JPRS ID: 8556 WEST EUROPE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070001-2
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 63
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORTS

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_ . RMO
S JULY vF i
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JPRS L/8556
5 July 11979
(FOUO 41/79) West Europe Report
FBI$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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.TPRS L/8556
5 July 1979
WESY EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 4i/79)
CONTEN7S PAGE
G6UNTRY SECTION
INPERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Norway Assigna French Firmg Portion of Oil Field
(vECx,kNs AFFaRER, 3 May 79) i
FRANCE
.
Presidential Adviser Henry Jean-Baptiste Gives Opinions
(Henry Jea,n Baptiste Interview; JEUrTE AFRIQUE,
2 May 79) 2
New Version Ariane, Mini-Space Lab Planned
(Pierre Lengereux; AIR & COSMOS, 26 MaY 79) 16
Ariane First Stage Iaunch Tested
(AIR & COSMOS, 26 May 79) 21
Grenoble Military Hoapital Operations Described
(MEDECINE ET ARMEES, Feb 79) 22
Briefs
Djibouti Military Modei�nization 25
SPAIN
CNP: Marxists Opposed by Oid L:.ne Anarchiats
(carBio 16, 27 May 79) 26
Basque President-in-Exile To Head RegionaJ. Government
(CANIDIO 16, 20 May 'i)) 32
PCE-PSOE Agreement Subject oP Commentary
(Editorial, Jua.n Toms t3e Salas; CANIDIO 16, 20 May 79) 35
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
Economic Recovery 8een on the Hori.zon
(caMaxo 16, 20 ray 79) 37
INI rnvestmenta I{eep Holding Company in Red
- (CAbIDIO 16, 27 MaY 79) .........8................. 44
Briefs
(}RAPO Infiltration oP Polire 47
MPA?AC Leader 3n Z11 geelth 47
EI'A, GRAPO Unity 47
SWEDEN
Robot-15 Missile Seen operationai by 1985
- (Pierre Iangereux; AIIR & COSMOS, 9Jun 79) 48
Brief Overview oP Armed Forces :'rovided
(Olof Dackenburg, Hans Berglund; ARNEE3
DIAUJOURD'HUI, ray 79) 50
Economy Ministry Seee Continued Unemployment Drop in
_ 1980 - (vECxaNS aFARER, 3 May 79) 56
,
- b -
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COUNTRY SECmLION
NORWAY ASSIGNS FRS?NCH FIRMS PORTION OF OIL FIELD
5tockholm VECKANS AFFARER in Swedish 3 Mey 79 p 53
[Article: "France and Norway in Joint Export Drive"]
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIlZS
(Text] It becomes more and more obvious thaC France ia emerging as one
of Norway's moat important partnera in the industrial and eaergy fields.
The firsC Cangible proof of thia surfaced in the beginning of April when
the Norwegian Government permitted two French oil companiea to join the
so-called "sma11 gold block" 30/6, which was number 1 on Volvo's shopping
list in the North Sea.
The French Elf and Total together acquired a 20 percent share as the only
foreign corporations admitCed.
The government's decision became knowm at the same time that a large French
trade and industry delegation---headed by Citroen's and Renault's top
execuCives--visited Oslo.
But the initial contacts at the goverrunent level for futu�re cooperation in
the fields of~induatry and energy were already taken at the end of October
last year. Since then there have been several meetings at goverr.ment level.
On 20 May the minister of industry, Olav Haukvik, travels to Paris to meet -
his French colleague, Henri Giraud. They will continue the discuseions
in regard to the agreemenC which is expected to be reached this fall when
Giraud will make a return visit in Oslo. Up till now the French-Norwegian
negotiations have resulted, among other things, in agreements between _
Kongsberg's'Weapons Factory and Elf. The agreement grants Kongsberg
access to Elf's know-how within the off-shore area.
According to what VECKANS AFFARER has learned, the agreements involve joint
NorWegian-French export investments in regard to the equipment needed by
; the oil industry in the Middle East, Canada, Mexico and China. Further
; negotiations are also in progress in regard to Norwegian manufacture of _
' components under license for the automotive industry.
~ COPYRIGHT: Ahlens 6 Akerlund tryckerier, Stockholm 1979
I 9349 1
; CSO: 3109
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COUNTRY SECTION
PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER HENRY JEAN-BAPTISTE GIVES OPINIONS
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 2 May 79 pp 89-94
FRANCE
[Interview with preaidential teahnical adviser Henry Jean-Baptiate by
JEUNE AF'RIQUE newamen headed by Jean-Louia Buchet, in Paris, daCe not
given]
[Text] What is the purpose of an adviaer, then? These are "preaident's
men" whose poaiCion in the hierarchy of reaponsibilities and deciaiona
are difficult to asseas. Are they deputy miniaters or "Deua ex machina"?
Are they grey eminences in the shadow of the great or hardly uaeful orna-
menta gratified with a title? Undoubtedly neither one or the other, but
the adviser is a peraonality who is ill-defir.ed. And when his official
task ia to take care of "matters relative to the North-South dialog and
the sCudy of developmental problems," fielda whose scope, camplexity,
and lack of preciaion are gauged at Che same Cime, one cannot help think-
ing that Che duties of this adviser are not the easiest in the bunch.
Henry Jean-Baptiste knowe all this. This naCive of Martinique, 46 yeara
old, born in Fort-de-France, with a impressive height, with the calm
demeanor of a well-meaning giant and the refined manners of a aenior offi- _
cial emerged from Che palace, is not naive enough Co believe Chat the
posC of technical adviser to which he was appointed by Preaident Vatery _
Giscard d'Eataing on 8 January 1979--he is the firat to hold such a
poaition--will be a calm place. Everybody knows {.ndeed that while the
idea of the North-South dialog is particularly dear to the French presi-
_ dent, so far it has consiated much more in apeeches on official trips
than of facts. The task of Aenry Jean-Baptiste--who likea to think of
himself as neither an ornament nor a gadget but willingly admits that he
is a symbol, that of a resolve to open up--will firat be to give a little
credibility to an idea. _
Thia individual, who from an intellectual viewpoint likes to situate
himaelf at the confluence of two lines of Negro Chinking--that of Leopold
Sedar Senghor [of Senegal] whoae adviser for economic and developmental
affaira Jean-Baptiste used to be for a long Cime, and that of Aime
Cesaire--unquestior.ably possesses the love of dialog. This is a passion
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which the acute awareneaa o� paet and present injueCiceg vis-a-vis his
brothers Yas oniy strengthened. It is a passion which his intiellacCual _
Graining--the traditional honors track of the French senior o�ficial--
bachelor's degreea i~ Che Nationa].hSchoolhof School
Politicr~1 Science an
~ changed. -
Ae the Elysee Palace [of the French preaident] Henry Jean-Baptiste will
be a iittle and at the same time the president's "Miseer Africa," "Miseer f-
. Development," ;and "Mister North-South Dialog." These are uncomfortable
privileges which will prompt him to tread only slightly in the jurisdic-
tion of aeveral ministries. It will undoubtedly be neceasary Chat Henry
Jean-Baptiate should be a bell hammer in order to have his p.qesion shared
in the political palace aaway tillWpreaide over routines
neocolonial habits which, in Practice,
maintained by France wiCh the Third World.
- It ia this new man, �resh from the axperience of 8 years apenC in Senegal
aC the side of Leopolu Sedar Senghor whom we interviewed. Jean-Baptiete
entrusted to ua his hopas and his ambition: "I like men who aucceed," he
confided to us. There is no doubt Chat Henry Jean-Baptiste has the
- resolve to succeed, but wi11 he have the means to do eo? Will he be able `
- to turn into something concrete the nebulous nature of the presidenC's
Henry Jean-Baptiste
ideas on North-South
ue aifg we development?
-
wi11 not be annoyed
score. F. S. _
"I Shall Not Be the Andrew Young of the Elysee Palace"
Question: As technical adviser at the Elysee Palace since January 1979
you are the first person from Martinique to serve with President Giacard
d'Estaing. Earlier, you had spent several yeara as adviser to PresidenC
Senghor. This is an unusual record.
' Answer: The fact that I am from Martinique indeed explains many things
-
that I feel and that I sha11 tell you about in a little while. As for my
record, I recognize that it is both conventional and somewhaC exceptional.
It is conventional to the extent that I went to secondary school at home
in Martinique and then did my advanced studiea in Paris. I was a studenC -
' at the ENA [National School of Administration]. I passed the competitive
examination in 1958. Then, I went to the Court of Accounts and subse-
quently became involved in the [French] cooperation program. I wished to
go abroad under thia program for personal reasons rather than ior the
sake of my career.
Tt so happens that a position was vacant in Dakar which was offered to me
and I went there. I expected to be away for a short while--that is how
things were done--but I was in Senegal for nearly 9 years. This will
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roR oFrzczAL usE orrLY
auggest to you ChaC I did noC geC bored, boCh becnuse it was Senegal and
because T was at the side of Presidenr Senghor.
Queation: Ten years enrlier, would the same kind of administraCive career
noC h$ve prompted you to attend the Colonial School rather than the ENA? _
Answer: Indeed, many people from the [French] AnCilles served in the
colonial administraCion, often involving very famoua personalitiea auch
as Governors Felix Eboue or Wiltord, for example. But when I arrived in
Senegal I heard through Senegalese frienda thaC the time apent by aome
officials hailing from the Anttlles had bePn viewed in often ambiguous
manner by the Africana. Queseion: Did the fact that you were from the Aneillea help you or
hinder you in Senegal in the last analysis? `
- Answer: I believe Chat in the last analysie it aerved me well. IC is an _
individual question and nearly one of generztion. It is a question of '
attitude vis-a-vis people and knowledge--or of acknowledgment--of their
own history. I am convinced thaC thia aCCiCude of opening up and
humility is a good one. I had the feeling of finding part of myself
ignored Coo ofCen, scoffed at, and acorned in the aneilles. And I believe
that the Senegalese have understood this. They conaidered me a littlP as
- one of their kind. I never felt an alien in Senegal. If, on the other �
' hand, I would have had the feeling of being useless, I would have left.
- Question: In what way were you useful?
Answer: As technical adviser to the Senegalese preaident I was there
first of all so that he might consult me but also that I might adviae the
prime minister, too, cn all questions of their choicey notably, on the
_ problems of financing of development: Mobilization of domesCic resourcea
~ and foreign assistance. But, beyond technical questiona, I was involved
by President Senghor in an exceptional experience. I ahall mention, by
way o� example, three specific and I belfeve imporCant areas.
First, the construction of regional integraCion zones. These are the two
experimenta of the CEAO [West African Economic Community], limited to the
Francophone counCries only, and of the CEDD-O [West African States
Economic Community] open to English-speaking countries as well. And that
is where Preaident Senghor's power of intuition and analysis resides. He
thought for very long that the Africans must first organize amnng them-
selves. Perhaps he was led to that analysis by the special position of
Senegal which used to be the capital of former French West Africa and
which drew various advantages from Chis status. But I believe that it is
a fesr of the future more than nostalgia of the past which explains this
constant striving of President Senghor. ,
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The second example is that of the reform of the I3CEA0 [CenCral Bank of
- the WesC African States]. It ie an imporCant task in which I took parC
- in vary axalting team work with Senegaleae and French friends and of
which I ratain a vivid recollecti.9n directly drawn Prom experi.ence.
FurChermore, very symbolica].ly, Chis collective work led to the Cransfer
of the head o�fice of the RCEAO from Paris to Dakar in 1978. Once more,
you wi11 noCe that this is a mt3tCer which involved all the counCries of
, the UMOA [West A�rican Monetary Union], roughly, the countriea of the
CEAO.
ConCradictory Qualities Are Necessary
The third example ia the Lome Convention. Senegal presided over the
group of the ACP [African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries (associated
wiCh the European Economic Community)] which led to the signing of thie
convention, presenCly the instrumert--I do noC dare to say the most
satisfying but the least unfavorable--to the dialog among unevenly
- developed countries.
And then there are many things in which the government of Senegal and the
ministries with which I have worked have wished to involve me such as the
preparation of the Dakar conference on raw m,aterials or of the Arab-
African aummit meeting.
Question: Were you involved in docnestic policy a little?
Ailswer: NaCurally, even in the daily drama, the humble work of compiling
files or of the study group which is dignified or phased out at the Cime
of decision. However, I participated in a few more specCacular opera- -
tions which stem from domesCic policy: The creation of the Dakar fair, _
the opening of the Teranga Hotel, the initial stage of price stabiliza- _
tion at a time when "imported" inflation was getting out of hand, the _
- eatablishment of the National Sor,ial Action Foundation, various financing
agreements (French-Senegalese, Eurafrican, or Arab-African), and so on.
Question: In all these operaCiona, you worked with various ministries.
Relations cannot be easy between a technical cooperation personnel in
' the preaident's office and the Ministry of Finance, for example.
Answer: These relationa are indispensable and, admittedly, at times
tricky. They are indispensable because an adviser worthy of that name
has to ga and seek the information and not wait for it. They are tricky
because it is first necessary to inspire trust without becoming complacent.
Neither should one give the minister the impression that one has come to
~ check up on him or spy on him for account of the president, especially
- when one is from outside. One must possess contradictory qualities--much
curiosity as well as much discretion.
- Question: What did you do for 8 years aseisting Senghor?
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Anawer: WiChout wiahing to commend Che merixs of the Senegalese preai-
denC--they are fairly we11 known--he is a very easy man to work wieh.
- Firati, bacause he has a feeling and taste for organization and method.
You know that there are few apeechea of Presidenti Senghor in which he
does not call his fellow-citizena "to organization and method." Then,
because he is a man of great courCeay, that is, that he knows how to
- ligten to his adviaer. He 11aCens to you, allows you Co apeak. And then
I recall all his gestures and which sCrike hia interlocutors. For exam- ~
- ple, the Senegalese president makea a habit of seeing you to the door or
he willingly and spontaneously autographs his writinga Co you--all these
liCtle Chings which make your relations.
= When it comes now to basic things, unquestionably Che president has a
- cerrain number of theses or raeher analyses or goals thaC I have indeed
seen verified and concretized in the pursuit of his policy and particu-
- larly three of his maior ideas: The need to fight Chrough regional
groupings againsC the balkanizaCion of Africa (wiCnesa the "concentric
circlea" of the CEAO and CEDEAO); Eurafrica, or the dialog between theae
two conCinents (witness the Lome Convent3on); and the deterioration of
Che terms of trade, one of tha basic problems of the underprivileged
countries.
Question: Did you work with Yrime MinisCer Abdou Diouf?
Answer: I was the adviser of Che prime minisCer as much as of the preai-
dent. This means that I was entertaining a double dialog: With the
president, the man of culture and reflection, and then with a younger
person, a man of files with whom I had great affinity of language because
our training was approximately the same. ~g-
Socialism Without Violence
Question: Did you experience Senghor's socialism?
Answer: I did. It is a slow, difficult, undoubtedly perfectible proceas
but one which is probably fairly well adapted to the exisCing state of
Senegalese society. It is socialism Senegalese-style, without violence
or prisons. And that is an increasingly xare feat in today's world. It
is also a system where people practice sharing fairly widely. But I wou],d
- like to stick to ,`.he facts: Senegal suffered a lot from Che drought dur-
ing 5 or 6 years with all the consequences thst you know. The,Senegaleae
- have also experienced fully and at the same time the impacts of the oil
crisis and worldwide inflation.
Now I remind you that in Senegal thp.*.e was not even the slightest strike
during this period, not the least social movument of any scope iu a
country Chat General de Gaulle used Co qualify as "turbulenC." And it is
specifically at that time that President Senghor decided to encourage the
experiment of multipartyism and an opposition. I merely state these
facts, which are obviously sueceptible of various interpretations.
