analyzed togather. It is neceseary to study
on a~oint basis the maintenanas of detente and ita connection
with eocial progreee and th~ poasibii~ty of progreesive forces'
unity. It is necessary~ ~ointly~ to determine a progran of af-
fort and methods for solving the basic issuea of our epoch and
for consolidation and further development of the detente proceea
with extenaion of detente to the ephers of the military and dis-
armament--that ie, for the final eliminatfon of the threat of
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thermo~nuclear world war~ for peaoe~'ul coexietence of govarn-
mente wi~h differing aooial atructure and for the expaneion af
mutual].y benefioial relations~
Ae far ae iaeues basic to the ~ommuniat movement are ooncerned~
~t fa neoessary to examine them ~ointly by holding common dis~
auesion of problema. Debate and friendly exohange of opiniona
cannot~ huwever~ oa11 in queation or even ne gate the efforts of
x~evolut~onary foreea. Their value and the hietoricai viatorie~
of the communist movement are unqueetionable.
Fr3endly exchange of opinions can be conducted only on equal
terme. One aould hardly accept a situation wherein a represen-
tative of some fraternal party would groundleesiy oritioi~e
soofali~8~ aountriee and in the bourgeoie press question aocisl-
fat ~ountrieg' achievemente while viewing any responee to thia
as meddlesome. We ooneider debate ar?d the inevitable exchange
of opinions to be a mutual~ bilateral and multilateral procese.
We diacerningly take the position of Ieraeli Communiet Perty
General Secretary E. Berlinguer~ atated at the Berlin Conference
when he declared~ referring to criticiem of the policy line of
the Israeli Communist PartY~ "Although we do not share theae
critical ~ud~nnents, we also oonsider their expreesion legitimate.
Moreover~ we would like debate on these important sub~ects to
develop in the working-claes movement--in a spirit of friend-
ship and mutual underatanding, of couraa, but at the eaiae time
more freely and openly. "3
We acknowledge differsnces of position among parties of ths in-
ternatfonal communi$t movement~ but we dery? that thie necessar-
ily divides them. Our claes enemy~ imperialiam~ would like to
effect precisely this disesnsion. We consider it natural that
fraternal parties operating in differing eituationa and inde-
pendently determining their atrategy and tactics should arrive
by different routes at one and the same goal--the building of
a soCfaliet society~ but we re3ect opinione and practice accord-
ing to which this can b~ accomplished only by means of ohalleng-
irig and demeaning paths taken by others and.questioning their
validity. We are in concord with fraternal par~ies workir~g ur~-
der trying conditions in capitalist countries~ struggling
agafnst monopolies and bowrgeois dictatorship and fighting for
�o~fal reforms answering the inte~asts of a~n entire nation. At
the same time we believe that solidarity must no~ be abused.
Friendly debate expreseirig mutual respect is a regenerative
element of the international communist movement. The bourgeoi-
sie~ however, is aggressive arid calculating~ and it attempts to
turn our debate against our unity. It i.ncites anti-Sovietiem
by all means in its power. It would be a groes politice~l error
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~~ox ~~~tcinL us~ ~rtLY
to ime.gine that an~ti-Soviet gi~luencQ onu'~h~$WOrkingiclasa~n~
crease any communist party e
Anti-Sovietism is the ~oa'~ ugtgoommunieteurunity~the bourgeoi�
sie whioh ie trying to dier p
Anyone who underestimatee t~ne i~Q,�t~iWithoutrpuz' o~e~and~againet
countriee~ ignorea ~hefr ga ~
the intereste of revolutioh~ke theirepeoplesitfaith indsocial~p
ing countriea~ trying to s
ism~ is thereby impeding the etruggle of Praternal par~ies work-
ing there.
V.I. Lenin~ in perceiving twe~hend~ParQtion fors andethe vic-r
national clasa etruggle~ 8a P
tory of the univereal soci~aii~e~~olutionary~ProcesgVet mulatedf
vQrious aurrente of the w r
by the struggle of the internaofc~ ZOthicenturye"cannotnbe~anYd
that the ~ocialist revolution
thing other than an exploafied." mIt$istinconceivableh"without
the oppressed and dissatis
revolte in small coloni$1 ~Qte~tso~the~pettYpbourgeoieiehwith
revolutionary exploaion p P
all of its pre~udicee..."4 Justifying the great role of the
national liberation movement in the world revolutionary process~
V.I. Lenin wrote~ "...The socialist revolution will not be only
and primarily a struggle of revolutnoi'iait wilieberaastrugglecof
country a8ainat their bouxgeoisie
all colonies and countriea �in~rnational~imperialiema"5 of all
dependent countries against
These Leniniet tenets were~ moreover~ direc ~oachgtonthetinter-
views of those for whom the dialectical apP
actfon of vsrious currents of the world revolutionary proceas
wae alien. The general direction of world events in our day
again and again confirms theteachintiooncerninguunitydof alli
cal realitY of the Leninist 8
currenta of the internnti~helleading~ro erin
it ofbthe~working
movement~ ar~d concerni g
class--the m~in motive fo~~ off h~~sBOC etyron the basise ofe
ciding factor in the re
sociQl. ~ustice~ freedom~ ismutable fact thatWthe strongeriand
o!' nations. It is an ind p
more stable the positihes ~rh~dninfluenceaofWtheiworldasoci-
become~ and the mare t P
alist sys't�em are strengthe ed~ and the more hopefulebecomenthes
in world politics intenaifi e for peaca. national independence
prospecte of nations' stru881
and social progrees~ ~d tmenteofeage old humanaidealeitical
oonditions for the achieve ,
?
~
I
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The cloee ooopexat~on of European soofaliet coun~ries and o~
the communist and working-clase movement with revolutionary
and democratic forces of other aantinente demonstratee thie
in~erconnec~tion in praotice with comple~te clarity.
Above a11+ the enormous contribution whioh the working-clage
movament in ~urope and ite revolu~ionary avant-garde con~ingenta
have made in recent yeare towards s~trengthening the po~i~ion~
of eocialism outside the European continent ehould be emphaeix~d~
Proletarian solidari~y wae diaplayed with great intenei~y in
�that compreheneive eupport rendered by governmente in sociali~~
collaboration and by European communfet and working-clase par-
ties to the Vietnamese as they repelled imperi~liet aggreseion.
The ~onference of the Political Adviaory Comm~ttee of Partici-
pan~ Wareaw Treaty States convened in Prague in i972 thue is-
eued a etatement in connection with the oontinuing aggreseion
by the United Statea in Indo-China~ affirming anew through it
the de termination of socialiat ~ountriea to give all necessary
aid to opponente of aggreseion.
In the same year the Conference of Communiat and Working-clase
Partiee of European Countries was convened in Paris in support~
of the Vietnamese people and other nations of Indo-China. Ite
participants a~pealed to communfets~ the working claea~ city.
and rural laborer$~ to democratic and patriotic persona~ to the
younge r generation~ and to all who value the ideals of peace~
~ustice and independence~ to intensify ~oint actions in support
of struggling Yietnam.
This eolidarity made an important contribution to the historic
victory of the Vietnamese people, who had euccessfully repulsed
imperialiem's biggest attempt after World War II to deal with a
socialist atate by force of arme and suppress a national libera-
tion revolution. The national democratic revolutione in Laos
and Cambodia~ the peoples of which had determined as their final
goal the building of a socialist society, were a great achieve -
ment for the forceB of progress.
In a report at the 4th Congress of the Workers' Party o~' Viet-
nam~ First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers'
Party of Vietnara, Le Zuan~ declared~ "The victory of the Viet-
nam~se revolution is a victory for the forces of socialiam,
national independence~ democracy and peace throughout the entire
world~ which gave us eupport in the fight against American im-
perialist aggression."?
Support based on the multilateral aid of eocialist collabora-
tion and on the solidarity of the European working-class and
communiat movement hslped the Cuban people to pierce the imperi-
alist blockade in the seventies and to etrengthen the position
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~n~ o~~rc~a~. us~ orrLY
of socialiam in �their country. As ~'iret Secretary of the Cen-
tral Committee of the Communist Par~y of Cuba~ F. Castro~ em-
phasized at the 2sth CPSU Congress~ Soviet-Cuban relation~~
which "repreeent an example of internationalism~ mutual under-
standing~ respect and truet~" played an aepecially great role.8
In their speechee at the 25th CPSU Congre~e all representativee~
of the inte rnational re volutionary movement stressed the enor-
mous importance of the eolidarity of the USSR and other social-
ist countriea for nationa' eocial progress. "The growing pnwer
of the Soviet Uninn~" eaid General Secretary of the Central Cam-
mit~tee of the National Revolutionary Party of Laoe~ Premier of
the Laotian National Democratic Republic~ K. Fomvikhan~ "con-
tributes to the strengthening of the worldwide socialist. sys-
tem and heightens its role ae a factor determin3ng the couree
of hwnan development. It de tere the aggress~.ve intentiona of
imperialiats and serves as a powerful stimulus for the national
libera~ion movement and the international working-class move-
ment."
