JPRS ID: 8566 WORLDWIDE REPORT NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND PROLIFERATION

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070011-1
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• Document Page Count: 22
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• Sequence Number: 11
• Content Type: REPORTS

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~ ANO ~ ~ . ~

ii JULY i979 CFOUO i179~ i~F i
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I~ilk UI~1~1(1,11. t~til. (1NLY
JF'RS L/85~6
11 July 1979
CFOUO 1 /79) `
Woridwide Re ort
p
~
NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND PROLIFERATION
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
- ~OR O~~'iCiAL USE ON[.Y
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JPRS L/8566
11 suly ~979
_ WORLDW I DE REPORT
NUCLEAR DEVELOPMEi~T AND PROLIFERATION
cFOUO i/~9)
CONTENTS PAGE
ASIA
JAPAN
. MITI To Replace Nuclear Reactor Safety Pina With U.S.-Made
Pins
� (THE JAPAN TIl~S, 5 J~ ?9~ 1
Brief~
BT-3 Centrifuge~ ~
PAKISTAN
Briefs
Atnmic Bomb Test 3
LATIN AI~tICA
INrFR-AME~tICAN AFFAIRS
Wid,er Effecta of Argentine, Brazilia.n Progra~ms Examined
(John R. Redick; Etk~OPA ARCHN, 25 ~y 79) � � � � � � � � 4
NEAR AND N~tTH AFRICA
DGYPT
Briefa
Joiat Nuclear PoMrer 13
a- [ I I I- H1Tn1 - 141 FOUO ]
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COAfrFN1.'S ( Continued) ~g~
WEST EUROPE
F',LPII~#ND
Coa~3ortium To Join in Soviet Nuclear Plan~ for Libya
((ioran IIc; VECKAN3 AFFARER, 10 MaY 79) 14 .
~
FRANCE
First Nuclear Attack Subm~rine Lawnched
(Rene Moirand; I~ MONDE, 26 ~y 79) 16
_ Small Leak Detected in Cadarache Nuclear Reeictor
(LE FIC~RO, 6 Jun 79) 17
, - _
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~Ott 0~'E'ICIAI. U5~ ONI.,Y
JAl'AN
MITI TO R~PLACE NUCLEAIt REACTOR SAFETY PINS WITH U.S.-MAbE PINS
Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 5 Jun 79 p 3 OW
[Text) Z'he Nuolear 3afety Commisaion Monday apprcved a Ministry of International ~'rnde
and Industry plan to replaae defective pina found in presaurized water-type nuolenr
reactore.
The commission also approved MITI~s medsurea to improvc safaty control of ull pressurized
water reactors and boiling aater reactors.
'ihe dePecbive pins were first found in the No 3 reactor of the Mihama nualear power plant
of Kancai Electric Power Co in FUkui Prefecture.
Cracka were found in 106 control-rod guide pipe supporti pina of tho reaetor.
During regular checks~ similar defective pins xere Pound in the No 2 reactor of the
Takahama nuclear poaer plant of Kansai Electric, the No 1 reactor of Ikata nuclear
power plattt of Shikoku Electric Posrer Co in Ehime PrePecture, and the No 1 reactor
~ of the aenkai nuclear power plant oP Kyitshu Electric Power Co in Saga Preiecture.
All the defective pins were made in Japan. As a result of MITI analyses, it was found
that there were probletns in the material used for the pins and the heat processing.
MITI decided to replace the domestic-made pins tirith pins made oP U.S.-produced material
through a neu heat processing method.
Zt was also decided to alter the desY~ ot the pins and 3ought NSC approval o~n these
mea3ures.
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JAPAN
BRIEFS
BT-3 CENTRIFUGES--The Power Reactor ~and Nuclear Fuel Development Corpora-
Cion on 8 Jun announced Che BT-3 cen'~rifuge, a lengthened 92 metera ve 1.7
meters) version of the BT-2 centrifuge. With a separation efficiency 50
percent above that of the BT-2, the centrifuge is on line with international
sCandards and reduction in cosC via masa production is now the main focue.
The OP-1B centrifuges for the Ningyo-toge enrichment pilot plant will be
BT-3 models now being built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Toshiba, and
Hitachi. [Tokyo GENSHIRYOKU SANGYO SHII~IBUN in Japanesel4 Jun 79 p 1~
Development of a centrifuge of even higher performance for the OP-2 uniCe
ia planned, and may be accompliahed by fall 1979. Performance of the 7,000-
unit pilot enrichment plant is thus expected to be well above the initial
projection of SO SWU. (Tokyo NIHON KOGYO SHII~UN in Japaneee 9 Jun 7g p 2J
CSO: 5100
. '
t.
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Pt1KISTAN
BRIEFS
A'I'OMIC BOMB TEST--Pakistan wi11 probably explode its first atomic bomb in
less thAn 1 year in Che Sind Deaert near the Indian border. A urAnium
enrichment p1anC is Ueing built at Kohuda, some 40 kilomeCers from
Islamabad. Pakistani atomic scientists recently went to Libya, another
Moslem country that desires Co obtain nuclear weapons, [TexC] [Paris
VALEURS ACTUELLES in F'rench 21 May 79 p 43~
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4
INT~R-AMERICAN AFFAIIt5
WIDER EFFBCTS OF ARCENTIN~, BRAZILIAN PROCRAMS EXAr1INED ~
Bonn EUROPA ARCNIV in German 25 May 79 pp 279-290
(Article by John R. Redick: "The Nuclear Energy Programs of Argentina and
f~razil and Their International Effects"~
[Excerpts] The two Latin American countries which are the most advanced in
the process of industrialization, Argentina and Bxazil, have decided in favor
of nuclear energy wiCh particular emphasis. The significance of this decision
for the future of energy policy in the two countries is obvious, but the
effects are far-reaching on the international level too--in the Latin American
- region and in the rest of the world.
