JPRS ID: 8547 TRANSLATIONS ON USSR POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

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27 JUNE i979
~ 30
(FOUO 9!?9)
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JP RS L/ 8 5 A 7
27 June 1979
TRANSLATIONS ON USSR POLITICAL
AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
(FOUO 9/79)
U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIQNS RESEARCHSERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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NOTICE
Effective 2 Ju1y 1979 a new cover design and
title will be initiated for this report. The
title will be changed to:
USSR REPORT
Political and Socioloqical AfFairs
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TRANSlATIONS ON USSR POI.ITICAL
ANA SOCIOLOGICAI, AFFRIRS
(FOUO 9/79)
CONTENTS
JPR3 L/8547
27 June 1979
PAGE
INTERNATIONAL
Aixatol:y Gromyko Asaesses U.S. Foreign Policy
(Anatoliy Gromyko; VNESHNYAYA POLITIKA SSHA: UROKI
I DEYSTVITEL'NOSTI 60-70-e GODY, 1978) 1
NATIONAL
Book Discusses Languageg of SovieC NationaliCies ,
(K. Kh. Khanazarov; RESHRNIYE NAT5IONAL'NO-
YAZYKOVOY PROBLEMY V SSSR, 1977) 61
Excerpts From Eook 'Islam and Society'
(T.S. Saidbayev; ISLAM I OBSHCHESZ'V0, 1978) 71
- a - (IIT - USSR - 35 FOUOI
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INTERNATIONAL
ANATOLIY GROMYKO ASSESSLS U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
Moscow VNESHNYAYA POLITIKA SSHA: UROKI I DEYSTVITEL'NCST.' 60-70-e GODY
(U.S. Foreign Policy: Lessons and Realiry of the 1960's and 1970'e) in
Rusaian 1978 signed to press 17 Aug 78, I, III-VIII, 1-34, 252-281,
282-283, 300-304
[Annotation, table of contents, foreword, Chapter 1 and Chapter 10 from
book by Anatoliy Gromyko, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 23,000 copies,
304 pages)
[Text] The monograph shows the confronCation of various tendencies in
American political life, particularly in the perioda of government by ttie
Democrats from Kennedy to Carter. An analysis is made of the procQSS of
forming foreign policy concepts, atrategy and tactics of Che American
administration on a number of key problems of world policy in the 1960's
and 1970's.
A�ter summarizing, in part on the basis of personal impressiona, the
experience in developing Soviet-American relations in the 1970's, the
author draws a conclusion concerning the great potentials for atrengthen-
ing peace and conaolidating relations between the USSR and the United
States on the principlea of peaceful coexistence.
The work is intended for acientific and practical workers in the field of
international relations and all readers interested in problems of the
foreign policy of the United States. -
Con ten ts
Foreword
Page
Chapter,l. Basic Directions in United States Postwar Foreign
Policy and Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chapter 2. Fnreign Policy of the Kennedy Government: "New Frontiers"
and Former Miscalculations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Chapter 3. The 1962 Caribbean Cri.sis . . . . . . . . . . . . � . � �
Chapter 4. The Approach of ehe Democratic Administratiun ro the
Derelopment of B1lateral Soviet-Americbin Relarione
(1961-1968) . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chapter 5. The Democratic Government's Dangerous PClicy in Asia--
Laying the FoundaCion for Widesca.le Aggreasion
Chapter 6. The policy of the Kennedy Government in A,frica
Chapter 7. 01d Goa1s and New Methodg in the Kennedy Goverriment
Policy in Latin America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chapter 8. The Course Toward Inregrating rhe Forces of Capitaliam
in Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ChapCer 9. The Scientific-Technical Revolution and Problems of
Strengthening Peace snd Coopergtion . . . . . . . . . .
ChapCer 10. Ways of Improving Soviet-American Relations
Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Foreword
In the spring of 1971, during a scientific mission to the United States,
as well as in stxbsequent years of work in this country, one of the ques-
tions most widely asked me was the following: "Just when, at last, will
normal, f riendly relations be established between our countries, America
and Soviet Russia?" A second question was usually added to this one:
"What is hindering this?" These questions were posed, of course, by
various people, and one someCimes felt that it would have been more to ~
the interlocutor's liking to hear a negative answer on the potentials for
setting up widescale Soviet-American cooperation. Dogmas on the inevita-
bility of the Cold War, decrepit, but still not collapsed by that time,
had taken root in the minds of many Americans. It was necessary to
explain patiently thE esseace of the foreign policy steps of the Soviet
Union in the international acena.
The peace program adopCed by the 24th and developed by the 25th CPSU
congresses was a revelation for many Americans. For a long time the
idea had been drummed into their heads that the Soviet Union "was pre-
paring for aggression" against the West. These were, of course, absurd
insinuations. All the same, the awareness of a large number of United
States citizens had been dulled with such fabrications.
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!
IC is imporCant Co note, however, thaC for the Unieed Srates Gnvei-nmenC of
' the beginnicg of the 1970's the leaeona of the numerous crises and fail.ures
in American foreign policy in the 1950's attd 1960's, when the icy winds of
the Co1d War were bl.owing wildly in internaeional 1i.fe due ro the fault nf
the capitallat West, were not wasted. The aceual, real conditions, whicti
confirmed the complete rightneas of Lsnin's principle of peaceful coexis-
' tence, carved their way increasingly widely in the world arena. The 1970's
pass by under the badge of escalating detenee. At the same Cime, through-
out Chese years the efforts of the adherents of confrontation to defeati
detente did nnt cease in the West. This, unfortunately, is also a reality
of our timea. It constantly placea on the agenda the need to seruggle to
preaerve peace on earth and further limit the influence of Chose who are
still dreaming of reversing the development of ittternational relationa.
5ensible Americans are coming out today for realiam and a sober estimate of
the situation, and against a return to a policy of dangerous, unreasoned -
actions. Similar voices were also heard earlier in the United Statea, o�
course, in the 1960's. They rang out in circumstances thnt were complicated
for the United States Government and carried the great power of the emotional
charge of anger and a persistent striving not to let oneself be deceived by
militarist slogans. Sounding particularly loudly was the voice o� protest -
of young America, which in the 1950's as a rule had believed the fables of,
anticommunism. The 1960's became for them yeare of ever-intenaifying doubta,
now not only about the government, but also about the sincerity of the
dogmas of the Cold War and the "American Age" that were preached from the
American political Olympus. The insolvency oF the old foreign policy couree
was becoming increasingly clear.
At the beginning of the 1970's it seemed that all the stormy activity of
American imperialism that had been formed in the frontal attack against the
forces of socialism and progress had bogged down. A new alignment of forces
had formed in the world that revealed the tremendous advantages of socialiam
as a social system. Forced to create a powerful defensive weapon, the USSR
thereby proved the illusory nature of the West's counting on achieving the
situation that John Foster Dulles had once dreamed of, of "supremacy" over
th e peaceloving country. Furthermore, interimperialist conflicts had grown
sharper, the foreign policy ambitiona of the countries of the Common Market
and of Japan had intensified, the United States economic aituation had
become serious and the prestige of the once all-powerful dollar on the
bourgeois~~financial markets had fallen greatly. In Western Europe, "cr4sis
diplomacy to a considerable extent ceded to the dlplomacy of a search for
mutually acceptable solutions. Finally, in Vietnam the ar.rogance of offi-
cial Washington was taught an object lesson--a nation that defends the
cause of its freedom is invincible.
The development of Soviet-American relations in the 1970's was a major suc-
cess for the Leninist policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government with
respect to putting into practice the Peace Program adopted by the 24th
Corgress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This program, which
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wns developed at the their supported all Snvieti
people, aince it refleCts
1972 and 1973 inecribed a new, unquesrionably significanC page in the
history of inCernational relations.
L. I. Brezhttev, general secreCary of the CPSU CenCral CommitCee, and the
PresidenC of the United 5Cates signed the Basic Principles o� RelaCions
Between the Union of Soviet SacinlisC Republics and the United StAtes of
America in Moscow in 1972. In this historic docuinent the foundation is
laid for permanette fruitful development of Soviet-American relaCions.
ror the first Cime in the postwar period, the United StaCes Covernment,
having evaluated the lessons of the past, faced reality and acknowledged
the enormous significance af the principle of peaceful coexistence far the
cause of peace. As a result, it was recorded in the Above document rhat
both parties common
onducCing Cheiromutunl relations ~
nuclear age there is no
on the basis of peaceful coexistence."
The USSR and Che.United States took on the obligarions of avoThennec asary
confrontations and resolving differences in a peaceful way.
prerequisites for rhis were recognized as the interests of the security of
the parties and rejection of the use of force or the Chreat of its use.
In 1972 another historic document was signed at negotiations in Moscow--
the Interim Strategic Offensive Arms Agreement. This agreement was based
the
on the principle of identical securiCy for the parties. It check~fdcourse
arms race and lessened the threat of nuclear missile conflict. +
the agreement adopCed in Moscow on strategic offensive arms 1imiCation was
only the first, alChough exceedingly important, step along the road leading rtant to universal disarmament. Ch badvancingoalong itreven farthera wthe ithU comed ,
SCates not to leave this pa,
p1Qte persistence.
The results of the Soviet-American negotn~siWere�signedtinathislarearonithe '
were also fruitful. A series of agreeme
development of economic-tr.ade relations, scien tific-technical cooperation
ublic health, environmental
and cooperation with respect to outer space, p
protection and exchanges in science, technology, education and culture.
In a 3oint Soviet-American communique the governments of the USSR and the
~ United States expressed the conviction that the provisions formulaCed in :
the Basic Principles of Relations "would open new possibilities for the
_ Qevelopment of relations of peace and mutual:ly advantageous
between the USSR and the United States." In this way, S
bilateral relations acqiiired eve b ctual trustwing into relations built
on a balanced basis and cemented y mu
The substantial shifts that took place in the first ht9a0CCOmin
the international arena in the dirAction of securing detente were
panied by a bitter ideological-political struggle, since a considerable
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+ttumber of the bottrgeois puliticians nnd t}le milirAry ConCinued Co hold
1~! their 3CF111d5 on the Cold War and the arms race. x'hey were eri11 chained
; Co the pttat nnd aaempted to undermine the basic foreign policy tendency
- of our time--detente. L. I. Brezhnev poinCed oue the danger of� Cheir
actions at the Wor'j'd Congress of PeACeloving Forces held in Moecow in 1973:
; "It goes wiChout saying that further expansion o� the arms rane whipped up
' by the aggressive ci.rcles of imperialiam and the detente that has begun are -
! Cwo processes going in opposiCe directions. They cannot develop endlessly, _
' so to speak, on para11e1 courses."L The subsequenC course of evenes showed
; thaC the struggle around the question of the fate of deCente noe only did
; not weaken, but was intensified. 7.'he Curn toward detente cnnCinued, but ar
i the same time sabotage o� iC grew more frequenr and ntCacks were made under
the most vxried banners and to the mosC varied slogans, beginning with
, demands ro carry out a'"policy of peace, based on military force" and
ending wtth a hypocriCical campaign of "defending human rights."
The opponent�s of detente, as is known, take their reading of time and of
~ events from the period of international relations when an armoaphere of
' fear and hostility was increasing pressure on them. They derive energy in
the hope of again leading astray the WesCern community, urging the United
States statesmen on in every way possible to a sCruggle with the "5oviet
~ threat," toward shortsighCed sCeps, atriving to lull their senae of
responaibility to their own people. ~
Through the efforts of the Cold War adherents in the United States, in 1978
detente underwent particularly severe trials. This situaCion was repeatedly .
ernphasized by Soviet statesmen and the press. For example, PRAVDA, in the
article, "The Present Policy of the United States Government," noted that
"recent frlcts indicate that changes dangerous for the cause of neace are
taking p13ce in United SCates policy" and that "the farther things go, the
more signs are accumulated that in this struggle the upper hand is beginning
to be taken by representatives of the groups thaC would like to undermine
detente, return the world to the Cold War and Co new confrontations and to
unrestrained military rivalry.112 Under circumstances of anCi-Soviet .
intoxicaCion, Senator Barry Goldwater stated direcCly that "iC would be
a good thing to return to the days of John Dulles." In this way, the
"h awks" uf the 1970's often turn to the "experience" of inte rnational
relations in the postwar period, alCering it in their own way. They are
obviously counting on the short memory of those people in the United States
who forgot the lessons of the 1950's and 1960's. That is why revealing the
true nature of American foreign policy of that period is an urgent task
that the author of this boak has also tried to fulfill, as well as to shed
light on certain features of today's Soviet-American relations and ways of
developing them furthe r in the spirit of detente. It is the latter that is
the only reasonable basis for a further advance in relations between the
USSR and the United States. As the lessons of history indicate, no alter-
natives are given in ehis sphere.
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FOOTNOTES
~ 1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i staC'i" [In Lenin's Course.
= 5peeches and ArCicles], Vol 4, Moscow, 1974, p 333.
2. PRAVDA, 17 June 1978.
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ChapCer 1. Basic Directions in United StaCes Postwar Foreign Policy and
Diplomacy
There were a good many governmental shifts in the United States in the posC-
war years. At the White House, with pomp or wiChout it, the presidential
seat was�occupied by both Democrats ttnd Republicans. After the eminent .
i American President Franklin RoosevelC, a man with, as was said of him, thin
lips and a hard heart, settled down for several years in Washington. This
was Harry Truman--a Kansan [as publi.shed] who asserted that he was an
incorruptible presidEnC. In any 6ar3e, visitors wore struck by a little
sign displayed on the desk in his office: "The buck stops here." It
obviously referred Co unscrupulous methods of getting rich. It could also,
however, be considered with complete certainty that the power and influence
of politicians and financial bigwigs of any type by means ended at the
president's desk. On its polished surface, as in the center of a solar.
ray, was the base of the epicenter of the powerful forces of the United
States, burning to cinders in American political life all those who did
not know well or did not take into account the interests of the American
elite and the financial "kings."
One digression apgears to explain certain seeming paradoxes in the American
way of life, system and politics.
I had occasion to live and work for many years in the United StaCes. It is,
of course, a coui:try that is in many ways complex, settled by working and
mainly well-balanced people, often with a distinctive sense of humor. The
, American, and espacially the American woman, perhaps, strive toward nothing
so much as personal well-being. As a rule, Americans are sentimental, love
' sports and classical music, nature and horror films, solitude and noisy
! merry-making. To each his own, as they say. Ordinary Americans, however,
' although many of them, worn out by everyday life, do not realize this, or
;
I realize it only quite vaguely, have a heightened sense of fear of violence
' that may be pe rpetrated, not abstractly, but on themselves. This feeling
persecutes many Americans both in everyday life and in thoughts about
! politics.
There are many profound works, articles and essays penned by Soviet scholars
' and journalis ts that reveal the roots of this phenomenon. At the same time,
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iC can quite 3ustifiably be noCed Chat the bosseg of the capitaliat system
attempt Co d3.rect the ordinary Americans' fear in the face of the social _
conditions of tiheir life against the "enemy from wiChout." Sociulism and commun ism are proclaimed as Ch3.s, even though Americans know ulmosC rtothin g
about whnt Chey represent. While echoes of the dynamic life in the SovieC
Union reach them, they scarcely penetrate the dense cur*.aln of the bour-
geois mass 3n�ormation media.
We wi11 discuss the main facCors in United States postwar foreign policy
and diplomacy. Unless they are taken into account, it is difficult to
understand the present period of American foreign policy and parCicularly
its future, even the near future.
- One of the importarit factors that has exerted the mosC negative influence,
particularly on the foreign policy of John Kennedy's adminisCraCion, lay in
the straregic and tacticnl aims of American foreign policy and diplomacy of
the postwar period and especially the heritage of U. S. SecreCary of SCate
John Foster Dulles. An analysis of the basic direcCions in the activity of
the postwar governments of the United States, including those headed by the -
Democrats, aids in a deeper evaluaCion of President Kennedy's fateign policy
and shows the truly rigid framework within which thn policy of Chis govern-
men t was carried out in the in ternational arena. In addition, it aids in a _
better understanding of the essence of the artificial barriers constanCly in
ef�ect in the foreign policy of the United States, that stand in the way of
an improvement in Soviet-American relations. Militaristic aims occupy a
, noticeable place among these obstacles, including those at the present time,
= in the second half of the 1970's.
After the end of World War II, United States foreign policy and diplomacy
underwent great changes, which were caused both by factors in the internal
development of this couintr.y and by external factors. It is weil' known that c
in the 1950's and 1960's American imperialism acquired new expansionist
features and began Co *_hrust the so-called Elmerican way of life upon other
peoples.
- The United States was the main power that unleashed the Cold War directed _
against the USSR and other socialist countries. Even today United StaCes
foreign policy and diplomacy are to a considerable extent guided by forces
that ca11 in question the interest of the I3SSR and other socialist states
in a fundamental lessening of international tension. This straCegic line
of American imperialism became firmly established after 1945. It is becom-
ing increasingly difficult to implement it, however, since the international
situation of the second half of the 13?0's has changed radically for the
better. Numerous international agreements were concluded, primarily at _
the historic meeting of the leaders of European states, as well as of the
United States and Canada,at Helsinki. The Final Act of the European con-
ference, signed by the heads of 35 states, including President G. Ford, -
became a historic event and a document, just as a number of bilateral
Soviet-American agreements, partl.cularly those pertaining to the bases of
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the ineerrelaCirns between the Sdviet Unidh ana the Uniepd 5taeen df AmeriCa
and the egreements regehed w3,eh respeeC Cd sCraCpgfc arms li.mie8tion.
tn th is way, detenr.e in SovieC-Amcrican relatiuns was cemeneed by mutual
agteements and underseandings. In the iinieed SCates, however, thia een-
ddncy alwayg had many influenrial opponents. Their preasurp, as the course
of events ahnwed, influeneed the 4rhi.te House policy after Che new Democratie
Pre$ident J. Carker came inta power. He beggn hi.g aceivity with rgspecr kn
the Soviet Urion from a pnaition thae can oe ca1.1ed naChing oCher ehgn
shorts:ghred. n e phnriseenn idea of the UttiC4d SCaCeH at; Che "mora1
leader of the free worid," whieh hes the r3ghe rn tench others how to
"defend humgn righ,ts," with no enncern for the segee a�fairs uf this
matter in ite own cnunrry, began to be reinrrocluced into Ameriran polittcnl
circulation.
All oi thig rang vpry dissonantly in the internaCional relntinng of the -
aecond half nf the 197019, in which dptenee was e deeermining factnr.
bn tnp of n11 this, in 1976-1977 American fnreign policy mnde the regulnr _
- aigzag in nn impnreane question guch as etrgtegiC nrms limieation, essen-
- tially casCing doubC nn the agreement reached ae Vledivostok on the
highest level in November 1974.
In thin difficult situation there was a new dieplay of the adherencp to
princ3ple and firmnesa of the foreign pclicy of the Soviet Union, which
- came to the defenae of everything poeitive thgt had been achieved in
5oviet-American relations in the past }ears. Afte r rejectina the ungub-
stantiated one-gided approach of official Washington to s revigion of the
agreement on gCraCegiC nrme limitatinn and the ridiculnug cleims td the
role of "universal moralist," the Soviet Government continued to carry out
a vast amount of work on escalating detente in Europe and in other regiona
of the Wnrld and on maintaining e policy toward lessening international
tension, including that in Soviet-American relatinns.
Words of wisdom, dignity and realigm, based on the generally recognized
prestige of the 5nviet State and the solidarity and power of the countries
of the socialist commonwealth,were heard from the Kremlin, addreased to
choge in the United States who aanted to cnrry out a"tough policy" in
relation to the USSR. 'this line based on principle was continued in the
message of greetinga sent by L. I. Brezhnev on 4 Ju1y 1971 to United States
~ president Carter on the occasion of this country's national holiday--
1 Independence Day. "I ahould like to express the hope," emphaeized the
head of the Soviet State, "that, by using the positive experience accumu-
lated during the last few years, we wi11 be able tn ensure the stable
development of relntions between the USSR and the United States alnng the
path of cooperation and interaction in the intere$ts of consolidating
peace and escalating the p rocess of detente."1
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LeC ug, hnwever, ggk ourselvps the qupgeian, why, g11 the aame, did
Ameri.cnn foreigtt palicy even in the second ha1f of the 1970'g, pgrticu-
lar1y wieh the nemocraes' gcCessinh ed power, sggin eake an a zigzag
nAture7 Why did rhetoric and iack oE retipere fdr ehe rrineiple of
eontinuiCy in international ogreements begin eh predominate in it?
There cannot, df cdurse, be a ter:9et one-wdrd attswer here, nar shauld
- the explanetion be gouglit only in certAin speci�ic individuala on the
Americsn politir.a1 sCenp.
American forEign pnl3cy haa a class basis: 1nrge groupings of monopolistic
Gapirgl gtnnd ae the helm of the stgte power. These groupinge do not
regard with favor the political 1eaders whd make gress miscalculations.
An pxample of this is the Demncratic pregidenr, Lyndon Johngon, who suf-
fpred pnliricnl defeat due tn the failure of the Americen venture in
E'ie tnnm.
If, hnwever, one gpeaks of the ideological-theoretiCal platform of American
foreign policy, it ig beBed on a ramified network of dnctrinee gnd roneepts
that are reiated by only nne thing--ideng of "American exclueiveness" and
e spirit of expans3onism. Behind the dtvergiCy of these dactrineg nnd
concepts, dugted with the neNege "aehievemenes" of American bourgcois
politieal theught, a stngle r,ortnnon aim was viewed--te strgngthen the posi-
Cion nf Americen capir.aligm, including strengthening it nt the expense af
othpr states, and after 1917, when Russia's workers took nathority into
their hands, Co plgce all pdssible dbgtacles dn the pach of development of
socialigm, and if possible, simply to gtop thig natural procegs.
We wi11 begin the analysis of the besic directions in American policy in
the 1940's to 1960's with a study of the foreign policy doctrines and
concepCs of the Cald War period.
_ Just what sort of doctrines and concepts are they?
Among the American foreign policy doctrineg and concepts there are thoge
that gerved and will probably continue for a long eime to gerve the United
_ States. This higcorical continuity is explained by the common fuctorg
inherent in American imperialism both at the beginning of the twentieth
century and in the present-,-expansion, aggreeeireness, lack of respect for
the sovereign rightg of other nations and reliance on force.
ThE doctrine of isolationiam, which dominated from the end of the eighteenth
century right up to the 1930's, should be particularly discussed. 'Phe
inspirer of it was the first president oE the United States, Cr.orge
Washington, who felt that America should stand aside from any itternational
conflicts. The roain goal of the doctrine in the eurly days was to protect
the United States against the encroachments of stronger European powers
and to create the conditions for consoltdating the AmericAn nation And
strengthening its state. In the niaereenth century the American bourgeoiaie
directed its main efforta toward maximum extension of the United States
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bnrdern on the Ndrth Amhrican cdntinenr. 'Ctic doeeri.ne of isolaeianidm
cnnCribured i,n the be3r poonib1e way Cn nctiieving ehia Aim, 1n accordgncp
' with the doctrine of iaolarioni,em, for e 1ong time rfie Un1,eed SCaten evoided
_ nttaching itself to any military-po1lC:lca1 a11ianCe.
Gradually the coneene df ieolaCionism evolved snd grow mare complex. Ieo-
lationiem beggn ro become a docrrine ehat enaured the Unired Stares the
opporCuiity of maneuvering relatively freeiy in the CompetiCion �or worid
_ lnfluence with its imperialise rivals. c1n the racrical plane, in acCOrdante
wieh the doctrine of igoiationism, the UniCed StaCes Government for the
time being preferred eo gtand epart from eny speeific ineernational con-
flict or especially military actiona, in order Co intervene BcCively in
the cdurse of icitierimperialiat confl3ct at e momenr adventageous for it.
A atriking example of this is the UniCed Statea poeition in Wor1d War I.
In the course of eime isolationiem increaeingly adgpred itnelf to the
interests of the Untted StaCes imperialist Qolicy. It was compleCely
discgrded with respect Co LeCin America. The nature of isolatinnism
acquired an expanaionieti slent, after the Monroe Uoctrine was proclaimed
in 1823. AC its basis lay the ideg of limiting the influence, and then
even forcing the European powere out of the Weetern Hemiephere. The
Monroe Docrrine signified thar the United Stares, in the firar querter of
the nineteenth century, was gradually beginning to depart from the posi-
tions of "classic" isolationism and regard Latin America as a ephere of
its own "specia.l interesta." With the development of American capitalism
and its turning into the imperialism, the Mon roe Doctrine Wae modified.
At the beginning of the rwenCieth century it was nlready being used to
justify Nashington's imperialiat intervention in the Affaira of the coun-
tries of tatin America. After World War II the United SCatea used the
Monroe boctrine mainl3� to subetantiate its police actions, eupprese the
nationa.l liberation movements in Latin America and attempt to cut off
dissemination of socialist ideas south of the Rio Grande. This doctrine
Was also dragged out into the light during the Caribbean crisis of 1962
to justify the dangeroua actions of the Un ited Statea Government with
reepect to Cube nnd the 5oviet Union. Therefore, right up to our timea
the Menovated Monroe Doctrine can be found in the arsenal of American
foreign policy and diplomacy.
At the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, when
the country entered the stage uf imperialigm, United States foreign policy
took on an active expansionist nature. The new palicy reqnired that fresh
ideas, doctrines and concepts be Worked out. A more detailed theoreticbl
platform was gradually worked out for American imperialist diplomacy. In
this period a group of atatesmen and scholars--President Theodore Roosevelt,
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and Admiral A. Mechan--worked out nea doctrines.
For example, the "Open Door Folicy" was proclaimed, directed primarily
taward Asie.
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A11 Chree basic docerines nn whieh American forei,gn pdlicy and diplnmaey
regeed tio a considPrable exrene in ehig period, 3n supplementing each nttier,
pursued the goa1 of ensuring the ineeregrd of the Unired 5taeee in three
geog.raphirnl regians df the wo r1d: iso1aCidnigm--3n Noreh Americn and
WesCern Eurdpe, the Monroe Doctrina--in Lntij America and the "Open Door
Policy"--in Aaia. Thesg docrrines eo a greatar or lpsger dpgree determined
_ the aCrategy atid taaticg of Amer.icgn dipl.omacy i.n the ineernationnl arena
- up to the 19 30' s.