The Premier of Laos is testifying to the fact that international
solidarity of revolutionary and democratic forces now aervea as
a most important factor in the development of national democratic
revolutions into socialist revolutiona. In his speech at the
October 19?6~ Plenwn of the Central Comtaittee of the CPSU, L.I.
Brezhnea noted that "we have every reason to say that in the
person of Laos the societ of socialist states is being enlarged
by still another member."~0
By their practical and theoretical activity communist and working-
class parties of Europe are in many respects furthering develop-
ment of the communist movement in non-socialist countries of
Asia, Africa and Latin America. Such assistance takes various
forms. These include acts of political aolidarity and moral
support of communists fighting, frequently, under the difficult
condition8 of underground activity~ police persecution and mass
repression. The solidarity of the E uropean communist and work-
ing-class movement helped in freeing Luis Korvalan from the tor-
ture chambers of Chilean reaction~ and it serves as an important
factor in activating the struggle of progressive forces in the
world against communist persecution in such countries as Indo-
nesia~ Paraguay, the Republic of South Africa and others. It
also involvea aid to small and as yet unconsolidated working-
class organizations in several countries of Asia and Africa for
setting up various forms of activity. And it is that aid which
communist parties of other continents~ assimilating the lessons
of European communiste' struggle for socialism~ democracy~
peace and social progress~ receive.
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Communiets of non�socialist countries in Aefa~ Africa and La~in
America especially highly value the role of the CpSU and the
Soviet State in the world revolutio�ary procees~ In a Declar-
ation of the Conference of Communiet Partiee of Latin American
and Carribean Gulf Countri.ee (1975) was stated~ "The Soviet
Union and its Communiet Party~ having aohieved remarkable eoo-
nomic, political and eocial succese--by which the mate r3al stan-
dard and life of USSR peoplee are being conatantly heightened
and rendered e ver more well-provided--has always fulfilled and
3s magnificently fulfi,lling ite proletarian and internationa"1
duty. Not only did they sa~e mankind from Nazism at the coat
of 20 million livee of their own sons and daughters and at the
eoat of huge economic loeaes~ but by their presence and stead-
~'astness they also enabled those natione of Europe and Asia
who had decided to follow ~he path of aocialiem to carry out
revolutionary reforms without fear of imperialist repression..."11
Coun~trie~ of socialist collaboration have at their disposal
effective foreign policy resourcee and well-developed communi-
cations with all revolutionary forces for exerting an active ~
shaping influe nce on the world situation--short~ however~ of
any "export of revolution." V~orld reform such as would serve
the intere sts of the working claes and in the long run all of
humanity is the goal of socialiet revolution.
Socialigm manifests solidarity with the in~ernational working
class and with all progressive forces struggling against ex-
ploitation and all forms of oppreseion. Successfully solving
the probl.ems of creating a new social structure and forming a
system of inte rnational security~ aocialiat countries are thue
improving international conditions for the unfolding of the
worldwide revolutionary process. Practical socialism, however,
not only indirectly but also directly aids the international
working class and national liberation movements, giving them
multilateral support.
II
One of the characteristic features of the world revolutionary
process in our time is the fact that it also includes develop-
ing nations which are freeing themaelves from the yoke of colo-
nialism and the national liberation movements.
The importance of liberated countries in international relatione
is growing. Socialist and developing states constitute a deci-
eive majority in the United Nations and in many prominent inter-
national organizations. More than 70 percent of the population
of the earth lives in just under 100 developing countries oc-
cupying approximately one-half of all the territory on the
globe. Located there are the majority of energy supplies and
. 36
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gupplles af other raw materials~ and at tl~~,~ same time these are
the pooreat and economically mogt backward nations.
A most important distingu3,ehing fea~ure of new wave national
democratic revolutione~ unfolding in developing coun~tries is the
fact the~t, with all their differencee~ they ara as a whole di-
rected againet imperiallem and are capab~e of creating important
condi~ione for the traneition to socfalism.
. In national liberation and democratic movements in developing
nations the process of olass differentiation hae been intensi-
fying more and more in recent years~ and the s~ruggle for the
future path of development is turn~ng more and more into a claes
struggle. On account of poorly-developed social conditione--the
basie features of which are the dominance of Christianity and of
ama11-ownerahip groups~ relative underdevelopment of the working
class and the significant role of such forcee ae~ for example~
the army--this class struggle is diatingufahed by a well-known
~peculiarity. The particular .dis.tinctive feature is a great ten-
dency towards radicalism or~ for instance~ an extremely vague
intdrpretation of goals and ideas connected with socialiem.
At the same time it should be noted that in individual develop-
ing countries income from the production of oil has risen efanf-
ficantly in recent years in connection with the energy crisis in
the capitalist world--a fact which has strengthened the position
of the bourgeoieie. Relying on that position~ imperialism f e
attemp~ing to accomplish its goals and manage the situation in
such a way that developing natione~ if only a part of them~ will
choose not a socialist.or a revolutionary democratic path of
development but a capitalxst path leading towards subordination
to imperialism.
Undex- these conditions~ it is the interriational responaibility
of socialist countries~ the international working-class and com-
munist movement to further in every way possible the struggle
of vanguard forces of nation~tl liberation movementa for social
and political reform and to help the~a determine a clear perspec-
tive and map a course leading to socialism.
The Berlin Conference of Europc~an Commun~.st and Working-class
Parties outlined a specific prc~gram of action in aupport of the
struggle of people of developing nations against neo-colonisliam
and for economic and social progress. This program includes
the requirement of "creating a new international economic or-
der= securing conditions for the economic and social development
of all countries--but for the mo~t poorly-developed countrie s
first= organizing broad international cooperation which would
support the people's of developing countries own efforts towarde
elimination of the gap between th~m and developed countriest un-
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restrioted exercising by every nation of ite ri~tht to independ-
ently take charge of ite national riah~s~ providing ali etatee
with accese ~n the ~chievomonts of contemporary science and
technology~ eetablishing a~uet oorr~lation b� tween pricee for
raw goods and agri~ulturai produote on the ono h4nd~ and pricee
for manufactured articlos on the other hand~ broadly d~veloping
trade relatione without any kind of artificia~. barriere and die-
criminatfon. "12
This f e the firet time ~hat the aommuniet movement of' ~urope hae
put forth euch a comprehenefva program for thss� probl~me. The
conferenee thereby made an impcrtant contribution to the further
rapprochement and ~ollaboration of present-day~ primary revolu-
tiongry forces--world sooialism~ the international prole~ariat
and the national liberatf on movement.
The role of the movement of Third World governments~ which has
now be come one of the most important factors in world polf tf cs ~ _
was particulariy sin~ed out at the Berlin Confer~nce of Euro~
pean Communiets.~ Th s role~ as wae emphasized in the Conclud-
- ing Document of the Conference, is that the Third World move-
ment "makes an active contribution to the struggle for peace~
securi ty. detente and aooperation on an equitable baeis~ for
the creation of s~ust eye~em of international political and
economic relations~ and to the struggle againet imperial3em,
colonialiem~ neo-colonialism and all forms of domination and
exploitation."13 Addressing the conference~ Preaident o~ the
Union of Yugoslav Communiets~ I. Bro~ Tito, emphaefzed in thie
regard~ "ThSrd World countries directly oppoee imperimlfat
policies and any kind of dominatfon. Their struggle is an ex-
preesion of the global progreasive and revolutionary proceee
characteristic of our epoch. This is a process of etruggle
against social and national oppreesion~ againet all forma of
exploi tation and subordination, a struggle for the consolida-
tion of peace, aecurity and equal cooperation among nations."14
The repercuaeions which the Berlin Conference of European Com-
muni~st and Working-class Parties received from the worldwide
r~volu~ionary movement were profoundly natural.
"The conference of 29 Buropean comaauniat and working-class par-
ties, representing a more than 29 million-member army of com-
munista, fe a most important event in the life of the world
communist and working-class movement~" as wae eaid in e leading
article of the central organ of the National Council of the Com-
munist Party of India, the rveekly I~W ~Q~. "Ite significance
is not limited to the boundaries of Surope, whera ~t?e atruggle
for peace. security, cooperation and social progrese was raised
to a new and higher stage ar~d rrith each day gathera strength.