Neither Argentina nor Brazil has committed itself bindingly to the non-prolif-
eration of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, both countries are clearly
endeavoring to achieve as much independence and freedom of movement in all
p}~ases of the nuclear fuel cycle as they can. The consequences are growing
mistrust between the two countries, clear uneasiness among their neighbors in
t}~e region, and lasting ill-will among some nuclear supply countries, above
all in the United States.
Regional and International Developmental Tendencies
- The atomic programs of Argentian and Brazil deserve particular attention from
two points of view: first in view of the rivalry between the two countries
within the Latin American region, and second in view of Cheir relations wiCh
the most important nuclear supply countries.
There can no longer be any doubt today about the rivalry betweer. Argentina
and Brazil in the area of nuclear energy.$ The military~governments of the
two countries are watching all the nuclear activities of the other side with r
distrust and attention. Their reactions in this area are particularly sen-
sitive, for it is the only one in which Argentina still has a significanC
advanCage over its up-and-coming neighbor to the north. The massi.ve transfer
. of German nuclear technology to Brazil does not change the fact that the
Argentinians will very probably keep their advantage as long as a general
economic or political collapse does not upset their calculations.9
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F'Ukt c)f~ I~ LC f Af, USI; l1N1,1'
It is qur.~tionnblc+ wh~~eher cht:~ riv~7lr,y In iCyr1E would be euaugh t:n mevr_ one
= nC Chr. Cwo countric~~ to devclop nuclc~r r:cployiv~s nnd to produce an rxpln-
- qion--nE course (on Che Indian model) "Enr peuccful purpose~." Con:~ideratLons
of sccurity rnther speak against iC in the Eorrseeahle Euturc~, i3nrh stnt~~
hrhve u~nutu~~l inter~sC In not burdening rheir b3latcral rc~l~itianahip wieh the
des~,ibtltzing uncert~~inl�ies c~nd potenti~l dc~nger,y which wo~ilci be connecred
with ehe unilater~l devclopment and detonnCion oE nuclear expln~iveq. Ie might
.~lso bc In the intcre~ry ot hoth governmenes to keep open eh~ po~sibilities
Enr influence cohich the srntus of a near-htomic power givE~s ehem n~ainsr. those
~;ratc5 which--like the United Seates--t~ke the nonproliEer~~tic~n of nuclear
w~~apons pnrticul~rly ~eriously. On the other hand, situatton:; are conceivahle
which could cause etCher of the two countries ro develop Cheir own iwcleur
we~pons ~aithout regard to bi?.aCeral relationships.l0
'I'hus Chc rivalry between ArgentinA and Br~zil does noC neces5~rily have to lead
to nuclear ~nrmament, but it sti11 has significnnt cEfects Eor the Latin Ameri-
cnn region. This can be seen most clearly in the long-term efforts of Argen-
etna for cooperative agreements ~+~ith other Latin American states. Argentina
cancluded ~nn ~ggreemenC wieh Peru in :~[aarch 1977 about the canstruction of a
research ractor wirh zero c~pac~.ty whic}~ includes the option Eor the purchuse
of this reactor as well as a power reacror wit}i ~ capacity of 10 h1W. An ~gree-
ment from the year 1967 on nuclear cooperarion witti Paraguay was renewed in
1975 for a large number oF projects; similar agreements exist with Columbia
and Uruguay. The president of the Argentinian Atomic Energy Commission signed
a comprehensive treaty wikh his Chilean colleagues in 1977; the cooperation
based on it, in the course of which Argentinian nuclear experts went to Chile
as adv.isors, while Chilean technologists were guests in At~~cha, was still
Eunctioning without Eriction in 1978, when the two c~untries were on rhe verge
of waging war against e~~ch other because of border disputes.ll Argentina has
also concluded a nuclear cooperation treaty with ~cuador, and a comprehensive
agreement with Bolivia which was signed at the beginning of 1978 regulates
tlie long-term training of Bolivian experts in Argentina.
For Argenrinian interest in bilateral nuclear cooperation with less developed
~ neighbor states, the decisive consideration might be that in this way ttie
tieavy water reactor technology based on natural uranium will find wider dis-
tribution. In a Latin American "club oE friends oE natural uranium," the
states which had once decided on tt?is type of reactor for themselves would
have to rely extensively on Argentinian technology, Argentinian uranium and
Argentinian heavy water. Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay,~Uruguay and Peru would be
- particularly welcome in this respect. In addition, in a U.S.-Argentinian com-
munique of 1977 "the potential role of Argentina as a significant nuclear
supply country" is recognized.12
In contrast to Argentina, Brazil has exerted much less effort on bilateral
agreement in the region and instead has emphasized its national independence -
in the region of nuclear energy. Still, there are Brazilian agreements witti
Paraguay and Uruguay, and in a significant step Bra~il signed a treaty with
Venezuela at the en~ of 1978 which anticipated technical training assistance
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wiCh reg~rd to the building of Che firsr VPnezuelan reuctnr in the 1990's.1J
'I'his is a firat subsCanCial indication of I3r~azil's interQSt in resule ~f nu-
clear techniquPq and techr;ology, which it h~s acquired from the C~erman-Drazil- ~
i~n ngreement of 1975. Beliind this is the inreneion of the ~razilians to en-
ter the Lntin American maricet also as suppliers of enriched uranium and nuclear
planCS, The developmenCnl lines of fuCure pateerns of nuclear coop~ration
and conflicr can already be clearly seen today.