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QueaCion: You now assist Preaident Giacard d'EeCaing. Are you Chen the
Andrew Young (U.5. ambassador to the United Natione) of the Elysee Palaco? _
Answer: These are cliches and I shun stereotypes. Experiences of this
= kind rarely overlap complexely. It is true Chat the temptation Co com-
pare us is easy. It was written...
QuesCion: Do you say Chat you are not becauae you are auppoaedly a man
of files, a placid individual?
Anawer: A placid man, did you say? I believe that this is not quiCe
erue. I can be a bell hammer and I am fairly fond of action, of
realizaCions.
- Queation: ?s there not a chance that you will be the "black on duCy" aC
the Elysee Palace?
' Answer: I don't believe that auah a Ching is in the mfnd of PreaidenC
Giscard d'Estaing. It is not in mine, at any raCe. I am undoubtedly a
symbol for the president--Chat of the Antillea which can assume more
impoxtance in Fxance--as the majority in the Antilles would wish it--
and represent a certain French diversiCy. My compatriots wish to grow
collectively, no longer to be "assisted" individuals but participate as
officials in the development of their island. Do you know Marius Tresor?
Is he the "black on duty" because he plays in the French soccer team?
In the same way 'L could cite for you eminent professors of inedicine and
law in France who hail from the Antilles but in no way conaider them-
selves to be "Negroes on duCy."
QuesCion: Tresor is even the captain of the French soccer team, but in
France there is a tradition of sportsmen from the Antilles.
Answer: That is not the only thing thaC we know how to do even though
we are, indeed, highly talented in running, jumping, or kicking the ball.
_ Question: You are the first person from the Antilles who is an adviser
at the Elysee Palace. How d o you explain it?
- Answer: That is unusual and President Giscard d'Eataing deserves credit
for being the first one to have thought of it. But we live on a very old
legacy of injuetices. If I am a symbol it is indeed because my appoint-
- ment is a firat. I was told the same thing rahen I was head of my class
at the ENA. No person from the Antillea had ever been head of his clasa _
- at the ENA.
- Question: Has there been another one?
Anawer: No, but there will be others.
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Question: How did you come to work for PreaidenC Giscard d'EsCaing?
Answer: On my return eo Dakar afCer my leave in 1978 PresidenC Senghor
told me of the probabilltiy of my deparCure. He had heard it direcCly _
from President Giacard d'Eataing who, a ahort while later, invi.Ced me _
to go and see him in Paris. He told me approximately the following:
"You have been working with PresidenC Senghor for a very long time. I -
- imagine that you are attached to him as we11 as to Senegal. Would you
conaider, if I aeked you, coming to Paris? I would like you Co be some-
thing of a symbol, a promise, noC an alibi. There is no reaeon why the
people of the Antilles should be our poor relatives." I told him that I _
was very flattered by his choice and certain that my compaCriota would
underatand and appreciate this promiae of the collecCive upgrading of
the French overseas departments. IC seems to me that Giscard d'Estaing's
attitudes reflect an analysis thaC I share, that of a world Chat ia
becoming more and more differenziated. There ia a great degree of .
differentiation which is expressing iCself, notably, in the regional
movements in France. According to Giscard we from the Antillas musC
axpress our being French in a cerCain way.
Question: Yet, your new functtons are not specially oriented Co the
French overseas departments and territories. There is a secreCariat of
state for that purpose.
Answer: ThaC is true and in many resp.:^.ta I am gratified at the fact.
I believe that initially it would be very difficult for a peraon From
the Antilles to occupy that poaition. There are so many demands and
frustrations that one man alone would not be enough. But in multiplying
experiences like inine in all sectors in France and the Antilles, without G
complacency or demagogy, everything becomes possible, serenely and _
clearly. -
Question: Do yau expect a change in France's re].ations with the
Antilles?
Answer: I believe that the inhabitanCs of the Antilles do not seek a
change in staCus. On the oCher hand I believe that they wieh to partici-
pate more in their development. The burden of development has become
very onerous by viztue of the contradictions of our economy. Our
products, which are essentially primary products, involve social costs
- of overdeveloped countries. That is the major contradiction. Our bananas
are infinitely more expensive than those of Africa or Latin America. Theae
are difficult problems. With President Giscard d'Estaing I believe that a
new language is being used in the Antilles. For the first time the French
are saying: "Tteose areas will not be developed withouC changing a number
of attitudes and customs, without offering ather prospects to satisfy the
reaolve of participation of the inhabitants of the Antilles and notably
- the young."
.
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Tha Narth-5outh niglog Kas Nnt Fgilad
Question: 1'ou d;: noe sepm eo hold the same pogitions es Aime CeOaire. -
Don't you feel lika competing with him at tha e7.ections in hlartiniqug2
Answert Competing wiCh him? No, I don't believe go. He is a man for
wham I have a lat of considprgtinn, regpect, and effection because I L
know hi.m personally. Hig ig a greae voice which Che entire world of
blacks needs.
- Question: Cpeairp wishee autonomy.
Anewer: fle doee, it geems to me, buC with a number of qualifications.
He ig undoubtedly an autonomist bur l don't believe that he is nrguing
for independence. personally, I hope for a large degrpe nf decentraliza-
Cion for MarCinique eo that we might be genuine overaeae departmente And
po that the firet word in Che term mighC not be secrificed for the eecond.
?f already aL Biarritz or Arra$ [on mainland France] there is too much
r,oncentration in the decieion-making power, well then at a dietance of
7,000 kilometers auch an arrangement is deadly.
Quegtion: As a symbnl for the Antilles, are you going to take care of
economic relations between France and the Thirn World for, if one goes
by the definitian of your position, Chis iA a poeC created for you.
Mawer: It was created for me but in a way others have already exercised
such functione. This is a field which has indeed been identified for me.
You know that the North-South dialog is a pereonal initiative of the
French president. He wishes that this position ahould no longer involve
other tasks, that the position should exist in its own righC.
QueaCion: Is it not atrange then that the North-South dialog is an
initiative which has been a relative failure?
Answer: I= it had failed there would not be a conference such as that of
UNCTAD (Unieed Nations Conference on Trade and Development) in the coming
Weeks, one which, in my opinion, should lead to the initial establiahment
of a common pool of raw materials. The agreement on rubber whici-. will be
signed and which should point the way to oCher commodity agreemente vould
not have occurred. But I think especially that no one would like to
aesume the responaibility for a break in this dialog, difficult and
incomplete as it may be. It is quite true, however, that things have
occurred in a way very different from What one could hope for. Unques-
tionably, President Giscard d'Estaing first wiRhed to avoid confronta-
- tion. That was after the oil crisis. What was involved was to avoid
that the problems be settled through confrontation, to arrange things in
such a way that a dialog should be establiahed on the relations between
the two major groups of countries. That has not failed. Only naive
people could imagine that mechanisms which reflect relationa of secular
forces would lead in 3 years to satisfying proposals for everyone.
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Today tt aeeme to me that to renlly have ehingg advgnce iC would be -
apprepriate to distingu..sh betwQen problems which must be eolved in
the international context nnd others. '1'he reform of the international
monec..ry eysCem involves everyone, for example. But there gre a certain
number of queseiong which can be raised in exemplary fashinn on the
inCerregional or reginnal level whgre cerCain anmplementariCiee are best
explaingd. This disCincCion among gevergl 1evele should noC appear as an
gtCempC aC divisiori in the Third World. What ie invdlved, then, ie to
determine on one hand which interlocutors gre guscepCible to use such
langunge without bein6 gccused of divisioniem by the Third World coun-
trieg and, on the other, eccording to which criteria "to differentiate"
the problems.
'Co Organize Interdependence
It seemg to me thaC such an epproach can lead en progress in the long run
and under certain conditions. But it ie in any cage necessary to con-
tin>>e the dialog. That is the only way possible. Concern for realigm
And real generoeity must go hand in hand and complenent egch other.
Fcr sacrtfices will be necessary by the affluent countries. What le
invo'Lved is a transfer of reaources and a aharing of decision-making
powers. Ys a period like the one we are experiencing, which ie alceady
- a difficult period, propitious for thig kind of sacrifice?
Question: France cannot take the iniCiative of what you call sacrifices?
Answer: In this case you are asking a little too much from an official
like myself. IC is up to the president to take initiatives. -
Question: Regarding the regional cadres, President Giscard d'Eataing
has taken other initiatives, a little more restrained than the North-
South dialog. At several French-African summit meetings he proposed the
establishment of a solidarity fund with Africa, a special fund in which
he wished specifically to invite several other industrial states to
participate. That is another idea which has not made much progrees.
- Answer: Such an initiative doea not depend on him alone. His idea was
to invite all countries susceptible of supporting that projecc to make
a special and supplementary effort on behalf of the African countriea.
But somewhat different ideas have appeared. For all that, the initiative
has not been relinquished. The atudy will continue. In what forcn? It
seems difficult for me to say. You wili not have to weit long since
the next aummit will be held in Kigali, Rwanda, in May 1979. The fate
earmarked to that initiative of Preaident Giscard d'Estaing should
rapidly be known. He once again expreased the idea, of Which he is
deeply convinced, of active solidarity with Africa. He reiterated it in
Yaounde in a form which also seems important to me--that of "mutual
intereate." In his mind cooperation muet no longer be a kind of by-
product, of a somewhat shameyul relic of a bygone age but rather a
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pogieive desire tn orggnixe interdependence. f7nce aggin, it is g genera1 _
- idea but, expreeged in ehis form, it is of g nature to give gome Juetifi-
cation td edoperaeion and projecC new dimension in public opinion which
is far from being convinced df ir.
,I
~ Questinn: These are sCill generel ideas, for ttte only concrete thing is
eh~ ~id ro d~v~lopment. On rhis gcore it wae announc~d Chat ~rgnce
would incregge ite aid. Yet, in 1978 guch gssiseance wae reduced and
Frenne cnnCinupe to eepouse a posieion of dietrusC regarding mu1Ci-
laCpral aid.
- Answer: Dietrust is Coo gtrong g word. Ie is noC poseible to do every-
thing ae the egme time. I believe that the government is plgnning--and
I believe Chgti that is what is being decided--to increage French multi-
1aCera1 aid. Besides, the Africen cnuntries espeaially seek aizable
bilatergl aid all the more so as they receive multilateral gid from
exigting internaCional organizatiotte: The World Bank, United NaCione
Development F'rogram, and Europeatt DevelopmenC Fund.
Question: The fact remains that France is one of Che countries which
has greaeest reservations regarding multilateral gid. Accordingly,
France nearly always adopts the same ateitude as the United States,
reEusing to provide funds whenever the prdblem is raised. PresidenC
Giscard d'EaCaing hns made three or four suggestions which are rather
good, which have currency among all intellectuals and eenior officials
of international organizations. But then France does not take the _
necessary steps to implement them. Z'his is the case in the North-5outh
dialog. Or, that n� the appeal of Yaounde which, incidentally, should _
have been launched in France since, as you atated, it is first addreased
to French public opinion.
Answer: It hae been heard :n France all the same.
- Question: Naturally, but one would have appreciated Giacard d'Eetaing's
defending this idea with persistence in his country. An effort has to
be made as in the case of Sweden where the government dues not have
problems with its public opinioa. This effort was lacking at the time
of General de Gaulle, that of Georges Pompidou, and it is stxll lacking
now.
Answer: There is a new element, there are new promises and arguments.
This being said I imagine that, as yourself, the president regreta not
to be able to make more rapid progresa in the direction that he has
chosen. But once again the time to do ao is not right.
Question: The time always seems to be wrong.
Mswer: That is particularly conatraining and you are well aware of it.
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Quegtion: 'Chere is na hiseoric pxempLe df g gnvernmenti noC achieving g
goal which it thought was really important. In truth Western gnvern-
mente, including that of Frence, da not sgsign eo eheir aid a guffi-
cienCly high priority gnd Chat fn the reggon why rhey do not mnnage.
Answpr: polieiCs is the art of the poeeible. Incidentally, you men-
tioned the concrete gnd personal iniCiaCives of the French preeident
(North-South diglog, the Africgn Davelopmene Fund). As far gg the
North-South dialog ig concerned each one is in ggreement in recognixing
todgy thgt this initiative hae helped greatly to reduce the riekg--in no
wgy imaginary in 1973 and 1974, you will recall--of conflicte and violene
confronta+tions. What ie involved, then, is a very concrete reault.
As fdr the African nevelopment Fund, the presidenC propnged Co gll the
intereseed count.ies and notably the Americans td egrmark U.S. $1 billion
- Co epecial and gupplpmentary aid to the African countries. In theee
timee this is a rather concrete iriCiative which tesCifieg Co a political
resolve which--I regreC with you--is not gufficiently ehared.
Question: Politica ia the art of realizing what can be done. In your
place, should you not be an advocaCe for theae argumeata rather than the
defender of France's limits7
Answer: Believe me, I wish to be the advocate, even of modest rank, for
these ideas in which I believe With the same intensity as you.
Question: One must aseume this "symbolic" taek.
Answer: It is one of the things that I strive to do but it is not by
taking ahelter in spectacular but unrealistic attitudes that progresa
will be possible. It will be necessF�ry-"suf.ficient for the day ie the
evil thereof"--to advance things and not give up.
Question: In this sense, even if you do not like the comparison, one
caanot help making an analogy betWeen you and Andrew Young. You both
have in common a symbolic vatue vis-a-vis a national community and its
use with relation to Africa. But you don't have--or not yet--an
electoral base.
Answer: As you say the comparison does not diaplease me but some dis-
tinctiona are aecessary. Andrew Young ie a politician, which is not my
case. I am a civil aervant and as such I do not occupy center stage.
French public opinion does not have to lcnov me as such. It is different
for cry compatriots.
Question: What does "compatriot" mean?
MsWer: That is a very flexible idea. There are my compatriots in the
legal sense of the term: They are all French citizens. There are my
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Fnx dFFicini. usE oxLY
compgCrioCs by birth: Thooo people of "my" cornerg of the world--from
MarCiniquE, from Guadeloupe. _
Queee3un: bo you noC wieh to include a portion of the Third World?
Anawpr: I don'r know whae you wiah eo include. Whgt Y wish is Chatil
for example, in my f'ield North-South dialog ahould lead to resulte in
the genge u� meeting the demands of the Third World. I wieh there were
a common fund df raw maCeriale. Aleo, ChaC we shnuld give aid equivg-
lent to 0.70 percenC of our Groes Ngtional Product; ChaC the reform of
the internaCional monetarp syatem, which wi11 indeed occur one day,
ehould take the interests of the Third World inCo account. In that
connection I am n pertisan of the Third World but I do not wish to atop
being lucid. Furtherroore, I gm convinced thaC in the new emerging world
the Crue inCerese of the indugCrial countrieg ig to develop the Third
World. I am working with that in mind.
Giscard Knowa How To Speak to the Africans
Ques*_ion: You told us how you used to do things with President Senghor. -
Ia it differene with Valery Gigcard d'Eetaing?
Mswer: They are two very different men, firaC because of their training.
President Senghor is a man who was trained in what once uaed to be called
the "humanitiea." He is a man of classical culrure, poised and pondered.
- On his parC, Preaident Giscard d'Estaing is a man of more Cechnical
education as well as one with more atress on economica and financa.
Obviously, this difference has a bearing on their working methods, on
their approach to problems. :
But w�hat atrikes me is their similarities nevertheless, their common
taste for what is in the future. Their eyes are not riveted on the next
electoral deadline. They often speak the same language. Here are their
watchwords: "The Chird millennium" for Giecard d'Eataing and "the year
2001" for Senghor.
- It is this need to perceive the signs, to interpret changes under way,
to try to atnortize "future shock" and perhaps to control it which seems
to make them comparable in my mind. Hence this feeling of solidarity
betWeen Africa and Europe which they share. I shall add as far as
Giscard d'Estaing is concerned thaC while many stateamen have known how
to apeak about Africa, President Giscard d'Estaing is one of thoae who
also kaow how to speak to Africane.