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It aleo spreade to e.li regiona of the earth where the etruggle
of democratic far es againet imperialiem~ neo-colonialis~n and
t'arciem goer on. "~5
The Berlin Conference won high prafse in s etatement of the
Conference of Communist and Working-olase Partieg of Arab Na-
tione~ co~vened towards the end of 19?6� The conference em-
phaeized the great importanca of the eolidarity with thsm of
the USSR and other soc~alist cooperation etatee for eoeial pro-
grees atnong these countries' peopl~.
SQluting the eucceesful complstion of the Berlin Conference of
European CoAUnuniet and Working-clase parties~ Genere~l Secretary.
of the People' a progressive Party of (iuyana~ Chsddi Dzhaga n~
declared that its Concluding Document "hae a coloeeal atimulat-
ing influence on the struggle for freedoaa~ peace an~ social pro-
grees in Latin America and in the Carribean Qulf. "i
Communists of all countries proceed from the perspective of fur-
ther strengthening of the interaction of present-day progreseive
forces~ and from the neceseity and poseibility of consolidating
the unity of fundamental currents of the world re volutionary pro-
ceeB.
In the contemporary epoch, characterized by the unswerving
growth of the forces of socialism and the working-claes move-
ment, by the weakening of world capitalism, by th~ viol~nt
development ar� the national liberation movement~ the eocial re-
form role of the international eolidarity of workere has in-
creaeed immeasurably~ its content hae bscome more diveree~ and
new forms of r~anifestation have arisen. Inten3lfication of the
i~portance of proletarian inte rnationalism in ob~ectively con- -
ditioned by the huge extensfon of i~ts aocial naese~ by the for-
mation of a worldwide socieliet system and by the progrsssive
proletarianization of society in developed countriea and in
countries still struggling for their freedom. As noted General
Secretary of the Communist Party of Great Britain, G. MacLennon,
in his speech at the Berlin Communiat Conference~ "Nowada~?s the
concern of internationalism and of international eolidarity--
the basic principle of communists--alao includes forcee far be-
yond the limits of the working class."i?
ProletariPn internationaliem'e sphere of action hag now widened
to 4 ro~ld �~ale. It proioundly influences all historically
promising tendencies in nations' eocial progress. In our time~
proZetarian internationaliem ia turning into an effective fac-
tor in the development of the revolutionary movement in countriee
of Asia~ Africa and I,atin America. The ideas and principles of
international working-claes solidarity have especially great
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gl.gn~ficanc~ h9re for the unification of anti-imparialiet
~oroe~ and for the complete tx~iumph of the Qauee of natfonal
fr~edom.
The etrategy line of the international communiet movement~
aimed at widening the front of the ar~ti-imperfaliet etruggle
has borne , fP.~.t �.and st~engthened interoommunication between
pxaa~tiosl eocialism~ the working-claeg and democratic mov~M
ment 1n capitaliat oountxies and those fighting ~'or national
and social ~.iberation in dependent and oolonial atates. De-
pendl.ng on the multilateral ~id Qnd eupport of eocialist coun-
tries and on the eo~idarity of the aommuntet end working-claee
movemen~, o preseed peoplee oould do away with the ehameful
imperfaliet~c colonl~al �yetem. The elimination of colonialism
ig a universally historic victory for the natfonal liberatfon
raovemont and ie~ moreover one of the hfatoric triwnphe of
proletari~an international~sm.
~very great ~uccess for European communigte and each of their
achievements in the struggle for social progrees~ for the widen-
ing of ite political influence finds vital reaponse in develop�
ing countriee and elicite enthusiasm amorig progressive forcee
and fear and confuefon in reactionary and coneervat~ve circlee~
The influence of Marsixt-Leniniet ~deas on freedom-fightere~
an in~luence which hae now extraordinerily inten~ified ae a re �
gult of the extension of communicatiAne between national libera-
tion and communist movements~ arouses particularly acute alar~n
among opponents of social progrees. Under thie influence pro-
gressive forces in developing countriee are more and more realM
ising the limitation of a nationalietic approach to the solution
- of social development problems and are promoting democratic pro-
grams provi.ding for the elimination of all forme of national
and racial oppresefon~ and for ensuring wi@espread democracy and
the creation of a governmental system anewering interests of the
people. Under the ir~fluence oF l~arxism-Leniniem in the ideology
of the national liberation movement there has also arisen euch
an important principle as that of the unity of ideae of national
liberation with probleme of social progrees. Along with demand8
f~r the elimination of traces of colonialism and for the streng-
thening of national independence, such goals as the accomplish-
ment of agrarian refo~e~ the annihilation of feudal forme of
e xploitation and the elimination of domination by foreig? capi-
tal have been advanced in the programe of a ma~ority of lea~ing
national liberation organizstione.
Tho influence of scientific socialism is aimilarly expressed by
the assertion, in the ideology of the national liberation move -
ment~ of the Leninist idea concerning the need for unity of the
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f orceg o~ eocfaliam, national libera~ion and the international
working-~1aes movement. The reali~~tion of this idea was an
important factor in tha victorioue development of the atruggle
of oppreseed peoplee ~or freedom and independence and now servee
to further the extenefon of natfonal revolutiona. Emphasizing
thig~ f~eneral Se~retary of the Central Committee of the National
Front of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen~ A.F. Iemail~
de~lared~ "We steadfastly adhere to the principle of internation-
al solidarity with revolutionary forces~ a conetituent part of
which we consider ourselvea. Thie principle finde expreeeion
in our aseiduous atriving for unity with socialist ~ountriea~
with the worldwide cocmiuni~t movement~ with working-claes par-
ties in capitaliat countriee and with the world national libera-
tion movement. Our relationa with these forces are constantly
being stren thened more and more preciaely becauee of thie
position."i~
The aocial advancement of former colonies is impossible without
profound~~~cial reforme. This truth hes already bPCOme obWious
to progreesive forces in developing countries. The example of
such countriea as Angola~ Benin~ Burma~ Guinea, Mozambique~ the
People's Democratfc Republic of Yemen and other etatea of soci-
aliet crientation indicates that national movements in develop-
ing countriea aro more and s~w branching out into movemente
directed against exploitative relatione.
Under these conditione imperialiets~ compelled to retreat~ are
trying to reconetruct their etrategy in relation to liberated
states and to find such ways and meane of penetrating them as
would allow them to preserve and consolidate positiona of capi-
talism there. The main tasks which they are setting for them-
- eelves involve taking control of the social and political devel-
opment of lfberated natinne~ undermining the alliance between
socialist cooperation and the international working-clase move-
ment on one hand, and the national liberation movement on the
other.
As before, armed aggression occupies an important place in the
~ ~ strategy of imperialiam. In the contemporary world~ however~
colonial and imperialist methods of such kind are becoming less
and lesa effective. The victories of the nations of Indo-China
as well ae the course of events in the People's Republic of
Angola, which at the end of 1975 wa6 eub~ected to foreign in-
tervention undertaken by imperialiem and South African racists,
have convincingly demonstrated this fact. The 3uat struggle
of the Angolan people in defense of their country�s indepen-
dence was met with the support of progres$ive forcea throughout
the world. Ae the head of the delegation of the Popular Move-
ment for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) emphasized at the 25th
Congrese of Soviet Communiets~ this solidarity and~ above all~
the aid of the USSR and othe r socialist countries played a truly
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t
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deciaive role in ~he viotory of the Angolan people over colon-
falietg~ raciste~ imperial3sts and their local aollaboratore.~9
The international eolidarity of eooi+aliet states and of the
~ommunist and working-claes movemen~ of Furope with the anti-
imper3aliet struggle of liberated oountries is an indiepengable
and extreme].y important prerequieite to the fur~her deve].opmen~t
, of na~iona7. revolutiona. At the same time~ those fighting for
tha :freedam of Agia~ Africa and Latin Ameriaa are making a sub-
stantial contribution ~o the struggle of working-clase masses
in the capi~aliat countries of Europe. Thua~ the suomeseful
national liberation etruggle of the peoplee of Guinea-Bissau~
Mozambiq ue and Angola signified not only the downfall of the
cnlonial policy of the reactionary regime in Portugal ~ but i.t
also wae one of the reaeone for the rise of the antf~fasciet
movement in the ~nother country it~elf. In its turn~ the demo-
cra~ic revolution which took place in Portugal in April 1974
greatly facilitated the achievement of independence by former
Portuguese colonies.