- P1uralixat3on of Cite aimg o� Ameriean foreign po].icy and updaCing the dipld-
maCic deviceg and mQthode occurred in the courae n� and after the end of
- Wor1d tvar Ix. The esRence of Amer3ean �oreigki policy end diplomacy in the
pogtwar peri.od amounts ro the old aim--aCtempCg to create a Pgx Americana,
that is pence in the Ameriran way, a worldwide American Empire, in which
no one woul.d dare to cust doubt on the supremacy of American pnliCiCinns
and monopoiigtA. There are a number of reasans for Chis approach of the
ruling clique in the United 5taCes rn international affaire.
The American imperialists assumed that in the gituaeion that hnd formed
after May 1945 the Unired SCntes was the only country that hnd emerged f rom
World War II with a stronger economic and financi.Al eyetem. Approximately
23 billion dnllarg worth of gold was concentrated at Fort Knox and other
gold reserve depoeitories oE the United 5Cates. The imperialist opponenta
of the United 5tateg--Germany, italy and Japan--were uCCerly defented, and
rivals auch ae England and France were gravely weakened. WaghingCon had
the monopoly on nuclear weapons. In Washington, furthermore, it waa felt
thar the Soviet Union, which had borne ttie brunt of the struggle with
fascisC Germany, could not withetand the calculations of the United States
tc+ establish "trusteeship" over the whole world. These conclusiona were
obvious hasty, and underestimated the actual and potential possibiliries
of the Soviet Union, just es the magnetic force of aocialist and communiet
ideas.
New doctrines and concepts had to be worked out for the political rearrange-
ment of the world intended in Washington. There was not long to wait for
practical ateps in this direction. 'rhey ahowed completely clearl.y that in
the struggle for world supremacy the ruling clique of the United States
intended to be supported primarily by its milieary and economic potential.
Already heing worked out by 1947 were the notorious concept of "containment"
directed against the Soviet Union and other socialist countriea, the "Truman
- Doctrine" ar.d the "Marshall Plan," which pursued the goal of establishing
the hegemony of the United States in Western Europe. In 1949 the aggrea-
stve military bloc of NATO was established. The ruling circles of the
United States of America set out to embody the idea of establishing a
world order in the American way, and the deformed offspring of American
- postwar foreign policy and diplomacy--the "Cold War"--wae born.
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'I'hp concapC n� "contai.nmenC" was reinforced by asertea of pnliticnl, eco-
nomic and miliCgry gcCions of the American Gnvernmene. In revegli.ng the
true aimg o� the concepe of "nontainment," UniCed SGateg SecreCary oE
State Dullee aC the beginning of the 1950'g advanned the doctrine of
"liberation," even more frankly aggreseive in ttature, nfter pYOC1a3ming
the goal of the United States to bp elimingeion of the soGialieC ordere
in WesCern Europe. The Co1d War- had reached itie apogee.
American diplnmacy in the Cold War period took nn hypertrophiCally defnrmpd
ahapes. IC discarded the positive experience i.n solving international
problems ehat it hgd accumulaeed under Pregident Rooaevelr. Moreover,
there is fu11 reagon for conaidering thaC everyrhing Itoosevelrian, which
was of poaitive signi�icnnce for both inrernaCionnl and for Soviet-American
relations, began to be cauCerized from American diplomacy beginning in 1946.
Teheran, Yglra, PoCedam--a11 of these hiatorical landmarke of internaCional
diplomacy in WashingCon were deliberatel.y defamed, and ttoosevelt'g name wae
digcredited, ae firse reaervedly, and then increasingly openly. The apirit
of seeking mutually accepCable eoluCions to internationgl problems jointly
with the Soviet Union was eradicated from American diplomacy. 5oviee-
American relations were frozen.
It would seem that certain pointa in the present atage of develnpment of
Soviee-Araerican relations recall, at least outwardly, thia postwar period:
a few influential gentlemen are atriving to reduce to the minimum the
positive experience in relaCions between the U5SR and the United SraCes
ChBC was accumulated in the firat half of the 1970's. The tremendnus
difference, however, lies in the fact that it ia difficulr, perhapa impos-
sible,to croas out this instructive experience. Many American politiciana
and repreaentativea of the business world realize qufte well that great
disadvantages for the United`StaCes itself are concealed behind escalation
of the Cension in Soviet-American relations. In the aecond half of the
1940's, however, there was no such realization.
Where they build their calculations on force, the means of peaceful settle-
menr of international diaputes fall Co the side. After the vicCory over
fascisC Germany,in the United States it seemed that for many years they
forgot whae a reeponsible, friendly attitude toward the Soviet country and
toward its f riends and allies was. Instead of this, America's ruling
elite concentrated its efforts on atCempta to isolate, and if it yorked,
simply to undermine the socialist achievements of the Soviet people.
Many American politicians came out openly in behalf of war againat the
USSR, seeking for this any kind of "convenient" pretexts, such as saying
that the Soviet Union was preparing an "intennational conspiracy" with the
aim of "overthrowing" the American Government,. Let us remember how the
fascist-type Senator Joseph McCarthy raged in the United States. Unfor-
tunately, he was not alone. Of course, not all American politicians
upheld such views, but they preferred to keep aiJ.ent.
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mhe nucl.ear weapong eeseing perfnrmed by the SnvieC Union in 1949 mndd the
mosr unbr3.dled Anti-SovieCs in the UniCed SCnCee chnnge their eune eomewhat.
The United SCgeea po.licy and dipldmacy, dangerous for the cause of peacc,
n� destroying everytihing pos;irive thnt had baen achieved during the war
yedrs wiett respect Co muCual Cooperati.on beeween the US5R nnd the United
StAtes, were in full gwing, howevpr. The United States egtablished many
' aggressive miliCary blocs throughnut the world: NATO, ANZUS, CENTO, SEATO
and ASPAC. Noe only the capiC8list, buC nlgo gome aE the devploping coun-
- Cries fe11 into Cheir trap. In moge of ehpge b1oCe the United StaCeg
occupied the commanding position. In oChers, such ag CENTO, for example,
the Un1ted Stnres did not formally enter, bur actively participated in the
work of its permunent organs.
The "argumentg" by meang of which Attterican diplomAts substantiated the need
tio put togeeher the aggreseive blo,:s were varied. it wns announced, for
example, tihat NATO was cregeed for the purpnse of "saving" WesCern Eurnpe
from "Sovier aggression," SEATO--to guargntee "order and securiey" for
SouthwesC Aeia, and CENTO--to combttt "subversive activities" in the Middle
and Near EasC.
It is quite clear what was really concealed br.hind the facade of the work
of American diplnmacy when it intensively sp1iC the toorld up into groups
confronting each other. In Western Europe NATO becgme an obstacle in the
path of relaxing international tension. NATO esaenti.ally restricts the
sovereignty of the overwhelming majority f Western Curopean countries and
restrains their diplomatic initiative with respect to improv:ng the inter-
national situation in Europe. The "danger from the East," preached by
bourgeois propaganda,proved to be n myth, and the danger of prolonging
American hegemony in Weste?rn Europe, o� aubversive actions against the
socialist countries and of revanchism in the FRG--a reality. Under the
cover of SEATO, at the end of the 1950's the United 5tates drove Indochina
into a bloody war. Finally, CENTO. This bloc was eatablished in 1955.
In 1956 aggregsion had already been unleashed against Lgypt, in 1958--
aggression by the United StaCes and England againsC Lebanon and Jordan,
and in June 1967--the Israeli aggrpssion ngainst Egypt, Syria and Jordan.
The open incursions into the sphere of foreign policy and diplomacy made by
the CIA and the Pentagon became increasingly persistently criticized in
America itself. In response to this criCicism, the United Stntes Activgted
the operations of bourgeois scholars and propagandists directed toward
proving that the world "had the communists to thank" for the origin of the
Cold War. A mure versatile version was drawn out into the light in the
1960's. It was stated that both the United States and the USSR were to
blame for the origin of the Cold War, but the latter, of course, "to a
greater extent."
For example, the American historian Arthur Schlesinger put fort}i the ver-
sion that the orthodox approach existing in the United States, which most
historians followed when explaining the sources of the Cold War, and
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which was that it t,+as nllegedly a bold and necesexry res ~ponge of the "free
world" eo "cnmmunist aggression," needed n reevaluaCion.
1
- Zn sBtting foreh his approech Co the origins oF the Co1d War, 5clileeinger
wr3Ces that in 1945 g poinr of view on world urder dominnted in the United SCares according to which a11 the seeees have common interestg in a11 world -
affairs and ehould collaborate in inCernational organizariono, Actually,
Koosevelt, upon reeurning fi�om the Ya1ta Conference, gnnounced ehat iC had
"put an end to the syarem of uniigrerai actions of cloeed a11ittnces gnd
spherea of influence, alignmenG of �orceg and a11 neher devices ehaC had
been tested throughout the centuries and had inevitably Eai1ed Co bring
the dea3red reault." It is in order to note, however, ehat ltoosevelt made
his sCaCemenr in the spirit of a pollcy of mutual assistance by the par-
ticipanes in the anti-Hit1er coalition and thnC he also regarded the pos-
sibility of postwar collaboration with the USSR wiCh jusrified hope.
American foreign poliny practice after ltooeevelr's death wns a complere
. contradiction Cn this approach as it had been underatood by the president.
Deprived of the spirit of cooperation, it rapidly evolved toward the viewg
of thoae who, inroxicated by the possesaion of the atomic bomb, called for
establishing the dictates of the United Stateg in international relaCiona.
It is characteristic that even the conaepC of the "sphereg of influence,"
when it did not secure the ruling clique of the United States, wae also
discarded and, converaely, was used intensively when it was advantageous
for it. Z'he concept of "apheres of influence" was rejected if it denoted
to even the slightest extent nonintervention in the internal affnirs of the
countries of the socialist comnwnwealth, and at the same time, it was
followed, for example, in relations with the countries of Western Europe.
This approach, of courae, had nothing in common with poetwar reality and
gradually forced tension in relations beeween the capitalist and the
socialist countries, including between the United States and the USSR.
Arthur Shlesinger, for example, acknowledged: "The critics and even the
frienda of the United States sometimes note a lack of correapondence
between the American passion for universalism, when it is a question of
territory lying far from Amsrican shores, and the preference which the
United States assigna to its own interests." Churchill, in aCriving for
Washington's blessings for an initiative in the spirit of the policy of
the English "aphere of influence" in Bastern Europe, could not refrnin from
reminding the Americans: "We are following the example of the United States
in South America."
It was President Truman who became the man to unleash, along with Churchill,
- the Cold War. Zn official Washington, notes Schl.esinger, the opinion was
stated that "If a conflict with Russia is inevitable, every sensible con-
sideration suggests that it should take place in Eastern, and not in
Western Europe."3 Under the pretext of "disagreement with the division of
the world into spheres of influence," American imperialism began an active
struggle to eliminate the people's democratic states in Eastern Europe.
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Nnving reeerved for itigelf the aphere nf i.nf].upnce in Lgein Ameriag gnd,
esseneially, having egeabli.ghed ie i.n Weseern Eurnpe, Ampriegn imperialism
at the end of the 1940'g faseened its eyes nn the EgsCern European staeea
Chat hud been 1iberated from tageist slaver,y. In Cnnjunceion w3th England
the United SCateg Gove rnmenC resolved ro esCnbllsh iCS "sphere of in�luQncn"
in Eastern Europe ne we11.
Jugr whae practical stepg did Truman'e government take ro dergil pnstwar
cooperation betiween the USSR and the United States nnd eo gCarC the Co1d
Wer? Wa wi11 name juet a few.
After ltoosevalt's deaeh in 1945, Pregidenr Truman did nor respond Co the
proposal on the development of econnmic relationg betwaen t}ie UniCed StaL�es
and the USSR. In May 1945 the United Stntes euddenly stopped I.end Lense
guppliea to the Soviet Unidn. The berbaric order to explode uCOndc bombs
over the Japnnese cities of. Hiroshimg und Nagaaaki wae Co a considerable
extenC dictated by the striving of the Americgn ruling circleg to put
pressure on the USSlt. Beginning with the autumn of 1945 the United Stntea
and England were alregdy beginning Co pursue a pnlicy toward g Cold Wer
against the Soviet Union. UniCed Seates Secretery of State Byrnes, as
che American researcher J. Wurburg notes, went to the London Conference
of Ministers of roreign Affnirs "with a firm intention of using nuc:lenr
weapons ag an implied threat,"4 having the according instructions from
PresidenC Truman.
In this way, the United Stntes Government, thousands of kilometers from its
borders, Cried to solve ints rnational at�faira, without tnking into nccount
the results of World Wer II, the social changes in Eaatern Europe and the
interesCs of the security of the Soviet Union. The bnurgeois scholars,
however, even liberals such as Schlesinger, could not drgw this conclusion.
Thetr half-hearted criticism of United States policy after 1945 and the
final answer to the question of the origins of the Cold War fn no way
coincide. On many questions they are close to the conformists and advocate
mainly the old view of the oYigin of the Cold War, accusing the Soviet
Union of almost everything.
Arthur 5clileainger, for example, states thnt the Cold War could heve been
evoided only if "the Soviet Union had not been committed to its convictions
on the infallibility of the communist doctrine and the inevitability of the
establishing of a communisC world."5 It seems that the "uncompromising
Leninist ideology" is again "to blame" for everything. As for Roosevelt,
the reason he cooperated so successfully with the Soviet Union was that he
was "ignorant... in the mysteries of Marxism-Leninism," nnd this was
"inexcusable.i6 Here one can clEarly see the class position of the bour-
geois scholar who does not wish to recognize the essence of the Soviet
foreign policy of peaceful coexistence, which proceeds from the fact that
the capitalists and those who serve this order cannot renounce their
approach to the bases of organization of human society and, of course, .
cannot acknowledge as illegitimate the point of view that defends the
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preservation and tihen the "victory of capiCnliem" on a warldwide gca1e.
They cannot, becnuse the capi,eaLises and their polieical syaeem wouLd Chen
prove Co be non-clesg ingtiCutions.
If one speake of the aims of American policy in tagtern Europe, afeer the
conclueion of Wor1d War II they consieCed mainly of noe permietiiig, in the
counGries of this region, ellmination of capi.taligt nrders and their devea.op-
ment along a socialist parh.
It is well knawn that the liberaeion moventent ngainsC �ascism, in which the
communisCa played the main role, became the chief force, which afCer 1945
- determined the development of Qventa in the Eaetern European countries.
The United States did nor want to acknowledge this. Ir puraued a subversive
policy with reapece eo a11 the prograsaive forces of these countries. In
ita Eastern European policy the UniCed SCaCes went obstinately egainat the
actual facts. American diplomacy began ro be guided in ehis region by
exclueively ideological and military-strgtegic aims. As a resulr, for a
long time a"hard" line dominaCed in Un3Ced StaCea policy and in the actione
of AmericAn diplomacy in Eastern Europe. The methoda by meang of which the
UniCed States aCCempCed to prevent the strengthening of the progressive
_ regimes in Eastern Europe amounted to the follow3ng.
The State Department began to put into effect a"diplomacy of proteat.0
The United States Government protested against any measure carried out on
liberated Cerritoriea. In 1946 American propaganda was already actively
taking up as armament the myth of the "Soviets' inCention to eeize Weare rn
Europe." American governmental and private propaganda aervices were used
for this purpose: the press, radio and televiaion. Local national
bourgeois information organs alan atCarhed rhemselves actively to the
misinforming propaganda directed against the peaceloving Soviet foreign
policy. Having gradually gotten to their feet, the Western European
bourgeois willingly helped to disseminate the myCh of the "aggresaiveness
of the Soviets," since they were justly frightened by the defection of a
number of Easte rn European countries �rom the capitalist syatem. This was
asserted about the Soviet Union which, having lost 20 million of its sons
and daughters in the struggle against fascism, aspired toward peace and
rehabilitated the economy destroyed by the war, in order to advance farther
along the path of reinforcing socialism. 1'he United Statea needed the
invented myth so that, having made use of the economic and military weak-
neas of the countries of Western Europe, it coiild thrust its hegemony on
them and take under its control and affirm on European soil the American
military presence. It must be acknowledged that the method of the
"diplomacy of proteat" brought American foreign policy definite success
in Weetern Eurnpe.
In this way, in the American �oreign policy and diploroacy in Europe in the
second half of the 1940's and 1950's, three basic goals were clearly
revealed, one of which was purely propagandistic, and the other two--fully
real. Since there was no "Soviet aggression" in Europe, the true goals of
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the American "policy of conCninmene" were soon clzarly r.evenled. 'I'hey
were assenti.all.y in the nature o� ntCempts ae intiervention in the internal
gf�aire of the neorles of the sncialise countries of Easeern Eurnpe nnd
expansion3st in narure with respect to the peoples of Wesrern Europe.
In Cheir work to undermine the influence of the socialiat counCries in the
internaeional areng, American policy and diplomacy have so far been cnunt-
ing ntt weakening the uniey and snlidartty of the sociglist countiriea. The
� leaders of the UniCed 5eates Governcnent dn not conceal their hopes thaC the _
naCionaligt tendencies in cerrain socialist countries will gain the upper
hand over the principles of internationalism. A apecial eerm even appeared
in the vocabulary of American poliCiciars and propagandists--"naCional
commuttiem"--by wh ich they mean the refusal of gny country of the 80CiF1Zi8t
commonwealCh Co follow the pr3nciples of proletarian internaCionalism..
These hopes of Che leaders of American foreign poli.cy increased especinlly
in the 1960's because of the splitting policy of Mao zednng's $roup in
China, which followed the paCh of arranr naCionalism and chauvinism that
had nothing in common wieh Marxism-Leninism. They were also rouaed by the
anti-Soviet policy of the present leadership in Beijing [Peking].
The American scholar John Campbell openly acknowledges that eince the
beginning of the 1950's the State DeparCment has been "nurturing the hope"
Char the microbes of "national communism" will spread to the socialist
countries. In this case American diplomacy, Campbell draws the conclusion,
has counted on "trying Co stir up antagonism" between the governmenCs of
the Eastern European eocialisl� counCries and the Soviet Union.8
The United States Government's attempts to i.ntervene in the internal affairs
of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe occurred as far back as the
meeting of the heads of the governments of the four great powers in Geneva
in 1455. President Eisenhower insisted on inc.juding on the agenda the
quesC:t.on of the domestic siCuation in Eastern Eur^pean socialist countries.
These demands were rejected by the Soviets. In December 1956 Secretary of
SCate Du12es preached the ide~ of the "neutralization" of the Eastern
European socialist countries. At the end of the 1950's the United States
Government began to make mare active usc of economic levers, Crying to
weaken the unity of the European socialisC countries. Dulles called this
tactic "f xiendly acts." Carefully concealed behind its facade were the
old goals of American diplomacy--weakening the unity of the socialist
countries in EasCern Europe.
In the 1960's, Washington, Gupported by assisCance from Bonn and London,
introduced a considerable correction into its foreign policy strategy with
respect to the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. The doctrines of
"peaceful involvement" and then also "building bridges" were proposed in
Chis connection. As early as 1960 Senator John Kennedy expressed his
lack of agreement with the tactics of President Eisenhower with respect
to the socialist countries of Eastern Lurope. The future herald of the
"New Frontiers" proposed the idea of a"peaceful offensive" against the
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socialist commottwealeh. Kennedy demanded a di�fereneiared npproach by the
United Statea to the Eastiern Eurnpcxn couneries and cnlled for the use of
the economic porentials of the United States ro weaken the Ciea between the
socialist countries of EasCern Europe and the USSR.
The policy o� "peaceful involvement" and "building bridges" ie by no means
a synonym �or the policy of peaceful coexiatence. It aerves as a supple-
ment to oeher direceions in the Unitfld Seates foreign policy and liears a
clearly marked antisocialisr nature. 5ome people in the United Statea did
not cottceal the facr tihaC ies gogl was an aspiration to "CeAr down" the
vary sCates to which the "bridges were being built."
The father of American foreign policy strategy was SecreCary of State John
Du11es.10 The burden of Dulles' ideas sttll lies on American foreign
policy and diplomacy.
In the course of seven years, from 1953 Co 1959, he was at the helm of
the United States foreign policy course. It was said of Dulles that he
"wears the whole State Department under his hat,"11 that ie, personally
directed American diplomacy. That ia essentially the way it was.
When he was the UniCed States 5ecretary of StaCe, Dulles carried out a
foreign policy that secured for him the nickname of the "knight of the
Cold War." He persiseently pursued a policy toward the deCerioration of
relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Dulles
preached a policy of "moral offensive" toward the USSR and did not hide
the fact that the main purpose of his work he regarded as the transforma-
tion of the socialist sysrem in the USSR in the direction of cap iCalism.12
To achieve it, Washington resorted to the most varied devices and methods,
really excluding only military actions.
Dulles assessed international relations primarily iti the light of United
States policy toward the Soviet Union. "There was hardly an hour during
any working day," notea A. Berding, "when the image of the Kremlin did
not appear in the thoughts of the SecreCary of State."13 Dulles formu-
lated the basic tasks of American fareign policy and diplomacy in the
following way: "In the first place, we should remain strong. We should
oppose further Soviet advance. We shou?.d make them understand clearly
that any significant aggression will entail the risk of war; in the second
place, we ahould strengthen the unity of the free world. We cannoC rely
only upon our own force; in the third place, we should do everything in
our power, by stimulating the evolution of the Soviet Union to greater
individual freedom.... "14 These were militaristic, falsified, moralizing
assertions, pursuing the goal of giving greater pressure to international
tension.
Dulles constantly stressed the fact that the Soviet Union "should be feared,"
since its aim was "supremacy throughout the world." The Secretary of State
deliberately distorted the nature of the processes taking place in the
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inCernational arena aftier Wor1d War II. For example, he placed nn equals
sign between the growth of influence of the ideas of socialiam and communism
in the world and Che "Soviet advance," denied the ineernarional nuture of
~ Marxiam-Leniniam and saw the "mnchinations of Mnacow" in all khe failures of
imperiali9m. Acc:ording to Du11es, "ro remain sCrong" meant syetematically
nugmenCin$ the arme race in the Un ieed 5tates, and "to strengthen the unity
of the free world"--to put together aggressive military blocs.
~
One wonders, why did Dul].es und other leading American politicians and _
- diplomats, just as their predecessors, hnve to resorC 3n their goals to
the myth of the "aggressive strtvin gs" of the USSR on an international
scale? Why did the leader o� American foreign policy select this precise tacCicnl device to work on American public opinion? The answer to these
quesCions was once given, in a burst of candor... by Dulles himself. He
acknowledged that "There is nothing for the peoples of the United 5tates
and the peoples of the Soviet Union to quarrel aboue.... There has always
been peace beCween the United States and the Sovier Union.... Both pArtiies
are to a considerable exCenC provided with everyrhing ttiey need...."15
Therefore, if even in Dulles' opinion, there was noChing in the bilgCeral
Soviet-American relations that could seriously damage them, the pretext
for this "should" be sought in the internaCional sphere. He did just Chis.
Some responsible American political figures are cnntinuing to do this Co
this day. .
Such were the basic tasks and aims of Dulles for American Diplomacy in the
1950's. Thex deprived it of a posiCive basis and to a greater extent than
before made a.servant of the policy of "balancing on the brink of war."
These same problems in general con tinued to be solved by American foneign policy and diplomacy in the 1960's, although, it may be noted, signs of a
more sober approach to a number of international problems appeared, as
occurred in 1963.
John Dulles left an unfortunate trail in the history o� inCernational rela-
tions. For a long time his views to a considerable extent derermined the
direction of work in Ainerican foreign policy, even when the Democrats were
in power. He was the auChor of the doctrine of "liberation" of the coun-
tries of Eastern Europe, proclaimed in 1952, of the concept of "massive
reCaliation," advanced in 1954, of tactics of diplomatic pressure, or
rather of the blackmail of his allies, known as the possibility of an
"agonizing reevaluation" of United States policy in Western Europe, to
which Dulles resorted in 1954, of the Chreat of "balancing on the brink
of war," openly proclaimed in 1956, and of condemning neutrality as an
"amoral phenomenon." In their aggregate these views also personified the
American foreign policy Chat Dulles implemented so actively in the inter-
national arena--the policy of the Cold War.
The practical results of this policy were: the establishing of SEATO and
the United States participation in it, the military Creaties with Japan,
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South Korea and Che Chiang 1Cai-shek regime, proclamaeion oE the aggressive
"Eisenhower poctrine," and inclusion of the FRG in NATO and the West
European Alliance. This was g type o� "diplomacy o� military blocs."
In the 1950's ir left no hopes for achieving agreemenCa on solving inrer-
national problems and for the development of Soviet-American relat3ons. -
- Some new features appeared in American foreign policy in the 1960's. With
a view to improving the predicCion oF foreign policy tendencies, a number
of scholars were enlisted tio assist American diplomgts, especiaLly when
the Kennedy Government came to power.
A clear tendency toward closer interaction and coordination of efL�orts of
bourgeois science and pracCical work in international relaCiona appeared -
in the UniCed States. There are a number of reasons for this phenomenon,
above all, the fact that American foreign policy and diplomacy suffered a
series of very ma3or failures and defeats: Washington did not succeed in
isolaCing the Soviet Union in the postwar world, attempts to undermine and ,
eliminate socialist gains in the countries of Eastern Europe failed, includ-
ing those made with the aid of the tactic of "softening socialiam," a number
of sCates in Asia and Africa followed the path of social3sm an d the svci- -
aliat revolution in Cuba was vicCorious. The posiCions of socialism we:e
strengtheneil throughout the world, despite all the efforCs of American
diplomacy to prevent this.
Moreover, Washington's political influence in Western Europe weakened
- noriceably and conflicts between the United Statea and other leading povers
of the capitalist world began to be more strongly apparenr. A struggle c.if
the nations of Latin America developed against the dominance of American
monopolies.
Under these conditions American foreign policy ared diplomacy leaders,
naCurally, were faced with the question of how they,should act next. �
In official Washington they became convinced that American foreign palicy
and diplomacy were in extreme need of a"shot in the arm," new foreign
policy doctrines and concepts Chat wo uld constituCe a more f irm, and,
the main thing, mo re flexible theoretical basis for United States foreign
policy and would serve as a type of compass for American diplomacy in the
1960's and 1970's. John Kennedy directly called upon ruling America to
eliminate th e"drough t of ideas" in Un ited States policy.
Under Kennedy American foreign policy planning was headed by Walt Rostow,
special assistanC to the President. Under President Johnson he even headed
the work of the Council on Planning Foreign Policy of the State Department.
In 1964 Rostow published a book, "The View From the Seventh Flour,"16 in
which he seemed to dispose of the past and outlined the future strategy and
tactics of American foreign policy and diplomacy. It looked as if the view
- unfolded of international policy from the window of Rostow's office-dif-
fered little from that seen from Dulles' office, although it did, of course,
have its own nuances. After all, practical experience had corrected or even
refuted many old dogmas of Atnerican diplomacy of the 1950's.
