JPRS ID: 8532 TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 43
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/09= CIA-R~P82-00850R000100060043-7
2i ~ ? i: pF i

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
~ FOR OFr1CiAL USE U~~LY
JPR5 L/8532
21 ~'une 19 79
~
~ ~
~
TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTN AFRICA
(FOUO 26%79)
� '
~ r ~
~ -
- U, S. ~OINT PUBLICATIONS RESEAR~H SERVICE
FO R OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
NOT~
JpR5 public~tion~ conCattt inf~rmation primarily from foreign
newep~perg, periodie~lg gnd bonkg, bue ~lso from newm agency
' trangrcig~iana and brngdcasC~. Materi~ls from foreign-l~ngu~ge
sourceg ~re transl~red; tho~e from ~ngligh-l~ngu~ge source~
~re Cr~ngCribed or reprinted, wieh the original phr~ging gnd
other ch~racCeristice reCained.
Headlines, editorial reporCs, and material enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JPIt5. Proceasing indic~Cors such as [Text~
or (~xcerpr) in the first line nf each ieem, nr fdllowing the
last line nf ~ brief, indicntp how the nrigin~l informaCion w~g
procesged. Where no processing indic~tor is given, the infor-
m~eion wae summarized or exeracted.
Unfamiliar names render~d phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
Cfon mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the . ~
original but have been supplied asappropriate in context.
OCher unaCtributed parentheCical notes within the body of an
_ item originaCe with the source. Times within items are as
- given by source.
The contents of Chis publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
COPYRIGHT I1~WS AND REGULATIONS GO'VEILVING 0'WNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN P.EQUIRE THAT DISSEi�IINATION
OF TEIIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
~O~t 0~'F'TCIAL US~ ONLY
JPRS L/85 32
21 June 1979
TRANSLATIONS (~N NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
(FOUO 26/79)
CONTENTS PAGE
NQRTH AFRICAN AFF'A~tS
Bousse3P's Paria Trip Did Not Help 8a.hareu Aeace Prospects
(Cherif Rachid; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 14-27 MaY 79) 1 -
AFC~HANISTAN
Briefs ~
New Army Forme.tion 4
AIkF~tIA
Foreign Cooperation Mscussed
( MARC~S TROPICAtJX ET MEDIT 1S, 11 NIeY 79 5
Forei~n Pn.rticipation in Housing Construction Described -
( MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MED1TIItRAM~1S, 11 N1aY 7'9 6
D~livery of Neu Methane Tanker Reported
- (r~aRC~s ~xo~c,~ux ~r r~nrr~nr~rs, v. rs~Y 79)... 7
Briefs
Uranium Study 9
Algiers Port Problems 9 ~
~ Bordesux-Algeria Maritime Route 9 -
~ Algeriaa-Indian Industrial Cooperation 10
~tailroad TraPfic 10
Eechar Airport 11
Merchant Fleet De.ta 11 -
Ne~r Algeria-F~ance MQritime Route 11
Algeriaa-Italiaa Company 11 _
DaYPT
Referendum un Peace Treaty Criticized
(AI,-WATAN AI,-'AFi~,BI, 27 AP~-3 1''~Y 79~ 12
- a- [III -NE~,A-121FOU0)
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
- ~Oit O~~TCIAL US~ ONLY ~
_ CONrENTS (Continued) ~ge
S~cre~ Mi.1.1t~,ry :Cr~~ormation Said Available to United
S~ates
(at,-waT~rr az-~a~r, 27 a~-3 ~Y 79) i6
Suppression oP Politica]. llisgidents Reported
( ~,-waT~x ~w- ~ nxaBZ, 2? A~ -3 ~y 79 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i7
~
Women Express V3~rs on Revolution
(s~r~, io r~y 79) i9
~JAPAN TIl~SES' on Reemergence of Irauian Cou~uniets
- (Richerd Wal].is; T~ JAPAN TIl~S, 26 N~Ie~Y 79) 25 -
' MOROCCO
Discontent in M~orocco Reported
(Abdelaziz Dahmani; J'EUNE AFRIQUE, 16 May 79) 28
StJ1aAN
Opposition 3eek8 Unity, Do~mfall of Regime
(Al-Sharif Hus~.yn al-Hindi Tntervieu; AL-WATAN
AL~~a~ASI, i8 t~y 79) 32 ~
SYR?A ~
' Connaunist P~rty Fhrtims Quarrel Among Themselvea
(~w-wa~ax Ew-~~asi, 4-io t~y 79~ 35
Grom~rko Repa~tedl,y Attempted To Eeal Rif'ts in Syriat~ CP
(AL-WATA.N AL-'AFiABI, 4-10 MeY 79~ 37
TUNISIA
NIDS Opposition, Presa Described as Baving Fhctions
(Soulsayr Belhassen; ,TEUI~ AFRIQUE, 2 NhY 79) 38 =
Potential Candidates fo~ Ai�ab League Secretary Ge~eral. -
Assayed
(Souhayr Belhassen; JEITNE AFRIQUE, 2 MaY 79) 40
F~c-Foreign Minister Masmoudi Cor~e~ts on Inter-Arab AfPairs
(Smlhayr Belhassen; JEtJN~ A~tIQt~, 16 Me~Y 79) 4~
- b -
FOR Ot'FICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~ CO1~II~1T8 (Con~inued) Page
~ Move of Ar~b I,ee~gue to Tunis Criticized
(nnie xacnia; a.~rQuE-as~, i4-22 ~y 79~ 46
New ,t+~ii.litiQe R~ported On
CKCAiQVCIsf1D~~ i4'~G2 LiiJ 1/I 4q
l~unger 3trike by Polibica]. Prisaners ~eported
. Ct~~11QVL'..~! n�~ ~T~CG 1 / / � ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ � 5O
Frieo~ner Qives Testimon~y on Torture
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 1~-22 Me~Y 79) 51
UN~!'ED AP.41H F~SIIiA,TE3
Ruler of el-3hariqah Interviexed on Re:ent Eventa
(Shaykh 8ultan ibn Muha~mned al-Q,asimi. Interviek; ~
AI,-WATAN AL-~ARAEI, 20-26 Apr 'j'9) 52
~
-c-
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
~
.
~'Ott OF~ICIAL US~ ONLY
~ :
NORTH AFRTCAN ArF'AIRS
BOUSSEIF'S P~FtIS TR1P DIA NOT HELP SAHARAN PEACE PROSPFCTS -
Paris AFRIQiJ~-ASIE in F`rench 14-27 May 79 p 39
[Article by Cherif Rachid: "Giecard's Ambiguousnesa. Ahmed Bousseif's
Trip to Paris Did Not Contribute Much to Clearing I'rospects Foi� a
3ust Peace in Western Msghreb." Passages between slantlines in _
_ ftalics~
[Text] /We are not in favor of a war between Morocco, Algeria and
Mauritania breaking out in the Maghreb. A period of inatability
might not only hasten the intervention of non-African troops in this
area, it might also, abuve all, open the doors to all kinds of
interference on the part of certain powers...friends or foes. In
addition, we do not feel that the Soviet Union is, at the present time, -
~ in favor of a conflic~~ in this area. This ir the impression I gained
f~om my talks with Soviet leaders..."/
. This, in substance, is what President Giscard d'Estaing told ;
Mauritania's new "strong man", Col Ahmed Bousseif, on Thursday ; May.
The latter had come to Paris with a double mission to flxlfill:
l. To find out to what ~.:~tent France would be WilTing to help
Mauritania against the Sahraoui fighters of F~ont Polisario, should the
latter denounce the unilateral cease-fire and resume their offensive
to regai~i control of their territories now illegally occupied by
Morocco and Mauritania. In other words, would the French government be -
wflling, once more, to mobilize its military forces, air force and
navy, to "protect" Mauritanfa against the Sahraoui insurgents and
prevent these f~om regaining their territorv? If not, What else
could the F`rench president suggest?
2. To firid, ,joi:ztly xith the French government, an alternative to the
present conflict through a direct intervention of Paris ~rith Rabe,t,
Algiers and the Polisario.
1 '
FOR OFFICIE+I. USE 0".rI.Y
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
~
roK ~~ric;int, us~ ocr~,Y
Whil~ it ia true thot the "hr~wka" eraund Mr G3scard c~~~.stt~in~~ ~n the
~lysees P~lace, yeem of late to have the upper hand, the ~'r~nrh
president neveri:helesa wurned the Maur3tanian leader agninst /"any
_ suicidal po].icy which might i~irther weaken Mauritania and place it at
the mercy of its Moroccan, Al.gerian and Sahraoui enemies!"/ ~
/"Your v3ta1 3nterest,/ Pres:dent Gisc~r.d d'Estaing is reported to
have told Mr Bouaseif, /is to avoid a double pitfall: do not chan~e
allie~ in favor of Algeria, but do nat ~llow yovrself to be drawn
ag~inst your will into the wake of a policy of war in t,he Maghreb.
Algerians ~nd Mnroccans w311 pull through one way or the other, but ~
~ the survival of M~uritania as an independent and sovereign state is
at stake..."/
A Ha~ardous Calculation
Obviolisly, Bousseif's position is not an easy one. A man from the
right, his ideological choicea make him leat; towards the Alids monarchy
ratber than towards Algeria. On the other hand, he knaws that if he ~
pla~s a strictly Moroccan card, the Maui�itanian people (and its
military leaders), who are tired of war, will not follow him.
In addition, should a military coup d'etat take place in Morocco, he
would lose decisive support and be left to a fate not to be envied.
This became very clear to him during conversations he had in -
Noua,kchott with a large delegation of the Algerian political bureau,
sent specially by President Chadli Bend,jedid to find out what Bousseif's
real intentions were, and at the same time warn him of the consequences
of a flall alignment on Rabat.
These were the con8itions, both paradoxical and conflicting, which
formed the background of a Mauritanian dPlegation's visit to Tripoli
- Where it is reported to have signed a protocol of an agreement giving
back to the Polisa:io the part of Western Sahara now occupied by
Mauritania. After a�ew hours of silence, and no doubt under pressure
from Morocco, the Mauritanians backed up and ~ust said they had only
discussed the right of the Sahraouis to self-determination, a statemei~t
- which is fully contr~dicted by the minutes published ,~ointly by both
countries.
Will Giscard's advice and Warnings have the effect anticipated? Will
the ,joint mission of the Milian and Nigerian heads of state, Moussa
Traore and General Ubansan~o, and of the secretary general of the OAU,
in Rabat, Algiers, Nouakchott and with the Polisario bear fruit?
It is still too early to tell. What is sure, however, is that neither ~
Rabat nor Nouakchott are in a position to afford a war with Algeria ~
. 2
FOR OFFICIti;. ~SE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
~'OR nFFICIAL USL ONLY
without Paris', and to a certain extent Washington's conaent,. Of =
course, King Hassan might think that by s~arting such a war he would -
forcc his western and Iaraeli allieg to come tu his he1p. But this
i3 ~ hazardous calculation. And the que8tton remQins as to whe~her
the army would follow ~nd, if it did, whether it would not take the
opportunity to overturn him. A~t any rate, i~ ia on such mined .
ground that the Elysees seemed to find itaelf after Col Ahmed Bousaeif's
visit to Paris: "mry to reach a direct agreement with the Polisarfo,"
the French president is reported to have told him, "but to avoid to
go through Algerian or Moroccan channels. Above all, avoid to ent,er
into a coalition against Morocco..."
Lieutenant-Cploriel Bousseif probably did not need this new piece of
advice. This was the "advice" already given to him by Mr Rene Journiac,
eminence t3nt of the Elysees, during his latest trip to Nouakchatt which
- had resulted in the coup against President Ou1d Saleck.
� COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
929~+
CSO: 41?00 _
3 ~
FOR OFFICIti:,. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
- FOR O~FICIAL USE ONLY
a~xarrzsrAN
Bxx;~Fs
NEW ARMY FORMA.~ION--The communiab governm~ent of Afghanista.n is setting up
a new arm~y officered entirely by political commissars so as to be able
more efYicienlty to combat the Zalamic diasidence originating in the
eastern and central perts of ~he country. FYfty percent oP the non-
commi.s~ioned officers and ~;alisted men of the ald arnqy are said to have
deserted a.nd ,~o3ned up with the rebels 3ince the 1978 revolution.~ext]
[~?aris VALEIktS ACTUELLES in French 4 Jun ?9 p 3J
cso: 4900 .
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
FOEt O~F'~CIAL USE ONLY -
ALGERIA
FOR~IGN COOPERATION DISCUSSED -
' Paris MARCHES TRAPICAUX ~T N~DITERRANEENS in Fre~nch 11 May 79 p 1178
- [Text] Coo~eration with Canada
A protocol was signed on 3 May in Ottawa between Chaeib Taleb, Rlgerian a~n�-
bassador, and ths Canadian Finance Minister. An Algerian-Canadian intergov- _
ernmental economic, scientific ~nd technical cooperation commission, which is
to meet once a year, is responsible for promoting bilateral relations in a
number of areas. Its creation followed the October 1978 agreement, by means
of which Canada is opening a line of credit for Algeria of $1,200,000.
r
Cooperation with Spain
_ Uuring the visit in Algiexs o� Carlos Bustelo, the Spanish minister of Indus- .
try and Energy, the decision was made to send-Spanish experts to study tlie
methods of cooperatian in urbanism, construction and hous~ng.
- Cooperation with Tunisia
- The Algerian-Tunisian negotiations on communications, begun on 3 May in Tunis,
envisage computerizing the postal services and training their staffs, with
couperation between the two countries in this area.
Cooperation with Australia
Brian Chatterton, Australian Agriculture,.Fishing and Forestry Minister, on
5 May began a one-week official visit to Algeria. He is to visit in particular
the Ksar Chellala integrated project area, which was undertaken with Austral-
ian cooperation and will soon beco~e active.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, P~ris, 1979 _
8946 -
~ CSO: 4400
~
FOR OFFIC7AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
,
FOR 0~'rICIAi. USE ONLY
~
ALG~RIA
FOREIGN PAR'TICIPATI~JN IN HOU5ING CONSTRUCTION UESCRIB~D
Paris b1ARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 May 79 p 1117
[Text] Two West German construction firms that have re~;ently fallen into bank-
ruptcy because of difficulties with the domestic market while they were exec:ut-
~ ing important contracts in Algeria, lead this country to wonder about the
sincerity "of the West German partnership in its entirety" (E1. hfOUDJAHID, -
25 April). One of them in particular had concluded with Algexia in 197G a _
total of 18 contracts totaling 2,500,000,000 dinars, in which it entered as
subcontractor into the construction of 4,000 housing units, 10 CEM [expansion
unknown] and some civil engineering projects. The Algerian newspaper's chron-
icler concludes: "The FRG is our country's second commercial partner. Let the _
lessons be learned-��all the lessons!"
One of those "lessons" seems to be the Algerian government's abandonment of
the "key-in-hand" formula, to the profit of the temporary group of firms,
jointly and indivisibly pooling technical, material and human means of firms
_ (national and foreign) sharing the risks and the advanta~es of the operatinn.
An early accord of this type was signed in March 1979 between the Algerian .
national firm ECOTEC [National Office for Economic and Technical Studies] and
the Dutch company ~redero International, to develop at Tizi-Ouzou a university,
a city and a uni~~ersity hospital (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS, 3 March
p 561). Prop~sals of that nature have also been sent by the Al~erian minister
of Urbanism, Construction and Housing to the building firms of various social-
ist countiries visited in 1978: Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, the USSR.
Groups of French firms are al~o interested in tliis unprecedented effort being
undertaken by A.lgeria in housing construction, notably the Rhonalpin Group
for the Study of Construction in Algeria (GRECAL) (See MARCHES TROPI~AUX ET _
I~DITERRANEENS, 23 March p 734) and ALBRECO (Algeria-Britain Construction)
[see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS, 6 April p 864).
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moxeux et Cie, Paris, 1979
8946
- CSO: 4400
6
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
_
1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _
ALG~~IA
DELiV~RY OF NEW METHANE TANKER REPORTED -
y Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET NIEDITERR:~N~ENS in French 11 May 79 p 1178 ~
[Text] Following the "fiassi-R'Mel" in 1971 and the "Larbi-Ben-M'Hidi" in
1977, the largest methane tanker delivexed by Meditexranean Ship and Iadus-
_ trial Construction, the "~achir-Chihani" was hande3 ~ver on 23 April at Seyne
to the Algerian National Navigation Company [CNANJ.
In the speech he gave on that occasion Mr Herlicq, president and general man-
ager of Mediterranean Ship and Industrial Construction, placed great hopes on `
- participation of these shipyards in the CNAN's new building program, espec- _
ial?y where methan tankers are concerned. In fact, Algeria recently announced
- t!~at it proposed to order, before the end of the first quarter of 1980, six
125,000-cubic-meter methane tankers and two others of 50,000 cubic meters--
the latter might be replaced by three 35,000-cubic-meter vessels which would -
- offer raore flex~bility of use. That represents a great hope for Mediterranean `
Ship and Industrial Construction, but "even though there is complementarity _
between France and Algeria, which are neighboring countries and friends, the
prices are still the determining factors in concluding the hoped- �or markets." -
Competition from the shipyards of Asia and the Scandinavian countries will
~ influence the deci.sion. The I.a Seyne shipyard, however, has in i.ts favor the
excellent results given by the first two methane tankers in service. .
Mr Guendouz, the president of the CNAN, recalled that the engineers, workers
and technicians had gone from the 40,000 cubic meters of the "Hassi-�R'Mel" t~
tjie 129,500 cubic meters of the "Bachir-Chihani", which proves their technical
capability.