No less significant is rhe development of the relatiotts of Argentina and
Brazil with the leAding nuclear supply countries. The two Latin Americnn
stutes hnve m~de it unmistnkably clear that they would like ro turn more to
rhe ~urope~n supply centers and move away from the United States and C~nada.
Hr.azilian-U.S. relationships have clearly been in~ured in the quarrel ubout
the treaty of 1975 and the intention of. Brazi'l~ revealed at that time, of
having access to the whole nuclear fuel cycle. It is true that the U.S~ govern-
ment tias come to terms with the fact that it will not succeed in preventing
Brazil Erom going its own way by Ct~e exercise of open pressure. President
Carter underlined that during his visiC to Brazil in March 1978 with the words: _
' "The right of BraZil and West Germany to continue their pl~ns is not yuesCioned
by us."14 Nevertheless, it is obvious that the United States wishes to con-
tinue to try to make technological alternatives palatable to the Brazilians,
such as the development of the thorium cycle for advanced reactors. A de- -
cisive facCor for the future of U.S.-Brazilian relations will be whether
Brazil continues to accept de facto uninterrupted international supervision
of its total nuclear energy program--including the pro~ected pilot plants for
reprocessing and enrichment.
In spite of the growing uncertainty which looms ot~er the progress of the
GE~rman-Brazilian project beyond Angra II and III--especially since the new
Drazilian president, Figueiredo, took office--it appears to be an established
fact that Brazil's nuclear program wxll remain closely tied to Europe for the
foreseeablp future. An important link in this tie is the 10-year treaty tt~aC
- Brazil concluded with the German, British and Dutch gas centrifuge consortium
URENCO. According to this, Brazil will receive in the years 1981 to 1991 en-
riched uranium to the amount of 2 million separation units, as well as an op-
tion on an additional 2 million for the Angra II and III reactors. After
violent internal policy struggles, the Netherlands finally agreed to this
treaty in 1978 under the condition that an international plant will be created
for the storage of plutonium under the supervision of the IAEA or in accordance
with a special agreement. Details of this plutonium regime are dependent among
other things on the recommendations which the International Conference for
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INPCE) in session at that time may make up to
February 1980. A further condition is that such an arrangement must be able
to function by 1986 at the latest, for it is anticipated that at that time
Brazil will have a militarily evaluable capacity for reprocessing of plutonium
, at its disposa1.15
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~lrgeiit tnn alyu shnws ;i tendency ra Ert~e I tselE .Erom cooperc~C.{ot~ wlth Canad~
~nd the United SCnCeq r~nd to look Eor acr.ess Cn ridv~ncc~d nuc:.l~ur technology
~ tn tl~~~ rRG. Ni~;h CNi,A nEfirtal5 openly ~nQmie th~t the,y woul.d ro~r.il.ly l~rcaCcr
t I~~~ C;tn~~cllnit (:ANI)U ~~~rhiiol~~hY, hut t:liey yt~ Lrl< Co Cl~r C~~i111i111H I11;~1~f!~cl Cor u
V~IY~(.'~y 0~~ Cl'~7~i011N~ ~Ullll` Cl"!AAOIIEi TTl(!I1C~.Ul1CC~ Fli'(`: ~1qA~.t~V(' C!X~)l!I'IL't1C('4 ~ll
;~~~t~~nt(fLc ancl nurl~~r~r-tc~rhnnlogtcnl eoat~er~tton, the lnng-t~~rm 1nLr.rest~ o~
rhe Ccrmans in Argentinian uranium~ ~Znd their more conciliarory pos~tlon in
quc~C.iony oE nonproliEeration conCrols and the transfer of nuclenr technology.
~he rel~tions betwren ArgentinA and rhe United StAtes in the are~ of nucleAr
energy, b~sed on a treary from 1969, have not developed exactly fuvorubly
duriug the Carter administration. The United 5tates still supplies ur~nium
Eor tlie iive Argentinian research reactors. Areas of porentiul differences
bc~tween the U.S. ttnd ArgenCinn are in the questions of the supply of heavy
water, rhe resale of nuclear fuels, preparation of fuel elements ~?nd repro-
cessing.16 In referencc~ to heavy water supply, first of all in Argenrina ~n
absolu~ely reli~ble guaranCee of supply on the part of the foreign counrry and
on a longer-term basis the development of industrial fabric~tlon in their own
country is cons~dered to be absolutely necessary to keep ehe national nuclear
energy program running, but also to Eill the expected demand Prom othE~r Latin
tlmeric~n countries. Argentinian government representatives ~~t the end of
1978 announced their interest in an agreement according to whi.ch the ilniCed
State~ w1s to be of assistance in the develo,:ment of I~eavy water eechnology,
wliile ~r~entina could sliow its appreciation by restraint in reprocessing and
possibly by r~~tification of tlie Creaty of Tlatelolco. Unfortuantely American
politicans have not yet reacted to this.