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Wnlr ltoseow Ee1t eh ne the mAin soa1 of Amertcan �areign policy and diplnmacy
was ensuring the victory of capitaliam over socialism in the confronCaCion
of the Cwo ser.uceures. The capiCaliat countries, in his opinion, emUodi.ed
rh e"f reedom" which allegedly did not exigt in the nocialiet counCries.
Since the United 5tates, you see, could not be in accordance with such a -
3ituation, iC conaequently had a right ro sCruggle for "freedom on a world-
- wide scale." There is, of course, no denying tihat Walt RoaCow was candid.
He essentially Ficknowledged that the "crusade" of the imperiallsts against
socialigm nnd communism contjnued. Jttggling the words "freedom" and
"democracy," Rostow ser United State foreign policy and dipl.omACy the aim ,
of "complete victory" over the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.
A great deal of rhis approuch appeared After the DemocrnCic victory in the
presidenttal eLeceions of 1976. A number of American polit:icians reCurned
to the old songs, passing them o�f as a"new approach" to internaCinnal
affairs. In reality, however, the only thing new here is the namea of .
' these public figures.
In formulat3ng the goal of "complere victory" over socialism, Rostow called
upon the autliority of United Stiates Secretary of State Dean Rusk for aid.
The latCer, Rostow notes, said the �ollowing: "Sometimes one may hear Chat
our tasks or policy do not pursue the goal of victory. This is completely
incorrect. Of course we intend Co win. And we will win. Our goal is
victory for all mankind.... This will be a victory on a worldwide scale
in the name of �reedom."17 This is the way the official leader of American
foreign policy and diplomacy reasoned.
By the middle of the 1960's iC had become clear that American imperialism
still continued to put its rrust in ml.litary force as the meana of achiev-
ing its foreign policy goals. Washington relegaceu peaceful means of
_ settling international disputes to the background. This was particularlv
indicated by Un3.ted States aggression against the Vietnamese, attempts to
deal with the Cubans through military measures, intervenCion in the
Dominican Republic and many other cases.
This is how, for example, Walt Rostow described American diplomacy: "The
main element in a policy of national security in the present-day world is
- the correlation between the military and nc.imilitary goals, between force
and policy.... There are scarcely any diplomatic relations that we have
implemented that would not be influenced by an esrimate of the military
power of the United States and the conditions under which we would probably
actually utilize this power. Our military potentials and our will to use
them in important national interests and aicns are Che inevitable background
of our civil policy."18 Rostow puts forth the same idea even more clearly
in another staCement: "Among the diplomatic relations implemented by us
throughout the world, or diplomaric steps, there are hardly any that do not
pose the question: Does the United States have the potential and the will
to use military force to supporC its policy?19 Although Rostow also states
that "in a broader sense our goals are political, and not military,"20 this
does not sound very convincing, because of the fact that it was precisely
military force that Washington preferred over peaceful diplomacy.
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Even ii etie unfcagible gda1 nf Nnerican policy nnd dipldmnCy--cs eablinhing
worid aupremacy nf Ghe United 3eateg--in ae firot g1anGe a pniiticai ane,
the rnad ed ie may be paved oniy with iocai wdrg gnd a majnr war. The
Ameriean miliearigeg reaorted repeaeedly en the fdrmer. Tfie miiieary
agpect in majdr American po1icy in the 1950'g ea 1960'g waa an actuni
realiey, and world eonperatinn Ca achieve paiieical goalg wns Cn a con-
siderab1e extent made up nnly uf good ineentinng. The experiance in inter-
naeionai relations in ehose yeara indieaCes ehat at the moments when inter-
' nntidnai reietians wauld becdme aerained, when capiealigm wouid guffer
periodic defeng in the international arpna, and whpn the fnrcen nf the
nationnl-liberaeion movement were aceively struggling for Cheir freedom,
American imperialigm would even preceed eo apply miiitary force, u$ing
1arge eonCin$eneg of ehe Unitpd StaCeg Itegular Arnry �dr ehin purpose.
tn modern i.nternaeional relatidns the tendpnny Coward further nceivgtinn of
American military policy and cr3sis dipldmacy, whieh serves ie, ig coming
into conflicc with the eerengtheni.ng of the defensive power of the socialist
co untriea, pareieularly the SovieC Union. Thae ig why ehi.s same Rostow was
glways forced Co gtaee ehaC "Military pnlicy, which ia the efficienC servannt
of the grear goal (Roseow ig dreaming of the complete viceory of capitaligm
over socieligm--An. G.)," mugt begin wieh recognition nf Chege basic
fnetors: "'i'he Sovieti Union now hae ae its digposal quEficiene nuclenr
- power and devices for transmiCting it Co inflicr tremendoue destruction on
Western Europe and aven greater destrucCion on the United Staees. There-
' fore, an integral part of national policy is achieving our goalg ehrough
means ChaC would reduce the probability of nuclear war to the minimum, at
the same time ncknowledging that it ig always2poegible, and ghould be prn-
- posed in defenae of our important interestg. ~
It goes without sayirig that the Soviet Union's policy does not puraue the
gbals of unleashing uuclear war with the United States, even though the
rulin g circleg of the latter are often captivated by the exultation arouged
from time to time by the great wavea of anti-Sovietism springing up in the
political life of this country, and frighten their people with the "com-
munist threat," including that on the miliCary plane.
It can easily be noticed that usually a sort of "ninCh wave," aignifying
impendinA danger, of anti-Sovietism rises in the period when the United
States Congress is considering and approving military allocationg. If,
however, it ig neceseary to justify worktng out and putting into practice
new systems of strategic weapons, like the neutron bomb, the waves of
anti-Sovietism in the United States begin to be inteneively diseeminated
in the mass infornation media at any time. For example, a fierce anti-
Soviet campaign wab stirred up in the United SCates in connection with the
demands of American militarists to supply them with "winged missilea" for
armament, moreover under conditions violating the Soviet-American agreement
ac Vladivostok. The political bosses of the Democrats yielded to this
pressure in the spring and summer of 1977, which complicated relations
between the USSR and the United States.
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The basis nf a "rationai miiieary policy" wan idid by Ctenernl Maxweil
Tayior ar the end di the 1950'a, and it wgg "improved" under Prefaidenea
Kennedy and Jahnadn. ita esgenee iay in the felidwing basic cnmponents:
Eurthee amngning af nucipar wpapons, imprdvifl$ the mpang of deiivering
them en eheir gnaig and the iaurching gystems, produceion of a 1nrgp
number of ordinary arma of a11 typ@s, and diso neeting up speciai uniea--
of "green berets"--ta fighe againge tt� nationa1-libe ration mavem@ne.
it was nat lagitimate, however, ea ateetnpt ea impaae this miliCarized
approaeh eo the internatianal relationo of the spcond ha1f af the 1970's,
when mankind had a1ready graduaily begun td farget about the Gold WAr of
the paetern of the 1950'g, by seriving eo gee up gsysCZm of ,stable peaee,
and not a permanene milieary-polieieai cnnfrnntaeidni
In the United Staees rhere ig a quiee extengive pelitiedl gchool, the
representativea of which aetempt in every poagible way to prove thae
ceoperaeion be t+een Ameriran and Sovieg diplomacy is ailegedly impossibie
because of the faee that the 1aCter is guided by Mancinm-i.oniniam. The
represeneativeg of ehis schaol, regardiess of the facts, deny the possi-
bility of achieving posieive resuleg in the courae of diplomatic contacta
betwepn the USSit and the Unieed 5taeeg, jugt as of orher eapitaligt statee
with socialist states, and promote the theor}, elready long cnllnpged,
that "diplomgcy can operate efficiently only if fundamenrsl ideoingir.el
end gocial problemg ere nnr largely the gub3eer of the dispuee."22 The
adherentg of thig eppronch grgue that poliries achieve grent gUCCesBeg in
the international arena only when they are in harmuny witli the ideology
and social order of the other party. Since Sovicc policieg adhere ta
Marxist-Leninist ideolngy and deny the fairnesg nf the bourgeoig gyatem,
con$equently, "it is iropes$ible to do businegs aith them."
In chis theory thQre is complete confugion af the stete and diplomatic
functions aith world vieW. As a result, it turns out chet only the repre-
sentativeg of states With the same social formation can negotiaee among
themselveg, even if their countries are at war with each other, since they
do not cast doubt on the fundamentals of the basis--the social order of
the other pnrty. As for the interaction of diplomacy of the leading
capitalist stateg and diplomacy of the socialist 8rates in solving inter-
national and bilateral problems, it is allegedly impossible due to the
fundamental ide4logical divergences. Practical experience, as is known,
has lcmg ngo disproven this ridiculous approach.
- It is easy tn see what the authora of guch vieag arc driving at. They are
engaged in utterly undermining the principle of peaceful coexistence of
states with a different socioeconomic system. In their aork, those who
overthrow the principle of peaceful coexigtence reaort to every possible
Cype of dishonest devices, ascribing to Soviet foreign policy ends that
it is not pursuing and, conversely, denying its true aspirations.
V. AspaCurian, professor at the University of Pennaylvania, was, for exAaple,
a representative of this type of "school" of political Wiliness. In the
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arEic1e, "9oviet Uipiomacy," ha staeed ehae the eheory df heaceful eaexid-
tence "does nae seek Co neee1e" fundameheai 3neernatianal probiema, He
wene on to draw the COftGlU9iOt1 thag the theory of peacefui cdaxiatience has
its own ultimate gaa1 of eiiminating the sociai dystems of the countrieg of
the Weae with the gid of boeh forciblp and peecefui means. "Coexis eance,"
Aepaturien taughr, "in simply a dacepeion for carrying out the Cold War
in aeeordanee wieh the ru1es ehae are advartageaus for ehis." The prd-
fessar subetantiates this eearement with the face ehnt peacefu1 coo.xiseence
"does not in eny cese denote a 1essening of the ideological war ehat pur-
nues the end of eiiminaring capitglism.523 Of couree, peacefui eoaxisCence
aetually does not speeify ary iainening of the seruggie wieh bourgeois
ideology. As for the "elimination of egp3talism," here we may recali the
words af V. I. Lenin that ravolutions dn not break oue "to order," and
thae "Ir wnuld bp impossible to pue an end to the supremacy of cepitalism,
if tha entire economic development of the cepital.ist countries did not
lead eo rh38."24
In his speeeh ee the International Conference of Communist end Workers'
Pertien in Mugeow on 7 June 1969, L. I. Brexhnev, heed of the delegation,
etreased the fact th at the principle of peaeeful coexiatence af gtaCee
"means that the debatable queetiong that arige between countriea ehould
be resolved noe by force of arms, not by wgr, but by penceful medns. It
has already acquired broad internationgl rpcognition." After noting the
great potentials that 1ie within the policy of peaceful eoexiseence,
L. I. Brezhnev ateted: "We make no exceptions here for even one of the
capitalist gtates, including the United Statea: For us, pegceful coexis-
tence ia not a temporary tactical device, but an important principlp of
the conaiatently peaceloving socialtet foreign policy."ZS
The opponents of the policy of peaceful coexistence in the United Statee
hush up in every poesible way the fact that it not only procl8irtis the
rejection of War gs a means of regolving debatable question8 between states,
but also prov3des for a firm international-legal basis for successful ,
cooperation of different atatea in solving inte rnational problems and
problems of a bilateral nature that resta on the principlea of equal rights,
mutual underatanding and truet among states, consideration of each others'
intereata, nonintervention in intprnal nffairs, respect for the sovereignty
and territoriel integrity of all countries and the development of economic
and cultural cooperation based on fu11 equality and mutual benefits. Is
this not the reason why in the United States they fell ailent concerning
the Helsinki Agreement in all of its content? After all, the latter
agreement is an achievement of the policy nf peaceful coexistence.
- The American oholar R. Strauss-Hupe, who considered a nuclear war possible, -
was even more candid in hig recommendations to the United States Government
to undermine even further the principles of peaceful coexistence. While
acknowledging that the communists "are imposgible to defeat in astruggle
for people's minds,"26 he appealed, "instead of pursuing the illusion of -
peaceful coexistence with the communiste," that "the aolidarity of the West
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`and NATd b@ reinfdrced and the Aelaneic eoneepts be put ineo pracCice,"
Straua-Nupe regarded the peridd of the 1960's ag only an "unseabie eruCe,"
Acknowledging with biteerness ehae during the vears ehae had paeeed since
the socS.aliee revolutS.on in Ruseia, the achievemenes "of the communiet
gyeeem ehroughout the world are g Bupreme guceode in hintory," this
adhQrent of a further intengifiration of inCernaCional tension demended
that the United 3eateg 8ceivae2 the Cdid War,27
l
There 8re a grene many knightg of the Cold War aUCh as R. Seraus-Hupe in
the acaclem3.c circlas of the Unieed Stiates. Even today Chey are carrying
out eubvergive wdrk againet peacefui enexisrencQ, and arp i,nspi'r3ng in the
heertg nf Americans a leck of fgith in the possibility of leseening inter-
nationai rension even in the distant future.
There axe elao, however, among American poliCical figureg, diplomats and acholare, those who come out in behalf of the pessibility and need of
eooperation with the Snviet Union and other socinllst cnuntriee. It ig
suf�ieient, f.or example, to mention the name of the former Unieed Staees
Ambgseadar Cn Mogcow, Averi1 Harriman, end df SenaCor Edwerd Kennedy, the
fnrmer permanent United SCates rppregeneative to the UN, C. Ynet, the
former Chgi,rcnan of the Senate Commi.tree on Foreign A�fairg W. Fulbright,
the diplomat and scholar G. Kennaa, Profegeor F.. Neal, publicist J. Warburg,28
and representatives of bus:nees c{rc1es, D. Kendall, A. Hammer and S. Eaton.
o Even amnng people of ehig type, however, there are different approaches and
underetanding of the "idea of cooperation" itself. For some this is only
an attempt to look at peosenr-day reality, while esaentially remnining in
the position of American Qxpanaionigm; for othera--it is a basig for requir-
ing furrher development of new fo rms of lmerican diplomatic activity, particularly in internetional orgenizationg; for sCitl orhers, the most -
realigtically mindpd ones--iC ig an acknowledgement of the indisputable
facC thae in its time United States aggression in Vietnam wns the chief -
obstacle in the way of solving many importAttC inte rnational problems, and y
- ChBC a policy of peaceful coexistence must be followed. The problem, how-
ever, always lies in the extent to Which auch views nre received in the -
governmenta: :.ircles and whether they intluCuce ;unericatt toraign policy.
These views are reasonable if they are contrastcd with the views of the
circles in America that come out against peaceful coexiatence between the .
- USSR and the Unitsd States on the grounds that the World view of the 5oviet
people is Marxism-Leninism. Realistically thinking Arnerican politicians
draw the conclusion that the differencea in the appronch of the USSR and
the United States to the golution of their internal social and political
problems should not prevent the solution oE international problems auch as ~
the development of bilateral relations, disarmament, strategic anas limita-
tion, complete banning of nuclear testing, non-proliferation o� nuclear
weapons, banning the use of nuclear weapons by the former, etc.
A requirement of primary i2portance in the modern world is to "avoid the
cataclysm of nuclear war. 9 A sensible point of view! The world is so
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diver~e in the social., pol3Cica1 and ecenomic respace thnC it would be
unreali.sCic to greempe eo esCablish in ie the hegemany nf nny nne power
or group of aountiri.es. Consequentiy, the iden of the Pax Ameri.cana 3a a
�ietion. gut when :hnse whn seEmi.ngly come foreh i,n behalf oF peace�u1
coex3otence etate tihat the United SeaCes "ig the only seaCe ehat at tile
presenC Ci-me has wealeh and firing power... , organizationai abiJ.ities and,
we hope, the political imaginatien to combine inCo a single whole an
efficient international eystem of peacefui chnnges,1130 they begin to
contradict themaelves in propoaing clearly non-peaeeful means for the
"peaceful changes."
On the baeia of an analysis of American foreign poliCy of the last ehree
decades, the conclusion may be drawn that the contradictinn beeween the
attempre 'Lo ucdersrand the changek; Chat have taken p1ace in the world and
the formulas for solving today's problems with old methods are a charac-
rerietic feature of political thinking and activity of g lgrge number of
American acholars and diplomato. They sti11 often count on eome eort of
"exclusivenesa of poai.rion" of the Un3ted States in the world arena, and
attempt Co thrust thig interpretation o� the international gituation on
each United StaCeg preeidene that has newly come into power.
In the midst of the political paletCe o� viewa on the queetion of the
potent3al of peaceful coexistence o� the United States with the Snviet
_ Union, there ehould be particular discussion of the point of view of -
George Kennan, a well-known diplomat of the past, former United Statea
Ambaseador to the USSR and profesaor at Princeton UniversiCy, who had a
great deal of experience in studying SovieC-American relations. Kennan
notea that in the United States there i:s a"serious crisie of public
opinion" on the queation of what policy te cerry out in relation to the
socialist countries, and states directly that the West "has no choice,
it should initiate a search for peaceful coexietence as the basie of ita
policy." He also came out as an advocate of expanding trade between the
East and West.31�
The neocolonial aspects of United States foreign policy should also be
dtscuased. This system of implementing the expanaionist goals of American
imperialism in the developing countries had been widely dieseminated by
the 197019. It ig an aggregate of economic, political, ideological and
military methods by means of which imperialiet exploitation in a somewhat
updated form is essentially foisted upon the developing countries.
The situation that formed in the develop'Lng countries after the conclusion
of World War II, in which the economic and political positions of the
European powers and American foreign policy and diplomacy appeared to be
weakened, was immediately attempted to be utilized in the interests of the
United States monopolies. All of this was done under various pretexts,
particularly under the pretext of struggling with the "communist danger"
in the former colonial countries. The United States, which at one time
was late to the dividing up of the "colonial pie," noa tried to take
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revenge dn irs imperialiae rivals. The Atneriean monnpoiisto were quite
suceeaaful in the3r ttepiraei.on: td a conaiderable exeene Chey managed
Co crowd eheir Camperitorg in Asi.a and AEr.iea. As for Latin Amarica, the
Unitied Segtes, juse as before, coneinueg ro dominaee.
The nimg of American foreign policy and diplomany in the developing cown-
tries nr.e, in the firse p1ace, the desire to prevent the appearanee and
developmenr of socialiam in Asia, A�rica and LaC3n America and to rerain
. ehege regiond of the wor1d and indi.vidual countries wirhin the oystem of
the warld capitallst ecnnomy, gbove a11 d@pending on American monopoliea, ,
and in the secnnd p1ace, to Crowd out the monopolies of other 3mperialist
eouneries 3n the tiegions thae are mosC i.mpor.tant iu ehe economic reepect. ~
The use, in the developing rauntriQs in the interesrs of the United StaCea,
not only of the foreign policy seaee nechanism, propaganda and military
force devi.ees but a1so of America's pconomie and acientifia-teehnicnl
potentigl began re be eharacteristic of American diplomacy after Wor1d
Wgr II. 2'he 5raee Deparement wae increaaing].y gUpported by ecnnomic
2eva:s: export of cnpttal and eCOnomie "ageiaeance." When this policy
is carried ouC, a certain correction is made ro adgpt the inCereste of _
American companies and firme Co the new cnnditions, when the exploirution
of natural resources in the develnping countriea should take into account
rheir pnlitical indeperidence.
The neocolonieliaC policy, even though it mainly purgues the o;,d enda, ie ;
not aC all equivalent Co coloninliem. While the colonizera, for example, z-
carri6d out and continue ro carry out their policy in the coloniee pri- ;
marily with the aid of force, the neocolontxers achieve this primarily -
by meana of indirect compulsion. At the same time, the lattQr, when it
is advantageous for them, regorted to the old violent methode. It ie -
sufficient to recall United Statea intervention in Guatemnla, the Congo
(Kinshasa), the Dominicun Republic and, finally, the aggression of
American imperialism in Vietnam. What took place in the 1910's in
Angola, Lebanon, Zimbabae, Namibia and Zaire reconfirms the fact that
the United States was not rejecting methods of usSng force, even though
something elae is also clear. Under the conditions when the United Statea
venCure in Vietnam had failed, the politicians and generals of the United
5tates in the eituations of conflict that hnd arisen in some apecific
country began to resort more often to indirect than to direct uae of force.
They began to count mainly on reinforcing oligarchical and military regimes
and on the use of aiercenariee and economic preasure.
In his time, John bulles called the colonial problem "America's dilemma.02
He and his assistants resolved the dilemma by trying to make compatible
what was incompatible: the relatiotta of allies within the f ramework of
NATO with official declarations that the United States "wgs in opposition ~
to colonialism." Under these conditions, American diplomacy chose the _
course that Dulles formulated in this way: "We should be mediators between :
the European colonial powere and the peoples struggling for their
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i,ndependenee." No supporr by ehe Unieed 3taeea and ies cliplomacy of a
single narional 1iberaeion movemene in the developing eountriea was ever
seen, however. Moreover, American polieiciana, ae any convenienti ingtgnCe
in the UN and other l.nternati.onal orgenizaeions, waged a sCruggle ngaindt
decolonizae3on. Du1.les, giving 8n examples to his subordinaeeg, aratedi
"I am not sure ehat aach coloniai ngtion shouid automatically obtain inde-
pendence juet because it demandg it."33 'rhere is s medieror for youl
The Un3ted States mase informat3.on media, carrying out the American poliry,
exerted great ef�nrts to blacken Soviee policy on the netional iseue. The
American propaganda myth on "Soviee colonialism" is exaggeraCed rd rhil; dsy.
In the 1950's and 1960's, John Dulles, end afeer him Dean Rusk as well,
atrove to draw the attention of their listenerg and eollocutore to rhe non-
existent "Soviet colonial3sm." Even Coday these false esgertiona are heard
concerning Soviet policy, for example, in Afrira. They are, of course,
completely groundless.
Whi1e giving battle to "Soviet colonialiem," the United Stgtps Secretary of
StaCe avoidgd in every poagible way even meeting the repregentaCives o� the
nations atruggling againgt colonialiam. Neither Du11es nor Herter, for
exgmple, fe1C like meeting Che representarives of the national liberaCinn
movemenC of the Algerian people, ginee rhie might "offend" ehe French
colonizera. American policy and 3iplomacy on thie questioa changgd eome-
whgt only afeer President Kennedy came to power.
United States policy and diplomacy in the international arena ie constently
embellished and defended by hundreds of bourgeois scholars, and not only
Americans. Every year the publishing companiea of the United SCaees ieeue
dozens of plump books in which the idea is peraigtently put forth Chat
American foreign policy is guided by some "altruistic" nw tives and ie
implemented by "enlightened" politicians, who are Chinking only of how to
"help" other nations. This type of work carefully avoids the queation of
the class nature of American foreign policy, of its moving forces in the
person of monopnlistic capital and of the politicnl boases and military-
industrial coII+plex.
The works of the bourgeois scholare, politiciana and diplomats who glorify
American foreign policy and diplomacy are widely disseiainated outaide the
limits of the United 5taCea, and millions of studenta in institutiona of
higher education in America and the coumtries of Western Europe, Asia,
Africa and Latin America atudy from them. Even though, of course, the
coefficient of efficiency for Washington from this type of literature on
international relations and American diplomacy is quite low, thia doea not
mean that this type of apologetics does not leave ita tracea in the con-
sciousness of the people, particularly the young people, who know about
many historical events only from books.
As an example, we may discuss the book by the former Eng1is34Ambaseador to
Moscow William Hayter, "The Diplomacy ,t the Great Powers. This
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relaeively smn11 work rnneains chapters dn AmeriCan, SnviCe, Cng1iah nnd
Frehch diplortiacy. Even rhough in the forewdrd eo ehe book Hayeer noten
ChaC ie in nne of a research nature and cdnsistg nnly df "persona1 impres-
s3ona" from diplomgei.c service in Wash3.ngenn, London, pnris and Moecow,
nevertheLesa the a~sesamenrs exptiessed by the Engiiah diplomaC are of
interese if only because Chey are ful].y purpoae�ul in ngeura and bear
a fu11 prdpagdtdiseic 1dad.
The aasessmenr given by William Nayeer of American diplomgcy is mdsC com-
plimenCary. He noCes ehae the United Seaees 811egedly eraditionally comes
oue againyt nolonialism, nnd ia gYieved only ehat ehis pogition of Ameriean
diplomacy "was ofean made diffieuLt by its inreractinn wiCh the colonial
powers, England and FranCa." Kayeer Chug uttempted tn geate rhar Amaricnn
poliey wag noC Cangled up in the en].onidl diviaibn of the world and is
devoid of colonialiet agpirations.
The book extolg American eCOnomie "agsiseancp," which has grnwn up particu-
larly gince World Wnr II and has become the means of ernnnmic and, following
it, also political gubordinntion of many Countrieg tn Americgn monopoliee
eapital. The auehor even etaeeg thgt if the United Sentes hud angaged only
in "culCivaCing its nwn gerden," "a11 the rese of the wnrld would have gone
to piecag." The English diplomat made nnother, mor� amazing diacovery. It
appears, in his opinion, that there is "simply no" "Americcin imperialism"
Ie daes not exist, since in the United Sr.atea "anticolonialist sentiments
are widely disgeminated." It would therefore be difficult for Weshington
to carry out an imperialisC policy, "even if it ever needed it, which it
did not."35
The example using William Hayter's book indicates that American policy and
diplomacy are quite actively defended, in memoir liternture, as well ns in
the university and academic world.
If one speaks of American political institutions and their influence on
foreign policy, there is no question but that the President of the United
States ghould be put in first place. He performg the function of heAd of
sCaCe and hpad of the government. Being the leader of the system of
executive power, the President of the United Stateg naturally exerta
considerable influence on the adoption of the most important foreign policy
decisions.
According to the constiCution, the President of the UniCed States possesaes
such great authorities that it may seem that in hie hands ace concentrated
all the reins af actual power that make it possible to act almost indi-
vidually in matters of foreign policy. That is what often happena in the
making of individual foreign policy decisions. The situation is different,
however, when the overall strategic course of American foreign policy is
worked out. Nundreds of peoplc and numerous state institutions take part
in this process. Working out and putting into practice the decisiona pro-
duced in the dEpths of the United States political and state mechaniam also
take shape in the political line of American imperialism in the inter-
national arena.
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mhe hresident nf ekip Un3red Seates r8n resrrain and even revoke the 3mp1e-
mentatinn nf dc!ctstons theC in his opinion endanger the cnunery'A intaresrs.