Concerning the new order from the CNAN, Mr Brongniart, ihe director in France
of the commercial fleet, stated that he was very much looking forward to the
meeting with the Algerian government chat will take place in Juyie. "The past
has not always been easy, our relations have sometimes been strained, but we
hope for better days ahead, first of aIl by having the desi~e to enforce the
accord for distributing maritime traffic. Algeria is a youiig country, but its
CNAN is experiencing amazing growth. We hope to obtain orders, but we cannot
ask for exclusivity if our prices are higher. The problem of revising prices -
_ during construction can certainly be settled. In fact, so~ne shipowners have
7 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
~ox n~~ici~r.~ usx nxLY
~ c~mplained of having h~d tn suffer sfgnifiC~nt uprl~tin~ df p~ic;es beC~use of
the ~cnndmic situ~tinn, especi~ily three y~~rs ago. We must ~ind ~ w~y to pro-
pdse defin~te pri~es zv those we talk with~"
'~he main characteristics of the new methane t~nker are dlmost the s~me as those
of the "J.arbi-~en-M'Hic~i": length betwc~en perp~ndicul~rs, 226,~0 meters; width
outside nf timbers, 41.~0 meters; depth ~t tnp d~ck lin~, ~7.6U m~t~rs; max-
imum dra~t, 10.~5 meters; test sp~~d, 15.d knots; total r.grgn c~p~~ity,
129,50(~ cub~~ m~ters; nwnber nf tanks, S; C~p~CitY nf igrgest t~nks, 31~45U -
cubic mete~s. Its installations are d~signed t~ tr~nspnrt liqu~fied n~tur~l
gas at a temper~ture nf -160tl.
7'he "~achir-Chihani", after te$ts off ~'dulon, will approach Arzew, whcre it
will lo~d its first liquefied natur~l g~s cargo for th~ United 5tgte5.
- COP1`~ICHT: Rene M~reux et Ci~, paris, 1~7g
394 G
CSO: 4400
8
FOR OFFICIAL U5E ONLY
.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
~
~t~R d~~ICIAL U5~ dN1.Y
- ALG~RIA
BRIC~5
UWINIUM S`~UUY--Within the framework of its pragram to develop Algerian natu-
r~l resources, the N~tiongi Mining ~xplor~tion and ~xploitation Comp~ny
(50NAR~M) r~cently ~w~rded to a temp~rary partnership ineluding the compani.es
McKee ~U5), Trgction gnd ~lectricity and Uninn Mining (delgium) and Cot~cna
_ ~ng:neering Comp~ny (5wiss) a study contract dealing with the sacond phase of
_ developing urgnium deposits at Abankor and 'Cimgaouine in the Alg~rian Nogg~r.
The study is dealing With mines, g concentration piant, genei�al industrigl `
divisions, water supply, the mining town, etC. It in~ludes all ~;ctivity, in
offiCes or nn-site, leading to precise definition of the project and the de- -
livery of bids for its realization. [TextJ [Pa:is MARCHE5 TROPTCAUX ET MED- -
- I'TERRANE~NS in French 11 May 79 p 1117~ 8946
ALGIERS PORT PR08LEM5--Algeris~n newspapers periodically relate the troubles
the ports are experiencing, more precisely the Algiers port, where merchandise
imported by the n~tional companies is accumulating. On 24 April Salah Goudjil,
Transportation Minister, and Ahmed Ali Ghazali, Public Works Minister, visited
the port and held two working meetings at the headqvarters of the National
Ports Office (ONP). The Transportation Minister stated that "important de-
cisions have been taken in this area, and orders have been given to begin the
work" (of refitting the port). The warehouses of some firms, improperly
built w~thin the boundaries of the port, will be removed. "The potential ex-
ists," the minister concluded, "but there must be the will capable of settling
(the doubtful) questions." We state that Mr Goudjil, during the open coordina-
tion conference at the government palace on 23 April (MARCN~S TROPICAUX ET
N1~DITERRANEENS, 4 Mayj, recommending decentralizing the port sector, notably
the autonomy of the ports and their tie-in with th~ governor's authority.
[Text] [Paris MARCtiES TROPICAUX ET h~DITERRANEENS in French 11 May 79 p 1117]
_ 8946
BORDEAUX-ALG~RIA MARITII~ ROUTE--The JOURNAL DE LA MARINE MARCNANDE said in its ~
3 May issue: "Can the resumption of direct maritime re2ations with Algeria be
anticipated? That is the question being asked by the shippers who use the port
of Bordeaux, who have to ship through other ports significant to.inage of manu-
factured products produced in the region; =.~;cording to Lhem, the freight equip-
ment which is there permanently xould jusr.ify resuming that line. Lacoste Inc.,
for its part, by aay of example, was tn receive on consignment the Algerian
9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
~dtt U~~'tCtAL U5~ ONLY
ves$e1 "C~bc~-5id~ero", own~d Uy the Algeri~n N~tional N~vig~tion Company (CNAN),
. which w~s ~omi~g t~ lc~~d 7U0 tnns of structur~l steel representing ~bout
2,OOU cubic mr~t~rs--equipment for ~ fruit-c~nning pl~nt, equipment to b~ de-
b~rk~d ~t the port of Skikd~, An addition~l shipment nf equirment, ~lsn man-
uf~ctured by Uesse Hrnth~rs, is expect~d in M~y. L~~nste InC h~.d pr~vinu5ly
~hip~ed to Alg~ri~ $eve~~l thous~nd tnns df ~quipment for ~ n~w sho~ f~etdry, _
Thes~ tw~ ~x~tnpl~~ are not isol~ted dne~." ['~ext~ (paris MARC[{~5 T~driICAUX GT -
. Pf~nl'f~~RAt~1~~N5 in ~rench I1 M~y 79 p 1178] 89db
ALG~IttAN-iNUTAN INnU5TttIAL CnOpERA'~InN--Moh~med Li~ssine, th~ Algeri~n mini5t~r
of Ne~vy Industry, tnok tn Indi~ in April ~ deleg~tion of le~ders of the heavy
industry se~tdr. After ~ viszt tu v~rious engineering, ele~tronic ~nd he~vy
equipment compl~xes and conversatidns with the Indian leaders of those indus-
tries, the potenti~l for Indign-Algeri~n industriai cooper~*ion was ~xamined.
The missinn, th~ minister st~t~d, was in response to the dir~~tive to se~k
d~velnpment ~nd diversifi~~tion n� Algeria's Industri~l r~luti~ns with the non-
ali.gned countri~s. 7'here is, he ~dded, ~ definite possibility of acquiring in
Indin some of the goods and services now purehas~d by Algeria in the indus-
tri~lized countries: heavy industry, mechanics, electricity, electronics,
metallurgy. Cooperation could al$o develop in the field df engineering. An
official report outlining the potential for bil~tcr~l conperatit~n was signed
in New Uelhi, and product-by-produrt discussions are tn be held betwcen thc
two countries' national companies. [TextJ [paris ~fARC}{~S TROPICAUX EP MCU-
IT~RREW~~N5 in ~rench 11 May 79 p 1178~ 8946
_ RAILROAD TRAFfIC--YJe have alrc:ady mentioned (MARCIi~5 TROpICAUX ~T N(I'DIT~RWW~iS
- 13 Apri1, p g28) the contract concluded betwe~n Algcri~ and the It~lisn
firm COGCFA~ ~expansion unknown), to double the E1 Gourzi-Constantine-Skikda
railroad. Here are some details on the traffic, 7,000,000 tons per year, pre-
dicted for this secti:.~n by 1990, including mainly: steel products (tubes,
sheet metal, extrusions, commercial iron, billets, iron pellets) from the SNS
[National 5tee1 CompanyJ complex~s at E1 Hadjar and Jijel, destined for the
southern oi.l zones, fron the processing units and dxstribution centers for
steel products implanted over the whole national tcrr~tory (2,200,U00 tons per
year, eventually ~ore, considering new optinns envisioned for the Jijel complex);
iron ore from the $ou-Khadra mine and v~rinus raw ~aterials for the Jijel c~m-
plex (900,OU0 tons per year); fertilizer for the nation~l market, produced by
the Mnaba fertilizer complex (600,000 tons per year), and products (nhosphor-
ic acid) and raw materials (sulfur) engendered by valorizing the Ujebel-Onk
- phosphates (1,200,000 tons p~r year), to Eo through the future port of Jijel- _
Djendjen; cement from the Nadjar-Sound and Hamma-Bouziane c~ment works (300,000
tons); raw marerials (~1 Outaya salt) and products (plastics, sodium tripaly-
phosphate) of the chemical industry at Skikda and Annaba (200,000 tons per year);
cer~als for storage silos in the East and Southeast of the country, imported
Lhrough the 5kikda and Jijel-Djendjen ports (1,400,000 tons per year); general
merc:handise from or for the East and Southeast, passing through the Skikda and
Jijel-Djendjen ports (600,000 tons per year). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPI-
CAUX ET h~DIT'~RRANEENS in French 4 May 79 p 11t8J 8946
10
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
� _ - -
FOR 0~'F~C2AL U5~ ONLY
~
~~~HAR AIRPORT--'Che ~c~nomi~ t~k~off of th~ g~ch~r gnvernnrate is m~rked by
the spc~ct~~ui~r ddv~lnpm~nt of air trgffic. ~c~tw~nh ig7G nnd 197g th~ numb~r
of p~sscng~rs incre~~~d by 60 pc~rC~nt, frc~ight by 400 parcent, und post~l tr~f- `
fic is st~~dily incre~sin~. This progress is th~ r~~ult nf socinyec~nomiC
ch~ng~s ~n th~ gov~rnarate sin~~ 1976, which justified putting intn s~rvic;e~ in
Octnbcr 1J75~ ~oeing houvy transport ~quipment on the Algiurs-H~chnr~ Ur~n-
Bechur, Algiers-gechar-Tindouf line~. Currently 11 weokly ~light~ CotltleCt
B~rhgr with Algiers, 6 flights with Or~, 3 with Tindouf, and S destined fdr
Adrar, Timirooun, Goleg ~nd Gh~rdaia. The 3,000-metex runway wiil sonn b~
reinforr~d, ~nd g new runwgy leid out, tc, fr~qu~ntly receive 707-type plan~s,
with l~nding aids. B~chgr envisions beeoming ~ stopover on the pnt~ntiul in- _
t~rnatinnal line serving th~ ~irports of ~outhwest Afric~. [Text] [p~ris
- MAltCH~5 TROpICAUX ~T M~bIT~itRAN~~N5 in ~rench 4 May 79 p 1118J g946
hl~RCNANT FL~~T dATA--The journ~l ALG~~I~ IN~ORMATION h~s put together the �ol-
lowing figures~ showing the ~conomic import~nce of the country's merchgnt fleet:
3,000 sedentary ag~ntis, 5,250 sailors~ including 1,000 officers; ~ 1,400,OOU-
din~r turnover; 12 maritime ~?gen~ies ~nd 2U tra~vel ag~ncies in Aigeria?, rc-
presentation in all worid port~; a fl~~t nf 68 vessels, whose tntal weight is
1,350,000 tons, that is: 34 Gonvention~l cargo ships, 14 transports, 5 car
- ferries, 6 oii tank~rs for refined products, 5 tankers for crude, 3 m~thane
tankers, a GPL [liqueFied petroleum gasnLNG] carrier, 4 vessels under construc-
tion, including 3 methane tankers and one cargo "wine tanker"-- during tt~e yeurs .
1979-1980 this will make a fleet of 72 units with a total dead weight of
1,550,000 tons; 70 vessels chartered for a fixed period and 90 chartered by
the voyage; a fleet of 22 tugs with a total power of 37,500 horsepower; ~ nct-
work nf over 40 r~gular lines, serving the countries of Africg, Asia, ~urope
and A.roerica and offering 100 dep~rtures per month; activities in tramping,
freighting, consignment, transit, brokering, towing and passenger transport;
an active presence in numerous maritime conferences; a conperation acting with
the maritime companies of il countries that h~ve sign~d intergovernment~l mari-
time accords with Algeria; full-share participation in semi-public maritime
transport companies: A1~TC [expansion unknown], COB~NAM [expansion unkttown]
and CALTRAM [expansion unknown~. [Text] [Paris MAR~HES TROPICAUX ET I~DITER-
ANE~NS in French 4 May 79 p L118] 8946 _
N~W ALGERIA-FRANC~ MARITIN~ ROUTE--Two new maritime lines, departing from
Algier~ and Oran for the port of Sete are to be opened after 15 June to trans-
port passengers and vehicles by car-ferries. This new connection, to be pro- _
vided by vessels of the National Algerian Navigation Company, is intended to
decongest Marseilles harbor as the sumaer period approaches, which is marked by
massive movements of Algerian emigres between Algeria and France. [Text]
[Paris MARCti~S TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRA.\~~N5 in French 4 May 79 p 1118~ 8946
ALGERIAN-ITAL~AN COMPANY--A semi-public wlgerian-Italian food industry company
was created on 25 April by the terms of a contract signed in Algiers between
Italy's Cooperativc Muratori Cemenstisti and the Algerian nutional company,
SEMPAC [expansion unknown]. The activity of this semi-public company, whose
capital is divided into 51 percent for the Algerian state and 49 percent for
the cooperatives belonging to the Italian cooperative movement, xill be carried -
out in the fields of design, study, development of industrial units, of ex-
tending and modernizing them, as well as creating distr3bution centers and
storage centers in Algeria. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DI'I'~RRAN~ENS
in French 4 May 79 p 1118] 8946
CSO: 4400 l.l
yy'i~ AL+6+T/~TAT itG'L~ AIITTV
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
�
~ POR Ot~FiCIAL U5~ ONLY
B(~YPT
RLFBRENDZTM ON PLACE TttLATY CRITYCIZED
~ Paris AL-iiATAN AIr'ARABI in Arabie 27 Apr-3 May ~g pp 22..23
(Articles "The Family Craws A Preeident for Life"~
_ (Tentj preeidenr ai-Sadat gave himself 99.9 percettt -
of the vorea of the 10 million angry E~rptiana vho he
claia~ed aent to the polling centere lasC Thureday
(19 April) Co give their view of hia treaty arith Iarael~
his dieeolving of the People's Aseemtily and hig effort
to "deepen" democracy. AI~-WATAN AIr'ARABI's corre8-
pondent in Cairo reporta on hie observatione~ imprea-
sione and expectationa follo~ring the referendum.
Fore~gn correepoadents and journaliste aere quite ,urpr~,oed laet Friday
night ahen the official reaulta of the referendum aere aa,iounced: 99.95
percent of the v~oters eay "yes" to the al-Sadat-Begin tr~aty and to
Paleatinian aelf-rule; 99.9 percent support the preeident on diseolving
the People'.e Assembly and on his effort to deepen democracy. The cause of
the ~ournaliats' extreme autpriee is that in touring the polling centere
thP day before~ theq had observed a light voter turnout. Som~ polliag
ceutere, ia �act, eepecially those deaignated for vomen voters, ware empty~
except for co~i.tteemen.
The political circlee~ however, Were not surpriaed by aI-Sadat's etring of
nines [refarence to the voting reeults, 99.9 aad 9g.95 p~rcent], for theee
have come to be identified ~.-ith all of al-Sadat's previoua referenda~
~.specially those that were conducted for him by his interior minieter,
Ha~ Gen Nabaai Isma'il.
The fact is that there vas no urgent need for the referenJum on the treaty, -
particulsrly since it has alreadq been signed and endorsed by the na+ die-
eolved People's Asaembly. The vhole affair apptared as an attempt to ac-
com~lish what has alr~.;dy been accomplished. But President al-Sadat
Wanted, in his oaa aords, "to ahar the Arabs that Egg?pt is behiad him an
the treaty." He also vanted to dem~netrate to the Amartcaa people that he
ie a popular, tolerant~ democratic man, and, therefore, vorthy of a8sis-
tance.
12
FOR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
~0!t d~'~fCIAL U5~ ONLY -
7'h~re wg~ no pr~paration for th~ referendum~ exeept nn~ televi~~d ~ddreg~ by
n1~5adat ~nd thre~ maeeing~ with ~duceCional and eCudene grdup~, during whi~h
h~ thre~tpn~d averyoi~p, beginning wiCh Che ~eud~nt~ ~nd ~ndit~g witih Ch~ ~
Ar~b~. ~v~n b~for~ rh~ r~f~rpndum~ n~v~p~p~r h~adiin~~ w~re trumpeting the
re~ulta : Ye~, Y~. Y~g !
Th~ di~~olving of th~ Ppopi~',~ A~g~b1y immedi~Cely ~fter ~ndorging th~
Cr~aCy ~truck m~mb~r~ di thp ruling Natic~ng2. pgrCy lik~ g Chund~rboiti. ~
_ Their pr~sid~nC'e gcticm f~1~ frnm ~ ele~r, blu~ gky, ~nd gpp~~r~d ~g a
calculated ~CC~tnpt to puni~h thpm~ undeservedly~ ~nd ~o dieciplin~ th~
"minority" Which had ob~ect~d to the treaty. In eh~ p~ge~ th~ National
Pgrry ha~~ wiChout f~il~ don~ the bidding of th~ authorttpe~ never r~~~ce-
ing a requeet or turntng do~m a propo~~l. If a reque~t demand~d that a
di~eident b~ sil~nced~ h~ wa~ eilenc~d or ~mav~d from the party altogether.