Question: Senghor calls himself a socialist while Giscard d'Estaing
characterizes himself as a liberal. Hat�e you had no problem in making
an ideological reconversion?
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Answer: My gngwer to you is unhesiCgCingly nn. In its wiedom, the
public admin3eeration mgndaees ies o�ficiale tio be reserved in tihe
exercise of their funcCions and gpneral,ly respects their intimaCe con-
vicCions. 7'here is no cho3ce to makQ in ehaC respece, nor of neceseary
reconvexsion.
- puegtion: But behind the senior official there is Henry Jgan-Bapt3ete.
Who are you? As presidenti Senghor would eay, which perguaeion are your
political convictions reminiecenr of: Socialise? Liberal?
Anawer: ltather socialiat, let ua say center-lefC, but I do not get loet
' in Che clouda.
Question: Have you been an acCivist in a political party?
Answer: I have noC been an activiet. I have never had g perty card.
QuesCion: Were you more politically actfve in the past?
Answer: I don't believe eo.
Question: At the time of decolonization, of France's colonial ware, did
y ouu have a poeition?
Anawer: Yea, a clear one: I favored independence.
- Queation: Between Senghor and Cesaire, what does "Negritude" (NegrohoodJ
repre3enC for you?
Anewer: "Negritude" means that one ahould feel comfortable with one's
skin color.
Question: It is poesible to be white and be comfortable with one's akin
color.
Anawer: Undoubtedly, but we are speaking of "Negritude." That meana
being black and feeling comfortable with one's black akin. As you know,
many "blacks," notably in the Antillea, have for a long time denied IF
their African roots. To sit well in one's skin is to admit that the
oCher is also well in his skin and to clearly asaume his "difference."
Question: Is it more difficult to be black from the Antillea than
African black?
Answer: I don't believe that it is more difficult. One muat be aware
that we represenr an original entity. The Africaa does not raise this
kind of question. He is as he is. On our part we are a biologfcal and
cultural mix. Hence a situation of crosa-breeding which is always a
half-way situation: Not good anywhere but well everywhere at the eame
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Queseinn: Are your childran like you7
Answer: Y raise ehem wieh tihis faeling.
Question: Does your aon approve of you?
Answer: I beli.eve or rather I hope eo. Yn gny case, when he eees my
files he thinks thaG the Noreh-South dialog is the bueinesa of a genera-
tion.
CnPYRIGNT: Jeune Afr3que GRUPJIA 1979
2662
CSO: 8119/1437-C
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COUNTRY SECTION
NEW VERSION ARIANE, MINI-SPACE LAB PLANNED
Paris AIA & COSMOS in French 26 May 79 pp 66-67
FRANCE
[Article by Pierre Langereux: "Space Research Center Pxepaxing New -
Versions of 'Ariane' Rocket and Project for 'Hermes' Marlred Mini-Space ~
Lab"] -
[Text] By the year 2000, France is preparing to carry out a very ambi-
tious apace program based primarily on the proapecta of the development
of the European "Ariane" rocket.
- The latest version of the rocket--"Ariane 511--as a matter of fact makes
it poasible to build the first French orbital station, particularly for
the procesaing of materials in space, the ao-called "Minoe" project.
This etation will be serviced by a apace capeule with automaCic control
which can then give riae to a manned and reusable "mini-epace lab" (super-
sonic glider), as disclosed by AIR ET COSMOS saveral months ago (aee AIR
ET COSMOS no 757, p 419 17 Mar, and no 760, p 43, 7 Apr). SupplemenCary
details on these projects--particularly on tne "Hermes" mini-epace 1ab
of CNES [National Space Research Center]--vare released recently, on 16
May, during a dinner gt,ten by the CRPAE (Aeronautical and Space Public
Relations Club), by Mr Hubert Curien, president of CNES, and Mr Frederic
d'Allest, dir.ector of boosters at CNES and officer in charge of the
"Ariane" program.
From "Ariane 1" Co "Ariane 3"
In its current version, "Ariaae 1," the "Ariane" rocket whoae firat
launch is etill acheduled for November 1979, ahould be able to put a
payload of 1,700 kilograma iato a geosynchronous t ransfer orbit (200-
36,000 kilometere, inclined at 9.5 degrees) from Kourou; this payload
correaponds to a weight of about 970 kilograms for the satellite placed
in a geoataCionary orbit. This performaace is alaost equivalent to that
of the American "Atlas-Centaur" rocket but it is lesa expensive; the
cost of launchiag a geoatationarq satellite of the "Intelsat 5" class
presenCly is roughly on the same order ($22 million) for "Ariane" as it
is for the "Shuttle" of NASA which however is much more powerful.
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France however has already drawn up n shore-term innpravement program for
the "Arinne" rocker which Wiii make it posaibl,e to increase the payload in
a geosynchronous transfer orbiC from 1.7 to 2.3 tona, in othar worde, a
gain of 35 pexcenC in Cerae of performances which will ei.mulCaneously be
accompanied by a reduction of abauC 30 percent in the cost of the weight
carried by the satiellite as compared to "Ariane 1", F. d'Allest declared.
~ This new veraion, "Ariane 3," should be ready aC the end of 1982 or the
beginning of 1983, accord9.ng to the CNES preaidene. It wiii enable Che
European booster to place, in a geoatiaeionary orbit, simultaneously two
satellitea of the "Thor Delta 3910" clasa (2 x 800 kg) or two satellites
o� the "ST5/PAM-D" clasa (2 x 960 kg), such as "ECS, MAFtECS, TELESAT" or
- "Telecom 1" or juse one big satellite weighing between 2,150 and 2,300
- kilograms for direct television (satelliCe with �ive channels).
- The "Ariane 3" vergion will be an improvement of the current rocket with
, more powEr�ul engines for the firat and aecond sCages ("Viking" engines),
as we11 as for the third atage ("HM7" engine) whoae tanks will be made
longer in order to carry 10 tens of cryogenic rockeC fuel (inatead of 8
tons). Besides, two powder-fuelled engines (7 tona, each), with a unit
thruat of 60-65 tona, will be connected to the f irat atage to aeaist in
the 1if toff.
, Another version, "Ariane 21" a less high-performance veraion--1.95 tona
in a transfer orbit--could also be u9ed for intermediate miseion by elim-
inating the additional "booatera" of "Ariane 3."
Provisions have also been made to introduce subsCantial savings on the
cost of turning out series-produced boosters by means of the recovery of
the first stage which accounts for about half of the cost of producing ~
the rocket (F 40 million). The feasibility atudy currently being con- i
ducted by CNES and ONERA [National Office of Aerospace Studies and Re
search] seema to have shown that the operation was feasible and profit-
able. It could be uaed operationally around 1983-1984, accordi.ng to '
- F. d'Allest.
- Thia improvement program for the "Ariane" rocket has already been aub-
mitted to the program management commitCee of the European Space Agency.
~ The green light was expected during Che last meeting of Che ESA which hao
- juat been held in Paris on 15 and 16 May. But two counCriea participating
in the "Ariane" program--Germany and Holland--are atill rather reluctant.
The CNES president however hopea that the supplementary development program
- wlll be adopted during a coming meeting of the ESA board--in June or July--
and at any rate prior to the end of the year. CNES secretary-general
Roger Lesgards furthermore recalled that the French government decided tc;
_ implement this program leading to the "Ariane 3" rocket. The operation
will cost about F 360 million.
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The "Ariana" Family
But the development of the "Ariane 2" and "Ariane 3" versions in fact ie
parti of g much more ambitious undertaking which is aimed at fu11y bene-
fiting from the tremendoue ef,�ort devoCed eo tihe deve].opmenC of the "Ariane"
rocket (more tihan F 4 billion) so as to develop an "Ariane" family--such as
there is, for example, a"Thor Delta" Family in the United Statee.
- According to Mr. F. d'A].leat, the importane thing is to improve Che perfor-
mance of the "Ariane" rocket up to Che extreme limit. "As a matter of
�act," he said, "this ie not a question for France to undertake the dev-
elopment of a new concept of the 'Space Shuttle' type (a huge pilotted,
recoverable and reusable vehicle), euch ae tihe one currently being dev-
eloped by NASA to replace all American rockets in the course of the next
decade. That ia noC within our means," declazed F. d'Allest.
"Ariane 4"
The purpoae of the future "Ariane" development program, planned by the
CNES, thua ia to introduce auccessive modificationa which will improve
the performance of the rocket while prepsring for the next sCage, the
last stage in the proceas, giving riae to the "Ariane 5" rocket--which
could launch a recoverable and reueable mini-apace lab.
By 1985-19909 the CNES is thus planning to perfect a new version "Ariane
4" of the European rockeC who~e payload in a geosynchronous tranafgr otbit
would thua be increased from 2.3 tons ("Ariane 3" ) to 2.9 tona, whereas
the unit cost would be reduced by 55-60 percenC as compared to the cur-
rent version ("Ariane 1"). This "Ariane k" rocket would make it poasible ~
simultaneously to launch a heavy satellite of the "direct TV" clase and
a satellite of the "telecommunications" class.
According to CNES, the cost of the "Ariane 4" operation would be roughly
equivalent to that of the preceding stage, or about F 300 million. This
time the important thing would be to make the third cryogenic sCage
bigger and to increase the thruat of the "Viking" engines to a maximum
for the fix'at and second atages; the tanks for the firat atage would also
be made longer as much as possible so as to increase the atockable roc-
ket fuel capacity (UDMIIi and N204) from 145 tons ("Ariane 111) to 190 tona.
Four powder-fuelled booatera would be added to the first stage--instead
of two on "Ariane 3".
But, consideriag the major modifications thus made in Che launch vehicle
--parCicularly the lengthening as such which would no longer make it pos-
- sible to uoe the current gantry towex--and the anticipated increase in
the number of launches, this "Ariane 4" atage would require the construc-
tion of a second launch pad at Kourou. The coat of this second launch
pad can be eetimated at several hundreds of billions of franca. That
would make it poasible for us to have more than four launches per year
(this being the current launch limit).
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"Ariana 5"
The lasC stage in the developmenC of the European rockeC thus would be
the completion, by 1990, of ttie "Ariane 5" varaion which wou].d be a
two-stage rockeC capable of puCting up to 10 tona of payload inCo a].ow
earth orbit (200 kilometere altitude, inclined ati 30 dagrees) from Kourou,
ittatead of 4.5 eons with the present rocket ("Ariane 1").
Thia Cime, the improvementa would esaentially i.nvolve the upper stage be-
cause ttie first stage of ehe rocket would have aCtained iGa maximum dimen-
siona and performances with "Ariane 4". The "Ariane 5" rocket would thus
have a aingle upper atage, but with cryogenic propulsion, with 40 tona of
rocket fuel$ to �eed a single turbopump engine with a thruat of 60 tons
in a vacuum. The rocket would thus have a single diameter (3.8 metiera)
�or the two stages, whereas Che ahroud, with a larger diameCex (4.5 meters),
would of�er a uaeful volume of 170 cubic matara, making iC poseible to ac-
commodate three btg satellites.
A aupplementary propulsion syatem could furthermore be added under the
ahroud fox misaions requiring great energy (geosynchronous Crans�er, plane-
tary shota). This propulsion asaembly would comprise the following: As
Che third stage, a cryogenic stage (derived fram the current third stage),
and as Pourth stage (optional), a powder-fuelled stage or a stage with
stockab],e rocket fuels, depending upon the miasion.
Thia "Ariane 5" rocket would thua enable Europe to place about 2.7 tons
into a geostationary orbit (or 4.75 tons inCo a transFer orbit), to send
automatic probes through the solar system (2.5 tons toward Venus and 600
kilograms toward Jupiter), to place, into a low orbit, heavy payloads of
the "Spacelab" type, or to put together "modular orbital stations" which
might be manned or which could be visited [inspected] by astronauta.
"Minos" Pro3ect
_ "Ariane 5" for example would make it possible to place into a low orbit
a station weighing several tons and coneisting of a"powex module" (10
kilowatts) which would be regularly serviced by an entirely automated
"mini-apace vehicle" without any crew (of the "Apollo" capsule type),
recoverable in the ocean, off [French] Guyana or in the Gul� of Gascony.
This is the "Minos" project of the CNES which calls for putting up an
orbital station for the induatrial production of new matexials in space.
On this occasi.on, the CNES stated that the "Minos" study takes into con-
aideration all of the techntques and technologies required for space
travel tomorrow:
Power supply through a photovoltaic generator with an output of more than
10 kilowatta in orbit, with atora8e means during eclipses;
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~ Automatic and remote-control rendexvoua techn3.quea and procedures permit-
ting the aesembly of big etiruceures, Che reconfiguration o� statione, and
rapairs of damage 1, orbit (to guarantiee ali�etime of more than 7 yeara);
Recovery techniques and procedures making it poesible to bri.ng paylaods
(matexials, �ibers, miecellaneous inetrumenta and equipmene) back down to
earth in good condition. -
"Hermes" Projecti
The implementation of auch an automatic syatem could be upgraded through
manned flighta for inapection or maintenance purpoaes, according to CNES.
Thus, the CNES is studying the "Hermes" project involving a manned and -
reusable apace vehicle which resembles the mini-apace vehicle project
_ which the Soviets have been atudying for more than a year. "Yiermes"
would be a auperaonic glider:with a delta wing; it would have a toCal
weight oE 10 tons and could carry five astronauts or only 2"pasaengera"
and 1.5 tons of cargo. "Hermes" would be launched by the two-etage '
"Ariane" rocket on which it would take the place of the shroud.
This vehicle, twice as big as an "Apollo" cabin, would thus be "manned."
BuC it would be piloted in an enCirely automatic fashion becauae Che
response time and the complexity of amooth [flat] reentry into the atmos-
phere are beyond the capabilitiea of manual piloting --which by Che way
ia also true af the "Shuttle." Teats were conducted recently at ONE1tA to
study the piloting conditions. At the end of its flight, the "Iiermea"
glider could be put down on a runway like an airplane (jusC like the
"Shuttle"). Such a manned glider could stay in a low orbit for a week,
it could handle traasfer and assembly of modular assemblies and it could
service orbital stations carried aloft by the "Ariane 5" rocket,
According to the CNES, the development of this kind of "multipurpose -
launch vehicle" ("Ariane 5" and "Hermes"), asauming certain technologi- _
cal pointa whoae feasibility remains to be demonsCrated, would take be-
_ tween 7 and 8 years.
COT'YRIGHT: Air & Cosmos, Paris, 1979
5058
C30: 3100
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COUNTRY SLCTION
,
4
ARIANE FIRST STA,GE I,AUNCH TESTED
Paris AIR & COSMO5 in Erench 26 May 79 p 69
FRA.NCE
(Text] The first qualification ahot for the first stage of the European
"Ar3ane" rocket was accomplished successfully on 17 May on Che big PF 20
test bench oE the SEP [European Propuls3an Campany] aC Vernon (Eure).
The test (Q1) lasCed 139 aeconds and ended when the fuel (UDMi) ran ouC.
It demonstraCed the good resistance of the-new phenolic aillca-resin
nozzle necka (SEPHEN 301) developed by SEP.
The bench teats of the.third stage of the European "Ariane" rocket with
cryogenic propulsion wi11 be resumed next June aC the SEP test center at
Vernon (Eure), according to Mr J. L. Dardare, director of the liquid pro-
pulaion and space sector of SEP. These tests had been auapended after the
serious accident on 28 Novembar 1978--explosion aC the test bench--wh3ch
caused considerable damtige to the stage being teated on the bench and
whi.ch reaulted in a delay of 6 months in checking out the third stage. The
latter thua cannoC be completed prior to Che firet flight of "Ariane"
scheduled for next November. In spite of thaC, J. L. Dardare declared
that he had conf idence in tihe proper operatioa of the third stage in fltght.