If, 1towever, the presidene rejeces proposals rhge seem unwise en him, theri
he thereby comea inCO conflicC wiCh the peap1e frnm the seaee gyaeem of the
United 8tates, major officials and representatives of the mi1itary-
industriel complex who have advanred theae proposalg. Moreover, presidents
of the United 5tates come and go, and the ma,jor offiCials (in the Seate
Departman e, the Pentagon, the CIA, the FBI, the Cabinet and deparCments)
serve for many years ae a rule, change their views on the epprnnch ro inter-
national relations hardly at ali, and if they do change, it is r8ther with
g change in generations, which 8ssess the balance of power in the inter-
national arena in their own way. Zt ie precigply in such political jumpa,
when a change occurs not only in the pregidency, but the rival party comes
to power, a whole group ot persone who determine the atrategic line of
United States foreign poliey,that mogC ofeen thera ariee in Soviet-American
ralationa new rompllcae3ons, often with o1d roote, including the nppearance
of the paseion of the "liberals" for morallzing, vaciLinCions and incon-
sistency in foreign policy matters.
All of the postwar presidente of the Unired Statee were loyal ro the pre-
vail3ng political moods. Trumar, Eiaenhower and Johnann in general pre- _
ferred not to go againaC the trend of the Co1d War, and evett the 1lmited
"hot wars." Even President Kennedy only i.n the lagt year of hie being in
power atrempted to implement a number of ineasures which, as is now clear,
to a coneiderable extent were counter to the ideas that had prevailed in
the State Department, the Pentagon and the CIA. Kennedy more than once
refused to approve the adventurous plana of the American militery wirh
respect to Cuba and Laos, the Soviet Union nnd Vietnam. !ie deCnined, at
least for two years, direct aggresaion of the United 5tates against the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam. At the same time, he wae unquestionably
one of the authors of widescale aggression by the United Statea in Vietnam.
Therefore, the president of the United States ia by no meana a sort of
"solitary figure" in the White House. Hundredg of people and farces
determining the basic directions of United 3tates foreign policy are at
work behind his back.
The Pentagon and the CIA play a large role in United Statea foreign policy
and diplomacy. This is how the American scholar James McCamy describes
it: "They (the military.--An. G.) are now equal partnere in making
deciaions and putting into effect the foreign policy, and will play this
role until the states resort [o pure force in carrying out their affairs."36
The Pentagon is a unique "mixer" of the interests of the American military
and military-industrial monopolieg. In their actions they often encroach
upon the sphere of foreign policy, often directing it, particularly, as
Americans themselves customarily say, under "weak" presidents.
Of course, just as in many other large capitalist countries, in the United
States the process of working out decisions on foreign policy is a complex
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mO%tlar. pursuing cl.aes ineereseg, c1egrly marked in the gphere of foreign
do1.icy sCraregy, the rival businegs circlea xnd political groupinge in
America, which form the bagis o� bourgpois power, in quesei.ons of tncCics,
determining the momene Eor modernization and the mose atrategic 1ine, are
consCantly i.n a proeess of sCruggle thar refleces their competieive
ineeresrs, so ehar ofren in the Unieed Stareg press an exchnnge of fire is
atgrCed by the repregetttaeives of ehese forces ehat have come to grips with
each other, and tihere are ahgrp olgcuggi.ons. Their struggle for dec3sions
advantggeoue for Chem will go on conseantly, pareicuLarly in questidna Chat
touch upon financial-economic interests. �The decieion-making proceas in
the sphere o� foreign policy," noees JamesMcCamy, "is sn complicated theC
it is almnsC impossible to gnalyxe. IC is determined by many factore and
carried out by many representaCives both wiChin the gnvernmene irself and
outside ir. Behind each telegram aigned by the secreCary of atate, behind
each announcemenC by the preaident, behind the decisions of the Combined
committee of chiefs o� seaff and behind each vote in the congressional
GbR1tt1iCCpG CheC has to do wieh internationnl a��girs stgnd the forces ehae
givp rise to gll these aceione." Further, McCamy acknowledges: "Before
each decision is made, numeroua facts are seC forth by any represenCaCivee,
groups of people, acting openly or behind a veil witti the aid o� the mase
information media and exerting influence on the minds of those who hAVe
the responsibiliCy of making the decisions."37 This is nothing other,
essentially, rhan an acknowledgement of the daily control of various
pressure groups over the ectivity of the United States Government and
American diplomacy.
In conclusion it ahould be noCed rhat American foreign policy and diplomacy
in the 1950's and 1960's showed itself as un acti-ve conservative force that
strove to turn the development of internaeional relations back to the days
when the UniCed 5tates dominaCed in Western Europe on the political and
economic plane, wirhour taking into consideration the vital intereats of
the colonial countries and peoples, and tried to "thrust communism back"
to Easeern Europe and Asia.
It woiild be a very sad rhing if the United States nling circles in the
second hnlf of the 1970's began to think in ouCmoded political egtegories
and Cook the path of repeating the past errors in Soviet-American relations.
Even in the past such an approach was aharply criticized in the United
States on the part of thoae who would like to see American foreign policy
and diplomacy liberaCed once and for all from the Dulles herirage. The
adherents of this approach in the United States in the 1970's have become
noticeably stronger and have begun to speak out more boldly against the
recurrences of the Cold Wnr in American foreign policy.
The second half of the 1970's can become an important stage in Soviet-
American relations if a category necessary for relations between the USSR
and the UniCed States such as stnte wisdom takes the upper hand. The more
dynamic the development and reinforcement of cooperation between the United
States and the USSR, the better for the cause of peace and for the peoples
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nf the two greati powera. putting into ef�ect the agreementg achiuved,
working out new agreemenes and the posirive effecr of a policy of peace�ul
coexistence--that ie what ia needed for ehis.
FOOTNOTES
1. PRAVDA, 4 Ju1y 1977.
2. A. Schlesinger, Jr., "Origina of the Co1d War," FOREZGN AFFAIRS,
Oceober 1967, pp 22-23.
3. Ibid., pp 26-39.
4. J. P. Warburg, "The United Statea in the Poatwar World," London, 1966,
p 33. S. A. Schlesinger, Jr., Op. cit., p 52.
- 6. Ibid., p 49.
7. "American Diplomacy in a New Era," NoCre Dame, Indiana, 1961, pp 300-302.
8. Ib id., pp 306-30 7.
9. Ibid., p 318.
10. For greater detail on the work of Secretary of 5tate John Dullee see
"Diplomatiya sovremennogo imperializma. Lyudi, problemy, meCody"
- [The Diplomacy of Modern Imperialism. People, Problems, Methods],
Moscow, 1969.
11. A. Berding, "Dulles on Diplomacy," New York, 1965, p 157.
12. F. Llliot, and M. Summerskiel, "A Dictionary of Politica," Lotdon,
1957, p 90,
13. A. Berding, Op. cit., p 30.
14. Ibid., pp 31-32.
15. Ibid., p 34.
16. W. W. Rostow, "View From the Seventh Floor," New York, 1964. _
� 17. Ibid., p 35. �
18. Ibid., p 34.
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19. xbid. , p 48.
- 20. Ibid., p 34.
21. Ibid. , p 35.
22. JOURNAL OF INTEI2NATIONAL AFFAIRS, No 1, 1963, p 51.
23. Ibid., p 54.
24. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complere Collected Worka], Vo1 32,
p 99.
25. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [In Lenin's Courae.
Speechea and ArCicles), Vol 2, Moacow, 1970, n 412.
26. R. 5Craus-Hupe, "The Real CommunisC Threat," INTEItNATIONAL AFFAIRS,
Oceober 1965, p 612. '
27. Ibid., pp 619-622.
28. J. P. Warburg, Op. ciC.
29. R. N. Gnrdner, "In Pursuit of World Order," New York, 1966, p 13.
30. H. Cleveland, "The Obligations of Power," New York, 1966, p 15.
- 31. G. F. Kennan, "On Dealing With the Communiat World," New York, 1964,
pp 3-4, 21.
32. A. Be rding, Op. cit., p 84.
33. Ibid., pp 84-85.
34. Sir W. Hayter, "The Diplomacy of the Great Powers," London, 1960.
35. Ibid., pp 10, 16-17.
36. J. L. McCamy, "Conduct of the New Diplomacy," p 7.
37. Ibid., pp 3-4.
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Chapter 10. Ways of Improving Soviet-American Relations
IC is no easy task to analyze the possible ways of developing and improving
SovieC-American relations. There are, however, certain featurea inherent
in them that not only can, but also ahould be atudied. '
The internaCional climate of the end of ehe 1970's in which the relationa
between the USSR and the United SCates are developing depends on both
objective factors and to a considerable extent also on the actions which
are carried out by the various powers af�ecting it.
Juat what are the objective factors that today determine international
relations and SovieC-American dialog? These facCors are above all connected
with the lawa of development of human society. Only those who feel that
such laws do not exisC can fail to agree with this. But what, then, sets
this world in motion? Can it be, as bousgeoia science claims, "the bio-
logical essence of human naCure"? Or only the "struggle for power" in all
of its various manifestaCions? Unquestionably iC is neither the one nor
the other.
In the capitalist West whole schools of bourgeois ideologists aCtempt to
deny that the development of human society takes place according to the
laws inherent in it. They usually regard history as a heaping up of
"chance circumstances," as the clash of the abstract concepts of "good"
and "evil:" They declare that history is made by "great individuals" ar
"heroes," but do not Cake into consideration the decisivn role played by
objective factors in its development. Moreover, the representatives of
these bourgeois schools declare "unscientific" the Marxist-Leninist Cheory
that has revealed and armed itself with the laws of development of human
society and, particularly, international relations.
When speaking of the objective realities that to a deciaive extent affect
the'development of international relations, allowance must be made for the
fundamenCal conflicts between socialism and capitalism; class struggle and
the movement of the national masses which profoundly affect international
life as a whole; the atruggle of the forces of the national-liberation
movement againut the policy of colonialism and neocolonialism; the balance
of'power between the USSR and the United States; the potential threat of
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a ttuclear war arising and the need to avert iti; the effect of science and
Cechnology in internaCional relations.
'1'he objective factors are in their turn int].uenced eo a considerable extene
by the subjective factiors involved in the acCiviCy of tndividual major
polieical figures or groups of influential peraous. If their subjective
acCions, maniEeaCed in the srate actions, are nor in conflict with the
basic positive directions in global sociopolitical development, including
the inte nlatiionnl sphere, the relations beeween stares with differenr
social systems develop relaCively peacefully. If, however, on the other
hand, the subjecCive actions run counter to the objective course of develop--
ment, then the remperature of our planeC's political climaCe rises sharply.
Inte rnaeional conflicts and dangerous crises occur.
No matter what forms cooperation and rivalry between states Calce, even
those such as the U5SR and the United Staees, one rhing is clear: the
soluCion to the probleme dividing them should be carried out only by
nonmiliCary means. The alternative to peace--is war. Nuclear war is
particularly dangerous, and should be excluded from internationul life
as a means of engaging in conflicC. The foreign policy of a11 states in
the 1970's and 1980's should be directed toward solving the international
questions at issue through negoCiaCions, and not by violent means.
There is at present an improvement in inCernational relations in Europe.
The European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, historic
in its resulCs, was held. Positive changes were achieved in the develop-
menC of SovieC-American relaCions. Steps were Caken to curb the strategic
arms race. The Cold War period is gradually receding into the pasC. 'i'he
policy of peaceful coexistence is finding more and more adherents. The
bourgeois politicians who oppose the process of detente and attempC to
breathe new life into the old Cold War policy are becoming fewer, even
though rhey are still influential.
Lenin's principle of peaceful coexistence is now recognized even by many
Western leaders as the basis for reciprocal relations between socialist
and capitalist states. The world is gradually, although not without dif-
ficulties, moving away from the extended period of tension and is making
the transition to businesslike collaboration. Sometimes internation
conflicts still arise. L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU
Central Committee, stated: "It is our deep conviction that the chief
tendency in the development of today's international relations is the
turn taking place away f rom tne Cold War toward detente, away from military
confrontation toward consolic'iating security and toward peaceful coexistence.
The agreements between the USSR and the United States achieved in Moscow and
Washington, particularly the Agreement on Averting Nuclear War, are an
important contribution to the development of this tendency. Therefore, as
the result of negotiations at the highest level, Soviet-American relations
have acquired the promise of becoming stable relations, supported on a firm
and long-term peaceful basis.
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A clear underatanding of the naeure a� the policy of detenre is very impor-
tane �or present and fueuxe Soviee-Amarican re1aCiong. When speaking aC
Tu1g, L. I. Brezhnev gave a rhorough defin,ition of jugt what detenee ia:
"Detente is above a].1 overcoming the Co1d War and a CransiCiori to nnrmal,
equable relations between states. DetenC2 ig the readinees to rQsolve
disagreemenea and dispuees riot by foree, noe by ehrears and aaber-raetling,
but by peaceful means, ar the negot3arion tab1e. Detente is definiee trusr
and the abiiity eo take 3neo consideraeion eaeh othar.'g lewful ineerests."2
Ie appears exceedingly i.mporCant for coneolidaCion of world peBCe and
security and fdr the cause of international cooperatiun Chat the responei-
ble Americgn politicgl figures of our generation arrive at an understanding
of the fact thar there is and wi11 not be any reasonable alternative to
detente, to peeceful coexistencp. Of course, peaceful Soviet-American
relations, just becguse they are objectively neceaaary, cannee become any-
thing i.n the nature of an irreproachable alliance or eerene aceord. The
two countriea represent different and mutually dppoeing social aystemg.
The U5SR and the United 5tatea exisC in a complex, changing world, nnd
each one of them has iCs own alliee. The opponents of detenCe in the
United StaCes, on the baais of the different or opposite poeitione of the
United States and the Soviet Union on certnin specific quegCions, are
ready to state that detente and the Soviet-American dialag allegedly did
not stand the teat of time. Such claims are an attempt to paeg off the
wish as reality and often also the intention of leading American public
opinion astray. It is impossible, however, to delude the Americans con-
~ ce rning wtigt is in their interests, whether to continue to carry out a
policy of forceful confrontations or, conversely, ro go farther nlong the
road to relaxing tensinn with another leading nuclear pawer. Comawn sense
will always chooae the latter.
Detpnte, ttie lessening of tension between the USSR and the Uni�.ed States,
is above all their mutual agreement to exclude the use of force, especially
war, in relatione with each other. It is the recognition of the inevi-
tab ility of peaceful coexistence between the two countries. At the same
tfine it is an extremely important postulate, an exiom of the reinforcement
of cooperation between the two countries and a tremendous impulse in the
development of economic, cultural, scientific and other relationa between
th e two peoples. There is every reason for detente to become a permanent,
growing procesa, and the Soviet Union is striving for it to become
irreveraible.
Some people in the United States connect the process of a further improve-
men t in Soviet-American relations with the so-called "price for detente,"
which the USSR allegedly "should pay." This "price" is the right to inte r
vention in the Soviet Union's internal affairs. The political thinking of
the pecple in the United 5tates who determine today's development of Soviet-
American relations depends to a considerable extent on whether the aerious
politicians in Washington can withstand these absurd ideas, corrosive for
detente, and everytriing that undermines relations between the USSR and the
= Un ited States. In the USSR they hope and believe that they can.
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The lase few decades have been charaeterized by an ever-increasing f].nw of
informaeian: the md$t varied, aomiflg frem the aourceg nf ehe honeeC
!nformntion media of the goeiaiist countriea and bdurgeois sourcee, ofCen
noC objective, and finaliy, gources, the information �rnm which is of n
sianderous nature. The 18tCer are the maon iafarmatiiun media that are
under the control of the exereme reaetion, Zionises and Maoides, the so-
calied "free worid" radio statidn, finencecl by the CIA. In addition,
- puffed-up worka diseorting the truCh often cnme from the pen of bourgeoig
historiang. A11 of thig makea it more complicaead for many Atnericang to
have the correce i.dea of the eventg eaking piace. Without, however, an
undergeanding of hiseoricgi procesges and of the poltcy of a Certain
epecific cnuntry, including the USSR, it ig impogsible to ineerpret soberly _
the present end future development of today's worid. It ie more difficnlt
eo understand the present than eo be driented ernward evenes that have
already eaken p1ace. It is more difficule for the simple regson that the
events eaking plgce today are in the proceeg of their development, thpy
have geemfngly not gcoppad yet, and noti a11 the facrors Pxplaining a cer-
tgin epacific phenomenon are known.
An underaCanding o� the pagt and the pregene should lead to an ur.derstanding
of the tendencies tn the deveiopment af evCtits in the near ancl diatunt
furure. Nere it is righC to gpeak of short-term, medium-term and lnng-
term predictions. Those Who ere engaged in political or scientific work
encounter the need to draw concluAions that would make it posaible to judge
the direci:ion in which a certain specific political and foreign policy
situation kill develop. The ability to look into the future and to make
congidered asspssments of the most probeble variants in the development oE
a policy, including 5oviet-American relgtiong, requireg, particulnrly, the
correcr methodological approach to them.
As for Soviet foreign policy, as well as the foreign policy of the states of
the'socialist connnonwealth, they are conducCed on the basis in principle of
the theories of Marxism-Leninism. This is the scientific base on which e
reliablc understanding is achieved of what is going on today in the inter-
national arena ard what determines the moving force of the foreign policy of
a certain specifiC stgte. In order to gain an understanding of today's
intricaCe internationul relations, one must have a good mnstery of
materialisC dialectics and Mnrxism as a whole.
Marxigm-I.eninism is a continuously developing acience that reveals its
inexhaustible content in historically changing social prgctice. V. I. Lenin
created the scientific theory of imperiglism and studied its nature, con-
tradictions and conformances to principle. t.enin's analyais of imperialism
is the direct continuation and further development of the ideas of "Dns
Kapital" by Karl Marx. Lenin pYOVed that the monopolistic stage of capi-
talism is its last stage, the eve of a socialist revolution. The thorough
anelysis of the new stage of world history made it posaible for Lenin to -
determine the tremendous potentials of the revolutionary movement in the
era of imperialism. He made a thorough analysis of the moving forces of
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socialisr revoiution in rhei.r indisooluble uniey witih oeher ravolutionary
f1owa, and armed the MarxieCs witih gacience of the strgCegy and t;actics of
.nmmunist and wurkera' psrtl.es undar the ngw histnriCa1 renditiona. On the
bneie of a bri].1iant eheoretical arralysis, V. I. Lenin, in guiding the
9olshtvik parey, supporred by the activity of the masees, was able in
pracCical work to implement the Graet Oetobgr Socialisr Revolut:l,on in
Ruesia, the 60th anniversary of which was w3.dely marked by a11 of pro-
greasive mankind.
Under the conditions of the ideological etruggle tntensifying throi;ghout
the world, Marxism-Leninism ie the only acientific method of epproaching
the moeC complex problemg of today's international relatione, including
the 3oviet-American relations. No matter how much the methnde of imperl-
aliet policy and the hisCoricaL circumstances have changed in comparieon
with Chat when V. I. Len3n lived and wroCe, if we take stock o� the exie-
tence in the international arena of the world socialiet syatem of states
and its increasing poaiCive influence on the couree of Coday's world
development, it becomes quite clear that the basic principles and theories
worked out by Lenin fu11y preserve their force. �
V. I. Lenin repeatedly noted that the naCure of internntionnl policy of
atates ia determined above all by their sociocconomic eystem, classes and
parties that are in state power. The main, determining influence on the
naCure of United States foreign policy proved, proves and will continua Co
prove to be the objective socioeconomic and class faceors. The deepeat
roota of both domestic and foreigr policy...," emphAeized V. I. Lenin, "are
determined by economic interests and the economic position of the ruling
clasges."3 As applied to an enalygis of the nature of today's tendencies
in Unl.ted States foreign policy one must primarily be guided by this Cheory
of LenSn's that atteste to the fact that the foreign policy of American
capitalism is integrally bound with its domestic policy, and is a continua-
tion of it.
The ruling class in the United States is the bourgeoisie. Epicenters of
power are found in the hands of its monopoliatic elite, which is able, with
the aid of the state-monopolistic mechanism of class supremacy, a sort of
exploitative machine ef power of the second half of the twentieth century,
to enaure itself the guiding role in the state affaira of the Uriited Statea.
The ruling elite in the United States consists of monopolistic families, the
directors of extremely large corporations, generals and high-ranking poli-
ticians. The military-industrial complex exerts an unabeting influence on
the palicy of American state-monopolistic capitalism. In the aervice of
this power machine are numerous political institutions, including the basic
bourgeois parties of large capital--the Republican and Democratic--which
regularly and with varying auccesa advance their proteges to the White Houae.
United States foreign policy is conservative in ite social nature.
The reactionary nature of the overwhelming majority of political captains
who stand at the helm of the American ship ot state is generally known.
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Ir is guffiaienr td menrion the names of euch American sCaCesrnan of the
_ pogrwar per3od ns Harry Trumnn, John Foeter DU11es, Dwight Eieenhower and
Lyndon Johnson ro breaChe the spirit of the Cold War, aggreseions and
foreign policy adveneures.
At timea there have bpen more flexi:ble poliCical. 1eaders ar the apex of the
pyramid of power in the United States, who undersrood ro a certain extenC
Chat American capiCaligm was gu�fering defege in the inCernarional arena
beeause in its policy iti entered intio prnfound conf lieC wirh the objeetive
circumseances, acted counCer eo the cnurse of liistory, proceeding from
osaified anticommuniar dogmng end did noti take into consideraCion the true
balance of power in the world.
For example, president Jnhn Kennedy displayed the aspiration, alChough
extremely inconsistent, ro adapt American �oreign policy ro the modern
world. Hig relaCively shorti sojourn in the White House mareled n emall,
but sti11 posiCive chgnge in American fdreign policy in the direction of
a more responsible approgch eo the problems of war and peace. Lyndon
Johnson did not wish to continue this positive gtyle that had appeared,
and the Vietnam adventure dislodged him from the presidentinl seat.
A thorough explanation of the complex and contradictory processea in inCer-
national relations and in American foreign pclicy is contained in the
materials and documents of the conferences of communist and workera'
parties, congresses of the CPSU end other fraternal parCies gnd apeeches
of the leadQra of the Soviet State. For example, as fer back ag the
Declaration of the Conference of Itepresenrarives of the Communiat and
Workers Parties (Moscow, 1960), two theories were noted that had the moat
urgent political and scientific significance as applied to the analysis of
modern American foreign policy. In the first place, it was emphasixed that
. "The development of international relations in our Cime is determined by
the struggle of two social systems, the struggle of the forces of socialiam,
- peace and democracy against the forces of imperialism, reaction and
aggression,"4 and, in the second place, the conclusion was drawn that
"A definite part of the bourgeoisie of the developed capitalist countries,
_ soberly assessing the balance of power and the grave consequences of modern
war,i5 was speaking out in behalf of the policy of peaceful coexistence.
The theses o� the CPSU Central Committee on the 100th anniversary of the
birthday of V. I. Lenin contain the conclusion that even today the imperi-
alists "have not given up hope of "replaying" the historic battles of the
twentieth century, gaining revenge, hurling socialism from the heights of
world influence and recreating colonialism in new forms."6 This reactionary
tendency in United States foreign policy is a reality, and it must be
reckoned with. Socaething else is also clear, however. In the 1960's the
aspirations of the United States ruling circles to damage socialiam both
by means of aggressive attacks and with the sid of more flexible policy
methods failed. This has a sobering effect on the many "hotheads" ir, the
capitalist camp, including the United States. "More than once during the
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pasr yearg," iC wns noend in the doeumenes of ehp InCernneinnal Cnnference
of Communise and Workers Parties, he].d in Moscow in June 1969, "imperialism
hae ptiovoked aharp international criaee ehar have plaeed humanity on the
brink of a thermonuclear confiict. United Seatea imperial3em, however, wes
forc!id to take into consi.deratinn the ba],ance of powar tihat had formed in
the international arena, the nuclear porenC3a1 of the 9ov3et Union and the
poesible conaequencea u� a nuclear-miegile war, and it ie becoming more and
more diffieult and dangerous for it to coune on the unleashing of a new _
world war. "7
Of course, deapite the forced wiehdrawal of some American poliCicians ea a
better-coneidered posirion, United 5tatea foreign policy hae i.Ca main fronC
Curned againat aocialism. The nature of imperialism continues to be mani-
fesCed in American �oreign policy. The adherents of ita old methode have
not laid down their arms. 7'hey wou].d gladly torpedo any poteneial along
the road to a further improvement in the international aituation and to
esCabliahment of normal relationg between the USSR and the United SCares.
This type of power, in the words of V. I. Lenin, congisCs of rapresQnta-
tives of the "camp of the crude bourgeoie," the "aggreasive bourgeois" and
Che "reactionary bourgeois."a At the same time, V. I. Lenin always made a
' specific approach to analysis of the alignment of forces in the intra-
- political arena of the United SCaCea, emphaeizing the fact rhaC "certain
American entrepreneurs are seemingly beginning to realize that it ia more
reasonable to carry ouC profitable business in Russia Chan to wage war wiCh
Russia, and this is a good aign."9
The modern era, as was noted at the 24th and 25th CPSU congresaes, is char-
acCerized by the struggle of twu opposing social systems. '1'he arena of this
confrontation is the whole world. The principal force confronting imperi-
alism is the world socialist system. The latter has already been in exis-
tence for about a third of a century. An extremely important component of
the socialist conunonwealth is the great peaceloving state--the USSR.