Tt~e further distribution of nuclear fuels of U.S. origin to other Latin Amer- `
ican staCes has become problem for the Argentinians since they have had to
deal with the complicaCed stipulations of the new U.S. nonproliferation law
(Nuclear Nonproliferation Act) of 1978. There were difficulties already in
1978 in the distribution of 14.8 kilograms of enriched uranium to Peru.
Problems have also surfaced in the preparation of fuel elemenks, and parti-
cularly in connection with zirconium. The United States supplies zirconium
to the FRG, which in turn sells the metal to Argeneina. A process for pro-
ducing zirconium of its own in Argentina was tried out in a plant of which
the Carter admiaistration had the impression for a time that it was not suf-
ficiently safeguarded against misuse. And finally there remains the question
of reprocessing. Argentinian government officials have let it be known that
they are willing to l~old back commercial reprocessing for the time being, but
they wish to continue working with pilot plants--which the United States in
turn does not wish to accept.
Nonproliferation Policy
Argentina and Brazil have often announced their support of nonproliferation
of nuclear weapons in public statements. Pievertheless, international sus-
picion of the two countries remains lively. The.attitude that they have
adopted toward the most important international nonproliferation agreements
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m~~y l~e re~;~nrded as an indication of their intr.nCion~. '1'huy Argenrin~ did not
COfipl(?rC ratiEicaeion of th~ limir.ed test ban tre~ty o[ 1963, which e~mnn~;
other things bans n~iclear weapon tests in Che atmosphere, while I~razil entered
into i~ as a Eull parrn~r. Boeh staCes refuse decisivEly to sign the trettCy
on th~ nnnproliferation of nuclear wc~apon;~ (Nuclcar We~pon B~n Trenty) af
1968. Ttiey consider it discriminatory because it assigns different obl3gutiony
to tti~: member stAtes and thua cements a sCatus quo in wtiich the sCates wiCl~out
nuclear weapons must exercise perpeCual abstinence whi.le tl~e srgCes.caith nu- _
clear wenpons c~n continue to develop their nuclear arsenals as much A5 they
wish.l~ Both stAtes are very active in their role as members of the InCer-
national Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO). But as yet they are nnt rendy
to ~~ccepr t}~e idea of comprehensive international~control in principle for
tl~eir own nuclear activities. IC is true Chat in realiCy, in ttie opinion nf
many experts, rhe two countries are de facto completely sub~ecr to international
control, since they have voluntarily opened all their plants existing aC t}~e
rime to the inspections of IAEO. BoCh :.ountries have officially and insistenr-
1y announced their intention of developing nuclear explosiv~s "for peaceEul
purposes," although in the opinion of a majority of experts peaceful nuclear
' explosions are tectinically questionable and ecologically harmful. Argentina
and Brazil were also the severesC critics of those "guidelinew" with whicl~
the nuclear supply countries--wiCh parCial success--tried to limit th~ trans- ,
fer of nuclear technology wirh regard to Che nonproliferation of atomic weapons.18
One might came eo the conclusion that under present circumstances Argentina
and Brazil insist equally on keeping a legal option to atomic weapons open.
~iut it is important to be aware of the atCitude which the two countries }iave
adopted toward a fuYrher nonproliferation agreement, i.e. the treary on a
nuclear weapon ban in Latin America (TreaCy of Tlatelolco). This independent
regional pact for the creation of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Latin America :
has as yet received little attention--especially in Europe. But it is very
possible that it still offers the best chance to tie Argentina and Brazil
into a nonproliferation regime in a legally effective form.l9 -
The treaty of 'i?atelolco, which was worked out after very rhorough discussions
in the years 1964-67, came into effect in 1969. Twenty-two Latin American
countries subscribed to it as full members. Four Latin American states are
not full members: Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba. The ratification of
the reports added to the rreaty documents a remarkably widespread international
consensus. Tlatelolco is at present the only significant armament regulatory
agreement that is supported equally by the great atomic powers, the United
States, the Soviet Union and China. In addition to these three states, France
and Great Britain have also ratified the reports or announced their intention
oF ratifying them.
Brazil and Chile have ratified the Tlatelolco treaty in a formal sense; Ar-
gentina announced its intention of ratifying it in 1977. However, the Bra-
zilian approval (and also the expected consent from Argentina) is only valid
to a limited extent at present. For the very detailed treaty conditions an- -
ticipate that the treaty will only come into effect completely when all Latin
American states have ratified the ereaty and all states with nuclear weapons
have ratified the corresponding reports.