Between June and September 1979, the SEP as a matter of fact will have con-
ducted four tests on. the entire propulsion assembly of the complete third
- stage (with in-flight tanks) and several teata of the propulsion bay (witih
- heavy tanks). A new test of the propulsion bay has juat been succesafully
accomplished on 8 May. This shot (B2-6) lasted 518 seconds (standard dura-
tion) and was completed when the liquid oxygen ran out. The servomotors
- were activiated, as was the attitude and roll control syatem. That was
- the sixth test o� the series and the eighth time this engine had been
- turned on, giving us a total of 2,900 seconda of operation on the bench.
J. L. Dardare also noted that the SEP had not encountered any major problems
in the perfection of the propulsion assemblies or the third atage and that
the difficulties were tied to the utilization of the engiae as such as a
- reault of ita senaitivity to the.explosion of hydrogen with air. For
example, the 28.November incident would not have or_curred in flight aince
the stage functions in a vacuum.. .
COPYRIGHT: Air & Coamos, Paris, 1979
5058 21
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COUNTRY SECTION
_ GrENOgLE MILITARY HOSPITAL OPERATIONS DESCRIBED
Paris MEDECINE ET ARMEES in French Feb 79 pp 141-143
FRANCE
[Excerptis] Among the old army hospitals that of Grenoble, up to now never
named, has a place of its own.
Born at the beginning of the century, in aupport of forcea atationed in the
Alps, it has had a vocaCion for tuberculoais until recenC yeare. This unit,
which enjoys an exceptional location, has remained, despiCe difficultiea and
threats to its very existence, the hospital of the 27th Alpine Divieion.
Its hospiCalization potenCial avoids the inconvenience of the large unita.
The authorized effort toward humanization is exemplary. The diecovery of
well-ordered pavillions, separaCed by spacious walkways bordered by trees
and flowers, behind a neat entrance ia a pleasure to the eye and a cause of
pride among lthe military. In the background vibraCe the greens and blues
of thp mountains and the sky. -
Built on the last slopes of the massif of Chartreuse, at an altitude of
227 meters, the hospital is dominated by Mount Rachais and Mount Saint-
Eynard, which protect it from the north and west winds, a situation which
explains a particularly mild and agreeable microclimate. One gets there
via national route No. 90, Genoble-Chambery, which in this place takes the
name of the avenue of the Maquis of the Greaivaudan. Facing the entrance
of the hospiCal, moreover, stands the statue of Major Nal, hero and martyr
of the resistance.
The general appearance of the unit has hardly been changed aince its be-
ginning. The area of the grounds is three hectarea; the covered surface
consists of 7,777 square meters, and the habitable developed surface is
18,767 square meters.
New Completions
The radiology unit, the operation suite, the dental offices and the labora-
tories have been recently renovated, along with the premises of the former
tuberculosis service, where the medical services are now located.
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Fdn nFFtcrnt, uSE ONLv
'Che nEw nCfice of hospitalizntidna nnd nutpntient CdCe, entirely recnn-
coIved, ting 3ugt been finished. partieiona hnve been kndCked ddwn in order
td Crente a vgat, we11-illuminated gpace, decorated with pictures and green
plnnCg. While ane gection regerved fnr the hoseess serveg simuleanenusly
ns n waiCing rodm, the rerngining gpnce is nccupied, due tu the gapg bptween
the vnridue points nf work (ndmianions, diachnrges, ouC-paCienC cgre), by
nfficeg ndapted rd the purpnse.
A cleur system of gignnlg enableg the pneientg nnd the visitnrs to drient
themselves quiee narurally Cowurd the admisgions serviee, wherp COitCscC
may be made without any abatncle on the pgrt nf the personnel.
EfEortg nnw under way will affect the recnnsCitution nf the surgicel sprvirp
(the be.Ag fnr the reaCoration nf six beds ig under way).
Television roomg, reserved for each of the threp geCtorg will doon bp
, plgced gC the dispoaal of the paeienCg.
'Che pergonnel of the esCablighnent hgve not been fargotten. The mege ha11
hgs jugt becn newly redone and decnrated. 'i'he npgrtmente of the segff may
hencefnrth be Gonaidered as a model of the type: the male nurses nctually
, have carpeted rooms with two bedg. -
The tieating equipcnent will be entirely renovgted in 1979-1980
Finally the engineering service will continue the painting of the exCerior
woodwork and iron work begun two yearg ago to brighten the grey facades of
the buildinga.
Pgrallel with this material effort, an entire policy of human relations
- hgs been launched and pureued both with regard to the pergonnel and with
the potential clientele.
The goal is to give the greatest reputation and the greatesC efficiency
possible to a hospital which deserves it, but the posssibilities of which
are perhaps not yet sufficiently known.
At present time there are 212 beds, of which 100 are medical; 76 in surgery;
26 in O.R.L. [Otozinolaryngologyj; 10 in ophthalmology. Thig capacity can
be raised to 300 beds in the event of mobilization, criais, or catastrophe.
Clientele
The Alpine Hospital of Grenoble is, above all, the healCh support unit of
the 27th Alpine division, 10,000 strong, created on 1 Auguet 1976 and heir
of the 27th Alpine brigade, which comprised the troop corps of Grenoble nnd
S:voy (CP at Grenoble) and the 17th alpine brigade located further south
(Cl? at Gap).
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Wliilc� the unitg baned in the Grcnnble urbnn urpa (6th B.C.A. [Bgtaillon dc
CiiagnGUrg Alpine], [itegiment d'artilleric de MontagneJ 27th H.C.S. (expanaion
unknuwn) the specialized brnncheg militiary gchnnl, the sehdol nf gir cadeta)
naarly usp the fncilitieg of the hdapieal, cpregin oeher uniCs belonging
tn the 27th alpine division, scattered Chrough the mountains nn(' ialleys
quite willingly direet eheir aick to orher igrger health units of the nrmy
whiGh are nearer or nw re eagily accessible.
A recpnr atudy permirs a eglculaCidn uf the pneentigl clienCele nf the Army
HngpiCal of Crenoble nt 15)000 gnd in g nw re renlistic wny nt 12,000,
figureg whiCh largely jueCify noe only the mainCenance of the hnapitgi bue
algo the effnrts ahich now havp been approved Co renovate iC.
Opergtion
Ttie gervices of surgery and mediCine ere staffed by doctorg on active
serviee. in ophChalna logy and in O.R.L. an intern and a contrnct phyaician
provieinnally nccupy the poeitione of militgry gpecialists. '1'his ig an in-
convenienCe for the unit and g major worry of the chief physician and the
regional director.
If the hoepital doea not yet have nll the desired personnel and deeirable
teChnical equipment, it still has the advantage of being located only 100
kilometers from the HIA [expansion unknown] of Desgenettes and of being in
the immediate vicinity of ttie CNU [Centre Hostitalier Universitaierej of
Crenoble, where there ig a DZ [Drop Zonej which the army can eaeily use
for certain evacuations.
Patients assignable to certain specialtiea (psychiatry, tuberculosis, derma-
tology, etc.) are mainly sent to the training hospiCal of Lyon, while the
CtiU receivea certain patienta in very serious condition who need intensive
and urgent care.
In compensation, and by virtue of an agreement concluded with the CHU,
patients coming from the civilian hospital are under certain circumstances
admitted to the HA of Grenoble.
Concluaion
The Crenoble Army Noapital, situated in a privileged context of a touriatic
region, handles the mission entrusted to it very well. With some additiongl
means it could become the preatige hospital of human dimensions which the
elite troops of the 27t1. division deserve, at the same time that i*, would
open, despite the heavy competition of the private aector, to the whole
potential clientele of 3renoble and ite surroundings.
COPYRIGHT: ADDIM
6108
CSO: 3100
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COUNMY SEC'PION
FRANCE
8R?EF5
DLTIBpUTr MQ,ITARY MODFRNVATION--France ig modern3xing itis aire forcE
materiel in D3tboutii by virtue oP the agreements etg:ec1 by �Lhe-tvo----
nationg. A flozen or so Mtxage III-C aircraft will be aent to Djibauti
to replace bhe obsoletie F-1,00 aircrsPt tihati are na+ neerin8 ti2e end of
tteir usef.il life. In additiion, the French iiational Asaembly has
draPted a].aw suthorizing the approval of cooperation agreements be-
tWeen the two countiries. Included ig a temporary protocol that es-
tiab].ishes the conditions under whi,ch French Pbrcea may be stat3.oned in
D3ibouti, and the principles of militiary cooperation. L1'ext)' [madrid
DEMSA in $panish Apr 79 P 59
-
CBO: 3110
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COtfNMY 3EC"rION SPAIN
CNTt MAM8T3 OPPOSED BY OLU LM AMaHIST3
Madrid CAMI0 16 in Spaniah 27 MaY 79 pp 2e, 290 319 32
(Text1 The old and now almost eternal, ye# Young battle betreon the trro
moet ~`amoue graybearde of the workore movement, Bakunia aad Maru, has ao.�
quired nox vig+or in the CNT (National Confederation of igbor), but thte
time it is Eakunin who hac kicked Marx in the panta.
Nistory repeate iteelf. '1'he anarchigt union CNT hae alrraye baen a tempting
morsel for Marxist revolutionary politiaiaag laaking mue rupport and ee-
peaially for sdherenta of Marxirt minority faotione: Trotalqritee, Bordiamgta,
all kinde of aounail mambera.
"Parallel Organization"
Now in Barcelona the CNT hae expelled the vieible leaders of a eelf-deaiguted
"anarchiet union affinity group," which the CNT aalis a"p4ra11el orgQniza..
tion," aad whiah it accuees of haviag plotted to set up e. poaer etsvoture
r+ithin the QQT deaigned to tusa it into a union "like the others, that ie,
a atatiet, a drive belt union."
Thia is what Center Federation leaders sa3d to Xavior pominao, vhile in
&;rcalana Meraedea Riva was buey corroboratiag thia denunaiation at the CNT
Preee aad Propegsada Organization on the Plaza Real,
Beoauae of thia mtaipurg+e, which a Madrid nexspaper esagg+erated to the point
of aauauncing that it would meaa the ead of the CNT aad at a time rrhen that
organizatiai is prepariag for its Fifth Comgreeag CAMHIO 16 hae beoome in-
tereated in the aurrent anarchist uniaci movemeat in 3psir.
Acaording to CHT souraes, the CHT noa has a total membership of 150,000.
In cooparieon xith.the eituatiou 2 years eg+o, the bslance aheet showa a
relstively eizable drop in the number of activiets but it also notes oigw
of reoavery in eeveral uaioas,
The Ceater Federatian, for example, vhiah had a memberahip oF 2,500 in 1977
that dropped to 1,500 in 1979, ha8 egain upped ita msmbershfp to 2,500.
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1
FoR oFFicini, usE ornY ~
According to CNT membarg them8elveg, there are today w3thin the orgarii-4stion
three aursents of id8as on what the CNT ehould be, Thus what tn at ie0ue ia
an important debate in whiah the very future of anarchist unionism is at
otaka.
Th8 preeg haa detined these currenta ueing the terma "pacotas" [translation
not ava3lable], "pur3sta" and "reformer~," trhiah ON'r members wnanimouely and
3ndigtsantly rejeat.
"'Po employ theae tormg ig to ad.mit that one laiows notihing about the CNT or
its history. It meane only that one wante to run it down," eqy people in
CNT oiraleg.
'Phe Thme Currents
Neverthelees, they themgelvee do not eeem to be very alear about ths terma
or affiliations that ehould be appliafl to theee different ourrente and there
is a very importaat reagon for thint the word, the definition, the aonoept
are a11 of fundamental importanae in the anarohist world.
In W event, they all agree on the following alarification proposed by
this reviews
Let us take the key plua8o in the debate, "anarchiet unionism," vhich com-
priees the three aurrente.
Qne of these lap emphasie on the word "aaarchist," another on the vord
"unioaism" and the third preaches a harmonioue eynthesie of the trro.
Rhoae bQlcnging to the :irst group are the onee the prees refers to ae
"paeotas." Crestly inf].uenced by the ideae eet forth in ft 1968 in Franae
and their effeata, they feel that under the preeent ciraumstanaea the CNT
ha,s to extend abeolute priority to the ao-called merginal ba.ttless ecologi- _
ca1 and aatiauclear campa,igns, Prisoner and gay movements, counterculture -
aations, etc. Tb,is faation' e moat vell-lanor+n CNT public figure ie Iuis
Andre$ Edo rrho ie laviah w3.th hia statements in vasious publioations and
vae the chieF author of the famoue Anarchist Conference of August 1977
(eee CAMO 16, No 296)0
On the other haad, the membere af the eeaond group, part of rhich conaists
of thoee excluded from Barcelona and MLlaga, etress the purely uaionist
aepecta of the Bituation and feel that the CNT ahould be muQh tougher vith
regard to membership qualifioations and ahould not re3ect normal union
~e6,io and peugrti ie~pating in ma~or negoetiatio~ns,aagreements, ~ o~ly minority etc,
The chief figures of this group come from the Marxist camp, but in faat
thiB faatfoa, urider other names and dieguises, hae eropped up in the CNT
repeatedly in the past ("those of the thirties," Pestaaa, Peiro, etc.).
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Fox oFFiclnL usE oN.Y
One of the best qual,Sfi,ed leaders of the group i.n 5ebastian Puuigoavert, who
was expelled a few ciays W in Basaelona.
And lastly, there is the ao-called "pur38t" aurrent, or those annarahist
unioniste who want the CNT to etiak to ite apolitical traditiong and.readi-
nese to take direot aotion, that is# etrikeg without xasning and heavy
pressuree on amployere. _
At the aama time, thera are trrn "hardheade" in the CNT whose real importanae
haa been particularly exaMerateds the FAI (Zberian Anarchtst Federation)
and those living in exile,
The S oala Iaire -
FAI members, Who are also members of the CNT, are divided among themeelvee
into varioue faatione and shift from one to another with ooneiderable ver.!
satility, dependi�g on the union or federatton in queation. At the eame
time, other unions tend to aaauee thoge in exile, sti11 living in Fra:zce in
little waaing groups, of all the evils of the CNT, xhich thoee in exile
reepond to patiently or virul.ently as the caee may be.
At 1315 on sunday 15 January 1978, several Molotov oocktails toseed by a _
group involving individuals carryring CNT memberahip cards burned and complete-
ly deetroyed the Sca1a Music Hall in Baroelona, causing the deaths of four _
workera xho perished in the flamea (see CArIDTO 16, No 321). -
Since the 3oala
Today, Sebastian Pufgcevert, rrhoae opponente consider Y,im to be the "braina"
of the plot (and who has been expelled from the CNT), and Leandro Hernandez,
aho belongs to the "affinity grcyup" and has not been expelled beoauee in his
union the "group" is in the majority, explain to thi8 review: "We have begun
to unite aince the Soala inaident. That rras a very important Sunday for
the CNT becauae we had achieved our firat legal demonatration, attended,
according to the police, by 10,000 people. But along with thia good neas,
ae xere confronted rrith a brutal asaault perpetrated by CNT activiate, even
though aating on their orrn behalf and at their own risk. But this assault
reeulted in a heavy loas of inembership aud, at the same time, the positions
today oppoeing ona another were already being determined. One thing ie
_ certain and that ie the faat that some unions of the historioal FAS beggn
to attempt to change the very dynamics of the organization and that reasons
for a confrontation had already been produced at the time of the celebrated
meeting bettireen Peirats and Montser~y in Montjuich, clearly anti-Catalonian
in character, and at the Anarchist Conference. Our firet meeting was in
Marah 1978, rhen rre xorked out a number of stands on the politioal situation
of the time."
They addeds "We have beea acaused of ignoring some thingB like the struggle
on behalf of the prieoners, etc., but in reality the CHT is getting awa,y
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from the olaue et YUggle in the faotorieg and whether the aseemblles are
talcen over through ahutdowns or people in the faotoriee ie of no importanae.