In the international arena of the 1970's the United States Government is
implementing a policy of confrontation and struggle with the forces of
socialiam and the national liberation movement. This policy ie being car-
ried out under conditiona in which, as L. I. Brezhnev emphasized at the
24th CPSU Congress, the general crisis of capiCalism continues to be
intensified, with the United States itself auffering aerious economic
blows, accompanied by inflation and unemployment and aggravated by a
serious crisis in the currency-financial system of capitalism. In this
situation, "the forces of aggression and militarism, although crowded out,
have not been rendered harmless.... It is impo asible to regard the threat
of a new world war as completely eliminated."10 This is the situation that
has actually formed, the reality in which Soviet foreign policy is carried
outl
A specia3 characteristic of the present-day international aituation in which
official Washington must operate is the USSR's cnnatructive line, clearly
marked in world policy, toward resolving international problems by pcaceful
N
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meana, "Coward maintg3.ning normai, and whan circumgeances permi.C--goed
relaCiong with states belonging Cn a different social gyetQm.1111 "JusC
ae bafore," stsCed L. I. Brezhnev at the 24th CPSU Congrean, "we have con- i
eietently tried ro vlndieaCe Ienin's prineiple of peaceful cdexisrenee af ~
etates, regardlaes of their eocial eyatem. 'i'his princirle has now become
a real force in internaCionel devalopmenC."12
The SovieC progrnm of sCruggle fer peace and internaCional secuYity, ,
ndvanced by the 24th gnd developed by the 25th CP3U Congrese, ig exerting
a erpmendous inf].uence on the courge of woY1d eventa. `fhis is a prngYam ,
of struggle against imperialisr aggressian, a reliable basig for a 1asting
peace. Againse the background of the serious defeats and failures euffered .
by Americqn foreign policy, this peaceloving program congtantly drawe the
fixed attention of the American publie, which it ie becoming increasingly
difficult to win around with myths concerning the "Soviet threat." ;
Gug Nall, general secretgry of the United Stares Communigt Party, when
describing the Unired States dnmegtic policy situarion, noted in June 1971
that the program procnoted by the USSR of a seruggle for peace had become
the subject of animated digcusaions in the United States. Cue Nall empha-
sized that "The new Soviet proposals were advanced at the moment when the
situation in the United States had heated up abruptly. Something akin to
a political crie3s is developing in the country. It is primarily the result -
of the crisia in military policy, the result of the numerous coneradictions in thie policy.i13 These worde have been fully confirmed. 'Phe contra- _
dictions in United States policy today too are deep and eharp. A subatan-
tial and, moreover, influential part of the polltical and bueinese elite
ruling in the country is coming out in favor of further development of
Soviet-American relations. Convinced that ir is useless to negotiate with
the Soviet Union in a language of ultimatums and force, and realistically assessing the defense potential of the Soviet Armed Forces, they nre draw-
ing their own realistic conclusions and are advising the United StaCes
Governmen t to solve the international problems at issue not on the field of
battle, but at the negotiaCions table.
Former United States Deputy 5ecretary of State J. Ball, former Secretary of
Defense Clark Clifford, former Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Affairs William Fulbright, Senator Edward Kennedy, former Coaunander-in-
Chief o� the American Forcos in Kotea and subsequently United States Army
Chief of SCaff Matthew Ridgway--all of them in their time openly acknow-
ledged the failure of American strategy in Vietnam. "An idea cannot be
killed by bullets or bombs,"14 Ridgway concludes, in declaring American :
policy in Vietnam a"colossal mistake." Ridgway also directed attention
to the inadmissibility of the ruling circles o� the United States dis-
regarding the internal problems, "which cry out for a need for the nwst
urgent solutions."15 He criticized the United States Government because
it continued to cling to the bankrupt concept, tantamount to saying that
"Our will can be imposed on our opponents by means of force or threat of
the use of force."lb
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' in his eurn, Sdnaeor Fulbright aekndwledged ChaC whi.1.e a pneiCive ehange
~ had takan place in the seneiments of Americans, "these changee do not stem
~ f rom wigdom, but from the eonsequences of failure. The sharraring deEQae
~ of American policy in Vietnam aroused in srho].ars, journalises annd pali-
r3ciane an inexorable readinees to rev3se the basee of Americgn postwar
` pollcy."17 Fulbright cr3tieiaed the biind anricommuniam of some of the
Amer3can poliCi.ca1 elite, and rlghr�u11y saw the sources of the UniCed
! StaCes defeats in the f ore3gn policy arena in the faCt rhae afeer the
proclamation of the "Truman Doctrine," "every American presidenC... was
under tremendous preesure from Chose who demanded that he demonstrate anti-
' communist orthodoxy."18 Fu1b right felt Chat Vietnam would "almost cereainly"
become a eort of waterahed in American foreign pol3cy, but at the same timQ
he d3d not take the risk of predicting precisely in which direction it would
develop further, staeing that this was "noe at a11 clear.1119 The aenatnr
was careful in his conclueions, but noe by chnnce. He realixed ChgC the
Co1d War forces in the United Statee would not cede their poeitions without
a fighr.
By the beginning of the 1910's many influential political figurea in the
Republican and bemocratic parties held the firm opinion that the hnpes of
the UniCed StaCes Government af etrengChening ire international poeition
by means of a pol3cy of aggresaion, and at the same time weakening the
poaition of the USSR and other socialist countriea were insolvent. Thig
circumstance contributed to the fact that the United States Covernment wae
forced to a definite extent to reckon with the actual situation and the
spirit of the times, and engaged in a search for foreign policy atrategy
and tactics thaC would answer to the potentials of American capitalism.
It goes withouC gaying that at the same time it did not Yenounce many old
politicaS goals, and moreover was constantly under the presaure of the
ultra-reactionary forces, which did not approve of any posiCive changea,
no matter what they were, in American foreign policy toward realiam.
(?n the one hand, the Republican Administration repeatedly stated the desire
to pass f rom the "era of confrontation" to the "era of negotiationa."
President Nixon ultimately approved a policy toward a certain activation of
Soviet-American economic and scientific-technical relatione. The United
States also occupied a relatively pasitive position with respect to inter-
national problems. On the other hand, the Republican Administration made its polfcy repeatedly more rigid with reapect to the USSR, threw itself into
the maelstrom of new foreign policy adventures in Southeast Asia and ahowed
indulgence toward Israel's aggressive policy toward the Near East. As L. I.
Brezhnev accuraCely noted at the 24th CPSU Congress: "The frequent zigzags
in American foreign policy, which are apparently also connected with certain
domestic policy maneuvers of a market order, are complicating the conducting
of affairs with the llnited States."20
The constructive program of'regulating the basic international problems,
worked out by the 24th and 25th CPSU congreseee, ie bearing fruit. A aub-
stantial part of the American public lets it be clearly underetood that
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ie is rired of the reeurrences af the Cold War and tn innger beiieves in the
nryth of the "aggresaiveness of ehe Soviets." Amerirane seem ta heve grown ~
up andhare aiready ceased eo Cake on fairh many of the pdstulates of the '
Coid War. In Unieed Seates palieical and busineam circles, including the Whiee Houae, i.n the first half of the 1970's there begen to be a more
eerioug apprearh to the probierts of seeking epheres of poseible cooparaCinn
wieh the USSR in solving unseCtled international problemg and queetione of ~
bilararal Soviec-Ameriean relationa. i
The poaeibilirieg_af improvtng bilateYa3 5ovier-Ameticnn relaeions are now
quiCe substantia1. Many of the porentials for this methnd have not y8t been
utilized. An analysis of bilareral Soviet-Americen relgtians ahows that the
lion's share nf the efforts of the US5R and the Un3ted States, when the
Americen i.aaders cede eo th p Logic of the circumstences, fa11s Co the solu-
tion of internationai problems, and not problemg of bilgtpral Snviet-American
relations. Of caurge, the former are very important, gnd the stateamen of
both countries ehould ati11 be concerned w3th them. The development of
biigteral SovieC-American relations, hoaever, continUes to be one of the
roost urgent problems. Its gradual solution wnuld place the building of
inrernational pegce on an even aounder fooCing.
'rherefore, the gradugl awarenesa of the importance of Soviet-American rela-
tione for the fate of the United Stateg iegelf, along wiCh the recognition
of the need to further coromenaurate the foreign policy potentials of
WashingCon with the actual balance of powers in the world, marked by the
further consolidation of the positiona of the USSR and other eocieligt
cauntries, has made the American ruling circles follow the path of peaceful
coexiatence with the Soviet Union. Although the change for the better in
Soviet-American relations, gchieved during the last few years, tias occurred
primarily because of the purposeful and initiative foreign policy action of
the CPSU and the Soviet Government, one must not fail to give its due to
the leadership of the Republican Administration, which ultimaCely dis�
plgyed a aerious approach, and regarded an improvement in relations with
the USSR as one of the most important priorities of United Statea foreign
pnlicy. In explaining the nature of the policy taken by the Nixon-Ford
administraCion Coward improving 5oviet-American relations, 5ecretary of
State Henry Kissinger pmphagized in nne of his speecheg in the autumn of
1974 thae there could be no peaceful order in the international arena
without the constructive development of relations between the United States
and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Kissinger noted that the efforts under-
taken by the American side with a view to achieving more constructive rela-
tions wiCh the tiSSR, "are implemented not on behalf of any single adminis-
tration or single party for any definite period. These efforts express
the unswerving striving of the overwhelming majority of the American people
toward deCente and their hope that any responsible government aill aspire
toward peace. No other aspect corresponds to a greater extent to the
inCerests of mankind.1121 When he went into retiremenC, Richard Nixon, in
his address to the American people, noted that his administration'g period
in power had denoted "the beginning of new relations with the Soviet Union,"
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that the Uni.eed 3eates "should conCinue to devpiop 8nd expand ehese new
relationg, ao ehae the ewa moot powerfui powers in the world would live
in cooperation with eaeh oeher, and noe ae odds with each oeher."22
Realizing the importance of
Amer3can relations, Gerald
stated that "he promised Co
American policy of the 1ast
there can be no aiternative
countrieg."23
con tinuing the pnliey toward i.mprdving Snvier-
Ford, who replaeed Nixon in the Whiee House,
preserve the eonCi.nuiCy i.n carrying dut the
ehree years," eince "in the the rmonuclear age
eo poei.Cive and peacefui reiationa beeween our
Everything indicated ehat, based on the fundamental egreamenrs already
reached berween the USSR and the United States, ie was fully possib1e ro
advance 3n the businega of muCually advantageoug collaboratton and the
solution of the problems thae were of vitgl gignificance both �or the
Soviet and American peopiee c;nd for the peoples of other enuneriea. At the
inirial atage of acCiviry of the ltepublicnn Ford'e adminietrgtion, the
gradual development of relations between the USSR and the United Statpe had
already been expressed in the agreement reached in Vladivoatok concerning
a new long-terei agreement on aCrategic arms limitation.
It ie characteristic that, while consciousiy proceeding Coward these poei-
tive ateps, the American leaders by nn meana regarded them ag "conceeeions"
to the Soviet Union or the obtaining of any unilareral advantages by the
$oviet party alone. Theae results as a Whole also were fully in accord
with the intereats of the United States itaelf. For example, when explain-
ing the aignificance of the Vladivostok agreement, PreeidenC Ford emphasiaed
at a prese conference in Washington on 2 December 1974: "We have achieved
the establiahment of solid and equal limitations of the strategic forces of
each party, thus averting an arms race with all its horrors, inat24ility,
prgssure of military tension and spending of economic resourcea. In
Vladivostok, in Ford's words, there aas laid "a solid foundation for poten-
tial implementation in the future of curtailing armament," and "a positive
atep: was made "toarard peace on the baeis of equality, the only basie on
which agreement could be reached"25 betweett the USSR and the United States
r+ith respect to strategic arms lic,itation. The resultg of the European
conference Were evaluated by SQCretary of State Henry Kiesinger as a
"useful step along the path to detente and the averting of war.1126
The problem of the continuity of the policy taward the USSR implemented by
the Republican Administration rose in all ite acuteneas in connection With
the accession to power in the United States in January 1977 of the Democratic
Administration headed by Jiaamy Carter. In the preceding period many state-
ments had been made from thia quarter in favor of developing relationa with
the Soviet Union, the step forward of which had been delayed even before
Carter's accession to the White House, because of domestic policy evEnts in
the United States, and particularly because of the offensive of the opponenta
of detente, iunluding some in the Republican Party itself, during the period
of the 1976 preaidential elections. In reality, hoarever. when the need to
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solvQ the mogC critical prdblema, ehae ware of interest �or boeh sidea,
especially advancement along the path of comp].eting the draft of the new
agreement on strate$ic arms, roga eo the prgctical p1anE, the new govern-
menC of the Unieed Staeeg nt firsC took an unraalleCic position, obviously
striving to achieve for i.tse1f one-sided advanrages and benefi.ta. Moreover,
a1l ehis was taking place ro the accompaniment of a thoroughly false,
inten8lve anti-Soviet propaganda campa3gn (with the main emphae3,s on the
Soviet "miliCery Chregt" and nn the quegtion of "human righte"), againat a
background of activation of the opponentg of datenee, who called for the
West'e amassin$ arms and whr, tried to eurn the positive development of
Soviet-llmer3.can relariona back ta the Cold Cdar times.
As the we11-known Americnn colunm iet J. Kraft acknowledged, the Carter 27
Governmane "blundered in Soviet-American relatione from the vpry staYC.ii
According to the evidence of Brookingg Institute agsociaCeg B. Hlechman and
S. Kaplan, "hisearical experience ghows rhat an infl.exible anti-Soviet
position as an end in itgelf, although payrhologically possibly b28nging 11
satiafaction, gerveg ae nn obvious hindrance in gettling crises.
The attempta made by afficial Washington to put pressure on the USSR and
to inCervene, on th e pretext of "defending human rights," in the internal
affairs of the Soviet State did not bring their initintors the expected
results. Moreover, thig policy of Washington's was directed, essentially,
toward freezing detente and aroused obvious anxiery among the leaders of
a number of other leading capitalist countries--allies of the United States.
As the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOtt noted in this connectian, FRG Chancellor
Nelmut Schmidt, French President V. Giscar d'Estaing and Canadian Prime
Minister Pierre Trudeau "expressed doubts concerning Carter's poaition on
the question of 'rights' and mentioned its effect on Soviet-American rela-
tions."29 According to the eWidence of TIME magazine, because of the
actions of the United SCares, "The European allies of the United States and
even eome American specialiste in the study of 3he Soviet Union were
obviously concerned for the future of detente."0
Former President Ge rald Ford criticized the position of the United Statea
Government on the question of "human rights" as applied to the sphere of
Soviet-American relations. In a talk with American journaliats he openly
stated: "I think that rheae tactica should be criCicized if they hinder
the achievement of progreas in important areas of relations wiCh the Soviet
Union such1s negotiations on strategic arms limiCation at the second
stage.... 3 The Carter Administration a roach to the question of mutual
relations with the USSR could not help but have nn effect on the overall
state of relations between the two countries. As the magaaine, U.S. NEWS
AND WORLD REPORT, close to the ruling circles of the United States, stated
in this period, "American-Soviet relations are at present chillier than aC
any time in the last few years.02
The American press, therefore, throughout 1977 repeatedly pointed out the
actions of the Uemocrats' administration as the source of a cooling in
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SovieC-Ameriean ralaeions. "Na maeter what ig said aboue sny individugl
aspects nE Carter's poliry," wrore the WASHINGTON r05'I', "thera ig nd ques-
ei.on bur rhae the Presidenti is aeCing exCremely haseily..., without com-
paring individual faceora, without directing the proper artention to the
possible reaction of the Ruasiana.... Ie (rhe pollcy--An. G.) lonks as
if iC were fashioned off-hand. Even many of Ctie people who are eympaeheeic
eoward the epecific $oa1s p roposed by CarCer think ehae his approaeh hae
flaws and is leading to the opposite resultg."33
In turn, Gerald Ford also statEd: "The facCs indicate thgt gt pregent the
situation is worae wiCh respect Co detenCe Chan iC wag nine monChs ago."
Ford noted that when he lefe the WhiCe Houae, the Salt-II Agreement wae
95-percent worked our," and "without a dot~bt, could have been reaahed
before 3 OcCober 1977,"34 thae ig, before the expiraeion of the period
in which the Interim Agreemenr wag in effect.
Designated by the term, "controlled rivalry," the policy sCresaea what
separaCes the two countries, and noC the coinciding of ineerests of the
USSR and the United Statea. Coexistence 3n a spirie of cooperatian is
much more in keeping wieh the spirit of the last quarter of the twentieth
century Chan the so-called "controtled rivalry," from which, as is said,
it is but a step to uncontrolled "confronCaCions" of vdrious typea.
7'he Leninist foreign policy of the Soviet Union acta as a powerful counter-
balance to this whole lightweight atructure of the adherenta of "controlled
tension." It is principled and peaceloving in ita content.
The 24th CPSU Congress advanced the Peace Program, which directed Soviet
foreign policy toward further active peaceful offensive. "In advancing
this program," said L. I. B rezhnev at the World Congress of Peaceloving
Forces in Moscow, "we have seen our mission in contribuCing to the elimina-
tion of the seaCs of tension, helping mankind to rid iCself of the specter
of thermonuclear catastrophe that hangs over iC and contributing in every
way possible Co detente."35 The 25th CPSU Congress, which ndopCed the'
Pragram of Furtlier Struggle for Peace and Inte rnational Cooperation and
for Freedom and Independence of Peoples, became a historical new stage in
the peaceful offensive of the Soviet Union, of the entire aocialist
commonwealth and of the international forces of peace and progress.
The Cask posed at it of restraining the arms race, a transition to cur-
Cailment of arms and rhen Co disatmament is in accordance with the funda-
mental interests of the security of the peoplea of the earth. The 25th
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union put forth a number of
specific measures for the purpose of its implementation:
a) Do everything possible to complete the preparation of a new agreement
between the USSR and the United Statea on limiting and curtailing strategic ~
arms and to conclude international agreements on universal, complete
cessation of nuclear weapons tests, on banning and destroying chemical
weapons and on banning the designing of new types and systems of weapons
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of mass desrruction, gg well as affecting the naCuxnl environment for
military and other hoseile purposes;
b) Undertiake new efforte to aetivaCe negorietiong on reducing armed forcea
and armg in Cenrral Europe. After agreemenn cas been reaehed on ehe firer
apecific steps in Chis direcrion, to conCinue in eucceeding years the cguse
of miliCary deeente in Chie region;
c) Serive for Che practice of syetemaCic reduntion of militsry expendiruree
of many statee become aaubgCitute for their presenC constanC growth;
d) Take all measures for exCremely rnpid convocaeion of a World Diearmament
Conference..s.
Serive to conclude a world ngreement on non-use of force in internationgl
relaeions."36
The 25Ch CPSU Congress emphasized the excepeionally impnrCant significance
attributed by the U5SIt to reaching agreement with the United 5tates in
negoCiations on straCegic arms 1imi.tation. Throughout 1976 and for a
considerable part of 1977, however, these negotiationg proved to be para-
lyzed due to the zigzag posiCion of rhe American party.
A component of the process of international detenre is the development of
long-term nnd large-scale ecnnomic-trade and induetrial-technical col-
lahoraCion between East and West.
When speaking aC the CPSU Central Committee October (1976) Plenum, L. I.
Brezhnev stressed the fact that, "In complete accordance with the program
approved by Clie 25th party congress, we are conCinuing work on developing
equable mutually advantageous relations with capitalist states.
2'his work has iCs special characteristics at each stage. Five or 10 years
ago there was the problem oi creating a basis for normal relations of
peaceful coexisCence with France, the F1tG, Che United States of America,
Canada, Italy, England and other capitalist countries and of ridding these
relations of the chief extraneaus features of the Cold War. When this had
in general been done, we went farther, and began to develop increasingly
widescale cooperation in politics, economics, science, technology and
culture."37 All of this is the fab ric of lasting peace, including that in
relations with the United States. Even the opponents of detente realize
this. That is why they would like to tear it up, to teat, if it may be
expressed this way, ita soundness.
Since it is the result of the positive political changes that have taken
place in the international arena, the accelerated development of economic
and scientific-technical cooperation between the socialist aad capitalist
countries in accordance with the feedback procedure itself contributes to
reinforceing detente in political relations. The development of economic

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collaborarinn between Enst and Wese ia importane, on the nne hand, ns the
mgterigl basis of deeenee, and on the other hand--es one of. the factors in
. the development of inCenZaCional economic cooperation. Due to deeenCe,
stiates are �o r the firaC time in tiheir hiseory acquir3ng, under apprnprinre
condirions, the opportunity of enjoying ehe wealth and advantages of inter-
natiional diviaion of labor wiChin the framework of a11 of mankind.
Ie 3e aufficient to recaii justi environmental pollutinn, wh3ch recognizes
no nationgl borders, as we11 as the growing scarciey of mineral-power
resources, which require uniting th e efforts of all the staCes eo aolve
a number of urgenC problems of scienCific-technical progresa. Only on a
global baeis can the mose effi.cient solution be found to a number of demo-
graphic problems, provid3ng a11 of mankind with food and complete elimina-
tion of the poverty that hurCe the right and digniey of mankind.
DeCente had a favorable effect on economic relationa between the USSR and .
the United States. During the period �rom 1972-1977, Soviet-American trade
expanded at quiCe rapi.d rarea, even though irs growth was held back by a
number of unfavorable facCora. The volume of SovieC-American Crade in 1976
exneeded the 1971 level by 11-fold, which is indicated by the table g�iven
below.38
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Commodity turnover
(in million dollars) 220 640 1415 960 2090 2595 1950
Still, deapite the rapid growth of export from the United Statea to the USSR,
in 1976 it was only 2 percent of the total indicaCor in this sphere, so Chat
there were great potentials in SovieC-American trade. They are not, how-
ever, being opened up as quickly as many American businesamen and the SovieCs
would like, primarily through the f ault of the opponents of deCente.
As far back as October 1972 the United States signed a trade agreement with
the USSR that specified granting the Soviet Union "most favored naCion"
trade conditions, as well as the placing in the United States of a large
number of Soviet orders for agricultural and industrial products, commercial
arbitraCion in third countries and an improvement of the conditions for the
operation of representatives of American firms in Moscow. The adopCion in
1974, however, of the discriminatory Jackson-Vannik amendmen t to the law on
trade, which linked-the "most favored nation" conditions in trade and iCs
being extended credit with "emigration from the USSR," prevented the 1972
Crade agreement from going into effect.
5ti11, the process of detente was gatherinb~~oofea nwith 1972
USSR and the United States concluded a num8reements
development and regulation of economic-trade relations between them. Among
them are: the 1972 agreement on regulating sett1emenCs for Lend Lease
(payments by the USSR to pay off indebtedness for Lend Lease are linked to
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problems of trgde, economic and financial collaboratiion of the countriea);
the 1972 agreement on reciprncal exCending o� crediti. The 1972 agreemenC
on certain quegt3ons of inerchanC shipping (renewed in 1975) eased the
restricCion on Soviet shipa entering United States porta and �ixed the
exCenC to which the ships o� boeh counrries could partiicipate in merchant
marine Crade shipments carried our within the framework of bilaCeral rrade.
As the resule of 5ovieti-American meeeings at a higher level, the two sides
adopted measures to reinforce the organizational structure of economic
relatione between the USSR and the UniCed StaCes.
In 1972 a Joinr 5oviet-American Commietee on Trade Problems was established,
which meets alternately in Moscow and WashingCon. In 1973 a US5R Trade
DelegaCion in Washington and x Commercial Buresu at the United SCates
Embassy in Moscow were opened. In the same year the American-Soviet Trade-
Economic Council (ASTES) was established, the members of which are over
200 firms from the United Stares and a number of Soviet organizations.
Over 20 American companies obtained permission ta open their delegations
in Moscow.
In accordance with the agreement on civil air transport (1966), in July 1968
regular air communications were opened between Moscow and New York. After
the summit meetings in 1973, Aeroflot obtained the right to make runs between
Moscow and Washington, and Pan-American Airlines--beCween Leningrad and New
York; in 1974 a long-Cerm agreement was signed on assistance in economic,
industrial and technical collaboration; the USSR and the UniCed States are
participants in the European Conference on Security and Cooperation, the
Final AcC of which calls for activating cooperatioii in economics, science
and the environment.
In January 1976 the agreement between the USSR and the United States on the
problem of tax assessment, signed in 1973, went into effect; in 1976 a
fishing agreement was signed.
In accordance wiCh the communication of the United States SCaee Department
(July 1977), "expansion of trade with the USSR is advantageous to the
United States, since iC increases employment, improves the balance of
trade, ensures access Co valuable raw material and reinforces the elements
of stability in political relations." It must once again be emphasized
that in the business circles of the United States it is newly recognized
that further development of normal economic collaboration between the two
countries is being prevented by the restrictions imposed by the American
side itself (absence of the "most favored nation" regime and of loans of
the Export-Import Bank, export control and numerous non-tariff barriers).
These barriers could have been surmounted to a certain extent through
developing the most progressive forms of economic-trade collaboration,
particularly joint production on the basis of cooperarion. In the opinion
of the majority of American experts, it is important to seek new forms of
industrial-technical collaboration, mutually acceptable to the llSSR and
the United States.
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'Phe presenee d[ diacriminarory regCrietiona nn erude wieh ehr. U5SR led to
etie fgcr thgt recenely the Sovieed have been fnrced en shift a number of
arders eo orher Cduntriea, 7'his reaulCed in the fgce ehae in 1977 the
USSR-Unitp.l SCaCes commddity turnover waa 1egg than in 1976.
Curtatling the commndity eu rnover beCween the United StaCes nnd the USSit
ceusey nnxiety in the busines$ circles of the United Stntes. Acaording to
the estimaee of Yudzhin Milosh, vice-prpsident of the American-Snvier
Eronamic Trade Counci.l, since the discriminaCory rrade 1egislaCinn wenC
- intn effect, thnr ig, gi.nce Jenuary 1975, American firms have losr 2 billidn
ddllarg wnrrh of orders from the USSit at the mi.nimum, which megns an amp]oy-
ment cur in the United Seares of epprnximaeely 80 000 pereong, 8r a eime
~ when glmoat 7 million Americgns cannot find work.~9 By the end of 1976
the insolvency of the Jeckson-Vacm ik amQndment had already become obvious Co
many people in the United States.
UniCed StAtes business circlea, ineeregeed in Crade wiCh the USSR and aith
othe r socialist countries place definiCe hopeg on repeal nf the discrimina-
to ry regulations of the 1974 law on trade. IC ie characeerietic ChBC the
final document nf the regular fourCh segsion of the American-Soviet Trade-
Economic Council in Decembe r 1976 (represenred aC it were 234 American -
compnnies, producing 25 percene of the United 5taCes gross nuCional product)
onee egain confirmed support of the trade agreement of 1972 gnd, particu-
a larly, provisions of it such as reciprocal, unconditional grnnCing of the
"cnost favored nation" regime, reciprocal extension of lonns under normal
conditions of export and those adopted in business practice, including the
use of the potentials of �inancing of the Export-Import Bnnk of the United
States and loans of Soviet o rganizations.
- The documents of the 25th CP5U Congress also poinCed out the important
polittcxl significance of scientific-technical relations with foreign
countries. L. I. Brezhnev noted in the Report of the CPSU Central Com-
mittce that "economic and scientific-technical relations with capitelist
states also exppnd the material base of the policy of peaceful coexistence."40
The USSR and the United States are two countries that have a powerful
scientific-technical potential. Moreover, successful dr.velopment of
scientific-technical collaboration between them goes beyond the framework
of their interests alone. As is noted in Article 2 of the agreement betwcen
the government of the USSR and the government of the UniCed States on
cooperation in Science and Technology, its goal is affording broad pos-
sibilities by both parties for uniting the efforts of scholars and speci-
alists of both countries in working out the most import.ant problems, the
execution if which will contribute to the progress of science and technology
for the well-being of all countries and all roanl:~nd.