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~ N'Uki UH ~ 1C l AI. ~iSh: uNl l'
'1'li~~ frttrr~~~~tion~~l r,~tif'ication ~f th~~ rc~~~ortv iy a1t~r~Kt cotnj~lete kc~duy. H'hait
iN tnlyNfn~; itt ord~~r to put thr treaty ~.tttn rffc~Ct !b fin~l rfatifir..~tto� hy
~lrtrtttin.i, r~ttfic~,iticit~ I,y Cul~:~ ~nJ tl~~~ ~~ttle~~u~n; of r~n inyigt~ific,~nt bord~~r
df~put~~ br.twc~~~n Vc~n~~ruc~la and Guyt~n~ whfrh tK ~ c~ndition for Cuyr~n~'y r~tffi-
r;itiun, /1~~ ~~on thryr~ rnndittona hevc~ b~:en fu1fi11rJ~ tlic~ tr~~F~~y nh1 tF;ation
yul?,jc:rt 1nK ~ll ch~~tr nurlc~~r activitteq td cnntr~l !~Y the IA~:O (det~ily
_ of wl~[rh :~ti 11 hyv~~ to hc~ work~c! auc) come~~ int~ effect f~r Argr.ntinn nnd
i{ra~il. Altl~ou~h tt enn hc~ ~;aid that in both cnuntrie~ thir~ cnm~rchengivr r.nn-
crul ;~lrcr~dy ~xi~ty ~i~~ f~ctn, uniir~itcd participatinn in tlic~ 'I'l~tclolcn trenty `
wc~uld bt~ the fir~t l~~;ally binding involvement in an incern.ytidnnl t~oc:proliC-
Ejrntt~~n rc~gtme for Arp,c~ntinn ~nd ~rar.il. 5uch r~ st~p wnuld h,~vr~ ic~ bt ev~l-
- u~7ted ~s a serihuy ~t~ternent in favor n� the idc~a nf nnnprc~liferntion.
'i'h~. ~;overnments of t~~~ twa cnuntrie~ nre quite cler~r ~b~ut the ~i~nificance
of this step. The Hr.~zilian gnvernment~ which was the fir~t td bring fntn
play the idea of ~ nurlear we~pon-free zdne in Latin Amerirs, is nlre~dy
cloyer ro the materi~l nbligatinn of ~he Tlatelolco tre~ty than Argentina.
'I'hat rhe ratific.7tion of the trenty hns mnre than qymbolic m~~ning �or Hr~tir.il -
cnn br_ clearly secin in uff.icial gtatements. In che document is~ucd by the
br~~ili:~n government in 1977, "'I'he Brazili~n Nucl~~nr ~nery,y Pro~;r~m," it ~ays~
"With the ;~igning r~f t}~e treaty, Br~xil ha~, undc~r the rulc~s of intern~~ti~n~~l
law, cnmmitced itself to refraining from any action which is contrnry td the
~uals ~f the treaty."20 The Argentinian ~overnment. on the other hand, h~ving
riigned thc~ treaty in 1967, ix ~till d~laying ratification todgy, ~lthnugh thh
hegic~~~tn~; of the prnces~ w.~s announced in 1977--at the urKing uf tlie C~rtrr
admt~~i~:tration. '!'hi5 delay c~n be tr3ced bnck in p~rc to dlfferenc~K of
optnic,n wit~iin thc militnry ~overnment. tnfluentinl forre~ in tlic ~tomir.
~nerKy department, CN~A, and in the extertor ministry t~mph~3cically suppnrt
ratification, as does Presfdent Jorge Videla hitaself, but it is known that
parts of the army are opposed. Ratification is further complicated by th~
U.S. nonproliferation law of 19~8 uhicl~ makes a revision of the Untted States-
Argentintan ~greemenc nn nuclear cooperntion necessary. The very unfortuneCe
w7y in whieh the Carter administration 1~as purgued its human rights poliey
tnward Argentina has dnubtless also h~d its effects. There is a natural
ronncc:tion (even if it is denicd by both sides) between the J.5. deslre for
ratification of the treacy df Tlatelvlco und the Argentini~ns' de~ire for
unreSCricted access to advanced nuclear technology under appropri~te inter-
naCional control.
Argentina and ~razil Beyond IN~CE
'I'he Inte rnational Conference an :~uclear ~uel Cycle Evaluation (INE'C~), in
- ~hfch more than SA statc~s and s~veral international organizations parcicipate
by now, is approaching its final stage~ Whic2~cri11 coMe to an end witli a
plenary session in ~ebruary 1980. The work of the conference is carried out
in a total of eig}it working groups (of ahich one~ wt~ich is cancerned witl~
regulations for nuclear burnoff, caeets under the co-ch.~irm~n~hip of ~tin Argrn-
ttnian).21 INFC~ is a wdy-station in the long-term ~t1tCL'itAt~bfl~l t~~i110$ thac
arose from the dispute about those "guidelines" of 1977 uith uhich the nuclear
supply countries stirred up such deep bitteraess, particularly ~mong the
~
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i~'OK c~Fi~ IGIAL U:lt~. C1NLY
Ar~;~~ntint~~nr+ ~nd Nr.~~ilianK. In IN~G~ t~ tdrgtyr f~rum we~ crp~trd, in whirh
rountet~~~ with undiypue~d e~zl~nnlt~~i~~1 pdt~ntiel for thc~ dev~~lopm~nt df nu-
rle~r we.~rnn~, lfk~ Ar~~ntin~ end Hra~f1, aen ~l~o find a Me~rin~. tN~'C~ ip
intphded m~iniy fer the �~x~hange of t~chnieal infot~mati~n~ but thn r~~uit~ ~~f
tl~e cnnferen~~e--houever ~~anty they~ r,~y be--wiil h~vQ ~dlitfedl rhflpequ~nr~~.