- If ~ r~qu~~t dpm~nded th~t ~"thief" df ~h~ op~n ecoarnnic poliey be pro-
tected ~ggingt oppoeition qu~geiong (in hegrings~~ the p~rty Cr~t~d enough
noise ~nd ~moke to gmoth~r the que~tioner. C?n the day Che Cre~ey wa~ ~n-
dor~ed~ th~ perty t~mbers were exuberant at ~1-Sadat'g word~ of praige for _
them. "I gm proud of you and o.f your aork~" he had told th~m. 7'hey ac-
tu~lly danc~d, ye~ daneed, and hugged egch oth~r in congratulating them-
selves. 'They gang the national hymn "Ny Country" s+ith member Fayidah itamil~
~ wif~ of th~a interior minieter~ conducting. When they aent hom~~ th~y had
no inkling that their preeident wag about to und~rtalce a"conetitutional
- coup." The conetitution has two provi~iong for di~eolvit?g rh~ People's Ag-
sembly: a diepute betWe~n the executive and legielative branche~ of govarn-
r~ent--Which did not occur--~nd ~n emergency ~ituation under which the preei-
dent is authorizeJ to hold a referendum ge a~ane of re~olving en iseue.
An emergency ae apecified in the aecond provision did not exiet in thia
case, gince the People's Assembly had already goae along aith the pre8i-
deat on wh~t he hsd called a"problem of de~tiny," that is, endorsing the
treaty with Ierael.
There are many theories ae to Why the president diegolved the P~opl~'s Ag-
senbly and called for neW elections, ag we11 ae for his campaigte to "deepen"
dpmocracy. Ameng these:
The president was acting under American direction in s calculeted attempt to
divert the people'g attenCion �roai the treaty to ~ 1oca1 problem, on~ frota
which al-Sadat Would emerge ae a democratic leader. After his iranian e~e-
perience With the ahqh, President Carter Wants all America's allies to have
pQpular and democra~:ic le~dere. But, aacording to diplo~mte of the U.S.
~mbassy, the Americans Were the first to be disappointed irhen al-Sadat in-
sisted on his 99.9 percenC victory margin.
A rush to normalize relations ~+ith Israel, contrary to the atatement made
by the state miaister far foreign affairs, Dr Butzos Chali, during a hearing
in the People's Ass mably on the trea ty, that "normalization vould begin 15
months after the signing of the treaty."
13
FOR OFPICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
~~~t (~I~FIC~AL U5B Ot~LY
t~ro~ring oppoeition wiChin gnd aiChouC the people~~ An~~anbly, gtirring o~
di~s~nt among ~tudpnt~ and ia r�~ligiou~ circie~ ~?nd conn~rn ~bout officigi
oppo~ition by eh~ 3oci~li~~ 1.~ibor ~arty.
tn the absanc~ of ~ P~p~~'~, A~~~?ls1y, th~ con~~itution ~uth~ri~~~ th~ -
pr~rid~nc ~o ru1~ by d~c rpp.
Politic~l ab~~rv~r~ not~ thgt Ch~ pre~id~nt gpp~ar~ int~ne on ~e:iking
~g~inat the oppo~iei~~ t~ ~Norf~ ~ny a~tionai mov~ment sim~d ~t ~cuttling
eh~ pe~c~ tr~ty. ~h~ aCC~eYc~ of ~our~~~ aili b~ carri~d nut in ~ com- _
p~et~ly "d~mocratic" m~nner. it aili b~ igunch~d a~ ~n attempC eo pr~-
eervp the "sovpreignty of th~ laa" or on th~ pr~t~xt of eafeguarding
~gyptien "valua~," "viil,ng~ morality" or "pre~idential" or "he~d-of-the-
family" guthority. ie i~ noe un~xpect~d that ~1-S~dat may ~xploit th~ con-
atitutionai provi~ioa ahirh permit~ th~ formation of political p~rti~~ to
f~rm alt~rngC~ p~rtieg, or parellei but couati~r-oppo~ition p~rti~~. The
po~~ibilieicg ineludr a"eoalition pgrty~" a"r~ligiou~," but pli~nt, -
p~r~y, gttd a n~t,t~ eplinter ~',af,d party.
Thi~ m~y not be eufficienC t:o gain compl~tp con~rol of our "panding
democracy~" and the effort mAy extend to profe~eionai and l~bor unione�
~nd, in particular, to the prsss.
nur "p~~di.ng democracy," hidden b~hind a gm~keacre~n nf a mulCipgrty ~ys-
tem and camouflag~d in d~m~goguery~ hae ail the halimaric~ of a per~onal
dictatorehip, on a scaie unprecedented in Eg~ptian hietory.
Ai-Sadgt'~ clns~t advia~re ~?y that Preeident Carter has adv,.:eeo1 tha
ggyptian preeident to pay attentioa to tt~?o important areae after signiag
the peace treaty: cleaning up cortvption and building a d~mocratic facade.
What appeare certain, ig that Pre~ident al-Sedgt hae decided to folla+ the
gecond half of President CaYter~s advice~ the half which offerg a greater
opportunity for attractive slogane~ring. Tn laurrch a frontai attack on
corruption at thie point is much more difficult and mAy~ in fact, be im-
~osaible. The bpst that can be ~ccompli~hed in this direction is ~o -
punish ~ome of the small-time thiaves or a few of their leadere who shoa
an inclinatton to~+ard independence from the ruling circlea.
A1-Sada t's experiencee ~+ith the mngeed o~a 18 and 19 Janu~ry 1978 convinced
him that flirting vith liberaliem at anq level can be a dangerous game.
- Ttu~t acperience mArked the begitming of hig retreat from all demxratic
meaeure8 that he had auaouoced earlier. Tha short freedQa apell eajoyed
by the political parti~ end~d horribly vhan al-Sadat mov+ed to quell all
real opposition from the right or ehe left.
If there is anv truth to the aestsmption that the Hay 15 reform aavement
wrta haped by che conditioas prevailing follo~ring al-Sadat's riae to pa+er,
thea the caming "Hay 15" movement vill, aece8sarily, be determined by the
circuar tancea Burrouading the concluaion of the Sgyptian-ieraeli peace
14
P~R OFPICIAL US~ ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
_
~nu o~~rcrnt. vs~ d~L~r
rr~ey. Specifia~liy~ eh~ m~v~m~nt wiii reflect th~ ramiftratiot?g of ~1-
- 3~dat'g ~CC~mpG to �org~ w3th I~re~l a comprehen~ive ~~nd rotapl~menc~ry al-
liance, i.e.~ politic~lly, econamically gnd cvltureily. ~
N1-3adge'~ "n~w d~mocracy" wiil bear th~ imprint of thi~ ggr~~ment. Thi~
n~w d~nocr~cy~ directed ~rom out~t~e the aoUntry, wi11 be fraught with the
d~t~~~r ef milit~ry gdv~nturi~m in eh~ Arab world ~nd Africe.
Intern~~ly, the n~w d~mo~racy wiil be chgracteriz~d by euppre~~ion of the
working ci~geg b~hind g~logan of higher producCion ~nd grpater proeper-
tty.
~bg ~cv~r~ b~li~v~ ehnt ~1-S~d~t'~ ~econd revolutionary dea?x r8cy will have
all th~ ~rappingg of ~ real d~mdcr~cy. Simultaneou~ly~ haaaver, it wi11
inv~iv~ total ~uppres~ion, fasciet ~tyle. ~heyr foregee the follo~tng con-
~~quenc~a:
1. A1-5adg~~ th~ hero of p~ace~ may b~ chnsen pr~gid~nt for life. He tnay
becom~ the firet leader to occupy the eupreme position in a new "hereditary _
republic."
2. A revic~ of the pregent party system--ag ~nnounced by al-Sad~t behind
cloaed doore~ when h~ referred to the presence of unacceptable political
oppogition~ ahich mugt be ended~ and~ in hie own worda~ "ae quickly ~s �
poeeible."
3. An announcemerit that the preee Will becace A fourth branch of govern-
ment, an innovation Without precedent. gnyti+here. Thie nea branch of gow
ernment ~rill be charged with brainwa~hiitg the masses into accepting all
che requiremenCe af his "open" policy to~ard a cultural alliance With
Ierael and a rapproachement With international Zionie~. -
4. M avowal to aecure freedom~ in every regpect, to all aupportere of
his peace Creaty and to ieolate diesent~rs. Heading the liat of dieaentera
are the leftista, regardles~ of ehade~ the numeroue Islamic organizatio~ns,
sil naticmalietic elemente and groupingg, ae Well ao the liberals--for
Whom the ~hock of tl~~ so-called new democracy aill be greateat. "
Zt trill not be long before the ordinary citizen will reali~e that the new
democratic comedy and the promiseg of proeperi ty have gone too far. The
desp criais faciag the govetrnment Will lead it to exttemea of propaganda,
to a pnint where ita efforta vill become conCecoptuoue of human common senee.
Thie is already becoming clear to ordin$ry citizens, Who contract the
reality of the treaty--a very sad and bitter one, indeed--aith the
orchestrated attempt to make it appear more attractive and eagier to saallaar.
COPYRIGEiT: 1979 AIr-WATAN AL-'ARABI
9063
CSO: 4802 15
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
FOtt OFI~ICIAL U3L ONLY
L(iYPT
S~C1tET MIL'ITARY INI~ORMATION 3AID AVAILABLE TO UNITED STATES
Paris AU-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arebic 27 Apr-3 May 7'9 p 15
- (TexC] U.S. infilCration of Lgyptian military recorde etarted with the air
' force~ the shield of the grmed forces.
AL~iATAN AIr-'ARABI learned that the eupreme co~ander of the armed forcee~
PreeidenC a1~Sadat him~elf, has iesued orderg permitCing Pent~gon axperta
access to air force records to engble them to evaluate Egyptian defenee
~ needs.
A number of American ~dssile experts are etudying Egypt's air defenee net-
work, coneieting of Soviet Sam 2, 3 and 6 miseiles. The experts believe
that most of these have becom~ obeolete~ and blame Egypt's de~ert climate
and the uc~vailability of replacement parta for the inadequacy of the
eyet~m.
The Egyptian Air Porce had been extremely careful to maintain abaolute
secrecy about its missilea, and used elaborate camouflage t~chniquea to
hide Chem from U.S. epy satellites. EgypCian military commandera were
convinced that information about the miesile network was being relayed Co
Ysrael by the UniC~d States.
In a related development, the United States has agreed to provide Egypt
With a amal~ number of F-4 fighter bombsrs~ the plane Which forms the back-
boae of the tsraeli Air Force. T he agreem~ent came on the heels of a de- ~
cieion to equip Che Israeli araenal ai+th P-15 and F-16 aircraft, which are
superior to the F-4 in armaments, load capacity~ apeed and maneuverability. -
The F-5 airplane deal approved for Egypt last year will be apeeded up,
with the first delivery coming thia year instead of next year. The F-5
aixcr~ft iaill be the mainatay of the Sgyptian Air Force in the 80's. -
AL-i~ATAN AIr~ARABI learned that Saudi Arabia has not yet paid the nearly
$500 million c~at of the deal. It is believed that the delay ie due to
, Saudi Arabia's occupation irith other Arab oblig,ationa. -
COPYRIG~iT: 1979 AL-WATAN Atr'ARABI
16
9Q63 ~R OPFICIAL USE ONLY _
CSO: 4802
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
FOR n~~~CIAL US~ ONLY
EGYP'~
SUPPRES3ION OF POLITICAL DISSIDENTS REPORTED
Paris AL-WATAN AL'ARABI in Arabic 27 Apr-3 May 79 p 14
[Article: "Al-5adat Bypgsses A1-Minya Gov~rnoraCe to Avoid Demonetrations"]
(Text~ President al-Sadat cancelled a acheduled viait to al-Minya and _
al-Sa'id Gavernoratea Co avoid atudent denwnatraCions that began a week
earlier. The demonstration by Koran-toting etudente of al-Minya Univer-
. aity wae aparked by ~ campaign of arreata by security men directed againse _
members of Islamic organir.ationa. In the enauing clash, in which knives
and eimilar weapons were uaed, one student wa8 killed and two soldiera were
taken hostage. The follawing day~ veiled Moslem girls took Co the city
atreeta to pratest the trampling of copiea of the Koran during the policP
attack against the etudenta. Security men quickly turned the town into an
armed camp and impoaed an early evening curfew againet the residents.
The campaign of terror and arreat againet political dissenters is in marked
contrast to President al-Sadat's announced intention to "deepen" demoaracy.
In a pre~s release marking the third anniversary of its formation~ the
Progressive National Coalition Party diecloaed that 543 of its membera
were sub~ected to arbitrary arrest and interrogation, and that its weekly
paper AL-AHALI was~confiscated 11 timea in the past aix months befare it
was shut down permanently by the Egyptian government. The report discloaed
further that the party's central offices were raided three times in the
past three monthe, and that each time aecurity men confiacated Cypewritere,
publications and other party documenta.
There ie a rumor in the ~udicial circlea that the attorney general, 'Anwar ,
Abu Sahli--leg,al adviser to the well-kno~m businesaman 'Uthman Ahm~d
'vthman, the president's i~18w--is preparing a list of phoney chergea
againet top Coalition Party leadera, particularly Khalid Muhyi al-Din,
Lutfi al-Kholi, Yahya al-Jamal, Milad Havna, Muhammad Ahmad Rhalaf Al1ah,
Lutfi Wakid aad ~iusayn Fahmi, in order to arrest them aad end their politi-
cel activity, after the referendum ie out of the way. The "official" op-
position, on the other hand, enjoys the government's protection. It is
very interesting that Mr Mustafa Kamil Murad, chatrman of the Liberal Party
and former leader of the opposition, has now become a leading busiflesaman
17 _
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY .
in one of the "open econom4?" enterprisea. Hie fartune began to improve
- when hie party agreed to go along with tihe ruling partiy. Mr Murad's enthus~
iaem for the peace treaty wae~ reportedly, greater than that of mnny Na- -
tional Par~y memb ere. Not on1.y did he endoree every provieinn of trie tireaty,
but complimanCed the prime minieter~ Muetafa Khalil, on his eupreme negoCiat-
ing ekille on behalf of Egypt and the Arabs. It ie ~u~C poesible that
Muetafa Murad hae become the epokesm~n of those who look tcward ecanomic co-
operation with Ierael.
COPYRIGHT! 1979 AL-WA~AN AL-ARABI
9063
Cso: 4802
l
18 ~ -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
~Ott n~FICIAL US~ ONLY
IRAN
WOMEN EXPRESS VIEWS ON REVOLUTION
Hamburg STERN in German 10 May 79 pp 92-100
[Text] Monavar ia 76 years old and hae been a widow for 36 years. She had
nine children; aeven died; she raised two, "When it was a son thaC I
loat, iC was very bad," she saye.
The fact ehaC ehe euffered lees when a daughter died never irrituted Monavar.
"Men are preferred to women." It says in the Koran in the fourth Sure
Chat Chat is the way the world is seC up. To diacover in~uatice Chere
is ge imposaible for her as it was for people of the Middle Ages to under-
atand ChaC the earth rotated about the sun.
But the newa of Che equality of wanen has reached even her country, Iran.
Ayatollah Khomeyni, the conqueror of the ahah, learned thia when he took
over pow~er. His order that women should wear the veil again drove thoueande
of Iranian wanen into the atreeta. With the freedom slogans of the
revolution atill ringing in their eara they asked: "Is there no freedan
for us in the dawn of freedom?" The veil iasue made headlines. In
Frankfurt feminiaCa--with 3imone de Beauvoir at ehe head--eatablished an
"Int~ernational Committee for the Defense of Women's Rights" and aent a
delegation to Peraia to support their sisCers solidarily. Kate Millet,
~ the American feminist, also came, but was quickly senC away. She had
called Khomeyni a "relt~.ous Cyrant."
The old Monavar deeply respects Khaneyni. I meC the ~ld wanan aC Nasrin~s,
our interpreCer. Nasrin, 33, atudied political science in Germany. Two
months ago, full of hope, ahe returned to her country from exile. Mean-
while she has becane c rnicerned: "No one knows what the new constitution
will contain."
_ We are on our way to Monavar's gradda~ighter, Asam, who lives in the
southern part of Tehran, in the poor secCion of the city. Tehran lies
like a crooked p1atF at the feet of the Elbur mountains. Up in Che
northern part are ::ite palaces of the shah and the villas of the rich.
, Below in Che aouthern part a ciirty sluah runs together when it rains
or when the anow melts. Here live three-fourths of the 4 million
inhabitanCe, mostly crowded together in huta--sometimes in Cents.
~9
FOR OFFI~I~?L USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
I~0lt UN'I~'ICiAL IISL l1NI,Y
Whila Che Caxi driver threads hia wuy Chrough the chuoCic Cr~ffic wieh tiha -
bli.nd dex~erity of ~ mole, Monavar Cella more abouC her life. She was
never intereaCed in politice--unCi1 Che revolu~ion. Then she fe~.ti rhat
' someChing wae happaning thar concerned her. She sansed Che good luck
~h~t a poliCical lattdsli.de mighC brin~ �or the litCle people. "z am ~oo
old eo aee beCter d~ys now," she says, "but someChing h~s tio change for
~he ynung people."
Her husband was a small tenant farmer. When he died she moved Co the city
with her children. Since she ia illiternee, like 70 percenC of a11 women
in Ir~n, she did domestic work. Couldn~t she remarry r~s a 40-year old
wanan? The ~h oughC neve~ occurred to her. "ThaC ian~t proper." She
receives no pension. If her daughter FaCimeh did not take care of her �~i
she would have Ca beg or starve. Asked ttbout her three biggest wiahea
stie says: a car for her son, a wi�e f or one of her grandaons, and a Crip
for herself ~o Karbala, a ShiiCe place of pilgrimage. Husayn, a grandson
of Che Prophet, died there as a martyr.
If she could come back to the earth eo live agnin would she rather be a
man or a woman? She doea noC hesitate for a second: "A man."