Emphasizing the growing importance of mutual support by present-
day revolutionary forcea~ President of the Central Comamittee of
the Communist Party of the Netherlands~ H. Hukatra~ in a epeech
at the Berlin Conference of European Coaamuniat and Working-class
Partiea, eaids "Thie showa how closely one is connected with
another. In ~oint etruggle i~t will also be necessary in the
future to establish contacts and carry on exchange of opinions
between communist parties and national revolutionary movements
in other parts of the globe."20
Under contemporary conditions social contradictions have a glo-
bal character. They are embodied in the contest between two
world social syatems, in the opposition of the international
working class to monopolist capital, and in the sharp conflict
between imperialism and the national liberation movement. All
of the forms of struggle are in.close interaction. In our time
the dialectical unity of the internal and international class
struggle has become especially close-knit and varied.
The relauation of international teneion intensifies the need
for international unity of all revolutionary and democratic
forces of the world. Both the problems of further development
of detente itself and the ob~ective conditions of the interna-
tional claes struggle demand this. The common characte r of
liberation goals and the historical deatinies of worke rs of
all countries of the globe~ the progressive nature of their
fundamental goals and the presence of a common enemy--world-
wide imperialism--form the basis of such unity. All of this
makes especially urgent the problems of creating an interna-
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tional anti-imperialiet front uniting all linke of the world
revolutionary and freedom movemen~ in the struggie for estab-
liehment of lasting peace~ national liberation and ecc~al -
progreea.
FOOTNO'1TS
i.. Quoted from PRAYD~~ i~F July 197~� ,
2. Conference of ~uropean Communiet and Working-clase
Partie e ~ p 30.
3. Ibid.~ p 241. '
4. V.I. Lenin~ Comple te Collection of Worke~ v 30~ p,54.
5. V.I. Lenin~ loc. cit.~ v 39~ p 32?�
6. See~ The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union and Inter-
national Relations. Collection of Ddcumente. 19?2~
PP 13-14. ,
Quoted from PRAYnA~ 15 December 19?6�
8. Welcome Addrese to the 25th CPSU Congreee~ p 40.
9. Ibid. ~ p ~217�
10. L.I. Brezhnev, Speech at CPSU Central Committe~ Plenum,
25 October 1976~ P 29�
li. Quoted from GRANMA~ 16 June 1975�
12. Conference of European Communist and Working-claea
Parties~ pp 32-33�
13. Ibid.~ p 15.
14. Ibid.~ p 206.
15. r1EW AcE~ 4 July 1976.
16. Quoted from PRAIiD~A~ 12 July 1976.
1?. Conference of $uropean Communiet and Working-alass
Parties~ p 149.
18. Welcome Addrese to the 25th CPSU Corigrese~ p 431.
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i9� Sse~ Weloomo Addrere to the 25th OPSU C~ot~gres~, p 40,3. `
20. Conferanc� of Buropean Communiet a~nd Working-ola~s
Psrtfee~ p i?i.
COPYRIQ1iTt Izdatol'atvo "Me~hdunarodr~ye otnoshsniy4"~ i977
ii94i
CSO~ 1800
~
.
~
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~ _.t~_~.:_: _ . . ,
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INTSRNATIONAI,
tiROMYKO FORBWORD TO N8W SDITION ON U88R FORBICN POLICY
Moscoa VNSSHNYAYA POLITIKA 30tBT3KOC0 30Yt1ZA in Au~~ian 1978 oignad to pr~~o
10 Nov 78, pp 1~ 2, 472
(Sacond, rovi~4d aad sup~i~tad~ 4dition of book on Soviat loraign policy
with fora~oord by A. A. Cromy~; ~or o~ccerpeo ~rom lirae adition and Cromyko
foraaord 84~ JPA8 65459, 14 August 1975, No 666 of thie s~ri~s, pp 28-57~
(Excarptej Tiela Pag4:
Titla t VNBSffi~YAYA POLITI1tA SOVBTSKOCO SOYtTZA (Foraign Policy
ot tha Soviat Union)
Authorss i. D. Ov~yanyy (leadar), Y~. Yu. Be~u~h,
0. 8. Horiaov, V. A. Grachev~ V. L. I~raalyaa,
V. P. pisbamin~ S. V. Pokrovokiy, V. I. Popov~
G. L. Rosanov, p. A. Samgin, A. i. Stepanov~
V. P. Stratanovich and a. A. Trolisanlw
Pubiieher: isdatei'etvo politichaek~oy litaratury
Placo aad year of publicaeions Mo~cow, 1978
Sign~d t~ Preae Dat~s 10 Novambar 1978
Nuober of Copiss Pubiish~ds 175~000
Numbar of Pagaes 472
Aanotation:
The book ie dawted to the con~iatant and peraiitant activity of tba CPSU
aad tba Soviet atat~ aimed at the conaolidation of psace and tt?e ~ct~aaion
of datanta, a halt to tha arms race and otakind'a saivation lro~ the thraat
of a nav vorld var. Particular ateention has b~en paid to tha imploentaeioa
of the Program of Further Struggia for Peace aad Intarnational Cooparation
45 '
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and eha Fr4ndom and ind4pand~nt o! eho P4apioe put forward by tha Zseh parey
co~arQO~. Tha book may bn uond ie ehQ oy.tam o! party �eudiae. Tha auehore
arQ pro~a4aora end aa~io~ane profoo~oro of ehn t189R For~ign Minietry Dipio-
maeic Acad~r.
Tabia of Conennee: P�gd
Fora~?ord. Tha BorQign Poliny of thn Sovi4t 9tiata--Povor~ui Woapon
of tho Communi~e Party in tha Struggl4 fos Poaco and
Social Progra~~ 3
Chaprar i. Tha Scidntific Noturo o~ eho sovid~ vaion~� For43an
Policy 24
PrincipiQS of thn Foroi~n Policy o! Socialiom--V. Lanin'a
Briiliant ThQOr4t~~el. Inharitanc4--24. Tho Dacrdo of P~aca--27.
Baaic Principias o! ehn Soviot State's For4ign Policy--30. Tha
CPSU--Diracting Forca o! 3oviae Forai~n Policy--3S. Th~ P~ac4
Program of ~ha 24th and 25th CPSU Congres~aa--39. Tha n~+
USSR Constitution on the Foroign Policy of ~he Sovi4t Star4--44.
~ Chaptar 2. Tht StrangehQning of eh~ Fri4ndehip~ Uaiey and Cooparation
of thd Sociali~e Countriaa--Main Dir~ceion of eha USSR's
Poraign Policy 49
2.1. Prol4earian, Socialiat In~~Ynationalism--Baiis of eha
interstata Rolationa of tha Socialist Couatriea
The ilorid 3ocialist Syat~s--49. The Nav Z~+pa of intar-
aationai Relationa--53. Coobination o~ l~ational and
Intaraational Intdr~sts--58.
2.2. The USSR and the Coilectiva Orgsni:ations of tha
Socialiat Stae~a 63
The USSA and C~lA--63. The USSR and th4 Narsaw Pact
Organisation--69.
2.3. Dov4lopmane of Bilataral Coopsration 76
Fycieadahip Charters--76. ~'ha USSR'a Cooparation ~?ith
the Buropean Socialiat Coimtries--77~ Th~ USSR's Co-
operation Hith tha Socialist Countriea of l~sia--9S.
Soviat-Cubaa Rilationa--101.
2.4 Tha Soviat Uaion and Cfiins 1~
The USSR's Role in the Victory o~ tha Chineae ~avolu-
tion--104. Soviet-Chinaaa Cooparation 1949=1959--106.
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2.4. EConr'd~
Soviat-Chia4~Q Ralaeione in eho 1960'r--109. Soviot
~ropoaio on int4r~taea l1nYd~maut~ vith ~ho PAC. Tho
24eh and 2Sth CP9U Conar4a~a� on Soviae-China~d A~la- ~
tion~--113.
Chapear 3. Th~ Str~ngeheniflg o~ Ch4 USSR's Cooparution Nieh eha
Dweloping Countrid~ 120
3.1. The L~ainite Policy of eho CPSU and eha Sovi4t Stat4
Hith Adip~ct to thd Dwoloping Seatd~ N
Th4 Sa~ic Principido o! Rolations--120. Th4 USSR and th4
tiquidation of Co~oniali~m--12S. Tha Incroased R~o14 of tha
Liboraead Seae~a in Norld Aflaira-127. Tha USSR'o and tha
Davolopin~ Countri4s' Advocacy of Poac4 and Inearnatiionai
Coop~raeioa--136. Tha US9A'� Ttado-Sconomic Ra~ation~ iiith
thd D4vdioping Stata.--139.