Nut tt ~~nr~nry 1E~r~H ~nd 1~~~ ~robabl~ that IN~G~ ui11 gtil~ bp abl~ eo fin~!
hn i~urrn~tinn~l ~onH~~nr~ug dn th~ ericical probl~mg di th~~ nucl~er fu~l ryr1E
brf~+re thc fi.n~l repnrt; the vicwpofnt~ on thp thornie~e qu~~tion~ er~ ~im�1v
ton widc~ly~ g~perbted. Wi~h th~ conr.lusion a: tN~'C~ there will b~ th~ e~~k d~
gr~~pin~ the het politi~~l irong dire~etly if a nan-pro~if~retion regim~ ~cchpted
hy all .iideg i~ to funetion.
`I`he uillingne~g df Argenein~ and Brazil to c~oper~t~ in thp ppriod ~fter iNFC~
wili be df de~i~ive ~i~nifi~enc~~ WhaE difficulti~~ may arig~ in th~ prdeegg
m~y be qe~n from the very fACt that the two eountri~~ dr~ not p~reieipeEfng
in thc~ firgt ~nd mnst irn~ortant uedercakin~ in conjunctfon With IN~C~~ i.~.
the 5ecdnd (V~rifi�~ti~n) C~nf~r~n~e of th~ ttonprolif~roCion treaty whirh ig
tn tnke ploce in June~ 19~d. All attempt~ on eh~ part of the advanc~d nucl~qr
energy cnuntrip~ to int~grate Atigentin~ nnd Braxil intu nonprdlif~rntion ef-
forc~ beyond INPC~ wil~ hgve to teke into aceaunt the extcht of n~tinnal prfd+~
and pre~tige th~t the tWV se~t~s h~v~ inve~ted itt th~eir nu~1~~r ~nergy pru-
grau~s. ~or the Argentiniang and 8ra~ilian~~ the grruggl~ for nuclear encr~y
i~ primarily a battl~ for acc~~g to technical progreg~ in which th~y see the
key tc~ the ~conomic d~velopment of their rountrieg. Any poliey dire~thd ~t
b~rring or Cutting off the tao countri~g from advanced ("gengitive") nur~cnr
rE~~hnnlagy is doom~d to feil ~nd will only produc~ deeper embttcerment.
"fhe 1~~ding nucf~ar pn~rgy countri~~ sMould th~refor~ not purgu~ ~ polic}� of
technological refusal, but instegd should asgigt the Argentinians and ~ra-
zilian~ in developing their nuclear iedustry--and insist at th~ same time
tt~at the dc~vclopment of the n~ce~sary political institutions in Latin Amcrica _
~hould progregs. In che framework of a coopr~hensive political conc~eption, the
nanproliferotion r~gime of Tlatelolco ehould be ~ncoureged ae ~auch as posgible;
volunt~ry contributian~ and political demonstration~ of confidance could
qupp~,rt thp Work of th~ Tlatelolco control organization OPANAL (Organixt~tion
fur the Ban of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America). In ~ddition~ the ~hnught
of a Lacin Am~ti~an reginn~l confer~nce on the modpl of INFC~ ghnuld be
supporc~d and encouraged. A regional tNFC~ canfer~nce could giv~ mom~ntum to
tfre exchenge of nuclear inEormatioa bets+e~n Latin Americgn countripB. It
would be desirable for the stateg of Latin America tn find common projCCts hi
nuclear ~ooperation desirable in this s+ay~ as vell as posaibly ong or morp
nucl~a~r energy centers in crhtch sensitive plante can then b~ located aith
a~propriate internacianal ar regional control.
Argencina and Brazil, th~ most advanced nuclear energy countries in Latin
America~ would have to play a leading rolc in this. But the prcrequisice
~+ould b~ that the most important auclear supply countries in their turn would _
shos+ their readiness to giv~ benevolent gupport to cooperative und~rtakings
of the Latin American countries. tt is to be hoped that in the nucl~ar supply
10
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~0lt UFN'tC 111t. U;~i, c)NLY
c:~untries the rhdlti~ttoi~ will heorme widE~~pread thnt hnvtng d Hhdre~ in ~~dvan-
~ed nu~l.e~r te~hnnl~gy ~nd ~re~tit~f; r~gf.c?n~t1 conpc~r~tfve prn,~eCt,~ and inHti-
tuti~ns wduld b~nef it th~ pe~ce gnc! the ~~~.urity af i.~tfn l~mericn pqually.
~^i~ "ti'.bT~~:
!l. ThE~ hilat~ral riv~lry hetween Argenti~a and ~razi' in th~ ~r~a ~f nu~l~de
cn~r~y Ig ~ very explaqive t~piC far governm~ne repr~~t~flC~tiv~g ef b~~h cdun-
trieq. ~1ffiCi~lg deny hntly th8t tli~r~ i~ any rivalry, end ara pertieul8rty
tnecn,acd tf fnreign ~l~server~ any ~nyehing on thi~ gub,~c~e.
tl. It iq noteworthy that ch~ Arg~ntinian atomi~ pr~grAm wa~ ~uee~g~fully
~e~led nff from tr~flu~nc~~ frnm the un~tab~h int~rnal po~itidn and ha~ made
~c~ngt~nt progresg.
10. '~hig 1~U~9t~~Dfl ~nd dtharg ~~nne~ted wi~;: t~ , re ereated in mdr~ det~il in
Jdhn R~diek, "Rpgional ttegtraint: U.S. Nuelcar P~liry ~nd L~Cin Ameri�~,"
in: f~Rrit~, Sprin~ I97A.