The sorrow for the people whose lives were sacrificed in the revolution
against the shah--75,OOU in one year--has not stopped yet. There are
litCle ~?iCtiering towers all over Che streeCS, especially in the poor _
sectioiis, Co honor Che dead--abouti the height of a person, decorated wiCh
pieces of glasa of many colors and small pieces of mirror. In the middle,
easily visible, is a picture of the dead person. "ThaC is an old tradiCion,
when a young man has died who was not yet married, thaC is, who had not
enojoyed life yet," explains Nasrin. The tradition knows of no such way
_ to honor young girls, who died in equal numbers.
The place where Asam lives is called Chardonghe and was once a village.
Meanwhile the corrugated iron huts of the city have spread to the village,
but iCs nucleus has remained inCact. Here noC one woman without a veil can
be seen. "Chador" is the name of this clothing that reaches the ground,
made of one half-circular piece of cloth. It doea not have eiCher hooks
or eyes and is pulled far into Che forehead, held together by ehe hands
over the chest. Often women hold the cloth clenched between their teeth
when Chey need an arm for a child or a purse.
Foreigners are immediately noCiceable in Chardonghe. Young boys in jeans,
= with their shirts open as far as the belts, shooC past us on their noisy
mopeds. They look at us openly, and show off according to the ancient
male ritual. It would be exactly the same in the Bavarian forest. The
women on the other hand remain close to the wall, seeming to disappear -
in the walls; they follow us with their eyea only. Five-year old girls
_ are already wearing veils walk and their posture expresses the plan for
Cheir future life: head bent, shoulders drawn in, arms tightly pressed
to Che body. The chador leaves Chem no choice.
20
FOR OFFICIA; liSE UNLY
_ ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
, FOIt OT~'FICIAL U5~ ONLY
~
- Nover~hele6s, Ch3s clothing wae a symbol of reaietance during Che
~ revolurion. zti aignal.ed a re~ection of tihe ~uieurgl violatione by Che
Wee~, oE the culture of comic books, coke, and night clube, of Foreign
d anination in ganer.al. In 1936 ~he shah'g ~a~her had pxohibited the veil.
He wAS not concernod, howevex, wi~h ehe liberation of women, but wl.th tha
_ mobilization of cheap female lgbor for Che coming industrializ~Cion. Since
- 1942 women have been able to chooae whether or no~ ~o wear Che vei1.
Wa do not find Monavar's granddgughCer at home but in the ba~h house. This
- communal arrangemenC belonga Co ~he men be~ore noon, Co the womon in
the afCernoon. SCone sCeps lead to a dark catiacamb. In ~he hall witih
ite nichea and ehe Tuxkish cold water basin in the m3.ddle Y feel like
a tiime traveler who got out in Che Middle Ages. Lighti atreama f orm ~bove
through an opening in ~he dome-shaped ceiling. ~C ia Lively in the ad~acQnC
- bathing room. There ia ateam, and sounds of alapping and equealing~ The
wcnnen have their amall children with them.
Asam says later that at first she thoughC Chat we were aenti by ehe
authori~ies because of her separation. Asam ia 33; for 6 years she has been
living aeparated ~rom her husband. H~ has been married again for a long
time and has two children with his naw wife. Every Peraiam m~n can marry
a second woman if the firsC wife agreea, according to a decree of the
shah of 1967. This agreement is ofCen forced or Che men aimply diaregard
tihis resCriction. Asam cannoC marry again as long as ahe is nat oEfzcially
divorced. BuC with three children no one would take her anyway~, she thinka.
In Iran marriage for a certain time is atill common, a apecinl form oE -
prostitution. It comes from Che days when men were on the road f or
months with Cheir caravans and atayed for a long time in strange places. -
- With Allah's blessing, they did r.ot have to do withouC Che services of
women on these trips. They paid the price of Che bride f.or a certain
time, got married, and at the same time set the time of the divorce.
Asam is an unskilled worker in a factory. She checks and packs panty
hose. Almost all her coworkers there are divorced. SincP the ahah
legally allowed women to sue for divorce also, Iran has the fourth highest
divorce rate.
At the present time eighC people live on Asam~s income--between 500 and
600 DM pex month: she and her three children, and her unemployed brother
with his wife and two children. The house belonga to her mother-in-law.
Since she has not received a penny of support from her husband, hia family
pays at least Chis way a kind of alimony.
The "house" consists of two ground level rooms without a door between t}.em,
a small court wi th an outhouse in one corner and a stone basin with a
- water faucet. The only furniture in the roans is a television and two
dressers. 7.tao pictures are handing on the wall: Ali, the aon-in-law
of the PropheC Mohhamed, and a color photograph of Ayatollah Khomeyni. In
each room Chere is a stack of mattreases that are spread out uC night.
Asam and her three children sleep in the front room, her brother and his
family in the rear room.
21
FOR OFFICIE��.. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
F'Utt Uk ~ 1C 1 AL J~N'. dNLY
~ Six yeard wiChduti ~ hueb~nd meane ~i y~~r~ ~iehruC ~~ex 1tf~ fc~r ~ p~r~i~n
wcxnan in tih~ er~dition~l envirotunenti. Y am lonking for ~~~r~ful
~drmulation and finglly agk Agam whetiher ~ha d~~e noC fe~l 1~n~ly ~cxnetime~.
She undergtiand~ tmmedi~t~ly. "One g~t~ u~~d ~o tt," ~h~ ~~y~.
A p~r~i:~n wom~n h~~ ~to right tio gex dueeide m~rri~g~. WiChin m~rriag~ ~ex
id her duty. Even if her hu~band hag be~een and ieeulted h~ti during thp
dt~y, at nighti rho wifQ mu~t obey. "Th~ women ar~ your faztnland," eays
the propheC (Kor~n~ e~cond Sur~)~ "~c~n~ intio yuur land in wh~C ~ver way
y~u w~ne."
The hdly bonk nf ehe Mdsleme hgg ~~erieg of corr~Ctive me~~ureg f~r dig-
obedient wtves. "lt~primand th~m, ~baC~in frc~cn Chem, lock then in tih~ir
rooms ~nd begti ehem." 5uch placea c~nnnt b~ ~rased by the f~ct thgt the
proph~t wae generoue in other greas--he ~ilowed women eo own property~
for ex~mple.
" When a husb~nd CgCChCB hig wife in fl~gr~nti wiCh a lov~r he ~an kill her.
There is a p~ragr~ph in Persign law which etates th~t a courC muee d~cl~re
him innocene in ~uch g case.
"Many murdera of wives are noe atoned," g~y8 ~~rideh, 29, a lgwyer in
_ Tehran, "because the men aimply claim that rhe woman deceived them e~nd wae
c~ughC by Chem."
.
_ "A wcxnan belongs where she w~nte to be." Thia slogan ig in the office
of the biggest Irnnian women's organization, which w~~ formerly h~nded
by Princess Ashraf, the twin sister of the ahah. The money that was given
her was correspondingly royal in quantity. The organization had
500 counaeling placee in the whole country and 3,700 w~men coworkere.
lluring rhe time nf Che king Sohre~ an elegant repreaentative of die
middle class who will certainly never exchange her linen blazer for the
chador, was responsible for publicity work. We had already telephoned
several ~imes and I was consoled again and again: The organization
will be headed by new women; everyChing is c:hanging; probably noC even
the old name will remain.
The new wanen in Che leaderehip, who are coming inCa a ready-made nest and
want to take over the budget, reveal Chemselves as sCrictly religious
fighters for Islam, a fact made obvious by Cheir layers of black cloth.
TheSr belief ie: In Ielam women have equality. Wh~ever helpa religion
to win, helpa wanen win. Whoever takes care that Moha~aed~s laws, as they
are written in the Koran, gre '~.epC, frees Women fran their oppreesion.
I ask: "But in the Koran it says, for example: in caurt tc~o female
witnesses havs the same Weight ae one male witness. Is thaC not a clear
~ discrimination?" "No," I am taught, "because Women are by nature more
sensitive than men, since they all become mothers, and therefore the
atatement of one women cannot be trusCed." ;
- 22
FOR OFFICIl,L U5E ONLY
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
~dlt d~~'ICTAL U5~ tlNLY
"Y d~ n~e undera~~nd ehaC," I~~y~ "if ~11 wzxn~n ara ~qu~11y ~mnCion~l,
eine,g eh~y vill a11 become muthers, it ie m~~ningie~~ td 1tge~n to ~
~eccmd wanan."
~`he brow~ are furrow~d; th~re is g long diecueAion; ftn~lly Ch~ ~nawer
_ COrtlpB: "Oc~ly God kncnr~ peopl~. Ne creaC~d ehem. he knous Why Ke mgde
thie law."
Khomeyni~ God'~ right hand on eareh, i~ omnipre~enC t.n Tehr~n. Lnperiously
h~ look~ from every wgil ~nd every di~pl~y window. B~nke ~nd gov~rnment
officee, bouCiques and b~keries, boeeee end beggare--all confees their
fgith wieh the pictur~. Whoever doee not ig denounced by religioue
fanatice aa a fdliower of the ehah or ~ communi~C.
MeeCing place: ~ cdnference roo~ di the fotZUer P~hl~vi foundation.
With the help of this foundation the shah filied his private treaeurias
gnd Ccm Crnlled Che perst~n econany. The building wge occupied by rhe
Mdy~hedin, Ch~ "fgiCh fightere," during ehe revoluCion.
The Moyahedin are guerillae. Together with the people's fedayin they
fo~tned the leaderehip of the revolutian. PoliCically they are lefCiet,
~ but they ~re--in conCraeC Co rhe MarxisC fedayin--faithful Mosle ms.
Fatimeh, 26, and Sahre~ 22, our twoiaterview partners, Cell about "black
Friday" which sho~sid realiy be called "red l~riday~" The military had
encircled a big aqu~re Chat is called Shohador today: "Martyre' Square."
' At first the soldiere ehoC into the air; finally they aimed at ehe crowd.
, "There were many Waaen in the aquare," says Fatimeh, "they Were ready to
die, they aere not afraid." After the maseacre the corpses aere removed
with bulldozers.
The Moyahedin are fighCing for a socieCy in which there is no more
exploitation of man by man, where all are free. Also wamea? Fatimeh
and Sahra do not wear the chador but scarves that compietely cover their
hair and evenly cut, knee-length coaCa. "Hedyab" is the name of this
clothing, which means "chastely covered."
Moyahedin women carry Weapons. They fought and died w iCh equal rights.
What role do they now have in the heirarchy of their revolutionary
liberation organiaation? "The wanen do the same thing as the ~n," says
FaCimeh, "they atand guard, teach, organize meetings." It dependa always
on What a peraon is moet suited for.
Finally they are honest: "We do not have any illusions. In our organ-
ization women have a worae poaition. Intellectual work is almost ex- ~
clusively restricCed to men." Private plans? Marriage? Only it it can
be ha~monized With our poliCical struggle. Our time and strength belong
to the organization."
23
FOR OFFICI/,:, U5E ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
~OK UN'~ICIAL US~ bNLY
"I ~m prnud o~ th~ wum~n in Iran," ~~id Ay~tidli~h Khan~yni in t?i~ ep~ech
in Qc~n, in whi~h he promi~ed wanan equaitey. "Y~u rrn~ nC th~ v~ry frnne
~nd inepired th~ men. You have the h~greg of lionu."
Meanwhile the poaiCions are newly dietributed. "7'he duty o� the eisters
ie the p~cificntion of th~ brother~~" i~ the elog~n on wglir~ aid~ the
hypocrteicgi figeeery next to it: "Your blgck ch~do~ fnrced the enmty
into fltghe more th~n our red biood."
In ~n ~Lnos~ whintng Cdne g fiyer ple~de to wexn~n rd v~il th~rn~~lv~e "for
Al.lah'~ eak~." "Ydu cannaC imggin~ how our n~rvou~ eygtem reacC~ when ydu
shnw your be~utiful bodiee. Kow ar~ we guppueed e~ think of ~ur c~ork?"
Besidee it ie unfair to th~ older wanen, " who are not ~ae preCty ~ny mor~."
"I wouid nev~ar look ~ft~r a gtri in j~~ns," e~ye our taxi drtver, "buC when
a veil ie blown op~n a liCCle bit...."
In i.~lehzar Stre~t young people have put up Woud~n pla~eg With photographe
- of the eh~h and hi~ ~tife ge t~rgets: ~arah Diba in a bikini, the king
in a miliCary parade, both tio~~Cher with their chiidren. Raund green
piec~s indicaCe the places where a~ good shooCer hae Co fit: forehegd,
neck v~in, heart. Five ehote cost 10 rial (25 Pf~nnig). Bueiness is good.
Also uaed ae t~rgeCs are picCures of Women, bosomy stare with eCandgrd
faces. ~orcnerly they were thought to be preCey and Were copied by upper-
class wanen. Today they are "sex objecCe," symbols of moral decay--free
for shooting.
When $adieh, 31~ a secreeary, aanCed to ~nter her office a few days ago,
ehe wae sCOpped by g m~nber of the Weapon-carrying revolutionary c aamittee
that ia guarding her firm, an American business. With hie rifle the
young man pointed to the top tato button of her blouse. He Wanted them
buttoned. Bad ieh did him that favor. "But only for you," she said to le t
the self-appointed guard of virtue understand that et~e vies~ed hie hinC as
personal ad~ice and not as an order from the top.
Bahieh does not trust the new rulers: "They Want Co dictaCe to us WhaC _
to aear, where we can go, and haw we should live. 2 did not fight for _
thie."
The struggle has just etarted," says BehdyaC Mobasheri, the wife of the
minieter of juaCice. On the day that we visited her, her husband offered
to resign, but was asked to remain in office. Ne does noC agree any more
With the politics of the religious rightisC wing. "~lanen cannot give up
naW," says B~hdyat, "they have to continue Co fight--for their rights,
the righCs of all people~ with all means."
Even with arms?
She answerg in German: "Naturally."
COPYRICHT: 1979 ~runer + Jahr AG ~ Co.
9232 2~
CSO: 4403 FOR OFFICII+:. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
~o~ d~~tciat. us~ o~tt.Y
i~x
'JAPAN TIML3' ON RL@iL1tCLNC~ OI~ IRANIAN COMMUNI5T5
Tokyo TE~E ~APAN TINES in Engli~h 26 May 79 p 12 OW
tArttcie by Richerd Wg111g: "Iran Communiste out in Open Againet--Tudeh
Legd~r Back from 23-Year Lxilp, galgttcing pro-5ovi~t ~nd Pro-Ayatollah Line") -
[LxcerpCs] ~ehran (KYODO--ItEUT~it)--After 30 clandestine years of persecution
the Tudeh (Communist) Party coagi~ters iteelf legal ggaia and i~ operating
openly in Iran.
- The party's nev secretery-ge~ergl~ Nur-e-din Kianouri, 63~ returned to Teh-
- ran laet month after 23 years of exile, mosC of it spent in East Cermany. The
Tudeh ha~ establi~hed iCS headquartars in an office blork a~xt to Tehran U:~i-
vereity gnd hae etarted bringing out it~ aeekly NARDOM (TNE PEOPLE) neaepaper.
This ttme the Tudeh has throvn its support entirely behind revolutionary reli-
gioue leader Ayatollah ttuhollah Khomeynl.. But it remaina as pro-Soviet ae
When it was driven undergrouad, even though thig ie probably the main ob-
stacle to the growth of its popularity.
Anti-Left De~on~tration
Hunched on a aimple netal c!iair in ~ ~t~:~e';-~;::~::shed office, Kianouri
diamieeed the dangera of a civil war or a 8plit bets+een the left-ving and
Islamic supportera of the revolution. But he ineisted that there wae. etill
a poasibility of a coup by pro-shah right-ving officers.
While he offered Ayatollah Khomeyni's Yslamic republican party an alliance
in a broad popular revolutionary front, hyaterical cros+de of mourners vowed
death to communism oaly a fev milea ai+ay at the fuaeral o~ the head of Iran's
secret revolutionary council.
- The Tehran funeral of Aystollah Horteza Not~hari, gunned do~+n by unknoWn
c�sailants here on May Day, turned into a huge anti-lefiving demonstration
aad devout Muslims blamed his death on the left.
25
FOR OFPICIAL USE ONLY
n
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
_ ~'Ott dt~~'1C~AL U5~ t~NLY
Ki~nnuri, who~~ p~rey h~g bl~med Ch~ g~~a~~inaeion on rp~ct~on~ry foree~,
di~mi~~~d th~ a~ti-communigC ~iog,an~, ~aying th~y had bp~n in~pir~d by f~~-
cist~, right-winger~ ~nd ag~nte of imperi~li~m gnd S~v~k (th@ dapo~ed ~hah'~
~~cret polica).
The Isl~mic eupportere of the revolution have ~ince thc~ overthrow di the
. mnngrchy ~hoan Chemeelv~e inrr~a~ingly intolerant o~ their er~twhile e~~ulgr
elliee, but Kianouri gp~~~red le~~ ~fr~id of g puYge of the l~ft Chgn of g
coup by pro-shgh rpmc~flts ~mong th~ mil3t~ry.
Cangtituriongl i~e~rs
Th~ 'Tudeh leader welcom~d the propoeale to natiocu~lize in~urance companieg
and h~avy induetry in the draft conetieueion of the I~lamic republic. But
h~ voiced fpars that other articles of th~ propos~d con~Citution could be
u~~d ~g~in~t the 1eft.
Z'he drnft ~aid depuCiea to Che futur~ pgrliamenC could nat b~ gffiliaCed to
the left or the right. ~heir only affillation w~e to be tn the nat~on, gc-
cording to the texC. ~
Ki~nauri bl~m~~ th~ Marxist-I.~nini~t Fedayan Khalq (People~ Guerrilla) organ-
izgtion for ~tirring up most Muslfm feeling againeC the left.