3.2. Tha USSR'g Rolations With eha Daveloping Aaian Countrias 146
Tha Conaolidation o~ thd Asian Stato~~ Indapandanca--146.
L. i. Brashnov's Viait to India--149. Tha USSA'� Rsia-
tiona Nith tb~ Othar Couatriaa of South and Southoast
Atia--153. Thd OSSR'a R~laLiono Nith Al~hanistan, Turkay
and Iran--155.
3.3. The Soviat Union's Ae~atioas With tha Arab Countriea 160
Tha Sociopolitical Poaieion of eha Arab Statea--160.
The Davalopment of Soviat-Arab Ra3,ations--162. Tha
USSR's Ralationa iiith tha Progru.iv~ Arab Statas--164.
3oviet-Bgyptian Relation--168.
3.4. Tha Soviat Union and the African Countriea 171
Tha USSR's Asoi~tanco to th4 African Peoplu in Gainin8
Iad~peadance--172. Tha Soviat Union's Dafeaas of the
African Countria Against Imparialist Aggreasion~--174.
Tha Soviet IInion'4 Support for the Struggla for the
Libaration of Sou~harn Africa--176. The So~?iet Union's
Support for Alrica's Anti-Imparialist Unity--178. Tha
OSSR'a Bilateral Relation~ With tbe Africaa Statas--183.
3.5. The USSR'a R~eiations With eha Latin Amarican States 189
t,~tin America: Tiaa of Changa--189. Tha Setablial~ant
and Dawlopmant of Ralatione Batvean rha USSR and tbe
Lein A~erican Countries--194.
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' Chaptar 4. Tha 3ovint Union and tha Capitaliet 8eaea� 241
4.1. Tha N4a 9tag� of tha U88R'o Cooparatioa Wieh tha
Capitalioe Countriae
~r
Dovalopmant of tha U8SR's Politicai Ralatiione With
the Ctpiealist Cou~atriee--203. Sconomic Ralatione .
8atweaa tha USSR end tha Capitaliet Statae--206. '
4''
4.2. 8oviaC-Am4rican Rolationo 210
~ 5
8oviat-Amarican Ralatione in tha First Poetwar Yeare ~
--213. 3oviat-Amarican Ralatioae Undar the Kennadq
and Johneon Adminietrations--214. The 3tart of the
Turnaboue in 3oviet-Amarican Relationa--216. The
Vieit to eha Unit~d Statiee bq L. I. Brazhnev~ Geaerai
Sacratary of the CP3U Canerai Committea--220. Develop-
mant of Bconomic Ralatione--221. 3ovieti-American ~
Ralatione 1974-1976--223. Tha 25th CPSU Congreee on
Soviat-Amarican Relatioas--225. The USSR'e Relatione
With tha United Statee Under the New Demacratic Admin-
ietration--227.
4.3. Soviat-Franch Relatione 232
The US3R'a and Pranca'e Mutual Relationa in the Firat
Post~rar Yeara--232. The USSR and France--at the 3ources
of Detente--235. 3oviet-French Cooperation--Real Factor
of the Coneolidation of Peace and Security--239. L. Iti~ '
Brashnev'e Viait to Praace (1977)--245.
4.4. Relatione Between the USSR aad the FRG 248 ~L
Tha Bstablist~ment of Diplomatic Relationa Between the
USSR and the FRG (1955)--249. The USSR'a Relatioas With
the PRG ia the 1960'e--251. The 1970 Moscow Treaty--253. ~
The Further Poeitive Development of Relationa. L. I.
Breshnev's Vieit to tbe FRG (1978)--257.
4.5. Soviet-British Relationa 260
From the Siatorq of Soviet-Britieh Relatione--260.
Relatione Between the OSSR aad Britain? Since World
War II--261. Soviet-Britieh Relationa at the Bnd of i'~
the 1960's-3tart of tbe 1970's--263. Soviet-Britieh ~
Ralations at the (~rrent 3tage--264.
r`i
~
~
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4.6. Mutual Relationa of the USSR and Italy 269
What Hietorical Experience Tells Us--269. The Turn-
about Toward Coopezation Between the US3R and Italy
--271. Soviet-Italian l~elations--Important Factor of
tha Strengthening of Peace in Europe--273.
4.7. Soviet-Japanese Relations 275
Normalization of Soviet-Japanese Relatione--277.
Soviat-Japanese Relatione in the 1970's--280.
4.8. The USSR's RelaCione WiCh Other Capitalist Countries 286
Chapter 5. The US9R's Struggle for Lasting Peace, Sacurity and
Cooperation in Europe 2g4
5.1. The Struggle of the USSR and the Other Socialist States
To Secure Peace, SecuriCy and Cooperation in Poatwar
Europe 2g6
The German Complex in Postwar International Relationa
--296. The USSR's Proposals and Actions To Consolidate
Peace aad Securitq in Europe (1952-1955)--297. The USSR'e
New Proposals on the German Complex of Questions--301.
The Soviet Union in Che Struggle for European Security
in the Ftret Half of the 1960'e--303.
5.2. Malcing Europe a Continent of Lasting Peace and Coopera-
tion--Command of the Times 306
The Socialiat Countries' New Proposals on Questions of
European Security (1966)--306. The Start of Practical
Preparatioas for an All-European Conference--307. The
Foundation of European Security--Recogaition of Terri-
torial and Political Realitiea--309. The 24th CPSU
Congress on Conaolidating European Security--310~
5.3. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
and its Historical Sigaificance 313
Multilateral Consultatione in Heleinki (November 197'2-
June 1973)--313. First Stage of the Conference--314.
Second Stage of the Confereace--315. Third Stage of
the Conference. Ita Final Act--317. Significance of
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
--320.
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5.4. The Current Stage of the Struggle for Peace, Securitiy
and Cooperation in Europe 322
Implementation of the Helsinki Principles and Accorde
--Basis of the Consolidation of Peace and Secur~.ty in
Europe--322. The 25th CPSU Congress on Further Steps
in the Ineeresta of Secur3ng Lasting Peace in Europe
--324. The Propoeals of the Soviet Union and the Other
Socialiat Countriea on the Further Strengthening of
Peace and the Development of Cooperation in Europe--325.
The USSR's Struggle for a Settlement of the Cyprus
Problem--328.
Chapter 6. ''i'he Soviet Union's Struggle for Lasting Peace and Security
in Asia and in the Near East 332
6.1. The Soviet Union and the Problem of Securing Peace and
Security in Asia
The Soviet Union--Bulwark of Peace in Asia--333. The
Principles of Aaian Security Proposed by the USSR--335.
6.2. The USSR's Efforts To Consolidate Peace in the Far East
and in South and Southeast Aeia 338
The Soviet Union's Support for the Korean People's Strug-
gle for the Country's Peaceful Reunification--339. The
USSR's Assistance in Securing Lasting Peace in South Asia
--342. The USSR's Asaiatance to the Vietnameae People
in Repulsing Imperialiat Aggresaion--3G6. The Victory of
the Peoples of Indochina in the Struggle for Independence,
Peace, Democracy and Social Progres~--350.
6.3. The USSR's Struggle for the Liquidation of the Hotbed of
War in the Near East 354
The Soviet Union's Defense of the Arab States Against
Imperialiat Aggression in th~ 1950's-1960's--355. The
USSR's Struggle for the Liquidation of the Consequences
of Iaraeli Aggression--358. The Soviet Union's Support
for the Arab Countries During the 1973 Military Crisis
--360. The First Stage of the Geneva Near East Peace
Conference--362. The Troop Disengagement Agreements--363.
The USSR's Assistance in the International Recognition of
the PLO and the Consolidation of the Anti-Imperialist
Solidarity of the Arab Countries--365. Soviet Proposals
for a Peaceful Settlement in the Near East (1976-1977)--368.
Complication of the Near East Situation--369.
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Chapter 7. Tha USSR's S~ruggle in the United Nationa for ~he
Strengthening of International Security and for
D18armament 373
7.1. The USSR's Struggle Against AtCempta To Make the
United Na~ione an Inatrument of the "Cold War"
(1946-1959) 375
The Soviet Union's Role in the Creation of the
United Natione--375. The USSR'e Struggle in the
United Nations for Peace and International Co- .
operation in the Firat Postwar Years--378. The
Soviet Union's Proposals on Disarmament QuesCione
--380.