7'he fira.1 atraw wae the di,souagion on the agreementa when Conetruooion de-
o3ded not to ge along with them ahile we were in favor of negotiatitsg, al-
though in the end we did not gign and Withaut whiah we may wind up on the
1osing gide. "
Marxi.ste, Out t
The traditional faation of the CNT ie not partiaularly eaey on the "aff3�ityr
group, " whic3h it aaauses of being "a parallel orgatiization made up of peopYe
trying to eeize porrer," an an oldtime ONT membex put it at a round table
session held with QAMSIO 16 at CNT haadquarters on the Plaza Real in
Baraelona.
There they eaid that, whon the CNT reorganized iteelf in 1976, "various
groupa with other similar leanings and ideologies turned to it. There were
Trotsky3.tea, progreesives, Marxiets and even leftist Catholiae... in a word,
there were a13 ktnds, and everyone wanted to join the CNT."
"Among them," added those attending the meeting, who refused to glve their
naaea or a11ow themaelves to be photographed, "there were thoee who oalled
themselveg aommuniet-anarchiets. At any rate, during a plenary seseion it
was firm].y agreed that the CNT vae an anarchist union organizetion and it
was deoided that either this communi.atrassarahiet group ehould dieeolve it-
self or leave the organization."
ZRieae aativists were acauaed of having pretended to disperae but in real.ity
- of having more or lese eeoretly organized them$elvea in order to influence
the organization aad win nex aativiete over to their aauee.
1'Man~y of those belonging to this parallel faation come from other union
organ3.zations like the General Union of Workers (IIGT), inaluding the Com-
miesions where they were ezpoaed as Trotekyites or Marxiat-Leniniets aad
expelled. We Iniew that they aere organizing throughout the aountry and
holding meetings in various partg of Spain," they went on, and the press
searetary 3ndigaantly saids "'lhey have damag+ed the reputation of all
anarchiat union motives,"
Fledericals Voi.ce
Trey went an to explains "Typical of these people is their political op-
portunism, alao typical of Marxism,
'1'hey made use of speeehos like the one Peirate made at the 1977 meeting in
Montjuich to attack those of ua xho agreed with him and sub$equent politioal
events ahoa that he was right. They eaid they were dieciplea of Peiro
but their main a3m `+as to seize poxer and infiltrate the CNT preas, xhich
they sahieved With the SOLIDARIDAD ONtERY."
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FOti orrrcr.nL usE ONi,Y
Un the phona, speaking from hnr apartment in moulouaa (Pranao), Federioa
tdontoony still has a alear, firm voioo. Fox her, tha dieauesion over the
expuleione in Bouccelona, the unions and the SOLIDARIDAD OHREtA has been
exaggbrated.
"From here, I am unaware of the hidden motives in the a�fair, but what ig
apparontly at isgue is the expogure and expulsion of a Maxxiet elitist group
_ that wa,nted to seize influential poots in the organization and manipulate
~ the eongrees announaed for Ootober in its favor," ahe told CAMBIO 16.
Towasd the Fifth Congress
As a matter of faot, in a document divulged by the exaluded "a.ffinity group"
right af'ter its expulsion, it eeverely aacuges "the exile group and other
aearet, almost Mafia-like organ.izations" (read the FAI) of violating the
principles of federalism.
The exile group responded with another doaument addressed to "these youths
- who are reaating againat their elderg" in whiah it reminda them "what the
CNT exile group has been and has aecomplished," rendering homag+e to thoee
CNT membera who have been shot or "assassinated," from Amador Franco ta
Joaquin Delgado and Cuillermo Granados with the 5abate brothere between them.
From France, they also pointed out to this review anather reason for the
"exile group's" irritation with the "g:coup." The SOLIDARIDAV OffiRERA hact
publiehed an article by the expelled CNT member, Mikel Orzandia, who had
participated.in the last muniaipal elections in the Basque Country in the
Herri Bataeuna nationalist leftiet ooalition.
CNT sources in France eaid that thie political position of the expelled
SOLIDAAIDAD OffiUMA manag3zig editorahip was one of the most influential
factors in deaiding to expel them.
Thia Mqy the CNT atarted to prepare for ita Fifth Congreas.
Site to Be Decided
The last one was held in Zaragoza in 1936 and represented a victory for the
ideas advanced by the then FAI in the CNT. It was of considerable political _
importance and, in fact, profoundly marked an entire generation of workers.
Today thinga are different. The CNT is not what it was and mar~y of its
membera doubt whether thia is really the right time to call a congress.
At the moment, they doubt that it can be held in October as planned. Qn
the other hand, the gite of the congress has not yet been deaided on but,
as of now, it will be held neither in Madrid nor in Barcelona. In CNT
circlea, there ia talk of Seville, Valencia or Zaragoza.
Nothing in the CNT is like it is in other organiza.tions. When any other
ordinary union or party plans to hold a congreea, the 3 or 4 daye are
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perfeatly programmed and preparad fox.
But wh3.1e we lrnow when a CNT congress is to begin, we never know when it
wiii end. The laet one, held in Zaragnza, 1aeted 18 daye. Coneidering the
number ef queetione the CNT at present plane to disoues, in ONT airolea
they say that the Fifth CongreeB oould laet almoet a month.
Deepite thiag Luie Andree Pdo, the leading figure in the eo-oalled "pasota
movement," feels that the congress will be "a congress of little importanoe."
And this preo3.aely becauee of the "group," gome of whose lsadere have beer
exposed and exaluded, Edo sayss "It will be a congY'aee in neme cnlY.
This is due to the faet that the aonvoaation to a congress was maniPulated
and thi.a was done preaieely in order to be able to mani.pulate the aongresa."
And in an interviea published by EL VIWO 2'OPO9 he peseimietiaa].ly adde that
not 3ugt a few CNT aat3vista, rrhether "pasotas" or not, are together g^oing
through "a perSod during whiah not anly are the member unions not funation-
ing but even lesa eo the company aeationg and oomoai.tteea. At a time when
neither the loaal nor border federatione, nor the regional aommi.ttees are
funotioning, when not even the National Committea ie f'unationing, it ie in-
sane to have a CNT oongreso."
National Committee, Badly Damaged
Actuaa.ly, the arisis is not over. Edo has in veiled faahion eaid what matW
CNT membera from Easaelona do not aonceals The National Commi.ttee's prestig+e _
is still very badly cla,ma8ed. Two of its members were in fact cloaely linked
rrl,th the "group, " Mmy doubt that the commi.ttee will make it to the congress
in its preaent form. _
Fdo, a"paeota," aharee the fear of traditional anarahi.at union organi7.at
tions which still feel themselves bound by the old Zaragoza congreae.
The CNT unions - and thia includes the Marxist "group" which maintain
_ links wit,h IISO [Workers Trade IInion], CC00 [Workera Comnisaions] and UCT
miriorities and with people from the CSUT ~Confederation of IInitaxy Tr.'a+de
IIniona of Workers] or the SOC [Workers So idarity of Catalonia] ae well ae
with Andalusian farmera, want to eatablish the CNT on a nea basie into vhich
theae groups aaa be :ntegrated.
He adds that a aongress manipulated by them would rid the CNT of its anarchiet
aontent aad rrou].d aet the dogs loose on CNT anarehists,
Before this oould happen, Bakwiin has given Marx a kiak in the paata.
COPYRIG$'Pt 19799 CA''IDIO 16, INFaRMACION Y PtTBLICACIONES9 S.A.
11,466
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- COUN'I'RY 9EC'.CION SPAIN
BASQUE pRESInENT-IN-EXILE Td HEAD ItEGIONAL GOVEItNMENT
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanigh 20 May 79 p 33
(UnatCributed arCicle: "Leizaola Prepares Luggage"]
[Texe] The veCeran Basque naCionalisC leader Jesus Mgria de Leizaole,
Preeident of the government in exile, ia ready to leave behind his 42
yearg of forced absence from Spain. Hie luggage is ready to be cloaed in
hie o�fice of RuE Singer in Paris to return to Euakadi. The "lendakari"
[PresidenC], with his 82 years of age, the last poliCician of the republic
in exile, could become in the next few weeks thc first Basque Preaident of
the post-Franco era. Althaugh apokesmen of the Euskadi government in Paria
do not give a definite date for the historic return, it ia taken for granted
that Leizaola will crosa the Bi'dasoa itiver and the Irun border thia aummer. -
"I anxiously await the moment," he was explaining to CAMBYO 16, "but will not
do so until Che time thaC the Autonomy Statute ia signed. I believe, how-
ever, that I will return soon."
The old nationaliet leader, surrounded by a small group of collaborators in
the Paris office since his inseparable friend and colleague, Manuel de Irujo,
- returned to Spain 2 years ago, could become the chief political figure of
the Basque country. This depends on the auccess of the efforts of a aector
of the government to restore the 1936 StatuCe with the support of the Basque
NaCionalist Party (PNV).
The operation of rapprochement with the PNV launched some weeks ago by
collaborators of the government and even some minister has found a very
favorable responae in PNV circlea. The acceptance of the 1936 Statute on
the part of Madrid, which at first would not pose too many technical di�-
ficulties for its approval, could serve as a ahorC-term propitioua measure
to find a definitive solution.
In thie sense the nationalist leaders, still somewhat cautious about this
proposal, however viewed the pro3ect as favorable... "We demand only that
the study of the definitive statutQ approved by the parliamentary parties
in Guernica and currently introduced into Parliament be not delayed in-
definitively," a leader of the Euakadi Buru Batzar, the top organization
, of the PNV, atated.
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tn u like munner sevcrul nfEtaiuls nf Chis piirty consulred Uy CAMBin 16
acknnwlpdged thaC cnnCnCCs were seiy.i egking piace ar nigt, 1evels and,
shnuld gn agreemene be renched, the aceepranc:e of the 1936 Seatuee would
ennb1e the Bggque naeionalisCg Co obtain recngnitiinn of g higeoricgl
1egi.ri.macy Chatithey hgve never plgced in doube. In turn, the sourCes
consulCed consider that the ,.aCurn of Lei2aoln could halp to expediGe the
pacificgtion of Eugk,adi.
The urgent gpproval nf one sC&Cute or andGher ie ut this time the mnin
concern of the ma3ority of the Bgsque politiinal forces.
Socialistg for Guernica
"I believe," Leizaoln adds, "thar boeh can serve for the pacification of
Eugkndi and for my pegaeful reCurn as Presidenti of a new government ac-
cepeable to a11 pnrties."
Snme of these pareieg, however, congidering thne ehis ttegotiation could
favor only the PNV and UCD [Democratic Center. Union], criCicized Chis sud-
den solutiion to the Basque question.
Sources of the P5E-PSOE [Spanish SocialiseparCy-Spatiish SocialistWorkersPgrty]
(Basque sncialists) said: "We cannoC be against any solution to the Baeque
problem, buC in the first place iC seems to us thae the procedure is noC
the correct one. The restoration of the 'spirit of the 1936 Statute'
cannot come solely from a bilateral negntiation between the UCD and the
PNV. We believe Chat the basis for the normalizaCion of the Basque problem
should be the approval of the Guernica Statute without delay, although we
reiCerate that we are open to any solution that will restore coexistence
among our people."
On the other hand these views were criticized by the naeionalists, who
accused the socialists of having abandoned the Basque GovernmenC at an
' inopportune moment (2 months ago), after forming part of it for more Chan
40 years.
These same nationalisti sources viewed with favor that Vice-President Fernando
Abril, who played "such a nefarious role" in the constitutional negotiations
with the Basques, is out of the current negotiations, and that the top rep-
reaentative of the centrist government party in the Basque country, Jesus
Maria Viana, is eliminated from the current negotiation plans.
During the past few days, and deapite the denial of the minister of regions,
Mr Fontan, about the matter, the nationalist leaders appeared to be optimistic
about a quick agreement. This time we expect that it will not be a new
maneuver of the Suarez Government, which apparently has finally decided to
face our problem," a Basque member of Parliament aaid.
The swift restoration of the 1936 Statute would not be viewed with disfavor
by even the radical nationalist sectors, which could accept this proviaional
solution despite the fact that they support the Guernica pro3ect, or their
own project as in the case of Herri Batasuna.
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Thus the members of the nagque NaCinnnlisti AcCi.an (ANV), belongi.ng Co the
= Herri Bgtagung cnali.Cidn, were gning to summon represeneaeives nf the PNV
und the ItepubliCnn Left tin diacues the subjecC and tn replace its current
member in the Baeque government in exile. This deaire of the ANV tio con-
tinue Co form part of the aforementioned hietoric entity could, on the
other hand, produce serious confrontatiions in the currenC cogliCion of the
aberCZale lefC.
CbPYRIGHT: 1979, CAMBTO 16, Infnrmacinn y Publicacionea, S.A.
8414
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5PAZN
PCE-PSOE AGREEMENT SUHJECT OF CONMENTARY
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 20 May 79 p 3
[Editorial by Juan Tomas de Salas: "PSUE"
= [Text] Don Santiago has already pulled a fast one from the outaet. In the
heroic celebrations of last May Day a catchword was chanted, and impoaed,
by communiat miliCanta in all the demonstrationa throughout the country:
"PSOE, PCE [Spanish Socialiat Workers Party, Spanish Communist ParCy],
- uniCed onto power." The socialist leadera received.thia new communist
embrace as if it were'from a tiger, buC the naive soaialist grassroots aoon
enough chorused Che catchword creaCed by Don Carrillo for the greater
glory of the PCE.
To aggravaCe matters the euphoric communists cheered Tierno in Che presence
of Felipe in the Madrid demonstrations, thus creating pasaive irritation
among the socialist leaders to whom the new mayor, Tierno Galvan, is not
as irreproachable as he should be. The communist strategy is increasingly
clear: to convert the tactical municipal pact into a strategic death em-
brace. Don Carrillo always said it: "Ah, I would have done thinga dif-
ferently if I were the secretary general of the PSOE instead of the PCE."
And, moreover, the congress is looming over the socialistts. The Marxist
wing and the infiltrators of all hues w311 try to hit harc: the moderate
line followed by the executive committee to date, and they uill try to
banish into obscurity the figures who in the midst of the party have de-
fended modern socialism in the face of a aocialism that already stinks up
the S tate. Friend Mugica and friend Guerra, they are coming after you
with hammers and sickles.
The current social,isC executive commititee undoubtedly..needs a Choraugh
- transformation. As a group they have not risen up to the occasion in the
pasC 2-years, which have been full of unprecedented possibiliCies .and
happenings. They were given a large meabure of hope in the first free
elections of 2 years ago, which they managed to preserve despite every-
thing until 1 March, but they profited very little from it. They almost
never acted independently, almost always were caught in the pincers of
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the UCI) [Uemncrarlc Centur Uninn] ar the pCL, ndnhCed the oppnsiCe viewH,
vacil.lated between governing in coalition wiCh the UCD nnd uccepting the -
municipal embrace of Don Carril.lo, proteeted and ye].led a 10t but accomplished
1ltele. And the argument that "the bad ones of the UCD" are to blame is not
valid. A party that representa such a high number o� voters is never in-
effective because of the governmenC, but because of its own shorCcomi.ngs. No
serious opposition can be ofFered when many of its leadera mentally con- _
tinue to flee ahead of the policemen.
But if the socialist executive commitCee has to come out of the congrese
transformed, the danger is that it be transformed retrogressively. If it
is rransformed tnward Marxism and the outdatied concepts, iC will betray the
great hope Chat millione of 5paniards have placed on a modern party that
will pick up the socialist trends without bogging down in the past. If
Marxism-Leninism is ratified at the congress and the new executive comnittee -
emerges more antiquated than the current one, the scant auConomy that the
PSOE has shown up to now could vanish altogether. And do not forget thaC
Don Carrillo is watching. He swallowed the socialist youCh in the 'Thirties,
and it would be very sad if he culminated his career in the 'Eighties with
another big unified socialist party at the national level, thaC is Co say,
the PSUE [Unified Socialist Party of Spain]. The Spanish socialisCs must
find themselves, but it is not going to be easy at all.