~lith a pgternal smile, he called the Fedayan eincere, but said their youth
and inexperience had led them to malc~ m~ny tactical mietakes. Th~ ~edayan
hae repeatedly deneunced the Tudeh as 5oviet tools, but Kianouri eaid he
vas ati11 Willing to bring them under the umbrella of hie propoaed popular
revolutionary front.
Kianouri was promoted to secretary-general last January in a move videly
aee as an attempt to pro~ect a nea image by a party Which ~,�as slaw in ~oin-
ing the Khomeyni band-~agoa.
5upporta Kabul Regime _
Kienouri, fnr ins~tance, strongly supported what he called the progressive
policies of the t~abul regime W~ich has been accused by the Iraaian Govern-
ment and religioua leaders of persecuting Muelims iu neighboring Afghanistan.
He said reactionaries inside and outside Tran vere trying to provoke a con-
flict b~twe~n the two couatries. The Tudeh believea Iran ahould sign a
ireaty of nonaggression and noninterveation with Afghaaiataa and all its
neighbors as a more toward the establistm~at of aa Asiaa collective sacurity
system----a long-cherished Kremlia project.
For him, Iran's northern neighbor--~hich has invaded this couatry in both
~+orld aars--could never pose a threat to the Irauian zewlution. "We be3ieve
26
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
I~OIt Ot~ICIA[. USg nNtY
eh~C th~ Sovi~C Union and iC~ eociali~t 011i~~ hav~ n~v~r r~pr~~~nt~d ~
dangQr for th~ lib~arey ~nd ind~pend~ne~ of eouneri~~ figheing ~g,~in~t ~m-
perialiem~" i� the aay he pa~gee over Che Kreml.in'e r~eord of ~tmad int~r-
_ v~neion.
lt~g~firming hi~ ~id~liCy ra th~a principle of inC~rngCiot~l eo~p~r~ti~n ~mong
_ coamuni~t p~rtiee and hailing the Sovipt one tihp b~t-drgnni~ed ~nd ma~c
~xperienced, he diemir~~d iha Surorommunist experimene in We~rarn 8urop~
as irr~levant.
"Hi~tory ~hoa~ that th~ 8oviet Comm~n~et Party line on int~rnaeionai i~~u~~
ha~ ala~ye bepn ~uetified...ae knoa of n~ country ahere eociali~m h~e been
conetructed and triumphed by any oth~r ;~rinciplee than those folla~d by th~ _
~oviet Communigt Party and ite socialia: 811ie~~" he eaid~ but re~ect~d ~c-
cueaeion~ of Tud~h ~ur,s~rvi~na~ to th~ l:r~mtin.
On one point. at l~gt~ Kianouri e~id ther~ ~rould be no return zo the pa~t.
Ther~ is t~-~ be no r~vivgl of the~Tudeh milltary orggnization--the group ahich
- in the lete 1~~,0'a and early 1950's ~etabli~hed a e01id coamuniet neta?ork in
th~ ehah'e ~rma?d forceg.
Th~ Tudeh 1~ad~~r eaid th~re vas no need for euch a csll in an army vhich eup-
port~d the revolution but added a ~horough purge of the mil3tary wae etill ~
neceseary.
Old-Fashioned
A etudenC of arrhitecture in Nazi Gemm~y for three years before returning to
tegch at 'Cehran Univeraity in 1940, Kianouri ie an old-faahioned communi~t
aith t~e time for ideological innovetions. '
Aware of the glamour gained by the Fedayan and other guenilla groups for
th~ir part in the overthroa of the ehah, the Tudeh claims to have loat mor~ ~
etreet fighters than any ather political organization in laet Pebruary's
- battle of Tehran.
Foimded 37qe~re ego, the Tudeh ie the oldest po7~r:~1 party in Iran. Ki~nouri
eaye it aill take oae or two yeare before itg strength can be properly g,auged.
As long ag the cotmtry's pre8ent rul~re accepc his claim that the 1949 bgn on
the perty Was illegal, the Tudeh ~rill at least be able to offer Iran ihe
traditional co~uaiet values of experience, diecipline and organization--
increasingly valuable commoditiea in a country thro~m into chaos bq revolu-
tion.
COPYRIGHT: Tolcyo JA~an Times, ~979
CSO: 4920
27
FOR OPFICIAL ttSE ANi.Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
t~OR Ot~PiC~At, U9~ ONLY `
MOROCCO
DT3CANTEN'~ IN MORO~CO R~PORTED
Pasi~ JEt1N~ AFRIQU~ in Fr~nah id May ?9 pP Z5
k~Ar*.ic1~ by A~ela~ia D~hhmati~ s"'rha Sooial Demoeratic ~mptation"] -
CText~ A n~r~ language ig b~ing epoken in the kir~gdom of }taasan II.
That of eocial ~ugtice arid of the sl.ruggle against Qorrup-
tion and th~ abuae of ~ox~r.
As i May rras draking near~ dvgryone held his b~reath~ labor day could give
free rein to the anger of tens of thaueands oF demons!?rators. Tha nex -
prime mini~ter~ Mr Maati 8ouabid~ ehose this moment to defuse the "bomb."
On F5rlday~ 2'l Ap7Cil~ he antiotu~ced a seriee of ine~urea Which Nould elear~y
lighten this heavy atmospher~ Nhich ~ras due to a net loea in tha purchaeing
poxer of t.he vast ~a~jority oF Noroecar?s.
Amon~ these measures~ the SMIG ~~alaire minimum i~dustriel gar~nti= gua-
ranteed roinimum induatrial ~age (trhich xas 391 c~Srrham~~ 430 French f`rar?cs)
xa8 raised 30 percent xith an additional incraase of 10 pereent as of
i January 1980s in private enterprises~ xagas ~eloN ~00 dirhama xere ra~a~c1
by 116 dirh~ams~ and those betxeen S00 and J~000 dirh~ama by 100 dirhama. The
3MAG [3ala3re minimum agricole garatrti= guarruiteed minintum agriculttsral
tirage]~ xhich i8 very lox, made a 40 per~ent ~ump and the sma11 xage esrners
in the public sector received a is percent, ~aiae. Moreovar, the p~ime min-
iater promiaed a reduction ,~f rents and a,~ ~rontribution by the enterpriaes
to housing coatas a tougher flght a~gairtst price iaareaaes~ ~ore subst~tial
- reimbursements of social aecurity and even #,he cancellation of the last rate
increases for xater and eleetricity.
This increa8~ had been set at 44 percent, but dwring the last fex month~~
~he bills of electricity, gas ar~d xat.er consumers ha~d been multiplied by
tt+o and even three trhen co~pared to the old ones! There xere ttwusar~d8 of
proteats. The ansxer xas invar~ietzly: the country needs ~oneq because
of the burden of the xar in the Sat~ara. Was it the ~eal of a few high
officiais xho xanted to loprove the increasingly critical situation of the
treasury in thia xay or ministerial dSrectivoe?
28
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
1~Ott d1~1~~CtAL U5~ dNtY
H~?ving thug p1a~~.t~d the r~h~pegt t~n~ion~ ~ the prima mini~t~r tonk ~dv~r?t~ge
of it te pre~~nt th~ ~~tt~~~. lin~~ of hSg program on W~dn~~c~?y, ~!~?y~ to the
~rliam~nt. It rr~~ hi~ f~~~~ impo~ctant politia~. ~?et ~inc~ hi~ nomin~?tion -
on 27 M~~h to h~~ th~ gov~rnm~nt in p1~~~ of !tr Ahm~d Ogman ~ Mr t4a~?ti
~ouabid spoke of "conti.nui~~." Hu~ everythir~ on~ t,~ b~li~v~ th~t ~
g~~ciou~ chang~ of direat~on i~ itt the offing~ In O~m~n timeg~ tih~ ~conomy
~xp~ri~ncad a 1ib~r~1 ~~rio~ ahich r~~ch~d it~ climax ~t~ 1975~ t~g to a
~oasin~ of the m~~ck~t ~i~e of ~ho~ph~?t~~~ uhich i~ the m~in r~,~ourc~ ~ Th~
fiv~-y~ar p1~n ~973-197? aa~ ~r~vi~ed uprrard~. Inv~gtm~nt,~~ uhieh ~r~r~ on
th~ ord+~r of 1.2 bi111on dirh~m~ ~n ~9?3~ h~ multipli~d by 8 for 197?
- ~l0 billian dirh~mg).
~hi~ eupho~ie ~tmo~phar~ a~ ~aaom~ni~d by f~~~h ~tart for demoe~aey
Which up ~o th~n hacl b~~n eleajrly mu~~1~d ~ At th~ ~am~ tim~ ~ th~~~ xa~ a?n
~xplo~ion of n~tion~. p~ide ~nd un~nimity ~round th~ m~?tt~r of th~
~ulmin~tit~ it~ th~ Cr~~n M~~h af Novemb~r 1~5. 'Y'h~ first ,~n~g~ ~pp~a~~d
itt 1976 t~d 197?� A reduotion of SO p~r~~nt in the ma~rk~t pri~e af pho~-
pt~t~~ ~~t,~nation of int~rna?tional trade, grou~rig con~wnption of incr~~ingly
~xp~n~ive ~n~~gy~ g~toping infl~tion~ bngg~ng doxtt of th~ partial uar in the
Sa}~a ~ x~r uhich~ not includin~ the m~int~nana~ o~ the troops in
Mauri~ania and in Shab~~ coats aiore th~rl ~ million ~lollar~ a day
Sufldenly~ the euphoria turn~d into ~uish, th~ ~ruc~ety oF the rich~ the
grumblin~ of the poor xho x~r~ tired of carrying the main burden of this
crisi~~ aithout mentioning the pr~ee of t~lood. It xas a dead-end. There
had to be a ah~ge of dir~ction.
- As if nothing uere goit~ on~ Maati Haua~bid is quietly leading Moro~co out of
its traditional liberali~m to take it into ~ social-demoeratia era. A social
d~mocracy structured by "Islaia, th~ constitutional canarchy~ democracy~
public freedoms~ t~rritorial integrity, social ~ustice, d~alogue~ an opening
to all po~itical tendeneies Nhi1e enumerating~ on 2 t~y, the basic
principles and values of xhat ibroccan society at~ould b~ 11ke~ the prims~
minigter did not hide th~ difficulties ar~d handicapa.
~'irat of a11, "the stubborn~~~ of the leaders in Algeria, xhich represents
a hinrlrance ta the achievement of prosperity in the region." ~b that end
it WS].1 be necessary to b~in~ an end to the ruinoua "half-~rar~ helf-peace"
~ituation. But, ~g a prellminasy to peace~ there is nc que~t�on of r~con-
~ sidering territorial integrity. _
On th~ other hand~ in order to maintaln national wlar?imity about the Sahata~
~~it ~rill a~lso be necessary to arrive at a more equi~table rediatribution of
the natfonal riches ar~ revenues." A balancing t~hi~h ~n onl~ be achi~v~ti `
through �'a bigger strugLle against certain social ailments auch as nepotiam~
corruption, the abuse of poxer~ xherever they may occur.~~ 7his dariitg
~assage Nas punctuated by vigorous applause~ even though a number of repre-
- senta~iveg are from the moat advantaged classes. ~.1?eryboc~y feels that
~~something" xill have to be done to counter the criais~ xhich is at the same
time an economic aad a moral Ane.
29
FOR OFEtICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
~OR df~~'ICIAL U3~ dNLY
Kith th~ ~e~m~nt of Kir~g H~gg~ TZ~ who r~main~ th~ m~in gtr~t~~igt ~f tha
change ~ Maati Eouabid not only tri~d ~o gcas~ tho~e r3.ch inc~i.vidu~.].s ~~om~
billiona~res ~rho in tha pa~t h~ve abuead ~11 the ~itu~?tione~ H~ did not
fail c1~~creetly to oa11 ~he U9~P ~Un1on 8ocia1,l~t~ fle~ forceg populaires~
~~~i~t~~t Uniun nf Fapular Fbra~s ~ the main op~s~itian pa~ty dn the left~
to order by ~~ting that '~tih~ ~volving d~mocracy mugt t~ prot~at~d ag~.ingt
~11 ~i~rahi~~ and higher bida.'~ Aa a matt~r of fact~ theee l~et fex mon~h~
~ the par$y of Mr Abderrahim Bouabid ha~ baen the ma.i.n b~neficl~ry of the dig-
~onten~ in th~ country. The nwab~r of itg ac~ivSat~ ha~ ~eatly in~r~agafl
~ine~ the rel~tSve failur~ of ~he June 19?7 legialative el~~tion~. Thie
hag plac~d the oth~r big parties~ suah ~ the I~tiqlal the Nbro~oan Fopular
Movement ~1~M] and the National Rg11y of Independenta ~RNI~~ in a aometlmee
diffi~W.t poeition.
~'her~ is a s~riou+~ d~bate ~oing on xithin the Istiqlali "It would be bett~r
to ~bandon tr,~ gov~rnm~nt ehip if w~ have to ~or?tinue emptying our r~nlcs~"
In orcler not to xithdraW it~ ~ight mini~ter~~ the Ietiqlal hag been given
~ati~f~~tion in foreign policy xith a mor~ v3~oroua condemnation of Se.ci~t
~nd i;h~ departur~ of the 3hah of 7san. ~er~ ~e anxietie~ of a d~ff~rent
kind xitl~.in th~ RNI: about the middle of Apri1~ 30 represent,ativeg xanted
to seced~ in order no langer to ba mixed up Kith the b~g bus~nesamen and
_ billiottaireg in tha party. Theae ~~big shotg" s~rouse certain doubts and
- r~unors~ magnified by putalic opinion, ha?ve circulated about flighta of capital
~nd impending arr~~t~
Thi~ climate s~riously xorried even the Pa1ac~~ xh~re numeraus people sus- -
pected that this ~'crisis of confidence~~ operatian xae ~aused by malevolent
foreignerg xho may have found sympathetic earg xithin the country. Thie
: l~d to veritable mobili~ation on 10 and 11 April~ to neutralize a strike
by teachers and health officials. _
These strikes~ xhich xere incited by the nex union Uranch of the U9FP~ the
Democratic Confederation of Labor, t+~re fought by means of large nwabers of
arrests gnd firings~ even an atsrming return to the praetiae of torture
xhich xas inflicted on ~everal .teachers~ atudents and ~rorkers. One need
only read various local nexspapera, auch as AL-MUHARRIR~ to find out~ thanks
to real Freedom of the preas~ about the misdesds of aome policemen or of a
fQx local administrator$. AL-BAYANE, in turn, ci~ed 5 ca~illion hours of
strikes for the three lagt months alone~ strilses xhich affected the minea~
the barilcs, the railroads, the longshoremen~ the teachers
At the beginning of May, the government plan oariaged to unt~ee~e allghtly
this heavy atmoaphere. The name BouaMd has become very popular~ but kl.th-
out knoxing uhether it refers to Abderrahfm or Maati. iihil.e axalting a
change~ it is the second one xho conducts the policy of the firat by trying
to cut hira out. But some people are afiald for Abderrahim~ afraid that he
- might meet xith the same fate as Zluiisian union leader Habib Achour, xho
xas pushed too far by his yow~g lieutenants xho demanded ~~everything and
everythir~g ima?ediately"
30
FOR O~ICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
FOR 01~1~IGIAt U3E ONLY
But Sn Morooao~ Abd~r~ahSm Bouab~.d hae a uindox opening onto tha Na~ion~.
5eourity aounail. 'I'here~ he meets onoe a w~~ek with K.1.ng Haesan I7 ~nd ~11
the par~y leaaer~~ including the communist A11, Yata~ ~to t,a~.k about a 8aared
oauea i t,he Sahara~ ~t Ss a bi~E 11,ke a vi~ious ci.~a],e.
COPYRICNTa J~un~ At'rique GRUPJ~A 1979
~3
CSOt 4~00
,
31
FOR OFFICIAL USS ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
~OIt O~~ICIAL US~ ONLY
SUUAN
OPpO52TIbN S~EKS UNITY, DOWN~ALL 0~ R~GIME ;
P~ri~ AL-WATAN At-'ARABI in Arabic 18 May 79 pp 2)-30 JN -
~Intervinw with gl-Sh~rif Hueayn g1-Hindi, ~xiled leader nf Che Democratic
UninnigC Pgrty, g Sudgn~g~ oppneition grnup, by AL-WATAN AL-'AI2ABI corres-
pnnder_t Bndr al-Ha~, in Lottdon--date not gpecified) _
(Exc~rpte] (Qu~~tinnj Undoubtedly, you have been following the official
conCscCe between Sudan and Libya. It hn~ aleo been reiCerated Chat offi-
cial Sudanese contacte were made with you in Y.ondon. Is thig true? What
is your explanation of these activitiea, undertaken by Preaident Numayri's
regime at thie parCicular time?
~Answer) The revolutinnary crisie has reached its peak in Sudan~ both
on the public and military levels. At the same time, the pan-Arab aiege
of the Sudanese regime hg~ been tightened. All 18 Arab statea at the
Bgghdgd Arab ~ummit stood together, while Sudan and Oman alone stood on
the side of al-Sadat.
In my opinion, Numayri's acti~rities are suspicious, because their purpoae
is to extricate Sudan from Che atrangling crisis, which has taken on
different aspNCts in recent weeks. Some of these aspects are viaible,
while othera are not. Yet they all indicate that the revalutionary crieis
is ripe on the nation, pan-Arab, military and public level~. Therefore,
the purpose af these activities is to water down thia revolution, which
is bound to explode.
I repeat, we are not a party to theae activities. We cannot possibly sit
down at the negotiation table unlesa Numayri declares that he will etep down
from government in Sudan or proclaims a pan-Arab poaition, meeting the maxi-
mal demand made by the Sudaneae people, who adhere to their pan-Arab stand.