Progress on the road to normalizing SovieC-American relations in 1972-1974,
as well aa further expansion of scientific-technical contacts and mutunl iL
striving for accelerated ^.olution of the most pressing scienCific problems,
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ipd td the concludin$ df 10 interaeate and ineergavernmenea1 agreemenea en
cndperaei.nn af the USSR gnd the UniCed States in aeience and tezhnology,
explori.ng oueer gpace, devaiuping nuclear power envirnnmeneai proeeetion,
agricui ture, sCudying the Wor1d Ocean, rranspor, , power engineering, con-
serueti.on, medici.ne and publir hegieh.
In ehis tiame periad savi.ee nrganizations established rdnCaeGs with nver
300 American induseriai ftxma, and egreemengg nn sci@ntific-technical
coopgration ware eoncluded with a number of ieading corporations. There
are now aver 60 such agreenentg. Amang the firms ehat have eseablishad
coneraCtual relations wieh 5oviet organ izaeions through the Sraee Com-
mittee of the USSR Council af Miniseerg dn Science and Technology may be
named such giants of the cepitaliat world ag General Electric, Kaispr
InduaCries, Aoeing, MonsenCo, Gulf Oi1, Sperry, Control Data, Hewlett-
- Packard, Singer, Standard Oil of Zndiana, Deere and Co., and otherg.
Considering the growing interegt of Americar businegg circles in coopera-
- tion with the Soviet Union wiehin the framewnrk of the American-Soviet
Economic Trgde Council, a special CommiCtee on Scientific-Technical
CooperaCi.on Bekween the USSR and United Statee was esCabliehed to asgist
in the development o� gcientific-eechnical and industrial conperntion
between Soviet organizatidng and privare American firms.
The fruitful and mutually advantageous cooperation between the US5R and the United 5tatea in science and technology, however, since it is also an impor-
tant factor in the materialization of detente, doee not guit the most
reactionary American circles. They are striving to hinder the development
of this type of cooperation wi.th the US5R. Sometimes measures are taken
by the Unired Srates Administration, under pressure from them, to resCrict
the valume nnd subjects of joinr research carried out according to the
programs agreed upon within the �ramework of the Soviet-American scientific-
technical agreements. bespite this malevolence, however, American scien-
tists and specialists show great interest in caoperation with Soviet
organizations.
~ There were interesting resulCs, published in August 1977, fram an anonymoua questionnaire, carried out anang major American firms and specialists on
trade berween Gast and West by a United States congressional committec.
Of the $8 firms that answered congress' questions, 85 came out in favor of
granting the USSR and other socialist countries the "most favored nation"
conditions, that is in behalf of repealing the discrimination in export of
the socialist countries to the United StaCes, preventing normal development
of economic tt-ade collaboration be[ween them and the socialist countri.es.
Of 24 representatives of American academic circles queried, only one came
out in fAVOr of the JacksocrVannik amendment, which had made the development
of Soviet-American economic relations dependent on certain problems that
related completely [o USSR internal policy. It was again confirmed that ~
the majority of the representatives ef American business and scientific
circles are supporters of further development of sciettific-technical and
economic-trade collaboration with the Soviet Union and other socialisC
countries.
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DBCanCe ronCinues eo carve ies way inCo the furure ahd is finding numerous
supporCeYS in the UniCed Seatiee. buri.ng 1976-1977 collnboraeion betiwenn
the USSR and the Unieed StaCee wne euccessf.ully developad in such f.ie1ds
8e epeCin1 electromeCallurgy, chemicaL catglyaig, metrology, auComated
conCrol syeCems, using computare in admini8tiration, economic model etudy,
mirrdbioldgy, railraad eransport, the aeudy nf the Wnrld Ocean, use of the
reacCione of thermonuclear aynChesis for power, etic. Soviee-Nnerican
noopergeion is being developed successfully and mutually advantggeously
in designing generators on an in,lastrial scale. Joinr work of grenr prac-
ticgl importiance ie being carried ouC by Soviet organizations and Amer3can
indugerial firms. For example, in the collaboration with the American
General Electric Company, joint indueCrial developmenta are being imple-
mented in the field of eurbogenerator building, new types of high-voltage
power cables and cryogenic and superconductor equipmenC; work is being done
in collaboration with the Dresser Induarries on designing and Cesting new
types o� equipment for the petiroleum refining industry, and with the
Hewlitt-Packard Companyppon autiomaCion of continuoua aeeel teeming.
Soviet-American cooperaCion in agriculture hes great perapectives. In con-
juncti.on wiCh the American F'MS-Corporakion, the Moldavian SSR ia performing
CesC-experimental work on highly mechanixed vegetnble cultivation. This
experi.ment is regarded as the first step on the road to joint deeign of a
large-acale agroindustrial complex wiCh a high degree of inechgnization and
auComaCion of the processes of rai;ing vegetables and their induatrial
proceasing and packaging.
On condition of a regponsible attiCude toward the progresa in derenCe held
by the American administration, the aolid base now established for acien-
tific and technical cooperation between the USSR and the UniCed States will
also make it possible in the future to develop it on the basis of mutual
advantage and respect for the interests of the parties, which would corre-
spond to the level of the scientific-technical poCential of both countries,
their possibilities, interest, and also the current and future demands of
the key sectors of science, technology and industrial production, which
will ultimately serve the improvement of SovieC-American relations and
reinforcement of the process of international detente.
The new, far-reaching proposals concerning internaCional detente advanced
by L. I. Srezhnev at the ceremonial meeting of the CPSU Central Committee,
USSR Supreme Soviet and RSFSR Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin, dedicated to
the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, are being
widely responded to in world society and are an additional basis for the
further development of Soviet-American re],ations. The goal of these pro-
posals is to hegin to "drive down the curve of the arms race, gradually
lower the level of military oppogition..., essentially reduce, and then
eliminate the threat of nuc?ear wgr--Che real threar of danger for
mankind."41
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Ie was proposed thgC an agraemenr be reached on Che simuLCaneous cessation
of producCi.on of nuclear weapons by all sCaCes. AC the aame rime, the
nuclear powers could tgke on the obligaeion o� bggi.nning gradual cureail-
ment of the seocke alregdy accumulaeed to thp point of their complete,
100-percenti e13mingCion. Iti wgs also propoeed rhat nuclear weapona tests
be banned not only in rhe aCmoephere, ourer epace and urder water, but
aLso underground, and that agreemenCa be reached on announcing a moratorium
on nuclear gxplosions for peaceful purposee gs weiL.
Thia is whae is dictiated by gtaee wisdom. Today's arsenal of nuclear
weapona has now reached such power thae it could, ae is calculated, deseroy
the enrire world popularion 15-fold. In 1976, eccording to the calcularione
o� rhe American scfenCiaC Lester Brown, world milieary expendirures reached
350 billion dollgrs, and there were 30 mi111on people in the ranke of the
armiea. Just two-day expendiCures for weapons aere equal to the yearly
budget of the UN and all its specialized organixAtians, and, incidentally,
every foureh scientific associate in the world ie now engaged in developing
increasingly new, "more efficient" syaeems nf grmament.4Z
The UniCed States military deparCmente are noC dying out. The PenCagon,
which in rhe 1977/1978 financial year reached a military budget amouneing
to 116.6 billion dollars, a record in the country's hiaCory, is already
demandiag 134.2 billion dollara for 1978/1979.43
The reacrionary circles in the UniCed States Congress are increasingly
setting the Cone of the new militarist campaign. "Hawks" we11-known in.
the United Stares--senators Barry Goldwater, Henry Jackson and a number of
congresemen--have come out wiCh appeals to the United States Govi!rnment to
sCiffen up the American position in Soviet-American negotiatiorp on aCra-
tegic arms limitation. These opponents of detente have accused the Demo-
cratic Administration of allegedly, in the name of signing the new agree-
ment, being prepared to all but "capitulate" to the Russians. This was
the voice of the military-industrial complex.
The international situation that was forming in the spring of 1978 was not,
therefore, a simple one. The development of detente was caught in a tense
struggle. Under these conditions, the consiatency of the Soviet Union's
'.,Leninist foreign policy course, directed toward stopping the arms race and
achieving true disarmament, was revealed in full measure. As L. I. Brezhnev,
genpral secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet, staCed in his speech on the cruiser "Admiral Senyavin,"
"It is in this precise direction that there will be a solution to the �unda-
mental question of how the international situation will develop further and
here thaC the keenest struggle is developing now. 41 L. I. Brezhnev noCed
that in I3ovember 1974 a high-level Soviet-American meeting was held in the
Far East during which an agreement was reached on conclusion between the
USSR and the United States of a long-term agreement on atrategic offenaive
arms limitation. Soon after the Vladivostok meeting, however, work on this
agreemenC proved to have virtually come to a standstill because of the
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inconsiseency of the Unieed 5eaees Governmenk. Uue eo the consrrucrive
segnd of the Soviee Union ir wag then pogsi.ble eo eurn the negoriarions
into the channel of the former egreemenr. In the course of bilaeerai _
Soviar-American meeeings reeoluGions in principlp of cerrain isgues were
found, and on the whale the group of provisions o� the agraement ehaC had
ndt been fina].ly worked ouC wae narYOwed. At the same time, under Chase
Conditions too, the United Statee GovernmenC conCinued Co avoid Caking
eidee and even srrove ro ehrust on the world a new type of wenpon for maeg
desCruction--the neueron bomb. "It is Cime �or certain Western 1Qadere tu
begin to think gerinusly about their responsibiliCy eo their own peoples,
and to a11 peoples for the faCe of the world," sC&Ced L. I. Brexhnev, -
"and Co ghow, in gctuality, their readinees eo undertaka eff eceive eCeps
roward curbing the arms race.
Fnr its parC, the Soviet Union wi11 conCinue ef�orts to achieve a ereqdy
advgnce along the path of military deCente and tranaiCion to Crue disarma-
ment. This ia our firm policy, and we wi11 be seeadfase in puteing it inCo
practice."45 Thege words were greeted with rremendoug gaCisfacCion by the
world public.
The spring and summer of 1978 ahowed that many influenrinl political figures
in the United Stares were obviously trying to achieve a breakdown in the
proceas of detenre, and a return, if not to the "cold," then to a"cool"
war. This was manifested particularly graphically during the inCervention
of the NATO counrries, including the United States, in the internal affaire
of Zaire. Yet another attempt was made to ruin detenCe. At the same time
it was claimed that the reason for the people's uprising in Zaire wns either
the "Soviet" or the "Cuban" involvement in it. Thia malicious propaganda
in the spirit of whitewashing imperielist aggresgion by certain NATO coun-
tries in Zaire essentially attested to the fact that the adherents of the
Cold War in the United States were applying the same methods of misinforma-
tion and slander that had been for such a long time issued as the "truth"
when American imperialiam trampled the earth of Vietnam under the pretext
of "aggression f rom the North," that is, "aggreasion" of the Vietnamese in
rheir own country, which was, of course, in itself abaurd.
Just what really lay behind the intervenCionist policy of the United States
and a number of other NATO countries in Af rica? This is worCh discuasing.
When the aggressive actions of the United States and their acceasoriea in
inCervention are justified by virtue of a noticeable deterioration in
Soviet-American relatiuns, it is a very serious sign, indicating a aort of
calculation for the world, and particularly the American public, to forget
the lessons of analogous imperialist actions of the preceding years. The
truth, however, is that in Africa there was a threat to the s-trategic
policy of the West, the aim of which was to thrust the system of new
colonialism on independent Africa.
Serious political and socioeconomic changes are taking place in Africa.
A number of African countries have follnwed the path of progressive social
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developmenti, having chosen in fgvor of socia13sC orienCation. The co11ec-
rive vo3ce of rhe independene Aftitean etaees is being heaYd increasingly
dec~sively in suppore of detente, in behalf oE rein�orcing peace and in
behalf of affi.rming the principles of equal rights in poliCical and economic
relat3one beeween states. On the agenda is elimination of the LaeC veetiges
of colon3alism and raciam in the south.
Under the conditii.ons, complicared for imperiaiiem, in the NATO countries
alarm has arisen: it has turned oue that ne3thar WashingCon and London,
neither Parie and Bruesels alone have i,t in their power ro etop the national
liberation process in Africa. Hence we have the unification of �orcea
within the framework of the aggreseive NATO bloc.
An important quQStion ariaes from this. The aims o� the new colonialiam do
noe lie in solving any local problem, es for example, saving tha regime in
Zaire. It is a question of a considerably broader intenCion--to etop the
advance of the Af riean stgtes along the path of reinforcing independence
and preventing a weakening of the dominaeing pogition of capitalism in the
economics of Africa. The apecific nature o� rhe present Africgn policy af
the basie ahock force of rhe bloc of imperialistg--the United StaCes--lies
in increasing ef�orts wiCh a view Co weakening the liberation etruggle on
the continent, aplitting the anCi-imperialist unity of Africa and inhibit-
ing the process of international deCente.
The return to the policy of in terventionism will not bring the United States
the desired dividends. A direct conflict with the national liberation move-
ment in Africa in the style of clasaic colonialiam will atill further under-
mine the preatige of the United Statee in the developing couneries and will
have an adverae effect on their faith in the denlaranions of American
statesmen. It is not by chance that in the American prese at Che height of
the evenCs in Shab, warnings appeared that the "long-term consequences of
the hostility with the huge majority of the independent states of Africa
will be catastrophic for American positions and influence."46 Furthermore,
it may be considered that the policy of "crisis diplomacy" in Africa would
have the gravest domestic policy consequences for the United States.
That ia why a reCurn to interventionism in Africa after the disastrous
- failure in Vietnam aroused definite disagreements in the ruling circles oF
the United States.
The decisive resiatance on the part of most of the 4frican countries to the
recurrence of "crisis diplomacy" caused a cerCain "lowering of the tone" of
the pronouncements of a number of leading figures in the Carter Administra-
tion. The danger of further armed intervention by imperialism in the
internal affairs of the African countries--both in the souCh of the con-
tinent and in regions of other conflict situations--remains, however. The
reinforcement of the unity of the African states and of their friendship
and all-round cooperation wirh members of the socialist commonwealth is a
powerful covering force against the recurrences of "crisis diplomacy" in
the developing countries.
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in 1979 Chere were also oeher ghorreighred ateps taken Uy the Atnerican
administration in the 3.neernaCionai arena and in 5ovi.et-American relaeiana.
WhaC is the worth, fdr example, of the arriving, agginst the naeional
interesrg df the United Seaees ieaelf, Co ugp the "Chinese card." In
this caae the Unieed 9tares ahowa poLieical neargighredneas in relations
with Bei3ing, for the presene Beijing:leaderehip ia erying eo serain Sov3ee-
American relgeiona anli to achieve a military con�ronCat3on boCween the U3SR
and the Unitiad States. l?n1y peop1e bl3nded by anti-Sovietiem and ant3.-
communism, much 1i.ke gamblars in "poliCica1 poker," could fail tu realize
rhie obvioug tiruth. In fa1ling under the influence of the ncrivgtied
coglit3on of opponenea of detente, thege eraeeamen ceagp ro convey the
national inCereaCg of the United SCaeea, gnd are placing themselves in
the service of the narrow but 3nfluenCia1 group of pergone who represonC
the miliCary-industrial complex and ulerg-righeieC circles and organizaCiona
of counter-revolutionary emigrante. WQ observe that in the UniCed States,
inetead of f3rnmees in the matter of prntecting detente, adherance to the
spirit and letter of the Soviet-American agreemenrs and n etriving Coward
mutual underetanding, acCions of the oppoeiee nature are undereaken. They
are pursuing the gogl o� undermining confidenne between the US5R and the
United Staees, are charging the atmoaphetie with suspicion, are urging on
the arms race to a new orbir and are announcing thae detentie is undQrmined
because of the "aggresaiveness of the Sovieee." Thie course is far from
the political wiedom and staCe approach ro international affairs. It is
fraught with grave dangers, gnd this is increasingly clearly realized by
many reaponsible poliCical figures and businesamen in the United SCates.
The ove nwhelming majoriry of Americana continue to speak out regulnrly in
behalf of deeente. They demand from their statesmen a responsible attitude
toward the interests of mankind and the problems of world policy. So far
it is hard to say whether this truth has been 'assimilated by the preaent
Democratic Administration.
The road to improving Soviet-American relations is clear. It lies in the
direcCion of acknowledging the realities of today's world, in a struggle
with the political blindness of the opponents of deCente, in the reaponsi-
bility of the governmenCs for it and in the inadmissability of leCCing
international relations slip, including Soviet-American, back to the Cold
War. The opponents of detente see the future of internaCional relations
a nothing but a"grent military-poliCical glaciaCion," in the ice of which
detente would perish. What happens after that does not worry them. It
would appear that the fate of the present and following generations of
people does not worry them. This is, of courae, unnatural, but miliCarism
and humanism, as is well known, have always been anCipodes.
There is no doubt that the common will of all peaceloving and progressive
forces of today, despite any attempts made by the opponents of detente, will
take the upper hand in this complex struggle that is observed in the inter-
national arena in the 1970's. The objective processes that are forming
the need for detente for the world fellowship of states, speak their weighty
word. "There is no task more urgent and vitally important than to create
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peace eolid and inviolable.... Aa for the SovieC Union, we will not hbld
thinge up.1147 'Phese worde of L. Y. Brezhnev attesr to thp inflexibie will
of the CPSU and of the Soviet peopla ro rry to achieve further progrese in
dgtienCe, including the development and reinforcemenr of fraindehip wieh the
American people. �
FOOTNOTES
1. L. I. Brazhnev, "0 vneshney poliCika KPSS i Sovergkoga gosudareCva.
Rechi i etar'i" [Thp Foreign Policy of ehe CPSU and the Soviet State.
Speechee and Articles;, Moscow, 1975, p 601.
2. L. I. Brezhnev, "yydayushchiy8ya podvig zashchiCnikov Tuly" (The Out-
seanding Heroiam of the Defenders of Tula), Moacow, 1971, p 12.
3. V. t. Lenin, "Po1n. sobr. soch." [CompLete Collected Works), Vol 36,
p 327.
4. "Programnmyye dokumency bor'by za mir, demokratiyu i sota3alixm"
_ [Program Documents of the Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialiam),
Mos cow, 1964, p 57.
5. Ibid., 51-58.
6. "Ob ideologicheakoy rabote KPSS. Sbornik dokumentov" [The Ideological
Vork of the CPSU. A Collection of Documents], Moacow, 1917, p 276.
7. "Mezhdunarodnoye soveshchaniye kommuniaticheskikh i rabochikh parCiy.
Dokumenty i materialy. Moskva, 5-17 iyunya 1969" (International Con-
ference of Communist and Workers Partiea. Docwnents and Materials.
Moscow, 5-17 June 1969], p 288.
8. See V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 44, p 408.
9. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 40, p 152.
10. "Materialy XXIV s"ezda KPSS" [Materials of the 24th CPSU Congress], p 29.
11. Ibid., p 23. .
12. Ibid.
13. Gus Hall, "'ltao Worlds," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, No 6,
1971, p 4.
14. M. B. Ridgway, "Indochina: Disengaging," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1971,
pp 591-592.
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15. Ibi.d., h 587.
16. Ibid., pp 594-585.
17. J. W. Fu1br3ght, ".'Reflectienfg," NEW YORKER, Jan 8 1972, p 41.
18. Ibid., p 42.
19. ibid., p 57.
20. "Materialy aIXIV a"ezda KPSS," p 28.
21. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENT3, Dec,9, 1974, p 1514.
22. ibid.
23. DEPAItTMENT 0F STATE BULLETIN, Sepe 1., 1975, p 312.
24. DEPAItTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, Dec. 14, 1974, p 505.
25. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Aug. 12, 19750 p 1016.
26. Ibid., p 1034.
27. WASKINGTON POST, June 2$, 1977.
28. NEW YORK TIMES, June 24, 1977.
29. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 29, 1971.
30. TIME, July 18, 1971, p 24.
31. NEW5DAY, Marcti 29, 1971.
32. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, July 11, 1977, p 35.
33. WASHINGTON POST, July 11, 1977.
34. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, July 1, 1977.
35. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i etat'i!' [In Lenin's Courae.
Speeches and Articles], Vol 4, p 315.
36. "Materialy XXV s"ezda KPSS," p 26.
37. L. I. Brezhnev, "Rech' na Plenume Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS
25 dktyabrya 1916" [Speech at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on
25 October 1976], Moscow, 1976,'pp 34-35.
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38. "InCernaeional Economic Raporti oE rhe Pr~sident, January 1977,"
U.B. TRADE STATUS WITFI COMMiJNIST COUNTttZES, Feb'. 15, Aug 8, 1977.
39. JOURNAL OF COMHERCE, May 3, 1977.
40. "Materialy XXV s"ezdg KPSS5" p 56.
41. L. I. Brezhnev, "Veli.kiy OkCyabr' i progress chelovechestva"
[The Grear October and ehe Progresa of Mankind], Moacow, 1977, p 28.
42. See PRAVDA, 16 November 1977.
43. Cited from PRAVDA, 29 October 1977.
44. "Poyezdka Leonida I1'icha Brezhneva po Sib3ri i Dal'nemu Voetoku.
Marti-gprel' 1978 goda" (Leonid I1'ich Brezhnev's Journey Through
Siberia and the Par Easr. March-April 1978], Moscow, 1978, p 39.
45. Ibid., p 43.
46. NEW YORK TIMES, June 1, 1978.
47. L. I. Brezhnev, "Vydayushchiysya podvig zashchitnikov Tuly," p 13.
COPYRIGHT: "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1978
12151
CSO: 1800
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i.
,
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NATIONAL
BOOK DISCUSSES LANGUAGES OF SOVIET NATZONALITIES
Moscow ItESHENIYE NATSIONAL'NO-YAZYKOVOY pItOBLEMY V SSSR (Solving the
National-Language Problem in the USSR)" in Rua;sian 1977 eigned to preae
23 Jun 77 pp 19 2; 152; 30 4; 143-151
(Titile, author, annotation, publication data, tab1e of conCente, foreword
and chapCer nine �rom book by K. Kh. Khanazarov; "ltesheniye natisionallno-
yazykovoy problemy v SSSR"l
[The SoluCion of the National-Yanguage Problem in the USSR]
Moacow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literaCury, 1977.
Khanazarov, Kuchkar Khanazarovich.
"Reaheniye nataional'no yazykovoy problemy v SSSR. Moacow, PoliCizdat,
1977.
152 pp
Professor K. Kh. Khanazarov is the author of the books "Sblizheniye
natsiy i natsional'nye yazyki" [The Rapprochement of Nations and National
Languages in the USSR], "Stroitel'atvo kommunizma i natsional'nye yazyki"
[The Construction of Communism and National I,anguages], a number of pamph-
leta and articles, devoted to theoretical questions of the development of
national languages in our country.
In the new book, the experience of solving the national-language problem
in the USSR is summarized, questiona of the further improvement of lan-
guages in the conditiona of developed socialism and the development of a
new hiatorical historical community of people--the Soviet people--are
examined. The book tells how in the courae of the growing collaboration
and friendship of the nations and natipnalities of the USSR the Rusaian
language, with their voluntary agreement, became the language of inter-
national intercourse.
The book is intended for all people interested in the problems of national
relations.
61
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10504-242 IMYZ
Kh 079(02) _77 Order form 23-66-77
Chief of the editorinl boatid; V. M. Mikhkalev
EdiCor: S. I. pruzhinin
Junior editor: V. V. Kalina , Art editor: S. I. Sergeyev
Technical editor: 0. M. Semenova
IB No 1106
Turned over to Che prinrer 29 March 1977. Signed to press 23 June 1977.
Format 70X108 1/32. Typographical paper No 1. ConvenCional printer's sheet
6.65. Publisher's record aheer 6.55. EdiCion of 23,000 copiea. A01600.
Order No 3848. Price 45 kopecka.
PoliCizdat. 125811, Special city posCal aervice (GSP), Moacow, A-47,
Miusakaya ploshchad', 1.
Printing presa of the publiahing houae 2vezda, Perm', Ulitsn Druzhby, 34
Copyright: PolitizduC, 1977.
CONTENTS
FOREWORD 3
Chapter I. THE ESSENCE AND CNARACTER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF LANGUAGE 5
Chapter II. THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF LANGUAGE PROCESSES IN THE USSR 14
ChapCer III. QUESTIONS OF THE NATIONAL LANGUAGES IN THE THEOEtY AND
POLICY OF THE CPSU 32
Chapter I V. BASIC ASPECTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL LANGUAGES 43
1. Enrichment of the Vocabulary
2. Creation and Perfection of the Written Language 63
Chapter V. BILINGUALISM�-A CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE OF THE NATIONS AND 81
NATIONALITIES OF DEVELOPED SOCIALISM
' 62
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~ Chapter
Vi, THE pi2E1tEQUiSSTES FOR T12ANSFO12MING THC 1tUSSIAN LANGUAGE INTO
_
AN INTEItNATIONAL LANGUAGF
92
1. The Russian Language--the Native Language of the
~
Majority of the Population of the CounCry

I
2. Z'he Propinquity of ehe Ruaeian, Ukrainian and Belo-
i
ruseian"Ianguagea
94
3. The Disaemination of the Russian Language Amnng the
~
;
Peoplea of the Country
98
~
4. The Influence of Yntrinaic Peculiaritiea oF the Russian
Language
100 -
(
S. The Richness and Expreasiveneas of the Russian
~
Language
109
~
6. The Growth of the International Significance of the
~
Russian Ianguage
116
i Chapter
VII. THE EQUALIT'Y OF RIGHTS OF LANGUAGES--THE VITAL FOUNDATION
!
OF THE DISSEMINATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL LANGUAGE IN THE
;
I
USSR
124
~ CHAPTER
VIII. THE NATIVE LANGUAGE AND THE LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION
129
~ CHAPTER
I
IX. THE NATIVE LANGUAGE AND NATIONAL BELONGING
143
! INSTEAD
~
;
~
~
OF A CONCLUSION
151
63
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FoR oFriczAL usE orrLY
FOREWORD
= Lnnguage as a means of expressing Chought, as a form of its objectifica-
tion is gradually beittg perfected ae is Che ability of man to comprehend
- and to make known the regularities of objecrive reality. Social changea
create canditiona which promote the acceleration of the development of
language or, on the contrary, slow down its perfectiion. The Great October,
having radically transformed the aocicpolitical, economic and cultural
spheres of our life, also introduced enormous changes in the languages of
the peoplea of Che USSR. A revolutionary leap has taken place in Cheir
development.