COPYRIGHT: 1979, CAMBTO 16, Informacion y Publicaciones, S.A.
8414
CSO: 3110
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C()IINTRY SECTYON
OCONOMIC RBC6VBRY SBBN ON 3'NS t-IOR I7.ON
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 20 May 79 pp 560 57, 59, 61
fiPAYN
(Text)"The situetion of the aconomy is like the beginning of a zace
ahere the starting signel has been qivAn. Now it has to run since
the arorst psrt of the crisis is over," Javier dei Moral, underseare-
tary of the Ministry of Bconomy, toid CAMBIO 16.
t,eai and his team sre siightiy optimistic for the first time. They
steted: "It can be said thet at the end of 1978, after an intensiva
prxeas of adjustment and correction, the Spanish economy is in a
qood poaition to subetantiaily accelerate its rate of eocpansion in � _
1979 and thus create the neceasary jobs."
Nevertheless, the banks and businessmen do not agree and feel the
situation is much worse. "Given the decline of the Spanish ecanomy
at the end of 1978 ancY the beginninq of 1979, it does not seem likely
= that we will reach important quotas in national econnmic growth, ac-
cording to the Bank of Bilbao."
The CEOE (Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations] indicated
that the results obtained in tho :fight against inflation are still
"very fragile. There are great risks not only of continuation of
�he present price levels but even of a Yelapse." It also felt that
the "objective conditiorys" that lead businessmen to invest still do
not eotist.
Another bank, the Bank of Vizcaya, has just Yevealed its latest sur-
vey on business prospects in the industrial sector vrhi.ch shaars "no
clear indications of industrial Yevitalization." Jose Ramon Laauen,
economiat and former presidential adviser, had no doubt a fea days
ago thet "the economic results of 1979 will be worse than those af _
1978.11
A tap officie1 of the Ministry af Economy told this magazine: I'There
ia s defeatist attitude spreading throughout the country that I do
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noti think has a concrete bagig; it can be dangerous." In his opin3sm,
"all tho'3.ndices iead us to axpect a 9ituation of moderate axpansion
in the neoct few months that wiii improve the recessive s3tuatian in-
herited fron 1978,11
To those L�egponaibia eor the economic pol3ay, "the infiationist eac-
peatations w311 have to kaep going down" after a year of major da-
clina nnd parsistence of the rate of pYice increase. In the meantime,
the objective continues to be to reach a price index in december 1979
of 12.5 p0rcent or less a.fter infiation in the first quarter of 1979
has already reached 30 percent.
"We believe that this can be achiaved if the price increase does not
surpass 6.5 percent 3n tha first haif," Javier del Morai stated aftar
tha package of measures wag passed last 26 April to co%bat inflation
better, among othe.r things. If this is not achieved--which is the
businassmen's fear--contracts would have to be revisAd which could
result in more confiict and qrea,tar costs for businasses.
Even consideYing that an important reduc:tfon in the price leval can
be achieved canpared to 1.978 (December to December showed an increase
of 16,5 percont), the Bank of Bilbao believes that the indec wil7. be
about 14 percent at the end of 1979. The ODCD estimates for 5pain
are slightly higher than the official ones--13 percent.
As to price policy, the CBAE sent a memorandum to tha government sta-
ting that "the present control of a number of industria.l prices and
trade margins is a deceptive anti-inflationary system." According
to big business, it only masks inflation temporarily at the cost of
decapitalization of businesses and the disappearance of some of them.
Price Freedom
"It is necessary to work haYd on price control and liberalization be-
cause what many busiresses do not receive in prices, they receive in
subsidies or import tariffs," a high official of the administration
told CAMBIO 16. The philosophy of the economic team seems xo lean
toward progressive price liberalization except in monapolistic sec-
tors while it favors competition and limits tariffs. "If businessmen
want price freedom, fine, but they must not ask for subsidies or
protectionism," he cammsnted. "They must be consistently for a mar-
ket economy."
If inflation is the major obsession of the government, unemployment
is the main nstioral pYObiem for almost everyone since officially
there are more than I million unempioyed; the unions say 1.5 million.
The qovernment, efter saying that "an employment policy cannot be
undertaken on a temporary besis of 1 year," indicated that its ob-
jective is to create betareen 100,000 and 150,000 jobs in industry,
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congtYUCt3on and gervices in 1979. Since the active population aan
qrow between 50,000 and 60,000 this year, unempioyment would decrease,
according to the astimates cf the I,eal team, by about 100,000 peoplop
be3ng placad offici.aily at under 1 miilion aga3n.
N�vertheiess, there are aleo much more pessimigt3c estimates. Accord-
3.ng to the Bank of Biibao, uremployment wili grow by some 2000000
peapln in 19799 about the game incraase as 3n 1978 (initially gati by
the Moncloa pact at only 100,000 new unemployed). The largest unions,
the CC00 [Workers CommisgionsJ and the-UGT [Genaral Union of Workers],
aqzae with this eatimate.
In spita of these vary3ng statistics, everyona saems to agrAe that
thero is only one way to creatiA jobs: enoourag0 investment. To the
CEOE, the best and least inflatiotiary way to achieve this is to an-
couzage private investment which makes up 75 parcent of the total
netionai investment.
Nevertheless, private initiative pinys down the role of this invest-
ment. "The present employment crisis cannot be considered oxclusively
the result of an investment crisis," Manuel Martin, secretary gene-
ral of the Populax Bank, indicated. "The creation of jobs fs mainly
bssed on profit expectations."
Investment, According to Ecpectations
The C DOE eocpisined the conditions that must exist so that businessmen
will invest: political and economic expectations as to the type of
sx iety and medium and long-term economic policy; eocpectations of so-
cial climate and peace; and expectations of reasonabla profits.
In addition, businessmen speak af one basic condition for investment:
a finaacial framework so that businesses have adequate financing and
do not receive limited credit as in 1978. Javier del Moral, urder-
- secretary of economy, feels that investment faces two structural
problems: one, as indicated by businessmen, financing problems; and
the other, often forgotten by management, the need for an industrial
reconversion procesa. However, businessmen, particularly the CEAB,
include one more condition: an adequate labor framework.
The topic then jumps to personnel flexibility. According to an ex-
pert consulted by this magazine, "the subject of flexibility concerns
businessmen much less now than it did in the middle of 1977 because
productivity is improving, slavly but surely." Nevertheless, the
subject of personnel mobilfty continues to be important, according
to other obaervers, because the businessmen want to use it as a aray
to recover lost authorfty. Apparently the government is studying
some type of regulstion on this although xeliable sources told
CAMBTO 16 thst this could only be done after negotiations with the
unions.
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The econom3c team ig optimistic that the privAtio buainassman w311 re-
3nvest in the second half ef the year After public 3nvestment bearg
the burden in the f3rst half. "The speciai oharaateri.stia af the
businASSman is that he inveats; the Spanish businessimn has apant 4
years without actiing lika a businagsman, witheut investinq. I be-
lieve that as expectations improve glightiy--as 3n this case--he wi11
aecfae to invast. It might be in July, being aptimistic, or in Oc-
tober, being pesgimistic, but I believe that hn will invest,ll Javiar
del Moral indicatod.
Governmant pians agtimate that gross invastment in 1979 aiZi incroase
8.4 percent cvmparad to the previous year. Agai.n the Bank of Bilbao
is much more pessimistic; it estimates A lavel of investmant deawnd
very similar to 1978, actually a decrease of 1.1 percant. 'We do not
und�rstand this prediction which has nothinq ta do with our estimates,+l
the Minietry of Bconomy toid this magaxine. "hven assuming thara is
no increase in private investment-�arhich would end the prasant trend
--there wouid bo overali gromth of about 4 percent because of public
investmen-t and 'stocks. "
The foreign aector, one of the alassic imbalancas in the 5panish
economy, has functioned marvelousiy in 1978 with recordg in exports,
reserves, tourism, current account balance and trade balance. Ac-
cording to the aconomic team, the current account balance aili con-
tinu� showing a substantiai surpius in 1979, maintaining an elevaled
rate of exports which they think ariii grow 7.2 percent.
Challenge of Growth
In its economic report, the Bank of Bilbao again disagraes and is
more pessimistic than the government. After ind:catfng that the for-
eign sector as a arhole "vvill act neutrally in the 1979 macroeconomic
pian," it predicts only a 5.5-percent increase i:i exports arhile it
also believes that there will only be a 5-percent grawth in imports;
the government belfeves that imports will increase 8.4 percent. In'
other atards, it feels that there is goiag to be a slight rovitaliza-
tion throuqh the foreign sector aithout forgetting tourism.
Inflation, unemployment, investment, exports and the foreign sector
are oniy parts of one great chailenge: growth. H'uentas Quintana
said: "This country has to do three things in the cominq years:
first, graar; second, graw; and third, gzaw." If the Spanish economy
does not yraw at twice the rate of the European countries durinq the
next 30 years, we cannot be Europeans by the 21st century.
"In 1978, we qrew 3 percent," Crisanto Plaza, general direclor of
economic policy, said. ItFor 1981=82, we will have to grow betareen
5 and 6 percent." Jose Luis Leal, minister of economy, aaid foY
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th3s year. 1979t that "tihe most reasonable hypotheeeg indioatA a
- growth of 5 percent." Although in3tia11y an increase of 4.8 peraent
3n the GNP has been a$t3mated for 1979, Jose Luis I.aai prefers to
spealc of an apprc�cimate growth without decimais "bacausa any gma11
daviatian can ba used to attack tihe government."
The bus3nessman in general and th0 CROB in particular feei that these
est3mates ara unrQalist3c and be].inve thati the growth w3.11 be similar
to tMat of 1979 because of elevated prica$, the structure of domestic
damand, the problams of invastment and tha diff3cu].t campetitian in
the foroign seotor.
Internationai Contmct
in the interna,tionai context, the maneuvering possibilities of the
Spanigh aconomy are heavily candit3oned. 7fiis year there wili not
~ ba any foreign stimuli to growth as there was in 1971. To the Min-
istry of Bconomy, tha correct way is to continue effoYts to reduce
the rate of itfiation, to decrease even more the difference from
the prices of devoloped countries and to support any effort to in-
crease growth based on increased domest3c demand and especieily on
investment sinca exports cannot surpass the rate of expansion re-
corded in 1978.
investment Dilemma
Since March 1978 investment expectations in the industry showed a
siight improvement aith a relapse at the end aE the year; this has
been surpassed in the first quarter of 1979. The March 1979 monthly
survey of the Ministry of Industry seems to point towaxd the consoli-
dation of a waak recovery of business expectat3.ons while it also
points to an improvement for the second quarter of 1979.
On the other hand, pYedictions of investment as well as use of pro-
ductive capacity indicate a recoveYy in the second quarter. The
ministry's predictions on the next quarter's orders show a slight -
decline while the "stock" of finished products increases. The in-
dicators of consumption shaw increased vehicle registration, gaso- _
line consumption and sales in large stoYes.
Also, accoYding to the survey of business eocpectations that the Bank
of Vizcaya made in March, a lack of initiative is noted in private
investment which does not show ciear siqns af recovery in spite of
the fact that the results of the survey reveal, for the third conse-
cutive month, an impYOVement in the expectations of business
davelapment.
This unclenr situation is caused by the pYesent balance betareen the
factora that favor investment and those that discowcage it. On the
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passimisti.c s3de, the pr3ncipal stimuli for 3nvestments-'racccrding to
tha M3nistry of Industry magax3ne SCONOMIA INDU5TRLAL�-hava been the
nead to inctease production capacity, the need to replAae oid in-
$tsiiations, the reduction of manufactur3ng costb, the need to im-
prove product3on quality and to manwfacture new products.
The pr3ncipal obstacles are: wealrness of domestic demand, diff3cu1-
ties of fore3gn :E3nanc3ng, lack of local funds, increQSe of domest3c
costs, fear aE credit reduct3.ons and export d3fficult3es because of
revaluat3ons and 3nternal iriflation. -
RoYeign Investment Aga3n 3n Spa3n
While Spanish investment has been remiss 3n work3ng 3n Spain, foreign
3nvestment has reveled in the country and broken a11 records. In
1978, foreign investments were double 1977 investments, reach3ng
56,887,000,000 pesetas (about $1.3 biliion). -
By country, the United States continues to be the leader with one-
fourth of the total foreign 3nvestment, followed by Switzeriand, the
United Kinqdom and the Federal Republic of Germany.
The tendency of foreign investment in recent years has been toward
the puYChase of majority shares of Spanish businesses that, in the
end, take control. According to the Ministry of Commerce, invest-
ments of inejority foreign capitai increased to 156,268,000,000 pese-
tas between 1960 and 1976, SO percent of the direct total investment
during that period.
Corstruction Does Not Pull Its Weight
The economic plan for this year prepared by Abril Martorell at the
end of 1978 was based on encouraging public investment duYing the -
first half so that it would attract private investment in the second
half. In this plan the construction sector played the role of target
sector for public investments, tesponsible for pulling the weight of
investment until private businessmen could see the future more clearly.
According to almost all the sources consulted by CAMBIO 16, the con-
struction sector has not been able to play this role in the first 4
months of 1979. "The construction sector has not been able tu st3- `
mulate investment," Francisco Garcia Valdecasas, manager af ANCPE
[Natioiia1 Assxiation of Building Oonstructors and pramoters], told
this magazine "because it continues to lack long-term fi.nancing and
- also because the delay in the approval of the state budgets has pre-
vented the realization of some programs."
To the Bank of Biibao, the construction sector is one ocf the great
unknoams in the 1979 economic situation; it can take a negative or
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pos3t3.ve pos3t3.on. Accord3ng to th3s bank's xeport, the Itlateness in
the approval o:E the budget w311 make rev3talization of the housing
sectox wh3.ch is the great hope for the construct3on sector vexy
d3f:F3cult. "
The construct3nn sectoz 3.s a basic sector 3n any attempt to rev3ta13ze
the economyg pr3nc3pa].ly because of'the great number of jobs and 3.n-
vestment that it generates. Aiso the sector has about 300,000 unem-
p].oyed and is now fac3ng a major cr3sis; 3f 3t does not solve 3.t,
oniy haif as many houses w311 be started 3n 1979 as 3n 1973.
Accoxdiny to Garc3a Valdecasas, the mQasures taken by the government
last 26 Apri1 to 3ncrease the amount of credit are inadequate fax
solving the ser3ous problem of f3nancing the sector. "Some 84 b31-
lion will be released from the banks and another 3.5 billion fram
the credit agencies but it does not state that one part of these cre-
dits goes to hous3ng." The manager of ANCPB eacplained: "The finan-
ciai 3nstitutions prefer to make short-terb and h3gh�interest loans
instead of loans for 12 and 15 years with an interest that the bor-
rower and promoter can pay."
Finally, the sector cont3nues without measures to modify the expec-
tations and there is a inrge "stock" of unsold houses. According to
the CEOE, the goveYnment must adopt four important measures:
l. Priority use of public investments for works of infrastructure
and mass housing;
2. A housing policy of official protection without fluctuatiQns, ac-
companiad by financing which benefits the borrower;
3. A national plan of territorial arrangement that focuses on the
problem of land; and
4. Raconsideration of the legislation on state contracts as well as
its system of price revision.
Housing Collapse
Year Houses Started
1973
4449000
1974
4160000
1975
382,000
1976
324,000
1977
305,000
1978
225,000
1979
208,000
Source: Netional Association of Building Constructors and Prmoters
COPYRIGHT: CAMBIO 16p ][NFORMACION Y PUBLICACIONES, S.A. ~ 1979
7717 . 43
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COUNTRY SOCTION 5PAIN
INI INVESTMENIS KBEP HOLDING OOMPANY IN RED
Madrid CAMBI0 16 3n Span3sh 27 May 79 pp 469 47
[Tesct] At the end of 1 year as president of the IN I[National Tnsti-
_ tute of Industry], Jose Miguel de 1a Kica has presented the balance
for 1978. Of the 71 bus3nesses in which the INI participates dir-
ectly, 30 had losses. The total deficit of this group of businesses
reached 57.3 bill�ion pesetas. "Yt has been a bad year," De la Rica
commented, rAterring to losses that are almost four times those of
1977 (16.1 b3113on). Based on INI control over these businesses,
the loases imputable to the INI total oniy 29.3 billion.