[Question] You have been quoted recently as asserting that the downfall
of President Ja'far Muhammad Numayri's regime is imminent. Do you atill
hold this view?
32
- FOR OFFICIkL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
~OR OF~ICIAL US~ ONLY
(AngwerJ Y~g. Ag ~ ma.tGer of fgct, I am even more convinced now ~nd I
hold Co my opinion. I wnuld like to a~gure ~11 my broehere in Sudgn gnd
in th~ Ar~b homeland thaC this reg3me'g dnwnf~ll is very near. The
regime i~ breathing ita 1aet. The regime's currenC gceivities ~nd
convuleicn~ ar~ nothing but a desperaCe attempt ro prolong it for g month
or two,
(QuesCion] On whati do ynu base your belief? Uo you have a compleCe pic-
Lure of the re~l ineerngl situation?
(Answer~ The many reports and informgtion we have speak of acCiviCies,
oucburets and individual gteempte within the armed �orces and of ambiguous
incident~ in which a number of of�icera, NCO's and troops fell victim.
'Ther~ ie aleo talk about ~rmg being smu~gled acrosa the border ineo Sud~n.
(Quegtion] '1'here ie Calk abouC differences among members of the Sudanese
regime, such as the differences between Preaident Numayri and his deputy
Abu al-Qasim Mahammad Ibrahim.
[Answer] The talk about differencea between Abu al-Qasim and Numayri and _
between this man and Chat man is characteriatic of Sudanese policy.
Numayri's ob~ective is Co turn people against each other, in order to stay
in power.
[QueaCion] You said that Numayri has deceived some of Che Sudanese states-
men. Do you mean Sadiq al-Mahdi? If this is so, there are reports of a
r~newed dialog between your party, the National Union Party, and al-Mahdi.
[Answer] There is no dialog between Sadiq al-Mahdi and the Sudanese
opposition. What has happened is that all those who were represented by
- al-Sadiq al-Mahdi in Sudan are now in the Sudanese opposition. Theae
people come here and then they go back to al-Mahdi to warn him against
slipping into the government's ranks. They come to us to confirm that they
- are adopting the oppoaiCion line inside the Sudan.
~ We know these peop~e very well, because we have worked with them in the
opposition. As for al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, we cannot and musC not conduct a
dialog with him, unless he clearly defines his role in Sudan: Is he
working for the overthrow of the current regime or not?
A1-Sadiq is now followin~ a middle course, a compromise course. And even
if al-Sadiq al-Mahdi adopts a definiCe attitude against the Sudanese
regime many people will not feel confident. They believe that al-Mahdi
might change his attitude again.
~ The important thing is that there is no dialog between us and al-Sadiq
al-:iahdi. There ia no agreement, and this is definite.
33
FOR OFFICItiI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
FOR OF~ICIAL USE ONLY
Itegarding the otiher groupe and parties, Chere ie a conr3nuoue d~.alog with
- Chem b~eed on adopting e line of clear oppoeition to the Sudanese guthori-
ties. Thig dialog is being conducCed among the Democratic Unioniet Party,
the Ba'Ch Party, the communiate and othar opposition groupa. So far~ we
have not reaChed a formula for 8 pACC~ However, we are meeCing and con-
~ eult~.ng with one another and discueaing the question of reaching a~oinr
formula for Che unitiy of the Sudanese opposition movement againet rhe
current regime. '
COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
CSO: 4802
?
34
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
FOR nFFICIAL USE ONLY
SYRIA
COIrQriUNIST PARTY FACTIONS QUARREL AMONG THEMSELVES
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 4-10 May 79 p 32 JN
[Excerpes] Damascus--It ie no secret thaC the Syrian Communist ~arty--one
of the oldest communiet parties in the Arab world--experienced internal
divisions during Che seventiea, and that Chese diviaions precipiCated the
presence of two para11e1 communist parties. Theae are: The Syrian
Communist Party under the leadership of the 65-year-old Khalid ~~kdash,
which has drawn the old guards who are in sympathy wiCh the Soviet Union's
political and ideological line; and the Syrian Communiat ParCy--political
bureau, under the leadership of Riyad al-Turk, which pursues a more inde-
pendent line from Moscow's.
During the Fifth Congress of the Communiat ParCy--political bureau, and
then during the meetings of the party's central committee 2 months ago,
the party's line and policies and its ability to aCtract the masses, and
_ especially the party bases, were debated.
Informed observers here say that the lengthy discussions precipitated the
differences among thQ party's various trends. Theae currents can be
formulated as follows:
1. Riyad al-Turk's faction, which is supported especially by the group
known as "the Homs Group." Homs is an industrial town in Central Syria
which used to be one of the active center~ of the communist party in the
past.
2. The faction of Yusuf Nimr. This wing is supported by the Damascus
group, and includes party members who were involved in levelling strong
criticis;a publicly at Khalid Bakdash's leadership.
~
3. The faction of Badr-al-Din al-Tawil. This includes a group of,party ~
members who expressed their dissatisfaction with the manner the party's _
intern~l elections were carried out, claiming that the elections were ~
divorced from the spirit of democracy. ~
- 35
FQR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
~Ott f~~'~f~fAt, U5~ tlNLY
The cnmmuni~t p~rty l~d by ~akdggh ig in e no better et~Ce thgn th~
par~ll~l pgrey led by al-'~urk. Diff~r~nce~ in~id~ ~~kdg~h'~ p~rey hgve _
1ed td ehe pd~tpdn~ment of party ~lp~tion~ fnr ~lightly mor~ Ch~n 1 y~gr.
At timee the party leader~hip found itself uneble to control thE curr~nts -
whi~h ~1~ghed ingide the p~rty. The~e current~ were gov~rned mor~ by
pergnngliCie~ ~nd ldyglti~~ thgn by p~licic~l and idpologica~ eon~id~r~-
~ cinns.
'Th~ mogt l.mpdrtant gnd promittent currentg in~ide the pgrty c~n b~ r~epr~- -
set?eed by the following fgctions:
- 1. The fe~tion nf Mured Yueuf~ membpr of the politiegl bureau~ who--it
w~a reported here--threaten~d a f~w weeke a~go to "explod~" th~ pgrty from
within, d~cl~re publicly ~hgt eh~ m~ceer i~ no longer tolerabl~ and put
gll thp f~cC~ b~fer~ the pgrty.
2. The faction of Yu~uf F~yggl, the pgrCy'g d~puty ~ecretary g~ner~l and
gtrongman, who accuB~s Murad Yusuf'g factiott of gttempting eo impose it~
nominees, viewe and line on the party throu~h party el~ctions.
Party l~ad~r Khalid Bgkdash appeare to be the main lo~~r as e re~u1C uf
this split. He findg himself unable to take the gide of either of the
two sides, especially aince both sides claim to apeak on his behalf. _
Obaerverg note that no measurpg have been euccesaful in prevent~ng Che
_ party from aplitting. ~ven the decisions ndopted by the party's central
committee at the end of lagt year did not prevent the aplit and division.
The split ineide the communist party in the aeventies is due to several
_ personal, political and ideological reasons. There were atrong ob~ections
to "the personality cult" inside the party.
This accusation is ievelled against Khalid Bakdash who has retained the
party leadership for more than 40 yeara, and--in the words of his oppo-
nents--directs the pacty in a"personal and arbitrary" manner. This
accusation hns gained eCrength while Bakdash's advanced age and poor
health have greatly a:fected his party activities. This hae brought about
more than one person who aspires to be his succeasor.
On tha political and ideological level, the neW party leaderehipa and
bases have felt the need to pursue an Arab line that is in harniony aith
the Syrians' aspirations, national hopes~ and great and conetant commit-
~~nt to Arab c~uses, above all to Arab unity.
Th'.s line is represented by Riyad al-Turk, Daniel Ni'mah~ Zafir 'Abd-as-
Samad and Ibrahim Bakri. Differences reached the point of a complete
split and al-Turk formed a neW party~ ahile most of his aforementioned
supporters returne~! to the party fold under Bakdash's leadership.
COPYRICNT: 19?9 tiL-WATAN AL-ARABI
CSO: 4802
36
FOR OFFICIAL USE 0?1LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
,
~'Olt 0~'~'YCIAL U5~ ONtY
5YRIA
~ GROMYKO REPORTLULY A'TTE1~@TED TO HEAL RIFTS IN SYRIAN CP
P~ri~ AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 4-10 May 79 p 32 JN
(Textj During his recene visiC to Damaecu~, Andrey Cromyko, member of
the CP5U Central Commiteee Politburo end U5SR Foreign Minister, met with
several members of the political bureau of the Syrian Communiet Party.
Amang the more important topice which Gromyko discuseed vith them wag the
attempt to contain the crisie that was threatening to explode inside the
party.
Cromyko talked about the circumatances facing the area~ eapecially in
the wake of the eigning of the Egyptian-Ieraeli treaty, and the 5oviet _
t1nion'e responeibility in this matter. Gromyko eaid that he does not
want trouble from the Syrian Communist Party~ and that the party'e unity
is very important for the Soviet Union's influence on eventa in the area.
Gromyko's meeting took place at Khalid Bakdash's home, and wae attended
by Bakdash, Murad Yusuf, Daniel Ni'mah and 'Umar al-Siba'i. Yuauf Payeal,
leader of the opposition faction inside the party, did not attend the
- mpeting because he Was touring some socialist countries.
It is well known that the CPSU has made several ineffective attempts to
intervene and contain the differences and splits inaide the Syrian
Communist Party during the past feW y~ars.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-ARA$I
- CSO: 4802
37
FOR OP'FICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
FOR OFp'YCxAL USE ONLY
- ~rurrYSu
- MDS OPPOSITION, PRESS DLSCRIBED AS HAVIN(i FACTIONS
Parie JEUNE A1~RIQUL in ~rench 2 May 79 p 1'7
(ArCicie by ~uni~ correepondenti Souheyr Belhgeeen: "1'he Tunisian
Opposition and ICe Newepapere"]
(TexCj "Owc neaepaper hailed the iniCiativ~ (eetabliehmenC af e political
party) of a certain number of sociai democrate headed by Ahmed Mestiri.
This doee not mean far a11 that that our organ is the epokesman of thaC
party. Our taking of position ie a coneequence of our attachment Co
fundamental freedoms underwriCten by the Constitution." Yt ie in theee
te nve that the editorialist of AL-RA~Y introduced the eecoad year in
- bu~iness of the opposiCion newepaper afCer 3 monthe of interdiction.
Theee camments did noC go unnoCiced amang public opinion vhich, during -
the past year, had found differencea in tone betWeen AI.-RA'Y and
~EMOCRATIE, the tWO publicatione of the t~IDS [MovemsaC of Social DemocratsJ.
The forner~ headed by Hasaib Ben Anmar, reflected the opinion of Che
radical wing of the movement s~hich fotmed the executive com~aittee establiehed~
even though it wae not approved, on 12 June 1978. In contraeC, D~ATIE
has alvaye been mar e careful in accommodating the go~ern~nt.
Ben Ammar ae~s to want not only to have the ti+o Weeklies cover the enCire
spectrum bue also to outline a reaction of greater independeace with
regard to the factions Which animate the mwement. If AL-RN'Y, it is
- aleo asserted, "defended Habib Achour and the trade wnion leaders...and ~
supported the demanda of eane individuals to have nevgpapera...," it s~as
in order to defend fundamental public freedome. AI.-RA'Y thus backed the
founding of a party by Ahmed Mestiri ~ust as it had backed the etudents.
"Our position is a reacCion before the disreepect of the authorities
vie-a-vis public libertiea," the editorialist continued. This concern
is perhaps not alien to the interdiction measure against AL-RA'Y or the
six cases na+ before the courte in ahich the t~ro aewapapers are the
defendante.
3$
FOEt OFPICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
FO~c OFFIC~AL USB ONGY ~
Accordingly, the fa~Cion~ which cc~xirC within Ch~ mewamenr refiect more
rtrategic and egceicgi di~ferencas th~n diAagrae~nenCr ov~r aeaenCi~l
goais. Hesidas, ali r~a a rign of poliCic~1 matutiitiy in iti.
COPYRI(~T: Jeuee Afrique (~[tUPJIA 1979
2662
C$0: 4400
~
39
FaR O~FICIAL USB ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
Falt OPFICxAL US~ ONLY
TUNISrA
POT~NTIAI. CANUIDATES FOR ARAB LLAGUE 3EC12L~ARY (iEN6RAL ASSAYSD
Parie JEUNE AI~RIQUE in F'rench 2 t~y 79 pp 68-69
[Articl~ by ~uni~ correepondenC Souhayr ~eih~eeen: "Argb t,eague--7'he
Cgndidate Fram 'Tunie"~
[TextJ A candidate for the poet of secreCary general of the Arab League
(whose headquartere viil be traneferred to Tunia ~a a reeult of the
$aghdad eummit conference ~hich suspended Egype fran the I.eague), Tunieia
facee a touchy problem, namely, which candidate to propose for the ~ob? `
The iniCial responee of th~ man�in-the-street overlapped that of the
politici~n, both of them thinking in the past.
- Indeed, the ngmes mentianed were thoae of pereonalitiee~ who are no longer
on the political scene Coday but vho have identified--each in hie own
aay�-with Arabism: Bahi Ladghem, aho for 15 years was the right-hand
man of President Habib Bourguiba, and Mohmned Masmoudis fottaer Tunisian
minieter of foreign affairs, ehuated aeide afCer the gborted Tunisiaa-
Libyan uttion of 1974. "Why would We hold political grievancee against
rather than trust theee 3ndividuals, the real ectivism which motivaCed
their action and which idenCified Tunisia's image through them?" a diplamat
noted. Today, it is found that thie image has persieted deapite the
receding of the individuals into the background. Bahi Ladgham repreeente
the Tunisia of the 1950's and 1960's which used to advocaCe Arabiem aith
faith and moderation. Mohatned Masmo~+!~i repreaents aaother, more
controversial and parCieaa, generation. Each one th;ia symbolizes an age
of "Tunisian Arabism" and they appear--including to tho8e outeide Tunisia--
- ae serious candidates. Other "high-caliber" candidatea besides those who
have managed Tunisia's foreign affairs and thereby become knara in the
Arab aorld auch as Habib Chatty cannot for various reaeons be conaidered
ae candidates for the Arab I,eague position. One ca ld also think of a
career dip~omat such as Taieb Sahbani, who has the virtue8 of ~the profes-
sion. Descreet, he enjoys a moral authority which raiaes him to the
leading raak of "profesaional" candidates. Juet ae the choice of T~mis
as the 8eat af the Arab teague, so the eelection of Che Tuc~isian caudidate
for the position of secretary general is somewhat of an elimination gaae.
1+0 ' .
FQt OFPICIAL USE ONLy
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
I~OA O1~FICiA'L US~ ONLY
Thig prdcedur~ c~n anly i~~d ta, Ch~ ~hoice df gn individuni who h~A ~C
ieaet be~n in cone~ce with eh~ Ar~b wnrld, ~'h~t ia th~ c~~e df Ch~dly
Klibi, th~ p~~~ent T~nieign mini~ter o~ inform~Cion, who hns b~n~fiCed ~
fran hie gov~rnment's con~idence. A uni.ve~c~itiy prnf~g~ar of A~c~bic _
liCeY~Cur~ ~nd philosophy ~G ~h~ 3nrbann~, Klibi h~e been ~ n?~tnber of
th~ Ac~demy of AY~b Lieer~eure for n~grly 10 ye~rg n~w~ ~orh nn thi~
ecor~ ~nd bv virtue n~ hig wri~ings, h~ i~ kncx~m in cul~urgl circle~
and in thd ra~dia (egctor~ which he had hegded ~1m~~C uninte~ruptedly
for d~e p~gt 13 y~gre).
A cultured man whoee pg~t ie th~t of g g~nior gov~rnment ~fficial, Chedly
Klibi h~s ~ notaworthy prpeenc~ in inCern~tion~l ~ultur~l circles (UNESCO)
~nd eep~eially Arab one~. Hie following nnd influence cannot be chailenged.
Lndowed with a penetrating ~pirit of analyeig, Klibi hae the g~ri~e of
di~creet ~nd mdd~r~te lan$ugge, buti ~ lgngua~e th~t is Fair an~ i.~loquenC.
When h~ hgs to m~k~ a d~~iainn, he 1i~t~ne, r~l~t~e to p~ople, ,~.td is
prud~nt. Aged 54, of frail build and with gr~ying hair, he mov~g wiCh
a~ much ease in Ar~b gnd I8lamic circles as in French-~peakfng circlas.
A member of the polieburo of Che Deatourian Socialiat ParCy (Che highest
poliricai c~rgan in Turtisig), Chedly Kiibi, despi.te hie Cime in Preeident
Bourguiba's cabineC, hag never had the opportuniCy to distinguish himsetf
in gpecial circumstancea. In ~ddiCion, his experience aith international
politice is academic. He is litrle knawn in Arab political and dipianatic
circlea. That undoubtedly explains why his candidacy aurpriaed the
participants aC the Baghdad conference. 3 ane even auggested that they
vieWed With favor the candidacy of Bahi Ladgham whose qualities ae negotiatar
had been nppreciated gt the time of hi~ intervention at the head of an
Arab delegation sent to A~aan to puC an end to the Sordanian-paleetinign
claehes of "Black September" [1970). The name of Mohamed Mascnoudi, in
contraet, wag not put forward by many delegates, Who often preferred
Taieb Sahbani to hia~.