Sixry years of SovieC power is an exceedingly insignificant lengrh of time
for a language. Buti, as L. I. Brezhnev said in the Summary Report of the
CPSU Central Committee to Che 25th Congresa, "during this time our country
traversed a path equal Co centuries".1 During these aix decades, a de-
veloped socialism has been built, a new society, the likea of which man-
kind has noC known before, a socialist way of life has arisen and a aocial-
ist type of person--Che Soviet man--has been created. During the yeara of
Soviet power, the fraternal fri.endahip of all Che nationa and naCionalities
which make up the great and powerful Union of Soviet Socialiat Republics
was formed and went Chrough severe trials. As is noted in the decree of
the CPSU Central Committee "On the 60Ch Anniversary of the Great October
SocialiaC Revolution", in our counCry "Che factual equality of all nations ;
snf nayionslities in all epheres of social life is guaranteed, culCure--
national in form and socialist in content--has flourished, a genuine
' brotherhood of the people of work has been firmly eatabliahed, regardless ?
of their naCionality, a brotherhood that is welded together by by the2com- '
munity of basic interests, goals, and the Marxist-Leninist ideology .
For the nations and nationalities of the Soviet L'nion, all-round flouriah-
ing and voluntary rapprochement in all spheres of life are characteriatic.
The present book makes an atCempt to subject to analysis Chose basic trans-
formations in Che language life of the peoples of the USSR which have been
accomplished during the years of Soviet power, to examine questions of the
development of the national languages and the perfection of the language
life of Che peoples of the USSR in the stage of developed socialism, to
reveal the historical necessity and progressive character of the growing
dissemiriation of the international Russian language and on this basis--
the mass bilingualism of the population.
In his work on the book, the author based himself on the works of the
classics of Marxism-Leninism, party documents, and also on the research of
Soviet scholars in the sphere of scientific communism, Marxist-Ieninist
philosophy, and linguistics: V. A. Avrorin, A. G. Agayev, I. K. Beloded,
Yu. D. Desheriyev, M. S. Dzhunusov, M. I. Isayev, S. T. Kaltakhchyan,
M. P. Kim, V. G. Kostomarov, M. I. Kulichenko, I. F. Protchenko, P. M.
Rogachev, M. A. Sverdlin, F. P. I'ilin, A. I. Kholmogorov, and others.
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'Che author will be graeeful eo readdrs Enr eheir observaCinns and desires -
which can help him in Che �urther rhorough e1aboration of Che queations
examined.
Chapter IX
The NaCive Language snd Naeiongl Belonging
Nntional membership, i, e., Che natianaliry of a person, cannoC be eaCgb-
lished only on the basis of outward signs--color of hair, shape of eyee,
, distinctive cheekbones, ehape of nose, eCc. T'he gradual rapprochemenC and
mixing of peoples in the course of A thousand yeara has now led to the facC
titat among the representatives of any nation and nationality one cnn find
~ peoplc who are gimilur in their external feaCuree to the represenCatives of
nny other nationa and nationaliCies, Among the Azerbaijanis, for
example, we encounter people which by Cheir ouCward signs we can egsily
take for Iraniana, Kurda, Turka, Armenians, Turkmen, Syriana, I1ulgarians,
etc. Among the TaCara we can encounter people who do noC differ from
Etussiane, Chuvash, Bashkir, and Nogaytey. Similar examplee can be citpd
for any other natinn and nationatity of the USSIt.
National membership of an individual cannot be determined only by his place
of residence or birth, by the length of time he has lived among the repre-
sentatives of otther nations and nationalities. Moldavians, for example,
may live and work in Tadzhikiatan for a decade, but Chia does not give us
the juetificntion to count them as belonging to the Tadzhika. Or Ukrainiane
who were born and grew up in Kazakhstan are not deprived of their Ukrainian
- national memberahip.
And finally, the national membership of a peraon can also not solely be de-
termined on the basis of his native language. A citizen of the USSR, for
, example, a Karelian, a Tatar, an Armenian or a Buryat, who was born, grew
up, or lived for a long time among the Ruasian population, gradually
master8 the Russian language to auch un exCent that may call it his native
language. And vice versa, a Russian, who has lived for a long Cime among
the Kazakh or some other population, may thoroughly master ita language
and call that language his native tongue.
It is preciaely these propositions which conatitute the point of departure
for the "InstrucCion of the Central Statiatical Administration of the USSR
on the Cc+nduct of the All-Union Census of the Population in 1970 and the
Completion of the Census Questionnaires". btaCates that in determining
nationality "the nationality is listed which is indicated by the reapondent
himself. The nationality of children is determined by the parents. Only
in those families where the father and mother belong to different nation-
alities and the parents hesitate to determine the nationality of the children
themselvea, preference must be given to the nationality of the mother.i3
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As far as the quesCion of the deeerminaeidn of the narive language ig con-
cerned, the i.netructinn determines thar "rhe name of the language ig regie-
tpred which the respondene himself eonsiders hfs naeive languttge. If the
- respondent heaitaCes to desigttaee any language as hie naCive 1attguegei the
name of the language musr be regiatered which hc knnws beae or which ie
usually used in tlie famf ly.
"G
The native langugge may not coincide with nACionaliCy.
The importance of the problem of the correlaeion beCween naeive language
and national memberghip haa to do with the fact thaC with each new level
of the deepening internaCionalization of production and culture the number
and proporCion of people ig growing whose native language and nationality
do not coincide. _
For the abeolute majority of people, the coincidence o� ngtive language and
narionality is natural. Contemporary nations and naCionaliCiea are hiator-
ical formed ataUle communiCiea of people wiCh their own language, territory,
economic li�e, and culture. Every individual who conaidera himself as
belonging Co a certain naCion or nationality, as a rule, asaociatea himself
with its language, considera Chis language hia native language.
biscrepancies between the native language and national membership arise al-
ready under capitalism, when millions of people move from one counCry to
another, from one continent to another in search of work, a better fate,
= when the industrial centers and complexes being created are gathered in the
, citiea and the developing economic regions of the representatives of
dozens of nations and nationalitiea, tearing them off from their native
national environment. Living for a prolonged period of time (not in-
frequenCly since birth) in another national environment, as a rule, results
in the fact Chat the individual little by litCle forgets his native lan-
_ guage, which coincides with hia national memberahip, and adopts the lan- .
guage af the local population. The more capitaliam developa, the more the
proceasea of the internaCionalization and merging of the populaCion in-
tensify, the more significanC the stratum of auch people.
Bourgois acience and statistics prefer to determine national membership
of a person on the basia of his naCive language. As a result, together
with the losa of his native languag,e, the individual also loaes his
naCionality. Capitaliat society commits violence against millions of
workers, implements n policy of their forced assimilation.
In socialist society the number anc' proportion of people whose naCive
language and nationality do not coi.ncide also increase gradually from year
to year. But, in contrast to capitalism, under socialism these pracesses
unfold voluntarily, on the basis oc the principles of socialist democracy.
Socialism acceleratea the developm:nt of productive forces, intensifiea
the economic specialization and c(�peration of the republics, intensifies
the intercourse and exchange of cadre among them, leads to the growth of
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the mobility and muleinationality of the populaCinn of the republice gnd
economic reginng. Having esrablished relations of muhual CrusC, friend-
ehip nnd cooperaCion gmong the peoplea, having instilled the ideae of
internationaligm and a scientific world view, it mare and mnra acCelerateg
their voluntary coming CogeCher, forever eliminatee the spirie of hoseili.ty,
miatrust, and alienation among them. All naCionA and natiottalitiee are
guided by g aingle ideology, strive for a common goal, are based on common
principlea of eocialiem. The consciousnees of milLione has been deeply
penetratied by the understanding Chati all republice are inalienable purCs
of a aingle soc:ialigt Fatherland, all natione are indiviaible parts of the
~ Soviet people.
The eoluCion of the problem of the change of the native language under so-
cialiam takea place painlesely because socialism proCeces the national
feelings of people, givea them the right to keep rheir national memberehip
upon changing their language. 7'his ia a manifeaCation of the profound
democratiem and humaniam uf the socialist solution of the quegtion of
native language and and natiionality. The chAnge of native language of a
eignificant part of the populaCion thua is nccompanied under socialism
by the complete freedom to keep their national membership. And this pro-
motea the acceleraCion of the procesa of bringing the peoples Cogether.
In contrast to language, the que8tion of the national memberahip of a per-
son does not require immediaCe settlement aince the facC thaC the membera
of a given collective belong to different nationalitiea by no means preventa
them cooperating, from solving common taska, if they apeak a commonly-
understood language. It ia not national membership, bur the uniCy of views,
criteria and aspiraCionR of people, their devotion to the ideas of Marxism- ~
Leninism, which guarantee the auccesa of communisC construction. NaCional
membership, in subsCance, does not raise any obstacles to the unity and
rallying of the workers, language differences, by contrast, create serious
complicatians for their intercourse and elucidation of common goals. For
this reason, socialist socieCy carries out purposeful work in regard to the
dissemination among the workers of all nationalities of a common language
of international intercourse and cooperation aide by aide with the free
development of national languages. Complete freednm by the eieizens of the
USSR to retain their national membership upon changing their language does -
not hinder, but promotes coordinated activities, cooperation an@ muCual
assistance of the peoples nf the USSR. It is fully in line with the con-
siatently democratic character of the aocialist order and proceeda from a
calculation of the relative stability of national conaciousnesa and national
peculiaritiea of paychology, the influence of which on the determination of
national membership is esaential.
A relationship of interdependence exists between the growth of the number
of people living outside the republic af their nationaliCy and the growth
of the proportion of citizens who conaider as native a language not of
their naCionality. As statistical data show, this growth ia very eignifi-
cant. During the years 1959-1970, the number of Ukrainians 2iving outaide
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the boundaries of the Ukrainian S5It increased by 374,000, of 13elorussians
outaide the boundaries of the gelorugsian SSR by 381,000 pc:ople. '.Cha cnr-
responding indices were 493,000 for the Uzbeke, 238,000 for the Kazakha,
157,000 for the Azerbaijania, 67,000 for the Moldavians, orc.s ;
- The friendghip of peoplea gnd Cheir cooperaeion in conjunction with the
:
conaiaCently renlized principle of complete freedom of movemenr nnd seGtle-
mene o� the population withi.n the boundariea of the entire country xegard-
leas of naCional memberahip leada to the gradual growrh of multinaeional
republicg, economic-geographic regions, and producC'ion collectives. The
Kirgix SSIt may be ciCed ae att example. According to the 1926 cenaus, Clie
repreaenraCives o� 63 netionalieies of the USSR and foreign counrriea were
regiaCered on the eprritory of the republic. In 1959 thia figure was equal
reaeneativea of 118 nationa
re
th
h
p
e
at
to 100, and the 1970 cersus revealed t
And nationaliCies of the USSIt and foreign statea were living in the Kirgiz
`
SSR. During the census of the population in 1970, it was noCed that resi-
denCa in Kirgiziya included Udmurty, Altaytsy, Aguly, Laktsy, Tabasarany,
ublic
re
th
,
;
p
e
Taty, Shortay, Gggauzy, Tuvintay, nnd othera who were not ~n
at the begittning of the socialist reforma, i. e., in 1926.
In the aggregate, Chese facCora lead Co the gradual growth in the country
aCion-
d
n
of the number and proporCion of people whose naCive language an
7 million
of 94
sus
1959
.
,
cen
ality do not coineide. If according to the
non-Rusaians the naCive language and nnCionality did not coincide in the
case of 11.7 million people or 12.4 percent, thie figure noticeably in-
14.8
illion non-Rusaians
7
112
,
m
.
creased according Co the 1970 census--of
12.98 percent, of the population considered as their naCive
e
i
illion

.
,
m
language a language not o f t heir nationalit y.7 rtoreover, in 1959, 10.2 mil-
i
h
r
e
lion pPople, in 1970, 13.0 million non-Russian people named Rusaian as C
~:y
~ native language. Here we have, thus, a growth during 11 years of 28 per-
=
.
. cent. At the same time, the growth of the number of people who name as
f their nationality (wiCh the ex-
; y-
Cheir native language not the language o
c e p t i o n o f t h e R u s a i a n l a n g ua ge) amounted to a total of 10.4 percent for
-
the period under review (a growth from 1,558,000 to 1,615,000), that is
-
' lagged behind a little in terms of rate of growth.
Th.: study of sCatistical data ahows that these processes are found among
ir
Th
k X
e
all nations and nationalities and in all republica of the USSR.
th
e
in C e n s i t y v a r i e s d e p e n din g on concrete conditionst for example, among
~
national groups the proportion of PeoPle who consider as native a language
noC of Cheir nationality is by far higher than among other nations and
nationalities (among Greeks--60 percent, among Poles--67.5 percent, among
This proportion
)
tc
t;
.
.
e
Iranians--63.1 percent, among Czechs--57.1 percen
nificant in the case of nations whose republics are exceptionally
is 3i
g
multinational or the great part of which livea beyond the boundaries of

their republic (13.1 percenC of the Chuvashi, 10.8 percent of the TaCars,
~
33.8 percent of the Bashk:ry, 37 percent of the Karely, 22.2 percent of
the Mordva, and 17.4 percent of the Udmurty consider as native a language
not of their naCionality), and very insignificant among the indigenoua
4

;
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population af the majoriry of union republice (in 12 repu~?ics oue of 15
Chis proportion does not exceed 1-3 percenC), However, for a1L thati, the
inc'rease in the propdrrion of people among whom a diecrepancy of nnCive
18nguage and nationaliCy cAn be observed i8 a general eendency--on the
whole for the USStt thie index for 1959 and 1970 amounted respactively to
5.7 and 6.1 percent (including Russians).
The facCa and figurea ghow that in Chese procesaes the leading tendency
is the transition of the repreaeneaCivea of the non-Ruasian peoplea of the
USSR to the Russian language as their naCive language. During 1959-1970,
the number of people Chroughout the country whoae native language and
naeionality did ttoC coincide increased by 2.92 million people, of theae
2.84 million are those who preferred calling Russian their nnrive language.
And this is understandable: the workers chooae the internaCional Russian
language as the moaC convenient for intercourse wiChin the boundariee of
the entire counCry and and because iC equips them with a powerful means of
apiritual growth and enrichment of knowledge.
The change of the nneive language forma one of the basic paths for the
apread of bilingualiam since it does not signify rejection of the former
native lang.uage. Changing the languAge of inatrucCion and the change in
the native language connected with iC are an esaential atep in the furCher
coming together of nations and nationalieies, in the intenaification of
the proceasea of their inCerpenetration.
Instead of a Conclusion
' The experience of the Iand of
the only correct road Co the
This is the free development
equality of rights and muCual
voluntary utilizaCion of one
mon international language.
the Soviets shows ChaC socialism has found
solution of the naCional-language problem.
of all national languages on the basis of
enrichment with the simultaneoua broad and
of the equal languagea, Rusaian, ae the com-
The socialist order not only proclaims, but createa real conditions for
the realization of the equality of languages.
At the present Cime, we have achieved a level when support on two languagea
--national and internaCional--has become a daily necessity for every
nation and nationality, one of the compulsory conditiona for their further
flouriahing and coming together, for succesaful communist construction.
The construction of communism is the business of the hands of millions of
workers of all nations and nationalities of our great Fatherland. The
stronger their unity, close cooperation, the more succesaful the movement
ahead in the creation of the new society. The international Rusaian lan-
guage emerges as a powerful lever for rallying the peoples of the Country
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FOCt OFFICIAL USE nNLY t
nf the Soviers in the realfzatiion di the histidr3.c plans of the Communier
parCy. Z'he aCeainmant nf complete maseery of the internaeional Russian
language by the enCire populaCfon of the USSR is the moet important task
of our socieCy, an organic and integral part of the educaCion of the Soviet
man--the builder of communism. `
F00'fNOTES
1. "Materialy XXV e"yezda KPSS" (MaCerials of the 25th CPSU Congresa],
Moacow, 1976, p 87,
2. "0 60-y godovahchine Velikoy Okryabr'skoy sote'ial'isticheskoy revolyu-
Csii. Postanovleniye TeK KPSS ot 31 yanvarya 1977 goda" (On the 60th
Annivereary of the Great October SocialisC Revolution. Decree of the
CPSU Central CommiCtee of 31 January 19771, Moscow, 1977, p 12.
3. "Vaeaoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya--vsenarodnoye delo" (The All-Union
Populgtion Cenaus--A Common Cauee for the Nation], p 45,
4. Ibid., pp 45-46.
5. Calculated according to the data: I. Yu. Pisarev,"Narodonaseleniye
_ SSSR" [The Population of the USSRj, Moacow, 1962, pp 88-89; "Itogi
Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda" (Reaulta of the All-Union . 4
Population Cenaus of 19701, Vol IV, Moscow, 1973.
6. Based on data of the Central Statiatical Adminiatration of the Kirgiz i
SSR.
7. Calculated according to the data: "Itogi Vaesoyuznoy perepiai naseleniya
1959 goda. SSSR (svodnyi tom)" (ReeulCs of the All-Union Population
Census of 1959. USSR (Summary Wlume)], p 184; "Itogi Vaeaoyuznoy
� perepiai naseleniya 1970 goda", Vol IV., p 20.
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, Moscow, 1917
i
8970 ,
CSO: 1800 ;
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NATIONAL
EXCERPTS FROM BOOK 'ISLAM AND SOCIETY'
Moacow ISLAM I OBSHCHESTVO in Rueaian 1978 pp 19 2, 254, 253, 3-12, and
232-236
(Annotation, Tab1e of ConCents, Introduction and Conclusion from book by
T. S. Saidbayev: "Islam and Society; An ACtempC ae a HisCorical-
Sociologi.cal Study," signed to presa 19 Jun 78, Izdatiel'stvo Nauka, 11,000
copies, 254 pagea]
[Texr] Annotarion
On the baeis of the Marxist theory of culCural transfer Che monograph
offers a sCudy of the hisCory of the disseminaCion and esCablishment of
Islam among a number o� peoples of our country, and of ies social funcCions
in the pre-revoluCionary period. A number of sections deal wiCh the main
stages of secularization in the republics of Central Asia following Che
victory of the OcCober Revolution.and provide a study of the social functions
of Islam today.
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i
mable of ContenCa
IntroducCion . � . � � G a 6 � � � 4 � � a 4 6 a � � � � � 6 3
Dissem3naeion of Islam on USSR Territory . . . . . . . . . . 13
Arab Expansion: Ideologingl or Economic? . . . . . . . . 14
Diasemination of Islam in the Light of the MarxisC
Theory of the Tranefer of Culture . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Conaequences of the Disaemination and Establishment
o� Islam on Our Country's Territory . . . . . . . .
. . 43
Islam in ehe Pre-Revolutionary CenCral Aeian Society
50
Is1am's Illusory-CompensaCory Function . . . . . . . .
. . 56
Islam's Inregrative Function � � � . � . . . . . . . .
. . 64
Is1am's Regulative Function � � � � � � . . . � . . .
. . 93
Islam's CammunicaCive FuncCion � � � � � � � � � � � .
. . 102
Islam in the Socialiat Society � � � � � � � � . � � � .
. . 121
Main Stages and CharacCerisCica of the Secularization
of the Areas of the Dissemination of Islam After the
October Socialist Revolution � � � � � � � � � . � �
. � 128
Islam Under the Conditiona of the Developed Socialist
Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . 173
Islam's Illusory-Compensatory Function . . . . . . . .
. . 181
Destruction of Che Integrative Function of Islam
192
Islam's Communicative Function . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . 206
Religious Regulation of Family-Life Relations:
Illusion and Reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . 222
Conclus{on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . 232
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . 237
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InCroduction
The headlong development oP eocieCy, change of generatiions, and renovaCion
of socioeconomic conditions related to the development of acience and
eechnology, and the increased congcienCioueness, culture, and level of
intormation of the Soviet people have raised the Yequirements governing
a11 ideological work among the masses. The paeh "which, if followed, would
enable us ;:o upgrade the effectiveness of Chis work," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev
pointed out at the 25th CPSU Congreae, ie the "comprehenaive approach to the
organization of the enCire matter dF education in accordance with
the characteristica of the various groupa of working people" ([Biography
reference) 66, p 24).
The practical atheistic education of the masaes makes the comprehensive,
all-round study of the social functions of religion under the conditione of
a socialiat socieCy necessary. On the basis of the achievementa of history,
ethnography, aocial psychology, folklore studies, and orher sciencea, the
religion experts must bring to lighti the general natural relations and ties
between the various aspects of aocial life and the functioning of religion,
and inCerpret them on a broad conceptual and methodological level. The
integral study of the problem of "religion and aociety" alone will enable ua
to structure the work on aurmounting religious veaCiges, comprehenaively
view the object of aCheiatic influence, and take into consideration and
foresee the nature of the influence of aocioeconomic factora on changes in
religious feelings, properly determining the immediate and long-term tAake,
skillfully selecting the ways and means for atheiatic propaganda, and conduct
it in a state of close unity with ideological-political, labor, and moral
upbringing.
In recent years the "religion-society problem" has drawn the attention of a
number of Soviet researchers. Let us note, above all, works atudying the
methodological aspects of the problem as a whole (402, 406, 407, 426, 427,
428, 429, 469, etc). Works have also been written on various aspects of the
problem--interrelationships between the individual and society in the light
of the sCruggle against religious ideology (455), interrelationahips between
religion and soclal life in the various historical perioda of differenC
societies (327), the process af secularization of the socialist society
(249), the dialectics of the social roots of religion (275), the social
funcCions of religion (292), etc. Works have also been published directly
related to the study of the problems of "Islam and society": on some
characteristics and ways of molding an atheistic outlook among the Tadzhik
peasantry (105); surmounting religious beliefs under Tadzhik conditions and
achieving a conversion to socialism while bypassing capitalism (286); secular-
ization of the rural population of the Karakalpak AFSR (104), the influence
of social progress on changes in the way of life and religious awareneas of
the population of Uzbekistan (178), and the evolution of Is1am in the USSR
(103). Works were written on the general problems of specific sociological
study of religion and atheism as a whole and of Islam in particular (110),
as well as on the results of specifiG sociological studies conducted in
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individuaL areas (287). So far, however, no worke have been publlahed
which, using the princ3pl.ee based on the Marxiat-Leniniet underatanding of
religion, would offer a broad gnalyeis of the social functione of one or
gnorher widespread religion.
Wieh identical eocioeconomic condi.Ci.ons and a aingle social ideology,
naturally, a number of common features exise in the manifesegtions of a11
religions oparating under the conditions of our counery. However, we muat
not fail to take inCo coneideration also that each religion, in accordance
wiCh iCs hiaCorical past and the contemporary conditions of the development
of the nations among whose bellevers it hag been disseminated, as well as
the characCeristice of ita apecific dogmas and culte, has ita own unique
features.
Therefore, when we discuas 'talam which, in terms of its �ollowera, ia the
aecond most widespread, following the Orthodox religion, we must conaider
it from a general viewpoint applicable to all religions withouC, however,
applying tio it in ita entirety the already-existing concepta applicable to
other religions. In this case it is a question of the all-round atudy of
the entire variety of religioua manifesCaCions in the socialisC society.
According to the Marxist doctrine people muat be the target of the social :
studies, however, people taken in their factual, empirically obaerved ;
development procesa occurring under specific circumsCances (20, p 25).
The present work does not preCend to provide an exhaustive atudy of the
entire problems of interrelationships between Is1am and society. The author
has focused his attention on the soluCion of a number of main problems such
as a sociological sCudy of the reasons for the diaseminaCion and consolida-
tion of Islam on the territory of our country, the functions in the
pre-revolutionary society, and the stages of secularization of the areas
where it is widespread, as well as the social functions of Islam under the
conditions of Soviet republics which have bypassed the capitalist way of
development. Most of these problems pertaining Co Soviet Islamic studies
- have been insufficiently studied or totally neglected. Some of the views
which have been established on individual aspecta of the problem demand, in
our view, clarification or even revision. That ia why the author pays a
certain atCention also to the elaboration of some methodological aspects of
the "Islam and society" problem.
F. Engels's statement on Christianity, "one could not set aside religion
which took over the worldwide Roman Empire and, for 1,800 years, ruled over
the overwhelming segment of civilized mankind, simply by proclaiming it a
- nonsense concocted by frauds. In.order to remove it, we must, above all, be
' able to explain its origin and development, proceeding from the historical
conditions under which it appeared and reached its domination. Here we
must answer the question of how did it happen that the popular massea of the
Roman Bmpire preferred this nonsense to all other religions ..."(239
p 307).
,i
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~
, FOR OTFICIAI, USE ONLY The Moelems which profess Is1am are Eound among the Uzbeke, AvArs, Kirgiz,
Tatare, Tadziiika, CherkPa, Uygurs, and Chechena. Each of these natiions has
its own hiaCory, distinct from ehe oChers. However, ir was precigely Islam
that Curned ouC to be g rellgion whoee acknowledgment and raverence wns
accepted by Cheir ancestiors. Why was it preciaely Is1am thae was able to
push out here the previous rellgious beliefs? How to explain the facC Chat
ie wae precisely Is1am that became the ruling ideology and that it had a
deep in�luence on the mentality, culCure, and value orienCationa o� said
peoples?
A atudy of the reasons for the disaeminarion and esCabliahment of Islam
ineviCably leads Co the determination of the social grounds for thig phenomenon.
F The anawers to the question of why precisely Islam was able to puah out the
~ previous belie�s of the peoplea who became iCs followers, rather Chan the
followers of Buddhism or Chriatianity with their centuries-old histiory,
developed theology, and we11-trained clerical cadrea, are linked wiCh the
i study o� the characCerisCics of Islamic dogma and cu1C, ignoring which would
make it impoasible to determine to the fullest extenC the level of iCa in-
~ f luence today. Ignorance or unwillingneas Co take into consideration Chia
specific feature largely leads, in our view, to subjectivism in asaesaing
the level of religious beliefs among the populationa of areas where Islam
is widespread.
The author does not assign himself the universal task of studying the procese
of the appearance and establishment of Islam in the light of all the peoples
of our country professing iC. In each aeparate case the procesa L�ook place
under unique specific circumstances. His purpose is to study Chia proceas
f rom the general aociological viewpoint, and the determination of the common
laws governing the dissemination and establishment of Islam within our
territory. Being of general theoretical significance to a certain exCent,
this approach makes it possible to compare the history of each naCion within
the framework of universal history, and to establish differences in the naCure
of the manifesCations of Islam in a specific area.