Most of the losses are from eight businesses and two sectors; steel
- (Ensidesa,, A],tos Hornos del Mediterraneo) and ship construction (p,s-
tilleros Espanoles, Astano, J. Barrexas and Astican). Zwo businesses
in Asturias--Hunosa and Ensidesa--account for almost half of the -
. losses of the INI (27,40290000000). Concerning the losses of Altos -
Hornos del Mediterraneo, 3t must be pointed out that these have little
to do with the IlNI since that business joined the stat0 "holding"
campany at the end af 1978.
Credit Drain
Jose Miguel de la Rica indicated: "The serious problem is the finari-
cial structure of the INI businesses--the enormous imbalance that
exists between resources and direct investments--so the businesses
are obliqed to invest with credit and not with their awn funds or
_ state contributions."
The high cost of these resources means a high cost for the INI busi-
nesses, according to De la Rica. In 1978, the INI estimated that
this deficit finance structure imposed an additional cost of 25 to
30 billion pesetas. In other words, if the INI businesses had an-
other financinq structure, half of the total losses couid have been
avoided,
. 44
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"F3.nanQigl oxpenses are a catastrophe for the INI bus3nesses,�' re-
- peated 3.ts pres3dent. According to the data 3n the presertetion,
these expens0s are a].most tw3ce those o:E largA Spanish bus3.nesses.
If 3t was 4.5 pexcent over sales 3n thesa laxge businesses, it was
7.7 percent for TN7 businesses 1ast year�
Another justif 3cat3on for such 1arge ].osses, accord3ng tp De la R3ca,
was hav3.ng to confront crisis ~ Accrdinq toclNlses~imates~,t~hey
the steel and sh3pb J sectoxs
cr3s3s cost the INI 29.4 mi113on pesetas.
Nevertheless, the losses in these two sectors must ba compared to
those suffered by other countries. Yf 4zsidesa lost some 2,500 pe-
setas per ton of steel produced in 1978, private business lost more
(2,800 pesetas per metric ton at Aitos Hornos of Vizcaya) a;id the
average losses in Europe were much higher (3,500 pesetas per metr3c
ton was the average loss in the BDC).
As to the shipbuilding sector,
creased losses, in many cases,
5,000 workers were affected by
were affected, 8,000 in Sweden,
nine countYies of the BDC.
it must be remembered that the in-
were to maintain employment: only
the restructur3ng. Ir Japan, 259000
9,500 in Norway and 45,000 in the
Investing Alone
The third official justification of the losses refers to the investoY
effort that the INI made in 1978. While private initiative in the
industrial sector invested 5.6 percent less than in 1977, the INI
group increased its investments about 23 percent to a total of 141.9
billion pesetas. Altogether, INI investments made up 33.4 percent
of the total industrial investments 3n 1978.
in other rwrds, they equaled 1 out of every 3 pesetas invested in
1978.
The f.act that the INI invested 1 out of every 3 pesetas invested in
industry meant, according to its directors, an additional cost of
4 to 5 million pesetas which eacplains one-tenth of the total losses.
However, this effort does not seem to have been in vain: jobs in
the INI~have increased 2.4 percent (it employed 244,400 people in
1978) while they decreased 0.6 percent in industry.
in 1979, INI investments will increase to 187 billion pesetas which
means 45 bi113on more than in 1978. "It is necessary to see that
the INI investments, at the cost of its financial structure, insure
the industrial base of Spain in the 1980's. T'hey also are a counteY-
balance to decreased productive investment," De la Rica indicated
in his presentation.
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On the cxndit side of the INI is alsa the eaport3.ng effort real3.zed
by its bus3nasses 3n 19780 3.ncreas3ng 3ts sales abroad by 17.1 per-
cent compar0d to the previous year. Accord3ng to the est3.mates of
the inst3tute, 3ts businesses have qenorated one-eighth of the for-
o3gn currency obtA3.ndd by the countYy (exactly 127.2 b3113.on).
' Aiso the different act3.vi.ties of the xNi businesses, especial].y 3n
the energy sector which received two-thirds of the total 3nvestment,
saved a total of 29.3 b3.iiior, 3.n foreign currency in 1978 through
the product3on of national fuels, alwn3nwn and fre3ght.
"Fox this year and the com3ng years, it Jose M3gue], de la R3ca ind3-
cated, "we have two baa3c objectives: to selact the plans ot the
sectors and to select d3rectors for our bus3nessas." Special empha-
sis will be given to this second point because 71 enterprises of
direct paxticipation depend on it, 240 of ind3xect part3cipatian and
240,000 workers and because traditionally the losses of the INI are
attributed to bad business management.
Also work will be directed toward curing what seems to be the canceY
ot the INI businesses: its financial structure, which might be even
more deterioYated now after the government regulations, mak3ng for-
eign indebtedness, the traditional source of resources for the INI, _
difficult.
The INI of Tomorrow
Lastly, De la Rica outlined in his recent visit to New York what the
strategic plan of the INI will be for the coming years, based on
these six points:
l. Generation acf foreign currency through the encouraqement of eot-
ports as well as replacement of imports; -
2. Supply of raw materials in order to guarantiee low-cost supplies; 3. Contribution to national technological development;
4. Contribution to regional development through the exploitatian of
local resources in depressed regions and through management;
5. Maintenance and generation of direct and indirect jobs; and
6. Develapment of ather activities of great national interest at
the request of the government (defense matters, for eocample).
COPYRIGHT: CAMBZO 16, INFORMACION Y PUBLICACIONES, S.A., 1979
771'7
CSO: 3110
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COUNTRY SECTYON
- gRIEFS
SPAIN -
GRAPO INFILTRATION bF POLICE--High-ranking officers of the Naeinnal Police
(PN) suepect that ehere could be members of the GRAPO (First of OcCober
Armed Revolutionary Group] infilCrated in the law enforcement forces,
following the discovery of the namea and addresaea of 93 policemen in
possession of the terrorist organization. LasC week, however, an internal
memorandum of the PN denied that four policemen had been arrested under ~
accusation of belonging to the terrorist organization, a rumor Chat has
been going around the poliae!atations. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in
Spanish 20 May 79 p 5] 8414 ~
MPAIAC LEADER IN ILL HEALTH--Antonio Cubillo, the lawyer who heads the
Sovereignty and Independence Movement of the Canary Islands 'MPAIC) ~
sponsored by Algeria, has been given no hope by the doctiora who treat him in Algiers following the attempt on his life on 5 April 1978. It ~
appears that the impairment of the health of Cubillo is the result of ~
his failure to follow the medical treatment and recommendations for his .
' recovery. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 27 May 79 p 5] 8414 ~
ETA, GRApp UNITY--The Basque ETA Basque Fhtherland and. Libert GroupJ ~
_ and the GRAPO first of October Anti-Fascist Resista.nce Graupa reportedly i
decided to coordinate their terroriat actiona at a meeting held in Port {
Vendres around 8 April. The meeting was attended by an emiseary from ;
Romania. The GRAPO, operating in Castile and Catalonia, could harass i
the tourists ataying along the Mediterranean coast.ffext~ rasis i
VALEURS AGTUELLES in French 18-24 Jun 79 p 307 ,
C50: 3100
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- C4UNTRY SECTION
R0130T-15 PIISSILE SErN OPERATIONAL BY 1985
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 9 Jun 79 p 148
SWTDFN
[Article by Pierre Langereux: "The Swedish 'ROBOT 15' Missile Wi11 Be ripera-
tional in 1985"1
[Text] The big new Swedish item in the military area is the ROBOT-15 anti-
ahip mfssile, otherwise known as "Rb 15" or "RBS 15," devslopment of which
- has just been authorized by the Swedish government (see AIR & COSMOS, No 764).
On 26 Apri1 1979 the defense equipment department made a contract for 1.3
billioq kroner (about $295 million) with the SAAB Bofors Missile Corporation
- for deyelopment and mass production of the new "Rb 15" antiship misaile in
its sea-to-sea uersion. Manufacture of 100 missiles is provided far in this
contract, to equip in 1985 the 12 Swedish "Spica 2"-class patrol boats, each
of which will be armed with 8"Rb 15" missiles and with torpedoes. The mis-
sile is also intended, in its air-to-sea version, for the Air Force, to equip
the future Swedish attack plane; but the decision oii development of this ver-
sion will be made in 1981.
- The Swedish government's decision, which does not meet with une,nimous approval
in the country's military circles, has given the preference to development of
a natiqnal missile rather than to purchase of an existing foreign missile,
partly to cope with the serious unemployment problems that the Swedish aero-
nautical industry has experienced since the abandonment of several projects
for new airplanes and missiles. The French EXOCET missile, from Aerospatiale,
and the American HARPAON missile, from McDonnell Douglas, were in competition
to equip the patrol boats of the Swedish Navy. The Pentagon had proposed de-
' liveriag to Sweden, starting in 1981, 100 HARPOON missiles for $100 million.
This is the Pirst missile order received by the new company SAAB Bofors Mis,-
sile Corporation (SBMC), formed at the end of 1978 by SSAB-Scania and Bofors
AG for the purpose of joint development, production and maxketing of the new
Swedish missiles. Several other Swedish firms, including Philips (Sweden),
will participate in the construction of the "Rb 15." The ROBOT-15, previously
known by the designation "RB 0h Turbo," is derived directly from the SAAF3 04E
48
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,

y k ,
i
'f.' ~
At left: an artist's conception of the new "Rb 15" antiship missile in low-
altitude flight configuration over the sea. At right: full-size mockup of
"A.A13 Bofors Missile Corporation's new "Rb 15" e.rtiship missile, with the pro-
,ject director, Hans Ahlinder, standing by it.
air-to-ground missile, alias "Rb 04E," mass-produced by SAAB-Scania for the
Viggen airplanes of the Swedish Air Force; the "Rb 04E" is a heavy missile
(600 kg), 4.5 meters long and 0.5 meter in diameter.
The "Rb 15" greatly resembles it, since it measures 4.35 meters long by 0.5
- meter diameter and 0.85 meter in airfoil span (with airfoils folded back).
It weighs 560 kg, without the two big powder-fuel boosters attached to the
missile for takeoff from a ship. The "Rb 15" is an aerobic missile, propelled !
in cruising flight by a turbojet fed air by a large ventral air intake. This ~
general configuration of the "Rb 15,with external boosters and turbo,jet, !
somewhat recalls that of the Franco-It alian OTOMAT antiship missile. The ;
"Rb 15" is a long-range missile--about 100 km--which adopts the low-�altitude i
flight tra,jectory (sea-skimmer) of all modern antiship missiles. It is equipped with a big explosive payload and with ECM [expansion unk;.own] p10-
tection. Fire control is automatic, with a computer that also does t;?e checks ,
on the missile before firing. Once the tnissile is launched, it is entiraly
autonomous, which implies a guidance system combining an inertial platform
and a self-guider for final target search.
COPYRIGHT: Air & Cosmos, Paris, 1979
_ 11267
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SrCTION
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ARP+ITD FORCES PROVIDED
Paris .A.RMEFS D'AUJOURD'HUI in French May 79 pp 37-39, SO
swrnFrr
[Article by Col Olof Dackenburg and Co1 Hans Berglund: "The Swedish Armed
Forces"]
[Text] Sweden has been spared war for more than a century
and a ha1f. The last time we were at war was in 1814, under
the leadership of Marshall of France Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte,
who was to become ICing Karl XSV Johan, the founder of our
royal d}masty. It was in that year that peace was concluded
with France and other countries.
ldhen the NA.T.O and Warsaw pacts were born, and the attempt, made on Sweden's
. initiative, to form a"Nordic defense bloc" failed, Sweden chose the line of
independence, the foundation of which is nonparticipation in allianees in
_ peacetime, tending toward neutralit,y in case of war in Europe.
Defense of Independence
Our defense has been organized in such a way as to be able�to pursue this pol-
icy, and there has never been an,y question of modifying this orientation. The
- Swedish people are unanimous on this point. But this necessitates a strong
defense, a total defense, which calls on the entice nation. 'I'hus, military
defense is complemented by an important civil defense effort, and in parallel,
an economic and psychological defense. Sweden puts a larger proportion of its
gross national product in+o defense than most of the states of Western Europe.
P+tilitary defense is built on the conscription system--every Swedish man from
18 to 47 is under obligation to do military service and receives a war duty
assignment--advanced technology, a system of rapid mobilization, and a state
of perme.nent full alert.
Military Geography
Our Nordic neighbors to the south as well as to the west are members of NATO. -
- To the east lies neutral Finlana, linked to the Soviet Union by a sort of
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FUlt nN'FtCIA[, 115L nNi,Y
\
nqet, "Ind on tl;~ ot}cr oide ot' the 1laltic nrc ;st:r.ten Lhnt hnve rn11t_ed to t1iC
W;irr�ta Ilict, Sweden thus occupiF;s a position a� equilibriwn betrreen these
pnct s, on Lhe northern f].nnk, the importanre a� which, from the rdinti of view
(it' n~,01111it,,v pnl.ir.,v, hrLs inerensed n p,reat dcal in recent yearn (building, oC n
syr�tem of ren hanen, oi1 deponits, etc.). The polar eap nnd the E1CCe88En td
the l3nltic, nlong r+ith the western rlorwep,ian coast, are zones of great gtrn-
tegic importnnce. We believe that Sweden countg above a11 ag s zone of pag-
rnge ftnd of bnses fbr operatibng directed against, ob,jectives dutside our
r rnunt ry .
"'Che entire rountry must be defended." '"his established princinle n$turally
rreater, some big problems. "weden has n surfnce xreg about 80 peraent that
of Crancc, WhererLS its populntfan, n little more than 8 million, comAq to
roughly 80 percent of that of inetronnlitan Parin. 14e xcid thnt 5weden's
length stretr}le s frdm nnrth to sauth. t� one slides the map of "Weden down
to whec�e the northern tip ig in the position of the southertt tip, the 1gtter
covers the south of Corsica, opposi.te rrapies. but Sweden also has some geo-
prnnhiral advantages. In the enst, the sauth and the southWest is u coaet
more ttinn 2,000 km 1anp,, part of it easily defensible because of an archipel-
7p,o which is difficult to navigate. 'I'he western border is constituted b,y the
ocandinavinn nlpine chain. And in the far north, the border area With Finlnnd
con^i3ts of 500 km o� desert, most of it north of the polar circle. Further-
more, th.? country is le,ced by a large number of rivers, attd a vast lacustrian
system c'acilitates defense measures. F'or a great pKrt of the yenr, the climate
is at ].east rough, which requires special equipment and makes invasion diffi-
cult, Whether it comes from the borders, the ses or the air.
'Che Army "in its Homes"
'i'he Army, based on general militgr,Y service, is "in its homes." 'I'here are
many aho think that our Army is composed only of the roughly 50,000 conscripts
who receive basic training in our units each year. But those are not enough--
fRr from it--to defend a country so vast and so sparsely populated.
To defend the entire country, it is necessary to have all the rr,en rQady to
- rear nrms. Our Arrty is therefore composed of combat units who stay in their
- horces in peacetime but are ready to be mobilized in a feK hours or s feW deys.
'dobilized, this Army has more than 500,040 men in its War organizstion. To
these nre added the more than 100,000 volunteers of the local guard.
For economic reasons, not all units of the Arn~y can be of the same quality.
'I'hus We have brigade units and territory defense units, as well as the local
guard.