7.2. The New Situation in the United Nationa and the US5R's
Struggle for its Increased Efficacy in the Defense
of Peace (1960-1970) 384
The Soviet Proposal on General and Total Disarma-
ment--385. The 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapona
Tests--387. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty--
389. The Treaty on Demilitarization of the Sea
Bed--391. The USSR's Proposals on Strengthening
the United Nations as an Inatrument ~f Peace at
the 20th-25th Sessions of the General Assembly--~93.
7.3. The USSR's Proposals at the 26th-32d Sessions of the
UN General Assembly on Consolidating International
Peace 395
The USSR's Struggle for Implementation of the Declara-
tion on Strengthening International Security--397. The
USSR's Proposals on Prohibiting the Use of Force in
International Relations--398. The USSR's Struggle
in the United Nations To .Liquidate Hotbeds of Tenaion,
Colonialism and Racism--401. The USSR's Positions in
the United Nationa on Economic, Legal and Certain
Other Questions--404. The Struggle of the USSR in
the United Nations for the Extension and Coneolidation
of International Relaxation and To Forestall the Danger
of Nuclear War--407.
7.4. The Soviet Union's Struggle for Disarmament at the
26th-32d Sessions of the UN General Assembly 409
The Soviet Proposal on the Convening of a World Dis-
armament Conference--410. The Couveation on Banning
and Destroying Bacteriological Weapons~--413. The Soviet
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7.4. [Cont'd~
Propoeal on a Reduction in Military Budgetg--414.
The USBR'e Propoeei Prohibiting AlteraCion of the
Environment fnr Military PurpoeQe--417. Tlto U38R's
Initiativas ie ~ha Spher4 of Limitarion of the
Arme Raca at eha UN Cenaral Ase~mbly 30th Seesion
--420. The US8R'e Momorandum on Queetione of Limit-
ing the Arme Raca and Disarmament (1976)--424. Quee-
tione of Diegrmament at the UN Qeneral Aseembly 32d
Seaeion--425~ The Soviet Propoeale at the UN Ganet~al
Aesembly's Spacial Disarmament 8eseion--428.
Con:lueion 439
Concise Chronology of the Main Tnternational Events (1945-1978) 455
Foreword: The Foreigt? Policy of the Soviet 3tate--Powerful Weapon of the
Communiat Party in the Struggle for Peace and Sacial Progrese
The foreign policy of the 3oviet Union~ which wa8 born in the fire of October,
carries within it the great energy and inepiration and spiritual strength
and noble ideals of thie most important event, which has illumined the en-
tire 20th century and was the moat abrupt aad profound turaing point in
man's history. The path trodden by the SovieC people in six decadee is
one of intensive labor and eelfless and heroic etruggle for the loftieet
goala which have ever inepired mankind. Under the leaderehip of the Com-
muniet Party our country's working people quickly turned our motherland into
a mighty, highly developed etate, which is marching in the vang:~ard of social
progresa. For the first time in history the Soviet people created a developed
socialiet society and are the firet builders of co~?unism~ "...It may proud-
ly be said," Comrade L. i. Brezhnev observed in su~ing up the results of the
- past decades, "that we stood our ground,. endured and conquered."1
The USSR'e Leninist foreign policy has made an impressive contribution to the
Soviet people's creation of the new eociety. The objective historical con-
ditions of the Soviet atate'e emergence and development and the nature and
content of the era begun by the Great October logically determined the para-
mount significance of the external factor in the life of our country and
the close connection of internai developmenC with international problema.
"...From the very atart of the October Revolution," V. I. Lenin observed,
"the queation of foreign polic~r and international relatione confronted us
as a moat important queation."
The foreign policy of the 3oviet state ia the fruit of the multifaceted,
purposeful and peraiete~t actfvity of the Communiat Party--the leading and
direcCing force of Soviet society. Pollowing the Leninist traditions, the
Communi~t Party, its Central Co~ittee aad the Central Committee Politburo
constaatly keep questiona of international life at the center of atCention,
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daily diract the forei8n policy activity of the Soviet rtata and ineura the
feYSightedness~ conettuctive nature and high efficacy of the etape takan.
Emphasizing that tha eocialieti moetgdifficule transition~BVonl.sLanieiob-
linas repreeant� tha gteaeaet~
eerved that "this is g n~ �~eAe wo=datmaycalso bapappliedtin~fullctocthaot
ba raad abouti in books. Th
CPSU'e foraign policy activity.
The elaboration and ecientificglu~~g~traquire the partyiettremendouetcra@gy
and eactica in the internetion
ative acCivity, which is gledaretandingyofnthegentirencoursa ofdhiatoricalnca.
Relying on a "theoraCical un
movement,"4 ite integrity and unity aad~ at the aame tima~ ite divareity aad
contradictoriness, the CPSU ie paving the foraign policy way of the Country
of Soviete on the baeie ofrld de
elopment endtitenleadingntrande andtaflpre-
couree and proepecte of wo
cise conaideration of the alinement of ~ogch to~re$litr~ani~~Xi~;mbVniiB
Leninist principles with a creative app y
Lenin observed, "differs from all other eocialiet theories in its remarkable
combinatiion of complete acieective couraeyofnevolutioaBwiChf theeaoetedecie
atate df affairs and the ob~ ener revolution-
sive recognition of the significance of the revolurionary ~~~Y~
are creativity and revolutionary initiative of the maeees....
The Peace Program advanced~by the 24th and 25th party congreaeea is a etrik-
ing embodiment of the CPSU 8 ~e~8tionalnrelatione on the basistofAa compre-
Marxist-Leniniat theory of int
hensive ecientific interpretatcorrelationlofflforces8lnftheeworldgarenaeand~cg�
The fundamental change in the
the enormously increased mighliancewitheall8pr 8ressive~andipeace~d-loving~
ness and its atrengthening al
forces enabled the party to put forWard as a practical taek the realization
of a cardinal turnabout in inter ~~io~~~~sive mutually~beneficialninterg
tion to detente and the developm rinci le of the peaceful co-
national ~ofpstatea withtdiffeYent 9ocialnaysteme. p
existence
The foreign policy couYge of the Soviet atate formulated at the 24th and
25th party congresaes testifieslobalhe ganaioncofnthe8epheretof itseactivity8
of Soviet foreign policy, the g ~P
and the vital eignificance of ita goals and taske for the fate of all peoples
and our entire planet.
role in the elaboration, compreheaeive
L. I. Brezhnev performs an outstanding
subetantiation and implmen o~lna~e~�ur L:rIy,Brezhneves numerou8 foreigne_ -
country and in the internati
tripa and his meetings and tal gt on of~thegunityta
decohesiongof heeption
al significance in the consolid
53 ~
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~ocialiet countriae and the atrengthening of thsir beneficent influsnce on
rhe couree of internation~l life, in untying the knots of eeneion in rela-
tionr baCween etatae adhering to diffarant eociai syeteme and in a fundamant-
al improvement in tha climae� in ineernational ralatione. Tha political docu-
mente eigned ae a rQeult of th4ea trips hav4 bacome ma~or lendmaYks in the
life of contamporary 8urope ~nd in the raorganization of the onr3re syetem of
internaeional relatione. L. I. Brezhnav's tramandoue parsonai contribution
to the party'e titanic activity aimed at liquidation of tha "cold war," the
cementing of detente and tha elimi.netion of tha danger of a new world war
hae earned h3m the profound gratitude of tha Soviet people and high end de-
,aerved authority in the world communiat and workere movemant and among tha
broadeet working people'e maseae of the ~thole worid.
L. I. Brezhngv'~ worke devoted to queetione of the foreign policy of the CPSU
and the 3oviet state are party documente of tYemendous historicai and poli-
ticai eignificance. Embodying a Leninist, claee? and truly ecientific ap-
proach to inCernational probleme and imbued wiCh the philoaophy of hiatori.cal
optimism and a vieion of the proepects of world development~ theee worke re-
preeent a further development of the theory and etrategy of the CPSU's inter-
national activity and arm Soviet foreign policy with accurate and correct
points of reference. The very rich ideological property made up of the
Leninist principles of the Soviet atate's foreign policy enriched and de-
veloped in relation to the new hietorical conditione and the coloaeal exper-
ience of the international activity of the party and its Central Committee
become the proiberationSmovement and~theebroadeetcircleaQO~futhetpr greeeive
and national 1
international community.
The Soviet state's foreign policy en~oys the undivided supporC of the Soviet
people and their Warm and unanimoue approval, which Was expresaed, in parti-
cular, during the nationwide discusaion of the draft of the USSR Conatitu-
tion, which legislatively recorded our atate's I.eainiat peace-loving course
in the international arena. Accumulating the tremendous experience of the
international activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state, in a special chap-
ter devoted to foriegn policy and aleo in other articles related to the
sphere of internstional relations the new conatitution records the hiatoric
victories won by the Soviet Union and s~orld eocialism in the international
arena and asser~s in the aphere of international rQlations the great advant-
ages of 8ocialism and the eocial etrucCure, political eystem and ideology of
the ne~a society and the profoundly popular character of aocialiat democracy.