11. New strong Argentini~n cnmmitment eo nuel~ar coep~racinn ig b~cam~ clear
tb che nuehor nf thi~ r~port wh~n he ~xp~ric~ne~d tl~~ participntion nnd ehe
Eriendly gt~t~m~nts t~f ~ r~~pQCt~d offtci~~ c~f th~ Argentintun CN~1 (Martin~x
Favini) during nn int~rnacional nuel~~r an~e~y conference errc?ng~d by the
Chilegn nucl~er en~rgy easuaig$ion et o timg when the tWO countri,e~ app~ared
td be on the v~rg~ of war (S~ptember L978).
l2. Jntnt cotnmunique of th~ R~public of Ar~entina ~nd thr United Statey~
2~ h~v~�mbar 197~. 7'he lr~ngunge of this communiqur cnmmit4 thr Unit~d Stntey
unambigu~usly to r+u~parting Argentina'~ d~~irQ td bec~a~ a~~pplier
ot nurlrar mat~ridl. Offiei~l~ af th~ Argentinian CN~A w~r~ ang~red wh~n the
i:arter ~dminfscration l~ter tried to interpret the conanuni~ue differently.
1~. aFtJJ1ZIL TODAY~ Brazilian ~taba~sy in Washington, b.C.~ November 1978.
14. "CN~ NEW YO1tK TI"t~5 ~ 31 March 1978.
15. NUCL~/1R NEWS, nctnber 19~8.
16. The follduing desrription of impor~tant differenc~s in th~ nuclear enprgy
area b~tu~~n the United 5tetes and Argentina is bns~d on the interpretation
of conv~rsations that the author had With Arg~ntinian offici~ls during a vi~it
to Argentina at the ~nd af 1978.
17. Thig subject and r~IatBd questions a~re discussed by dn international
group af An~rican, ~uropean and Latin Aa~eriran o:fi~ials a~ a confcrencr of
th~ 5tanley Foundation about enprgy and nucledr safety in I.atin Americn Whi~h
aas held in St. John's on Antigua from 25 to 30 April 1978. ~The conference
report is availablC from: 7'he Stanley Foundation, Mugcacine~ Iowa 52761,
U.S.A.)
11
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18, '~rKt: ~A 6/1g78, p n 1~1 ff.
19. M~r~ d~t~il~ on th,i~ treaty c~n be found in John R. Itpdick~ "R~ginnr~l
Nuel~dr Arma Caneral in Lsein Am~rie~, in INTERNATtONAL ORGAN1ZATtON~ Spring
1~I75; t~xt of th~ erpety tnt ~A l4/1967~ p b l52 ff.
z(1. Tc~xe af ~h~ Br~~ilian nuclear ~n~rgy pregram in: ~A 14/1977~ p U 387 ff.
71. Ct th~ work pre~ram of INFC~ in: EA 24/ 1977~ p U 7~0 ff. 'Ch~ eighe
wnrking gr~up~, whieh t~~v~ produe~d more than S00 doeum~nts with abour 10,OOb
~~ngeq, ai11 pr~pare their documentation for th~ Technical Coordination Com-
mittr~ uf IN~CE at the end of May, it ig anticipatpd. The rommitte~ then hag
time uncil Pebruary 1980 to completp a final report which wi11 be pr~genc~d
td the plenum. NUCLEOI3tC5 IJE~K, 15 Februaty 1979.
CUPYRICN`T: 1979 Verl~g fu~r int~rnationale politik CmbN, Bonn
9~37
C50: 5100
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FOR OF~' iC iAL US E ONLY
~CYPT
BEtI~FS ~
JOINT NUCLEAR POW~it--'I'he Ieraelis are planning to build, ~ointly with
the ~gyptiana, a nurlear pnwer pl~nt in the northwestern Sinai. The
power would b~ uepd by both countriee. (Text~ (Parig VAL~URS ACTUELL~S
in ~rench 28 M~r 79 p 33J
C50: 5100
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FINLAND ,
CONSORTIUM TO JOIN IN SOVIET NUCLEAR PLANT FOR LSBYA
Stockholm VECKANS AFFAR~R in Swediah 10 May 79 p 31
[Article by Goran Ek]
[Text] Helsinki--Finland, the first western nation to buy a Soviet nuclear
power plant, will probably be rewarded for this by its eastern neighbor in
the form of an entrance ticket to a similar project in Libya.
When the general agreement recently reached between the Muaaimar q,adhdhafi
government and V/0 Atomenergo Export on the construction of a 400 megawatt
atomic power plant at Libya's expense was signed some time ago there was
a very interested third perty in the background~ namely the Finn Atom
atomfc pool consisting of eight Finnish steel firms with an interest in ,
the nuclear poWer plant industry. .
The Sovfet Union is selling nuclear technology and the fuel needed for it
to Libya. The Finns have been promised inclusion in contract bidding on -
related projects, the residential community to be built near the nuclear
plant, planning, construction work, electrical systems, components, etc.,
which in all amounts to a good part of the roughly 1.5 billion kronor the
nuclear plant will cost.
"The Finn Atom group delivered products worth well over 100 million kronor
to the nuclear power plant, now several years old, at Hasthol.a?en outside
Lovisa in Finland, the plant that is our point of xeference. Thus we
have the resources for substantial enterprises," Finn Atom executive direc-
tor Daniel Jafs told VECKANS AFFARER. Later this month he will go to
Moscow to discuss the Libyaa project.