Taieb Sahbani chaired in Tunis, during the firet half of April 1979, the _
working seesiona of Che CommitCe~ of Six (Kuwaie, Algeria, Tuniaia, Irgq,
Syria, and Saudi Arabia) entruated with traneferring the Arab League
headquarCere. -
B~hi Ladgham, who had shunted aside by President Bourguiba in 1970 (in
favor of the preaenC prime minieter, Hedi Nouira), said: "If I could
help improve the exiating atate of inter-Arab relations I would not
refuse the position." According to Ladgham it would be necegsary, even
with a truncated organizaCion, Co take an "optimisCic" vieW "oF
redfacoveriea and reconciliation Co give it a new breath of life and to
coneider ahat has jusC happened as a pasaing incident."
The negatiNe aide of the sanctions will not be lang in making itaelf
felt in all the Arab countriea, eapecially in the committees of the Arab
League which had plans pending. "Ke shall aee then whether We have
gone too far," Bahi Ladgham said. According to him, the secretary general
41
FOR OPFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
- ~OR O~F~CLIL U9~ ON~Y
of the Atigb T.~ggu~ ~h~uld b~ imp~reigi r~g~rding Ch~ aurr~ne~ ~hirh ggtC~~~
th~ ~rg~nisc~el.an 90 g8 to find ~"modu~ viv~ndi" ~nd, withouC r~C~nting,
throw g~~ick Co ~gypt ~nd beC on the fueure. L~dghgm go~e furth~r. _
Yndeed, h~ f~aei� th~t ~ rev~mping ~f the Le~gu~'r s~er8tari~e ehouid give
the e~cr~t~ry g~nar~l not ~ roi~ of ~xecutive seer~tary ae in the care of
tha Oxg~ni~~Ci~~n o~ African UniCy buC rathar of initiaesve ~nd, pro-
portinn~t~ly, grr~nge eo ChgC hia ~unctii~ne might par~ilel tho~~ of the -
Unit~d N~tione ~ecretary gener~i. In oCher.~ aordr~ to arr~ng~ thi,ngs eo
eh~C th~ execuriv~ m~y b~ "th~ mgna~er of ~ c~uae r~~h~r th,~n th~
~dminieCraCor of ~n in~tteuCion ~nd--wh~t is ~ven Worae--Che m~n~ger of
egncCiong, th~t ie, of the ne~~~ive ~tde of incer-t~t~b ~~t~ticm~." Th~
gecretg ry g~ner~l of Ch~ Arab I.eggue mugC in eume a~y--eCiit ~ccarding
to Bghi Ladghem--b~ "the coneci8nce of th~ Arabe but it is a18o neceu~ary
tn find ~ nancdnCroversigl peraonality aho i~ noe ~u~t ~e~king ~ pa ition
either in hi~ country or ~leeahere. ~er~onaliy, I em not fiehing for
~nyChing, L~dgh~nm s~id. "One tgkes g big ch~nce in being aecret~ry? p~ner~i
of th~ Arab L~~gue."
Yt ie thought that Che Council of the Arab i.eague might be convaned before
the ech~duled d~te (Septanber 19y9) to elect the naw g~cretary genernl,
nnd it ie burely probabl~ Chat the Tuniei~n Qovernment ehould change
iC~ mind ~bout euppurting th~ cgadid~cy of Chedly Klibi. However, �ome
individugls feelin Tunie that if gn acCion ie taken by the Arab heade of
eCgte in favor nf $ghi i.adghgm, ae [BgypCian Preeid~ntj Gemal ~Abd-al-Naeir
did at the time of "Black 3ept~mber," it is not inconceivable that
President Bourguib~ might allos~ hime e1f to be pereuaded.
Accuxding to Moh~med M~emoudi, the tranefer of thg Arab I.~ague headquartere -
- to Tunis could be "an excellent thing for Che Arab World." But given
the diviaions Which fragment it today~ the candidate for the position of ~
secretary general needs imagination and a perfect knawledge of the
individuals and problems in order for the League to becane more effective.
That is Why Mohamed Masmoudi declgres himself to be ready--he too--to
r~spond to a poeaible call by hia govermient even for a limited period~ _
long eaough ro "put the machine inCo motion." -
While the iniCial reacCione to the de~ieion to transfer taken in Nov~aber
1978 Were marked by ite reservationa, Tunig is todgy not only the seat
of the Arab League but ~iso the hane of an accepted candidate for the
' poeition of secreCary general. Thie unaccuetomed combination ia not the
reeult of the reeolve of Tunisiana but rather than of the preeeure of Arab -
countries Which had no other choice. Bapecially for Algeria, the tranefer
of the organization kas gn occasion of rapprochement With ite easCern
neighbor. 7'he Algiers Government evidenced enthuaiaem and unusual Warmth
in congratulating the Tunigians "for Chis proof of trusC" and made iC kaa+n
42
FOIt OFFIC7AI. USE 0[~LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
OP'PICYAL U9~ ONLY ~ _
that Aig~ri~ e~pported ~h~ ~uni~s~n candid~ny. In tihe lon~ t~arm~ it
i, beliav~d, Aig~rig couid ben~fic fram ~"M~ghrabi~~ti~n of tih~
i.~aague" ~?iehouti h~ving eo b~r its ieconvenient ga~turee. ~
COPYRIaH~ t J~u~?e A~riqu~ f~tUPJIA 19y9
26GZ
_ C3~;: 4400 _
~
43
FO~t OFFICIAL t~3E O~tLY _
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
1~OR Of~YC~A~ U9~ ONLY
TUNI8Y11
EX-NOR~ICN MItdISTER MASMOUDI CO~AiENT3 ON INTBIt-ARAB AFFAIRS
~~ri~ JLUN~ At~EtYQUB tn French 16 Mgy 79 p 23
(Areicie by runi~ correepnndent Souhayr Belh~gsen: "A1-Qadhdhgfi Ha~ ra
Stop"j
[Text~ "Revolution h~~ became a goal for Qadhdhafi. ~e cannoC stop any
more. One must kc~ow ha~a to becan~ coneervativ~ in order to r~t~in ehe
~chievemenCe of the revolution. However, Qadhdhafi's permgnent revolutiion
ig crazy." Caning fran the mouth of Mohmned Masmoudi, fot~m r Tunisian
minieter nf foreign affa2re, theee worde mny be eurprieing. Considered
ae the artiean of the Tuniaian-Libygn mergex plan of Jerba (January 1974),
Maemoudi lives today undQr houee arreeC, a victim of thia aborted union.
He hae thue had all the time nec~asary to mediate on this "eoul in
rebellion" ge h~ ehgrgcterised Col Mu'aarmar ai-Qgdhdhafi in hie book,
"The Araba in the 3torm," and to reviae hie attitude regarding the Libyan
head of staCe.
Ieolated, a prieoner WithouC being one, Mohamed Masmoudi has never been
under such hegvy guard as he ie today, aven When he aas the Tuaieian �
foreign minieter. 3ix sentry boxes painted in Tunieia'8 national colare
aerve as shelter for the police Who Watch Maemoudi's reeidence of the
Manouba district. A police etationwagon ie parked on a pet~oanent basis
in front of Che entrance and no fewer than seven policemen in mufti check
_ on the identiey of the new visitors. Depeading on instructions, these
are a1loWed or not to aee the master of the house. He is alone at home,
hia Wife and eeven children living in Paris. Masmoudi ~hones them on
Pridays fran his parente-in-law's home Where he visits after hia Weekly
prnyer at the mosque. During this only outing hie car is preceded and
folloaed by police vehiclea.
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni hae replaced Qadhdhafi in Masanoudi's thinking.
The Iranian revolution thrills him. "It ie the mosC important event in
theee paet 50 yeare," he explaina. "It ie now neceseary to avoid aeeing
it pre-empted by the Americans or the Ru~eians or by anybody else. To
convert it into a political mwement to aseert ite authenticity aould be
to denigrate Islma. The Iranian Islamic regime will be the best in the '
World or will not be at all.
44
FOR OFFICIAL'USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
~tllt O~IC~AL US~ ONLY
"'~n f~i1~w tih~ Weee ig en ~~pduse ie bn Che end. Now, dn~ fi.ndg tndny Ch~
f~ilura of m~eeri~liam. We muet th~re~or~ be im~gin~eiv~, inn~vgtiv~,
era~rive, fo~r pro~regs stmns ~ran the differ~nce. On~ muet be proud _
of one'~ differ~n~e, e8~01188 ir. And wh~n~ ~s ~.n Ir~n, ~he peopi~ wiehoue
r~rm~, wi~h~ut nnyChtng, ~g~e Qven de~Ch fdr Ch~ ~nk~ bding differen~~
�Ch~e iu ~ grndC ln~~dn for ue, Tha 3h~h wug going ggain~C Ch~ CurronC
nttd ha c~ma up gg~inet ehe ~ornid~blo r~~ection of a peopl~ who hAd only
eheir f~ith."
- ~nr Moh~med M~smoudi 8upport d� th~ 1'~.le~tini~ng is Che nCher prim~z,~
aepecC of Ch~ Ir~ni~n r~volu~ion. He pgid: "The pglestini~ne loat B~gypt
but th~y won Iran." The fot~ner Tunigian �oreign minieter ie not g
p~rti~an og pre~idant Anw~r ai-3~d~e~ M~emoudi c anmented: "K~ ia g man
whan the mgse medig hgv~ driv~n ouC of hie mind," who beli~ ves Chat he
is C~rrific. ~nr Mgemaudi, ~1-S~d~t h~g b~en nothing mor~ th~n ~ Coy in
Che hands of Pr~eident Jimmy C~rCer, whn did n~e know even how to make
~n import~nt ~11y of Anragr gi-9ad~t by pr~eerving his power or by giving him
resourc~s. According to Masmoudi, ie ie pric~~ Miniater Mgn~chem Begin
who dr~a the mos~ benefitia fran the Waehingecm (peace~ tregty.
"Being involved in domestic politic~ is of no intereee eo me whatever~"
he cuntinued. "It is neceseary today to fulfill the dregm of the young who
wish to fight in an Arab-Muslim cultural context 8o thgt th~y mgy find what
ie approprigCe to Chem anywhere in Chie are~. Between an organic union
of this Arab-Muslim ~rea and what ie in exietence today there is nothing. _
However, what woutd be exalting, etill for Maemoudi, is to etrive to
, concretize thie dream," Which will not happen fran one day Co the next."
The transfer of the Arab League to Tunie has made the name of Mohamed
Masmoudi newsworthy once more. Some countries reportedly proposed hie
name as candid ate for the poaition of secretary general.
The clashes which divide the Maghreb will calm doWn one day, Masmoudi
observed. "I am convinced thaC countrie8 will end up by geCting together,"
ha noted regarding the Algerian-Moroccan dispuCe. The Way in which _
succession has taken piace in Algeria, "without hitches or problemg," is
a leason for the Third World in his eyes. Like a lion in a cage, M~hamed
Masmoudi c amnented on current evente with hia grating voice by looking
at disCant horizona which keep him frnm bumping inCo some more iaQnediate
realitiea.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
~662
CSO: 4400
45
FOR O~FFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
t~OR OI~ICiAL U5~ ONLY
'MTNIBIA
MOV'E OF AR18 Y~IC~ TO '~I1NI3 aRITIQIZID
P~ri.~ AFRYQUF-~ASY~ in Frenoh 14-22 MqY 79 p 42 -
[Artiole by Anie Saohid= "An ,rob Gloea"~
[Te~ct] Sinae Bourguiba still ahooeee the Veetern oamp,
eetting up the Arab I,eague ia 'sn,ie xill iuvoiva rerioue
threste.
Tunis i~ deaked with llrab fla?gs. Sinae the a~nounoemsnt of the traaefer of
~rab Leggue heedquarters to the Tuaieiau oapital~ the reoovery oampsi~a ie
in full arring. I~rerq man ~aolc in the aountry hae been dsily invited to
celebrate the event.
But while in Baghdad the aonsansus aa to 1liaie eeemed to be rather that it
~a the leeeer of t~ro e`rils, in ~nisia matters toolc quite aaother turn.
- In the course of etatemente iesued, people ehifted briskly from "the leseer
of txo evi2s" to a"~udiaioue choiae" and to t~he a posteriori ~uetifioation
of R~uni~ia~e Arab polioy, rrhich wauld thus be eaaotioaed.
O~e mig3~t think one was imagi.nis~g it but the faat ie that in reality o~e
hears eympathetia aomments from Paleatini~a resistance org~ni$ation epokee- _
men as aell as from some member nations of the Firm4ees Froat.
Tunisiaa diplomato are Firmly couating on puahing their advaatag~e to the
limit, aided, to be sure, by the uaual lit~anies on the "nsx viet~as" tbat
xill noa be opened to the organizsticai ae a result of its being looated in
R1~nie~ Without provoking the elightest reserve or the alightest unreat,
the g+averna,ent has aesumed the offeneive. It alreac~y has its oandidate
in the league~s eearetasiat gea~erel, Mr Criadli Hlibi, tirlio haa slns~ys been
a f1i11-fledg+ed member of the Deatovr eetabliebment arld ie qualified to teaah
Arabic, whiah ia something for a rsgime ~rhoee obeeaeiar? with the Meet ie
boundleas.
46
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
~o~ n~rzcitw us~ ~rtt.Y
W~ oan quite rightly ~~?y ~ha~ the hi~tory of relatione betrreen Tunisia ~nd
the Argb Leagu~ ie that of the former~e guooeagive breake with the le?tter.+?
'11uzi~ia had to wai.t ~wo and one-ha.lf yeare af~er gaiming ~,~g independenae
before of~iai~,].ly applying for admieeion to tha organ3,zation. Aoaording
to the former president of the Tunieian Ae~embly and one of the baron~
(tod~y eomeaha~ forg~otteri) of the De~tour Regime~ th3e we?s the oandition
" impoged by Franoe and e?ooepted by Bourguiba .for the granting of independenoe.
Moreover, Edg~r Faure, then French prime minieter, ueed thig argument to
conv3noa the Frenah deputie~ of Deg~our'e good intentiong torrard the Weet.
8ut as soon ae Tunieia wae admitted, it diatinguished iteelf far more by
ite syetema~io obetruation than by ite ~upport of the com~on aaus~e oF
n~?tional libere~tion. At that time, Bourguiba ge,ve the aampai~ againdt
what he aalled ~'Ns~eer'~ heg~mor~y" over the Arab world top priority in hie
diplomatio poliay.
M Attentive Ear
- The Bourguiba Regime was at its peak. It autome~tioally identified iteelf
r+ith the Weat againet the "dog~atiem of the baakward Arabe." Thie was the -
- era when, abandoning Ia Mar$a, Bourguibe deaieively choso to reside in
CartYsage in order to alearly mark the digtanae that ahould eepe.rate "his"
Tuniaia from the "baokward mul.titudes of Maehreak."
People no long~er bothered to oouat Tuniaian snits with the Arab League.
When it xaa not buey absenting itBelf from meetinga, ~niaia moet ~often
added its voiae to thoee of the organization~e reaationaiy faation~
Through God only lmowe rrhat cruel irony of history, it was the diplomat
who most dietinguiehed hi.maelf in thie role of apoilsport Bourguiba had
asei~ed to him who aha,ired the six-man aommiseion reaponsible for seeing
to the Arab League'a move to 'ltinis~ We are referring to Mr Taieb Sahbani,
the current secretaiy g~eneral of the Minietry of F~Sreign Affaire.
If we now look at the matter from the staadpoint of the Arab cauae, the
factor that has done the most to mobilize the league throughout ite 30 yeare
of existenae, we find a perfect illustre?tion of what Tunieis'e Arab policy
xas and atill ia~
In a aecret letter to Nahum Goldmann, Bourguiba rrrotes "Paleetine does not
intereat Tunieia, What aoncerne ua is the cnmimuaist dang~er and the vagariea
of Arab nationalism, Iarael constitutes no dang+er for us." Iater~ ev~ery
time he felt it necessary, he tuned hie violin to Western diplomaoys the
United States and the EEC in the region. And when the EEC differed aith
~ American plane for controlling the situation, Baurguiba differed with the
~ EEC. so ~n ~974, ~~8'~ba, Nouira, Chatty sud Sayah one after aaother
counseled a PLO dalegation to directly aontact the Americaas rather than to
address themselves to the EEC, "ahich will be oF no help to you." ~?us
- during each phage of the America~Zioniet plot, Waehiiigton found aa attentive
- ear in Bourguiba.
FOR OFFICIAY. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
FOR O~~ICIAL US~ ONLY
The defeatiet trend tha~ t~de~r threatene the Ara,b world did not oome into -
being with 3edat. Bourguibr~ hae been the initiatox einoe 1965 when, in his
Nell-known epeeohee of ead memary on Jordan and LEibanon~ he appualed to the '
Paleetinian maesea to eurrender, to e?oaep~ the 19a8 partition plan.
Likewige, Ieraeli-Arab oontaote do not go baok ~o D~yen'e viait ~o Rabat in
19?7. Ten yeare easlier, in 1967, Hourguiba, met with Baron E~dn??ond de
Ro~heobild in S'witzerlaad before turning t.he reins of government over to
hia miniater of foreign affaire (today in diagraoe), Mohammed Maemoudi. On
trro oaoas3one the latter eearetly met with Ieraeli offiaialas in Wieebaden -
- (FRG) in 1q71 and in Athena in 19?2.
After 1970~ Masmoudi wae ~n faat the promoter of a"'11~nisian Arab poliay'~
~et in a frame~tork of 3audi hegemo~y c~ver the Mid.dle East and in Afrioa.