Developing the Peace Program of the 24th and 25th CPSU congressea, the con-
stitution charta the aew boundaries and reference points of Soviet foreign
policq for the future. It is aimed at a further intenaification and con-
solidation of, the poaitive trends in current international life, makin8
detente a continuous aad increasingly viable, universal and irreversible
process aad at extensive and mutually beneficial cooperation between the
peoples and is de~aonstrating with new force the peace-aeserting misaion of
socialism. In the laconic linea of the constitution the Soviet Union appears
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to ail mankind ee a powerful end 3ndaetructible buiwark of p~ac~ and e
ehining beacon illuminating for the peoplee Che hietoricai path of the
traneition from capitaliem to eocialiem.
The modarn era ie characterisad by Cha ehprply incraaoed intereet of hundrede
upon hundred~ of miilione of paopia on all continante in the probleme of tha
future~ tha problem of a gunranteed and laeting pe~ce ~nd the p~the and
proepects of eocial progreee. In rhe exampie of the USSR and the other eo-
cialiat countriea the peoplae of the world are being pereuaded of the cor-
recteeae of the forecaet of K. Marx~ F. Engels and V. I. Lenin th~t com-
muniem ie Che anawer to the riddle of hietory. The Great October reaolved
tha key problem of sociai development--the liquidation of private ownarehip
and the relatione oi oppreeeion and axploitation which it eagenders--and
proved the poesibility of and need for a fundamental change in the political
eyetem of society and the replacement of the domination of the monopoliea
by the power of the working people. In deciding our country'e fate, the
great proletarian revolution in Ruesia thereby provided an anewer Co the
probleme which hi~tory had aet mankind. "Md the worid-hietorical eignifi-
cance of the October Revolution," L. I. Brezhnev obaerved, "ie precisaly
that it opened the path to the eolution of these problema and thereby to the
creation on earth of a new tqpe of civili~ation."6
Having laid the highway to the creation of a new eociety--one of material
abundance and the comprehenaive and unlimited development of the human per-
eonality's epiritual wealth--the Great October also aignposted the practicable
and effective path for the aolution of an age-old problem of mankind and
for securing man'e most important right--the right to live under peaceful
akies. Imperialiem, to employ V. I. Lenin's expreseion~ signified the coup-
ling of all statee "in a eingle dirty bloody bundle."~
The Soviet state, vhich wae created by the victorious socialiet revolution,
boldly opposed the imperialist policy of aggreseion and oppresaion and ad-
vanced a program of the all-mibracing reorganizetion of relatione betL;een
countries and peoplea on the basis of the principles of peace and gsnuine
democracy in ita very ftrst foreign policy act. Thereby the Great October,
which V. I. Lenin regarded as the "firet victory of the cause of ttie abolition
of wara,"8 aleo opened a nev era in the development of international rela-
tions.
The victory of the revolution afforded the Rusaian working clasa in the ahape
of the Soviet state a powerful lever not only for raiaing a backward country
to the heighte of social progresa in a few decadee but also for active in-
fluence on the internetional aituation and for opening to mankind an outlet
from the chaos and wara engendered by imperialiam. Proletarian internation-
alism--the fundamental principle of the ideology of the w~rking clasa and
ita party Which embodies the objective precept of the working people~s strug-
gle for their social and national liberation and for the building of social-
ism and communism--became the moat important guiding principle of the state
foreign policy of the Soviet country.
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Developing K. Marx'~ thinking that it ie precieely loyalty to Che invigorat- _
ing principie of internationaiiem which is the guarantee of the completa ;
victory of the eocialiet proletariat ineernationally~ in the epr3ng of 1918
V. I. Lanin expresead the inexorabla confidanca that "3oviet power, which
hae otanchly fulfilled all the obligat3one of tha intarnationai eolidarity
of ehe workare of ail couneriee in thair etruggle egainet tha yoka of capitai
and for eocialism, will continue to do everything in our pow~r to aeeiet the
internatiional eocialiet movement and to eecura and accelerare the pathe
leading mankind to ealvation from the yoke of capital and from hired slavery
and to the creation of a socialist socieey and laeting, ~uee peace among
the peoples."9
The CP3U is invariably loyai to this beheat of Lenin's. Six decades of
Soviet foreign policy are the epic of the great international exploit of
the world'e first socialiet state, the courageoue defenee of the conqueets
of the revolution and tirelese etruggle for peace and friendehip among the ,
peoples. The strong growth of the Soviet Union's economic and defense po-
tential and its increased international influence and authority and the grow-
ing influenca of worid socialiem on the courae of hiatory are now revealing
poseibilities for the fuller manifestation of the traneforming and creative
nature of the USSR'e foreign policy. The organic unity of the moat humane
goals and at the same time the moet urgent demande of our time--ineuring
peace and social progresa--is a moet important and inexhauetible source of
the vital atrength and efficacy of the Soviet atate's foreign policy.
The profoundly progressive role of Soviet foreign policy as an active and
effective factor of world developmeat has been and ie being manifested pri-
marily in the accompliahment of ite principle task--securing the moet favor-
able conditiona for the building of aocialism and communiam in our country.
V. I. Lenin also eaw thia ae the Soviet country's highest duty to the world
revolutionary movement.
Having breached imperialism's world domination for the first time in history,
the young SovieC republic found itself encircled by statea which were hos-
tile in a class reapect. Would the socialist republic, immeasurably weaker
than its adversariea economically and militarily, ~vithetand the presaure of
the hoetile forcea of imperialism? Not only the fate of the revolution and
the fate of our motherland buC also the proapecte of the progressive de-
velopment of all mankind depended on the solution of the question.
At a price of tremendous sacrifices and deprivations the Soviet republic re-
pulaed the campaigas of the interventionista and won for itaelf peace.
"...Ahead," V. I. Lenin said in December 1919, "lies the main phase of that
peaceful building which enliata all of us, which we desire, which we mus~
perform and to which we will devote all our efforte and our whole life." ~
The past decadea enable ua to evaluate in its entirety the world-historical
aignificance of the unparalleled exploit of'the party and people, who t~ere
able, despite the coloseal difficultiea and deprivations, to preserve and
consolidate the Soviet state and make it an indestructible bulwark of peace,
democracy and eocialism.
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Tha fact tihat the USSR'a Lanin~st foreign policy made a worthy contribut3on
to the accompliehment of thie expl~it ie now an open book for the who1~ world. _
Operating under exceprionally difficult conditione and in an atimosph~re of
the conetant threat of attack from outeide and anei-Soviet provocaeione~
parCicularly folloaring faecism'e eeizure of power in Carmany~ our country
displayed ~.ron endurance and adherence to principl~ and combined firmnass in
the defense cf iCs etate interaets and the ca~se of peace wieh flexibility
and realiem. Tha annals of Scviet foreign poS.icy abound in etirring pages
describing the courage and etanchneee of Soviet diplomats~-theee emiseariae
of the Soviet people--who ekillfully and with an awarenee~ o� their high re-
eponeibility puraued parey policy and displayed eelflees devotion to the
ideals of co~uniem.
In World W~r II the Soviet Uaion was the main force barring Cerman fascism'e
path to world domination, it bore the main burden of the war and played the
dQCisive role in the rout of Hitlerite Cermany and militeriet Japen. The
Soviet panpie'e everlaeting feat of arme ~rill be remembered down the agee
forever. The fundamental shifts which occurred after the rout of faeciem con-
firmed V. I. Lenin's brilliant perapicacity and the correctnees of his fore-
caet of the patha of the development of human eocieCy. They created qualita-
tively new conditions and opened new paths and directione for Soviet �oreign
policy'e exercise of ite revolutionary-traneforming role. 'Phe 5oviet Union's
influence and aurhority strengthened immeasurably, aad the scale and depth
of the farsighted and effective impact of CPSU policy on the proceeeee of
world development and the entire ayetem of international relationa grew and
' are syetematically growing.