The auChor has studied extensively the functions of Islam in the pre-
revoluCionary feudal society, for the proper understanding and interpretation
of the functions of Islam in the socialist society and its place.in.the social
structure of this society can be accomplishr.d only by the study of its origina
and the role it played in pre-socialist society. The eteady quantitative
changes and quality transformations, the constant appearance of the new and
elimination of the o1d, inherent in a hisCorically developed society, contain
also a recurrence of certain qualities and phenomena. One of the development
characteristics is the "recurrence at the higher stage of certain features,
characteristics, etc, of the lower stage," a development which seems to go
over pages alreatiy covered yet which repeats itself on a different and higher
level (negation of the negation) (45, p 203).
Therefore, the contemporary condition of Is1am cannot be presented as
something entirely new or totally unlike the old. Naturally, however, nor
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could one speak of an aueomntic repeCiCion of ire former sratus in goeiety,
for auch recurrence ia relative and maintains a srate of diAlgcCical, unity
with iCs oppoeite--Che non-repeatiable, Certain functions and fentures of
Is1am are repeated within the socialise soCizCy buC in a new way, following
new 1awa.
The aurhor then traces the bagic srages of gecularization of Central Asian
soyieCy following the eatAbllahmant o� the 5oviet syetem. 5uch an approach
to the problem of "Zs1am and society" is tteceassry, in our view, for the
following reasons: above all, it proves the vitaliCy of the MarxiaC under-
atanding of religion, ita social origina, and functioning, and the fact that
11 religion will disappear to the extent Co which socialism wi11 develop.
Ita appearance must take place as a resulti of the social development in which
educaCion plays a major role" (21, p 470). A clenr example is prnvided of
this fact in the Central Asian Soviet republics where, wiCh the growCh of
the econonry and the political conscientiousness of the working people and
their literacy, Ts1am is gradually being removed �rom the various realms of
soci.al and private life. FurChermore, iC is important also to aum up the
experience in resolving the religious problem under the conditions of
republics which have bypassed the capitalist way of development, as acquired
by the CPSU and the SovieC state.
The need to study such problems is created by yet two oCher important reasons.
FireC, we muat take into consideration thaC with a view to triggering a
hosCile aCtiCude toward the ideas of socialism and communism and the Soviet
system, and to discredit its policy in the field of national and religious
relations, the ideologs of anti-communism continue extensively to promote
the thesis of the "persecuCion of Moslems" and of their organizations, par-
ticularly in the period of the building of a socialist society, and the
"particularly" hostile attitude of the Soviet state toward Islam, and so on.
They claim that the secularization of the Islamic areas is the result of
administrative rules and pressure on the part of the authorities and is of
a superficial, purely exCernal naCure. In their view, the Moslems are not
ausceptible to the ideas of atheism, for they are parCicularly aCtached to
religion and, allegedly, Islam provides a particular immunity to the influence
of various forces. The main objective of anti-communism is to belittle the
successes ans tremendous changes which have taken place in the lives of the
Central Asian nations following the October Revolution and which became the
base for their abandonment of religion.
Under contemporary conditions, when many countries in Asia, Africa, and
Latin America, having rejected the colonial yoke, have taken the path of
socialist development, interest in the experience of the building of
socialism in our country, particularly in the republics of the SovieC East,
has become exceptionally great. Such an interest is legitimate, for the
socioeconomic living conditions of pre-revolutionary Central Asia and
Kazakhstan and of a number of Afro-Asian countries at the initial period
of the gaining of their independence have a great deal in common. Today the
Afro-Asian countries following a socialist orientation are resolving, in many
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cnses, the game problems which arose aC the inirial stage of the revo].uCionary
changes in Central Aaia and Kazakhatan. That ia why the study of the hiyCor-
ica1 experience of the Cranaition oP prev3.ousl.y baclcward nations in our
counCry Co socialiam, bypaseing capitialism, is of exceptional importance.
Addressing the June 1976 Berlin conference of communiat and workers' parties
of Europe, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasi.zed the importance nf the atudy of
the experience in the building of socialism under a greati vnriety of con-
ditions. He discusaed the need Co atudy and aum up acquired experience, the
more so $ince, in addition to the unique specific features related to nAtional
characCeristice, iti mandatori7.y incl.udes cominon featurea o� general interest
(70, p 19).
The contemporary non-capiCalisti development of Aaian and African countiries
is not a repetition of the paCh covered by the Ceneral Aaian republics and
Kazakhatan. However, the exisCing differences do noC lower the value of the
- SovieC experience which directa the revolutionary forces of orher countriea
toward the proper soluCion of similar problems enabling them Co approach
this solution on a planned basis, taking into consideration the sum total of
- circumsCances and confronting forces. The countries with a socialist
orienCaCion, said Comrade Sh. R. Rashidov, CPSU Central Committee Politburo
member and first secretary of the Uzbekistan Communiat Party Central Com- _
mittee, need a specific experience in resolving one or another problem which
arises in the courae of building a new life, and specific ways, means, and _
methods for resolving it in our country (77, pp 33-34).
An imporCant problem which must be resolved by the developing countries, and
which we too had to resolve, is that of religion, its function in society,
and the interrelationship between the state and religious organizations, and
between believers and non-believers. This problem is common also because
here it is a question not of religion in general but, specifically, of Islam
which dominated in pre-revolutionary Central Asia and Kazakhstan and is
the moec widespread religion in countries with a socialisC orienCation.
Islam has had a major influence on the molding of the official ideologies
of these countries. Reverence to Islam in some of them is based on the need
to abolish ownership based on exploiCaCion calling for the redistribution of
the wealth acquired by a population minority in favor of the poorer majority.
In such countries religion continuea to have a noticeable influence on all
aspects of the life of society and of the believers--economic, political,
and spiritual. T_t is natural that under such circumatances the choice of
the proper ways and means for the solution of the religious problem asaumes
a major significance. The experience acquired in.the course of the socialist
changes in the Soviet republics which bypassed capitalism is of unquestionable
pracCical interest to the developing countries.
The study of the social functions of religion, as a characteristic addition
to the theory of non-capitalist development, enables us to predict the
future of religion in our country and in many other countries with a socialist
orientation.
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The study of the social tunctions of Islam on the zetraspect:Lve 1eve1 means,
essentially, rheshandatl~e relations
influence on auch functiona
narrowing of the realm oP iCs inEluence.
Theistudy of the sucial functions of Is1am under the condiCions of a developed
socialiat society holds a leading position in this worlc. Considering Islam
as an element of society, the author deCermines I.ts interrelationship wiCh
the other elements of the social sCructure. He explains its position in
social rel.Ations (the need of the people it satisf3.es and the ways it uses
to accomplish this). As we know, to its followers, religion is a general
theory of this world and its encyclopedic compendium and popularly expressed
logic (6, p 414), and a"science of 1ife." For this.reason, the author also
describes the in�luence of Is1am on the outlook and views of its followers
and on their life orientation and values as we11 as on the various aspects
of their lives and activities. A1l this conCribuCes to the determination of ves the objective and su~3i~tiandrtheointerrelationshipnbetweenhatheisCic andtiges,
the means to surmoun ,
other trends of ideological work.
The initial methodological principle in this study is the MarxisC view Chae
religion is noC an accidental phennmenon in history, or the result of
ignorance and even stupidity but is "nothing other than an imaginary reflection
in the mind of exter.al forces which dominaCe the people in daily l3~e~~;a
reflection in~TXis~ earthly ises cially unearthly shapes"
According to
positions in society at diff erent times.
At the same time, the present situation of religion retains a great deal of
what was related to its past role. The experience of the past is a pre-
requisite, the starting point for subsequent development. This determines
the other methodological principle of Marxism--the specific-historical
approach--using the work Co clarify the contemForary social functions of
Islam. The trip into the past, found in this book, pursues the single ob-
jective of interpreting profoundly the manifestations of conCemporary Islam ~
and to establish and explain their characteristics and try to determine `
means for surmounting religious beliefs. Historicism, as V. I. Lenin taught,
is a structural component of dialectics, a method for the study of phenomena
in their appearance and development and their link with specific conditions,
a method for clarifying both general and specific features. The lack of a
historical attitude toward social problems deprives us of the opportunity
properly to interpret the nature of facts which reveal general and specitic
features of phenomena and which lead to emphasis on illustrations, facts,
and citations. Marxism, V. I. I,enin emphasized, stems from the fact that the
past, present, and future in various phenomena are always dialectically inter-
related: the present stems from the past. One way or the other, it ia
determined by iC and is the basis for the futu::e. Since in reality there
are no absolute contradictions among the ind'vidual ages of the historical
process, theie1SPPaTheimostsreequally liable aspectsofbthe questioneofetheasocial
cognitive lev
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eciencee V. I. Lenin wrdCe, "is noe eo forget the basiC hi.sCorienl.
- link, to consider each problem from the viewpoinC n� haw did a cerrui.n
phenonenon deveLop in htgtory, whaC were the main gCgges cavered by rhis
dcvelopmene and, to consider, from the viewpnint of Chig development, what
hns become of this problem Coday" (38, p 67).
Applying Marxige methodologicgl principles, the auChor studies the soctal
- functione of Iglam in ncrordgnce wieh the eharaCeerieeica of ehe diatance
- covered by the republics of Centrgl Aein and the condiCions of the socin-
economic and cultural development of ieg naCinne at the pregent srage.
In the course of their development the Central Asian peoplea avoided an
entire socioeconomic system--capitalism--proving, yet once again, to the
entire world the tremendous advantages of the aocinlist eyatem. However,
this leap cannoe Cake place wiChout A trace in the life of a natiion. It
cannot be a gimple ascengion in a straighe 11ne, merely the appearance of
gomeChing new without the repeCiCion of the old. "We," V. I. Lenin said,
"can build communism only on the bagis of the sum CoCal of knowledge, or-
ganizations, and estnbliahmenCs, nnd a sCock of human forces and means left
to ua by the old aocieCy" (44, p 301). V. I. Lenin �requenely emphasized
that there has been no historical cnae in which a new production method has
appearQd suddenly, wiet..jtC being preceeded by a long series of Eailurea,
errdrs, And recuzYence:;. We must remember that the transition to socialism,
bypassing capiCalism, "is not ensured by a psoper economic foundation and
a respective htstoricnl and psychological experience" (299, p 216). "The
absence of one or another stage in historical development demands its own
'compensation, a fill-in (279, p 14). _
Ttie author not only interpetg the social functions of Is1am on the basis of
the general laws governing the development of the socialist society but
tries to clarify the specific features of its condition which stema from the
characteristics of the non-capitalist way of development of the area it
covers. In the av'.:-;ir's opinion i:his enables us to note the various aspects
of a single ccndition. Whereas the first applies to the general methodological
problems of the study of religion, the second enables us to determine develap-
- ment charscteristtcs. Naturally, here we must proceed on the basis of the
common aspect of the general and the apecific. "The general," V. I. Lenin
wrote, "exists only in the separate, through the separate. Everything separate
is (one wny cr another) general. EveryChing general is (a particle or aspecC
or essence) of the sepacate" (43, p 318). .
The specific-historical approach to the study of Islam has an independent
value us well in terms of the atheistic education of the working people.
Under circumstances in which the party calls for the shaping of a scientific
outlook in all working people, the all-round study of the problem of the
dissemination and establishment of Islam and of its function in the past and
the present will enable us to bring to light the historical and social base
- of religion, and the gradual yet steady process of the withering away of its
role and influence on society and on the believers. It is important to
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surmounC the religious faieh in man before he hag rea1ized ieg reasnne and
seen its earehly origins. Therefore "today the anciology of religion Carriee
out an imporeane funcCion, ingpiring the beliQVers Co inrerpreti to a certain
exCenti rtiQir faith, ouelook, percepeiona of the world and fEelinga, con- .
verting an objene of blind fgitih inCo an objece of atudy. IC is this,
precisely, which is being resdlved by the moet imporCgnC teek of atheistic
education--awakening a conacioue atCiCude Cawarfl conceptual pYObleme"
(109, p 72).
HisCoriciam in the aCudy of religion asgumes parCicular imporCance under
preeenC circumsCancea, when young people enCer in life whose awgrenese of
the renctionary role plgyed by Islam in the pase comea only out of rext-
booka. HisCOricni knowledge alone can ahape in the young people a proper
attitude toward Yelam. Therefore, we muat obviouely discuas the development
of a feeling of historiciem umong the young people through atheietic propa-
gandg.
The importance of the specific-hiatorical approach increasea under contemporary
condiCione for yet another reason. Our eimea xre characCerized by increased
reciprocul information among represenCaCives of related ethnic groupa on the
di�ferencea exiaCing among Chem, not only of ekhnical but of socioeconomic
narure. In our time a trend has been noted toward increaeed ethnical aware-
nesa. IntereaC in the past of one's naCion, its origina, and role of
individual components in its hietory has increased. This "ethnical paradox,"
manifested Against a background of the weakening of ethnic relationa, ia
explained by the fact thaC the latCer are compensated by conceptg relaCed
to the common historical destiniea of the membere of each individual ethnic
group. "The strengthening of this concept is, in the final account, the
reault of the nearly comprehensive growth of literacy As well as the radical
changes triggered by the scientific and technical revolution in the develop-
ment of information media (press, radio, television, motion pictures, and so
on). It was thus that the necessary prerequisites were created for the
increased level of information )n the part of the broad masaes in many
counCriea concerning the hiatorical past of Cheir nations. Spontaneously
developing concepts of this past (such as legends, and other folklore
traditions) have begun to be replaced to an ever-greater extenC by knowledge
based on apecial research" (148, p 106).
The entire history of the peoplea profeasing Ialam is largely linked with
a religion which has had a aerioue impact on all aspects of their life. The
concept of the unity between the religious and the narional has been estab- _
liahed in social paychology and of the atCitude toward Islam as an age-old
attribute of national life and keeper of national values. Claims have been
voiced linking with Islam all cultural accomplishments of the nation in the
pasC. Frequent attempts are atill being made to present religioua faith as
a feature of national originality and the non-observance of religious cere-
monies and holidays as betrayal of the behest of the anceators, and disrespect
for the nation and its culCure. All this makes exceptionally topical the
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expogure nf the link beCween religidn and nationgl;.aeic veseigeg (481,
15 SepCember 1972). The implementiaCion of ehim taslc seti by the pttrCy is
poesible only thrnugh the edopCion of a hieCorical approach to the inter-
pretation of Islgm and the definitiou nf itie role in erhnic processes nnd
influence on the life of ite follnwers.
Finally, yeC annCher prnblem of g meChodoingingi ngCure is the extiene tio
which it would be legitimnte tio sCudy the reasong for the diseeminatiion of
Ielam thraughoue the territory of the country and its eocinl functione by
taking ae an example a big aren auch as CenCral Aeia and Kazakhetan.
Manifeatationa of Islamic vesCiges in one or another republic or oblagt
have, unqueationably, their characCerietics and epecific feaCurea. The parCy
preas has condemned the enthueiasm for narrow ].ocal Copica, poinCing out
thaC research in the �ield of the social aciencea should cover a broad range
of pheeomena and reveal patCerna or exiating characteriaCics leAding to the
manifeatarion of such patCerns (241, p 59).
IC aeema to us thaC the numerous materials available today on the individual
- parCs of the countrv are obviously insufficient for developing, on their
basis, fundamental works on the social functiona of Islam, for quantiitative
accumulaCiona do not always lead Co the determination of a general case.
It seema more Accurate to ua to go from the general to the individual. The
sCudy of the reasona for the disaemination of Islam and of ita moaC important
functions throughout the territory of the country or in a big area is not
the equivalent, either in terma of assignmenta or methods, of the atudy of
such phenomena in an individual area or wiChin the hietory of a s=ngle
nation. The scientific study of euch problema covering a huge area makes
it necessary to deCermine and define the main features and linea of develop-
ment, and Co depicC the process in ita entirety. It seema to us that,
following general theoretical ideas ranging from the establiahment of a most
general law Co the gradual concretizing of the problem within the limits of
_ a separate area or the history of a single naCion or nationnlity, we would
find wiChin already-known facCs a richer conCent which, with an empirical
strict approach Co them would remain concealed ahould we conaider individual
features outside the overall system. Following the approach we have choaen
each facC should yield conaiderably more information, converCing into a
link within the tiistorical process as we study its int2rconnection with other
facts and phenomena. In turn, thia enables us to reveal beCter the cha::acter-
istica of the social functiona of Islam in one or anoCher area and its role
in the faCe of one or another nation. We consider this one of the purposea
of this work. '
Conclusion
The utudy of the functions carried out by Islam in the past and under the
- conditions of the developed socialist society convincingly proves the accuracy
of the Leninist views to the effect that in the country of the victorious
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proletiarian revnlutiion aeheism becomes poeeible not as a reaulC of banning
religion (which would only conCribuCe to the stirengthening of religioug
fanatiicism) but thanka ro the systematic perauasion of the believera, and
their involvemenC in actiive social work, as well ae as a xesulC of socio-
economic and cultural changes. Such an tttieieude toward religion has been
re�lectied also in the new USSIt cnnsrituCion which proclaims the freedom o�
conecience ae one nf the basic righrs of the Soviet citizens.
The comprehenaive and complex nroblem of ittterrelaCionahipg between eociety
attd Zalam, naCurally, cannot be reeolved wiChin the limita of a aingle atudj.
However, even Chia hag enabled us, it seems to us, Co expresa some prelim-
inary suggeaCiona effecCing the further application of the comprehensive
approach Co practical aeheiaCic work conducCed by party, atate, and public
organizations and eatabliahmenCa.
We conaider imporCant the prnbLem of the correlation between the compre-
hensive approach and the oCher principles and meChods of atheistic education
of the working people. We believe that the comprehensive approach ia noC
merely one of the principles of this educaCion, as some reaearchers believe,
the way we cannoC consider aeparately and aparC from the apecific-hiaCorical
and differentiaCed approach the other principles and methods. The application
of the comprehensive approach would be imposaible wiChout the observance of
all these principlea and methoda, and without Cheir integration wiChin the
organization and conCenC of the work aimed at aurmounting the influence of
religion.
The comprehensive approach must be based on acienCifically substantiated
data on the needs of the ciCizens living under conCemporary conditions and
the results of the established "vacuum" which religion fills, and so on,
in order Co earmark and implement measures for the elaboration of the true
earthly requirements and substitute them for the religious requirementa.
The all-round concept of the functions fulfilled by Islam in modern society
will enable us, szbove all, to make more extensive use of the entire organiza-
tional and tFC:inical and socioeconomic factors for surmounting ita vestiges
and use morl� purposefully and intensively the public environment in exerting
an atheistic influence on the individual. Thus, the steady increase in the
strength of the national working clasa, the development of the educational
and cultural standards of the working people, and the migration of the popu-
lation, as a result of which republics, oblasts, and rayons become ever more
multi-national, leading to the appearance of multi-national production
collectives, and so on, could greatly influence the narrowing of the functions
of Islam.
Knowledge of the characteristics of Islamic dogma and cults and the specifics
of their manifestations today are contribuCing to the practical utilization
of a number of additional requirements related to the adoption of a compre-
hensive approach. One of them is familiarity with the object of atheiatic
education to be influenced. The proper determination af the object of
atheistic propaganda largely derermines the proper determination of its
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conrenC, objectives, and rasks, and the eingling ouC df the main and leading
directiion which ig the mnndatory requirement of adopring a comprehengive
approach to eurmountiing religious prejudices,
In rhis matter, it seems to us, some gg yet unreaolved problemg exisr. LeC
us take as an exttmple the problem of religinus fniCh and itis crieerig. Mnny
studies conaider as objective indicatora o� religious faith extiernel mani-
festations of the ntititude toward religion: aeeending moaque gervicea,
praying, fasCing, ful�iLlment of other religious ceremoniea, and so on.
Islam, as we pointed oue, faces the believers with a number of requiremente
dealing with the obaervation of ceremonies. Nevertheless, iC does not
require their mandatory implemenCation and grants a number of indulgences.
Therefore, auch criCeria of religious faith could, on the one hand, lead to
belittling it, ahould the believera. �ail to fu1fi11 a number o� �c,ligious
ceremonies, and, on the other, Co overemphasizi.ng it, since, for a variety
of reasons some Islamic ceremonies are obaerved even by non-believera.
However, nor could we agrea with researchers who suggesC that people who
observe religious ceremoniea as national ceremonies should not be conaidered
as faithful. It is well known that atheiatic educaCion ahould not be
limiCed to separating people from religion. Its purpoae is to mold a
scientific outlook, an atheiatic conviction, and an immunity to All religioua
influences.
Along with the believera there exista a rather numerous group of people who
lack a atrong immunity againsC religion or the principle-mindednesa and
convictions needed to oppose religioua people. In our view, this calla for
broadening the influence of atheistic propaganda. It complicates ita taska
and faces it with specific problems. The latter does not mean that in the _
areas of dissemination of Islam propaganda musC be waged distinguiahed by
their final objectives and tasks from work conducted among the followera of
other faiths. It is a quesCion merely of the special ways, means, and
methoda used to attain the same objective.
For example, a head-on criticism of the Islamic doctrine, ceremonies,
unseemly actions by its clergy, and so on, would be hardly effect;.ve. In
many cases it leaves the people indifferenC and, sometimes, merely irritates
them. A propaganda structured regardless of the characCerisCics of the
aCtitude of the believers toward Islam and ita clergy or of the position of
Islam in the public mind could not yield expected results.
It is precisely in the areas where Islam is widespread that what V. I. Lenin
considered the most important fact in atheistic propaganda becomes partic-
ularly important, i.e., developing in the masses a conscious attitude toward
religious problems and a conscious ciiticism of religion. Naturally, this
Cask must be implemeiited on a differentiaCed basis, in accordance with the
characteristics of the various groups of working people, paying particular
attention to the upbringing of the young people and the intelligentaia. The
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molding of g proper understgnding nf moeC imporCgnti cottcQpes of the Soviee
person such gs pACrioCiam, love and respect �or one's own nation, and under-
etanding irs Crue inCereees and ChaC which indeed ennobles and glorifies it,
must hold e leading poaiCion in the atheietic And internationalisti education
of the 1atter, The combinaCion of ntheietic with inCernationaliet education
must conCribute to the realizgeion not only nf the ideological harm of
religiouA ceremonies but also of the FacC ehae ideneifying them wiCh national
cuatoms pulla the nation back, eo the pasr, rather Chan contributing Co iCs
development.
In our view, a considarable role ehould be assigned in propaganda work to
the Marxiat interpretaCion of the reasons for the diesemination and eatablish-
menC of Is1gm, its Crua poaition in hiaeory, the role which Islam plays in ;
the preservation of obaolete concepta, and the diatinction betiween religioue
ideology and cultural valLea nresented in a religious coating. In order to
develdp a proper artitude Cownrd naCional values a depiction of the unity
of human hiatory and the general nature of the lawa governing the develop-
ment of human culture, emphasizing in propaganda work common features,
traditions, and cuatoms of different naCiona, and ahowing the aocial base
for,their appearance and strengthening in the li�e of one or another nation
could greatly help the developmene of a proper attiCude toward national
valuea. Let us emphasize that hisCoricism in propaganda meana not only the
depiction of the way,,.under the pxessure of social progress, the development
of science, technology, culture, and education, religion has been gradually
loaing iCs most important functions and becoming a matCer of inerely indi-
vidual conacience. HisCOricism calls for considering propaganda in terms ~
of the future as weli--the interpreCation of inevitable doom o� religion and
of its toCal elimination from all realms of social and human life.
The study of the functions performed by the ceremoniea and prescriptions of
religion in the life of the nations which had accepted-Islam in the past
poses, iC seems Co us, yet another problem. The introducCion of new, Soviet
ceremonies has been, and is considered, unqueationably, accuraCe, being one
of the most important means for restricting Moslem religious ceremonies.
However, Cheir application encounters certain difficulties, since a certain
segment of the population is opposed Co the new forms of life and is supporting
the old. A number of reasona hint at the ~:uccess of the new and the re-
striction of the old, linked with Islam. In our view, among the many Chere
are two mosC important reasons for such difficulties. The first is that,
frequenCly, the main purpoae of the new ceremonies is reduced to the lowering
of essentiaYly material outlays. The� educational and ideological content
they should have does not hold a proper position or is totally neglected.
The second is that it is forgotten that the new ceremonies will have their
desired educati.onal influence only if efforts to apply them become a
structural part of a thoroughly planned and well-organized ideological
process, aimed at chanbing value orientations relaCed tu Islam, and promoting
a new world concepC. This is a process aimed at developing true and durable
life valuea, free from the influence of religion and of the feudal past.
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' A
roR oFFraiAt usE ornY
We hnve cnnaidered merely aeveral poeaibiliCiem for upgrading the
effecCivenees of work to aurmount the veaCiges of Islam and develop the
theory of atheistic educaeion made posaible by the atudy of i.ta social
functiona. The tiheory of atheiseic educaCion will become a necessary manuaal
for action only when it ia imbued wiCh the reaultis of the apecifi.c-historical
sCudy af the role of religion in the paet and the presenC, cLosely linked
with the developmenC oF sociery. A Cheory based on Chis analysie could
, provide an all-round aubaCanCiation of the contemporary religious circum-
stances, bring eo light the objectiive and subjective reasons for Islamic
veaCigea, earmark the meana for reducing the reproducCion of Islam in the
new generaCions, and upgrade the effecCiveneas oE atheisCic propagandd.
All Chis calls for the further development of the sociology of religion and -
the involvemenC of the effort of specialiats in many related acientific
secCora in the study of iCs social functions. The topical naCure of the
aignificance of thia work ia dictatied by the attention which the Communist -
ParCy pays to the education of the new man, the builder of the new aociety.
~ "In all realms of life and development of our aociety," Comrade L. I.
Brezhnev emphasized in his reporC "The Great OcCober and the Progress of
Mankind," "the level of conacientiousness, culrure, and civic responsibility
of the Soviet people wi11 play an ever-gxeater role. Promoting in man an
aspiration toward lofty aocial objectives, ideological convictians, and a
truly creative aCtitude toward labor is one of the primary taska. This is
one of the important fronts in the stsuggle for communism. The course of
economic consCruction and of the socio-poliCical development of the country
will depend to an ever-greater extent on our victoriea on this fronr ae well"
(476, No 16, 1977, p 11).
- 5003
n CSO: 1.800 END
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