In case of War, our brigades, of some 5,000 men each, Will have to cope with ,
the most difficult missions. Therefore the brigades have the most highly ~
qualified personnel and equipment. In vierr of the differences of terrain and
climate in the different parts of our country throughout its length, we have ,
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thrre typen of brtgade; the infantry brip,adeii, the 14orrlnn.i bri.gaden, and the
armored brigades. A1.1 the brigndes are Componite, and are generall,y organ-
tx.ed inta divisidn units,
'I'he infantry brigade hiis heav,v firepower and great combat endurance. It en.n
fight on a].1 tei'2�uins. 't'he antitank arm haH very high pdwer: in principle,
eaCh mun hus n"recoilless a,ntitark wegpnn," and tL compan,v, for example, hag
72 ,ingle-shot antitgnk wen,ponF. At the pregent time, the number of infgntry
brigadeg is 20,
'I'he Norrland brigade is ur infantry brigade equipped With far mdre trnCked
vehicles. I3y means of them, it can make far longer movementa in the anow and
- bn bare ground. '1'he Norrland brigade is tihoroughly prenared for all cnmbat
in terrain wilv-h �ew or na rotLds, such ss the rlesert zonen in the north of
SWeden. At preaent, we have fnur briqaaes of this type.
The areored brigade is intended mainl,y for combnt in the open terrsins of the
southern and central parts of to,reden. Oui� principal assault tank is the
turretless S tank. Certain units also have Centurion tanks.
tn addir,ion to the defense-df-territorV (DOT) units, which sre mohilized
throughout the country, we use strong local gu$rd units fbr country-wide
defense. 7tin3e units protect the mobilization, and man the fixed defense
instal.lations loceted on the borders, along the coasts and at the airports
until other units have been mobilized. 7'he local quurd is ree.dy to go into
action in 1 or 2 hours. Their weapons and other equipment are kept in their
homes or in the immediate proximity. The 1oca1 guard, recruited everytirhere,
is n basic source of information; it is alKays first on the spot, and often
sustains the first shock. Ts it something like the French national gendar-
merie, with its military organization?
7'he Navy
Ifie Swedish Navy has a long coastline to defend and great expanses to patrol.
As in most small countries, it is "retrogressing" torrard smaller surface attack
vessels, fast, armed mainl.,y with torpedoes and missiles. For shelter, it
uses the structure of the Suedish archipelago, where it has basea for rapid
offensives. The vessels can enter dfrectly into the shelters holloWed out in
rock, for refuge, maintenance, etc. The emphasis is on the torpedo boats of
= the "Spica" type, patrol boats, and submarines. But there are still some 10
destroyers/frigates. There are about 20 modern torpedo boats, some 15 patrol
boats, and as many submarines. A certain prfority is given to mine-1qYing
and protection against mines. Part of the fishing fleet is ready, in case of
mobilization, to do duty as auxiliary mine-sweepers, alongside the special-
ized mine-layers and mine-sweepers. Certain civilian craft--the ferry boats,
for example--can also lqy mines.
In Sweden, the coastal artillery is an integral part of the Navy. Using heavy
_ artillery, missiles and mines, it ensures the defense of the strategic points
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nn our 1ong coastline. The inntnllgtinng are ugually cut into rock. In
peacetime, we aJ.ready have �ixed mine bnrriers laid in the narrnws of vitial
watiere.Thay are aorked from coastel statiions. The coaetal arbillery also
has mob3le units, wh3.ch intervene in different xones.
7'here is no special naval air force, apart from a number of heLicopters which
have mainly antigubmarine miseiona.
The Air Farce
The Swedish Air Force enjo,ys a good reputatinn for effectiveness, high tech-
nical leve1, and great vigilance. The combat planea are the SAAB brakens and
Viggens, both of top international class and made in Sveden. The numbnr of
these planes today is abnut 500--thus a little more than the combined strength
of the CAFDA [Air Defense Forces Air Command] and bhe FATAC [Tactical Air
Forceg]. 7'heir missions are of the same nature, buti are perhaps concentrated
more on air defense. On the other hend, there is no strategic aviation, cuid -
transport aviati.on is weak by comparison srith the French force. In order to ~
ensure transport capacity in case of mobilization, the resources of the civil-
ian companies wi1l be made ready to para].lel those of the military. The train- ing plane, the SAAA 105, can be armed, and a certain number of units are
created if the state of alert is raised, especially for close collaboration
with the Arrt~y. For surveillance and af r defense, Ke have a highly automated
system based on modern radar systems--the French "Palmier" system, p,mong others.
The radars, designed for maritime and lox-altitude surveillance, are placed
atop high pylons. In addition, We have an optical air surveillance system
xhich covers the entire surface of the country, and the data from Which are
automatical.ly entered into central units. All the surveillance centrsl units
and the command posts are sheltered in rock. This sytem, callP-d "Stril 60,"
is as modern as "Strida II, but perhaps more extensive.
In addition to the shelters in rock, dispersal is used for protection. The
bases are numerous, and the fundamental principle is a maximum of one squad-
ron per base, even When the greater part has to be concentrated in one direc-
tion.
In these bases, the aircraft are apread out along roads on land which are
several kilometers apart from one another. If the runway is cut off, the
nearby roads can serve as reserve bases. All the pilotg train frequently at
taking off and landing on roads, and the planes are built with this use in mind.
State of Alert and Mobilization
Certain sections of Srredish defense are alxays operational, especially in the :
Air Force and the Navy. The surrounding seas and air space are patrolled 24 ;
hours a day, arid units ready, to go into action are in a state of permanent '
alert. There is considerable international muvement in our latitudes, es- j
pecially on and over the Baltic. For example, Ke �ly an average of 35 sorties ;
per month +:o identify unknrnm airplanes. f
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FdR oFFictnt, usE drtLY
On tho who].e, our gtate of alert in bnse(l on otzr Mpid mobilization oystem.
W hrive~ r,r.ittered thrdughout our etttire territory, more thnn 230000 equipment
,.epntn eongtantly in servl.ce, Where iA11 theequipment di the combat units ig
rencly at hnnd. The units trafn frequentl,y to mobilize in the shdrtest posi
Bib1e time. It Can be naid that in a militnr,y territorial dtvinion (We hft+te
some 20 of them, as in France), 4,000 1oca:t gugrd men are rendy tn do battle
n few hourg after the nrder has been given, 105000 defense-o�-territnry men
are reacl,y 1 dcLy lttter, and the brige.deg fare ready 1 or 2 da,ys After that,
An essential rule is thAt- a11 nf society's resources mugt be en11ed on td con-
tribute. tn case of inebilization, the units are thug complemented by civilirun
vehicles, airplanes, vesnpls, etc,, ahich in pettcatime glready have their as-
signmentn to these ta8}t5, Contracts have been made with construction firms
tn set up congtruction or repair units which are at thp dispoaal o� civiltan
or militar.y flefense.
'Craining System
7'he primary idea nf nur military training system ia that the combat units--
the "sdldfers in their homes"--must, in all branches of defenge, be opera-
tfonal once mobilizatinn has started.
We also hgve basic training and periods of refresher trgining.
Basic training, which is dif'f'erentiated, is aimed at rrartime assignment to a
given post and at coordination in the units. The duration of tht3 training
is short by international standarda: from 7 and .1/2 to 10-11 monLhs, depending
nn the wartime assignment. Abaut 50,000 men gre trained egch year. After his
basic training, the v)nscript receives a kartime assignment and remains in the
combat organizatf on untfl the age of 47.
As a general rule, the combat units are recalled every 4 years, for periods
of refresher training. At such time, they are called to their regular mob- ~
ilization points in the field, equipped, instructed in the handling of neW
weapons, etc., and finiah the period with an extended maneuver in a combat
unit, a brfqade for example, and under conditions as close as possible to
those of War.
Each of these periods generally lasts from 2 to k Weeks. Every men must do
five of these periods at k-year intervals--the first three usually in a brig-
ade unit, and the others in a defense-of-territory unit.
In addition, the noncommissioned officers of our combat units must do three
- special periods of Just 15 deys, falling betxeen t;te normal periods; their
purpose is to train them to determine the combat m'.ssions of the units.
Some 100,000 men are thus instructed each year in the refresher-training per-
iods--nearly tWice the number that receive basic training. It fs hoped--and
believed--that our "army in the homes" Will thus be operational upon mobili-
zation.
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We have no women's mi1ita3y service- Nor Cgn the Swedigh wdman chooee acar-
eer di' armq. 13ut the quegtion df a chgnge in beinp didputed bttterl,y, nnd
trext yrnr, the f'.LrnL women wiil bepin their trcLining aa Air Fnrce offiCern,
Oh the ather hanrl, we have a lnrge number of women voluntieere, about 35,000,
Who in ease o� war Wi1.1 serve in offices, an nurse's aidee, vehtcle drivers,
in the te1ecommunicatiions services, in the air defense central unita, ete.
Much more cnu1d be gaid about Svedish clefense--about aivil defense, Cor ex-
ttmple, aith ehe].terg for 50 percent of the population, about the organizntion ~
nf evacuatian for the other ha'Lf and the speaial regcue unitg. Or on the gub-
JeCt of the Swediah vrar materiel indugtry, ahich supplieg defense with more
thr;n 90 percent of itis materiel, thanks to ueii-known firms auch as 9AAB, FF'V
(expansion unknoxn], LM Ericason, ltagglunds, Karlskrongvarvet, and many others.
The space available for tihis article does not permit more detiailed ana].ysis.
mhe SWedish people are unanimously behind thig pol.icy of nonalliance, which
requires a strdng defense in order to be Credible. As in an,y democratic caun-
try, debste on the question of defense is intense, and inquiries show that
the clesire for defense ig strong. Of course, the econonLy remains for us a
problem Which, With the rapid riae in technological costs, is leading to a
quentitative weakening of the technically most highly qtialifed branches. But
for some time to come, Swedish defense should remain strong enough for an ag-
gressor to think twice gbout the "profitability" of an attack. And defense
thereby greetly aupports our policy of nonalliance, the aim of which is to
keep Sweden out of any eventual conflict in our region.
Co1 Olof Dackenberg, Swedish military attache in Paris, Was
commissioned as an officer in 1946. t;mong other things, he
has been a professor in the Infantry Application School, the
Royal Military School, and the Higher School of War. He has
commanded a mountain regiment as well as SWeden's most northerly
military territorial divfsion.
Col Hans Berglund, Swedish naval and air attache in Paris,
- entered the SWedish Air School in 1945� He Was commissioned
as an officer and licensed as a fighter pilot in 1948. He
has more than 4,000 hours of flying time. Among other thi:,gs,
he has commanded the reconnaissance squadron and has been
chief nf the operations section of an integrated military
- region as Well as assistant chief in the operations section
of the general staff of the armed forcea.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 - Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'AuJourd'hui"
11267
CSO: 3100
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FOIt OFFICIAL USE UNLY
COUNTRY SECTION
ECONOMY MINISTRY SEES CONTINUED UNEMPLOYMENT DROP IN 1980
Stockholm VECKANS AFFARER in Swediah 3 May 79 p 5
SWCDEN
[Art3cle: "1979 Will Be a Record Year--But 5weden Must Exercise Reatraint"]
[Text] All signa point to Chat 1979 wi11 be a Cop year in Che current Swedish
business-cycle if one looks $t tha total economic growth rate. But the
utilizaCion of capacity could continue to improve and unemployment continue
to decrease nexC year as we11.
The great problem wi11 be to hold down coneumption by municipalities and
houaeholda so that the deficit balance on current accounts doea not increase
further.
The Ministry of Economics in its national budget calculatea that Che GN'P
_ will increase by 5.1 percent th3s year. BuC after that the pace will _
slow down to a growth rate of 4.2 and 3.percent respectively in 1980 and 1981.
- If that estimate turns out to be correct, Swedish economic activity will
continue to increase, at least during�1980, with further utilization of
capacity and declinfng unemployment as a result.
But the ministry has already adjusted its GNP-estimate downward from its
5.4 percent in the preliminary national budget in January. The main reason -
for thfs is the lower esCimate of inventories. This year's inventories
are expected to be 1 billion kronor less (in 1975 prices) than esCimated
in the January prognosis.
On some pofnts the raCe of increase has been reassessed upward. The most
positive change concerns the fndustrial volume of investment. Last winter
- it was estimated that there would be a moderate increase of 3 percent.
The latest fnquiry of corporate fnvestment has increased that figure to
7 percent.
The Ministry of Economy counts on further improvements in industry's invest-
ment figures for the next few years. As shown in the table, it is estimated
that there will be increases in volume of 9 percent, both in 1980 and 1981.
These are completely reasonable figures.
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Bue ehere is sei11 a way Co go in order eo reach the level o� the egriy
1970's.
'Che cnlumn at the table's Earthest right indicatea how far the recovery in
the econcnni.c upawing has broughC ue. IG shows the total change in volume
from the firgt year of the recesaion in 1975, and includes the Departmene
of Economy's own favorable estimate up to, and including, 1981.
Even in 1981 induatry's volume of investment will be less than 90 percenC
of whati it was in 1974. Only thie year does induatrial outpue reach the
1974 level (aee also next page). And the expected rate of increaee for
1980 and 1981 are noe spectacular.
The reagon for this is, of course, our weakened competiitive strengCh and
export difficultiea. Nevertheless, a yearly increase to between 7-8 percent
in the volume of exporta is expected for the 4 years 1978-1981. But the
average yearly increase for all the 7 years from 1975 will be less than
4 percent.
ThaC figure is exceeded by the municipalities which--since the oil criais--
have been the most expansive sector of the Swedish economy. Municipalities
increased their investmentis and consumptiion between 1975-1978 by more than
18 percent. By 1981 the Cotal increase is estimated to be almost 30 percent.
During the immediate yeara following the oil crisis, it seemed natural to
invest in the expansion og the municipal sector. This provided opportunities -
to mainCain employment while waiting for the international recovery. But _
Chis picture has now changed.
The government has entered into agreements with municipalities and with
the Association of Swedish Counties to limit growth of local consumption.
But this has not stopped the growth in the municipal sector. Instead the
Department of Economy has had to make an upward revision of its estimate
for boCh municipal consumption and municipal investments for 1979. The
prognoses in the table for 1980 and 1981 can be said tio reflect mostly -
wishf.ul Chinking.
The same can be said in regard to the calculation for the growth of private
consumption, The national budget also stresses these problems: Given the
current climate of economic upswing how to hold down the private as well
as the public trend of consumption within the economic long-range framework.
The continued economic upswing and rising corporate profits may make it
difficult for indivfduals and municipaliCies to exercise restraint.
This involves considerable risks for both inflation and the balance of
current payments. The department does not figure on a.continued decrease
in the rate of inflation after last year's improvemenC. And the deficit
in the balance of current payments again increases Chis year and next year
as well, With higher domestic demand the situatiots could deteriorate
rapidly.
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Chnngeg in volume in percent 1978 1979 1980 1981 1975-81
GNP
2.8
5.1
4.2
3.0
15.6
Of which Private consumption
- 0.9
2.8
2,2
2,0
12.8
Industrial. investment
-18.2
6.9
9.0
9,0
-12.6
Houaing construction
18.3
5.0
6.4
2.0
15.7
Government
3.4
1.7
0.9
0.9
9.7
Municipalities
4.0
4.2
2.8
2.4
29.8
Lxport trade
7.8
8.0
7.6
7.0
29.3
Import trade
- 7.0
9.5
7.7
6.0
15.7
Balance of trade in billion
krnnor
5,600
4,700
5,200
7,100
Balnnce of current paymenCs in
billion kronor
3,900
-6,300
-7,500
-6,700
Consumer prices
10
6
6
5
Industrial production
1.2
6.6
5.5
5 9.8
COPYRIGHT: Ahlens & Akerlund tryckerier, Stockholm 1979
9349
CSO: 3109 END
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