Hie flair for businese direated him toward the petrodollar aountriee. He
turned thie into s poliay. He wae even in the pay of a wing of t.he Pales- -
tinian reaiataaoe organizetion, whioh he aleverly used to endow himeelf
- witli aredibility. -
And so it ie thie aountry~ '1luniaia, aad under the Destour Reg~me~ that the
Arab League will henaeforth be looated in~ Tbere can be no doubt that the
influence of Tuaieian diplomaoy on the or$anization's f~ture orientationa
vill be immenae, We are r~?illing to bet thst one of ita top prioritiee w3.11,
inaofar ae ie poeaible, be to limit the dt~mag+e oaused lry Egypt's eoanomia
enoirolement, whioh wae deaided on in Ba~dad. 'D~is xill be in the nature _
of things becauee the United 8tatee is already threatentng to do eo. rlnd
caa the Destour Regime and the 1lmerican Government retlise to perform favora
~ for one another?
_I
* In connection rrith this, aee the details provided by Tunieian natia~al -
opposition leader, Mr Ibrahim Tobal, in hie book~ "'1'he Fatl of the _
Eourguibe? Regime," publiehed in Arabia.
COPYRIGHTt 19?9 Afrique-Aefe
11,466
CSO: 4400
~
~+8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
FOR OFFICI.AL USE ONLY
- Toxxsx~
rr~w raLSm~s x~~n o~r
Paris AFRSqDE-ASIE in Frenoh 14-22 May 79 P 44 =
[Tert] .In the country of ~'dialogu~e ar?d oollabore~tiaon~" of '~soaial peaae
aad ~oie de vivre," a new "demoaratio" inatitutioal hae ~uet oome into being.
An employere militia will ueeflilly aomplement the politioal mil3tia,
directly adminiatered by PSD [Deatourian Sooialiet Partyr] director Mohammed
_ Sayah and the Watahmen~s Corpe at the uni.veraity iri order to me~inta.in order.*
The members of this new militia, dubbed "aompaqy watohmen," who will wear
an unusual uniform "remini~aent of those worn by Ameriaau poliaemen;" writee
a Tunisian new~paper as na,i.vely aa you please, will be reaavited from the
Armar, the National Guasd or the polioe. Trained in the uae of weapons and
organized.3nto brigades under ~the oom~aad of a chief who must be a no~com
in ~he Armar, the National Guard or the police, they will of aouree be ahosen
- by the heads of th~~ National Security Police~ 'I'his will guaraatee prof~e-
sional management, leaving administration to the firme involved. (In ~)lain -
languege, they will be responeible to the police without reaeiving their -
pay from the latter,)
It is intereating to note that thie new militia rras areated in the walte of :
- a aircular feaue3 by Prime Mtnister Hedi Nauira as we lmow, a maa who
favors diaa.ogue - dated 13 Februaxy 1978, A~qy connection with the 26 Janu-
ary maseacres of that year is purely fnrtuitaus, Another rray of aelebrating
- the workers' First of May.
- * In a communique published on the oacaeion of the First of May, the I~ITP
[People's IInity M~vement] vig^orouely denounced this new attaak on labor
union ri~ts and particularly on the right to strike.
- COPYRIGHTs 1979 ~rique-Asie _
11,466
Cso: 4400
~9
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
. . �
. �
~ � : I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
~o~ nrrrciar, us~ o~.Y
~tsL?
xurrc~ s~nc~ ~r pors~tr.~ ~xzsox~s a~a~~
Parie e~Q~-asiE in Franah 14-22 t~ay 79 p 44
[Text] ~he De~tour Government thou~t thsy vere submiseive and resigned
to their fe?te. Buti nox "the forg~otten anee ot 8ord~ et~toumi " who have
been r~tttng in Aourguiba~e ~a,ile !or aver 10 yearo, ~ve bro~Cen the v411
of etlencs behind whi.ch the 'l~ni.rl.an C~vernmeat va~ated ~0 lceep thsm.
Noureddine Ben I~hedder, Gilbert Naacaahe, Ahm~cl. Een Othma~n~ ~bd4l,lah Souiesi,
Moham~ed Salah Fliee aad Baahed Hellalour~a have g+o~e an a hung~er etrike to
. remind the peoplo of ~ia~ieia aad the world o! the oiraumrtancer of their -
arre~ts and convictione. ~hese aotiviets are serving lo~ng prison ssatencee
for having exeraieed the ri~t of t'reedom of e~cpreeeion Artiole 8 of t}1e
1959 ~nieiau Conetitution raao~i~;ee.
Thie hunger strike marks the fffth annivereary of the z~evooaticn of the
preeidentisl decree that pardoued them vhich, ss Mr Pstrialc Bau~douia
etated at a preee aonferenae held by the Iaternaticoal F+ederation ot the
- Rigfite of Maa on 24 April, ca~setitute~ "an ama~ing aad unheard of proa~dure
for the ti+it.hdraval of a pas~doa,
~ We lanow that torture is c~urrently practiaed ia 'Rmieie? and that it has beea
applied to hundreds of oppouenta [of the regime] these past fev yeare,
Uafoai gativists Ho~uoine el~ouki aad Said el-Guagui died of it. Dut ~when
we read Ahmed Ben Othmsa~s testimor~r (see pag+e 56).+? ve can only oaae ag~a,in
vomit a~ the thou~t of a regiae that has turned rspreaeiom, torture aad
arbitraxy ~udgment into a eyste~a of gnvernmeat.
* Ahmed Ben Othmatt~s ao~plet~: testimat~q hae beea publiehed ia the Lpril
iesue of the reviev IES ~'~'S MOD~NSS,
OOPYBIGHTs 1979 Afi!que--esie
11,466
CSO: 4400
50
FOR OPPICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
_
- ~OIt 0~1~2CiAi. U5~ ONLY
TI~IIBIA
PRISONEEt GIVEB TESTIMONY ON TO~tTURE
Parie eFR~p1l~-AB~ in Frenah 14-22 1~ay 79 pp 56, 57
Te~ct] In Hourguiba~s 'l~aisia, Hedi ~Touira did not want holders of degrees
rom the Univereitier of Viacennee or ~an~erre. ge preferre~: tho~e with
degrnes i~n tortwce, earaed in his police eta~io~, And ~rith "talen~," ag _
one of their viatime, Ahn?ed Bea Othman~ in prieon eince 1972, test~fiest
"They dragg+ed me into ths tortua~e ahamber. 'Disy tore my alothee to ehreds
atid, naked, they tied mpr haads tog+ether. ~ey ehaved s lo~g iron rod be-
trreen ~pr hande thue tied aad betireen ~r lmeee end arme, thai suepending
me betxeen txo tables with mpr head hanging dorm, 'l~en blove delivered vith
horse whipe, alube and rubber hoeea raluod down on me, all over mpr boc~y~ _
but most often on the eolee of mpr feet. Frnnt time time~ they vet do~rn nry
woundB, oae of them letting water drip on them drop by drop, fihe others
beating me oue after eriother atid still aaother caunting the blotre sloud.
An old aaquaintauce, a dirty cop, Kedt Kaseem~ bragg+ed to hie aolleagueet
'I gave him 500 bloxs at one atretah and he didn~t cry once,'
"Onoe T had paeeed out aad the solea of apr feet ha,d no feeliag left in thera,
they took me doMm fram mpr perch, untied me and foroed me to drag myself
alaalg on ~r feet. To do so, they grabbed my penis es~d farced me to run by
pulliag on it with all their might, '8~en, once I xas up~ they at~a~rted all
over agains perch, blrnre, water drop by drop on the eolee of the feet, oa
ny bleeding wounde, on m~y eyelids aad noee to keep m~ from breathiag aad
caalceatrating on ~r sufferiug, More paeaiag out, buckete of icy vater in _
the face, ether to revive me, ~hen the head of the torture team that wae i
working me over, Abdelkader Tabka, sent for a ame~11 pa,ir of pliers and
started to tear out ahreds of bloo~y flesh %rom betveea ay fing~ere, noy nails,
the tender tips of mp~ toes. The blood t'loxed and he pour~ed ether aad
alcohol over ~r xounda to try to g~et me to s~ream. Someoae elae poured
_ alcohol over a~r pubia hair aad testicles aad eet fire to ~hem. It took -
monthe for the bums to heal aud the scare are still very cleeucly there
and as.ll be there for the rest of m~y life,
"Eignt houra of thie hell ti+ithout a break, Finally, they couldn't revive
me, So they dragged me into sa empty rnom aa~d shackled ms Wi.th heavy
che.ins to ri,ngs arichored in the xal].. Zhey left me there for 2 daye, during
- xhich time I retl~eed ta eat or apeak to them,"
CoPY~I~aT: ~979 e~erique-esie
11466 51
CSO: 44C0 FOR OFPICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
- FOR Ot?I?tCIAt. USE OM.Y ~ -
UNYTLb A~Ag LM~RAT~5
ttt)L~tt 0~ AL-SHAttIQN{ INT~RVIBWED ON REC~NT EV~N'fS
Peri~ AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 20-26 Apr 79 pp 30-31
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI int~rview with Sh~ykh 5ultan ibn Muhammed al-Qaeimi:
"Unity Nepded To Face Persian G;~lf Crieie"j
(TextJ Thig AL~~IArAN AL-ARABI'e secoad int~rview in 4 monthe with 3h~ykh
Sultan ibn Muhamm~d gl-Qagimi, ruler of al-Shariqah, one of the eeven pearle
of the United Arab Emirgte~. Th~re are geveral reasone for a gecond inter-
vi~w with 5haykh Su1Can~ but the leaditi?g one ia related to the rapid
developments thgt have taken place and continue to take place in the Arab
world and the Culf region in the wake of Che ~gyptian-Iexael peace treaty
and the B~ghdad conference. The significance of the interview with Shaykh
5ultan rests on the fact th~t, ae ueual, he is capable of reconciling hie
role as a ruler with hig feelings eg a citizen, aware of the danger that
threatens hie naCion and its aecurity at thia decieive ~uncture in ite
hietory.
(Question) There has been much talk lately about difference of opinion
among the rulera of the UAL. Can you give ug g clearer picture of vhat ir ,
happening?
[Answer] There are no differencea of opinion. All of ua are in agreement
that at this decisive, hiatoric juncture we need unity, not only in the
UAE but in the Gulf region and throughout the Arab world. This region has
a direct influence on th~e vorld's economy. It aupplies 60 percent of the
world's oil needs, and the demand for oil is increa~ing. In 1982-1983
- Russia Will experience a critical need for oi1. Purthermore, there is
increasing competition over oil among tr.e Western companies. {ihether we
Wish it or not, an international conflict over oil ~rill soon develop, and
s+e might ~ust become the victims of that conflict. An American official
was aeked wheCher the UniCed States arould intervene militarily in the
event of an oil stoppage or an unstable aituation that might threaten the
oil supply. His reaponse was that individual Europeans (eic] i+ill fight.
The im~.lication is that the West depends eatirely on thia oil, aad that
oil has become a matter of life and death for it. From this it is easy
to aee that this region must depend on itself. It must pull together
and set aside personal and regional dteputes. Thoae clamoring for uaity
in the UAE are fully aWare of the potential dangers. Thrones and governments
52
FOR OPFICIkL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
~Oit U~~'ICLAL US~ ONLY
~re ~~llap~ing gnd ehgnging ~round u~, but w~ gre dbliviou~ td whar ig egking
p1~~~ ~rt~und ug~ Th~ fgct i~ ehgC eh~ G~1f regint~ i~ in che eye di thp br~wing
gtarm. During th~ p~~e f~w y~grg of ies ~xiae~nee the UA~ ha~ gu~ceggfully
we~ther~d g number of crig~a C~pabie df de~troyin~ eh~ unidn. W~ hgv~
~urr~nd~r~d th~ h~1m nf th~ ~hip df ee~te to ~ wig~ ~nd cap~bl~ man. In
. r~ap~nge eo ydar que~tian, eh~r~forp, eh~re ig n~ r~~on eo worry about th~
UA~.
~Qu~gtion~ You app~~r to bp optimi~ti~, but wh~t ~bout thp fueura of the UA~?
(Angwprj It ig ~n obg~rv~b1~ fact thgt th~ UAL en~dyg denwcr~cy ~nd fr~pdom.
The peupl~ ~nd the gdv~rnm~ne are in direct touch with ~gch nthPr. There is
no g~p. Much of the government bu~ine~~ is common knoWledg~a to the citizenry.
The UA~ hag ite own foreign policy~ nne that ig sdmired throughout Che Arab _
world and internationally. I.aeely~ there have be~n demands Co consolidatQ
eh~ governm~nt's nervice~. Some of the~e demgnde vent to the extent of
ingi~ting on compl~te unity--a goal degired by all. Cod ~ailling, thp UA~
will snon b~~om~ on~ n~Cton. The artificial bound~riee drawn by the r?gtion'e
ett~mie~ wil~ digappear. Domestic policieg wi11 be unified, and Che people
Wi11 hav~ freedom and security.
(Quegrion~ A1-Sh~riqah ia becoming noted for its many beautiful buildinge, -
refl~~ting the Ar~bia arch3t~ctural heritage. There is also ~~n emphasis
on the cnn~truction of touriat facilities. Would you care to comment?
(Answer] The building boum in al-Shariqah ia not the Work of one individual;
everyone hae conCributed. New conetruction we~s so rapid that it outetripped
the capacity to supply servicea--something we had never expecCed. Th~e most
fundameneal requirement for al-Shariqah is that everyone work for unity and
set aside all parochial considerationa. This spirit must be demonstrated
not only as a sentiment but must be tranalated into action. Thie eame spirit
must also permeate our actions and policies. We are Eastern Araba and
this must be reflected in the architeceure of this city. I believe that you
agree with me that al-Shariqah strikes one ae an Arab city. We plan to build
more public squares and gardens and will aoon initiate a cleanlinesa campaign.
We then moved from internal UAE concerna to the central point of the inter-
vipw, namely, the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.
[Questionj How do you asseae the situation in the Arab world folloaing the
signing of the peace treaty and the establishment of an alliance Wtth Israel?
[Answe~; The peace treaty was not signed recently: It was signed in 1973
at Kilometer 101 in the Sinai desert when Bgypt and Israel endorsed the firsC
disengagement agre~nent. That Was the first danger signal which went
ignored by all the Arab countries. The peace treaty Was in Kissinger's hand
while he shuttled between Cairo and Jerusalem. The peace treaty was signed
in those days; what took place recently [the signing] was merely an after-
the-fact theatrical production. What we muat do now is to forget the treaty
and search our Arab soul to find answers to what went Wrong. The land of
53
FOk OFFICIl1L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100064443-7
~Ott U~~ICIAL US~ ONLY
ehie ngtion h~~ b~pn ~~eupi~d for n~grly 30 y~~r~ nnw. AC firge, we blemed -
Ch~ ~nldnix~rg. I.~t~r un we 3u~Cifi~d nur ghorCcdming~ by bl~ning Che
reeidugl ~ffect~ di the Colonigli~t ~rg. Whgt r~n w~ blgme n~w7
Thp c~th~r po3nt i wi~h Co empha~ize i~ ChBE, in the past~ we dealt with eh~
P~?1~~Cintgn probl~m gg though it werp th~ probl~m of th~ paleeCini~ng nn1y.
Yes, Palestine geve th~ Jew~ ~nd Zioni~t~ ~n apportunity ro Cr~gte ~ gtgte
gnd a Zioni~t pres~nce. But when th~t gtat~ w~~ b~ing plgnned~ it wge n~t
d~gigned wiCh ~ gp~cifi~ map in mind. Ther~ were no cl~arly mark~d bnund~rte~
on thgt mgp. Prom the mom~nC ~f ies birCh, the zinniet gtgt~ began to
expgnd. Today, it occupieg th~ terriCories of Argb countrie~. Th~ prnblem,
th~n, ig not regtricted to P~lestine; Che ~hol~ Argb ~.-orld ig in dgnger.
The problem ig the problem of g11 the Arabe. In gddition Co the territoriel
nature of Che conflict, I beli~ve it hae another, more eerinue aepecCt Ie
is g cultural conflict whoae a~m i~ to ch~nge the map ~nd~charact~r of thig
r~gion~ not in rhe next yegr nr twn, but in Che next 10 or 100 yearg. It
is imp~rntive, Cherfor~, that we give the fuCure geneYgtion~ a truly Arab
upbringing if we arp td pregerve the Argb identify nf this region and reetnre
our conquered tprritories. The firgt ~tep in thie direc:tion i~ for each
one of u~eo ask: Whar have I done for the Argb cause? Ttie ~ngr,~r may be
this or that or poaeibly nothing. IC is here thaC we must begin. Every
Areb t?ge an obligation to contribute. To be truly a part of thig nation one
mu~C serve it faithfully with all hi~ capacitiee. Thie must be the guiding
principle of our actions. True memberehip in thie nation demande that each
of us contribute to solving ite problems.
[QuestionJ What ie your asgesament of the most recent Baghdad conference
and the punitive political and economic measuree teken egainat the Egyptian
government?
[Answerj The conference and the unanimous agreement that resulted from it
are a good thing. America's aim is to undermine the Arab solidari!:y _
manifested at the conference. As Arab states, we must recognize that we
face a probl~sn of destiny, one that has been with us for over 30 years.
Our solidarity must not be a transient one; it must continue and grow in
the coming years.
[QuestionJ How do you assess the situation in the Arab Gulf region following _
the creaCion of an Islamic republic in Iran?
(AnswerJ The establietmient of an Islamic republic in Iran is the most
important, historic event in this region. We could say that history has
- been speeded up by tens of years. The Islamic republic came as a response
to popular demand; therefore, we wish it well. As neighbors to Iran in
this region, we are affected directly by the new republic. Iran borders
both the Soviet Union and Afganistan and will serve as a protective shield
to the Gulf region in the future. We, who live on Che other side of Che
Gulf, must unite and be ready to face whatever changes and exigencies that
might develop. We must be vigilant to foil any attempt to split our ranks.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
9063
CSO: 4802 ~
5~+
FOR OFFICIl,L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060043-7