Iraq is also on the list of Finnish-Soviet cooperative projects in the
form of four big thermal power plants. They were offered with the
Finnish firms K~ntram, Nokia and the Jaakko Poyry conaultant firm acting
as interested parties.
14
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Conpex~tion in third ~ountries is of great importance to the ~'innish
metal indusrry which anticipates employmenr problems in the 198.,'s. Th~?t
is also why Finnish critics of the Libyan pro,~ece are lying low~ Instead
the government is saytng rhat it won'r b~ Finland that is providing Libya
with atomic power and plutonium. The regponsibility for that mus~ b~
born~ solely by the Sovi~t'Union, a narion with enough authority, the
argument proceeds, to make sure the international regularions on atomic
fuel usege are adhered to~
Firms ir? Che ~inn Atom group include AA Ahlstrom, Nokia, Rauma-Repola,
W Rosenlew, Stromberg, Tampella, Valmet and Vartsila. Among these firms
Varrsila built some of the cooling system for the two units at Nastholmen
and recently sold the license for this to the United States. Valmet has
provided charging machinery and ventilating equipment~ Ahlstrom and
Stromberg have built main circulation pumps and Nokia has provided com-
pu~ers and measurement equipment.
Finn Atom has delivered similar products to ASEA-Atom's nuclear plant in
- Olkiluoto as well as ta nuclear power plants in Sweden to a lesser extent.
COPYRIGHT: Ahlens & Akerlunds tryckerier, Stockholm 1979
6578
CSO: 5100
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FRANC~
~I(tST NUCL~AR ATTACK SUBMARINE LAUNCHED . _
Paris L~ MONDE in French 26 May 79 p 14
[Article by Rene Moirand: "No Ceremony at t~ie Launching of the First Nuclear
- Attack Submarine"; passages in slantlines~are emphasized in the text]
['t'extJ Cherbourg--There will be no chief of staff, music or ceremonial wine
at the Cherbourg arsenal on Saturday 26 May for the launching of the first
nuclear attack submarine of the French navy.
Military authorities made the decision to go through with a simple "technical ~
launching" and canceled all the ceremonies that had been planned since the
decision to renew on this occasion the tradition of public launchings, which
had been suspended because of the demonstrations at the launchings in 1974 of
the "Indomptable" and the "Agosta." The vessel in question is the "Provence,"
the prototype of five units to be built by the arsenal specializing in building
nuclear submarines.
The shipyard mar,agement fears that demonstrations may be organized by unions,
which have been involved in a job action since 15 May to have the minister of
Defense reinst~te two decrees dating from 1951 and 1967. By the terms of these
decrees, the wages of the people working for national defense had been indexed
on those of Parisian metallurgical workers. But they were suspended for a year
in July 1977 under the Barre plan, and the suspension was extended in 1978.
The CGT [General Confederation of Labor], CFDT [French Democratic Confederation
of Labor], FO [Workers Force], and CFTC [French Confederation of Christian
Workers] are demariding that they be reistated and that negatiations also begin
concerning a reduction in hours.
The Cherbourg arsenal unions were summoned to a meeting on Wednesday 23 May
by the director of naval arms and construction; the unions refused to promise
/"clearly and precisely"/, as they were asked to, that no personnel would dis-
turb the launching of the "Provence." This kind of operation lasts more than
12 hours, and it cannot be interrupted without risk to the hull.
The lst Naval Region justified on Thursday 24 May its decision to go ahead
with the launching/"out of a desire not to encumber a very crowded calender
of new navy ship launchings."/
8782
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F'Oit Ut~ C1.(: fAL tJ51~: nNLY
FREINC~
SMALL LEAK DETECTED IN CAUARACHE NUCLEAR REACTOR
Paria LE FIGARO in ~rench 6 Jun 79 p 14
(TexC] A amall leak of radioacCive material has juet been reported as
having Caken place at the Center for Nuclear Reaearch at Cadarache (Arome
DepartmenC) where an experimenCal reacCor called the CAP (for 'chaufferie
avancee prototype'--advanced prototype heater) was involved.
. Accnrding Co the [French] Atomic Energy Coimniasion, the leak occurred in
one of the heat exchangers of the reactor when the radioactive water in the
primary circuit leaked into the aecondary circuiC which ia aupposed to re-
main "clean." This resulted in an increase in presaure in one circuit
thereby forcing the reactor's fine control syatem to blow off~a amall
amounr of ateam into the atmoaphere.
It was emphasized by the AEC that this ateam release amounted to lesa than
one tenth the maximum concentration permitted. Moreover, it was stated
that in contrast to what took place in Harrtsburg this incident did not
degenerate inCo an accident. "We are quite relieved," said one of the AEC
officials, "since everyrhing remained under control. Far from being en-
tirely negative, this type of incident permits the teating of Che safety
sysCems, and in this case, we found that everything worked without a hitch;
both core shutdown and emergency cooling occurred in time, and at no time
was the situation out of control."
Sy yesterda;~, the core temperature had returned to normal, ac~ording to
the AEC, which stated that the reactor had not been damaged by the leak.
All that will be neceasary, it was explained, will be to replace the de-
fective heat exchanger and the reactor can reaume operations teating fuel.
CSO: 3100 ~
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