The emergence of the world aocialist syatem began a neW etage ia the develop-
ment of the Soviet atate's foreign policy. An eatirely new phenomenon--the
socialist community--a new type of international alliance and a new, un-
precedented historical community of peoples and atates--took ahape and ia
developing. The Soviet Union is now an integral part of the ~orld aocial-
ist system and the socialist community, and concern for the utmoat consoli-
dating of the poeitione of world eocialism, the development of compreht:nsive
cooperation with the fraternal countries and for the etrengthenin~�~of their
unity and cohesion is the principal direction of the activity of Soviet
foreign policy. "Our country ha8 become a part of the big family of social-
iat etates;" L. I. Brezhnev said in the report devoted to the 60th anni-
versary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. "Thus could anything be
closer in the surrounding world to us Soviet communista and all SovieC people
than this socialist family? We are~~iiing everything in our power for ite
properaity and for our common goodl
The growth of the influence of the socialiet countries and their increased
beneficent influence oa the course of world events currently repreaent the
seminal directions of social progress. While dem~nstrating its superiority
over the capitalist system socialism is thereby paving the way for the aocial
renewal of the entire world. The rich and full-bloodied life of the ~om~?un-
itq of socialist countries and their comprehensive and increasingly efficient
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FoR o~~~ciar, us~ o~t,Y
fraternai cooparaeion, eha baaie of ahich is aocialiae int~rnationalism,
convincingiy ravQai ehe prograeeiva natura of the new ragularitiae enauing
from tha fuedamaneally nea type of relaeione batvaen staeee. Tha crnaeion of
a eoci,aey of matura eocialiam in tha U89R~ rha building of dnvalopQd eociai-
iem 3.n the fraternal eountriea and rhQ buiiding in eha fueura of CO~t1t~~A1D
aiehin rha framaaork of the aneira family of aonialiet et~tae make iC poa-
~ eible to vieibly concaive of tha inapiriflg pictura of ~ha tomorroa of human
eociary. The naa ralatione ah3ch, ehanke to eha intarnationaliet policy of
tha fratarnal partiae, have takan ehape batwaen tha countriae og tha eocial-
iat etaeee and primarily batWeen the countries of the eocialiet community
rapreeent a big and important contiribution of eocialiam to ehe lifa of eha
modern world. Acting ae a powarful accalarator of eha hiatorical procaee~
world socialism ie bringing thie future nearar for aii countriae and paoplae.
The poesib31iC3ae ob~ectivaly inharant in eocialiem eacure for it advant-
agee in all areas of the hietorical competition of the t~ro eyeteme currene-
1y underway in the ~rld arena. Social~aa hae firmly and irravereibly eeized _
the hietorical initiaeive. Reprasenting a new eocial form~tion, it poesae-
eae tremendoue poseibiliCiee aad reservee. BuC they are not realized auto-
maeically. Much depende here, ae the 25th CPSU Congrees obeerved, on the
policy of the ruling partiee and on their capacity for preeerving unity~
atruggling againet exclueiveaesa and national ieolation and acting jointly
in the nama of the accompliehment of common international taska. The fact
that the course of the Soviat Union toward a etrengthening of the friend-
ship, unity and cooperation of the eocialise couatries ie recorded in the
Baeic Laa of the Soviet atate as a constitutional provieion ie of tremandoue
aignificance in thie connaction.
Ae far ae the USSR's poeitiona in relaCion to China are concerned, our
policy in thie queetion aas defiaed bq the 25th CPSU Congreea. "...With
reapect to China, ae to other countriea," L. I. Brezhnev declared from the
congreea platform, "ae firmly adhere to the principlea of equality, reepect
for sovereignty and territorial integritq, noninterfereace in one another's
internal affaira and the nonuse of force. Ia a Word, we are ready to normal-
ize relatio~~ With China on the basis of the princiDlea of peaceful co-
existence. Thie poeition of oura holda good in full.
The aphere of mutual relationa with the countriea and peoplea vt~.ich were the
targets of colonial exploitation bq imperialiem has from the first days of
the victory of the Great October been a field of Soviet foreign policy's
traasforming and constructive activitq gigantic in acale and aignificance.
The basis of the Soviet etate's policy in relation to the peoplea of the
Eaet are the great ideas of iaternationaliem und a Marxiat-Leniniet under-
etanding of the role of national ~iberation movements in the modern era as
an integral part of man's world-hiatorical transition from capitalism to
eocialism. Back evea in the daqa when the ahackles of'imperialism's colonial
syetem fettered approximc~tely t~o-thirda of the territorq aad more than 70
perceat of the population of the earth, V. I. Lenin prophetically foresew
the tremendoue revolutionarq posaibilities of the working people of the
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~on o~Fictai, u~r ortLY
eoloninl rountirau ~nd po3nr~d oue thae "the Bociali~t ravolution aiil not
be oniy ~ed chief~y a etruggia of the ravolueionary prol~eariae ~n each
country agai,n~e ie� own bourgeoiein, no, it al.11 be ~ etruggla of aii coloniQs
and coueCrioe oppYneeed by ~pQrialiem and a11 dapandant countriee againse
intnrnaCional imparialiam."
The rapid devalopmant and euccnaaQe of th� national Z~bera~ion movemanee in
the po~Caar period wern a triumph of Lnniniem. Having creatad an eneirQly
naw corralation of forcae in tha worid arnna, the nmarganca and coneolidaeion
of the worid eocialiet eyetam conrributed eo an anormoue extent ru Cha liquid-
ation of the eolonial ~yetam. The winning of politicai independanca by for-
meriy oppreesad peoplee had, in eurn~ tha coneaquanca of a furthar aeakaning
of the poeitions of imperialiem. Nietory hae confirmad the ob~active con-
naction, which was diecioeed and eubetantiatnd by Marxiet acianca~ aed com-
munity of fundamaneai intaraete of ~rorid eoci813em and ehe national libara-
tion movemente~
The main taake currently confronting ehe daveloping etati~~ are tha eolution
of probleme of economic an~ eocial libaration and the eurmounting of aga-old
aconomic baclc~?ardnase in the ehortast ~ima. Ob~activaly this ie leading to
the euffueion of naCional liberation ravolutione aith increaeingly profo~nd
social content and confrontieg th~: young indapandent etatas wieh the queetion
of choice of the path of further developmenC. A charactarietic manifeata-
tion of the nature of the modern era is the fact that in a whole number of
eta~es libarated from colonial dependence theea taeka ara baing accompliehed
in the intareeta of the broad etrata of the aorking people on the baeis of a
socialiet orientation.
The aepiration of the daveloping etaCes ~o a atrengtheniag of political in-
dependence aed aconomic aad aocial progreae is, hoaevar, encountering etub-
born resietance on the part of the forcee of imperialiam and local reaction.
In ita attempte to coneolidate the dependent position of the young national
states and perpetuate their economic backaardneae imperialiam is counting
on finding a meane of transferring to them a coneiderable proportion of the
difficulties engendered by the contradictions and crieea inhereat therein
and thue atrengthening its poeitions and prolonging the exietence of the
hietorica].ly doomed capitaliet system.
The uee of economic and financial levera, the inetigation ot religious-tribal
civil strife and the provocation of fr~tricidal Ware--such are the unseemly
inetruments of the policy of neocolonit~liem. The bitter claehea with the
exploiter elemente and their foreign patrons are leadiag in a number of
cases to vacillatian in the policy of the young etatea and eometimea even
to the loes of poeitione which have been won and to regreseion.
As far as the Soviet Union ie concerned, it ie invariably loyal to I.enia's
policy of strengthening aolidarity W3.th the Asian, African and Latin American
peoples. In the annals of the peoplea' etruggle for national and aocial
liberation that ie not a single page ahich doea not bear the imprint of
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intornationalie~ eol~darity and affnceivn euppore on thn pare of the Com-
muniet Parey and thn Sovint stgtQ. Ae av4rywhora, ~n thn eone of eh4 13bar-
ation �truggia tbo Soviat Ueioe appQare on eho 0idn of ehn forcne of prog-
rase, dnmocracy and naCionai inddpandon~n and ernate thn A~~ergn~d~llncon@~
ae tee friondr and eo~rad4� in aeruggin. Our party eupp
tinue to eupport paopYea fighting !or thdir ~rdddom," L. t. Brashndv ob-
enrvnd gt ehn 2Sth CPStJ Congrne~. "Tho 9ovine Union oaQke no advanea~n~
for iteaif hnrn, ie nor chneing noncaeeion0~ doQe not aopirn to polieinai
domination and is not eoliciting milieary baaae. ~in arn acting ae~~ m-
mendQd by our rnvolueionary conecinnca and our communist bnliafe.
A moet imporeant and ma3or praseee-day probiem dntarmining tha proapaeta
o! soeiai progrQas and tha fata of civilisation itoeif ia that of tihe con-
eolidation of pQaca, a halt to tha arme raca and d3.armamant.
The Co~nun~ee ParEy, ite Canerai Com